CELEDONIO QUILBAN, ROMUALDO
DALAGAN, FORTUNATO RAMIREZ
AMADOR ALARCON and LUIS
AGAWAN, complainant,
vs. ATTY. SANTIAGO R.
ROBINOL, respondent.
A.M. No. 2180 April 10, 1989
ATTY. SANTIAGO R.
ROBINOL, complainant,
vs. ATTY. A. R.
MONTEMAYOR, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Subjected to frustrations were the dreams
of thirty-two (32) squatter families to own
the land of approximately 50 square
meters each on which their respective
homes were built. To vindicate their rights
they have aired their plight before this
Court. Thwarted, too, was the benevolence
shown by the original owner of the land
which parted with its property at a
giveaway price thinking that it was
accommodating the landless squatters.
The antecedent facts follow:
The Colegio de San Jose, a Jesuit
corporation, (Colegio, for short) used to
own a parcel of land at the Seminary Road,
Barrio Bathala, Quezon City. Through its
administrator, Father Federico Escaler, it
sold said land to the Quezon City
Government as the site for the Quezon City
General Hospital but reserved an area of
2,743 square meters as a possible
development site. Squatters, however,
settled in the area since 1965 or 1966.
Sometime in 1970, the Colegio, through
Father Escaler gave permission to
Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the
reserved site a house for his residence and
a training center for the Christian Social
Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of
squatters, Congressman Taruc broached to
Father Escaler the Idea of donating or
selling the land cheap to the squatters.
Congressman Taruc then advised the
squatters to form an organization and
choose a leader authorized to negotiate
with Father Escaler. Following that advice,
the squatters formed the "Samahang
Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala" (Samahan,
for brevity), with Bernabe Martin as
President (Exhibit "24", Robinol), who was
entrusted with the task of negotiating on
their behalf for the sale of the land to
them.
But instead of working for the welfare of
the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo
Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived
to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the
other Samahan members. On 28 March
1971, the land was ultimately sold to
Rivera at P 15 per square meter or a total
consideration of P 41,961.65. The
prevailing price of the land in the vicinity
then was P 100 to P 120 per square meter.
It was evident that Father Escaler had been
made to believe that Rivera represented
the squatters on the property. On the same
date, 28 March 1971, Rivera obtained TCT
No. 175662 to the property in his name
alone.
In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the
Samahan filed Civil Case No. Q-16433,
Branch IV, Quezon City, entitled "Celedonio
Quilban, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Maximo
Rivera, et al., Defendants." with the
principal prayer that said defendants be
ordered to execute a deed of conveyance
in favor of said plaintiffs after
reimbursement by the latter of the
corresponding amount paid by Rivera to
the Colegio. The Court of First Instance of
Quezon City, however, dismissed the case.
To prosecute the appeal before the Court of
Appeals, the Samahan members hired as
their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for
which the latter was paid P 2,000.00 as
attorney's fees on 8 October 1975 (Exhibit
"I"). Atty. Robinol was also to be given by
the members a part of the land, subject
matter of the case, equal to the portion
that would pertain to each of them. What
was initially a verbal commitment on the
land sharing was confirmed in writing on
10 March 1979 (Exhibit "2").
On 14 November 1978, the Court of
Appeals reversed the CFI Decision by:
(1) ordering defendant Maximo Rivera and
all his co-defendants to execute a deed of
conveyance of the land in question in favor
of herein plaintiffs after the payment of the
corresponding amount paid by the
defendants to the Colegio de San Jose, Inc.,
and in case of refusal or failure on their
part to do so, ordering the Clerk of Court to
execute the same in favor of plaintiffs and
declaring TCT No. 175662 (Annex E) null
and void and ordering the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City to cancel said
certificate and issue a new one in lieu
thereof in the name of plaintiffs-appellants,
upon presentation of the deed of
conveyance to be executed in favor of
appellants and (2) ordering appellees
jointly and severally to pay appellants the
sum of P 2,000.00 as attomey's fees, plus
costs." (p. 30, Report and
Recommendation)
To raise the amount of P 41,961.65 ordered
paid by the Court of Appeals, plus
expenses for ejectment of the non-
plaintiffs occupying the property,
conveyance, documentation, transfer of
title etc., the five officers of the Samahan
collected, little by little, P 2,500.00 from
each head of family. The Treasurer, Luis
Agawan, issued the proper receipts
prepared by Atty. Robinol. On 18 May 1979,
the sum of P 68,970.00 was turned over to
Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May
1979 the amounts of P l,030.00 and P
2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979,
the sum of P 2,500.00, or a total of P
75,000.00.
After almost a year, the five officers
discovered that no payment had been
made to Rivera. When queried, Atty.
Robinol replied that there was an
intervention filed in the civil case and that
a Writ of Execution had not yet been
issued by the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City. However, it turned out that
the motion for intervention had already
been dismissed. After confronting Atty.
Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other
excuses, which the officers discovered to
have no basis at all.
On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs
arrived at a "first consensus" to change
their counsel, Atty. Robinol (Exhibit "3").
The officers of the Samahan thereafter
approached Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor,
who agreed to be their counsel, after he
was shown the document of 6 March 1980
containing the consensus of the Samahan
members to change Atty. Robinol as their
lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice,
the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter dated
17 March 1980 informing the latter of their
decision to terminate his services and
demanding the return of the P 75,000.00
deposited with him (Exhibit "5"). Atty.
Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A
subsequent letter of the same tenor, dated
31 March 1980 (Exhibit "6"), was similarly
disregarded by Atty. Robinol.
On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor
formally entered his appearance in Civil
Case No. Q-16433 as counsel for the
plaintiffs (Exhibit "8"), vice Atty. Robinol, on
the strength of the authority dated 18
March 1980 given him by plaintiffs in said
civil case through the five officers (Exhibit
"9"). Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20
March 1980 a Motion for Execution praying
that the defendants and/or the Clerk of
Court be directed to execute a deed of
conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs
(Exhibit "10"). At the hearing of the Motion
for Execution on 5 June 1980, Atty. Robinol
manifested that he had no objection to the
appearance of and his substitution by Atty.
Montemayor (Exhibits "11" & "11-A").
Because Atty. Robinol, however, still
questioned the first consensus dated 6
March 1980, another document labelled
the "second consensus" (Exhibit "E") was
signed by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting
held for the purpose on 24 November 1980
to the effect that they had decided to
change Atty. Robinol as their counsel
because he had delayed paying for their
land notwithstanding the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in their favor.
Administrative Case No. 2144
On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers
filed this Administrative Complaint before
this Court requesting the invention of Atty.
Robinol for refusal to return the P
75,000.00 and praying that the Court
exercise its power of discipline over
members of the Bar unworthy to practice
law. The details of their Complaint were
embodied in their Joint Affidavit executed
on 14 April 1980 describing what had
transpired between them and Atty. Robinol.
In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that
he was hired by Complainants to appeal
their case to the Court of appeals after
they had lost in the lower Court; that their
agreement as to attomey's fees was on a
contingent basis if he obtains a reversal of
the lower Court Decision, they wig give
him a portion of the property subject
matter of the litigation equal to the portion
that will pertain to each of the 32 plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. Q-16433; that he did not
receive P 70,000.00 from Complainants on
18 May 1979 but only P 56,470.00; that he
prepared and signed the receipt dated 18
May 1979 showing that he received P
70,000.00 only to save complainants from
embarrassment and shame should their
co-plaintiff ask for proof that they
(Complainants) have paid their shares,
which they have not; that the correct
amount in his possession is only P
62,470.00-it would really be P 75,000.00
had the five Complainants paid their
shares in the amount of P 12,500.00 at P
2,500.00 each and one Fortunate Ramirez
paid his balance of P 30.00; that he had
the right to hold the money in his
possession as guarantee for the payment
of his attomey's fees of get a portion of the
property that win pertain to each of the
plaintiffs, he wants his portion converted to
cash, and the cash equivalent of his
portion is P 50,000.00 (2,743 square
meters divided by 32 plaintiffs equals 85
square meters for each plaintiff, multiplied
by P 500.00 up per square meter); that
considering that P 50,000.00 is even less
than one-half (1/ 2) per cent of the total
value of the property, which is more than a
million pesos, such amount is not
unreasonable; that he is ready to give back
the amount of P 12,470.00, representing
the difference between P 50,000.00 and
the amount of P 62,470.00 in his
possession; that complainants cannot
make this Court a collection agency and
that while this Court has the exclusive
disciplinary power over members of the
Bar, it is equally true that the Court cannot
pass judgment on Complainants' plea that
the amount deposited by respondent be
returned to them as this prayer should be
ventilated in an ordinary action; that he
does not have the slightest intention to
appropriate the money in his possession (P
62,470.00) for himself, but he is holding it
until his attomey's fees are satisfied there
being no guarantee for its satisfaction
because of Complainants' adamant refusal
to pay him; that there was no previous
notice to him of his discharge; and that
Atty. Montemayor accepted the case
without his Robinols formal withdrawal and
conformity.
Administrative Case No. 2180
Pursuing that tack on 29 July 1980, Atty.
Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment
against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for
alleged gross unethical conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty.
Montemayor readily accepted the case
without his Robinols formal withdrawal and
conformity and knowing fully well that
there was no consensus of all the plaintiffs
to discharge him as their counsel.
For his part, Atty. Montemayor denied that
the attomey's fees agreed upon by
plaintiffs and Atty. obinol were purely on a
contingent basis, the truth being that the
attomey's fees were payable on a cash
basis of P 2,000.00 retainer fee, as
evidenced by the receipt signed by Atty.
Robinol (Annex "I"), plus whatever amount
is adjudicated as attomey's fees by the
Court of Appeals; that the contingent fee
referred to by Atty. Robinol was the result
of his insistent demand after the Court of
Appeals Decision in Civil Case No. Q-16433
was already final, as shown by the date of
the agreement (Annex "2"); that twenty
[20] out of thirty-two [32] members of the
Samahan signed the agreement to
discharge Atty. Robinol and hire a
substitute counsel as shown by Annex "3",
which is a majority of the membership and,
therefore, a valid consensus; that he
agreed to act as counsel if only to arrest
the growing belief of the Samahan that
most members of the Philippine Bar are
unprincipled; that although there was no
formal Motion for substitution, there was
substantial compliance with Sec. 26, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, as shown by the
formal entry of appearance in Civil Case
No. Q-1 6433 (Annex "8"), the written
consent of the clients (Annex "9"), notice
to Atty. Robinol of his discharge and
substitution (Annexes "10' and "11"), non-
objection by Robinol of his appearance as
counsel (Annex "l 2"), and implied consent
of the Court to the substitution as shown
by its Order of 29 May 1980 (Annex "l 3");
that his professional and personal
actuations as counsel for the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. Q-16433, CFI-Quezon City,
do not cause dishonor either to himself or
to the Philippine Bar; and that the
Complaint against him should be
dismissed.
On 1 September 1980 and on 17
December 1980, the Court referred Adm.
Case No. 2144 and Adm. Case No. 2180,
respectively, to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and
recommendation. On 15 December 1988,
the Solicitor General submitted his
compliance and recommended:
1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be
suspended for three months for refusing to
deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his
possession, with the warning that a more
severe penalty will be imposed for a
repetition of the same or similar act, and
that he be ordered to return to the
plaintiffs, through the complainants in
Adm. Case No. 2134, the sum of P
75,000.00.
2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R.
Montemayor, Adm. Case No. 2180, be
dismissed, since he has not committed any
misconduct imputed to him by Atty.
Robinol. (pp. 59-60, Rollo)
Except for the disciplinary sanction
suggested for Atty. Robinol, we concur with
the recommendations.
Re: Atty. Santiago R. Robinol
Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of
ethical infractions and grave misconduct
that make him unworthy to continue in the
practice of the profession. After the Court
of Appeals had rendered a Decision
favorable to his clients and he had
received the latter's funds, suddenly, he
had a change of mind and decided to
convert the payment of his fees from a
portion of land equivalent to that of each
of the plaintiffs to P 50,000.00, which he
alleges to be the monetary value of that
area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right
to unilaterally appropriate his clients'
money not only because he is bound by a
written agreement but also because, under
the circumstances, it was highly unjust for
him to have done so. His clients were mere
squatters who could barely eke out an
existence They had painstakingly raised
their respective quotas of P 2,500.00 per
family with which to pay for the land only
to be deprived of the same by one who,
after having seen the color of money, heart
lessly took advantage of them.
Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that
since he was unjustly dismissed by his
clients he had the legal right to retain the
money in his possession. Firstly, there was
justifiable ground for his discharge as
counsel. His clients had lost confidence in
him for he had obviously engaged in
dilatory tactics to the detriment of their
interests, which he was duty-bound to
protect. Secondly, even if there were no
valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right
to retain his clients' funds intended for a
specific purpose the purchase of land. He
stands obliged to return the money
immediately to their rightful owners.
The principle of quantum meruit applies if
a lawyer is employed without a price
agreed upon for his services in which case
he would be entitled to receive what he
merits for his services, as much as he has
earned. In this case, however, there was
an express contract and a stipulated mode
of compensation. The implied assumpsit
on quantum meruit therefore, is
inapplicable.
But Atty. Robinol seeks to impress upon the
Court that he had received only the sum of
P 62,470.00 and not P 75,000.00 claiming
that five (5) officers of the Samahan had
not yet paid their shares to P 12,500.00.
We agree with the Solicitor General that
complainants' evidence on this score is the
more credible and that he had, in fact,
received the total sum of P 75,000.00
inclusive of the share of P 12,500.00 of the
five (5) officers of the Somalian For, in the
pleadings filed by Atty. Robinol himself in
the civil case below, namely, the Motion for
Execution on 5 June 1979; the Motion for
Postponement on 31 August 1979; and the
Motion to Set Hearing of Motion for
Execution on 10 March 1980, he made
mention of seven (7) persons, who, as of
that time, had not yet submitted their
corresponding shares which list, however,
did not include any of the five (5) officers
of the Samahan.
Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that
Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to
continue in the practice of law. He has not
only violated his oath not to delay any man
for money and to conduct himself with all
good fidelity to his clients. He has also
brought the profession into disrepute with
people who had reposed in it full faith and
reliance for the fulfillment of a life-time
ambition to acquire a homelot they could
call their own.
Re: Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor
In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned,
we agree with the findings of the Solicitor
General that he has not exposed himself to
any plausible charge of unethical conduct
in the exercise of his profession when he
agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. Q-16433.
Of the thirty-two (32) plaintiffs in said civil
case, twenty-one (21) had signed the first
consensus of 6 March 1980 expressing
their resolve to change their lawyer. In as
much as Atty. Robinol sought to exclude
seven (7) of the plaintiffs (out of 32) for
non-payment of their shares, only twenty
five (25) of them should be considered in
determining the majority. Consequently,
twenty-one (21) out of twenty-five (25) is
sufficient to make the said consensus
binding. It is more than a simple majority.
Moreover, the following developments
estop Atty. Robinol from questioning his
discharge as counsel: On 17 March 1980
he was informed in writing by plaintiffs of
the termination of his services (Exhibit
"5"). That was followed by another letter of
31 March 1980 of the same tenor (Exhibit
"6"). In his Memorandum of 12 December
1985 and during the proceedings before
the lower Court on 5 June 1980 he had
stated that he had no objection to Atty.
Montemayor's appearance in Civil Case Q-
16433. When the latter did enter his
appearance, therefore, on 20 March 1980
it was only after assuring himself that Atty.
Robinol's services had been formally
terminated. He had in no way encroached
upon the professional employment of a
colleague.
There is no gainsaying that clients are free
to change their counsel in a pending case
at any time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of
Court) and thereafter employ another
lawyer who may then enter his
appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in
the civil suit below decided to change their
lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and
confidence. That act was well within their
prerogative.
In so far as the complaint for disbarment
filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty.
Montemayor is concerned, therefore, we
find the same absolutely without merit.
ACCORDINGLY, 1) In Administrative Case
No. 2144, Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is
hereby DISBARRED for having violated his
lawyer's oath to delay no man for money,
broken the fiduciary relation between
lawyer and client, and proven himself
unworthy to continue in the practice of law.
By reason of his unethical actuations, he is
hereby declared to have forfeited his rights
to attomey's fees and is ordered to return
the amount of P 75,000.00 to the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. Q-16433 through the
complainant in the aforementioned
Administrative Case.
2) Administrative Case No. 2180 against
Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for
disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in
the respective personal records of Attys.
Santiago R. Robinol and Anacleto R.
Montemayor.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
RUBY MAE BARNACHEA, complainant,
vs. ATTY. EDWIN T.
QUIOCHO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On January 3, 2002, Ruby Mae
Barnachea filed a verified complaint for
breach of lawyer-client relations against
respondent Atty. Edwin T. Quiocho.
It appears that respondent had not
been in the private practice of the law for
quite some time. However, in September
2001, he decided to revive his legal
practice with some
associates. Complainant engaged the legal
services of respondent for the latter to
cause the transfer under her name of the
title over a property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 334411 previously
owned by her sister, Lutgarda Amor D.
Barnachea. The latter sold said property to
complainant under an unnotarized deed of
absolute sale. Complainant drew and
issued BPI Family Bank Check No. 0052304
in the amount of P11,280.00 and BPI
Family Bank Check No. 0052305 in the
amount of P30,000.00, both dated
September 5, 2001, or the total amount
of P41,280.00 for the expenses for said
transfer and in payment for respondents
legal services. Respondent enchased the
checks.
However, despite the lapse of almost
two months, respondent failed to secure
title over the property in favor of
complainant. The latter demanded that
respondent refund to her the amount
of P41,280.00 and return the documents
which she earlier entrusted to
him. However, respondent failed to comply
with said demands. On November 1, 2001,
complainant received a letter from
respondent informing her that he had
failed to cause the transfer of the property
under her name and that he was returning
the documents and title she had entrusted
to him and refunding to her the amount
of P41,280.00 through his personal check
No. DIL 0317787. Said check was drawn
against his account with the Bank of
Commerce (Diliman Branch) in the amount
of P41,280.00 and was postdated
December 1, 2001. Respondent told
complainant that he needed more time to
fund the check. However, respondent
failed to fund the check despite the
demands of complainant.
In his Answer to the complaint,
respondent denied that complainant
contracted his legal services. Although
respondent admitted having received the
two checks from complainant, he claimed
that said checks were intended to cover
actual and incidental expenses for
transportation, communication,
representation, necessary services, taxes
and fees for the cancellation and transfer
of TCT No. 334411 under the name of
complainant and not for legal services. He
asserted that he acted in good faith as
shown by the fact of his return of
complainants documents with an
explanatory letter and his issuance of a
personal check for P41,280.00 dated
December 1, 2001. He insisted that he
would not compromise for such meager
amount his personal standing as well as his
membership in the legal profession. His
failure to transfer the title of the property
under the name of the complainant was
caused by his difficulty in making good the
claimed amount, compounded by his
affliction with diabetes and the consequent
loss of sight of his right eye.
Respondent further alleged that he
was a licensed real estate and insurance
broker and had been a freelance business
management consultant. At the same time
he engaged in real estate brokering, pre-
need products marketing for Prudential
Life, and life insurance underwriting for
Insular Life. In 1999, he gave up the
practice of his profession as a lawyer and
subsequently managed to put up a
business center with fellow insurance
underwriters for their common insurance
underwriting practice.He further claimed
that sometime in August, 2001, an
insurance client introduced complainant as
an insurance prospect to him. In the course
of their dealing, complainant intimated to
respondent her willingness to consider
respondents insurance proposal provided
the latter would help her facilitate the
cancellation and eventual transfer to her
name the property covered by TCT No.
334411 in the name of complainants sister,
Lutgarda Amor D. Barnachea. Respondent
agreed to help complainant in the transfer
of the title to her name, with the condition
that no diligent study or verification of
complainants documents, nor preparation
of any additional document or any
application or petition whatsoever, will be
made by respondent. He explained to
complainant that his task was merely to go
through the regular process of presenting
the available documents, paying the taxes
and fees, and following up the processing
for the cancellation and issuance of the
certificate of title. In other words,
respondent offered to complainant services
which a non-lawyer familiar with the
procedure and the related offices can
perform and provide to the complainant
with respect to the transfer of the title of
the property in her name.
Respondent asserted that in the latter
part of September 2001, he discovered
and became aware for the first time that
the original copy of TCT No. 334411 with
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City was
destroyed in a fire in Quezon City Hall
several years earlier and that complainants
copy of the title needed to be reconstituted
before it can be cancelled and
transferred. At about the same time, the
working relations of respondent in the
business center with his non-lawyer
associates had become difficult and
strained, impelling him to sever his
business relations with them and cease
from to going to the business center.
Consequently, telephone communications
between respondent and complainant at
the business center was
cut. Communications became much more
limited when, apart from the fact that
respondent did not have a landline at his
residence, respondents mobile phone was
stolen sometime in October 2001.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) designated Atty. Dennis B. Funa as
Commissioner to conduct a formal
investigation of the complaint.Despite
several settings, respondent failed to
appear and adduce evidence.
On April 26, 2002, Investigating
Commissioner Dennis B. Funa submitted
his report and recommendation stating in
part that:
1. Respondent is not able to meet his
financial obligations due to financial
difficulties, and that respondent is in good
faith in his failure to meet this obligation.
2. It is recommended that respondent be
ORDERED TO REPAY HIS CLIENT within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this
Decision. The principal amount being
P41,280.00. Failure to comply with the
Order shall be considered as proof of
evident bad faith, and shall be considered
in the continuing evaluation of the case in
view of the continued failure to repay his
client.
3. Respondent should also be given a
WARNING that a repetition shall be dealt
with more severely.[1]
The Investigating Commissioner gave
credence to the claim of complainant that
she engaged the legal services of
respondent and paid him for his services
and that respondent failed in his
undertaking and refund the amount
of P41,280.00 to complainant despite her
demands and that respondent appeared to
be evading the complainant.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of
Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-
550 adopting and approving the
Investigating Commissioners
recommendation with the additional
sanction of reprimand for respondent:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and,
finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules,
with modification. Respondent is hereby
reprimanded and ordered to return the
Forty One Thousand Two Hundred Eighty
(P41,280.00) Pesos to complainant within
ninety (90) days from receipt of notice.[2]
While the Court agrees with the Board
of Governors that respondent should be
meted a disciplinary sanction, it finds that
the penalty of reprimand recommended by
the Board of Governors is not
commensurate to the gravity of the wrong
committed by respondent. As found by the
Investigating Commissioner, the
complainant engaged the legal services of
the respondent. As admitted in his letter to
the complainant, respondent had just
resumed his private practice of law two
months before complainant contracted his
services for the notarization of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, the registration thereof with
the Register of Deeds and the transfer of
the title over the property to the
complainant:
NOVEMBER 1, 2002
DEAR RUBY,
I AM SORRY I AM RETURNING YOUR
DOCUMENTS WITHOUT CHANGES.
I HAD A SERIES OF MONEY PROBLEMS
RIGHT AFTER YOU GAVE ME THE TWO
CHECKS AND COMING WITH THE AMOUNTS
WITH PERSONAL FUNDS.
I WAS REVIVING MY LEGAL PRACTICE ONLY
FOR TWO MONTHS WHICH WE MET AND
HAD JUST SET UP THE OFFICE WITH TWO
ASSOCIATES WHICH A FEW WEEKS LATER
WE HAD DISAGREEMENTS AND DECIDED
TO DISBAND. I WILL HAVE TO REFURBISH
MY OFFICE. I AM ISSUING MY PERSONAL
CHECK TO GUARANTEE THE AMOUNT I
TOOK. I NEED A LITTLE TIME TO COVER
THE AMOUNT. THANKS FOR YOUR
UNDERSTANDING.
(
Sgd.) EDWIN.[3]
Respondents claim that complainant
did not retain his legal services flies in the
face of his letter to complainant. Even if it
were true that no attorney-client
relationship existed between them, case
law has it that an attorney may be
removed or otherwise disciplined not only
for malpractice and dishonesty in the
profession but also for gross misconduct
not connected with his professional duties,
making him unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him.[4]
In this case, respondent failed to
comply with his undertaking for almost two
months. Worse, despite demands of
complainant, he failed to refund the
amount of P41,280.00 and to return to
complainant the deed of absolute sale and
title over the property. Respondents claim
that complainant could not contact him
because he did not have any landline at his
residence and that his mobile phone was
stolen in October 2001, is hard to
believe. He failed to adduce a morsel of
evidence to prove that his telephone at the
business center was cut or that his mobile
phone had been stolen. Even then,
respondent could have easily contacted
the complainant at her residence or could
have written her a letter informing her that
the original copy of TCT No. 324411 in the
custody of the Register of Deeds was
burned when the Quezon City Hall was
gutted by fire and that there was a need
for the reconstitution of said title. Neither
did respondent adduce evidence that he
was a life insurance underwriter for Insular
Life or that he had been sick with diabetes
and had lost his sight in his right
eye.Respondent simply refused to adduce
evidence to prove his allegations in his
Answer to the complaint.
The Court is led to believe that
respondents failure to cause the transfer of
the title of the property under the name of
complainant was due to a financial
problem that beset him shortly after he
received the checks from complainant. It
can easily be inferred from respondents
letter that he used complainants money to
alleviate if not solve his financial
woes. What compounded respondents
unethical conduct was his drawing of a
personal check and delivering the same to
complainant without sufficient funds in his
bank account to cover the check. Even as
he promised to fund his account with the
drawee bank, respondent failed to do so
when the check became due.
A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust
money or property of his client that may
come to his possession. He is a trustee to
said funds and property.[5]He is to keep the
funds of his client separate and apart from
his own and those of others kept by
him. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a
specific purpose such as for the
registration of a deed with the Register of
Deeds and for expenses and fees for the
transfer of title over real property under
the name of his client if not utilized, must
be returned immediately to his client upon
demand therefor. The lawyers failure to
return the money of his client upon
demand gave rise to a presumption that he
has misappropriated said money in
violation of the trust reposed on him.[6] The
conversion by a lawyer funds entrusted to
him by his client is a gross violation of
professional ethics and a betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.[7]
In this case, respondent
intransigeantly refused to return to the
complainant the amount of P41,280.00
which he received for the expenses for the
transfer to her of the title of the property
and for his professional fees. His dishonest
conduct was compounded by his
interjection of flimsy excuses for his
obstinate refusal to refund the amount to
complainant.
The relation of attorney and client is
highly fiduciary in nature and is of a very
delicate, exacting and confidential
character.[8] A lawyer is duty-bound to
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
his dealings and transactions with his
clients.[9] The profession, therefore,
demands of an attorney an absolute
abdication of every personal advantage
conflicting in any way, directly or
indirectly, with the interest of his client. In
this case, respondent miserably failed to
measure up to the exacting standard
expected of him.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, Respondent Atty. Edwin T.
Quiocho is found guilty of violation of
Canons 15 and 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
One (1) Year with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely. He is
DIRECTED to restitute to the complainant
the full amount of P41,280.00 within ten
(10) days from notice hereof. Respondent
is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court
proof of payment of said amount within ten
(10) days from said payment. If
Respondent fails to restitute the said
amount within the aforesaid period, he
shall be meted an additional suspension of
three (3) months for every month or
fraction thereof of delay until he shall have
paid the said amount in full. In case a
subsidiary penalty of suspension for his
failure to restitute the said amount shall be
necessary, respondent shall serve
successively the penalty of his one year
suspension and the subsidiary penalty. This
is without prejudice to the right of the
complainant to institute the appropriate
action for the collection of said amount.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE
TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY.
LEON G. MAQUERA
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
May a member of the Philippine Bar
who was disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an
attorney be meted the same sanction as a
member of the Philippine Bar for the same
infraction committed in the foreign
jurisdiction? There is a Rule of Court
provision covering this cases central
issue. Up to this juncture, its reach and
breadth have not undergone the test of an
unsettled case.
In a Letter dated August 20, 1996,
[1]
the District Court of Guam informed this
Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of
law in Guam for two (2) years pursuant to
the Decision rendered by the Superior
Court of Guam on May 7, 1996 in Special
Proceedings Case No. SP0075-94,[2] a
disciplinary case filed by the Guam Bar
Ethics Committee against Maquera.
The Court referred the matter of
Maqueras suspension in Guam to the Bar
Confidant for comment in
its Resolution dated November 19, 1996.
[3]
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Philippine
Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has
also been admitted as an attorney, is also
a ground for his disbarment or suspension
in this realm, provided the foreign courts
action is by reason of an act or omission
constituting deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct, grossly immoral
conduct, or a violation of the lawyers oath.
In a Memorandum dated February 20,
1997, then Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda C.
Verzosa recommended that the Court
obtain copies of the record of Maqueras
case since the documents transmitted by
the Guam District Court do not contain the
factual and legal bases for Maqueras
suspension and are thus insufficient to
enable her to determine whether Maqueras
acts or omissions which resulted in his
suspension in Guam are likewise violative
of his oath as a member of the Philippine
Bar.[4]
Pursuant to this Courts directive in
its Resolution dated March 18, 1997,[5] the
Bar Confidant sent a letter dated
November 13, 1997 to the District Court of
Guam requesting for certified copies of the
record of the disciplinary case against
Maquera and of the rules violated by him.[6]
The Court received certified copies of
the record of Maqueras case from the
District Court of Guam on December 8,
1997.[7]
Thereafter, Maqueras case was
referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation
report and recommendation within sixty
(60) days from the IBPs receipt of the case
records.[8]
The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of
Hearing requiring him to appear before the
IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline on July
28, 1998.[9] However, the notice was
returned unserved because Maquera had
already moved from his last known address
in Agana, Guam and did not leave any
forwarding address.[10]
On October 9, 2003, the IBP submitted
to the Court its Report and
Recommendation and its Resolution No.
XVI-2003-110, indefinitely suspending
Maquera from the practice of law within
the Philippines until and unless he updates
and pays his IBP membership dues in full.
[11]
The IBP found that Maquera was
admitted to the Philippine Bar on February
28, 1958. On October 18, 1974, he was
admitted to the practice of law in the
territory of Guam. He was suspended from
the practice of law in Guam for
misconduct, as he acquired his clients
property as payment for his legal services,
then sold it and as a consequence
obtained an unreasonably high fee for
handling his clients case.[12]
In its Decision, the Superior Court of
Guam stated that on August 6, 1987,
Edward Benavente, the creditor of a
certain Castro, obtained a judgment
against Castro in a civil case. Maquera
served as Castros counsel in said
case. Castros property subject of the case,
a parcel of land, was to be sold at a public
auction in satisfaction of his obligation to
Benavente. Castro, however, retained the
right of redemption over the property for
one year. The right of redemption could be
exercised by paying the amount of the
judgment debt within the aforesaid period.
[13]
At the auction sale, Benavente
purchased Castros property for Five
Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$500.00), the
amount which Castro was adjudged to pay
him.[14]
On December 21, 1987, Castro, in
consideration of Maqueras legal services in
the civil case involving Benavente, entered
into an oral agreement with Maquera and
assigned his right of redemption in favor of
the latter.[15]
On January 8, 1988, Maquera
exercised Castros right of redemption by
paying Benavente US$525.00 in
satisfaction of the judgment
debt.Thereafter, Maquera had the title to
the property transferred in his name.[16]
On December 31, 1988, Maquera sold
the property to C.S. Chang and C.C. Chang
for Three Hundred Twenty Thousand U.S.
Dollars (US$320,000.00).[17]
On January 15, 1994, the Guam Bar
Ethics Committee (Committee) conducted
hearings regarding Maqueras alleged
misconduct.[18]
Subsequently, the Committee filed a
Petition in the Superior Court of Guam
praying that Maquera be sanctioned for
violations of Rules 1.5[19] and 1.8(a)[20] of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules) in force in Guam. In its
Petition, the Committee claimed that
Maquera obtained an unreasonably high
fee for his services. The Committee further
alleged that Maquera himself admitted his
failure to comply with the requirement in
Rule 1.8 (a) of the Model Rules that a
lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a
client unless the transaction and the terms
governing the lawyers acquisition of such
interest are fair and reasonable to the
client, and are fully disclosed to, and
understood by the client and reduced in
writing.[21]
The Committee recommended that
Maquera be: (1) suspended from the
practice of law in Guam for a period of two
[2] years, however, with all but thirty (30)
days of the period of suspension deferred;
(2) ordered to return to Castro the
difference between the sale price of the
property to the Changs and the amount
due him for legal services rendered to
Castro; (3) required to pay the costs of the
disciplinary proceedings; and (4) publicly
reprimanded. It also recommended that
other jurisdictions be informed that
Maquera has been subject to disciplinary
action by the Superior Court of Guam.[22]
Maquera did not deny that Castro
executed a quitclaim deed to the property
in his favor as compensation for past legal
services and that the transaction, except
for the deed itself, was oral and was not
made pursuant to a prior written
agreement. However, he contended that
the transaction was made three days
following the alleged termination of the
attorney-client relationship between them,
and that the property did not constitute an
exorbitant fee for his legal services to
Castro.[23]
On May 7, 1996, the Superior Court of
Guam rendered its Decision[24]suspending
Maquera from the practice of law in Guam
for a period of two (2) years and ordering
him to take the Multi-State Professional
Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within
that period. The court found that the
attorney-client relationship between
Maquera and Castro was not yet
completely terminated when they entered
into the oral agreement to transfer Castros
right of redemption to Maquera on
December 21, 1987. It also held that
Maquera profited too much from the
eventual transfer of Castros property to
him since he was able to sell the same to
the Changs with more than US$200,000.00
in profit, whereas his legal fees for services
rendered to Castro amounted only to
US$45,000.00. The court also ordered him
to take the MPRE upon his admission
during the hearings of his case that he was
aware of the requirements of the Model
Rules regarding business transactions
between an attorney and his client in a
very general sort of way.[25]
On the basis of the Decision of the
Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded
that although the said court found
Maquera liable for misconduct, there is no
evidence to establish that [Maquera]
committed a breach of ethics in the
Philippines.[26] However, the IBP still
resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his
failure to pay his annual dues as a member
of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in
turn, a ground for removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of
the Revised Rules of Court.[27]
The power of the Court to disbar or
suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions
committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found
in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme
Court Resolution dated February 13, 1992,
which states:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor.A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party to a case without authority to
do so.The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been
admitted as an attorney is a ground
for his disbarment or suspension if
the basis of such action includes any
of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of
the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima facie evidence
of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (Emphasis supplied).
The Court must therefore determine
whether Maqueras acts, namely: acquiring
by assignment Castros right of redemption
over the property subject of the civil case
where Maquera appeared as counsel for
him; exercising the right of redemption;
and, subsequently selling the property for
a huge profit, violate Philippine law or the
standards of ethical behavior for members
of the Philippine Bar and thus constitute
grounds for his suspension or disbarment
in this jurisdiction.
The Superior Court of Guam found that
Maquera acquired his clients property by
exercising the right of redemption
previously assigned to him by the client in
payment of his legal services. Such
transaction falls squarely under Article
1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph
5 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Paragraph 5 of Article 1491[28] prohibits the
lawyers acquisition by assignment of the
clients property which is the subject of the
litigation handled by the lawyer. Under
Article 1492,[29] the prohibition extends to
sales in legal redemption.
The prohibition ordained in paragraph
5 of Article 1491 and Article 1492 is
founded on public policy because, by
virtue of his office, an attorney may easily
take advantage of the credulity and
ignorance of his client[30] and unduly enrich
himself at the expense of his client.
The case of In re: Ruste[31] illustrates
the significance of the aforementioned
prohibition. In that case, the attorney
acquired his clients property subject of a
case where he was acting as counsel
pursuant to a deed of sale executed by his
clients in his favor. He contended that the
sale was made at the instance of his
clients because they had no money to pay
him for his services. The Court ruled that
the lawyers acquisition of the property of
his clients under the circumstances
obtaining therein rendered him liable for
malpractice. The Court held:
Whether the deed of sale in question was
executed at the instance of the spouses
driven by financial necessity, as contended
by the respondent, or at the latters behest,
as contended by the complainant, is of no
moment. In either case an attorney
occupies a vantage position to press upon
or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in
breach of the rule so amply protective of
the confidential relations, which must
necessarily exist between attorney and
client, and of the rights of both.[32]
The Superior Court of Guam also
hinted that Maqueras acquisition of Castros
right of redemption, his subsequent
exercise of said right, and his act of selling
the redeemed property for huge profits
were tainted with deceit and bad faith
when it concluded that Maquera charged
Castro an exorbitant fee for his legal
services. The court held that since the
assignment of the right of redemption to
Maquera was in payment for his legal
services, and since the property redeemed
by him had a market value of
US$248,220.00 as of December 21, 1987
(the date when the right of redemption
was assigned to him), he is liable for
misconduct for accepting payment for his
legal services way beyond his actual fees
which amounted only to US$45,000.00.
Maqueras acts in Guam which resulted
in his two (2)-year suspension from the
practice of law in that jurisdiction are also
valid grounds for his suspension from the
practice of law in the Philippines. Such acts
are violative of a lawyers sworn duty to act
with fidelity toward his clients. They are
also violative of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which
states that [a] lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and shall be mindful the
trust and confidence reposed in him; and
Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. The requirement of
good moral character is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the
Philippine Bar but is also a continuing
requirement to maintain ones goods
standing in the legal profession.[33]
It bears stressing that the Guam
Superior Courts judgment ordering
Maqueras suspension from the practice of
law in Guam does not automatically result
in his suspension or disbarment in the
Philippines.Under Section 27,[34] Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts
which led to his suspension in Guam are
mere grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only
if the basis of the foreign courts action
includes any of the grounds for disbarment
or suspension in this jurisdiction.
[35]
Likewise, the judgment of the Superior
Court of Guam only constitutes prima
facie evidence of Maqueras unethical acts
as a lawyer.[36]More fundamentally, due
process demands that he be given the
opportunity to defend himself and to
present testimonial and documentary
evidence on the matter in an investigation
to be conducted in accordance with Rule
139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said
rule mandates that a respondent lawyer
must in all cases be notified of the charges
against him. It is only after reasonable
notice and failure on the part of the
respondent lawyer to appear during the
scheduled investigation that an
investigation may be conducted ex parte.
[37]
The Court notes that Maquera has not
yet been able to adduce evidence on his
behalf regarding the charges of unethical
behavior in Guam against him, as it is not
certain that he did receive the Notice of
Hearing earlier sent by the IBPs
Commission on Bar Discipline. Thus, there
is a need to ascertain Maqueras current
and correct address in Guam in order that
another notice, this time specifically
informing him of the charges against him
and requiring him to explain why he should
not be suspended or disbarred on those
grounds (through this Resolution), may be
sent to him.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with
the IBP that Maquera should be suspended
from the practice of law for non-payment
of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up
to the present.[38] Under Section 10, Rule
139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, non-
payment of membership dues for six (6)
months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the IBP, and default in such
payment for one year shall be ground for
removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys.[39]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Leon G. Maquera
is required to SHOW CAUSE, within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of this Resolution,
why he should not be suspended or
disbarred for his acts which gave rise to
the disciplinary proceedings against him in
the Superior Court of Guam and his
subsequent suspension in said jurisdiction.
The Bar Confidant is directed to locate
the current and correct address of Atty.
Maquera in Guam and to serve upon him a
copy of this Resolution.
In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall have paid
his membership dues, whichever comes
later.
Let a copy of this Resolution be
attached to Atty. Maqueras personal record
in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all
courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
GEORGE C. SOLATAN, A.C. No. 6504
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
NAZARIO,
ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES Promulgated:
and JOSE C. CAMANO,
Respondents. August 9, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------------------
-----
DECISION
The present case focuses on a
critical aspect of the lawyer-client
relationshipthe duty of loyalty. The fidelity
lawyers owe their clients is traditionally
characterized as undivided. This means
that lawyers must represent their clients
and serve their needs without interference
or impairment from any conflicting
interest.
This administrative case traces its
roots from the manner by which Attys. Jose
C. Camano and Oscar A. Inocentes
responded to the efforts of complainant,
George C. Solatan, to lease a certain
Quezon City apartment belonging to the
attorneys clients. On the basis of acts
branded by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) as bordering on technical
extortion, accepting funds and giving
unsolicited advice to an adverse party, and
casting doubts as to the procedure of levy,
the IBP resolved[1] to recommend the
suspension of Atty. Camano from the
practice of law for one (1) year. It likewise
recommended the reprimand of Atty.
Inocentes, whom it held liable for the
aforementioned acts of his associate,
under the principle of command
responsibility.
Only Atty. Inocentes has elected to
contest the resolution of the IBP, as he
questions the propriety of his being held
administratively liable for acts done by
Atty. Camano.[2] However, the
recommendation to suspend Atty. Camano
shall also be passed upon by virtue of
Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.[3]
Attys. Inocentes and Camano were
both engaged in the practice of law under
the firm name of Oscar Inocentes and
Associates Law Office. Atty. Inocentes held
office in his home located at No. 19
Marunong St., Central District, Quezon
City, while Atty. Camano was stationed at
an extension office of the firm located in
3rd/F, 956 Aurora Blvd., Quirino Dist.,
CHICO-
Quezon City.
The Oscar Inocentes and Associates
Law Office was retained by spouses Andres
and Ludivina Genito (spouses Genito),
owners of an apartment complex (the
Genito Apartments) located at 259
Tandang Sora cor. Visayas Avenue, Quezon
City, when the Genito Apartments were
placed under sequestration by the
Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) on 9 July 1986. [4] The
law office represented the spouses Genito
before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan,
and subsequently, with authority from the
PCGG.[5] in ejectment cases against non-
paying tenants occupying the Genito
Apartments.[6]
Complainants sister, Gliceria
Solatan, was a tenant in Door 10, Phase B
of the Genito Apartments. It appears from
the records that Gliceria Solatan left for the
United States in 1986, and since then, the
apartment was either intermittently used
by members of her family or placed under
the charge of caretakers.[7] In August 1987,
a complaint for ejectment for non-payment
of rentals was filed against Gliceria
Solatan.[8] On 3 March 1988, in a judgment
by default, a Decision[9] was rendered
ordering Gliceria Solatan to vacate the
premises of the apartment, pay the
spouses Genito the amount of Thirty
Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P30,600.00)
as unpaid rentals from February 1986 to
July 1987 with interest at 24% per annum
from 20 August 1987 until the premises
are vacated, Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as attorneys fees, and costs
of the suit.[10]
Complainant was occupying the
subject apartment when he learned of the
judgment rendered against his sister. On
10 May 1988, prior to the implementation
of a writ to execute the judgment,
complainant and his mother, Elvira
Solatan, approached Atty. Inocentes at his
home office. Complainant informed Atty.
Inocentes of his desire to arrange the
execution of a lease contract by virtue of
which complainant would be the new
lessee of the apartment and thus make
possible his continued stay therein. Atty.
Inocentes referred complainant and his
mother to his associate, Atty. Camano, the
attorney in charge of the ejectment cases
against tenants of the Genito apartments.
After the exchange, complainant went to
Atty. Camano at the satellite office of Atty.
Inocentess firm. From here on out, events
quickly turned sour. Different versions of
subsequent events were presented. The
facts reproduced hereunder are by and
large culled from the findings of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, Siegfred B.
Mison.
During the meeting with Atty.
Camano, a verbal agreement was made in
which complainant and his mother agreed
to pay the entire judgment debt of Gliceria
Solatan, including fifty percent of the
awarded attorneys fees and One Thousand
Six Hundred Pesos (P1,600.00) as costs of
suit provided that Atty. Camano would
allow complainants continued stay at Door
10, Phase B of the Genito Apartments. As
partial compliance with the agreement,
complainant issued in the name Atty.
Camano a check for Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) representing half of
the P10,000.00 attorneys fees adjudged
against complainants sister.
Complainant and his mother failed
to make any other payment. Thus, the
sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano
and some policemen, enforced the writ of
execution on 22 June 1988 and levied the
properties found in the subject apartment.
An attempt at renegotiation took place at
the insistence of complainant, resulting in
Atty. Camanos acquiescence to release the
levied properties and allowing complainant
to remain at the apartment, subject to the
latters payment of costs incurred in
enforcing the writ of execution and
issuance of postdated checks representing
installment rental payments. Complainant,
thus, issued four (4) checks drawn on Far
East Bank and Trust Company dated the
fifteenth (15th) of July, August, September,
and October 1988 each in the amount of
Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos
(P3,400.00).[11] Half of the amount
represented complainants monthly rental,
while the other half, a monthly installment
for the payment of Gliceria Solatans
judgment debt.
On 28 June 1988, acting on the
advice of Atty. Camano, complainant
presented an Affidavit of Ownership to the
sheriff who then released the levied items
to complainant. However, a Northern Hill 3-
burner gas stove was not retuned to
complainant. The stove was in fact kept by
Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito
Apartments wherein he temporarily
stayed[12] and, thereafter, turned over the
same to a certain Recto Esberto, caretaker
of the Genito Apartments.[13]
 3. He failed to turn over
the gas stove to either
On 1 August 1988, complainant party thereby casting
filed the instant administrative case for doubt as to the
disbarment against Atty. Inocentes and procedure of the levy.
Atty. Camano.[14] After formal investigation,
and despite conflicting testimonies on the
tenor and content of agreements and Based on the facts revealed, the
conversations, several disturbing facts penalty of Reprimand is therefore
were revealed to have been recommended to be imposed on
uncontrovertedAtty. Camanos acceptance Respondent Inocentes for
from complainant of attorneys fees and the committing the following acts that
costs of implementing the writ of adversely reflects (sic) in his fitness
execution, possession of complainants to continue to practice law[:]
levied Northern Hill oven, and advice to
complainant on how to recover the latters 1. He allowed Camano to
levied items. Thus, IBP Investigating perform all the
Commissioner Siegfred B. Mison, made the aforementioned acts,
following recommendations, viz: either by negligence or
inadvertence which are
Based on the facts inimical to the legal
revealed in their respective profession. He cannot claim
Memoranda, the penalty of ignorance or feign innocence
six (6) months suspension is in this particular transaction
therefore recommended to considering that the
be imposed on Respondent Complainants themselves
Camano for committing the went to his office on
following acts that adversely different occasions regarding
reflects (sic) on his moral this transaction.
fitness to continue to Ultimately, he exercised
practice law[:] command responsibility
over the case and had
1. He received money supervisory control over
(P5,000 then P1,000) from Respondent Camano
the adverse party inasmuch as he received
purportedly for attorneys periodic reports either by
fees and for reimbursement phone or in person from
of sheriffs expenses. Such the latter.
act of accepting funds
from the adverse party in 2. The letter disclaimer
the process of executed by Mr. Genito filed
implementing a writ, by Respondent Inocentes
borders on technical does not mitigate any
extortion particularly in liability whatsoever since the
light of the factual wrongdoing done against the
circumstances as profession cannot be undone
discussed. by a mere letter from a third
party.[15] (Emphasis
2. He gave unsolicited supplied.)
advice to the adverse party
in suggesting the filing of an The IBP Board of Governors
Affidavit of Ownership over approved the aforequoted
the levied properties, recommendation, with the modification of
a suggestion evidently in an increase in Atty. Camanos period of
conflict with [the interest suspension from six (6) months to one (1)
of] his own client, year, in a resolution stating, viz:
supposedly, the Genitos.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE,
as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the of the
Investigating Commissionerfinding
the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and
rules, with modification, and for
accepting funds from adverse party
in the process of implementing a
writ borders on technical extortion,
for giving unsolicited advice to the
adverse party a suggestion
evidently in conflict with [the
interest of] his own client and for
casting doubts to the procedure of
the levy, Atty. Jose C. Camano is
hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year,
likewise, Atty. Oscar Inocentes is
hereby REPRIMANDED for he
exercised command responsibility
over the case inasmuch as he
received periodic reports either by
phone or in person.[16]
The IBP held that Atty. Camanos act
of giving unsolicited advice to complainant
is a culpable act because the advice
conflicted with the interest of his clients,
the spouses Genito. The rule on conflicting
interests, established in Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, deals
with conflicts in the interests of an
attorneys actual clients among
themselves, of existing and prospective
clients, and of the attorney and his clients.
It states that a lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
The relation of attorney and client
begins from the time an attorney is
retained.[17] An attorney has no power to
act as counsel or legal representative for a
person without being retained.[18] To
establish the professional relation, it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of
an attorney are sought and received in any
manner pertinent to his profession. [19] At
the time the questioned statement was
made, Atty. Camano had called the police
to restrain complainant from surreptitiously
pulling out the levied properties from the
apartment complex by virtue of which the
latter was brought to the police station for
questioning. The statement was made in
response to complainants insistence at the
police station that the levied properties
were owned by him and not by the
judgment debtor.[20] No employment
relation was offered or accepted in the
instant case.
More fitting, albeit, to the mind of
this Court, inapplicable to the case, is
Canon 15 of the same Code which
encompasses the aforementioned rule. In
general terms, Canon 15 requires lawyers
to observe loyalty in all
dealings and transactions with their
clients.[21]Unquestionably, an attorney
giving legal advice to a party with an
interest conflicting with that of his client
resulting in detriment to the latter may be
held guilty of disloyalty. However, far be it
that every utterance of an attorney which
may have afforded an individual some
relief adverse to the formers client may be
labeled as a culpable act of disloyalty. As in
every case, the acts alleged to be culpable
must be assessed in light of the
surrounding circumstances.
While the levy was made on chattel
found in the apartment of the judgment
debtor, Gliceria Solatan, the complainant
was the true owner of the properties.
Consequently, the latter had a right to
recover the same. In fact, considering the
circumstances, the questioned statement
is in consonance with complainants
foremost duty to uphold the law as an
officer of the court. The statement of Atty.
Camano in such a context should not be
construed by this Court as giving advice in
conflict against the interest of the spouses
Genito as in fact the latter have no interest
over the incorrectly levied properties.
We, thus, note that the act of
informing complainant that the levied
properties would be returned to him upon
showing proof of his ownership thereof
may hint at infidelity to the interest of the
spouses Genito, but, in this circumstance,
lacks the essence of double dealing and
betrayal of the latters confidence so as to
deserve outright categorization as
infidelity or disloyalty to his clients cause.
Nonetheless, after having noted the
foregoing, we remain convinced with the
propriety of meting the one (1) year
suspension from the practice of law on
Atty. Camano, as recommended by the IBP,
based on his other culpable acts which
tend to degrade the profession and foment
distrust in the integrity of court processes.
On the other hand, Atty. Inocentes
seeks to distance himself from the events
that transpired and the reprimand resulting
therefrom by asserting that he was
incorrectly punished for Atty. Camanos acts
when his mere participation in the fiasco
was to refer complainant and his mother to
Atty. Camano.
However, it is precisely because of
such participation, consisting as it did of
referring the complainant to his associate
lawyer, that Atty. Inocentes may be held
administratively liable by virtue of his
associates unethical acts. His failure to
exercise certain responsibilities over
matters under the charge of his law firm is
a blameworthy shortcoming. The term
command responsibility, as Atty. Inocentes
suggests, has special meaning within the
circle of men in uniform in the military;
however, the principle does not abide
solely therein. It controls the very
circumstance in which Atty. Inocentes
found himself.
We are not unaware of the custom
of practitioners in a law firm of assigning
cases and even entire client accounts to
associates or other partners with limited
supervision, if at all. This is especially true
in the case of Attys. Inocentes and Camano
who, from the records, both appear to be
seasoned enough to be left alone in their
work without requiring close supervision
over each others conduct and work output.
However, let it not be said that law firm
practitioners are given a free hand to
assign cases to seasoned attorneys and
thereafter conveniently forget about the
case. To do so would be a disservice to the
profession, the integrity and advancement
of which this Court must jealously protect.
That the firm name under which the
two attorneys labored was that of Oscar
Inocentes and Associates Law Office does
not automatically make Atty. Inocentes the
default lawyer acting in a supervisory
capacity over Atty. Camano. It did,
however, behoove Atty. Inocentes to exert
ordinary diligence to find out what was
going on in his law firm. It placed in Atty.
Inocentes the active responsibility to
inquire further into the circumstances
affecting the levy of complainants
properties, irrespective of whether the
same were in fact events which could
possibly lead to administrative liability.
Moreover, as name practitioner of the law
office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the
responsibility to make reasonable efforts to
ensure that all lawyers in the firm should
act in conformity to the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[22] It is not
without reason or consequence that Atty.
Inocentess name is that which was used as
the official designation of their law office.
With regard to the actual existence
of Atty. Inocentess supervisory capacity
over Atty. Camanos activities, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner based the
same on his finding that Atty. Inocentes
received periodic reports from Atty.
Camano on the latters dealings with
complainant. This finding is the linchpin of
Atty. Inocentess supervisory capacity over
Atty. Camano and liability by virtue thereof.
Law practitioners are acutely aware
of the responsibilities that are naturally
taken on by partners and supervisory
lawyers over the lawyers and non-lawyers
of the law office. We have held that
lawyers are administratively liable for the
conduct of their employees in failing to
timely file pleadings.[23] In Rheem of the
Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Zoilo R. Ferrer, et
al.,[24] partners in a law office were
admonished for the contemptuous
language in a pleading submitted to court
despite, and even due to, the fact that the
pleading was not passed upon by any of
the partners of the office. We held therein
that partners are duty bound to provide for
efficacious control of court pleadings and
other court papers that carry their names
or the name of the law firm.[25]
We now hold further that partners
and practitioners who hold supervisory
capacities are legally responsible to exert
ordinary diligence in apprising themselves
of the comings and goings of the cases
handled by the persons over which they
are exercising supervisory authority and in
exerting necessary efforts to foreclose the
occurrence of violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by persons
under their charge. Nonetheless, the
liability of the supervising lawyer in this
regard is by no means equivalent to that of
the recalcitrant lawyer. The actual degree
of control and supervision exercised by
said supervising lawyer varies, inter alia,
according to office practice, or the length
of experience and competence of the
lawyer supervised. Such factors can be
taken into account in ascertaining the
proper penalty. Certainly, a lawyer charged
with the supervision of a fledgling attorney
prone to rookie mistakes should bear
greater responsibility for the culpable acts
of the underling than one satisfied enough
with the work and professional ethic of the
associate so as to leave the latter mostly
to his/her own devises.
While Atty. Camanos irregular acts
perhaps evince a need for greater
supervision of his legal practice, there is no
question that it has been Atty. Inocentes
practice to allow wide discretion for Atty.
Camano to practice on his own. It does
constitute indifference and neglect for Atty.
Inocentes to fail to accord even a token
attention to Atty. Camanos conduct which
could have brought the then impending
problem to light. But such is not equivalent
to the proximate responsibility for Atty.
Camanos acts. Moreover, it appears from
the records that Atty. Inocentes is a former
judge and a lawyer who, as of yet, is in
good standing and it is the first time in
which Atty. Inocentes has been made to
answer vicariously for the misconduct of a
person under his charge. An admonition is
appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,
the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolution dated 16 April 2004 is
AFFIRMED in respect of the sanction meted
out on Atty. Camano. Atty. Inocentes is
hereby ADMONISHED to monitor more
closely the activities of his associates to
make sure that the same are in
consonance with the Code of Professional
Responsibility with the WARNING that
repetition of the same or similar omission
will be dealt with more severely.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FLORENCIA M. SOMOSOT, Complainant,
vs. ATTY. ELIAS A.
PONTEVEDRA, Respondent.
On July 28, 1994, complainant Florencia M.
Somosot (now deceased) filed a verified
complaint1 against respondent Atty. Elias A.
Pontevedra for neglect of duty and for
professional misconduct for unlawfully
keeping money belonging to her.
It appears that complainant was one of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. X-98, for
reconveyance and recovery of possession,
pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental, Branch 59, San Carlos
City. Respondent was complainants
counsel of record.
On January 15, 1991, the trial court
ordered the parties to submit their
respective memoranda since the case that
had been pending for already twenty-three
years.2 Although the trial court apprised
the parties of the importance of their
memoranda to the resolution of the
complex case, both of the parties counsels
did not comply with the order. Thus, on
November 12, 1991, the trial court
reiterated the order, giving the parties a
fresh period of 15 days within which to
comply.3
Complainant repeatedly reminded
respondent about the deadline, but
respondent still failed to file a
memorandum. Instead, respondent
allegedly entered into an oral agreement
with the opposing counsel that they would
both forego with the filing of the
memorandum.4
After almost two years, complainants
daughter, Wilma S. Pones, sent respondent
a money order for P1,000 as payment for
the preparation of the
memorandum.5 Since the period for filing
had already lapsed, respondent took no
action on complainants request. Neither
did he present the money order to the post
office for payment.6Complainant later
learned that the case had been submitted
for decision without any memoranda. She
asked for a certification to this effect from
the trial court, then sent a letter to
respondent through Wilma Pones asking
respondent to return the money and
explain the certification.7 Respondent
ignored her request. Thus, complainant
filed the instant case.
On August 22, 1994, we required
respondent to file his comment.
Respondent manifested that he had earlier
filed his comment and submitted additional
copies of said comment.8
On November 28, 1994, we noted
respondents comment and required
complainant to submit a reply. Upon the
filing of complainants reply, respondent
filed a rejoinder.9
Respondent, in the main, argued that his
failure to prepare the memorandum was
justified. He explained that complainants
family lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Ponteras,
handled the prosecution of the case and
the presentation of witnesses.
Unfortunately, Atty. Ponteras died after the
presentation of the last defense witness
and his notes were lost. Complainant could
not produce copies of the transcripts of
stenographic notes while respondents
case folder were also lost by Atty. Ponteras
who borrowed but failed to return it.
Consequently, with nothing to aid him in
the preparation of the memorandum,
respondent was allegedly left with no
recourse but simply to enter into an
agreement with the opposing counsel to
submit the case without memorandum.
On March 1, 1995, the Court referred the
case to the Commission on Bar Discipline
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Before the case could be heard, however,
complainant died. Thus, the case was
submitted for decision based on the
records.
The core issue for our resolution is whether
respondent violated the Canons of
Professional Responsibility in failing to file
the required memorandum in Civil Case
No. X-98 and for keeping the money order
despite complainants request for its
return.
In its Report and Recommendation dated
January 5, 2004, the Commission found
respondent liable for breach of his
professional duties and recommended that
respondent be reprimanded and warned.
The Commission held that there was no
sufficient justification for respondents
failure to file the memorandum. Regarding
the money order, however, the
Commission held that complainants
remedy was not to proceed
administratively against respondent, who
did not present the money order for
payment, but to ask for a refund from the
post office concerned.
On February 27, 2004, the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines adopted the Report and
Recommendation as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering respondents
negligence in the performance of his
professional duties towards his client, Atty.
Elias Pontevedra is
hereby REPRIMANDED and Warned that
any similar or other complaint in the future
for breach of his professional duties will be
dealt with more severely.10
We agree with the IBP that respondent
should be appropriately sanctioned.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that lawyers owe
fidelity to the cause of their clients and
must therefore be always mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in them.
Under Canon 18, they are mandated to
serve their clients with competence and
diligence.11 Specifically, they are not to
"neglect a legal matter entrusted to
[them], and [their] negligence in
connection therewith shall render [them]
liable."12Additionally, they are required to
keep their client informed of the status of
the latters cases and to respond within a
reasonable time to requests for
information.13 Before admission to the bar,
lawyers subscribe to an oath to conduct
themselves "with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to their clients." Failure to
comply with these abiding precepts of
ethical conduct renders counsel liable for
violating the canons of his profession.
In this case, respondent failed to exercise
that degree of diligence required of him in
the performance of his duties. While it was
impossible for him to prepare a
memorandum without the transcripts of
stenographic notes and his case folder,
and while respondent may have been
constrained simply to enter into an
agreement with the opposing counsel to
submit the case for decision without
memorandum, respondent failed to inform
the trial court of said agreement. He
should have filed a manifestation before
the trial court informing it of the
agreement instead of leaving the trial
court waiting and wondering whether said
memoranda will be filed at all. His omission
not only gave complainant much anxiety, it
also needlessly compounded the long
delay in the resolution of the 23-year-old
case. Worse, respondent did not inform
complainant that the case had been
submitted for decision without
memorandum despite complainants
repeated requests for information
regarding the status of her case.
We remind respondent that by taking a
clients cause, he covenants that he will
exert all effort for its prosecution until its
final resolution.14 As we held in Parias v.
Paguinto,15 a lawyer should give adequate
attention, care and time to his clients
case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he
should undertake the task with dedication
and care. It is not enough that a lawyer
possesses the qualification to handle the
legal matter. He must also give adequate
attention to his legal work.16 Utmost fidelity
is demanded once counsel agrees to take
the cudgels for his clients cause.17
Moreover, respondent should have
accounted for the money order. Having
received the money order as payment for
professional services that he was unable to
render, respondent should have returned it
when complainants daughter demanded it
from him so that complainant could ask for
a refund from the issuing post office. As
expressly stated in Canon 16, a lawyer
shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into
his possession. He is required by Rule
16.03 of said canon to deliver such funds
and property of his client when demanded.
However, considering the absence of any
showing that respondent had acted with
malice, bad faith, or other evil motive in
failing to inform the trial court of the
agreement to submit the case for decision
and in failing to account for the money
order, we deem the recommended penalty
of reprimand sufficient penalty.18
Complainants prayer for damages is
denied. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil
action where the complainant is a plaintiff
and the respondent lawyer is a defendant.
Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken solely for
the public welfare. As held in Rayos-
Ombac v. Rayos,19 the attorney is called
upon to answer to the court for his conduct
as an officer of the court. The complainant
or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorneys alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the
proper administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elias
Pontevedra is hereby REPRIMANDED and
WARNED that the commission of the same
or similar offense in the future will be dealt
with more severely. He is ordered to return
immediately the postal money order in the
amount of P1,000.00 to complainants
heirs.
SO ORDERED.
PER CURIAM:
A.C. No. 7181
MARIA ANGALAN,
Present:
This is a complaint filed by Maria, Nena,
NENA ANGALAN, Dionicio, Magdalena, Francisca, Inis,
PUNO, C.J., Rosalino, and Josefina Angalan
DIONICIO ANGALAN, (complainants) against Atty. Leonido C.
QUISUMBING, Delante (respondent) for gross violation of
MAGDALENA ANGALAN, the Code of Professional Responsibility.
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
FRANCISCA ANGALAN,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
INIS ANGALAN, CORONA, Complainants are the heirs of Angalan
Samal (Angalan) and Sanaan Samal
ROSALINO ANGALAN, CARPIO MORALES,
(Sanaan). Complainants allege that they
AZCUNA, are illiterate and belong to the Samal
AND JOSEFINA ANGALAN, Tribe. Angalan, Sanaan, and complainants
TINGA, owned a 9.102-hectare parcel of land in
Barrio San Jose, Kaputian, Island Garden
ALL OF WHOM ARE HEIRS CHICO-NAZARIO,City of Samal, Davao del Norte. The
VELASCO, JR., property was covered by Original
OF ANGALAN SAMAL CASTRO,BRION, Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-11499.[1]
married
PERALTA, JJ.

to SANAAN SAMAL, On 15 April 1971, Angalan and

complainants borrowed P15,000 from
Complainants, Navarro R. Eustaquio and Arabella P.
Eustaquio (Spouses Eustaquio).To secure
the loan, Angalan and complainants
Promulgated: mortgaged 8.102 hectares of the 9.102-
hectare property and surrendered OCT No.
February 6, 2009
P-11499 to the Spouses Eustaquio. The
Spouses Eustaquio prepared a
document[2] and asked Angalan and
complainants to sign it. Angalan and
complainants affixed their thumb marks on
- versus - the document.

When complainants tried to pay the loan

and recover OCT No. P-11499 from the
Spouses Eustaquio, the Spouses Eustaquio
refused.Complainants learned that the
document which the Spouses Eustaquio
ATTY. LEONIDO C. prepared, and which complainants signed,
DELANTE, was a deed of absolute sale and not a real
Respondent. estate mortgage. They also learned that
Navarro R. Eustaquio (Navarro) had
x------------------------------- transferred the title over the 8.102-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x property to his name OCT No. P-11499 was
canceled and Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-9926[3] in the name of Navarro
was issued.

DECISION
Complainants engaged the services of provisions of the Public
respondent for the purpose of recovering Land Law, particularly
their property. In a receipt[4] dated 18 Section 119 thereof and
November 1970, respondent even on the face of the
acknowledged receipt of P1,200 from title of said property now
Francisca Angalan and her husband, under the name of the
Macario Capul (Capul), representing the defendants x x x the
full payment of his professional herein plaintiffs have the
fees: Received from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL right to repurchase said
and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the sum of property within a period
ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS of five (5) years from the
(P1,200.00) representing full payment of date of the conveyance;
professional services in regard to recovery
of Original Certificate of Title No. P-11499
in the name of Angalan (Samal). xxxx

Respondent filed a complaint[5] dated 13 7. [A

April 1976 with the then Court of First ]s a matter of right under
Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court the law, the herein
(RTC), Judicial Region XVI, Tagum, Davao plaintiffs are entitled to
stating that: the produce of the
property at least
beginning April 8, 1976;
2. x
x x Angalan Samal and
his children x x x are the xxxx
original patentees of a
certain parcel of land,
situated in Ombay,
Samal, Davao, covered 9. [B
under Original Certificate ]y reason of unwarranted
of Title No. P-11499, of refusal on the part of the
the Registry of Deeds of defendants to reconvey
Davao, having acquired the property to plaintiffs,
the same under HP-No. the latter have been
65310, pursuant to the constrained to engage,
provisions of the and in fact have
Homestead Laws of the engaged, the services of
Public Land Law (C.A. counsel x x x[6]
141);

3. x
x x [O]n April 15, 1971,
the herein original Complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio
patentees x x x sold and entered into an amicable settlement. In the
conveyed said parcel of amicable settlement[7] dated 3 September
land covered by the 1977, the parties stated that:
aforesaid title to the
herein defendants for the
sum of FIFTEEN
1. x
THOUSAND PESOS
x x [T]he plaintiffs have
(P15,000.00) x x x;
offered to the
defendant[s] the sum
of P30,000.00 as
4. x repurchase price which
x x [U]nder the the defendant[s accept];
 2. x This will inform you
x x [U]pon the signing that the Heirs of Angalan
hereof, the plaintiffs shall Samal have already
pay the defendant[s] the redeemed their property
sum of P15,000.00 and through me from Mr. Navarro
for this purpose hereby Eustaquio since September,
authorize the defendants 1978. In my capacity as
to collect the same from counsel of the Heirs of
the Clerk of Court which Angalan Samal and owner of
amount had been the money in redeeming the
deposited with this property, I have authorized
Honorable Court; Mr. Macario Capol to take
Likewise, upon signing over the possession of the
hereof the Deed of property together with the
Reconveyance shall be harvesting of the matured
immediately executed coconuts.
and delivered by the
defendants to plaintiff[s];

3. x When complainants tried to repay

x x [W]hile the balance the P30,000 repurchase price and recover
of P15,000.00 has not the property from respondent, respondent
been paid, the refused.Complainants learned that
defendant[s] shall respondent transferred the title of the
continue to possess, and property to his name TCT No. T-9926 was
if necessary to gather canceled and TCT No. T-57932 [11] in the
the produce of the name of respondent was issued.
property, however, upon
receipt of the
defendant[s] of the Complainants filed a complaint[12] dated 30
balance of P15,000.00, April 2004 with the RTC, Judicial Region XI,
said defendants together Branch 34, Davao City praying that (1) the
with [their] agent and/or deed of absolute sale prepared by the
worker, Alfredo Rabadon Spouses Eustaquio and signed by the
shall clear the area and complainants be declared void, (2) TCT No.
turnover the same within T-57932 be declared void, and (3)
fifteen (15) days from respondent be made to pay damages. The
receipt [of] said balance. case was docketed as Civil Case No. 57-
[8]
2004. In his answer[13] dated 29 December
2004, respondent stated that:

In a Decision[9] dated 30 September 1977,

the CFI approved the amicable settlement. [In] 1971, ANGALAN
(SAMAL) [now deceased)
[sic] together with his son-
Complainants did not have the P30,000 in-law, MACARIO CAPUL, the
repurchase price for the latter being the town mate
property. Respondent advanced of herein defendant Delante
the P30,000 and, in return, complainants in Danao, Cebu and who is
allowed respondent to possess the married to the daughter of
property and gather its produce until he is the late ANGALAN (SAMAL),
paid. In a letter[10] dated 10 January 1979 came to herein defendants
and addressed to the barrio captain of office and sought for an
Umbay, Samal, Davao del Norte, advice to borrow money;
respondent stated that:
x x x [T]he late ANGALAN [T]he absolute deed of
(SAMAL) together with his sale, [sic] dated 15 April
children in company with 1971, executed by herein
MACARIO CAPUL, were plaintiffs in favor of
directed by herein defendant defendants EUSTAQUIO,
to inform him why it was speaks for itself. It is a sale
necessary for them to of real property and NOT a
borrow money and for mortgage.
whatever [sic] purpose; after
their story, herein defendant
disagreed as to their xxxx
justification in borrowing
money which was for no
other purpose except to
have money on their own; Contrary to the malicious
and untruthful claim of the
plaintiffs, the legal services
of defendant Atty. LEONIDO
xxxx DELANTE was never solicited
by them. Plaintiffs only
asked defendant from where
It is preposterous for they could borrow money,
plaintiff[s] to claim that they and after knowing that they
had [sic] engaged the just simply would [sic] like to
professional services of borrow money without any
herein defendant to file an concrete investments in
annulment case since mind to repay [sic] back
plaintiffs never came back [sic] any loan, defendant
apparently ashamed when Atty. LEONIDO DELANTE
they were driven out, but drove them out of his office
worse they had [sic] never and told them to look for
paid the herein defendant a another person to help
single centavo for purposes them;
of filing an annulment case
against co-defendant
NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO; Defendant Atty. LEONIDO
DELANTE later learned from
MACARIO CAPUL, who is a
x x x [T]he transfer of said friend and a town mate, and
property consisting of 8.102 who is the husband of
hectares under the name of FRANCISCA ANGALAN
herein defendants was not CAPUL, that the plaintiffs
tainted with any deceit but had negotiated a sale with a
effected legally by virtue of certain NAVARRO
a valid deed of EUSTAQUIO x x x;
sale executed by defendants
[sic] spouses EUSTAQUIO in
favor of herein defendants. In September 1977, a former
xxxx Filipino client of herein
defendant DELANTE, who,
and his family [sic] are now
permanent residents of New
York, was looking for a real
property to build his
retirement home, [sic] and
he approached herein
defendant, in which he was
referred to defendant
EUSTAQUIO [sic]; Upon
 visiting the property of Hababag directed the parties to submit
defendant EUSTAQUIO, he their position papers.
was so impressed of the
location of the property and
decided to buy the same, In a motion dated 4 April 2007 and filed
hence left the money to with the RTC, respondent and complainants
herein defendant DELANTE prayed that Civil Case No. 57-2004 be
and to buy [sic] said dismissed.Complainants filed with the
property under defendants Court a motion to withdraw the complaint
name, with the for disbarment dated 4 April 2007 and an
understanding to turn over affidavit of desistance dated April 2007.
said property to him, as
soon as he and his family
shall have returned to the
country; In his position paper dated 2 July 2007,
respondent stated that (1) Angalan and
Capul went to his office in 1971 to seek
advice about borrowing money; (2) his
x x x [S]ince herein client from New York bought the property
defendant is not interested from the Spouses Eustaquio; and (3)
over the said property as his complainants executed a motion to
own, he waited for his client withdraw the complaint for disbarment and
from New York to come an affidavit of desistance.
home and to get his
property but after 11 years,
his client decided not to
come back anymore to the In a Report dated 15 October 2007,
Philippines, and directed Commissioner Hababag found that
herein defendant to register respondent violated the Code of
the Deed of Sale over the Professional Responsibility:
property to [sic] his name
and directed herein
defendant to refund his The issue to resolve is
client.[14] whether or not respondent
committed grave violation of
[the] Code of Professional
Responsibility when he
bought the property of his
Complainants filed a complaint[15] dated 28 client[s] without their
December 2005 with the Court charging knowledge, consent and
respondent with gross violation of the Code against their will?
of Professional Responsibility. In a
Resolution[16] dated 3 July 2006, the Court
required respondent to comment on the Weighing evidence
complaint and, in a Resolution[17] dated 4
presented by both
December 2006, the Court referred the parties, respondent should
case to the Integrated Bar of the
be punished for his
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report unprofessional and
and recommendation.
distasteful acts.

In a Notice dated 14 March 2007,

xxxx
Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag
(Commissioner Hababag) directed
complainants and respondent to appear
before the IBP for a mandatory His vain attempt to
conference. The parties failed to appear at salvage his malicious acts
the mandatory conference. In an Order was too flimsy to gain
dated 16 May 2007, Commissioner belief and acceptance. It
is unbelievable that a
 buyer would entrust his Respondents credibility is highly
money intended for questionable. In his answer dated 29
payment of a property December 2004 and filed with the CFI and
but allowed that said in his position paper dated 2 July 2007 and
property be registered filed with the IBP, respondent alleged that
under the name of Angalan and Capul went to his office in
another, specifically his 1971 to seek advice about borrowing
lawyer, simply runs money. According to respondent,
counter to ordinary complainants did not engage his
human nature. (Emphasis services. In his answer, respondent stated
supplied) that:

Commissioner Hababag recommended that It is preposterous

respondent be suspended from the for [complainants] to
practice of law for six months. claim that they
had [sic] engaged the
professional services of
In a Resolution dated 22 November 2007, herein defendant to file
the IBP Board of Governors (Board) an annulment case since
adopted and approved the Report with [complainants] never came
modification. The Board increased back apparently ashamed
respondents suspension from six months when they were driven out x
to one year. x x;

Pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of xxxx

the Rules of Court,[18] the Board forwarded
the case to the Court for final action.
Contrary to the malicious
and untruthful claim
The Court sustains the findings of the IBP. of [complainants], the
legal services of
defendant Atty. LEONIDO
DELANTE was never
Complainants and respondent presented solicited by
two different sets of facts.According to them. Plaintiffs only
complainants, they engaged the services asked defendant from
of respondent for the purpose of where they could borrow
recovering their property from the Spouses money, and after knowing
Eustaquio. In violation of the trust and that they just simply would
confidence they reposed in him, like to borrow money
respondent transferred the title over the without any concrete
property to his name. According to investments in mind to
respondent, complainants did not engage repay back [sic] any loan,
his services. His client from New York was defendant Atty. LEONIDO
the one who bought the property from the DELANTE drove them out of
Spouses Eustaquio. his office and told them to
look for another person to
help them;
After a careful review of the records, the
Court gives credence to complainants
version of the facts. Defendant Atty. LEONIDO
DELANTE later learned from
MACARIO CAPUL x x x that the
plaintiffs had negotiated a sale
with a certain NAVARRO
EUSTAQUIO.[19] (Emphasis they did not engage). He stated that,
supplied) [complainants] had never paid the herein
defendant a single centavo for purposes of
The Court is not impressed. Angalan and filing an annulment case against x x x
complainants went to respondents office NAVARRO EUSTAQUIO.
not to seek advice about borrowing money
but to engage his services for the purpose The Court is not impressed. Complainants
of recovering their property. This is fully paid respondent his professional
obvious. First, after Angalan and fees. This is obvious. In a receipt dated 18
complainants went to respondents office, November 1970, respondent stated that
respondent filed a complaint with the CFI he RECEIVED from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL
praying that the Spouses Eustaquio and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the
reconvey the property to Angalan and sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO
complainants.Second, in the complaint, HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00)
respondent stated that, by reason of representing full payment of
unwarranted refusal on the part of the professional services in regard to the
defendants to reconvey the property to recovery of Original Certificate of Title No.
plaintiffs, the latter have been P-11499 in the name of Angalan
constrained to engage, and in fact (Samal). This clearly shows that
have engaged, the services of complainants paid respondent his
counsel. Third, respondent issued a professional fees.
receipt to complainants stating that
he RECEIVED from Mr. MACARIO CAPUL
and FRANCISCA RAFAEL CAPUL the
sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) In his answer and position paper,
representing full payment of respondent alleged that his client from
professional services in regard to the New York bought the property from the
recovery of Original Certificate of Title Spouses Eustaquio:
No. P-11499 in the name of Angalan
(Samal). Fourth, in respondents letter
dated 10 January 1979 and addressed to
[I]n September 1977, a
the barrio captain of Umbay, Samal, Davao former Filipino client of
del Norte, he stated that he was the lawyer
herein respondent, who, and
of complainants: his family [sic] are now
permanent residents of New
York, was looking for a real
This will inform you that the property to build his
Heirs of Angalan Samal have retirement home, and he
already redeemed their approached herein
property through me from respondent, in which [sic] he
Mr. Navarro Eustaquio since was referred to Navarro
September, 1978. In my Eustaquio; and upon visiting
capacity as counsel of the property of Navarro
the Heirs of Angalan Eustaquio, he was impressed
Samal and owner of the of [sic] the location of the
money in redeeming the property and decided to buy
property, I have authorized the same, hence left the
Mr. Macario Capol to take money to herein respondent
over the possession of the and to buy [sic] said
property together with the property under respondents
harvesting of the matured name, with the
coconuts.[20] understanding to turn over
said property to him, as soon
These clearly show that complainants as he and his family shall
engaged the services of respondent. have returned to the
In his answer, respondent alleged that country;
complainants did not pay him his
professional fees (which, according to him,
 x x x [S]ince herein
respondent was not
interested over the said
property as his own, he
waited for his client from
New York to come home and
to get his property but after
11 years, his client decided
not to come back anymore
to the Philippines, and
directed herein respondent
to register the Deed of Sale
over the property under his
name and directed herein
respondent to refund his
client.[21]
The Court is not impressed. Complainants
repurchased the property from the
Spouses Eustaquio. This is obvious. First,
complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio
entered into an amicable settlement
stating that complainants would
repurchase the property from the Spouses
Eustaquio:
1. x x x [T]he plaintiffs
have offered to the
defendant[s] the sum
of P30,000.00 as
repurchase price
which the defendant[s
accept];
2. x x x [U]pon the signing
hereof, the plaintiffs shall
pay the defendant[s] the
sum of P15,000.00 and
for this purpose hereby
authorize the defendants
to collect the same from
the Clerk of Court which
amount had been
deposited with this
Honorable Court;
Likewise, upon signing
hereof the Deed of
Reconveyance shall be
immediately executed
and delivered by the
defendants to plaintiff[s];
3. x x x [W]hile the balance
of P15,000.00 has not
been paid, the
defendant[s] shall
continue to possess, and
if necessary to gather
the produce of the
property, however, upon
receipt of the
defendant[s] of the
balance of P15,000.00,
said defendants together
with [their] agent and/or
worker, Alfredo Rabadon
shall clear the area and
turnover the same within
fifteen (15) days from
receipt [of] said balance.
[22]
(Emphasis supplied)
Second, in his letter to the barrio captain,
respondent stated that complainants
repurchased the property from the
Spouses Eustaquio:
This will inform you that
the Heirs of Angalan
Samal have already
redeemed their property
through me from Mr.
Navarro Eustaquio since
September, 1978. In my
capacity as counsel of the
Heirs of Angalan Samal and
owner of the money in
redeeming the property, I
have authorized Mr. Macario
Capol to take over the
possession of the property
together with the harvesting
of the matured coconuts.
[23]
(Emphasis supplied)
These clearly show that complainants
repurchased the property from the
Spouses Eustaquio.
Respondents story about the client from
New York is unbelievable.Respondent did
not give any detail or proof to substantiate
his story the name of the alleged client, an
affidavit of the alleged client, the old
passport of the alleged client showing
immigration stamps, or any form of
correspondence between him and the
alleged client. The Court agrees with the
observation of Commissioner Hababag that
respondents vain attempt to salvage his
malicious acts [is] too flimsy to gain belief
and acceptance.
In his position paper, respondent alleged
that complainants executed a motion to
withdraw the complaint for disbarment and
an affidavit of desistance. This is
immaterial. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court states that, No
investigation shall be interrupted or
terminated by reason of the
desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of charges, or
failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same.
Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Canon 16 states
that lawyers shall hold in trust all
properties of their clients that may
come into their possession.Respondent
should have held in trust TCT No. T-9926
and returned the property to complainants
upon demand.[24] Instead of holding in
trustthe property of complainants,
respondent (1) transferred the title of the
property to his name, (2) refused to return
the property to complainants, and (3)
referred to complainants charges as
malicious and untruthful.
Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in them. Respondent should
have been mindful of the trust and
confidence complainants reposed in
him. Complainants allege that they are
illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio
took advantage of them. Complainants
engaged the services of respondent in the
hope that he would help them recover
their property. Instead of protecting the
interests of complainants, respondent took
advantage of complainants and transferred
the title of the property to his name.
Considering the depravity of respondents
offense, the Court finds the recommended
penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16
and 17 constitutes gross misconduct.
[25]
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court states that a member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Court for gross
misconduct. In Hernandez v. Go,[26] the
Court disbarred a lawyer for transferring
the titles over the properties of his client to
his name without the knowledge of his
client. In Hernandez, the Court held that:
Considering the
depravity of respondents
offense, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP too
light. It bears reiterating that
a lawyer who takes
advantage of his clients
financial plight to acquire
the latters properties for his
own benefit is destructive of
the confidence of the public
in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of the legal
profession. Thus, for
violation of Canon 16 and
Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,
which constitutes gross
misconduct, and consistent
with the need to maintain
the high standards of the
Bar and thus preserve the
faith of the public in the
legal profession, respondent
deserves the ultimate
penalty, that of expulsion
from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers.[27]
A person who takes the 8.102-hectare
property of his illiterate clients and who is
incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a
lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty.
Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating
Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.Accordingly, the
Court DISBARS him from the practice of
law and ORDERS that his name be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all
over the country. Let a copy of this
Decision likewise be attached to the
personal records of respondent.
ARTEMIO ENDAYA, complainant,
vs. ATTY. WILFREDO
OCA, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The law is no brooding omnipresence
in the sky, so spoke Justice Holmes. He
must have made the statement because
invariably the legal system is encountered
in human form, notably through the
lawyers. For practical purposes, the
lawyers not only represent the law; they
are the law.[1] With their ubiquitous
presence in the social milieu, lawyers have
to be responsible. The problems they
create in lawyering become public
difficulties. To keep lawyers responsible
underlies the worth of the ethics of
lawyering. Indeed, legal ethics is simply
the aesthetic term for professional
responsibility.
The case before us demonstrates once
again that when a lawyerviolates his duties
to his client, the courts, the legal
profession and the public, he engages in
conduct which is both unethical and
unprofessional.
This case unfolded with a on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the
verified Complaint[2] filed on January 12,
1993 by complainant Artemio Endaya
against respondent Atty. Wifredo Oca for
violation of the lawyers oath and what
complainant termed as professional
delinquency or infidelity.[3] The antecedents
are:
On November 7, 1991, a complaint for
unlawful detainer docketed as Civil Case
No. 34-MCTC-T was filed with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo, Batangas
by Apolonia H. Hornilla, Pedro Hernandez,
Santiago Hernandez and Dominador
Hernandez against complainant and his
spouse Patrosenia Endaya.[4]
On December 13, 1991, the
complainant and his wife as defendants in
the case filed their answer which was
prepared by a certain Mr. Isaias Ramirez. A
preliminary conference was conducted on
January 17, 1992, which complainant and
his wife attended without counsel. During
the conference, complainant categorically
admitted that plaintiffs were the declared
owners for taxation purposes of the land
involved in the case. Continuation of the
preliminary conference was set on January
31, 1992. Thereafter, complainant sought
the services of the Public Attorneys Office
in Batangas City and respondent was
assigned to handle the case for the
complainant and his wife.[5]
At the continuation of the preliminary
conference, respondent appeared as
counsel for complainant and his
spouse. He moved for the amendment of
the answer previously filed by complainant
and his wife, but his motion was denied.
[6]
Thereafter, the court, presided by Acting
Trial Court Judge Teodoro M. Baral, ordered
the parties to submit their affidavits and
position papers within ten days from
receipt of the order. The court also decreed
that thirty days after receipt of the last
affidavit and position paper, or upon
expiration of the period for filing the same,
judgment shall be rendered on the case.[7]
Respondent failed to submit the
required affidavits and position paper, as
may be gleaned from the Decision dated
March 19, 1992 of the MCTC where it was
noted that only the plaintiffs submitted
their affidavits and position papers.[8]
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the
complaint for unlawful detainer principally
real parties-in-interest. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby dismissed
on the ground that the plaintiffs have no
legal capacity to sue as they are not the
real party (sic) in interest, in addition to
the fact that there is no privity of contract
between the plaintiffs and the defendants
as to the verbal lease agreement.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Plaintiffs appealed the Decision to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City,
Branch 1, where the case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 3378. On April 10, 1992, the
RTC directed the parties to file their
respective memoranda.[10] Once again,
respondent failed the complainant and his
wife. As observed by the RTC in
its Decision[11] dated September 7, 1992,
respondent did not file the memorandum
for his clients, thereby prompting the court
to consider the case as submitted for
decision.[12]
In its Decision, the RTC reversed the
decision appealed from as it held that
plaintiffs are the co-owners of the property
in dispute and as such are parties-in-
interest.[13] It also found that the verbal
lease agreement was on a month-to-month
basis and perforce terminable by the
plaintiffs at the end of any given month
upon proper notice to the defendants. [14] It
also made a finding that defendants
incurred rentals in arrears.[15] The decretal
portion of the Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
of Taysan-Lobo dated March 19, 1992, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and new one
entered, to wit:
Defendants ARTEMIO ENDAYA and
PATROSENIA ENDAYA and all persons
claiming under them are hereby ordered to
vacate and dismantle their house on the
land subject of the verbal lease agreement
at their own expense. The defendants are
likewise ordered to pay the monthly rental
of P25.00 from the month of January 1991
to November 1991 and ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS monthly from
December 1991 until the defendants finally
vacate and surrender possession of the
subject property to the plaintiffs and to pay
attorneys fee in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS.
No pronouncement as to cost.[16]
Complainant received a copy of
the Decision on October 7, 1992. Two days
later, or on October 9, 1992, complainant
confronted respondent with the adverse
decision but the latter denied receipt of a
copy thereof. Upon inquiry with the Branch
Clerk of Court, however, complainant
found out that respondent received his
copy back on September 14, 1992.[17]
Having lost the unlawful detainer case,
on January 12, 1993 complainant filed the
present administrative complaint against
the respondent for professional
delinquency consisting of his failure to file
the required pleadings in behalf of the
complainant and his spouse. Complainant
contends that due to respondents inaction
he lost the opportunity to present his
cause and ultimately the case itself.[18]
In his Comment[19] dated March 17,
1993, respondent denies that he
committed professional misconduct in
violation of his oath, stressing that he was
not the original counsel of complainant and
his spouse.[20] He further avers that when
he agreed to represent complainant at the
continuation of the preliminary conference
in the main case, it was for the sole
purpose of asking leave of court to file an
amended answer because he was made to
believe by the complainant that the
answer was prepared by a non-lawyer.
Upon discovering that the answer was in
fact the work of a lawyer, forthwith he
asked the court to relieve him as
complainants counsel, but he was denied.
He adds that he agreed to file the position
paper for the complainant upon the latters
undertaking to provide him with the
documents which support the position that
plaintiffs are not the owners of the
property in dispute. As complainant had
reneged on his promise, he claims that he
deemed it more prudent not to file any
position paper as it would be a repetition of
the answer. He offers the same reason for
not filing the memorandum on appeal with
the RTC. Finally, respondent asserts that he
fully explained his stand as regards Civil
Case No. 34-MCTC-T to the complainant.[21]
Pursuant to our Resolution[22] dated
May 10, 1993, complainant filed
his Reply[23] to
respondents Comment wherein he merely
reiterated his allegations in the Complaint.
On July 28, 1993, this Court directed
respondent to file his rejoinder within ten
days from notice of our Resolution.[24] But
he failed to do so despite the lapse of a
considerable period of time. This prompted
the Court to require respondent to show
cause why he should not be disciplinarily
dealt with or held in contempt and to file
his rejoinder, both within ten (10) days
from notice.[25]
In his Explanation[26] dated February
28, 1997, respondent admits having
received a copy of the resolution requiring
him to file a rejoinder. However, he asserts
that he purposely did not file a rejoinder
for he believed in good faith that a
rejoinder to complainants reply is no longer
necessary.[27] He professes that in electing
not to file a rejoinder he did not intend to
cast disrespect upon the Court.[28]
On June 16, 1997, we referred this
case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for
evaluation, report and recommendation.[29]
In its Report[30] dated February 6,
2001, the Office of the Bar Confidant found
respondent negligent in handling the case
of complainant and his wife and
recommended that he be suspended from
the practice of law for one month. The
pertinent portions of the Report read, thus:
It is to be noted that after appearing at the
preliminary conference before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, respondent
was never heard from again. Respondents
seeming indifference to the cause of his
client, specially when the case was on
appeal, caused the defeat of herein
complainant. Respondent practically
abandoned complainant in the midst of a
storm. This is even more made serious of
the fact that respondent, at that time, was
assigned at the Public Attorneys Office- a
government entity mandated to provide
free and competent legal assistance.
A lawyers devotion to his clients cause not
only requires but also entitles him to
deploy every honorable means to secure
for the client what is justly due him or to
present every defense provided by law to
enable the latters cause to succeed.
(Miraflor vs. Hagad, 244 SCRA 106)
....
The facts, however, do not show that
respondent employed every legal and
honorable means to advance the cause of
his client. Had respondent tried his best,
he could have found some other defenses
available to his client; but respondent was
either too lazy or too convinced that his
client had a losing case.
....
For intentionally failing to submit the
pleadings required by the court,
respondent practically closed the door to
the possibility of putting up a fair fight for
his client. As the Court once held, A client
is bound by the negligence of his lawyer.
(Diaz-Duarte vs. Ong, 298 SCRA 388)[31]
However, the Bar Confidant did not
find complainant entirely faultless.She
observed, viz:
Respondents allegation that complainant
failed in his promise to submit the
documents to support his claim was not
denied by complainant; hence, it is
deemed admitted. Complainant is not
without fault; for misrepresenting that he
could prove his claim through supporting
documents, respondent was made to
believe that he had a strong leg to stand
on. A party cannot blame his counsel for
negligence when he himself was guilty of
neglect. (Macapagal vs. Court of Appeals,
271 SCRA 491)[32]
On April 18, 2001, we referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.
Several hearings were set by the IBP
but complainant did not appear even
once. Respondent attended five hearings,
but he failed to present evidence in
support of his defense, as required by
Investigating Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez. This compelled the latter to
make his report on the basis of the
pleadings and evidence forwarded by the
Office of the Bar Confidant.
On October 11, 2002, Commissioner
Fernandez issued his Report[33]wherein he
concurred with the findings and
recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
In a Resolution[34] dated April 26, 2003,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted
the Report of Commissioner Fernandez.
The Court is convinced that
respondent violated the lawyers oath not
only once but a number of times in regard
to the handling of his clients cause. The
repeated violations also involve defilement
of several Canons in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Right off, the Court notes that
respondent attributes his failure to file the
required pleadings for the complainant and
his wife invariably to his strong personal
belief that it was unnecessary or futile to
file the pleadings. This was true with
respect to the affidavits and position paper
at the MCTC level, the appeal
memorandum at the RTC level and the
rejoinder at this Courts level. In the last
instance, it took respondent as long as
three years, under compulsion of a show
cause order at that, only to manifest his
predisposition not to file a rejoinder after
all. In other words, at the root of
respondents transgressions is his seeming
stubborn mindset against the acts required
of him by the courts. This intransigent
attitude not only belies lack of diligence
and commitment but evinces absence of
respect for the authority of this Court and
the other courts involved.
The lawyers oath embodies the
fundamental principles that guide every
member of the legal fraternity. From it
springs the lawyers duties and
responsibilities that any infringement
thereof can cause his disbarment,
suspension or other disciplinary action.[35]
Found in the oath is the duty of a
lawyer to protect and safeguard the
interest of his client. Specifically, it
requires a lawyer to conduct himself to the
best of his knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
his clients.[36] This duty is further stressed
in Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates that (A)
lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence.
In this case, evidence abound that
respondent failed to demonstrate the
required diligence in handling the case of
complainant and his spouse. As found by
the Office of the Bar Confidant,[37] after
appearing at the second preliminary
conference before the MCTC, respondent
had not been heard of again until he
commented on the complaint in this
case. Without disputing this fact,
respondent reasons out that his
appearance at the conference was for the
sole purpose of obtaining leave of court to
file an amended answer and that when he
failed to obtain it because of complainants
fault he asked the court that he be relieved
as counsel.[38] The explanation has
undertones of dishonesty for complainant
had engaged respondent for the entire
case and not for just one incident. The
alternative conclusion is that respondent
did not know his procedure for under the
Rules on Summary Procedure[39] the
amended answer is a prohibited pleading.
Even assuming respondent did in fact
ask to be relieved, this could not mean
that less was expected from him. Once a
lawyer takes the cudgels for a clients case,
he owes it to his client to see the case to
the end. This, we pointed out in Legarda v.
Court of Appeals,[40] thus:
It should be remembered that the moment
a lawyer takes a clients cause, he
covenants that he will exert all effort for its
prosecution until its final conclusion. A
lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence
or abandons his clients cause make him
unworthy of the trust reposed on him by
the latter.[41]
Also, we held in Santiago v. Fojas,
[42]
every case a lawyer accepts deserves
his full attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its importance
and whether he accepts if for a fee or for
free. In other words, whatever the lawyers
reason is for accepting a case, he is duty
bound to do his utmost in prosecuting or
defending it.
Moreover, a lawyer continues to be a
counsel of record until the lawyer-client
relationship is terminated either by the act
of his client or his own act, with permission
of the court. Until such time, the lawyer is
expected to do his best for the interest of
his client [43]
Thus, when respondent was directed
to file affidavits and position paper by the
MCTC, and appeal memorandum by the
RTC, he had no choice but to
comply. However, respondent did not
bother to do so, in total disregard of the
court orders. This constitutes negligence
and malpractice proscribed by Rule 18.03
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates that (A)
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him
liable.
Respondents failure to file the
affidavits and position paper at the MCTC
did not actually prejudice his clients, for
the court nevertheless rendered a decision
favorable to them. However, the failure
is per se a violation of Rule 18.03.
 It was respondents failure to file
appeal memorandum before the RTC which
made complainant and his wife suffer as it
resulted in their loss of the case. As found
by the Office of the Bar Confidant, to which
we fully subscribe, in not filing the appeal
memorandum respondent denied
complainant and his spouse the chance of
putting up a fair fight in the dispute. Canon
19 prescribes that (A) lawyer shall
represent his client with zeal within the
bounds of the law. He should exert all
efforts to avail of the remedies allowed
under the law. Respondent did not do so,
thereby even putting to naught the
advantage which his clients apparently
gained by prevailing at the MCTC
level. Verily, respondent did not even
bother to put up a fight for his clients.
Clearly, his conduct fell short of
what Canon 19requires and breached the
trust reposed in him by his clients.
We cannot sustain respondents excuse
in not filing the affidavits and position
paper with the MCTC and the appeal
memorandum with the RTC.He claims that
he did not file the required pleadings
because complainant failed to furnish him
with evidence that would substantiate
complainants allegations in the answer. He
argues that absent the supporting
documents, the pleadings he could have
filed would just be a repetition of the
answer.However, respondent admits in his
comment that complainant furnished him
with the affidavit of persons purporting to
be barangay officials attesting to an
alleged admission by Felomino Hernandez,
the brother of the plaintiffs in the unlawful
detainer case, that he had already bought
the disputed property.[44] This did not
precipitate respondent into action despite
the evidentiary value of the affidavit, which
was executed by disinterested persons.
Said affidavit could have somehow
bolstered the claim of complainant and his
wife which was upheld by the MCTC that
plaintiffs are not the real parties-in-
interest. While respondent could have
thought this affidavit to be without
probative value, he should have left it to
the sound judgment of the court to
determine whether the affidavit supports
the assertions of his clients. That could
have happened had he filed the required
position paper and annexed the affidavit
thereto.
Further, notwithstanding his belief that
without the supporting documents filing
the required pleadings would be a futile
exercise, still respondent should have
formally and promptly manifested in court
his intent not to file the pleadings to
prevent delay in the disposition of the
case.[45]Specifically, the RTC would not
have waited as it did for the lapse of three
months from June 5,1992, the date when
plaintiffs-appellants submitted their appeal
memorandum, before it rendered
judgment. Had it known that respondent
would not file the appeal memorandum,
the court could have decided the case
much earlier.
For his failure to inform the court,
respondent violated Canon 12, to wit:
Canon 12: A lawyer shall exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of
justice.
Respondent likewise failed to
demonstrate the candor he owed his
client. Canon 17 provides that (A) lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. When
complainant received the RTC decision, he
talked to respondent about it.[46] However,
respondent denied knowledge of the
decision despite his receipt thereof as
early as September 14, 1992. Obviously,
he tried to evade responsibility for his
negligence. In doing so, respondent was
untruthful to complainant and effectively
betrayed the trust placed in him by the
latter.
On top of all these is respondents
employment as a lawyer of the Public
Attorneys Office which is tasked to provide
free legal assistance for indigents and low-
income persons so as to promote the rule
of law in the protection of the rights of the
citizenry and the efficient and speedy
administration of justice.[47] Against this
backdrop, respondent should have been
more judicious in the performance of his
professional obligations. As we held
in Vitriola v. Dasig[48] lawyers in the
government are public servants who owe
the utmost fidelity to the public service.
Furthermore, a lawyer from the
government is not exempt from observing
the degree of diligence required in
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 6 of the Code provides that the
canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of
their official tasks.
At this juncture, it bears stressing that
much is demanded from those who engage
in the practice of law because they have a
duty not only to their clients, but also to
the court, to the bar, and to the public. The
lawyers diligence and dedication to his
work and profession not only promote the
interest of his client, it likewise help attain
the ends of justice by contributing to the
proper and speedy administration of cases,
bring prestige to the bar and maintain
respect to the legal profession.[49]
The determination of the appropriate
penalty to be imposed on an errant
attorney involves the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the facts of the
case.[50] In cases of similar nature, the
penalty imposed by this Court consisted of
reprimand,[51] fine of five hundred pesos
with warning,[52] suspension of three
months,[53] six months,[54] and even
disbarment in aggravated cases.[55]
The facts and circumstances in this
case indubitably show respondents failure
to live up to his duties as a lawyer in
consonance with the strictures of the
lawyers oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thereby warranting his
suspension from the practice of law. At
various stages of the unlawful detainer
case, respondent was remiss in the
performance of his duty as counsel.
To reiterate, respondent did not submit
the affidavits and position paper when
required by the MCTC. With his resolution
not to file the pleadings already firmed up,
he did not bother to inform the MCTC of his
resolution in mockery of the authority of
the court. His stubbornness continued at
the RTC, for despite an order to file an
appeal memorandum, respondent did not
file any. Neither did he manifest before the
court that he would no longer file the
pleading, thus further delaying the
proceedings. He had no misgivings about
his deviant behavior, for despite receipt of
a copy of the adverse decision by the RTC
he opted not to inform his clients
accordingly. Worse, he denied knowledge
of the decision when confronted by the
complainant about it.
At this Courts level, respondents
stubborn and uncaring demeanor surfaced
again when he did not file a rejoinder to
complainants reply.
Respondents story projects in vivid
detail his appalling indifference to his
clients cause, deplorable lack of respect for
the courts and a brazen disregard of his
duties as a lawyer.
However, we are not unmindful of
some facts which extenuate respondents
misconduct. First, when complainant
sought the assistance of respondent as a
PAO lawyer, he misrepresented that his
answer was prepared by someone who is
not a lawyer. Second, when complainant
showed respondent a copy of their answer
with the MCTC, he assured him that he had
strong evidence to support the defense in
the answer that plaintiffs were no longer
the owners of the property in dispute.
However, all that he could provide
respondent was the affidavit of the
barangay officials. Last but not least, it is
of public knowledge that the Public
Attorneys Office is burdened with a heavy
caseload.
All things considered, we conclude that
suspension for two (2) months from the
practice of law is the proper and just
penalty.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty.
Wilfredo Oca is ordered SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for two (2) months from
notice, with the warning that a similar
misconduct will be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to respondents personal record in
the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies
be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and
to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.