REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)

FAR EASTERN UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF LAW
2nd Semester, SY 2016-2017

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAWS

Prof. Roentgen F. Bronce

Are you planning to follow a career in

Magical Law, Miss Granger? asked Scrimgeour.
No, Im not, retorted Hermione. Im
hoping to do some good in the world!
-Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows

I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A. Introduction
1. Definition and Scope
2. Historical Development

Cruz, C. L. Philippine Administrative Law (2016), Chapter 1

Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. PSC, 70 Phil 221 (1940)
B. Nature of Administrative Agencies

1. The Structure of Government

Sec. 2 (General Terms Defined), Introductory Provisions, EO 292
2. Doctrine of Separation of Powers

Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936)

FACTS
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pe
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of membe
the National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.

On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as memb
elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of vo

On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commissio
Motion of Protest against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only pro
filed after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that s
respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or
the election of said position be nullified.
ISSUE
W/N the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?

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RULING
Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional org
created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may no
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that i
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subjec
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government,
even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropr
cases. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutio
grant to the Electoral Commission as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.

DOCTRINE:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not thro
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it d
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitut
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provi
for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the vari
departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far mad
check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however
subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the Presiden
approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. T
President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the ot
hand, the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through
Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrenc
a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power
determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction
to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a cer
extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in tu
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of
Constitution.

Macalintal vs. COMELEC, G.R.No.157013 (2003). Only the Concurring and

Dissenting Opinion of Puno, J.
FACTS
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of
the said act one of the grounds, among others:
That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same section) to exercise the
power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and

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Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the

independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUE
Whether or not the provision is constitutional
RULING
No. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the second sentence in its
second paragraph allowing Congress to exercise the power to review, revise,
amend, and approve the IRR that the COMELEC shall promulgate, is violative of
Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

DOCTRINE:
Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
(JCOC), as follows:

Sec. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.a Joint Congressional

Oversight Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and
seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of
the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other
Members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives: Provided, that of the seven (7) members to be designated by
each House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the
remaining three (3) from the minority.

The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and
evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve
the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission.

All the parties, petitioner and respondents alike, are unanimous in claiming that
Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue
forged on this question raised by petitioner. However, the Court finds it expedient
to expound on the role of Congress through the JCOC vis--vis the independence
of the COMELEC as a constitutional body, as aptly provided for under Art. IX-A,
Sec. 1, which reads Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and
the Commission on Audit.

The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is

circumscribed by other constitutional provisions, one of which is the
aforementioned provision on the independence of constitutional commissions. The
Court has held that whatever may be the nature of the functions of the
Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution wanted it
to be independent from the other departments of the Government.

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a

distinct and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its

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functions, it should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully

warranted in the case of a less responsible organization. The Commission may err,
so may this court also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in devising
means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for
which it was created free, orderly and honest elections. We may not agree fully
with its choice of means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross
abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter,
and political questions must be dealt with realistically not from the standpoint of
pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its
contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual
experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous
position to decide complex political questions.

The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an

independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is,
to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold
that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws,
Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority. In line with this, this Court
holds that Section 25 of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional and must therefore be
stricken off from the said law.

Sec. 12, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not
be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function.

Manila Electric Co., vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil. 600 (1932)
In Re: Rodolfo Manzano, 166 SCRA 246 (1988)
FACTS
Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur
Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on
Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in
the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position
as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of
judiciary.
ISSUE
W/N he can be a member of such committee
RULING
The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the
Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions
(Sec.12, Art.VIII, 1987 Constitution).

An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that

Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of

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cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus
alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions
of the Committee are

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or
judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and
refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial

to the proper administration of criminal justice.

It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative

functions.

DOCTRINE:
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the promulgation of
rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are
devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit
Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29
September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of
Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:

2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be

enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its
doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to
assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the
principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the
trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice
Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or
legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to
the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of
adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of
respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less.

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic
insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As
incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity
and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such
structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-
members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render
assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they
exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment
of their judicial duties.

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3. Creation and Abolition of Administrative Agencies

Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 90482 (1991)

Eugenio vs. CSC, 243 SCRA 196 (1995)
FACTS
Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was
given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by
the Career Executive Service Board.

Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the
CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and
authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution
states:

Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the
Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly,
the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive
Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.

Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service
Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed
the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.
ISSUE
W/N the CSC has the power to abolish the CESB
RULING
The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1,
1974. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can
only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that
the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the
abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from
1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the
CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be
read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under
the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commissions power
to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..
2. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view

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the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and
positive outlook.
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was notmade to fall within the
control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to
attain policy and program coordination. This is clearly etched out in Section
38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department
or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation,
either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted
by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of
periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and
having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal
policies of the attached corporation or agency.
NOTES:
Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be
headed by a Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such
divisions as are necessary independent constitutional body, the
Commissionmay effect changes in the organization as the need arises.
Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The Commission shall have the
following offices:
(1) The Office of the Executive
(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2)
members
(3) The Office of Legal Affairs
(4) The Office of Planning and Management
(5) The Central Administrative Office.
(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records
(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation
(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards
(10) The Office of Human Resource Development
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit.
(12) The Office of Personnel Relations
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs
(14) The Office of Retirement
(15) The Regional and Field Offices.
DOCTRINE:
The Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1994 which adopted the Integrated Reorganization Plan.
As the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This

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follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices
is primarily a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public
Officers and Employees, viz: Except for such offices as are created by the
Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function. In so far
as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it
is supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable,
necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government, it is necessary to
create and define duties the legislative department has the discretion to determine
whether additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached
to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the
legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of
filling the office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit,
abolish the office." In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law
authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General
Appropriation Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the
operation of CESB.

Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998)

Sec. 31 in relation to Secs. 21-23, Book III, EO 292

Section 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. - The President,
subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common staff
Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as
well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies;
and

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as
well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.

Section 21. Organization. - The Office of the President shall consist of the Office of the President
Proper and the agencies under it.

Section 22. Office of the President Proper. -

(1) The Office of the President Proper shall consist of the Private Office, the Executive Office, the
Common Staff Support System, and the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System;

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(2) The Executive Office refers to the Offices of the Executive Secretary, Deputy Executive
Secretaries and Assistant Executive Secretaries;

(3) The Common Staff Support System embraces the offices or units under the general categories
of development and management, general government administration and internal administration;
and

(4) The President Special Assistants/Advisers System includes such special assistants or advisers
as may be needed by the President.

Section 23. The Agencies under the Office of the President. - The agencies under the Office of the
President refer to those offices placed under the chairmanship of the President, those under the
supervision and control of the President, those under the administrative supervision of the Office
of the President, those attached to it for policy and program coordination, and those that are not
placed by law or order creating them under any specific department.

Pichay vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary, 677 SCRA 408 (2012)
FACTS
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive
Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs(ODESLA), more
particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
ISSUE
W/N EO 13 constitutional
RULING
Yes. Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose:

(1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,

including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System
and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating, or merging
units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and

(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or
Agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies.4

In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora5 the Court affirmed that the
President's authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or agency of the
executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292,
thus:

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But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any
department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not
lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of
power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. (Emphasis supplied)

And in Domingo v. Zamora,6 the Court gave the rationale behind the President's
continuing authority in this wise:

The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency."
The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain
effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped
and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives
and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the
President. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division
specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the
President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own
office pursuant to E.O. 292.

Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to

transferring either an office or a function from the Office of the President to another
Department or Agency, and the other way around.7

Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal
structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as
extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic
move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another. Again, in
Domingo v. Zamora8 the Court noted:

However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to
reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the
President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another.
In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to
reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the
Office of the

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President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of

the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.

The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on
the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects
employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the
reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the
limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it
was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of
Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly "under the
Office of the President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions
of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the
President Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President
Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.

DOCTRINE:
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and
distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body
were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office
of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration
of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third
division the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division through which ODESLA
could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.
In Canonizado v. Aguirre,12 We ruled that

Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of

government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.

Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 637 SCRA 78 (2010)
FACTS
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather,
collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It
may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less

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order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts
of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
a. E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress
to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

b. The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which
was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
ISSUE
W/N E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
RULING
Section 31 contemplates reorganization as limited by the following functional and
structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any
agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices,
or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to
situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned,
much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in
the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President
under Section 31 is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable
to the term restructure an alteration of an existing structure. Evidently, the PTC was
not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of
Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive
Secretary,[46]

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any
department or agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not
lose sight of the very source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of
power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office

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of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre
[323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing
structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control,
authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject
to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of
control. Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter.[47] Clearly, the power of control is
entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in
the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from
Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The
Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the
authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute
this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean
that he is bereft of such authority.[51] As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v.
Manglapus:[52]

x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of

government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers
by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government with
provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to
enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and
whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution
itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of
the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other
powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over
the country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes
limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact
what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily,

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the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum
of specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.

C. Control of Administrative Action

1. By the President
Secs. 1, 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
Secs. 1-7, 21-23, Book III, EO 292
Secs. 1, 38, Book IV, EO 292
Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 (1989)

a. Control and Supervision

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1990)

Moran vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 192957 (2014)
FACTS
The late Emmanuel Moran filed a case against PGA Cars Inc. before the Consumer
Arbitration Office of the DTI under the provisions of Republic Act 7934, or the
Consumer Act of the Philippines, alleging that the company should be held liable
for the product imperfections of a BMW car which he bought from the company.
The CAO then rendered a decision in favour of Emmanuel, ordering PGA Cars to
refund the purchase price of the car as well as payment of litigations and
administrative fines. It motion for reconsideration denied by the CAO, it appealed
to the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, which also denied its
appeal, thus the company elevated its appeal to the Office of the President. By
decision dated April 3, 2007, the OP reversed the decision of the CAO, noting that
none of the conditions under Art. 98 of RA 7943 were present in the case; the
company cannot be heeled liable for product imperfection because it is not the
manufacturer of the product but only its seller; it was only after the lapse of
considerable time that the complainant filed the complaint. The complainant
sought reconsideration of the OP decision but was denied, hence, it filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it for being the wrong
mode of appeal and for failure to state the material dates.
ISSUE
W/N CA correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that
petitioner resorted to a wrong mode of appeal
RULING
Under the Consumer Act (RA 7394), the DTI has the authority and the mandate to
act upon complaints filed by consumers pursuant to the State policy of protecting
the consumeragainst deceptive, unfair and unconscionable sales, acts or practices.
Said law provided for an arbitration procedure whereby consumer complaints are

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heard and investigated by consumer arbitration officers whose decisions are

appealable to the DTI Secretary. Article 166 thereof provides:

ART. 166. Decision on Appeal. The Secretary shall decide the appeal within
thirty (30) days fromreceipt thereof.1wphi1 The decision becomes final after
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof unless a petition for certiorari is filed with
the proper court. (Emphasis supplied.)

The procedure for appeals to the OP is governed by Administrative Order No.

18,14 Series of 1987. Section 1 thereof provides:

SECTION 1. Unless otherwise governed by special laws, an appeal to the Office

of the President shall be taken within thirty (30) days from receipt by the
aggrieved party of the decision/resolution/order complained of or appealed from
(Emphasis supplied.)

In Phillips Seafood (Philippines) Corporation v. The Board of Investments,15 we

interpreted the above provision and declared that "a decision or order issued by a
department or agency need notbe appealed to the Office of the President when
there is a speciallaw that provides for a different mode of appeal." Thus:

Petitioner further contends that from the decision of respondent BOI, appeal to the
Office of the President should be allowed; otherwise, the constitutional power of
the President to review acts of department secretaries will be rendered illusory by
mere rules of procedure.

The executive power of control over the acts of department secretaries is laid down
in Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. The power of control has been
defined as the "power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify orset aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."

DOCTRINE:
Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the
executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative
control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be
effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions. All the
more in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case.Appeals are
remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Courts rulemaking
power. The Rules of Procedure was issued by the Court pursuant to Section 5,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules concerning the procedure in all courts.

Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an

exception to the remedyof appeal to the Office of the President from the decisions
of executive departments and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a decision or

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order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the
President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal.

Mondano vs. Silvosa, G.R. No. L-7708 (1955)

Phil. Gamefowl Commission vs. IAC, 146 SCRA 294(1986)

FACTS
The issue arose when Hee Acusar, who was operating the lone cockpit in Bogo, was
ordered to relocate the same pursuant to P.D. No. 449, the Cockfighting Law of 1974,
on the ground that it was situated in a tertiary commercial zone, a prohibited area. 1
Although the period of grace for such relocation was extended to June 11, 1980 by
P.D. 1535, Acusar failed to comply with the requirement, as a result of which the
Philippine Constabulary considered the cockpit phased out. 2 To add to his troubles,
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in a petition to compel the municipal mayor to
issue Acusar a permit to operate a cockpit, declared that he had waived his right to a
renewal thereof because of his failure to relocate.
On July 24, 1980, Santiago Sevilla, private respondent herein, was granted a license
to operate a cockpit by Mayor Celestino E. Martinez by authority of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Bogo and with subsequent approval of the PC Regional Command 7 as
required by law.
Acusar went to the Philippine Gamefowl Commission seeking a renewal of his
cockpit license and the cancellation of Sevilla's.
The Philippine Gamefowl Commission issued its resolution on the merits of Acusar's
petition and ordered Mayor Martinez and the Sangguniang Bayan "to issue the
necessary mayor's permit in favor of Hee Acusar" and "to cancel and/or revoke the
mayor's permit in favor of Engr. Santiago A. Sevilla."
ISSUE
W/N the PGC has the power of control over the subject cockpits and compel the
Mayor to issue license
RULING
According to the Local Government Code, the municipal mayor has the power
to "grant licenses and permits in accordance with existing laws and municipal
ordinances and revoke them for violation of the conditions upon which they
have been granted," 15 and the Sangguniang Bayan is authorized to "regulate
cockpits, cockfighting and the keeping or training of gamecocks, subject to
existing guidelines promulgated by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission."
16

A study of the above-cited powers shows that it is the municipal mayor with
the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to
issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits. Even the regulation of
cockpits is vested in the municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid
down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. Its power to license is limited
only to international derbies and does not extend to ordinary cockpits. Over

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the latter kind of cockpits, it has the power not of control but only of review
and supervision.

We have consistently held that supervision means "overseeing or the power or

authority of an officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such
action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties." 17
Supervision is a lesser power than control, which connotes "the power of the
officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter. " 18 Review, on the other hand, is a reconsideration or
reexamination for purposes of correction. 19

As thus defined, the power of supervision does not snow the supervisor to
annul the acts of the subordinate, for that comes under the power of control.
What it can do only is to see to it that the subordinate performs his duties in
accordance with law. The power of review is exercised to determine whether
it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is
necessary, it must be done by the authority exercising control over the
subordinate or through the instrumentality of the courts of justice, unless the
subordinate motu proprio corrects himself after his error is called to his
attention by the official exercising the power of supervision and review over
him.

At that, even the power of review vested in the Philippine Gamefowl

Commission by P.D. 1802-A may have been modified by the Local
Government Code, which became effective on February 14, 1983. Under the
Code, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is supposed to examine the ordinances,
resolutions and executive orders issued by the municipal government and to
annul the same, but only on one ground, to wit, that it is beyond the powers of
the municipality or ultra vires. 20 Significantly, no similar authority is
conferred in such categorical terms on the Philippine Gamefowl Commission
regarding the licensing and regulation of cockpits by the municipal
government.

b. Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

Angeles vs. Gaite, G.R. No. 165276 (2009)

FACTS
It appears that sometime in June 1999, petitioner was charged of child abuse by her
grandniece Maria Mercedes Vistan. The preliminary investigation of the complaint

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was assigned to State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (respondent Velasco) of the

Department of Justice (DOJ). In a Resolution dated June 20, 1999, respondent
Velasco filed a case against petitioner for 21 counts of Child Abuse under Republic
Act (RA) No. 7610. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ Secretary
who, in a Resolution dated April 4, 2000, ordered the withdrawal of the Information
against petitioner. On July 7, 2000, petitioner filed with the DOJ an administrative
complaint for Gross Misconduct, Gross Ignorance of the Law, Incompetence and
Manifest Bad Faith against respondent Velasco, which the DOJ subsequently
dismissed. On reconsideration, Velasco submitted a comment which contained
statements pertaining to Judge Velasco's sexuality.

On the basis of the above statements which petitioner claimed to be a direct attack on
her character and reputation as a public servant, she filed a Complaint for four counts
of libel against respondent Velasco before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila. It was dismissed. Petitioner Judge was clearly undaunted, as she filed a
petition for review with the DOJ of the dismissal. The petition was, again, dismissed,
even upon reconsideration.

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review Before the OP questioning the DOJ
Resolutions dismissing her petition. The OP dismissed the Petition for Review,
stating that under Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 58 dated 29 May 2003, no appeal
from or petition for review of the decision or resolution of the Secretary of Justice on
preliminary investigation of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the
President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

Petitioner thereafter filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 assailing
the OP order. In denying the petition, the CA applied the doctrine laid down in Carpio
v. Executive Secretary regarding the power of control of the President over all
executive branches of the government, in relation to the doctrine of qualified political
agency. The CA then ruled that the OP, relying on MC No. 58, dismissed petitioner's
petition for review and exercised its prerogative not to disapprove or overturn the
DOJ Secretary's resolutions, thus, approving the acts or decision of the DOJ
Secretary, being her alter ego.

The CA also held that the OP's outright dismissal of petitioner's Petition for Review
was valid and binding, and was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. It found
that the DOJ resolutions dismissing petitioner's petition for review became final and
executory after petitioner failed to elevate the said DOJ resolutions directly with the
CA in a petition for certiorari within the 60-day reglementary period provided for
under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE
W/N CA was erroneous in applying the doctrine of qualified political agency
RULING
The President himself set the limits of his power to review
decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the

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disposition of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly

expands the power of the Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the
Chief Executive helpless to rectify whatever errors or abuses the former may commit
in the exercise of his discretion is purely speculative to say the least. Petitioner
cannot second-guess the President's power and the President's own judgment to
delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to achieve proper and
speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a cabinet
secretary - his own alter ego.

DOCTRINE:
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency - The official acts of a Department Secretary
are deemed to be the acts directly of the President herself unless disapproved or
reprobated by the latter; that it was the OPs prerogative to determine whether or not
it shall consent to exercise its general appellate jurisdiction in any given case
emanating from the Chief Executives power of control over all executive officers
from Cabinet secretaries to the lowliest ranks.

2. By the Legislative Department

Secs. 21-22, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

Macalintal vs. COMELEC, supra
ABAKADA Guro vs. Purisima, G.R. No. 166715 (2008)

FACTS
Petitioners seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing
Republic Act (RA) 9335. R.A. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage
BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment
status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend
that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
transforms the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do their best only in
consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives
invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of
these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,

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integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to
officials and employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix
revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that
matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall
short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the
revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has
been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable
target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and
completed upon the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE
W/N the doctrine of separation of powers has been violated in the creation of a
congressional oversight committee.
RULING
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the
purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by
the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006, it approved the
said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the
issue of its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and
enforcing the law may be considered moot and academic.

This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront
the issue of the constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that matter).

The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of
congressional oversight in Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34 is
illuminating:

Concept and bases of congressional oversight

Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by

Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of

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legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures

undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional
perception of public interest.

The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative
power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. x x x x x x x x x

Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased
frequency to check the perceived "exponential accumulation of power" by the
executive branch. By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress has delegated an
enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the
administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that
the administrative agencies perform their functions within the authority delegated
to them. x x x x x x x x x

Categories of congressional oversight functions

The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may
be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.

a. Scrutiny

Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to

administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy and
efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of legislative
scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of
government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of
the agency involved.

xxx xxx xxx

b. Congressional investigation

While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the

facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a more intense
digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct investigation is recognized by
the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxx

c. Legislative supervision

The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight
power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and
informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding executive

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operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and

investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to
influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows
Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits
Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.

Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power.
It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an executive
agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law. These
provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations
to Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before
it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed
regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if
Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime.
Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if
Congress affirmatively approves it.

Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of

power between the legislative and the executive branches of government as it
offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the executive branch or to
independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of
such power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They
contend that this arrangement promotes democratic accountability as it provides
legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative agencies. One
proponent thus explains:

It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply
embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of
modern government have often led Congress-whether by actual or perceived
necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory
standards, leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive
officer. Congress articulates legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the
judgment of parties who may or may not have participated in or agreed with the
development of those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances
the reverse of our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the
Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to enact new
legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of overseeing post
enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to
determine whether its policies have been implemented in accordance with
legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention is appropriate.

Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon
the executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment measures
undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the separation of powers

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guaranteed by the Constitution. They contend that legislative veto constitutes an

impermissible evasion of the Presidents veto authority and intrusion into the
powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of government. Proponents
counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers as it prevents the
executive branch and independent agencies from accumulating too much power.
They submit that reporting requirements and congressional committee
investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-
making authority. They do not allow Congress to review executive proposals
before they take effect and they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing and
binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits
Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of
"subordinate law" or those enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a
delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a
necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside
its chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative veto
"is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control over the
evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute."

In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court

resolved the validity of legislative veto provisions. The case arose from the order
of the immigration judge suspending the deportation of Chadha pursuant to
244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States House of
Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to 244(c)(2)
authorizing either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of
the executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in the United
States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement
the House order and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration
Appeals dismissed the aliens appeal, holding that it had no power to declare
unconstitutional an act of Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for Ninth
Circuit held that the House was without constitutional authority to order the aliens
deportation and that 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine on separation
of powers.

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the
Court shied away from the issue of separation of powers and instead held that the
provision violates the presentment clause and bicameralism. It held that the one-
house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is subject
to the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a
majority of both Houses and presentment to the President. x x x x x x x x x

Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision,
two lower court decisions invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural
Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of
1980. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes containing
legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions required the approval

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of both Houses of Congress and thus met the bicameralism requirement of Article
I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even exercised.35 (emphasis
supplied)

In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional

oversight and considering the nature and powers of a constitutional body like the
Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the provision in RA 9189 (The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee.
The committee was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the implementation of
the said law but also to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by
the Commission on Elections. The Court held that these functions infringed on the
constitutional independence of the Commission on Elections.36

With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional

per se, meaning, it neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the
executive power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation
of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it
prevents the over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the

legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on
Congress.37 It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its members with either
executive or judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must
follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures"
specified under the Constitution,39 including the procedure for enactment of laws
and presentment.

Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to

scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined
to the following:

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget
hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to
appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation40 and

(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the

power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.42

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an

administrative agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations
of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains

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a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take

effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight
committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed to attach a
congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to
which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers.43 It radically
changes the design or structure of the Constitutions diagram of power as it
entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its own
laws.44

Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy
within the broad horizons of its legislative competence.45 It can itself formulate
the details or it can assign to the executive branch the responsibility for making
necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.46 In the latter
case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive branch or
the concerned administrative agency when it formulates rules and regulations
implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or ascertain
facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).48

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and

interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are
entitled to respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a
statute50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As
such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate
case by a competent court.51 Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an
overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of
approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the
Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335,
Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this
Court by the Constitution.

3. By the Judicial Department

Sec. 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Art. 7, Civil Code

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Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

4. By the Ombudsman
Secs. 12-13, Article XI, 1987 Constitution
D. Powers and Functions of Administrative Agencies
1. In General
Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940)

FACTS
The National Traffic Commission recommended the Director of Public Works and to
the Secretary of Public Works and Communication that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along Rosario St. extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca
to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30 am to 12 pm and 1:30 pm to 5:30 pm and also along
Rizal Avenue from 7 am to 11 pm from a period of one year from the date of the
opening of Colgante Bridge to traffic. It was subsequently passed and thereafter
enforce by Manila Mayor and the acting chief of police. Maximo Calalang then, as a
citizen and a taxpayer challenges its constitutionality.
ISSUE
W/N regualation is valid
RULING
The Supreme Court upheld the regulation as a valid exercise of police power in the
interest of public welfare.
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of
the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and
regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations
of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion
of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then,
lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state
(U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty

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because then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the
required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal
discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means
peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred
upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty
which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment
of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preservation. The grant of the
rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers.
Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the
public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased
difficulty of administering the law"
DOCTRINE:
This case is known primarily for the words of Justice Jose P. Laurel in defining social
justice:
Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to ensure economic stability of
all the component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est supremo lex.

Matienzo vs. Abellera, 162 SCRA 1 (1988)

FACTS
Petitioners and private respondents are taxicab operators in Metro Manila. The
respondents, however, admit to operate colorum or kabit taxis, thus, they applied for
legalization of their unauthorized excess tacis citing PD 101. Respondent Board set
such applications for hearing and granted provisional authority to operate. Petitioners
argue that the Board cannot do this as the six month period in the Transitory
Provision has lapsed and has become functus officio.
ISSUE
W/N the board may issue such permits
RULING
YES. The power vested by PD 101 to BOT was to grant special permits of limited
term for the operation of public utility motor vehicles as may, in the judgment of the
Board, be necessary to replace or convert clandestine operators into legitimate and
responsible operators. Such power remains even after the six months prescribed in
the law as such period merely provides for the withdrawal of the States waiver of its
right to punish said colorum operators. Notice and hearing are not required for the
grant of such temporary authority because of its provisional nature and that the

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primary application shall be given a full hearing.

DOCTRINE:
To determine whether a Board or Commission has power, it should be (1) liberally
construed in light of its purpose for which is was created and (2) that incidentally
necessary to a full implementation of legislative intent as being germane to the law.
Thus, the BOR shall, from time to tim,e, re-study the public need for public utilities
in any area int he Phils for the purpose of re-evaluating the policies.

a. Express and Implied

Villegas vs. Subido, 30 SCRA 498 (1971)

FACTS
Commissioner directed that petitioners Barbers, Paralejas and Lazaro be replaced as
station commanders of the three police precincts of Manila as their continued
employment as such was illegal, the eligibility required being that of an inspector
first class, allegedly not possessed by them Mayor: to disregard said directive, it
being in excess of the authority vested in [the Civil Service]Commission." As noted
in such communication: "
This Office is not aware of any provision of law requiring that Precinct or Station
Commanders should be at least a Police or Detective Major or an Inspector First
Class. Paragraph 4, Section 23 of Republic Act No. 2260
ISSUE
W/N CSC acted within its jurisdiction
RULING
It is well-settled that respondent Commissioner at the most may inquire only as to the
eligibility of the person thus chosen to fill up a vacant position. If he were, then
respondent Commissioner of Civil Service must so attest. That function being
discharged, his participation ceases. So we have held in the leading case of
Villanueva v. Balallo,11 the opinion being penned by the present Chief Justice. Thus:
"When the appointee is qualified, as petitioner herein admittedly is, then the
Commissioner of Civil Service has no choice but to attest to the appointment. It has
been repeatedly held that an appointment becomes complete upon the performance of
the last act required by law of the appointing power. The attestation required of the
Commissioner of Civil Service is merely a check to assure compliance with the civil
service laws."

In this particular case, the eligibility of the other petitioners as police captains is
admitted. That was duly set forth in the decision now on appeal. More than that, their
being exceptionally well-qualified, was likewise duly noted therein, a finding of fact
binding on us as this appeal raises purely questions of law. The justification for the
directive of respondent Commissioner is thus premised on his alleged power to insist
on a specific eligibility for each of the other petitioners designated, that of "Inspector
First Class (Police or Detective Major)."

In his brief, however, he can point to no express provision that would confer on him

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such a power. His failure is understandable because there is none. At the most, then,
he would rely on a reading of the Civil Service Act from which, mistakenly to our
mind, he would infer such authority. According to his brief: "Said authority to fix
appropriate eligibilities being corollary to respondent's 'exclusive jurisdiction over the
approval under the Civil Service Law and rules of all appointments including
promotions to positions in the competitive service" and/or being an implied power,
there is therefore no need for an express provision setting forth in black and white
what eligibilities are appropriate for what positions."12
There is thus an admission from respondent Commissioner himself that his power is
necessarily limited. He would, however, construe such a restricted authority
expansively. He would rely on an ambiguity.

DOCTRINE:
It would be a stultification of well-settled principles of public law if from the
vagueness of a statute, competence to act could be predicated. If such a purpose were
within the contemplation of Congress, an appropriate form of words could have been
utilized. The absence of such language negates its existence.

What is worse, the rules in question are not issued by the President, but by one of his
subordinates; their binding force then is not as great. Much less could they supersede
applicable statutes, not only in what they command but also in what they omit. It
does not admit of doubt that in the hierarchy of legal norms, such rules and standards
definitely occupy an inferior status. If the statute is silent as to the existence of
power, there the matter rests.

Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. CA, 231 SCRA 292 (1994)

FACTS
The residents of Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City raised a complaint
with the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), seeking to stop the operation
of the City Government of Caloocan of an 8.6 hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala
Estate, due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the pollution of the
surrounding water.
LLDA discovered that the City Government of Caloocan has been maintaining
the open dumpsite at the Camarin Area without a requisite Environmental
Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau of the DENR.
They also found the water to have been directly contaminated by the operation of the
dumpsite.
LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order against the City Government and
other entities to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of
garbage and other waste matter on the Camarin dumpsite.
The City Government went to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City to file
an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order and sought to be
declared as the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and

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enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its
territorial jurisdiction.
LLDA sought to dismiss the complaint, invoking the Pollution Control Law
that the review of cease and desist orders of that nature falls under the Court of
Appeals and not the RTC.
RTC denied LLDAs motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining LLDA from enforcing the cease and desist order during the
pendency of the case.
The Court of Appeals promulgated a decision that ruled that the LLDA has no
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of
garbage.
The residents seek a review of the decision.

ISSUE
W/N LLDA has the power to issue cease and desist order
RULING
LLDA has the authority to issue the cease and desist order.
a. Explicit in the law.
4, par. (3) explicitly authorizes the LLDA to make whatever order may be
necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
While LLDA was not expressly conferred the power to issue an ex-
parte cease and desist order in that language, the provision granting authority to
make () orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution, has the same effect.

b. Necessarily implied powers.

Assuming arguendo that the cease and desist order was not expressly
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect.
While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such
power as expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the
exercise of its express powers. Otherwise, it will be reduced to a toothless paper
agency.
In Pollution Adjudication Board vs Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the
PAB has the power to issue anex-parte cease and desist order on prima
facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the anti-
pollution laws of the country.
LLDA has been vested with sufficiently broad powers in the regulation of the
projects within the LagunaLake region, and this includes the implementation of
relevant anti-pollution laws in the area.

b. Discretionary and Ministerial

Cario vs. Capulong, 222 SCRA 593 (1993)

FACTS
On 6 July 1990, AMA filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 18, a petition for
prohibition, certiorari and mandamus against the Hon. Isidro Carino, DEC's Secretary
and Atty. Venancio R. Nava, Regional Director, Department of Education, Culture

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andSports, Region IX to annul and set aside the closure order and to enjoin the
respondentsfrom closing or padlocking AMACC, Davao City.On 26 July 1990, the
trial court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.Thereafter, AMA filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari in assailing the26 July order of the court
a quo, but, again,the Court of Appeals peremptorily dismissed the petition and also
denied its motion for reconsideration.

Under the cloak of an organization of parents of students styling themselves as

AMACC-PARENTS Organization,AMA filed another petition for prohibition and/or
mandamus with preliminary injunction with the RTC of Davao City, Branch 8,
entitled "Freddie Retotal, RicardoFuentes, Calixta Holazo, Ursula Reyes, in their
own behalf and in behalf of the othermembers of AMACC Parents' Organization vs.
Venancio Nava, in his capacity asRegional Director, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports."

On 7 August 1990, the court dismissed the petition. AMA, however, in order to
thwart the closure or padlocking of its school in Davao City,filed with the RTC of
Makati, Branch 134, presided over by respondent Judge, anotherpetition for
mandamus, with damages, preliminary injunction and/or restraining orderagainst
Hon. Isidro Carino, Secretary and Director, Department of Education, Cultureand
Sports, Region IX to compel the respondents to approve petitioners' application
forpermit to operate retroactive to the commencement of school year 1990-1991, and
toenjoin the closure and/or padlocking of AMA-Davao school.Petitioners, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, moved to dismiss AMA's petitionon the ground
that(1) AMA is not entitled to the writ of mandamus as petitioners' authority to grant
ordeny the permit to operate is discretionary and not ministerial;(2) AMA failed to
comply with the provisions of the Education Act;(3) AMA is blatantly engaging in
forum shopping;(4) AMA failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before
resorting to court;and (5) lack of territorial jurisdiction over petitioner Regional
Director and AMA-Davao.

On 15 November 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order directing the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, let a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued, upon filing of petitioners of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00, duly
approved by this Court, enjoining and restraining therespondent Hon. Isidro Carino,
his agents, representatives and any person acting for and his behalf, from
implementing the closing and/orpadlocking AMA Computer College, Inc. - Davao
City Branch, until further orders from this Court and on the following day, on 16
November 1990, issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE
W/N the action for mandamus is proper
RULING
As a rule,
mandamus
will lie only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a

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discretionary function.

A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room

for the exercise of discretion inits performance. On the other hand, a
discretionary duty is that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment.
As explained in the case of
Symaco vs. Aquino
,

A purely ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an officer or

tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment,
upon the propriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer,
and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty
is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion nor judgment. In the present case, the issuance of the permit in
question is not a ministerial duty of the petitioners. It is a discretionary duty or
function on the part of the petitioners because it had to be exercised in accordance
with and not in violation of the law and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. Thus, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Motion to
Dismiss the petition Establishment or recognition of private schools through
government grant of permits is governed by law, specifically Batas Pambansa Blg.
232.The authority to grant permit is vested upon the judgment of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, which prescribes the rules and regulations governing
the recognition on private schools (Section 27,Batas Pambansa Blg. 232). Whether to
grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports. Rather it is a discretionary duty to be exercised in accordance with the
rules and regulations prescribed. In the case at bar, petitioner has been operating a
school without a permit in blatant violation of law. Public respondent has no
ministerial duty to issue to petitioner a permit to operate a school in Davao City
before petitioner has even filed an application or before his application has been first
processed in accordance with the rules and regulations on the matter.

Certainly, public respondent is not enjoined by any law to grant such permit or to
allow such operation without a permit, without first processing an application. To do
so is violation of the Educational Act.

Ocampo vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973 (2016)

c. Errors in the Exercise of Powers

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CTA, 234 SCRA 348 (1994)
Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, 525 SCRA 11 (2007)

2. Determinative / Investigatory

Cario vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

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FACTS
On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher,
among them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila
Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to dramatize and highlight their plight
resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that
had time and again been brought to the latters attention.

The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They

complained to CHR.
ISSUE
W/N CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations
RULING
No. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as
regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence
and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and
making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals
or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.

Hence it is that the CHR having merely the power to investigate, cannot and not
try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers
HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and cannot do so even if
there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or
civil or political rights had been transgressed.
DOCTRINE:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or
probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to
subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine
and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function,

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the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec.
257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,
decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle
finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues
raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge"
means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . .
to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority.
To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge"
means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. .
. . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32

Department of Health vs. Camposano, 457 SCRA 438 (2005)

FACTS
Respondents Camposano, Perez, and Agustin are former employees of the
Department Of Health National Capital Region (DOH-NCR). Some concerned
DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident Ombudsman
Ringpis against Dir. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and
respondents, arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500
bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules
worth P330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical Laboratory. Thereafter, the Resident
Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health
recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct against respondents and their co-respondents. Subsequently, the
Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the respondents and their co-
respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019.
Afterwards, then Executive Secretary Torres issued A.O No. 298 creating an ad-hoc
committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR
employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against Graft
and Corruption (PCAGC). Consequently, the PCAGC took over the investigation
from the DOH. After the investigation, it issued a resolution finding respondents
guilty as charged. Then President Ramos issued AO No. 390 dismissing the
respondents from service as recommended by the PCAGC in their resolution.
Subsequently, the Secretary of Health issued an Order disposing of the case against
respondents and Cabrera dismissing them from service. Respondents and Cabrera
filed their separate appeal with the CSC which was both denied. Respondents
motion for reconsideration was denied on September 30, 1999. While Cabrera s
motion for reconsideration was denied on January 27, 2000. Respondents, however,
received the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on November 2001
which was promulgated on . Thus, Horacio Cabrera was able to appeal to the CA the
CSCs resolutions ahead of respondents. The petition of Cabrera was granted by

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the CA setting aside the resolutions of the CSC and exonerated Cabrera of the
administrative charged against him. Not satisfied with the denial by the CSC of their
appeal, respondents brought the matter to the CA which nonetheless used the same
legal bases for annulling the CSCs Resolution against respondents and held that
the PCAGCs jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to
presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no power to investigate the
charges against respondents. Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the
PCAGCs findings, the secretary of health failed to comply with administrative
due process. Hence, the Petition.
ISSUE
W/N DOH Sec may delegate the power to investigate; PCAG has the power to
impose sanctions
RULING
Yes; No. The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the
authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers
and employees under the formers jurisdiction.[16] Thus, the health secretary had
disciplinary authority over respondents.

Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the
jurisdiction of the President, in line with the principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint.[17] While the Chief Executive directly dismissed
her from the service, he nonetheless recognized the health secretarys disciplinary
authority over respondents when he remanded the PCAGCs findings against them for
the secretarys appropriate action.[18]

As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other

officials to investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based.[19]
In the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to the
PCAGC.

Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created
under AO 298 had the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their
authority was limited to conducting investigations and preparing their findings and
recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the disciplining
authority, who had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following

cardinal principles: (1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present ones case and submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal
must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to
support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must
have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and
must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must
be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the

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various issues involved.[20]

The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the
present factual milieu. Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident
from the health secretarys Order dismissing the respondents thus:

ORDER

This refers to the Resolution of the Presidential Commission Against Graft and
Corruption (PCAG[C]) on the above captioned case dated January 23, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds Respondents Rosalinda

U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief II, [Horacio] D.
Cabrera, Acting Supply Officer III, all of the Department of HealthNational Capital
Region (DOH-NCR) guilty as charged and so recommends to his Excellency
President Fidel V. Ramos that the penalty of dismissal from the government be
imposed thereon.

Acting on the aforequoted resolution of the PCAGC[,] His Excellency President Fidel
V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 390 dated [A]pril 20, 1998, resolving
thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais is hereby

found guilty as charged and, as recommended by the Presidential Commission
Against Graft and Corruption, is meted the penalty of dismissal from the service. The
records of the case with respect to the other respondents are remanded to Secretary
Carmencita N. Reodica, Department of Health for appropriate action.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Presidential Commission

Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) dated January 23, 1998 on the above
captioned case, respondents Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief II;
Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V; Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant
I; and Enrique G. Perez, Acting Supply Officer III; all of the Department of
HealthNCR, are hereby DISMISSED from the service.[21]

Concededly, the health secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what
action should be taken against officials and employees who have been
administratively charged and investigated. However, the actual exercise of the
disciplining authoritys prerogative requires a prior independent consideration of the
law and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement results in an invalid
decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an
investigators recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence
gathered. There can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation,
and the livelihood of the person administratively charged.

In the present case, the health secretarys two-page Order dismissing respondents

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pales in comparison with the presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to
the issuance of his seven-page decision, President Fidel V. Ramos conducted a
restudy of the doctors case. He even noted a violation that had not been considered
by the PCAGC.[22] On the other hand, Health Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica
simply and blindly relied on the dispositive portion of the Commissions Resolution.
She even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the recommendation with regard to
Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.

The Order of Secretary Reodica denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration

also failed to correct the deficiency in the initial Order.[23] She improperly relied on
the Presidents findings in AO 390 which, however, pertained only to the
administrative charge against Dr. Majarais, not against respondents. To repeat, the
Chief Executive recognized that the disciplinary jurisdiction over respondents
belonged to the health secretary,[24] who should have followed the manner in which
the President had rendered his action on the recommendation.

The Presidents endorsement of the records of the case for the appropriate action of
the health secretary[25] did not constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of
respondents. Like that of President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica should
have contained a factual finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable
respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal
intelligently, if they so desired.

To support its position, petitioner cites American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents.
[26] However, this case merely authorized the delegation of the power to investigate,
but not the authority to impose sanctions. Verily, in requiring the disciplining
authority to exercise its own judgment and discretion in deciding a case, American
Tobacco supports the present respondents cause. In that case, the petitioners objected
to the appointment of hearing officers and sought the personal hearing of their case
by the disciplining authority.[27] The Court, however, sustained the right to delegate
the power to investigate, as long as the adjudication would be made by the deciding
authority.

By the same token, the Constitution[28] grants the Supreme Court disciplinary
authority over all lower court justices and judges, as well as judicial employees and
lawyers. While the investigation of administrative complaints is delegated usually to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP),[29] the Court nonetheless makes its own judgments of the cases when
sanctions are imposed. It does not merely adopt or solely rely on the
recommendations of the OCA or the IBP.

3. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE /RULE-MAKING
a. In General
Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers
only if there exists a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the

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rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statute and must
involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix
the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself,
so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the
doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power. (RP v Drugmakers Lab)
Ople vs. Torres, supra
Smart Communications vs. NTC, 408 SCRA 768 (2003)
Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970)
People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450 (1977)

FACTS
The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-
1 which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.
The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly
prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider
the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE
W/N the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid.
RULING
No. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old
Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body
intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been
easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an
executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can
authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in
the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative
officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative
purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of
extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a
valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative
body to legislate Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because
the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in
enforcing the law.
DOCTRINE:
All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and
purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law
prescribes.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the

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sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of
course, the law itself cannot be extended.
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to
make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power
should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative
agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary
implication conferred upon it.

Republic vs. Drugmakers Laboratories, G.R. 190837 (2014)

ASTEC vs. ERC, 681 SCRA 119 (2012)
Manila Jockey Club, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 103533(1998)
ABAKADA Guro vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056 (2005). Only the
part on Delegation of Legislative Powers

FACTS
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT
Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO
enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions
for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and
6: That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of

the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);

or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year

exceeds one and one-half percent (1%)

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the
VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such
delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is
a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included
within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to
customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and
usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has
powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the
conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by
law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.
ISSUE
W/N RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate,

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especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of

Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power?
RULING
No. The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are
strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can
never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time
when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the
expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its
use or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.

The exceptions are:

(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution

(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution

(c) delegation to the people at large

(d) delegation to local governments

(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.

In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of

ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased
rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12%
rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves
the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of
the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President.
Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the
common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in
a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion.

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate
upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty,
which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12%
VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.

Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence
of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of
GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government deficit as a
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two
instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit

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such information to the President.

In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or
even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to
determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The
Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is
determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather
data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them.
His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information
and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.

Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes
what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our
complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can
go forward.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the
power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.

SM Land, Inc. vs. Bases Conversion, G.R. No. 203655 (2015)

Case Rule Notice, Hearing, Publicatio

Republic vs. Drugmakers Legislative rules YES
Laboratorie; Edu v Ericta are in the nature of subordinate
legislation and designed to
implement a primary legislation
by providing the details
thereof.31 They usually
implement existing law,
imposing general, extra-statutory
obligations pursuant to authority
properly delegated by
Congress32 and effect a change
in existing law or policy which
affects individual rights and
obligations.
Republic vs. Drugmakers Interpretative rules NO
Laboratories; Manila Jockey v are intended to interpret, clarify
CA or explain existing statutory
regulations under which the
administrative body operates.
Their purpose or objective is
merely to construe the statute

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being administered and purport

to do no more than interpret the
statute. Simply, they try to say
what the statute means and refer
to no single person or party in
particular but concern all those
belonging to the same class
which may be covered by the
said rules.
Republic vs. Drugmakers Contingent Rules YES
Laboratories; ABAKADA v. are those issued by an
Ermita administrative authority based on
the existence of certain facts or
things upon which the
enforcement of the law depends.
ASTEC vs. ERC Internal Rules NO
a regulation that is merely
internal in nature
ASTEC vs. ERC Letters of Instruction NO
rules or guidelines to be followed
by subordinates in the
performance of their duties

b. Doctrine of Delegation of Legislative Powers

In General (ABAKADA v Ermita) Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution

provides that the Legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are
strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which
can never be delegated, has been described as the authority to make a complete
law complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall
be applicable and to determine the expediency of its enactment.[40] Thus, the
rule is that in order that a court may be justified in holding a statute
unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it must appear that the
power involved is purely legislative in nature that is, one appertaining
exclusively to the legislative department. It is the nature of the power, and not the
liability of its use or the manner of its exercise, which determines the validity of
its delegation.

Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject

to the following recognized limitations or exceptions:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI
of the Constitution;

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 REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of

Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the

delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate;[41] and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. [42] A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. [43] Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step
into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

Exception - Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated
cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.

EO 292 Book IV Chapter 2

SECTION 6. Authority and Responsibility of the Secretary.The authority and responsibility

for the exercise of the mandate of the Department and for the discharge of its powers and
functions shall be vested in the Secretary, who shall have supervision and control of the
Department.

SECTION 7. Powers and Functions of the Secretary.The Secretary shall:

(1) Advise the President in issuing executive orders, regulations, proclamations and other
issuances, the promulgation of which is expressly vested by law in the President relative to
matters under the jurisdiction of the Department;

(2) Establish the policies and standards for the operation of the Department pursuant to the
approved programs of government;

(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department objectives, policies,
functions, plans, programs and projects;

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 REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)

(4) Promulgate administrative issuances necessary for the efficient administration of the offices
under the Secretary and for proper execution of the laws relative thereto. These issuances shall
not prescribe penalties for their violation, except when expressly authorized by law;

(5) Exercise disciplinary powers over officers and employees under the Secretary in accordance
with law, including their investigation and the designation of a committee or officer to conduct
such investigation;

(6) Appoint all officers and employees of the Department except those whose appointments are
vested in the President or in some other appointing authority; Provided, However, that where the
Department is regionalized on a department-wide basis, the Secretary shall appoint employees to
positions in the second level in the regional offices as defined in this Code;

(7) Exercise jurisdiction over all bureaus, offices, agencies and corporations under the
Department as are provided by law, and in accordance with the applicable relationships as
specified in Chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this Book;

(8) Delegate authority to officers and employees under the Secretarys direction in
accordance with this Code; and

(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.

Pangasinan Tranportation, supra

Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)

FACTS
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a
complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based on a
Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death benefits
and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the validity of the
memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative
power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said
regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of
legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.
ISSUE
W/N MC 2 is a valid
RULING
SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 797. ... "The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern
the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA)."

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be
delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be

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enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by "filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what
are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by
the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force
and effect of law.
DOCTRINE:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power:
1. Completeness test - the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test - there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to
map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.

KMU vs. Garcia, 239 SCRA 386 (1994)

FACTS
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda
allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within 15% above and
below the official LTFRB rate for a period of one year. Provincial Bus Operators
Association of the Philippines applied for fare rate increase. This was opposed by the
Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. and Perla Bautista as they were exorbitant and
unreasonable.
ISSUE
W/N DOTC may delegate the power to prescribe rates
RULING
The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range
over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to
an undue delegation of legislative authority.

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 REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)

DOCTRINE
General Rule: An administrative body may implement broad policies laid down in a
statute by filling in the details which the Legislature may neither have time nor
competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are
the regulatory bodies authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a
transport operator or other public service.
Exception:
Potestas delegate non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated.
This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes
not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.
A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in
violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The
policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at
will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs.
This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may
increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases
them or whenever they deem it necessary to do so.

c. Requisites and Limits of Permissible Delegation

People vs. Maceren, supra
Eastern Shipping Lines, supra
Cervantes vs. Auditor General, 91 Phil. 359 (1952)
Pelaez vs. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-23825 (1965)
Balbuena vs. Secretary, G.R. No. L-14283 (1960)
BOC Employees Association vs. Teves, G.R. No. 181704 (2011)
US vs. Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. 17122 (1922)
Tatad vs. Secretary, 284 SCRA 330 (1997)

Commissioner of Customs vs. Hypermix, 664 SCRA 666 (2012)

FACTS
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum,
for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge.[5] The regulation
provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity
descriptions and countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be
classified either as food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade
wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%. (not published)
ISSUE
W/N CMO is valid
RULING
[A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement
a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. xxx

In addition such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rules are
designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in

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charge of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three inquiries:
(i) whether the rule is within the delegated authority of the administrative agency; (ii)
whether it is reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper procedure.
But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as to the desirability or wisdom of
the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has
committed those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial judgments.
In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not into the validity but into the
correctness or propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when confronted
with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule; (ii) go to the
opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree
of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule.
DOCTRINE:
Considering that the questioned regulation would affect the substantive rights of
respondent as explained above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have
applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code, to wit:

Section 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines
Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on
the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from
that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency

shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford
interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any
rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates
shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks
before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs

nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than
what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the
administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or
render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases
the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that
new issuance is given the force and effect of law.[20]

Likewise, in Taada v. Tuvera,[21] we held:

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate

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notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations
in the Batasan Pambansa and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
records no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President.
Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. (Emphasis supplied)

Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised

Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down.

International Service vs. Greenpeace, G.R. No. 2029271 (2015)

Ocampo , supra
DOH vs. Philip Morris, G.R. No. 202943 (2015)

d. Administrative Procedure in Rule-Making

Secs. 1-9, Book VII, EO 292
Section 1. (2) "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that
implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice
requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or
statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not
affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public.

Section 3. Filing. -
(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3)
certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this
Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the
basis of any sanction against any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open
to public inspection.
Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law
not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from
the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in
the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of
which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take

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appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by
them.
Section 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center
shall:
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the
preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect,
together with a complete index and appropriate tables.
Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. -
(1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the
codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or
otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to
the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general
subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained.
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is
punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.
Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the
Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin
and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all
appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be
made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may
select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or
distribution costs.
Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of
each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.
Section 9. Public Participation. -
(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or
circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit
their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates
shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks
before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

Hypermix, supra
Phil. Communications Satellite vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218 (1989).
Include the Separate Opinion of Gutierrez, J.
GMA Network vs. COMELEC, G.R.No. 205357 (2014)
Board of Trustees vs. Velasco, 641 SCRA 372 (2011)
ASTEC vs. ERC. supra
People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954)
Cawad vs. Abad, G.R. No. 207145 (2015). Include the Separate
Opinion of Leonen, J.

4. QUASI-JUDICIAL/ADJUDICATORY

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a. In General
Administrative agencies posses quasi-legislative or rule making powers and quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule making power is
the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is
within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of nondelegability and
separability of powers.

Interpretative rule, one of the three (3) types of quasi-legislative or rule making powers of
an administrative agency (the other two being supplementary or detailed legislation, and
contingent legislation), is promulgated by the administrative agency to interpret, clarify
or explain statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates. The
purpose or objective of an interpretative rule is merely to construe the statute being
administered. It purports to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, the rule tries to
say what the statute means. Generally, it refers to no single person or party in particular
but concerns all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said
interpretative rule. It need not be published and neither is a hearing required since it is
issued by the administrative body as an incident of its power to enforce the law and is
intended merely to clarify statutory provisions for proper observance by the people. In
Taada v. Tuvera, 6 this Court expressly said that "[i]interpretative regulations . . . . need
not be published."

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear
and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law. 7 The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it
performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for
the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. 8 In carrying out
their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in
a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected it is elementary that in the
proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of
the proceedings.

The importance of due process cannot be underestimated. Too basic is the rule that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Thus
when an administrative proceeding is quasi-judicial in character, notice and fair open
hearing are essential to the validity of the proceeding. The right to reasonable prior notice
and hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence but also the opportunity to
know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit arguments
implies that opportunity otherwise the right may as well be considered impotent. And
those who are brought into contest with government in a quasi-judicial proceeding aimed
at the control of their activities are entitled to be fairy advised of what the government
proposes and to be heard upon its proposal before it issues its final command. (CIR v
CA)
Santiago vs. Bautista, 32 SCRA 188 (1970)
Subido vs. CA, G.R. No. 216914 (2016)
Lupangco vs. CA, 160 SCRA 848 (1988)

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CIR vs. CA, 261 SCRA 236 (1986). Include the Separate
Opinions of Bellosillo and Hermosisima, JJ.
Saado vs. Court of Appeals, 356 SCRA 456 (2001)

b. Incidental Powers
Sec. 13, Book VII, EO 292

Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 69 SCRA 99 (1975)

Qua Che Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963)
Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago, 162 SCRA 840 (1988)
Salazar vs. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145 (1990)
Public Hearing Committee vs. SM Prime Holdings, 631
SCRA 73 (2010)
c. Administrative Procedure in Adjudication of Cases

Secs. 10-16, Book VII, EO 292

Section 10. Compromise and Arbitration. - To expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting
rights or claims and obviate expensive litigations, every agency shall, in the public interest, encourage
amicable settlement, comprise and arbitration.
Section 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases. -
(1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The notice shall be served at
least five (5) days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place of the hearing.
(2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. If not precluded
by law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement or
default.
(3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings.
Section 12. Rules of Evidence. - In a contested case:
(1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably
prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
(2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily
available. Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the original. If
the original is in the official custody of a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted.
(3) Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit
rebuttal evidence.
(4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally cognizable technical or
scientific facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity
to contest the facts so noticed.
Section 13. Subpoena. - In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance
of witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any
party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law,
the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose
jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt.
Section 14. Decision. - Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and
shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each
case within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision
personally or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to them.
Section 15. Finality of Order. - The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15)
days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an

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administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration
may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said period.
Section 16. Publication and Compilation of Decisions. -
(1) Every agency shall publish and make available for public inspection all decisions or final orders in the
adjudication of contested cases.
(2) It shall be the duty of the records officer of the agency or his equivalent functionary to prepare a
register or compilation of those decisions or final orders for use by the public.

i. Administrative Due Process

Art. 704, Civil Code

Secs. 50-51, Book V, EO 292
Section 50. Summary Proceedings. - No formal investigation is necessary and the respondent may be
immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present:
(1) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong;
(2) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there is reasonable ground to
believe that he is guilty of the present charge; and
(3) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.
Resort to summary proceedings by the disciplining authority shall be done with utmost objectivity and
impartiality to the end that no injustice is committed: Provided, That removal or dismissal except those by
the President, himself or upon his order, may be appealed to the Commission.
Section 51. Preventive Suspension. - The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such
officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance
of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his
removal from the service.

Sec. 16, Art. III, 1987 Constitution

Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1950)

FACTS
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the
Philippine Army. NLU avers that employer Toribio Teodoro (of the National
Workers Brotherhood [NWB] of Ang Tibay) made a false claim that there was a
shortage of leather soles in Ang Tibay, making it necessary for him to lay off
workers. NLU alleges that such claim was unsupported by the Bureau of Customs
records and the accounts of native dealers of leather. Such was just a scheme adopted
to discharge all the members of the NLU from work. Hence, they say that Teodoro
was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against NLU and unjustly
favoring NWB.
As regards the exhibits attached to this case, NLU says that these are so inaccessible
to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the CIR. In addition, the
attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein.
ISSUE

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W/N there is a violation of due process

RULING

DOCTRINE:
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected in administrative
proceedings. The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. The Court of Industrial Relations
enumerated these rights: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must
have something to support itself; (4) the evidence must be substantial; (5) the
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or any of
its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision; and, (7) the tribunal should in all controversial questions render its decision
in such manner that the parties to the proceeding may know the various issues
involved and the reasons for the decision rendered.

UP Board of Regents vs. CA, 313 SCRA 404 (1999)

Acuzar vs. Jorolan, G.R. No. 177878 (2010)
Ganappao vs. CSC, 649 SCRA 594 (2011)
Nacion vs. COA, G.R. No. 204757 (2015)
DOH vs. Camposano, supra
Lumiqued vs. Exenea, G.R. No. 117565 (1997)
Ombudsman vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512 (2011)
Pollution Board vs. CA, 195 SCRA 112 (1991)
American Tobacco vs. Dir.of Patents, 67 SCRA 287 (1975)
DOH vs. Camposano, supra
Solid Homes vs. Laserna, G.R. No. 166051 (2008)

ii. Judgment

In General - In Montemayor v. Bundalian,[29] this Court laid down the

following guidelines for the judicial review of decisions rendered by
administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial power:

First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial evidence

the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in
reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of the
government, the findings of facts made therein are to be respected so
long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for
the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of
the administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence.

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Third, administrative decisions in matters within the executive

jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion,
fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the power of the reviewing
court to re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative
case as if originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court to
receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the administrative
agency concerned.

As stated above, the fundamental rule in administrative proceedings is

that the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence,
the allegations in his complaint. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is
unequivocal: Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Conversely, therefore,
when the findings of fact by the Ombudsman are not adequately
supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the
courts. Such is the case in the present Petition.

Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one administratively liable.
[30] The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is
reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the
misconduct complained of,[31] even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant.[32] While substantial evidence
does not necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in
an ordinary civil case,[33] or evidence beyond reasonable doubt as is
required in criminal cases,[34] it should be enough for a reasonable mind
to support a conclusion. (Marcelo v Bungubung)

Realty Exchange vs. Sendino, 233 SCRA 665 (1994)

Marcelo vs. Bungubung, G.R. No. 175201 (2008)
Santos-Concio vs. DOJ, G.R. No. 175057 (2008)

iii. Administrative Appeal and Review

Rivera vs. CSC, 240 SCRA 43 (1995)

Solid Homes vs. Laserna, supra
Angeles vs. Gaite, supra

E. Judicial Review of Administrative Action

1. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary/Prior Resort

Smart Communications, supra
Republic vs. Lacap, 517 SCRA 255 (2007)
Pimentel vs. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 187714 (2011)

2. Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

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PAAT vs. CA, 266 SCRA 167 (1997)

Obiasca vs. Basalotte , 613 SCRA 110 (2010)
Nazareno vs. CA, 267 SCRA 589 (1996)
Pascual vs. Prov. Board, 106 Phil. 446 (1959)
Maglalang vs. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 190566 (2013)
Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.205728 (2015)
Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges, G.R. No. 156109 (2004)

3. Modes of Judicial Review

Reyna vs. COA, G.R. No. 157219 (2011)

Remolona vs. CSC, G.R. No. 137473 (2001)
Ombudsman vs. Reyes, supra
a. Appeals from Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals (Rule 43)

Board of Commissioners vs. Judge de la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991)

b. Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court (Rule 45)

c. Provisional Remedies (Rules 57-60)
Paat, supra
d. Special Civil Actions

i. Declaratory Relief (Rule 63)

Hypermix, supra

ii. Review of Judgments/Final Orders of COMELEC/COA (Rule

64)

Cruz vs. Gangan, 395 SCRA 711(2003)

iii. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (Rule 65)

Simon vs. CHR, 229 SCRA 117 (1994)

MMDA vs. Concerned Residents, G.R. Nos. 171947-48
(2008)

e. Special Writs
Lucien Tran Van Nghia vs. Liwag, 175 SCRA 318 (1989)
Lozada vs. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 184379-80 (2012)
Gamboa vs. Chan, G.R. No. 193636 (2012)

F. Judicial Enforcement of Administrative Action

GSIS vs. CSC, 202 SCRA 799 (1991)

MMDA vs. Concerned Residents, supra, and the subsequent Resolution (2011)

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Ysmael vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 190 SCRA 673 (1990)

II. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

A. Introduction

1. Nature of the Public Office

Sec. 1, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution

Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188 (1920)

Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968)
Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 (1925)
Mathay vs. CA, 320 SCRA 703 (1999)
Fernandez vs. Sto.Tomas, G.R. No. 116418 (1995)
Laurel vs. Desierto, 381 SCRA 48 (2002)

2. Classifications and Distinctions of Public Officers

Art. 203, Revised Penal Code

Sec. 2, RA 3019
Sec. 2 (14), (15), Introductory Provisions, EO 292

Laurel, supra
Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 (1964)

B. Eligibility and Qualifications of Public Officers

1. Eligibility and Qualifications

Secs. 3, 6, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution

Sec. 2, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
Sec. 5, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
Sec. 21 (7), Title I, Book V, EO 292
RA 9225, Secs. 5( 2)
CSC MC No. 23, s. 2016

Gaspar vs. CA, 190 SCRA 774 (1990)

Maquera vs. Borra, 15 SCRA 7 (1965)
Aguila vs. Genato, G.R. No. L-55151 (1981)
Flores vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 104742 (1993)
Rodriguez vs. COMELEC, 259 SCRA 296 (1996)
Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 396 (1999)

2. Disqualifications

a. General Disqualifications

Secs. 6, 7(1)(2)Art. IX-B

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b. Specific Disqualifications

Sec. 13, Art. VI; Sec. 13, Art. VII; Sec. 12, Art. VIII; Secs. 1-2, Art. IX-
A; Secs. 1, Art. IX-B; Sec. 1, Art, IX-C; Sec. 1, Art. IX-D, all of
the 1987 Constitution

Abeto vs. Garceza, 251 SCRA 539 (1995)

Public Interest Center vs. Elma, 494 SCRA 53 (2006)

3. De Facto Officers

Monroy vs. CA, 20 SCRA 620 (1967)

Menzon vs. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251 (1991)
Malaluan vs. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 397 (1996)
Torres vs. Ribo. 81 Phil. 44 (1948)
Flores vs. Drilon, supra

C. Commencement of Official Relations

1. By Appointment

Corpuz vs. CA, 285 SCRA 23 (1998)

Obiasca vs. Basalotte, supra
Laurel vs. CSC, 203 SCRA 195 (1991)
Debulgado vs. CSC, 237 SCRA 184 (1994)
CSC vs. Cortes, G.R. No. 200103 (2014)
CSC vs. Dacoycoy, 306 SCRA 425 (1999)
Luego vs. CSC, 143 SCRA 327 (1986)

a. Classification

i. Permanent or Temporary

De Castro vs. Carlos, G.R. No.194994 (2013)

Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, 246 SCRA 281 (1995)
Romualdez III vs. CSC, 197 SCRA 168 (1991)
Sevilla vs. CA, 209 SCRA 637(1992)

ii. Regular or Ad Interim

Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution

PLM vs. IAC, 140 SCRA 22 (1985)

b. Appointments by the President

In Re: Valenzuela, G.R. No. 79974 (1987)

Velicaria-Garafil vs.OP, G.R. No. 203372 (2015)

c. Appointments to the Civil Service

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 REVIEWER (JMCRUZ)

Sec. 2, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution

i. Career Service

Sec. 7, Title I, Book V, EO 292

ii. Career Executive Service

PEZA vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 172144 (2010)

CSC vs. CA, G.R. No. 185766 (2010)
Dimayuga vs. Benedicto, G.R. No. 144153 (2002)

iii. Non-career

Sec. 9, Title I, Book V, EO 292

iv. Requisites

Camarines Norte vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185740 (2013) Pacete

vs. COA, 185 SCRA 1 (1990)

v. Remedies to Question Title

Mantala vs. Salvador, G.R. No. 101646 (1992)

Torrosa vs. Singson, 232 SCRA 553 (1994)
Mendoza vs. Allas, 302 SCRA 623 (1999)
Romualdez vs. CSC, 225 SCRA 285 (1993)
Bongbong vs. Parado, 57 SCRA 623 (1974)

2. By Election

D. Rights and Duties of Public Officers

1. Rights

a. Right to Office

Sec. 2(3), Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution

Baybay Water District vs. COA, 374 SCRA 482 (2002)

Pollo vs. David, G.R. No. 181881 (2011)

b. Pecuniary Rights

Sec. 5, 8, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution

Sec. 16, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution
Secs. 2-5, RA 6758
Secs. 8-10, RA 10149

De Jesus vs. COA, G.R. No. 127515 (2005)

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DBM vs. Leones, G.R. No. 169726 (2010)

CSC vs. Magnaye, G.R. No. 183337 (2010)
Domingo vs. COA, G.R. No. 112371 (1998)
Cruz vs. Gangan, supra

c. Right to Employee Compensation/ Insurance

d. Right to Different and Applicable Leaves
e. Right to Self-Organization

Sec. 3 (pa.2), Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution

SSS vs. CA, G.R. No. 85279 (1989)

f. Right to Retirement Pay

Rabor vs. CSC, G.R. No. 11812 (1995)

GSIS vs. Fernando de Leon, G.R. No. 186560 (2010)

2. Duties
Sec. 1,17-18, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
RA 6713
Alconera vs. Pallanan, A.M. No. 12-3069 (2014)
Marquez vs. Ovejera, A.M. No. P-11-2903 (2014)
Rabe vs. Flores, 272 SCRA 415 (1997)
PAGC vs. Pleyto, G.R. No. 176058 (2011)
3. Prohibitions

Sec. 2(4), 8 Art. IX-B; Sec. 16, Art. XI; Sec. 5 (3), Art. XVI, all of the
1987 Constitution

Santos vs. Yatco, 106 Phil. 745 (1959)

Santos vs. CA, G.R. No. 139792 (2000)
PEZA vs. COA, G.R. No. 189767 (2012)
Dimagiba vs. Espartero, G.R. No. 154952 (2012)
Debulgado vs. CSC, supra
CSC vs. Cortes, supra
CSC vs. Dacoycoy, supra
4. Liabilities
Sec. 38- 39, Book I, EO 292
Arts. 27, 32, 34, Civil Code
Title VII, Revised Penal Code
Sec. 24, Local Government Code
RA 3019
RA 6713
Secs. 1-2, 11, RA 1379

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Blaquera vs. Alcala, G.R. No. 109406 (1998)

Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune, supra
Gloria, supra
a. Threefold Liability Rule

OCA vs. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1(1993)

Cojuangco vs. CA, 309 SCRA 602 (1999)
Jorolan vs. Acuzar, G.R. No. 177878 (2010)
Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan, 318 SCRA 80 (1999)
Ocampo vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 114683 (2000)
OCA vs. Macusi, A.M. No. P-13-3105 (2013)
Larin vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745 (1997)
b. Command Responsibility

Rubrico vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 183871 (2010)

Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805 (2011)
Balao vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050 (2011)

E. Personnel Actions
1. Promotion
2. Transfer
3. Secondment
4. Detail
5. Reassignment
6. Reinstatement
7. Reemployment

Sec. 16, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution

F. Termination of Official Relationship
1. Abolition of Office
Sec. 31 in relation to Secs. 21-23, Book III, EO 292
Bautista vs. CSC, G.R. No. 185215 (2010)
Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Exec. Secretary , G.R. Nos. 142891-02 (2001)
2. Expiration of Term or Tenure
Art. 237, Revised Penal Code
Astraquillo vs. Manglapus, 190 SCRA 280 (1990)
Achocoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235 (1991)
Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan, supra

3. Retirement

Sec. 11, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution

Rabor vs. CSC supra

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In Re: Gregorio Pineda, 187 SCRA 469 (1990)

CSC vs. Pililia Water District, G.R. No. 190147 (2013)
4. Death or Permanent Disability
5. Resignation
Sec. 82, RA 7160
Sec. 66, BP 881
Ortiz vs. COMELEC, 162 SCRA 812 (1988)
Collantes vs. CA, G.R. No. 169604 (2007)
Joson vs. Nario, 187 SCRA 453 (1990)
Gamboa vs. CA, G.R. No. L-38068 (1981)
OCA vs. Amor, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2140 (2014)
Quinto vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698 (2010)
Estrada vs. Arroyo, 353 SCRA 452 (2001)

6. Abandonment of Office
Sec. 11, OEC
Municipality of San Andres vs. CA, G.R. No. 118883 (1998)
Canonizado vs. Aguirre, 351 SCRA 359 (2001)
Quezon vs. Borromeo, 149 SCRA 205 (1987)
In Re: AWOL of Darlene Jacoba, A.M No. 98-8-246-RTC (1999)
Philippine Coconut Authority vs. Garrido, G.R. No. 135003 (2002)
Adiong vs. CA, G.R. No. 136480 (2001)

7. Acceptance of Incompatible Office

Public Interest Center vs. Elma, supra

8. Prescription of Right to Office

Sec. 11, Rule 66
Tumulak vs. Egay, 82 Phil. 828 (1949)
9. Recall

Secs. 69-74, RA 7160, as amended

Angobung vs. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 254 (1997)

10. Criminal Conviction

Garcia vs. COA, 226 SCRA 356 (1993)
11. Impeachment
Secs. 2-3, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution
12. Removal
Sec. 2(3), Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution

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Sec. 3 (pa.2), Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution

Sec. 36 (b), 37-38, PD 807
Sec. 50-51, Book V, EO 292

Gloria, supra
CSC vs. Magnaye, G.R. No. 183337 (2010)
Teves vs. Feliciano, A.M. No.P-12-3089 (2013)
Balasbas vs. Manayao, G.R. No. 190524 (2014)
Villanueva vs. CA, G.R. No. 167726 (2006)
Gupilan-Aguilar vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197307 (2014)
CSC vs. Clave, G.R. No. 194665 (2012)
Fernandez vs. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 193983 (2012)
OCA vs. Ampong, A.M. No. P-13-3132 (2014)

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III. ELECTION LAWS

A. General Principles

1. Suffrage

Art. V, Secs. 2-4, Art. XVII, Sec. 32, Art.VI, 1987 Constitution
Sec. 4, RA 9189

Hontiveros vs. Altavas, L-9158 (1913)

Moya vs. Del Fierro, G.R. No. L-46863 (1939)
Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162759 (2006)

2. Kinds and Manners of Election

Sec. 2, RA 6735
Sec. 69, RA 7160
RA 8346
Sec. 2, RA 9369

CenPEG vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189546 (2010)

3. Election Period

Sec. 9, Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution

Sec. 5, RA 7166

B. The Commission on Elections

Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution

RA 8356

1. Composition

Cayetano vs. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113 (1991)

Brillantes vs. Yorac, G.R. No. 93867 (1990)
Sevilla vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 202833 (2013)

2. En Banc and Division Cases

Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307 (1992)

Ibrahim vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192289 (2013)
Soller vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 139853 (2000)
ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486 (2000)
Diocese of Bacolod, supra

3. Powers and Functions

Secs. 52, 57, as amended by RA 9369

Sec. 6, RA 8436 as amended by RA 9369
Sec. 43, RA 9369

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Sec. 2, Subtitle C, Title I, Book V, EO 292

Sec. 4, RA 7166
Gallardo vs. Tabamo, 218 SCRA 253 (1994)
Lokin vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193808 (2012)
Cagas vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209185 (2013)
GMA Network, supra
Brillantes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163193 (2004)
Akbayan Youth vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147066 (2001)
Tanada vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207199 (2013)
cf: Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207624 (2013)
Sahali vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201796 (2013)
Filipinas Engineering vs. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25 (1985)
Dumarpa vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192249 (2013)
Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 112093 (1994)
Poe vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697 (2016)

C. Political Parties
Secs. 3, 6, RA 7941

Ang Ladlad vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582 (2010)

Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589 (2001)
BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271 (2009)
Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766 (2013)

D. Qualification and Registration of Voters

1. Qualification and Registration
Sec. 1, Art. V, 1987 Constitution
Secs. 3, 8, 9, 11-15 18, 19, 23, 36, 40, RA 8189
Sec. 261, OEC
Secs. 3-8, RA 10367
RA 9189
RA 10366
Akbayan-Youth, supra
Kabataan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189868 (2009)

2. Deactivation, Reactivation and Cancellation of Registration

Secs. 27-29, RA 8189

3. Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings

Sec. 33-35, 37, RA 8189
4. Annulment of Book of Voters

Sec. 39, RA 8189

5. Absentee Voting

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Sec. 12, RA 7166

Sec. 2, RA 10380
Secs. 3(j), 5, RA 10590

E. Candidacies
Sec. 79, OEC

1. The Candidate

Penera vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613 (2009)

Gador vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 431 (1980)
Conquilla vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 139801 (2000)

2. Qualifications

Frivaldo, supra
Jalosjos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191970 (2012)
Marcos vs. COMELEC, supra
SJS vs. DDB, G.R. No. 157870 (2008)

3. Disqualifications to be candidates

Sec. 12, OEC

Sec. 40, LGC

Villaber vs, COMELEC, G.R. No. 148326 (2001)

Rodriguez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120099 (1996)

4. Certificate of Candidacy (COC)

Secs. 73-74, 76, OEC

Sec. 11, RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369
Sec. 7, RA 7166

Loreto-Go vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147741 (2001)

Amora vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192280 (2011)

5. Disqualifications of Candidates

Secs. 68-69, 72, 78, OEC

Sec. 6, RA 6646

Codilla vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163302 (2004)

Martinez vs. HRET, G.R. No. 189034 (2010)
Pamatong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872 (2004)
Timbol vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206004 (2015)
Jurilla vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 81192 (1998)
Dela Cruz vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192221 (2012)

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Tagolino vs. HRET and Lucy Torres-Gomez, G.R. No. 202202 (2013)
Villafuerte vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698 (2014)
Hayudini vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900 (2014)
Gonzalez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856 (2011)

6. Effect of Filing of COC

Quinto vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698 (2010)

7. Substitution
Sec. 77, OEC
Sec. 12, RA 8436
Sec. 12, RA 9006

Miranda vs. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351 (1999)

Talaga vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804 (2012)

F. Election and Campaign Finance and Propaganda

Sec. 9, Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution

Secs. 79-80, 94-99, 102-104, 261 (h), (g), (m), (v), (w), (x), OEC
Secs. 5, 6, 13-14, 32-33, RA 7166
Sec. 5, RA 8189
Secs. 3-5, RA 9006
COA Circular 2013-004 (January 2013)

Garcia vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 170256 (2010)

Ejercito vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398 (2014)
Diocese of Bacolod, supra
Pilar vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 115245 (1995)
G. Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) and Watchers
Sec. 3, 26, RA 9369
Secs. 168-169, 179, 199-202, 205, OEC
Sec. 26, RA 7166
H. Ballots

Sec. 2, RA 8436
Sec. 15, RA 9369
I. Casting and Counting of Votes

RA 9369
RA 6646

CenPEG vs. COMELEC, supra

J. Postponement of Election

Sec. 5, OEC

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Basher vs. COMELEC, 330 SCRA 736 (2000)

Cawasa vs. COMELEC, 383 SCRA 787 (2002)

K. Failure of Elections
Sec. 6, OEC
Carlos vs. COMELEC, 346 SCRA 571 (2000)
Batabor vs. COMELEC, 434 SCRA 63 (2004)
Sanchez vs. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454 (1987)
Sardea vs. COMELEC, 224 SCRA 344 (1993)
Mitmug vs. COMELEC, G.R.No. 106270 (1994)
Mutilan vs. COMELEC, 520 SCRA 152 (2007)
L. Special Election
Tolentino vs. COMELEC, 420 SCRA 438 (2004)

M. Canvassing and Proclamation

1. Canvassing
Sec. 3-4, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution
Sec. 238, 240, OEC
Sec. 5, 18, 20-23, 37, 39, RA 9369
Sec. 7, Art. XIX, RA 6734
Sec. 20, RA 6646
Librados vs. Casar, 234 SCRA 13 (1994)
Pimentel vs. COMELEC, 140 SCRA 126 (1998)
Lorenzo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 138371 (2003)
Quilala vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87276 (1990)
Utto vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150111 (2002)
Sema vs, COMELEC, G,R,No. 134163 (2000)
Belac vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149802 (2001)
Tugade vs. COMELEC, 57 SCRA 325 (2007)
Ocampo vs. COMELEC, G.R.No. 136282 (2000)
Siquian vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135627 (1999)
Latasa vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154829 (2003)
N. Pre-Proclamation Controversy
Secs. 16-20, RA 7166
Sec. 38, RA 9369
Sec. 243, OEC
Rule 3 of COMELEC Reso. 8804 for 2010 Elections
Lagumbay vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-25444 (1966)
Pimentel vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 178413 (2008)
Sandoval vs. COMELEC, G.R.No. 133842 (2000)
Villegas vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52463 (1980)
Baterina vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 95347 (1992)
Laodenio vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 122391 (1997)

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Gustilo vs. Real, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1250 (2001)

O. Election Contest
1. Election Protest
Rosal vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168253 (2007)
Violago vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194143 (2011)
De Castro vs. COMELEC, 267 SCRA 806 (1997)
Legarda vs. De Castro, PET Case No. 003 (2008)
Maliksi vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203302 (2013)
Abundo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201716 (2013)

2. Quo Warranto
Sec. 253, OEC
Sampayan vs. Daza, 213 SCRA 807 (1992)
Maquiling vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649 (2013)
Reyes vs. COMELEC, supra
3. Jurisdiction
Alvarez vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 142527 (2001)
Veloria vs. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 502
Nollen vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187635 (2010)
Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690
Lazatin vs. HRET, 168 SCRA 391
Arroyo vs. HRET, 246 SCRA 384 (1995)
Reyes vs. COMELEC, supra
P. Election Offenses
Sec. 2(6) Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution
Secs. 261-263, 267-269, OEC
Sec. 2, RA 7890
Secs. 31-32, RA 7166
Sec. 43, RA 9360
Sec. 27, RA 6646
Sec. 45, RA 8189
Sec. 5, RA 8295
Sec. 13, RA 9006
Sec. 28, 31-32, 35, 42, RA 9369
Pimentel vs. COMELEC, supra
Domalanta vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125586 (2000)
Regalado vs. CA, G.R. No. 115962 (2000)
People vs. Reyes, supra
Margarejo vs. Escoses, G.R. No. 137250 (2001)
Guzman vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182380 (2009)
BANAT vs. COMELEC, supra
Arroyo vs. DOJ, G. R, No. 199082 (2013)

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