PUBLIC , POLICY The Essential Readings Stella Z. Theodoulou Matthew A. Cahn California State University, Northridge Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458rye ogre Catia ie ne et elit a? Acquisitions editor: Charlyoe Jones Owen Production editor: Merail Peterson Interior design: Joan Stone Copy editor: Rene Lynch Cover designer: Miguel Ortiz Production coordinator: Mary Ann Gloriande Editorial assistant: Nicole Signoretti © 1995 by Prentice Hall, Inc. Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458 Al rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, in apy form or by any means, without permission in writing from the publisher Printed in the United States of America 1415 1617 18 19 EKMBKM 0987 ISBN 0-13-059255-2 ‘Prentice-Hall International (UK) Limited, London Prentice-Hall of Avsrala Pry. Limited, Sydney Prentice-Hall of Canada ne, Toro Prentice-Hall Hispanoamericona, S.A. Mexico ‘Prentice-Hall of Inia Private Limite, New Delhi Prentice-Hall of Japan, Ine, Tyo Prentice-Hall Asia Pre. Ltd, Singapore aitora Prentice-Hall do Brasil, Lida, Rlo de JaneiroContents Preface PART ONE The Nature of Public Policy What is public policy, who makes it, and why study it? 1. The Contemporary Language of Public Policy: A Starting Point, Stella Z. Theodoulow 2. Political Science and Public Policy, Paul A. Sabatior 3. Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of Government, Theodore J. Lowi 4. Symbols and Political Quiescence, Murruy Edelman 5. ‘The Analysis of Public Policy: A Search for Theories and Roles, Robert H. Salisbury 6. With the Consent of Al, Robert A. Dahl 7. Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, Hugh Heclo 8. Imperfect Competition, Ralph Miliband ative Democracy, David B. Truman 9. Group Politics and Repre: 10, ‘The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills Vi Contents PART TWO. Making Public Policy The process, structure, and context of policy making 11, How Public Policy Is Made, Stella Z, Theodoulow 12, Issues and Agendas, Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder 13, Agenda Setting, John W. Kingdon 14. The Science of “Muddling Through,” Charles E. Lindblom 15. Nonineremental Policy Making, Paul R. Schulman 16. The Implementation Game, Eugene Bardach 17. Implementation as Evolution, Giandomenico Majone and Aaron Wildavsky 18. A Conceptual Framework of the Implementation Process, Paul A. Sabatier and Daniel A. Mazmanian 19. The Role of Evaluation in Public Policy, David Nachimias 20. Trends in Policy Analysis, Stuart Nagel 21, The Politics of Public Budgets, trene $, Rubin PART THREE The Players Institutional and noninstitutional actors 22. The Players: Institutional nd Noninstitutional Actors in the Policy Process, Matthew A. Calin 25. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, Morris Fiorina 24, Congress: The Electoral Connection, David Mayheto 25, The Presidential Policy Stream, Paul Light 26, The Two Presidencis, Aaron Wildavsky 27. The Rise ofthe Bureaucratic State, james Q. Wilson 28, Bureaucracy, Max Weber 29. Regulation; Politics, Bureaucracy, and Economics, Kenneth J. Meier 30. Appellate Courts as Policy Makers, Laworence Baum 31. Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, Nathan Glazer 86 86 105 13 198 137 140 153 173 181 185 201 201 21 220 251 259 265; a7 288,32, News That Matters, Shanto Iyengar and Donald Kinder 33. Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide, Doris Graber 34, Parties, the Government, and the Policy Process, Samuel J. Eldersveldt 35, The Advocacy Explosion, Jeffrey M. Berry 36, ‘The Consultant Corps, Larry J. Sabato PART FOUR The Policy Game Rules, strategies, culture, and resources a7 Playing the Policy Game, Matthew A. Cahn 38, An Economie Interpretation of the Constitution, Charles Beard 39, The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, sand John Joy 40. Political Repression in t ited States, Michael Rogin m, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis apitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman 43, Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt 44, Constructing the Political Spectacle, Murray Edelman 45. A Preface to Economie Democracy, Robert A. Dahl 46, Who Rules America Now?, G. William Domhoff 41. Democracy and Capitalef Covermment 15 Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of G 1 085, Pley Analy Plc Stece Chega NleomHtlh A re tus NT6 Corcan to Compo, Lengo. Mas D Robots, Hanne Bors, Hew ogo. “fop-Down and Hatom-Up Mods of Fle tmlementtin: A Cea Pata 6 Jamsary 2118, an gee Sera ora of ue Poi 8 a a pend gs. “An Advocacy Coation Framework of Pl Sn Pley Scones Fal 12-108, ee oe me ee ne cso Priatation The Tol of Greerament Washington, DC: Th ‘Weban tsi, HALEN. 199, "Behavioral Assumptions of Pay Tool. Joumal of otis 52 (May) 510-559, ame nse nT err alt EW Na Reet program Budgeting” Public Atminusration Feciew 2 Distribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of Government Theodore J. Lowi Inthe long unl governmental poses ay be considered rediubute, be {Casein the ng ron some people ayn taxes moet they reece in sendee Grell ay be thought regulate Does, nthe Tongan, a govemsmental es sho the use of resources can only displace a private decision about the same ao aes last reduce private alteratives about the resource. But plies trum, and in the ‘ends of government decisions Policies of this kind are called ‘Novis n he short ron, and the short rum certain ts ve without regard to limited resources ist *} term first coined for nineteenth-century land policies, but easily land pe ve t coined for ni ceatended to include most contemporary public land and resource policies: rivers nt and research and de woe Cpork barrel) programs; defense procurement and - aa erin lor buses, and agora een” ses nde ‘elon, Distibtive poles ae chance yh ne ih they can be dings a hom any general rule “Panag inte fa anor he word can be taken asa synonym for “distributive” These are Fa ane ight indie decsionstht meaning of the cies that are virtual can Busines, Public Policy Case Studie and Pht Theory World 15. Rept by permission From Theodore Law.“ Poles ns uly 1963), 677 16 The Nature of Publi Policy only by accumulation can be called a policy. They are policies in which the in- Gulged and the deprived, the loser and the recipient, need never come into direet confrontation. Indeed, in many instances of distributive policy, the deprived ean- not as a class be identified, because the most influential among them can be ac- commodated by further disaggregation ofthe stakes. Regulatory policies are also specific and individual in their impact, but they are not capable ofthe almost infinite amount of disaggregation typical of distribu tive policies. Although the laws are stated in general terms (“Arrange the trans portation system artistically.” “Thou shalt not show favoritism in pricing”), the Impact of regulatory decisions is clearly one of directly raising costs and/or reduc. ing or expanding the alternatives of private individuals ("Get off the grass!" “Pro- duce kosher if you advertise kosher!”), Regulatory policies are distinguishable from distributive in that in the short run the regulatory decision involves a direct choice as to who will be indulged and who deprived. Not all applicants for a single television channel or an overseas air route ean be propitiated. Enforcement of an ‘unfuir labor practice on the part of management weakens management in its deal- {ngs with labor. So, while implementation is firm-by-firm and case-by-case, poli cies cannot be disaggregated to the level ofthe individual or the single frm (as in distribution), beeause individual decisions must be made by application of a yen. eral rule and therefore become interrelated within the broader standards of law. Decisions curmulate among all individuals affected by the law in roughly the same ‘way. Since the most stable lines of pereeived common impact are the basic sectors of the economy, regulatory decisions are cumulative largely along sectoral lines, regulatory policies are usually disaggregable only down to the sector level Redistributive policies are like regulatory policies in the sense that relations mong broad categories of private individuals ae involved and, hence, individual decisions must be interrelated. But on al other counts there are great diflerences in the nature of impact. The categories of impact are much broader, approaching social classes. They are, crudely speaking, haves and have-nots, bigness and small- ness, bourgeoisie and proletariat. The aim involved is not use of property but property itself, not equal treatment but equal possession, not behavior but being, ‘The fact that our income tax isin reality only milly redistributive does not alter the fact ofthe aims and the stakes involved in income tax policies. The same goes for our various “welfare state" programs, which are redistributive only for those who entered retirement or unemployment rolls without having contributed at al ‘The nature of «redistributive issuc is not determined by the outcome of a battle over how redistributive a policy is going to be. Expectations about what it can be, what it threatens to be, are determinative. ARENAS OF POWER Once ane posts the general tendency of these areas of policy or governmental ac- tivity to develop characteristic political structures, a number of hypotheses be-Dintribution, Regulation, Redistribution: The Functions of Government 17 he general come compelling, And when the various hypotheses are accumulated, the g Sito ech ofthe thee arnds bein quit to resemble, especie the thee “general” theories of politieal process, The arena that develops around di Ibtice policies ie best charactenzed inthe terms of E. E, Sehattchneider’s Tidings ca the polities of tariff legislation in the nineteen-twentles, The regular aay atena corresponds to the phiralist school, and the school's general notions are (ead to be limited pretty much to this one arena. The redistributive arena most atocely approximates, with some adaptation, an elitist view ofthe political process. yTPihe distsibutive arena can be identified in considerable detail from Schattschnelder's case-study alone.’ What he and his pluralist successors didnot See ats that the tational structure of tariff pots is also in largest part the Structure of politics of al these diverse policies identified earlier as distbutvs, ‘The arena is™pluralstic” only in the sense that a large number of small, intensely oanied interests are operating, In ic, theres even greater multiply of par eee goouregup wel on count or bee eset itis polities of every man for himself. The single person and the single frm are we major activists polities of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff are almost one-for-one applicable to rivers Mra harbors and land development poles, tax exemptions, defense procuc: inet, area redevelopinent, and government “services.” Since there is no real basis qe iiseriminating between those who should and those who should not be pro- tected indulged], says Schattschneider, Congres secks poltieal support by “ ing limited protection [indulgence] to all interests strong enough to furish formidable resistance.” Decison-inakers become “responsive to considerations o quality, consistency, impartiality, uniformity, precedent, and moderation, how cant forinal and insubstantial these may be.” Furthermore, a policy tha is so hos- Pitable and catholic... disorganizes the opposition.” PlaPl hen 1 billicnedollar issue can be disaggregated into many silions of aickel-dime items and each item can be dealt with without regard tothe others, trulpiation af interests and of aces i inevitable, and so reduction of eon: Tet All of this has the greatest bearing on the relations among participants an therefore the “power structure.” Indeed, coalitions must be bul o pass legisla tion and “make policy,” but what ofthe nature and bass of the coalitions? In the ‘iatabative arena, politcal relationships approximate what Schattschneider called Heutual noninterference"—"a mutuality under which itis proper foreach to seek dite [indulgences for himself but improper and una to oppose duties [inl toners) songhtby others” In he area of ver and harbors, references are ma {0 “pork barre” and “log-lling,” but these colloqulaisms have not been taken Sulcenty seriously. ATogeslling coalition isnt one forged af confit, compro- tne and tangential interest but, on the contrary, one composed of members who Tune absolutly nothing in common; and this is posible beeause the “pork bare see Sutainer for unrelated items, This i the typical form of relationship in the distributive arena. 18 The Nature of Public Policy The structure of these log-rolling relationships leads typically, though not always, to Congress; and the structure is relatively stable because all who have ac- ess of any sort usually support whoever are the leaders, And there tend to be “elites” of peculiar sort in the Congeessional committees whose jurisdictions in- This is the sort of socially unlocated conception which some American write ers with conservative yearnings have recently sought ta develop. But most moral and psychological conceptions ofthe elite are much less sophisticated, concerning themselves not with individuals but with the stratum as a whole. Such ideas tt fact, always arse in a society in which some people possess more than do others of yrhat there is to possess. People with advantages are loath to believe that they just happen to be people with advantages. They come readily o define theinselves as inherently worthy of what they possess; they come to believe themselves ‘natu rally elite and, in fact, to imagine their possessions and their privileges as natural extensions of their own elite shes. In this sense, the idea ofthe elite as composed ‘of men and women having a finer moral characteris an ideology of the elite asa Privileged ruling stratum, und this is true whether the ideology is elite-made or ‘made up for it by others In eras of equalitarian thetorc, the more intelligent or the more articulate among the lower and middle classes, 8 wel as guilty members ofthe upper, may shine to entrain ideas of « countereite. n west society, ba mater af at, here is long tradition and varied images of the poor, the exploited, and the op prese as the truly virtuous, the wise, a the blessed Stemming from Chien tradition, this moral idea ofa counter-elite, composed of essentially high gondemned toa lowly station, may be and has been wsed by the underlying pops lation to justifyharsh enticsm of ruling elites an to celebrate topian images of new elite to come. The moral conception of the elit, however, isnot always merely an ideology of the everprvileged or a counter-ideology of the underprivileged. It's often fact: having controlled experiences and select privileges, many individuals of thoThe Power Elite $1 upper stratum do come in due course to approximate the types of character they claim to embody. Even when we give up—as we must—the idea that the elite ‘num or woman is born with an elite character, we need not dismiss the idea that their experiences and trainings develop in them characters of a specific type. Nowadays we must qualify the idea of elite as composed of higher types of individuals, for the men who are selected for and shaped by the top positions have snd advisers and ghosts and make-up men who modify their ir public images, as well as shape many of their de- cisions. There is, of course, considerable variation among the elite in this respect, but as a general role in America today, it would be naive to interpret any major clitc group merely in terms of its ostensible personnel. The American elite often seems less a collection of persons than of corporate entities, which are in great part created and spoken for as standard types of ‘personality’ Even the most ap- patently free-lance celebrity is usually a sort of synthetie production tuned out each week by a disciplined staff which systematically ponders the effect of the easy ad-libbed gags the celebrity ‘spontaneously’ echoes. Yet, in so far as the elite lourishes as a social class or as a set of men at the ‘command posts, it will select and form certain types of personality, and reject oth- crs. The kind of moral and psychological beings men become is in large part de- termined by the values they experience and the institutional roles they are allowed and expected to play. From the biographer’s point of view, a man of the upper classes is formed by his relations with others like himself ina series of small intimate groupings through which he passes and to which throughout his lifetime he may return, So conceived, the elite is aset of higher circles whose members are xined and certified and permitted intimate access to those who com: mand the impersonal institutional hierarchies of modern society. If there is any cone key to the psychological idea of the elite, itis that they combine in their per- sons an awareness of impersonal decision-making with intimate sensibilities shared with one another. To understand the elite asa social class we must exam- ine a whole series of smaller face-to-face milieu. the most obvious of which, his- torically, has been the upper-class family, but the most important of which today are the proper secondary school and the metropolitan club > selected, ‘The power elite is composed of political, economic, and military men, but this instituted elite i frequently in some tension: it comes together only on certain coinciding points and only on certain occasions of ‘criss.’ In the long peace of the nineteenth century, the military were notin the high councils of state, not of the political directorate, and neither were the economic men—they made raids upon the state but they did not join its directorate. During the ‘thirties, the political man was ascendant, Now the military and the corporate men are in top positions Of the three types of cir compose the power elite today. iis the mil- itary that has benefited the most in its enhanced power, although the corporate 82 ‘The Nature of Public Policy circles have also become more explicitly intrenched in the more publie decision making cireles. Its the professional politician that has lost the most, so much that in examining the events and decisions, one is tempted to speak of a political vac- tum in which the corporate rich and the high warlord, in their coinciding inter ests, rl It should not be said that the three ‘take turns’ in carrying the initiative, for the mechanics of the power elite are not often as deliberate as that would imply. A times, of course, it -—as when political men, thinking they ean borrow the prestige of generals, find that they must pay for it, o, as whien during big shumps, ‘economic men feel the need of a politician at once safe and possessing vote ap peal. Today all three are involved in virtually all widely ramifying decisions. Which ‘of the three types seems to lead depends upon ‘the tasks ofthe period’ as they, the elite, define them. Just now, these tasks center upon “defense” and international affairs. Accordingly, as we have seen, the military are ascendant in two senses: as personnel and as justifying ideology” That is why, just now, we can most easily specify the unity and the shape of the power elite in terms of the military ascen dancy ‘The conception of the power elite and of its unity rests upon the corre sponding developments and the coincidence of interests among economic, politi- cal, and military organizations. It also rests upon the similarity of origin and ‘outlook, and the social and personal intermingling of the top circles from each of these dominant hierarchies. This conjunction of institutional and psychological forces, in tur, is revealed by the heavy personnel traffic within and between the big three institutional orders, as well as by the rise of go-betweens as in the high level lobbying, The conception of the power elite, accordingly, does not rest upon the assumption that American history since the origins of World War IT must be understood asa secret plot, or asa great and co-ordinated conspiracy of the mem= bers ofthis elit. The conception rests upon quite impersonal grounds. “There is, however, little doubt that the American power elite—which con- tains, we are told, some of ‘the greatest organizers inthe work! —has also planned and has plotted. The rise ofthe elite, as we have already made elear, was not and could not have been caused by a plot; and the tenability of the conception does not rest upon the existence of any secret or any publicly known orginization. But, ‘onee the conjunetion of structural trond and of the personal will to utilize it gave rise to the power elite, then plans and programs did oceur to its members and in deed it is not possible to interpret many events and official policies of the fifth epoch without reference to the power elite. "There isa great difference,” Richard Hofstadter has remarked, ‘between locating conspira that history is, in effect, a conspiracy. 7 ‘The structural trends of institutions become defined as opportunities by those who oceupy thelr command posts. Once such opportunities are recognized, ies in history and saying,The Power Elite 83 ven may avail themselves of them, Certain types of men from each of the domi- nant institutional areas, more far-sighted than others, have actively promoted the liaison before it tock its truly modern shape. They have often done so for reasons not shared by their partners, although not objected to by them either; and often the outcome of their liaison has had consequences which none of them foresaw, ‘much less shaped, and which only later in the course of development came under explicit control. Only after it was well under way did most ofits members find themselves part of it and become gladdened, although sometimes also worried, by this fact. But once the co-ordination isa going concern, new men come readily into # and assume its existence without question So far as explicit organization—conspiratorial or not—is concerned, the power elite, by ts very nature, is more likely to use existing organizations, working, ‘within and between them, than to set up explicit organizations whose member- ship is strictly limited to its own members. But if there is no machinery in exis- tence to ensure, for example, that military and politica factors will be balanced in decisions made, they will invent such machinery and use it, as with the National Secutity Council. Moreover, in a formally democratic polity, the aims and the powers ofthe various elements ofthis elite are further supported by an aspect of the permanent war economy: the assumptic that the security ofthe nation sup- posedly rests upon great secrecy of plan and intent. Many higher events that ‘would reveal the working of the power elite can be withheld from public know!- edge under the guise of secrecy. With the wide secrecy covering their operations nd decisions, the power elite can mask their intentions, operations, and further consolidation. Any secrecy that is imposed upon those in positions to observe high decision-makers clearly works for and not against the operations ofthe power elite. ‘There is accordingly reason to suspect—but by the nature of the case, no proof—that the power elite is not altogether ‘surfaced,’ There is nothing hidden about it, although its activities are not publicized. As an clit, it is not organized, although its members often know one another, seem quite naturally to work to- gether, and share many organizations in common. There is nothing conspiratorial bout it although its deesions are often publicly unknown and its mode of opera tion manipulative rather than explicit. It is not that the elite ‘believe in’ a compact elite behind the scenes and a ‘mass dawn below. [Lis not put in that language. Itis just that the people are of ne~ cessity confused and must, lke trusting children, place all the new world of for- cin policy and strategy and executive action inthe hands of experts. Its just that everyone knows somebody has got to run the show, and that somebody usually does, Others do not really care anyway, and besides, they do not know how. So the zap between the two types gets wider. NOTES 1, Jacob Burckbara, Force ond Freedom (New York: Patheon Books, 1943), pp 18 2. CL Hans Ge-th and C. Wright Mills, Chéracter and Social Structure (New York Harcourt, ‘race, 1955), pp. 457 1 we valve and ealing those who have the mst of tan cite derives ia mer ines rt te Talon econo, Feet, si pts the central ot C8 Wa ${Etalaume dutinvery bat oftuman cyan ghana inde which stands igor Suse voy och the way yonder are oven inde vrs subjects in exaiations i SSA The ghost pe ot lanyes, fr sarc, wil be given 10. The man sho docs no eta len. TSI pice reer acre or the man who ian cuand-out idiot. To the man who bas mad is lene or dks ay ri 10 Them vt cael Thousands we lie 6; to suchas jst manage to keep auto the por hose, keeping zr for those ho gotin.. Soler as make ls people who have the highest indices in hee ranch of c= Rap, and a clas give the veo sie! Viledo Pat, The Mind and Soity Nes Yorks Har {SID Blac, 1835), pus 027 and 001. Those who follow Us approach end up na wh one elite, bat Rvs umber eoreponding to the ner of vals hey elt. Like manatee astet was | TRAANE ti ones afl Beene frees stati na lear- titins provide concerning what groups wil ave acces tothe dvcoping vatedImes and Agendas 108, aon eet zou ear re ave tt tel een Frese they are concerned wis wil take place ter the platform they sel tentative assevane ofa vole Va that element To masoiae th assurance, poll {cl intrest groups ornally seek recognition nthe platform bls major pares? party orga Certainly recognition on a party platform is atleast indicative ofan issue attaining standing on the systemie agenda of political controversy.” ‘The media can also play a very important role in elevating issues to the sys- tomie agenda and increasing their chances of receiving formal agenda considera- tion, Certain personages in the media can act as opinion leaders in bringing publicity to a particular issue. Examples of individuals who have gained a larger Pidicnce for adispate nelude Walter Lippmann, Jack Anderson, and Drew Pear- son. Individuals whe have acquired an audience simply by constantly appearing in the news ean also publicize an issue. Ralph Nader has a ready-made constituency stemming from his many attacks on various inefficient and unscrupulous business practices, DIFFERENTIAL LEGITIMACY While most observers grant that there are inequalities in access to decision- Mak yaa it eastence of lil ntfs ong io: Unt levels and branches of government has the net effect of insuring widespread contacts, Further, the existence of dispersed inequalities (that is, the fact that troups having great resources in one area may not have comparable resources in bther areas) supposedly assures that no group will be without political influence in some areas. However, this argument fails to consider the relatively stable pattern of differential legitimacy accorded various social groupings. Differences in acces- sity to decision-makers are function ofthe seative legitimacy of warts zroups. For example, a proporal advanced by a group of businessmen to impreve EHD tows into the downtowm busines area is more ely to recave the ste. on of decision-makers than a counterproposal by ghetto residents to develop more extensive and elective mass transit systems. ‘The problem confronted by ay news fot group soles bow te lot Imize the group and the interest represented rather than how to legitimize a par. va a patton The letmacy athe group ll be rently nance by the status and community standing of its members. In other words, people without resources for example, lower-income groups) wllhave gente ily atnng legitimacy than their higher-income counterparts. For example, the anti-war mnverent aly promoted by student rope ho tron have pate ical standing received little public support until more socially prominent persons and groups entered the fray on their bebalf (for example, business groups, military leaders, clergymen, and senators) 104 Making Public Policy SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS ON AGENDA ENTRANCE Even if an issue is promoted by a group that is perceived to be legitimate, its ap- pearance on a formal agenda may be problematic owing to cultural constraints on the range of issues that are considered legitimate topics for governmental action. Any institutional agenda will be restricted by the prevailing popular sentiment as ‘to what constitutes appropriate matters for governmental attention. For example, federal aid to education was long considered by many to be an inappropriate area for federal governmental action, a fact that precluded active and serious consider- ation of the merits of the issue for decades. Legitimizing issues that are consid- cred outside of the governmental realm is difficult and normally takes along time. ‘The net effect of this is that new demands of particularly disadvantaged or de- prived groups are the least likely to receive attention on either the systemic agenda of controversy or the institutional agenda, NoTES 1, For a case study ofthis confit, sce Anew Hach The Truckers ws, Th Ralfosds” in Alin Wes tes (New York: Harcourt, 1062), p. 329-16, 2. Herbert Blumer, “Collactve Behavior.” in J B.C Yorke Wiley, 1997), 148, 3 Hans Toe, The aycholny a Socal Movements langpis Bobs Mera, 1965, 87 4. Mere the focus son actu aalsttion of esoures. A peresoed mastibon Is: covered iy the weatjstoe type of suelo 5. Calendars normaly provide predeind agendas for both the leishture andthe court Howe, nsession pce law ens tbe enced on tegen fe {qu of ong decowsnaker without gang Uovgh the normal pasedcs of agente pechonion For ecinpe nthe Congres, hc peda inghes he patente Da iene cluded fom our analysis, which octeson the jbl and union elena, where Tietmpore wl he found Pressure Politi in Peay (ea, The User of Power 7 Cates in American Pal ler (el), Rete of Sacolgy (New ot eas of pub Raymond Dave, il Pol an Levis Deer, Americas Buss and Plc Plc (New York heeton Pres, 1960p. 128, 1 David Troman, The Goeramental Process (New York: Knopf, 1964, p. 264 5, Seo, for example, Everett C. Ld, J, Amorcun Political Parties (New York W. W, Nor ‘on and Company, 1570) 8. Truman, op. ft, p. 255 10, Significant differences inthe platforms ofthe two major partes may poste a moral {eration in the national systemic agenda, This change maybe rece tough what Key called cot tel election.” Certainly ert o realigning, election may be taken a a nial of nao in the systemic agendh. See V. 0. Key, Polis, artes and Pressure Group. Sih cd. (New York ‘Thoma Crowell Company, 1964), pp 0-36.Agenda Setting 105 ms Agenda Setting John W. Kingdon these questions concentrate on participants: We uncover who affects agendas an these participants affect agendas and alternatives. We have conceived of three anal pirat enea paisonea pein Teciersegae chiar they generate proposals for public policy changes, and they engage in such poli activities as election campaigns and pressure group lobbying. Each partici t—president, members of Con ess iil oa, Bias. journalists, tion, proposal form: nd polities). Policy is not the sole province of analysts, participants usually specialize in one or another process to a degree. Academics seared Gs pollo horn ang deed mopeds Bas cone pupa nile fon pcos " Each of the participants and processes can act as an impetus or as a con- congressional committee chair, for instance, decides to emphasize a subject. Or a problem is highlighted because a disaster occurs or because a well-known indica- attend to other subjects. Concerns over budgetary costs of an item can also make AGENDA SETTING How are governmental agendas set? Our answer has concentrated on three exple- nations: problems, politics, and visible participants. From Agendes,Alteraties, and Full Paice by John W. Kingdon, Copyright © 1984 by Joba W. Kington pp 205-215, Repeated with pematn of HarpeCallos Colge Publishers 106 Making Public Policy Problems Why do some problems come to occupy the attention of governmental offi als more than other problems? The answer lies both in the means by which ‘those officials lear about conditions and in the ways in which conditions becon defined as problems. As to means, we have discussed indicators, focusing events and feedback. Sometimes, « more or less systematic indicator simply shows that there is a condition ont there. Indicators are used to assess the magnitude of the condition (e.g, the ineidence of a disease or the cost of a program), and to diseem changes in a condition. Both large magnitude and change catch officials’ atten- tion. Second, a focusing event—a disaster, crisis, personal experience, or powerful symbol—draws attention to some conditions more than to others. But such an event has only transient effects unless accompanied by a firmer indication of a problem, by a preexisting perception, or by a combination with other si events. Third, officials learn about conditions through feedback about the ope tion of existing programs, either formal (e.g, routine monitoring of costs or pro gram evaluation studies) or informal (e.g, streams of complaints lowing into congressional offices). ‘There isa difference between a condition and a problem. We put up with all ids of conditions every day, and conditions do not rise to prominent places on policy agendas. Conditions come to be defined as problems, and have a better chance of rising onthe agenda, when we come to believe that we should do some- thing to change them. People in and around government define conditions as problems in several ways. First, conditions that violate important values are trans- formed into problems. Second, conditions become problems by comparison with other countries or other relevant units. Third, lassifying @ condition into one cat- egory rather than another may define it as one kind of problem or another. The lack of public transportation for handicapped people, for instance, can be elassi- fied asa transportation problem or as a civil rights problem, and the treatment of the subject is dramatically affected by the category Problems not only rise on governmental agenclas, but they also fado from view. Why do they fade? First, government may aldress the problem, or fail to ad- In both cases, attention turns to something else, either because some- ig has been done or because people are frustrated by failure and refuse to invest more of their time in a losing cause. Second, conditions that highlighted a problem may change—indicators drop instead of rise, or crises go away, Third, people may become accustomed to a condition oF relabel a problem, Fourth, other items emerge and push the highly placed items aside. Finally, there may simply be inevitable eycles in attention: high growth rates level off, and fads come and go. Problem recognition is critical to agenda setting. ‘The chances of a given proposal or subject rising on an agenda are markedly enhanced if itis connected to an important problem, Some problems are seen as so pressing that they set agendas all by themselves. Once a particular problem is defined as pressing‘Agenda Setting 107 whole classes of approaches are favored over others, and some alternatives are highlighted while others fll from view. So policy entrepreneurs invest consider, able resources bringing thelr conception of problems to officals’ attention, and trying to convince them to sce problems their way. The recognition and definition of problems affect outcomes significantly. Politics “The second family of explanations for high or low agenda prominence is in the politcal stream. Independently of problem recognition or the development of policy proposals, political events flow along according to their own dynamics and Their own rules. Participants perceive swings in national mood, elections bring. how administrations to power and new partisan or ideological distributions to Congress, and interest groups of various descriptions press (or fil to press their demands on government. Developments in this political sphere are powerful agenda setters. A new administration, for instance, changes agendas all over town as it highlights its con- Ceptions of problems and its proposals, and makes attention to subjects that ere not among its high priorities much les likely. A national mood that is perceived to be profoundly conservative dampens attention to costy new initiatives, while a tore tolerant national mood would allow for greater spending. The opposition of {powerful phalan of interest groups makes i difficult—not impossible, but di ‘cult—to contemplate some initiatives Consensus is built in the political steam by bargaining more than by per- suasion. When participants recognize problems or settle on certain proposals in the policy stream, they do s0 largely by persuasion, They marshal indicators and ange that certain conditions ought to be defined as problems, or they argue that dielr proposals mect such logical tests as technical feasibility or value acceptabil- ‘ty. But in the politcal stream, participants build consensus by bargaining —trad- ing provisions for support, adding elected officials to coalitions by giving them concessions that they demand, or compromsisin that will gain wider acceptance “The combination of national mood and elections is a more potent agenda setter than organized interests. Interest groups are often able to block considers- tion of proposals they do not prefer, or to adapt to an item already high on a gov- adding elements a bit more to their liking, They less often imntiate considerations or set agendas on their own. And shen orgenized interests tome into conflict with the combination of national mood ancl elected politicians, the latter combination is likely to peeval, at least as Far as setting an agenda is eon- ceomed. from ideal positions to positions ‘ernmental agenda by Third, we made a distinetion between visible and hidden participants. The visible cluster of actors, those who receive considerable press and public atten- tion, include the president and his high-level appointees, prominent members of 108 Making Public Pliey Congress, the media, and such elections-related actors as politcal parties and ‘campaigners. The relatively hidden cluster includes academic specialists, career bureaucrats, and congressional staffers. We have discovered that the visible clus ter affects the agenda and the hidden cluster affects the alternatives. So the chances ofa subject rising on a governmental agenda are enhanced if that subject is pushed by participants in the visible cluster, and dampened ifit is neglected by those participants. The administration—the president and his appointees—is a particularly powerful agenda setter as are such prominent members of Congress asthe party leaders and key committee chairs ‘At least as far as agenda setting is concerned, elected officials and their ap pointees turn out to be more important than career civil servants or participants Dutside of government, To those who Took for evidences of democracy at work this is an encouraging result. These elected officials do not necessarily get their ‘way in specifying alternatives or implementing decisions, but they do affect ag das rather substantially. To describe the roles of various participants in agend Setting, a fairly straightforward top-down model, with elected officals atthe top, comes surprisingly close tothe truth [ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATION How isthe list of potential alternatives for publi policy choices narrowed to the ‘ones that actually receive serious consideration? There are two families of an- swers: (1) Alternatives are generated and narrowed in the policy stream; and (2) Relatively hidden participants, specialists in the particular poliey area, are in volved. Hidden Participants: Specialists Alternatives, proposals, and solutions are generated in communities of spe- cialists. This relatively hidden cluster of participants inchdes academies, re Searchers, consultants, career buremerats, congressional staffers, and analysts ‘who work for interest groups. Their work is done, for instance, in planning and evaluation or budget shops in the bureaucracy o in the staff agencies on the Hill “These relatively hidden participants form loosely knit communities of spe cialis. There is such a community for health, for instance, which includes analo- {gous subcommunities for more specialized areas like the direct delivery of aeedical services and the regulation of food and drugs. Some ofthese communi bes, such asthe one for transportation, are highly fragmented, while others are more tightly knit. Each community is eomposed of people located throughont the system and potentially of very diverse orientations and interests, but they all share one thing: their specialization and acquaintance with the issues in that particular policy area. ‘Ideas bubble around in these communities. People try out proposals in a va-Agenda Setting 109 riety of ways: through speeches, bill introductions, congressional hearings, leaks to ress, circulation of papers, conversations, and lunches. They float their ideas, criticize one another's work, hone and revise their ideas, and float new versions. Some of these ideas are respectable, while others are out of the question. But mmany, many ideas are posstble and are considered in some fashion somewhere along the line ‘The Policy Stream the generation of policy alternatives is best seen as a selection process, ogous to biological natural selection, In what we have called the policy primeval soup, many ideas float around, bumping into one another, encountering, nnew ideas, and forming combinations and recombinations. The origins of policy ‘may seem a bit obscure, hard to predict and hard to understand orto structure. ‘While the origins are somewhat haphazard, the selection is not, Through the imposition of eriteria by which some ideas are selected out for survival while cothers are discarded, order is developed from chaos, pattern from randomness. ‘These criteria include technical feasibility, congruence with the values of commu nity members, and the anticipation of Future constraints, including a budget con straint, public aeceptability, and politicians’ receptivity. Proposals that are judged infeasible—that do not square with policy community values, that woukl cost ‘more than the budget will allow, that run afoul of opposition in either the mass or specialized publics, or that would not find a receptive audience among clected politicians—are less likely to survive than proposals that meet these standards, In the process of consideration in the policy community, ideas themselves are im- portant. Pressure models do not completely describe the process. Proposals are evaluated partly in terms of their politcal support and opposition, to be sure, but partly against logical or analytical criteria as well, “There is along process of softening up the system. Policy entrepreneurs do not leave consideration of thesr pet proposals to accident, Instead, they push for consideration in many ways and in many forums In the process of policy develop- ‘ment, recombination (the coupling of already-familiar elements) is more impor- tant than mutation (the appearance of wholly new forms). Thus entrepreneurs, «who broker people and ideas, are more important than inventors. Because recom- bination is more important than invention, there may be “no new thing under the stun” atthe same time that there may be dramatic change and innovation. There is change, but it involves the recombination of already-famniliar elements, The long softening-up process is eritical to policy change. Opportunities for serious hearings, the policy windows we explored in Chapter 8, pass quickly and are missed if the proposals have not already gone through the long gestation process before the window opens. The work of floating and refining proposals is not wasted if it does not bear fruit in the short run. Indeed, it is eritcally impor- tant ifthe proposal isto be heard at the right time. 110 Making Public Pe cy ‘COUPLING AND WINDOWS. ‘The separate streams of problems, policies, and politics each have lives of their own, Problems are recognized and defined according to processes that are differ- tent from the ways policies are developed or politieal events unfold. Policy propos- als. are developed according to their own incentives and selection criteria, whether ‘oF not they are solutions to problems or responsive to political considerations. Po litical events flow along on their own schedule and according to their own rules, whether oF not they are related to problems or proposals. But there come times when the three streams are joined. A pressing prob- lem demands attention, for instance, and a policy proposal is coupled to the prob- lem as its solution. Or an event in the political stream, such as a change of administration, calls for different directions. At thet point, proposals tht fit with that political event, such as initiatives that fit with a mew administration's philoso phy, come to the fore and are coupled with the ripe political climate, Similarly, problems that fit are highlighted, and others are neglected, Decision Agendas ‘A complete linkage combines all three streams—problems, policies, and politics —into a single package. Advocates of a new policy initiative not only tske advantage of politically propitious moments but also claim that their proposal is solution to a pressing problem. Likewise, entrepreneurs concemed about a par ticular problem search for solutions in the policy stream to couple to theft prob lem, then try to take advantage of political receptivity at certain points in time to push the package of problem and solution. At points along the way, there are par tal couplings: solutions to problems, but without a rezeptive political climate: po ities to proposals, but without a sense that a compelling problem is being solved: polities and problems both calling for action, but without an available alternative to advocate. But the complete joining of all three streams dramatically enhances the odds that a subject will become firmly fixed on a decision agenda, Governmental agendas, lists of subjects to which governmental officials are paying serious attention, can be set solely in either problems or political streams, and solely by visible actors. OMeials can pay attention to an important problem, for instance, without having a solution to it. Or politics may highlight a subject, even inthe absence of either problem or solution. A decision agenda, alist of sub- jects that is moving into position for an authoritative decision, such as legislative etment or presidential choice, is set somewhat differently. The probability of an item rising on a decision agenda is dramatically increased if all three cle- ments—problem, policy proposal, and political receptivity—are linked in « single package. Conversely, partial couplings are less likely to rise on decision agendas Problems that come to decisions without solutions attached, for instance, are not a likely to move into position for an authoritative choice as if they did have solu- tions attached. And proposals that lick political backing are less likely to move {nto position for a decision than ones that do have that backing,Agenda Setting LL Policy Windows ‘An open policy window is an opportunity for advocates to push thetr pet so- Iutions or to push attention to their special problems. Indeed, advocates ia and ‘around government keep their proposals and their problems at hand, waiting for these opportunities to oceur. They have pet solutions, for instance, and wait for problems to float by to which they’ ean attach their solutions, or for developments In the political stream that they can use to their advantage. Or they wait for simi- lar opportunities to bring their special problems to the fore, such as the appear- nce of a new administration that would be concerned with these problems. That vdministration opens a window for them to bring greater attention to the prob- lems about which they are concemed. ‘Windows are opened by events in either the problems or political streams. ‘Thus there are problems windows and political windows. A new problem appears, for instance, ereating an opportunity to attach a solution to it, Or such events in the political stream as turnover of elected officals, swings of national mood, or vigorous lobbying :night create opportunities to push some problems and propos- als tothe fore and dampen the chances to highlight other problems and proposals. Sometimes, windows open quite predictably. Legislation comes up for re- rnewal on a schedule, for instance, ereating opportunities to change, expand, or abolish certain programs. At other times, windows open quite unpredictably, as ‘when an airliner crashes or a luky election produces an unexpected turnover in Key decision makers. Predictable or unpredictable, open windows are small scarce. Opportunities come, but they also pass. Windows do not stay open ther must be avaited. “The searcity and the short duration ofthe opening of a policy window create «4 powerful magnet for problems and proposals. When a window opens, problems ‘and proposils flock to it, People concerned with particular problems see the open ‘window as their opportunity to address or even solve these problems. Advocates tf particular proposals see the open window as the opportunity to enact them. As S result the system cones tobe loaced down with problems and proposals. If par- ticipants are willing to invest sufficient resources, some of the problems can be re- solved and some of the proposals enacted. Other problems and proposals drift tovay because insuflicient resources are mobilized. ‘Open windows present opportunities for the complete linkage of problems, proposals, and politics, and hence opportunities to move packages of the three Joined elements up on decision agendas. One particularly crucial coupling isthe Tink of a solution to something else. Advocates of pet proposals watch for develop- ‘ments in the political stream that they can take advantage of or try to couple their Solution to whatever problems are floating by at the moment. Once they have tmade the partial coupling of proposal to either problem or politics, they attempt {o join all three elements, knowing that the chances for enactment are consider- ably enhanced if they can complete the circle. Thus they try to hook packages of problems and solutions to politieal forces, packages of proposals and political 12 Making Publie Pliey centives to perceived problems, or packages of prablems and polis to some pro- posal taken fom the policystcams - . ENTREPRENEURS Policy entrepreneurs are people willing to invest their resources in return for fi- ture polices they favor. They are motivated by combinations of several things: their straightforward concem about certain problems, their pursuit of such self- serving benefits as protecting or expanding their bureaucracy’s budget or claiming credit for accomplishment, their promotion of their policy values, and their sim- ple pleasure in participating, We have encountered them at three junctures: push- ing their concerns about certain problems higher on the agenda, pushing their pet proposals during a process of softening up the system, and making the couplings Wwe just discussed. These entrepreneurs are found at many locations; they might be elected officials, career civil servants, lobbyists, academics, or journalists. No cone type of participant dominates the pool of entrepreneurs As to problems, entrepreneurs ty to highlight the indicators that so impor- tantly dramatize their problems. They push for one kind of problem definition rather than another. Because they know that focusing events can move subjects higher on the agenda, entrepreneurs push to ereate such things as personal view- ings of problems by policy makers and the diffusion of a symbol that captures the prblem in a ntsll They also may prompt the Kinds of feedback about ‘current governmental performance that affect agendas letters, complaints, an Sntstoolhcals. onda eters, complaints a ‘As to proposal, entrepreneurs are central tothe softening-up process. They write papers, give testimony, hold hearings, ty to get pres coverage, and meet endlessly with important and not-so-important people. They float their ideas as trial balloons, get reactions, revise their proposals in the light of reactions, and float them again. They aim to soften up the mass public, specialized publics, and the policy community itself. The process takes years of effort. ‘As to coupling, entrepreneurs once again appear when windows open. They have their pet proposals or their concerns about problems ready, and push them atthe propitious moments, In the pursuit of their own goals, they perform the fanction for the system of coupling solutions to problems, probleins to political forces, and political forces to proposals. The joining of the separate streams de- scribed earlier depends heavily on the appearance ofthe right entrepreneur at the Sight time. In our ease study of Health Maintenance Orggnizations in Chapter 1, Paul Ellwood appeared on the scene to link his pet proposal (HMOs) to the prob- Jem of medical care costs and to the political receptivity ereated by the Nixon ad- ministration casting about for health initiatives, The problems and politcal streams had opened a window, and Ellwood cleverly took advantage of that op- portunity to push his HMO proposal, joining all three streams in the process. ‘The appearance of entrepreneurs when windows are open, as wel as theirThe ‘Science of Muddling Through 113 more enduring activities of trying to push their problems and proposals into prominence, are central to our story. They bring several key resources into the fray: their elaims to a hearing, their political connections and! negotiating sills, and their sheer persistence. An item's chances for moving up on an agenda are en hanced considerably by the presence of a skillful entrepreneur, and dampened considerably ifno entrepreneur takes on the cause, pushes it, and makes the crit- ical couplings when poliey windows open. ; The ‘Science’ of Muddling Through Charles E. Lindblom Suppose an administrator is given responsibility for formulating policy with re- spect to inflation, He might start by trying to list all elated values in order of im. portance, e.g, fall employment, reasonable business profit, protection of small savings, prevention of a stock market crash. Then all possible policy outcomes could be rated as more or less efficient in attaining a maximum of these values. This would of course require a prodigious inquiry into values held by members of society and an equally prodigious set of calculations on how much each value is ‘equal to how much of each other value. He eould then proceed to outline all pos- sible policy altematives. In third step, he could undertake systematic compari- son of his multitude of altematives to determine which attains the greatest amount of values {In comparing policies, he would take advantage of any theory available that generalized about classes of policies. In considering inflation, for example, he ‘would compare all policies in the light of the theory of prices. Since no altema- tives are beyond his investigation, he would consider strict central control and the abolition of all prices and markets on the one hand and elimination of all public controls with reliance completely on the free market on the other, both in the light of whatever theoretical generalizations he could find on such’ hypothetical Finally, he would try to make the choice that would infact maximize his values. From Chaves E, Lindblom, “The ‘Science of Muuding Through’, FubleAdranetration Reve, 19 1050), 70-88 Reprinted with permission rom Publ Admitstruion Rewew © by the Amencan So. ‘sty for Public Adminstration (ASPA), 120 G Street NW, Site 10, Washinglon DC. 20005 A Shes reserved A Making Pubic Poliey {An alternative line of attack would be to set as his prineipal objective, either explicitly or without conscious thought, the relatively simple goal of Keeping prices level, This objective might be compromised or complicated by omly a few ‘ther goals, uch as full employment. He would in fat disregard most other social values as beyond his present interest, and he would for the moment not ev tempt to rank the few values that he regarded as immediately relevant. Were he pressed, he would quickly admit that he was ignoring many related values and ‘many possible important consequences of his polices. As a second step, he would outline those relatively few policy alternatives that occurred to him. He would then compare them, In comparing his limited ‘number of alternatives, most of them familiar from past controversies, he would not ordinarily find a body of theory precise enough to carry him through a com parison of their respective consequences. Instead he would rely heavily on the record of past experience with small policy steps to predict the consequences of similar steps extended into the future. Moreover, he would find that the policy altematives combined objectives or values in different ways. For example, one policy might offer price level stability at the cost of some risk of unemployment: another might offer less price stability but also less risk of unemployment. Hence, the next step in his approach—the final selection—would combine into one the choice among values and the choice struments for reaching values. Tt would not, asin the first method of policy-making, approximate a more mechanical process of choosing the means that best satisfied goals that were previously clarified and ranked. Because practi- tioners ofthe second approach expect to achieve theie goals only partially, they ‘would expect to repeat endlessly the sequence just described, as conditions and sspirations changed and as accuracy of prediction improved, BY ROOT OR BY BRANCH For complex problems, the first of these two approaches is of course impossible Although such an approach ean be described, it cannot be practiced except for relatively simple problems and even then only ina sora sumes intellectual eapacities and sources of information that men simply do not possess, and itis even more absurd as an approach to policy when the time and ‘money that can be allocated to a policy problem is limited, a is always the ease. OF particular importance to publi stators is the fact that public agencies are in effect usually instructed not to practice the first method. That isto say, their prescribed fumetions and eonstraints—the politically or legally possiblo—restrict their attention to relatively few values and relatively few alternative policies among the countless alternatives that might be imagined. It isthe second method thats practiced Curiously, however, the literatures of decision-making, policy formulation, planning, and public administration formalize the frst approach rather than the ‘nat modified form. Itas-‘The ‘Science’ of Mudiling Through 137 NOTES 1 James G. Marchand Herbert . Son inary characterize the erature Tey ao ie come pba spe hn Sis eet ates, to dence a less heae mode of poly tring Soe Onniaton ok Wiley at Son, 158), p57 2. “Oporto Research and National Planning -A Divent°5 Operations Research 78 (Oe Actes, I) Tes dissent rom parca pots ade ne atl och hs paper sah {2)