2011R00706/ AOL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Hon.

V. Criminal No. 17-

DONNA CONROY 18 U.S.C. 371, 1005 and 2

INFORMATION

The defendant having waived in open court prosecution by

indictment, the Acting United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey

charges:

1. At all times relevant to this Information:

a. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") was

an independent agency created by Congress to maintain stability and public

confidence in the nation's financial system by, among other things, insuring

deposits, examining and supervising banks for safety and soundness and

consumer protection, and managing the resolution of banks placed in

receivership for failure to comply with safety and soundness and other

regulatory standards. The FDIC had the power to shut down insufficiently

capitalized banks.

b. The New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance

("NJDOBI") was a New Jersey State Agency responsible for, among other things,

the examination of state-chartered commercial banks, savings banks, and

savings and loan institutions, and for bringing enforcement actions under New

Jersey state law when appropriate.

c. First State Bank ("FSB") was a New Jersey state-chartered

bank located in Cranford, New Jersey, whose deposits were insured by the

FDIC. As such, FSB was periodically examined by the FDIC and NJDOBI

(collectively, the "Regulators").

d. Defendant DONNA CONROY ("CONROY") was an attorney

licensed to practice law in the State of New Jersey, and a partner in a law firm

located in Cranford, New Jersey (the "Law Firm"). CONROY acted as outside

counsel to FSB, which was one of the Law Firm's most significant clients.

e. Co-conspirator One ("CC One"), who is not named as a

defendant herein, was an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of New

Jersey who performed work for FSB.

f. Co-Conspirator Two ("CC Two"), who is not named as a

defendant herein, held a senior management role at FSB and was a member of

the FSB Board of Directors (the "FSB Board"). CC Two was involved in

attempts by FSB to raise capital from investors, certain of FSB's loan activities,

and FSB's payment of operating and other expenses including, among other

things, costs and fees associated with attempts to raise capital from investors.

2. At various times relevant to this Information:

a. Co-Conspirator Three ("CC Three"), who is not named as

a defendant herein:

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 i. contracted with FSB to act as FSB's investment

advisor;

ii. held himself out, and was identified to the FSB

Board, as being involved in raising capital for FSB from investors through one

of two entities collectively referred to herein as the "Canadian Company";

iii. held himself out as the principal and sole

shareholder of a company referred to herein as the "CC Three LLC"; and

iv. indicated that he resided in Canada and did

business there through the Canadian Company and through the CC Three

LLC.

b. Co-Conspirator Four ("CC Four"), who is not named as a

defendant herein, held himself out as the principal of several companies in the

insurance field (the "Insurance Companies") that purportedly conducted

insurance related business functions in the State of New Jersey and in the

country of Bermuda.

Overview of the Scheme

3. Defendant DONNA CONROY, CC One, CC Two, CC Three and

CC Four (the "Co-Conspirators") engaged in an elaborate scheme designed to

deceive the FDIC and others about the financial health of FSB. The scheme

took place from in or about 2009 to in or about 2010 and encompassed three

interrelated phases. The first phase began with the manufacturing by CC Two

and CC Three of Tier One Capital through a transaction that appeared as

though outside investors had injected millions of dollars of new capital into the
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bank when in fact FSB's own money, funneled through CC Three, was misused

to obtain that capital. CC Three would end up as the nominal owner of

approximately 30% of FSB's stock as a result of this transaction, thereby

violating regulatory rules concerning the concentration of ownership of an

insured financial institution. As a result, CONROY and others took steps to

disguise the extent of CC Three's FSB stock ownership by falsifying documents

purporting to reflect that the share purchase was split among CC Three and

two nominees. These nominees were relatives of some of the Co-Conspirators

and had no real interest in the purchase of FSB shares. In the second phase

of the scheme, various Co-Conspirators caused FSB to make millions of dollars

in loans based on material misrepresentations in order to cover up the

fraudulent nature of the capital infusion and end inquiries from FSB's

auditors. The final phase of the scheme involved lying to the FDIC, among

others, about the capital infusion and the loans made to cover it up.

Phase One: The FSB Stock Purchase

FSB's Need for Capital

4. On or about November 7, 2008, FSB submitted an

application to the FDIC to participate in an aspect of the U.S. Department of

the Treasury's Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP"), the Government bailout

plan created in response to the 2008 financial crisis.

5. In a March 2009 Report of Examination, the FDIC and

NJDOBI determined that FSB was insufficiently capitalized. The resulting

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capital rating had an ongoing negative impact on FSB's operations and placed
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FSB at substantial risk of being subject to an enforcement action, and placed

in receivership, by the Regulators. On or about June 15, 2009, the FDIC

reaffirmed its determination that FSB was insufficiently capitalized, which

posed "a substantial probability of loss" to the FDIC's insurance fund unless

corrective action was taken.

6. FSB generally, and CC Two in particular, unsuccessfully

sought to attract additional capital from investors.

7. In or about June 2009, CC Two reported to the FSB Board

that, according to the FDIC, if five to seven million dollars of capital were raised

then the FDIC would be obligated to reconsider its insufficient capital rating for

FSB.

Moving FSB's Funds to CC Three in Canada as an Investment

8. Having identified the amount of capital needed, CC Two and

others then took several steps to fabricate that capital.

9. In or about June 2009, CC Two suggested to the FSB Board

that FSB hire CC Three as an investment advisor to restructure FSB's own

investment portfolio. Thereafter, FSB entered into an Investment Advisor

contract with the Canadian Company (the "Investment Advisor Contract"),

pursuant to which FSB wired approximately $12 million of its own funds (the

"FSB Funds") to the Canadian Company. CC Three caused the FSB Funds to

be placed in an account at the Royal Bank of Canada in the Canadian

Company's name ("RBC Account One"). Per the Investment Advisor Contract,

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the Canadian Company was to make investments on FSB's behalf from RBC

Account One and receive a monthly advisory fee.

Infusing $7 Million as New Tier One Capital

10. At or about the time that FSB engaged the Canadian

Company as its investment advisor, CONROY and other Co-Conspirators

agreed to engineer the infusion of $7 million of capital into FSB as follows:

a. $7 million that CC Three claimed was his money would

be used to buy 1.4 million shares of FSB's outstanding common stock,

representing just under a 30 percent ownership stake in, and de facto control

over, FSB;

b. to conceal their violation of FDIC and other regulations,

including regulations limiting the concentration of ownership of and control

over an insured financial institution, CONROY and other Co-Conspirators

fabricated documentation to create the false impression with the Regulators

and FSB that three unrelated parties (the "Nominee Entities") had purchased

the stock, namely,

c. one such purchaser was the CC Three LLC;

d. the two other purchasers - referred to herein as the

Nominee 1 LLC and the Nominee 2 LLC - were formed by, or with the

participation of, CC One, to act as nominee purchasers of the FSB stock. The

purported principal of the Nominee 1 LLC (referred to herein as "Nominee 1"),

was a member of CC Two's family and was recruited by CC Two to, in effect, act

as a nominee purchaser of FSB stock in connection with the capital infusion.

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The purported principal of the Nominee 2 LLC (referred to herein as "Nominee

2") was a member of CC One's family and was recruited by CC One to, in effect,

act as a nominee purchaser of FSB stock in connection with the capital

infusion;

e. three FSB subscription agreements to purchase a total

of 1.4 million shares of FSB stock in the names of the Nominee Entities were

executed in or about late September 2009;

f. approximately $7 million was transferred by CC Three

from RBC Account One in Canada to an account controlled by the Law Firm in

New Jersey, which CONROY represented was the proceeds of the sale of 1.4

million shares of FSB stock (the "$7 Million Capital Infusion"), and caused to

be paid to FSB;

g. FSB's books and records indicated that the $7 Million

Capital Infusion had been received as capital;

h. CONROY caused an FSB stock certificate representing

1.4 million FSB shares to be provided to CC Three in Canada, which CC Three

caused to be held in the Canadian Company's name in a second RBC account

in Canada ("RBC Account Two");

i. CONROY and other Co-Conspirators purposefully

concealed from the Regulators and one or more FSB officers and board

members the origin of the $7 million investment, nominee status of one or

more of the Nominee Entities, and CC Three's resulting control of some 30% of

FSB 's stock; and

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 j. on or about November 25, 2009, FSB withdrew its

requested $6.4 million in TARP funding.

11. In addition to obtaining de facto control of FSB, CC Three

also received approximately $715,000 from FSB as a so-called "finder's fee"

purportedly for "locating" himself, Nominee 1 and Nominee 2 as purchasers of

FSB stock (the "FSB Stock Purchasers"). CONROY and other Co-Conspirators

did not reveal to the Regulators, or to one or more FSB Board members and

officers, that FSB's payment of hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees to CC

Three was for services not performed; that is, the payments made by FSB to CC

Three for purportedly "finding'' Nominee 1 and Nominee 2.

12. The events described in paragraphs 10 and 11, above, took

place at various times between in or about mid-September 2009 and early

2010.

Phase Two: The FSB Loans

Using FSB's Own Funds to Buy FSB Stock

13. To buy the 1.4 million shares of FSB stock, CC Three

misused more than half of the approximately $12 million that FSB had sent to

the Canadian Company to effectuate the $7 Million Capital Infusion.

14. This misuse of FSB's own funds to buy FSB stock was

generally accomplished through CC Three's obtaining a margin loan to the

Canadian Company (the "Canadian Company Loan") using FSB's assets as

collateral.

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 15. As a result, the total value of FSB's funds then held by the

Canadian Company as FSB's investment advisor was reduced from about $12

million to about $5 million. The Canadian Company Loan also resulted in the

obligation to pay margin interest, which accumulated and grew in amount over

time.

The Audit

16. Because the Canadian Company- and not FSB - received

monthly statements for RBC Accounts One and Two, when third-party auditors

of FSB's financial condition sought information about the FSB Funds, the

auditors were referred to CC Three.

17. As FSB's third-party auditor made requests for information,

CC Three and others generated account statements from the Canadian

Company. One purpose of the Canadian Company account statements was to

conceal from the Regulators and others the misuse of the FSB Funds to

effectuate the FSB Stock Purchase.

18. In or about January 2010, CONROY and other Co-

Conspirators agreed, and acted in concert, to conceal the misconduct described

above by taking steps to end the auditor's inquiries about the FSB Funds. To

do so, CONROY and other Co-Conspirators decided to obtain more than $7

million to pay off the principal and accrued interest on the Canadian Company

Loan by causing FSB to make three fraudulent loans to the FSB Stock

Purchasers (the "FSB Loans").

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The FSB Loans

19. To procure the FSB Loans, CONROY and other Co-

Conspirators created and submitted false documents, made material

misrepresentations to FSB, and omitted material facts.

20. The material misrepresentations made in connection with

the FSB Loans included the following:

a. The Borrowers - The putative borrowers were the

Nominee 1 and Nominee 2 LLCs and the CC Three LLC. Because Nominee 1

was unavailable to act as a straw borrower for the FSB Loan to the Nominee 1

LLC, CONROY recruited a family member ("Nominee IA") to act as the

representative for the Nominee 1 LLC in connection with that loan. Nominee 2

continued to act as the Nominee 2 LCC's principal regarding FSB's loan to that

entity. CC Two concealed their nominee status from the FSB Executive Loan

Committee.

b. The Purpose of the FSB Loans - when CC Two referred

the FSB Loans to the FSB Executive Loan Committee, CC Two then knew (but

did not reveal) that the purpose of the FSB Loans was to generate the more

than $7 million needed to conceal the FSB Stock Purchases. The FSB

Executive Loan Committee was instead affirmatively misled into believing that

the Nominee 1 and Nominee 2 LLCs were borrowing money from FSB to use in

connection with a diversified investment portfolio;

c. The Business Plans - CONROY and CC One also

misrepresented the purpose of the FSB Loans, the use of the FSB Loan
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proceeds, and how they would be repaid, to FSB in two false and misleading

business plans created by them for the Nominee 1 and Nominee 2 LLCs;

d. The Assets of the Nominee Borrowers - CONROY and

other Co-Conspirators also generally misled FSB about the assets of the

nominees which, for at least two of the putative borrowers (the Nominee 1 and

2 LLCs), effectively did not exist; and

e. Creating Collateral - CONROY and other Co-Conspirators

then concealed the lack of putative borrower assets by creating loan collateral

to support the FSB Loans. They did so using the same 1.4 million shares of

FSB stock that were the subject of the FSB Stock Purchase and controlled by

CC Three. Specifically:

1. CC Four and his Insurance Companies fashioned

insurance policies that purported to protect FSB against loan payment defaults

by any of the putative FSB Loan borrowers (the "Policies");

ii. the Insurance Companies required security to write

these Policies;

m. CONROY and other Co-Conspirators agreed to use

the same 1.4 million FSB shares that were the subject of the FSB Stock

Purchase as security for the Policies; and

iv. this use of the 1.4 million FSB shares as security

for the Policies was concealed from FSB.

21. On or about May 10, 2010, the FSB Loans closed in New

Jersey.
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 22. On or about May 13 and May 14, 2010, more than $7 million

in FSB Loan proceeds was transferred from FSB in New Jersey to CC Three in

Canada.

23. The FSB Loan Proceeds set in motion a series of events that,

in combination, allowed CC Three to return approximately $12 million to FSB,

which ended the third-party auditor's inquiry about the location of the FSB

Funds.

24. Despite the return of FSB's $12 million, the FSB Stock

Purchase and the FSB Loan transactions left FSB with the following unresolved

problems: (i) the $715,000 "finder's fee" paid to CC Three in connection with

the $7 million Capital Infusion was not returned to FSB; (ii) CC Three remained

in control of approximately 30% of FSB's shares; (iii) the approximately

$200,000 of FSB Loan proceeds used to pay the accrued interest on the

Canadian Company Loan was not revealed, or repaid, to FSB; (iv) FSB's books

and records falsely reflected that the Nominee 1 and Nominee 2 LLCs were

actual FSB shareholders; (v) FSB had lent putative borrowers millions of

dollars to fund non-existent investment portfolios; and (vi) the FSB Loans were,

in effect, uncollateralized.

Phase Three: Deceiving the Regulators

25. Beginning in or about June 2010, the Regulators asked FSB

a series of written and oral questions in the course of examining FSB. Among

the information sought by the FDIC was a delineation of the facts and

circumstances concerning four areas (the "Regulator Inquiries"), namely:

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 a. the source of funds used by the Nominee 1 LLC to

purchase its portion of the 1.4 million FSB shares in September 2009;

b. the status of the FSB Loan Proceeds, and manner in

which they had been invested, after the FSB Loans closed in May 2010;

c. an identification of the security referenced, but not

described, in the Policies that were the collateral for the FSB Loans; and

d. a description of the family relationships between

CONROY and CC One and any putative FSB Loan borrower.

26. The Co-Conspirators knew that truthful responses to the

Regulator Inquiries would expose their fraudulent conduct concerning the FSB

Stock Purchase and the FSB Loans.

27. To prevent their misconduct from being exposed, the Co-

Conspirators, acting in concert, lied to, and misled, the Regulators concerning

the Regulator Inquiries.

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 COUNT ONE
(Making False Entries to Deceive the FDIC and FSB)

28. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 above

are hereby repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.

29. In or about September 2009, in Union County, in the District

of New Jersey, and elsewhere, the defendant

DONNA CONROY

knowingly and intentionally made false entries in books, reports, and

statements of FSB, and caused false entries in books, reports and statements

of FSB to be made, with intent to defraud FSB and to deceive any officer of

FSB, and the FDIC, and agents and examiners appointed to examine the affairs

of such bank, to wit, CONROY created, and caused the creation and execution

of, a subscription agreement that she then knew falsely represented that the

Nominee 1 LLC was the bona fide purchaser of FSB stock being purchased by

the Nominee 1 LLC with its own funds and for its own account as an

investment of the Nominee 1 LLC.

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1005 and 2.

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 COUNT TWO
(Conspiracy to Deceive the FDIC and FSB and to Influence the FDIC)

30. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 above

are hereby repeated and realleged as if fully set forth herein.

31. From at least in or about September 2009 through at least in

or about October 2010, in Union County, in the District of New Jersey, and

elsewhere, the defendant

DONNA CONROY

did knowingly and intentionally conspire and agree with others to commit

offenses against the United States, that is:

a. to knowingly and intentionally make false entries in books,

reports, and statements of FSB, and cause false entries in

books, reports and statements of FSB to be made, with intent to

defraud FSB and to deceive any officer of FSB, and the FDIC,

and agents and examiners appointed to examine the affairs of

such bank, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section

lOOS;and

b. to knowingly make, and cause to be made, and invite reliance

on a false, forged, and counterfeit statement, document and

thing for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the

FDIC, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1007.

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 Goal of the Conspiracy

32. It was a goal of the conspiracy for the Co-Conspirators to

deceive FSB, one or more FSB officers and members of the FSB Board, and the

Regulators about the financial health of FSB.

Manner and Means of the Conspiracy

33. It was a part of the conspiracy that, for the reasons and in

the manner previously described herein:

a. CONROY and other Co-Conspirators purposefully

misrepresented that the Nominee 1 LLC and the Nominee 2 LLC had purchased

FSB stock as part of the capital infusion described above, when they knew that

those LLCs were not the real beneficial owners of that stock;

b. various Co-Conspirators used FSB's own money to

facilitate the FSB Stock Purchase, and then concealed that misuse of FSB

funds; and

c. various the Co-Conspirators fraudulently obtained the

FSB Loans.

34. It was a further part of the conspiracy that various Co-

Conspirators forwarded written information to FSB and the FDIC pertaining to

particular Regulator Inquiries, knowing that their responses were materially

false because that information contained affirmative misrepresentations, or

omitted facts needed to make that information true.

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 35. It was a further part of the conspiracy that, at various times,

one or more Co-Conspirators misled the Regulators and FSB by withholding

information to conceal their illegal misconduct

36. It was a further part of the conspiracy that Conroy and CC

One concealed information pertaining to particular Regulator Inquiries.

OVERT ACTS

3 7. In furtherance of the conspiracy and in order to effect the

objects thereof, the Co-Conspirators committed and caused the commission of

the following overt acts in the District of New Jersey and elsewhere:

Misrepresentations About the 1.4 Million Share FSB Stock Purchase

a. On or about July 15, 2010, CONROY, as FSB's outside

counsel, objected to a direction by the FSB Audit Committee, which was then

the Law Firm's client, to provide the FDIC with information detailing the source

of funds used by the Nominee 1 LLC to purchase FSB stock in connection with

the FSB Stock Purchase.

b. On or about July 19, 2010, CC One and CONROY

exchanged emails about how to resist follow-up requests by an FSB Officer

about providing the FDIC with information detailing the source of funds used

by the Nominee 1 LLC to purchase FSB stock in connection with the FSB Stock

Purchase.

c. On or about July 21, 2010, in an email to CONROY, CC

One proposed that the existence of two holding companies purportedly created

to hold, and own, the shares of the Nominee 1 and Nominee 2 LLCs not be
17
disclosed to FSB or the Regulators. This email also contained a portion of a

script authored by CC One memorializing a fictitious phone conversation that

purportedly took place between CC Two and Nominee 2 concerning non-

existent Nominee 2 LLC shareholders.

d. On or about July 21, 2010, in an email to CONROY:

i. CC One re-sent the script of the fictitious phone

conversation referenced above in paragraph 37(c);

ii. CC One provided CONROY with a script CC One

authored memorializing a second fictitious phone conversation that

purportedly took place between CC Two and Nominee 2 concerning non-

existent Nominee 2 LLC shareholders; and

iii. CC One indicated to CONROY that CONROY

should prepare a script of a fictitious phone conversation between Nominee lA

and CC Two concerning non-existent Nominee 1 LLC shareholders.

e. On or about July 21, 2010, in an email to an officer of

FSB, CC Three concealed his control of the FSB shares that had been

purchased in the names of the Nominee 1 LLC and the Nominee 2 LLC in

connection with the FSB Stock Purchase.

f. On or about August 5, 2010, CC One and CONROY

caused an FSB officer to unknowingly misrepresent to the FDIC that the

Canadian Company had located the Nominee 1 and Nominee 2 LLCs as

investors that bought FSB stock in connection with the FSB Stock Purchase.

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Misrepresentations About the FSB Loans

g. On about July 1, 2010, CC Three misrepresented to an

officer of FSB that the Canadian Company was an investment advisor to the

Nominee 1 and Nominee 2 LLCs, and was managing their investment portfolios

(which in fact did not exist).

h. On or about July 16, 2010, CONROY forwarded to CC

One an email from the FDIC to an officer of FSB, by which the FDIC sought

information regarding, among other things, where the proceeds of the FSB

Loans "are and recent financial information on the [nominee] borrowers."

i. On or about July 21, 2010, CONROY:

i. emailed CC One two as-yet unexecuted "Investment

Advisory Agreement[s]" that purported to be between the Canadian Company

and the Nominee 1 and Nominee 2 LLCs;

ii. proposed to CC One that Nominee 1 and Nominee

lA both sign the Investment Advisory Agreement purportedly between the

Nominee 1 LLC and the Canadian Company;

iii. proposed to CC One that Nominee 2 sign the

Investment Advisory Agreement purportedly between the Nominee 2 LLC and

the Canadian Company; and

iv. proposed to CC One that both of these Investment

Advisory Agreements be backdated "for the loan" to March 2010.

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 J. On or about July 21, 2010, in the same email referenced

above in paragraph 37(e), CC Three misrepresented to an officer of FSB that:

i. the Canadian Company was the investment advisor

for the CC Three LLC, and the Nominee 1 and Nominee 2 LLCs;

ii. the Canadian Company had invested the FSB Loan

proceeds on behalf of these three LLCs in securities with a book value

exceeding $7 million; and

iii. the Canadian Company was not authorized by the

Nominee 1, Nominee 2, or CC Three LLCs to reveal to FSB what those entities

had done with the proceeds of the FSB Loans previously made to them by FSB

in May 2010.

k. On or about July 21, 2010, CC One sent an email to

CONROY proposing how to deceive others concerning Nominee 1's

nonparticipation in and unawareness of the FSB Loan to the Nominee 1 LLC.

1. On or about July 30, 2010, CC Four affirmatively

concealed from the FDIC and an officer of FSB that 1.4 million FSB shares

were used to secure the Policies from CC Four's Insurance Companies to the

Nominee Entities.

m. On or about August 9, 2010, CONROY affirmatively

concealed from the FDIC and an officer of FSB that 1.4 million FSB shares

were used to secure the Policies from CC Four's Insurance Companies to the

Nominee Entities.

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 n. On or about August 10, 2011, CC Two - who was then a

senior member of FSB's management - and CONROY did not correct the

contents of a written report innocently submitted by an officer of FSB to the

FDIC, which CC Two and CONROY knew:

i. contained materially false information concerning

the true source of funds used to effectuate the FSB Stock Purchase;

ii. contained materially false information concerning

the true purpose of the FSB Loans, the actual status of the more than $7

million in FSB Loan proceeds sent to CC Three, and CC Three's use of those

funds;

iii. contained materially false information concerning

the use of 1. 4 million FSB shares to secure the Policies from CC Four's

Insurance Companies to the Nominee Entities; and

iv. concealed the close family relationships between

Nominee lA and CONROY, and between Nominee 2 and CC One.

o. On or about August 11, 2010, CC Two concealed the

family relationships described in paragraphs lO(d) and 20(a), above, during a

meeting with the FDIC.

The October 2010 Letter

p. On or about October 13, 2010, CC One caused Nominee

2 to falsely indicate:

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 i. in connection with the FSB Stock Purchase, that

Nominee 2 had borrowed money from CC Three to buy FSB stock in the name

of the Nominee 2 LLC;

ii. in connection with the FSB Loan to the Nominee 2

LLC, that Nominee 2 had received some $2.5 million from FSB as loan

proceeds, and sent those funds to the Canadian Company in May 2010 for it to

invest for the Nominee 2 LLC; and

iii. that Nominee 2, having not received "any

statements regarding how that money has been invested" from CC Three

between the closing of the FSB Loan in May 2010 and October 2010, was

"beginning to get concerned . . . . "

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

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 FORFEITURE ALLEGATION

1. The allegations contained in this Information are

hereby realleged and incorporated by reference for the purpose of noticing

forfeiture pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(2).

2. The United States hereby gives notice to defendant DONNA

CONROY that upon conviction of the offenses charged in Counts One and Two

of this Information the government will seek forfeiture in accordance with Title

18, United States Code, Section 982(a)(2), which requires any person convicted

of such offenses to forfeit any property, real or personal, which constitutes or is

derived from proceeds traceable to the violations charged in Counts One and

Two of this Information, including but not limited to a sum of money equal to

at least $37,500 in United States currency.

3. If any of the property described above, as a result of any act

or omission of the defend ant:

a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third

party;

c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;

d. has been substantially diminished in value; or

e. has been commingled with other property which cannot be

divided without difficulty, the United States shall be entitled, pursuant to Title

21, United States Code, Section 853(p), as incorporated by Title 18, United

States Code, Section 2461(c}, to forfeiture of any other property of the

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defendant, DONNA CONROY, up to the value of the property described in the

preceding paragraph.

WILLIAM E. FITZPATR
ACTING UNITED STA ES ATTORNEY

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 CASE NUMBER:

United States District Court

District of New Jersey
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DONNA CONROY

INFORMATION FOR
18 u.s.c. 1005
18 u.s.c. 371

WILLIAM E. FITZPATRICK
ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, NEWARK, NEW JERSEY

Andrew Leven
AsSISTANT U. S. ATTORNEY
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY
(973) 645-2718