Weedman, Mark - The Polemical Context of Gregory of Nyssa's Doctrine of Divine Infinity PDF

The Polemical Context of Gregory of Nyssa's Doctrine of Divine
Infinity
Mark Weedman
Journal of Early Christian Studies, Volume 18, Number 1, Spring 2010,

pp. 81-104 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/earl.0.0301
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http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/earl/summary/v018/18.1.weedman.html
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The Polemical Context of
Gregory of Nyssas
Doctrine of Divine Infinity
mark weedman
Gregory of Nyssas account of divine infinity is one of his most important con-
tributions to early Christian thought, so much so that modern scholarship has
largely accepted Ekkehard Mhlenbergs claim that Gregorys formulation of
the doctrine has no real philosophical or theological antecedent. However, this
scholarship has discounted some important evidence to the contrary, especially
that of Hilary of Poitiers, who uses an account of divine infinity in ways that
anticipate Gregorys. The value of this evidence is that it helps establish the
polemical rationale for why Gregory developed and employed divine infinity
as he did: to defend the traditional pro-Nicene account of the Sons eternal
generation against anti-Nicene (here Eunomian) claims to the contrary.
Modern scholarship has lavished a great deal of attention to Gregory

of Nyssas doctrine of divine infinity.1 The scope of this scholarship has
brought to bear a variety of perspectives on this subject, but in the midst of
all this diversity, one theme emerges from nearly every quarter: Gregorys
1. See especially Ekkehard Mhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von
Nyssa; Gregors Kritik am Gottesbegriff der klassischen Metaphysik (Gttingen: Van-
denhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966). Beyond Mhlenberg, there are a number of treatments
of Gregory and infinity, most of which work within the perspective that Mhlenberg
established. Some of the more important include David L. Bals, Eternity and Time
in Gregory of Nyssas Contra Eunomium, in Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophie,
ed. Heinrich Drrie, Margarete Altenburger, and Uta Scramm (Leiden: Brill, 1976),
12855; Brooks Otis, Gregory of Nyssa and the Cappadocian Concept of Time,
Studia Patristica 14 (1976): 32757; Paul Plass, Transcendent Time and Eternity
in Gregory of Nyssa, Vigiliae Christianae 34 (1980): 18092; Paul M. Blowers,
Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Concept of Perpetual Prog-
ress, Vigiliae Christianae 46 (1992): 15171. Readers should note that this list is
by no means exhaustive, and I shall have occasion to interact with a number of other
important works throughout this essay.
Journal of Early Christian Studies 18:1, 81104 2010 The Johns Hopkins University Press
82 JOURNAL OF EARLY CHRISTIAN STUDIES
understanding of Gods infinity is the product of his own theologically

creative, philosophically adventurous mind. In this view, Gregory took
an accepted philosophical doctrine, that Gods essence is circumscribed,
radically reshaped it, and used this new idea to reshape an entire religious
and philosophical sensibility. The primary argument for the uniqueness of
Gregorys doctrine was made by the German scholar Ekkehard Mhlen
berg, who, in Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa, argued
that Gregory essentially invented the idea that God was infinite by nature.2
Scholars have tweaked some details of Mhlenbergs thought, both by argu-
ing that more robust conceptions of Gods infinity are present in thinkers
prior to Gregory and by challenging aspects of Mhlenbergs exegesis of
Gregorys texts.3 Mhlenbergs primary thesis, however, that Gregorys
doctrine appeared almost sui generis remains largely intact.
A closer look at the evidence, however, suggests that not only are there
antecedents to Gregorys use of infinity, but that the presence of those
antecedents reveals a larger problem with Mhlenbergs approach. What
Mhlenberg is really saying is that Gregorys emphasis on Gods eternity
and Gods infinity was not part of the Trinitarian controversy prior to
Gregory. My purpose in this article is to show that the opposite is true:
we can best understand Gregorys discussion of Gods infinity within the
broader context of fourth-century Trinitarian debates, especially when
we consider the pro-Nicene arguments for eternal generation. In the years
preceding Gregorys encounter with Eunomius, increasingly sophisticated
2. Mhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit Gottes, 2988, was primarily concerned with

the philosophical background of this notion, and one of his most helpful and enduring
contributions was to show how radically Gregory broke from the standard Hellenis-
tic conception of the divine. Mhlenbergs thesis is that the divine was not infinite in
a platonic system because that would mean God could not be known, which means
that Gregory is explicitly rejecting the platonic conception of God. Mhlenbergs argu-
ment is more nuanced, of course, than a simple claim that Gregory is not a Platonist.
He examines the thought of a variety of Christian and philosophical authors from
Plato through Plotinus, which allows him to show how different Gregory was from
all of these earlier thinkers. Mhlenberg does not, however, pay much attention to
Gregorys predecessors in the fourth century and so misses, I will argue, the polemi-
cal contextand most important backgroundfor Gregorys doctrine.
3. For challenges to the idea that Gregory was the first to talk about God being
infinite by nature, see Albert-Kees Geljon, Divine Infinity in Gregory of Nyssa and
Philo of Alexandria, Vigiliae Christianae 59 (2005): 15277, and John M. McDer-
mott, Hilary of Poitiers: The Infinite Nature of God, Vigiliae Christianae 27 (1973):
172202. Both of these authors specifically interact with Mhlenberg. For criticisms
of aspects of Mhlenbergs exegesis, see especially Thomas Bhm, Theoria, Unendlich-
keit, Aufstieg: Philosophische Implikationen zu De Vita Moysis von Gregor von Nyssa
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995).
WEEDMAN/DIVINE INFINITY 83
attacks on pro-Nicene attempts to explain eternal generation by their

homoian and Eunomian opponents forced the Pro-Nicenes to reconsider
key epistemological assumptions and to rethink what theologians can say
both about the nature of divinity and key issues such as eternal generation.
Among other moves, Pro-Nicenes began to reject the use of human analo-
gies, such as what it means to be a father or a son, to explain the divine
nature. But by abandoning these analogies, Pro-Nicenes also lost one of
their key arguments for eternal generation, namely, that just as a human
father is only a father when he has a son, the divine Fathers fatherhood
is eternal, which means the Son is also eternal. To replace this argument,
some Pro-Nicenes started to define divine eternity as infinity, that is, as
a horizontal line that extends, infinitely, before, after, and through time.4
Such a move appealed to Pro-Nicenes for several reasons, but the most
important is that it allowed for a defense of eternal generation that over-
came the epistemological limitations of the older father-son analogy. By
placing the generation of the Son outside of time but within the infinite
continuum of the divine existence, Pro-Nicenes could argue that there was
a real generation that was also eternaland, as we will see, overcome key
objections put forward by the Homoians and Eunomians.
My thesis, therefore, is that Gregorys thought on divine infinity must
be read as part of a larger strategy within pro-Nicene thought to pro-
vide ways of reflecting on the paradox of unity and diversity in God.5 To
make my case, I want first to examine the relationship between eternal
generation and divine infinity in two passages in Contra Eunomium 1. I
will focus on Book One of Contra Eunomium because Gregory devotes
much of that book to resolving one of the most intractable problems for
pro-Nicene thought: how to argue for the eternal generation of the Son
against Eunomian (and, ultimately, Arian and homoian) objections. This
4. I should be clear here that I am asserting that this move to infinity means that
these pro-Nicene authors begin to define eternity as infinity. I need to make this asser-
tion with a great deal of care, however, both because Hilary and Basil struggle with
their language and so lack precision, and because Gregory seems to float between
different definitions of divine eternityhe sometimes, as in the passages I discuss
here, defines it as infinity, but in other places he allows a more conventional defini-
tion to stand. For further discussion, see Plass, Transcendent Time. As I discuss
below (n.17), I am especially persuaded by Plasss argument that Gregorys account
of divine eternity depends on perspective: from a human perspective, it is appropri-
ate to talk about infinity, whereas from other perspectives, i.e. from within the divine
substance itself, other definitions are necessary.
5. I borrow the language of strategy from Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy:
An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), esp. 27378.
polemical context is significant, because this is the book where Gregory

also develops much of his understanding of Gods infinity, and I will
attempt to show that he develops this doctrine precisely for the purpose
of refuting Eunomian attacks on eternal generation. I will then turn to
the background of this debate, and show how two early Pro-Nicenes,
Hilary of Poitiers and Basil of Caesarea, use divine infinity in a way that
anticipates Gregory. Establishing the background will allow us to return
to Contra Eunomium and examine how this context helps us understand
a disputed text in Book One, which ultimately helps us recognize the way
in which the pro-Nicene conception of the divine as whole developed to
better meet the challenges posed by its opponents.
Gregory on Infinity and Eternal Generation

in Contra Eunomium
We begin with Contra Eunomium 1.34185.6 This passage is important

to Gregorys overall purpose in the book for two reasons. First Gregory
examines and refutes Eunomiuss claim that the life of the Father precedes
that of the Son, which is an argument that has significant implications
for how we understand the Sons generation. Second Gregory responds
to Eunomius by placing the life of the Son within the infinity of God,
and so this passage offer initial insight into Gregorys polemical purpose
for developing his doctrine of divine infinity, e.g. to provide a theologi-
cally viable response to Eunomian attacks on the pro-Nicene belief in the
Sons eternal generation.
Gregory begins his refutation by arguing that if the life of the Father
precedes that of the Son, then there must be an interval () between
the Father and Son, and this interval must either be infinite or finite. Since
that interval cannot, logically, be infinite, then it must be finite.7 But this
6. The text of Contra Eunomium 1 is in Werner Jaeger, Gregorii Nysseni Opera,

Volumen 1: Contra Eunomium Libros 12 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960), 12840. This
passage has received relatively little attention from the standard scholarly treatments
on infinity in Gregory, which is surprising given its length and apparent importance
to Gregorys overall purpose in Contra Eunomium 1. See, however, Bals, Eter-
nity and Time, 13135, for an overview of the passages primary argument. Balss
interest throughout his essay is on the implications of Gregorys thought in Contra
Eunomium for a systematic understanding of eternity, time, and history, and so he
largely ignores other aspects of Gregorys thought in the treatise. While I find Balss
conclusions very helpful overall, my purpose in examining some of the same passages
he takes up is much different, namely to explore the theological context out which
Gregorys emphasis on divine infinity arose.
7. Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 1.346 (Jaeger 1:129).
notion has its own logical problems. According to Gregory, any time we
say that there is an interval between two subjects, we not only limit that
which is subsequent, but we also fix in time that which we call prior. So,
for example, if we say that humans were made on the fifth day after the
heavens, we are also identifying the point in time when the heavens were
created; a subsequent event defines a prior event by means of the interval
that separates them.8 This means, then, that to claim there is an interval
between the Father and the Son is to claim that the life of the Father is
fixed, because the point of reference by which we limit the Son also lim-
its the Father.9 Gregorys logical point here is also driven by a theological
claim. The logical point is that an interval must have at least two points
in time, a beginning and an end. The theological claim is that neither the
Father nor the Son will have an end. Since both Gregory and Eunomius
agree that neither the Father nor Son will perish, the only way to measure
the difference-in-life between the Father and the Son would be to posit a
beginning for the Father, because this beginning is necessarily to establish
a point of reference for measuring the interval between them. But since
the Father has no beginning or ending, then the Son he generates must
also be eternal.
Gregory immediately recognizes an objection to his argument: if we
argue that assigning a beginning to the Son forces us to assign one to the
Father, why would not the same logic apply to creation? Everyone believes
that creation began to be, which means that its existence is marked by
the same interval in time that Eunomius assigned to the Son. A Eunomian
could plausibly argue, then, either that creation is eternal, or the Son had
a beginning.10 To answer this objection, Gregory argues that there is a
distinction between the way creation relates to time and the way God
relates to it. Whereas God has no beginning, creation is bounded and
ordered by sequence, so that we could, theoretically, traverse back through
the ages to the beginning of time itself. The divine order has no begin-
ning, and attempting to locate one would be analogous to looking at the
ocean, which constantly eludes our attempts to find its source.11 Thus the

11. Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 1.364 (Jaeger 1:134). As Mhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit
Gottes, 11518, points out, the ocean analogy also appears in Gregory of Nazian-
zuss work, though it seems likely that Nazianzen took it from Nyssen. Scholars have
concentrated on this passage as an early example of Gregorys doctrine of progressus
in infinitum. For an example of this tendency, and other bibliographical references,
see Bhm, Theoria, Unendlichkeit, Aufstieg, 51. However, Gregorys purpose in this
Creator created space and time to contain his creation, but he himself is
before time and above space. Everything within creation is available to
the Creator, but everything about the Creator continually eludes the grasp
of those searching from within creation.12
This metaphysical speculation sets up Gregorys main argument for
the eternal generation of the Son. We call the Son, Creator, Gregory
argues, and when we do so, we assign the Son to the realm of existence
that is outside of space and time.13 The difference between creation and
the Creator applies directly to the Son, which means that the Son cannot
be accounted for using the measures that we use for creation, which also
means that we cannot use any supposed interval between creation and the
act of creation to argue for a beginning in the Son. Not only does such an
interval not exist, since creation is contained within the infinity of God,
but we cannot make comparisons between what it means to be Son and
what it means to be creation. Therefore, says Gregory, the begetting of
the only-begotten one does not occur in time, neither does creation exist
before time.14 There is no reason to suppose that creation is eternal or that,
by having a beginning in time, creation impinges upon the eternity of the
Father. When we talk about the Son and creation we are talking about
two separate modes of being, which means that we can affirm, positively,
that the notion of the Sons eternal birth is contained within our under-
standing of the Fathers infinite eternity.15
This argument seems too skeletal to be entirely effective. At minimum,
Gregory would seem to need a fuller treatment of how and why creation
happened in order to show how the act of creation does not also locate the
Father in time. Gregory will take up the creation issue more fully in Contra
Eunomium 2.196ff, and it is possible that at this point Gregory believes
passage is not to make a judgment about how humans reach God, but to show how
the difference between the divine and created orders does not allow us to assign a
beginning to the Father because of any interval between God and creation.
12. Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 1.37072 (Jaeger 1:136). As Ayres has noted, the rela-
tionship between the creator and creation played an important role in the later stages
of the development of pro-Nicene thought. In particular, Pro-Nicenes wanted to be
clear that the divine nature was wholly distinct from creation, but that there was no
mediated substance between divinity and humanity. See Lewis Ayres, On Not Three
People: The Fundamental Themes of Gregory of Nyssas Trinitarian Theology as Seen
in Ad Ablabius: On Not Three Gods, in Re-Thinking Gregory of Nyssa, ed. Sarah
Coakley (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 20.
Basil had already answered the creation issue in his own anti-Eunomian
polemic, which is why Gregory does not take it up here.16
Nevertheless we can see from this passage that Gregory believes he
must define divine eternity through the notion of infinity in order to best
defend the Sons eternal generation. Eunomius used the Fathers ingener-
ateness and the Sons begottenness to distinguish between them and to
show that the Son had a beginning. In Gregorys mind, Eunomiuss rea-
soning does not succeed because it fails to understand what it means for
God to be infinite: we must, according to Gregory, say that the Father is
infinite, and when we do say that, we also say that the Father has neither
a beginning nor an ending and his life extends, infinitely, both before
and after time. When we say that the Father is without beginning or end-
ing, however, and we also say that the Son has no ending, we are forced
to acknowledge that the life of the Son also participates in the Fathers
infinity. Otherwise, we are left with the logical problem of how to account
for the interval between the life of the Son and Father. As Paul Plass notes,
Gregory almost seems to be saying here that Gods infinity involves an
extension of Gods being through and beyond time, even though in other
places Gregory affirms that extension as a concept belongs solely to
the created order. From our perspective, Gregory believes, Gods infinity
does extend infinitely, while from the divine perspective God is without
extension.17 To conceive of divine infinity as a kind of horizontal line is
helpful to Gregorys argument, however, because it allows him to deny
Eunomiuss claim that to be generated fixes that which is generated in
time. If eternity extends in this way, then the Son can be begotten without
having a beginning, since his beginning lies in the infinite beginning-
ness of the divine life. If we define eternity solely in non-linear terms,
on the other hand, then Eunomiuss objection has a great deal of force. A
doctrine of divine eternity, therefore, which is defined through the notion
of infinity, is crucial to preserve the eternity of the Son.
16. For the importance of the interpretation of Genesis 1 in Basil and Gregorys
anti-Eunomian polemic, see Ronald Heine, Perfection in the Virtuous Life: A Study in
the Relationship between Edification and Polemical Theology in Gregory of Nyssas
De Vita Moysis (Philadelphia, PA: Patristic Foundation, 1975), 13642.
17. Plass, Transcendent Time, 188: As light in modern physical theory is at once
wave and particle, so eternity is at once point and infinite line and oscillates from one
to the other as we glimpse it from one perspective or another; see also p. 186.
Contra Eunomium 1.66691

We can also see the connection between Gregorys development of divine
infinity as an anti-Eunomian defense of eternal generation in Contra Euno-
mium 1.66691. This is a long, complicated section in which Gregory
attempts to show the relationship between ingeneracy and eternity. We
might anticipate that infinity would play a significant role here, and sure
enough Gregory opens the discussion by recasting a traditional illustra-
tion of eternity, that of a circle, in light of his own understanding of divine
infinity. Gregory explains that while it is certainly acceptable to think of
eternity as circle, i.e. as that without beginning or ending, it is better to
think of the divine life as that which extends, infinitely, from a single point
in all directions, so that this life continually eludes our comprehension.18
The idea of the circle helps us to remember that God has no beginning or
end, so that when we contemplate the divine life, we are always unable
to discern parts, beginnings, or endings. Otherwise, however, Gregory is
again insistent that we interpret Gods eternity through the lens of infin-
ity, which is to say, God is not eternal because he exists in a sort of end-
less feedback loop, but because his beginning extends infinitely beyond
time and his ending infinitely exceeds the end of time.19
Gregory insists on this definition of divine eternity because, as before,
it allows him to defend eternal generation against Eunomiuss objections.
In this case, Gregory turns his attention to the way Eunomius uses the
word ingenerate to limit the divine substance and so deny that anything
begotten could be eternal. According to Gregory, Eunomius errs by defin-
ing Gods essence only as ingenerate, because while he correctly denies
Gods essence has a beginning, he does not adequately account for the
absence of an end in Gods essence; God is as endless as he is beginning-
less.20 Thus, says Gregory, it is necessary to use two titles, ingenerate
() and endless (), because only then can we capture
18. Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 1.66768 (Jaeger 1:218). For the background of the
circle illustration, see Bals, Eternity and Time, 36. Bals also notes that Gregory
ends up contradicting the logic of the illustration, a point I would like to make even
more strongly.
19. Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 1.669 (Jaeger 1:218). See Bals, Eternity and Time,
136: Thus, contrary to what the comparison may insinuate, Gregory clearly con-
ceives Gods eternity not as endless time, but as timeless life.
20. The idea that is the only term that describes Gods essence was Euno-
miuss most characteristic teaching. For discussion and overview, see Ayres, Nicaea and
Its Legacy, 14649. For the background to Eunomiuss use of the term, see Rowan
Williams, The Logic of Arianism, Journal of Theological Studies 34 (1983): 5681;
Michel R. Barnes, The Power of God: in Gregory of Nyssas Trinitarian The-
ology (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 17989.
the true infinity, continuity and eternity of God.21 Using only one of these
terms describes Gods being imperfectly; in the context of Gods eternity,
it is necessary to account for Gods beginning and ending. Although the
language of infinity largely drops out of Gregorys discussion at this point,
he is trying to define divine eternity as divine infinity, i.e. as the timeless
being of God that extends, unknowably, beyond the beginning and end-
ing of time.
This argument, however, is a feint: even though it takes advantage of
Gregorys move to divine infinity, Gregory is really interested in how Gods
infinite nature affects our ability to know the divine substance. Having just
argued that God must be both endless and beginningless, Gregory then
points out that assigning both terms to Gods being violates the law of
non-contradiction, or as Gregory says: one cannot combine two contrary
ideas in a single substance, because when that happens, they oppose each
other and so cancel each other out. An example of this would be fire and
water. To put the two together would be to destroy both of them.22 The
same is true for the divine substance, which puts Eunomius in a double
bind, as far as Gregory is concerned. To say that Gods being is defined
by ingeneracy alone creates a kind of half-god, one who has no begin-
ning, but whose end is undetermined. But to correct this error by adopt-
ing Gregorys proposal and saying that God is both ingenerate and end-
less leads to an even deeper problem, because what we end up with is a
God who is defined by opposites. We might as well say that Gods essence
consists of fire and water, or hot and cold. In the end Gregory is com-
fortable using ingenerate and endless only if we do not apply them
to Gods being.23 So by ingenerate we mean only that there is nothing
21. Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 1.66970 (Jaeger 1:218). Whether endless is actually
the opposite of ingenerate is a question Gregory does not bother to defend. He simply
assumes it in order to pursue his primary point, which is that neither concept tells us
anything about Gods substance in itself.
23. Michel Barnes has shown how Gregory will come to distinguish between the
nature of God and the three persons in the Trinity by distinguishing between the
of God and his . For Gregory, an is naturally productive, which
it expresses through a power (), in a way analogous to the way in which the
substance fire produces the power of heat. See Barnes, The Power of God, esp. 223ff.
This has epistemological implications, because while we can know the powers of a
substance, we cannot know the substance itself, even though powers are inseparable
from their substances. This helps explain what Gregory is attempting to do, perhaps
in an early, underdeveloped way, in this passage. Both ingenerate and endless
are removed several levels from the divine , which means that they can only tell
us something about Gods attributes and powers, not his being.
that caused God to be, and by endless we mean that Gods kingdom
will have no end, but neither of these terms give us access to Gods being,
which is beyond knowing.24
This is an important passage that has a number of resonances in Hellen
istic philosophy.25 Here again, however, Gregorys purpose is to provide
room within Gods being for an eternally generated Son. Someone might
argue, Gregory suggests, that if he (Gregory) is right about ingenerancy
and eternity, then we will either have to call the Son ingenerate or we will
have to deny eternity to the Son altogether.26 The problem, of course, is
that if we say even that the Son is caused by the Father, and so deny that
the Son is ingenerate, then we inject an element of time into the Sons life
and deny his eternity. However, this objection only has force if we apply
ingenerate to substance. Because Gregory has removed the language of
ingenerate from the level of being, there is no longer any logical necessity
for saying the Son has to be ingenerate to be eternal. What this means
is that we can identify other arguments for describing the Sons eternity
without having to resort to ingenerate.27 Gregory will devote a great
deal of space in the following books of Contra Eunomium to developing
those new arguments.28 For now, it is enough to note the importance of
24. Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 1.68384 (Jaeger 1:22223). Bals, Eternity and
Time, 13738, finds Gregorys argumentation in this passage rushed, and he suggests
that Gregory will refine his arguments, and offer a better defense of Basil, in the later
books of Contra Eunomium. Though I agree with Bals that Gregorys thought in this
passage is immature, I also think that we can give Gregory a little more credit for the
coherence of his argument. Bals makes very little of the contradictories section,
which means that he makes very little of Gregorys attempt to separate both ingener-
acy and endlessness from Gods being. It seems to me, however, that this is Gregorys
point, that we can say nothing positive about Gods existence. (Mhlenberg, in fact,
treats this passage under the heading, Die negative Theologie [Die Unendlichkeit
Gottes, 142].) If my reading is correct, then two additional points follow. First this
perspective is certainly consistent with a key component of Gregorys anti-Eunomian
polemic, which is to deny that any name can tell us anything about Gods substance.
Second Gregory uses the contradictories argument here because it sets up and makes
possible his defense of the Sons eternal generation in Eun. 1.685ff.
25. For a helpful elaboration on the philosophical background of this passage, see
Mhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit Gottes, 167f.
28. Gregory offers two initial suggestions in this passage. First, he suggests that
there is no interval in the being of the Son, which means that his infinity extends
back before the ages and onward beyond the end of time. Second, the thought
() of the name Son leads to that of the Father and the inseparable connection
between the two, which then leads us to recognize that the Son is always with the
eternal Father. Neither of these arguments represents the most mature expression of
infinity to this account of the Sons eternity. By shifting the focus from
eternity to infinity, a shift that entails (or includes) the epistemological
insight that Gods infinite being is unknowable, Gregory has opened the
possibility for talking about eternity in ways that do not require the Son
to be ingenerate.
Infinity and Eternal Generation in

Early Pro-Nicene Thought
Gregorys use of infinity to prove eternal generation in Contra Eunomium1

reflects a trend in pro-Nicene thought that was at least twenty years old
by the time Gregory was writing.29 The process began in the early 360s in
response to the rise of Homoianism in the East, as increasingly sophisti-
cated attacks on key pro-Nicene doctrines became more and more effec-
tive. The larger story of how this happens is complex, but at least one part
of it involved the way in which Pro-Nicenes defended the Sons eternal
generation. By the mid-350s, eastern Pro-Nicenes, and their sometime
anti-homoian allies, the Homoiousians, had come to place a great deal
of theological weight on the names Father and Son for formulating their
Trinitarian theology. Exploiting the analogy between fathers and son and
the Father and the Son allowed Pro-Nicenes explain the unity and diver-
sity of the Father and Son. Since a father and son share the same nature,
they are united, but since there are clearly two names, they are diverse
(but not on the level of substance or being).30
Gregorys anti-Eunomian polemic. In particular, the argument from the names Father
and Son seems very close to Eunomiuss claim that names reveal nature, which both
Basil and Gregory will repudiate. However, Gregorys use of the Father-Son language
corresponds to what Michel Barnes has suggested about the development of Gregorys
Trinitarian thought as a whole in his Divine Unity and the Divided Self: Gregory of
Nyssas Trinitarian Theology in its Psychological Context, in Re-Thinking Gregory
of Nyssa, ed. Coakley, 53. Unlike his predecessors, Gregory is not using the genetic
language to argue for the unity of the Father and the Son, but for their diversity.
Barnes then locates Gregorys argument for the unity of the Father and Son in his use
of , while I want to locate it in his doctrine of divine infinity.
29. This assumes a date of around 380 for Book 1 of Gregorys Contra Euno-
mium, 360 for Book 12 of Hilarys De Trinitate, and mid-360s for Basils Contra
Eunomium. For Gregory, see Gerhard May, Die Chronologie des Lebens und der
Werke des Gregor von Nyssa, in criture et culture philosophique dans la pense
de Grgoire de Nysse, ed. Marguerite Harl (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 5167. For Hilary,
see Mark Weedman, The Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers (Leiden: Brill,
2007), 21. For Basil, see Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 191.
30. This sort of reflection on the names Father and Son had deep roots in east-
ern theology, going back at least to Origen himself. See Peter Widdicombe, The
As homoian and later Eunomian theology began to gain traction, its

exponents recognized a flaw in how Pro-Nicenes used the analogy: in the
human experience of fatherhood, the father must, by definition, precede
the son. Otherwise, what we have is not a father-son relationship, but
something completely different. So when Pro-Nicenes attempt to use the
analogy to explain eternal generation, they are really stretching that anal-
ogy beyond recognition. Pro-Nicenes (and Anti-Homoians) attempted to
respond to these attacks, but they found that their older strategies, espe-
cially the strategy of using the names Father and Son to defend eter-
nal generation, no longer worked.31 This forced Pro-Nicenes to develop
new ways of describing how the Son could be eternal and distinct from
the Father, and it is in this context that we find these Pro-Nicenes turning
to divine infinity. In what follows, then, I want to examine the two most
prominent examples of this new Pro-Nicene trend, Hilary of Poitiers and
Basil of Caesarea, to show where the turn to infinity came from.
Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate 12

In Book Seven of his De Trinitate, Hilary argued that the name Father
refers to the nature of God; when we call God Father, we are saying that
he is Father by nature. This insight has a number of implications for Hilarys
Trinitarian theology, including the question of eternal generation. If God
is Father by nature, he suggests, then he is eternally Father, but in order to
be an eternal Father, he had to have a Son from eternity. This is Hilarys
primary argument for the eternity of the Son, and it reflects the general
trend of anti-homoian polemic in the East during the late 350s.32
Before writing the twelfth book, however, Hilary confronted homoian
objections to this line of reasoning, and in this last book of De Trinitate he
atherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
F
Press, 2000).
31. For example, Basil of Ancyra, the leader of the Homoiousians, spends a sig-
nificant amount of time arguing that the divine Fatherhood is passionless and devoid
of material connotations, and he does so precisely because he recognizes the poten-
tial danger in using the father-son analogy. He even argues that human fatherhood
is corruption of the true divine Fatherhood. See Epiphanius, Panarion, 73.3.1. As
Hilary and Basil of Caesarea eventually recognized, this argument saves the analogy
only by destroying it.
32. Though Hilary was a Latin theologian, he found his polemical voice in the
East after being exiled to Cappadocia in 356, especially through his apparently close
relationship with Basil of Ancyra. For Hilarys use of the Father-Son analogy, his
relationship with Basil of Ancyra, and his abandonment of that analogy, see Weed-
man, Trinitarian Theology, chap. 6 and 8. I have here adapted my analysis of Hilarys
thought from these chapters.
begins to distance himself from the Father-Son analogy. The objection that
Hilary regards as the most important is the homoian claim that, Every-
thing that was born has not been, because it was born for this purpose
that it might be.33 This proposition is powerful because it accepts Hilarys
claim about the priority of the name Son for understanding the Sons
nature. The Homoians are arguing that if the name does give access to the
divine nature, the only way to understand that name, and so understand
the divine nature, is by way of the common (i.e. human) understanding
of that name. To grasp what the name Father tells us about the divine
Father, we must look at what it means to be a human father. Thus, accord-
ing to the Homoians, human experience dictates that everything that expe-
riences birth also has a beginning in time. This is, in a sense, the reason
for a birth, to bring about the beginning of the one who was born. If we
accept that the Son was born of the Father, then we must, on the basis
of the Father/Son analogy, also believe that this birth necessarily occurred
in time. In this way, then, Hilarys claim that the birth of the Son indicates
his eternal generation does not stand the test of human logic.
Hilary first responds to the homoian objection by rethinking the useful-
ness of analogies themselves. The Father-Son argument, that the Father
gives birth to a Son who shares his fathers substance, works if we accept
an analogy between human fatherhood and the nature of God as Father:
just as human fathers give birth to sons that share their fathers nature, so
too with the divine Father and Son. Hilary argues, however, that analogies
between human experiences and the divine nature are limited because while
they help us understand certain aspects of the divine nature, they do not
reveal to us anything necessary about that nature.34 So, for example, we
know that neither the Father nor the Son is a creature, which means we
cannot assume that the ordinary experience of a human birth applies to the
divine birth. Hilary believes that the human analogy is useful, but when
using it, we must keep in mind what we already know about the natures
of the divine Father and Son, i.e. that they are spiritual and uncreated.
The problem with claiming that the name Son reveals the Sons nature is
that this claim can be exploited in precisely the way the Homoians appear
to have done, by taking the analogy as proof that the Son was a creature,
because in human fatherhood and sonship, the son always has a begin-
ning. The analogies can tell us some things about how the divine Father
33. Hilary, Trin. 12.22 (CCL 62a: 596); trans. Stephen McKenna, The Trinity,
Fathers of the Church 25 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press, 1954),
516.
34. Hilary, Trin. 12.8 (CCL 62a, 585; trans. McKenna, 5067).
and Son relate, therefore, but not everything that has to do with human
generation applies to God simply on the basis of the analogy.35
By distancing himself from the Father-Son analogy, Hilary has also
negated his primary argument for the Sons eternal generation, which
means he will have to offer another account of eternal generation. It is at
this point that Hilary puts forward one of the first constructive accounts
in Christian literature of divine infinity.36 In De Trinitate 12.16, Hilary
admits that when speaking of humans, it is true that the birth indicates a
beginning in time. Humanity was created by God, which means that suc-
cessive generations of humans inherit the creatednessand beginning in
timeof the first human.37 When speaking of the Son, however, we must
affirm that he who is [the Father] is the cause of him [the Son] being
what he is. As a result, the Sons generation does not belong in time.38
This is a slightly different argument for eternal generation than the one
that proceeds from the names Father and Son. The primary justification
for defending eternal generation is now the way that causation works
within the divine nature, not the idea that Father must always have a son
to be a father. To be sure, both name and birth remain important in this
argument, as they are the means by which Hilary establishes the causal
link between the Father and Son, not unlike what Gregory does in Contra
Eunomium1.690. At the same time, however, Hilary places a new emphasis
on the character of the Fathers eternity to provide a logical justification
35. Hilary addresses the question of analogies in two other places earlier in De
Trinitate. If Beckwith is right, however, that Hilary added both 1.19 and 6.9 well
after the original time of composition, perhaps as late as 361, then this adds addi-
tional evidence to the suspicion that this material reflects insights he came to late
in the composition of the workand in response to homoian polemics against that
Father-Son analogy. See Carl Beckwith, The Certainty of Faith in Gods Word: The
Theological Method and Structure of Hilary of Poitierss De Trinitate (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Notre Dame, 2004), 179.
36. For this claim and a thorough treatment of divine infinity in Hilary see,
McDermott, Hilary of Poitiers. Nearly every occurrence of infinitas and cognates
in Hilarys writings are in either De Trinitate 12 or in the prologue of Book One,
which adds credence to the supposition that Hilary developed this doctrine at least
partly in response to his new epistemological concerns. McDermott, Hilary of Poi
tiers, 17985, does show that Hilary seems to be working with an incipient notion
of divine infinity even in the early books of De Trinitate, but it is not developed,
nor does it play a role in his anti-homoian polemic. McDermotts attempts to find
a developed notion of infinity in Hilarys earlier In Matthaeum are unconvincing
(Hilary of Poitiers, 177).
37. Hilary, Trin. 12.16 (CCL 62a, 590).
for the Sons eternity: because the Father is infinite, whatever he generates
must necessarily share in that infinity.39
That Hilary now intends to define divine eternity as infinity becomes
somewhat clearer in a subsequent passage, where he relates eternal gen-
eration to our contemplation of the divine nature:
When we go back again over our thoughts and are always being brought
back further and further in our understanding of him who is, this one fact
about him who is always prior to them: that he is. That which is infinite
in God is forever drawing away from the contemplation of our infinite
perceptions, so that, no matter how much we may exert ourselves in going
back over our thoughts, we shall grasp nothing else before that which
is proper to God: that he always is. . . . Hence, he [the Son] was and is,
because he is from him who always is what he is. To be from him, that is to
say, to be from the Father, is the birth. To be always from him who always
is eternity.40
This passage is important for at least two reasons. First notice how Hilary
has relegated the whole notion of birth. What was once a first order
theological principle must now be defined in terms of divine causality or
generation. Second, and more importantly for our purposes, this passage
highlights the degree to which Hilary is grasping for the proper epistemo-
logical formation to explain eternal generation. The older, more straight-
forward father-son analogy has given way to reflections on what we can
know about the divine nature, and Hilarys instinctit seemsis to at
once assert the that we cannot know the divine nature and to assert, on
the basis of its incomprehensibility, that the generation of the Son lies out-
side of time and is eternal. The concept of infinity is important to this new
epistemological project because this is how we contemplate the nature of
divinity; from our perspective, at least, the divine nature stretches both
forwards and backwards so that it, as Hilary says later, swallows up
whatever pertains to time. And because the birth of the Son takes place
outside of our time-bound comprehension, it is eternal.41
39. See Hilary, Trin. 12.21 (CCL 62a, 59596). McDermott, Hilary of Poitiers,
187, makes much of this passage, seeing it as Hilarys principal argument. McDer-
mott notes that for Hilary, eternity is explained in terms of infinity, for eternity is
previous to every aliquandonot removed from time, but previous to it! A horizontal
time-embracing infinity, the never attainable termination of an infinite progressus.
The value of McDermotts conclusions for understanding Hilarys doctrine of eternal
generation is that it places that generation not so much in the birth or the name, but
in the nature of God himself.
41. Hilary, Trin. 12.31 (CCL 62a, 603).
In this way, then, the eternal birth of the Son is contained in our under-
standing of the infinite eternity of the Father. Hilarys use of infinity
hints at a new direction for both his thought and pro-Nicene theology
as a whole. Along with the divine names, reflection on the relationship
between the Father and the Son must also consider the eternal, infinite
nature of God.42
Basil of Caesarea, Contra Eunomium 1.7, 2.12, 2.17

We turn now to Gregorys brother, Basil of Caesarea. Basil provides an
important bridge between the pro-Nicene perspective we find in Hilary
and what we find happening in Gregory. Like Hilary, Basil experienced the
homoian victory at Constantinople in 360, and he was aware of the ways
in which homoian theology forced pro-Nicene thought in new directions.43
Like Gregory, Basil also faced the particular challenge of Eunomius, and
his response to Eunomiuss Apologia represents a much more radical shift
in pro-Nicene theology, especially from an epistemological perspective,
than Hilary was able to achieve.
Basil refers to divine infinity infrequently, but in Contra Eunomium 1.7,
he employs the notion in a way that illustrates the new direction of pro-
Nicene thought. His ostensive concern in the chapter is to discuss how
we can interpret the various titles that Scripture assigns to the Son. When
we read about the Son being called the way, the bread, the vine, and the
shepherd and the light, Basil says that we should understand these to be
properties () of the Son.44 What he means here is that because the
Son is simple and non-composite in his substance, these different names
must refer to the Sons activities (). Thus when we call the Son
light, for example, this designation refers both to the inaccessibility of
the Sons glory in his divinity and to the illumination of our souls that we
42. Hilary will return to this argument in his exegesis of Proverbs 8, where he
argues that although creation is not eternal, the preparation of the things to be
created is eternal. Because the Son was present at creation, Hilary argues, we must
acknowledge that the Son is eternal with the Fathers infinity, which means, in turn,
that the Sons generation is eternal. See Hilary, Trin. 12.40 (CCL 62a, 611).
43. For a fulsome account of Basils early Trinitarian thought and his experiences
with the Homoians, see Volker Henning Drecoll, Die Entwicklung der Trinittslehre
des Basilius von Csarea: sein Weg vom Homusianer zum Neonizner (Gttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996).
44. Contra Eunomium 1.7.6ff (ed. Bernard Sesbo, Contre Eunome: suivi de
Eunome apologie, SC 299, 305 [Paris: Les ditions du Cerf, 1982], 188). This is an
early use by Basil of , but this term will become foundational to his Trinitar-
ian thought. For further discussion, see Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 19198 (192
for treatment of this particular passage).
receive from him.45 Basil then turns to a more specific treatment of the
primary object of his attackEunomiuss doctrine of ingeneracy:
For when we say that the God of the whole universe is incorruptible and
ingenerate, we apply these words with different intentions. We regard the
past ages and we discover that the life of God transcends all beginning,
and we say that he is ingenerate. But when our minds turn to the future
ages, there he is eternal, infinite, and without completion. This we call
incorruptible.46
While this is not quite the way Gregoryor even Hilarywill develop
the notion of divine infinity, it is close, as Basil offers a picture of Gods
eternity that extends infinitely, without limit. But his primary point is to
limit how much we can say about the substance of God. We cannot call
the Fathers substance ingenerate because ingeneracy is a property
of that substance, just like titles such as way or door. While these
properties do tell us useful things about God, the simple and unknowable
substance of the Father cannot be contained by them.
What we see in this line of reasoning is the increasingly familiar pro-
Nicene strategy of separating names and designations from the divine
substance. In Contra Eunomium 2, in fact, Basil will develop a theory of
naming that explicitly repudiates any connection between names and the
divine nature. Basil believes that Eunomiuss judgment that the different
names indicate different essences fails to account for the way that names
actually correspond to their object. The names Peter and Paul are different,
but the substance of these two men is one. This is because the names do
not indicate the substances of the men, but rather point to the properties
that characterize each individual. If it is true that different names indicate
different substances, then we must suppose that Paul and Peterand all
humanseach have a different substance from the other.47 The same is
true in the case of the Father and Son: their names do not designate their
substance but refer to individual properties () that belong to each.48
45. Basil of Caesarea, Eun. 1.7.1520 (Sesbo 190).

46. Basil of Caesarea, Eun. 1.7 (Sesbo 192). Gregory quotes this passage in his
Eun. 2.446.
47. Basil of Caesarea, Eun. 2.4 (Sesbo 20).
48. Philosophically, Basil is taking the Aristotelian side in a long-standing debate
about the relationship between names and substance, and in some ways Basil (and
Gregory) and Eunomiuss debate can be read from this perspective. For this background,
see Raoul Mortley, From Word to Silence, Vol 2: The Way of Negation, Christian
and Greek (Bonn: Hanstein, 1986), 166ff; Paul Kalligas, Basil of Caesarea on the
Semantics of Proper Names, in Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources, ed.
Katerina Ierodiakonou (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 3148.
This means that no one can introduce diversity into the substance of the
Father and Son simply on the basis of their names.49
This does not answer the question of how we should understand the
names Father and Son. To resolve this problem, Basil offers an alter-
nate account of naming. According to Basil, any name can either refer to
the thing itself, or it can refer to the relationship between one thing
and another. So, for example, the names man, horse, and cow, all
point to the thing itself, while names such as son, slave, and friend
indicate only the relationship between the term and that to which it is
related. When we come to the name begotten then, we should not think
that it refers to substance. Instead, it only suggests a relationship with an
unbegotten.50 Otherwise we are faced with another absurdity, because
if begotten refers to substance, then every begotten would have the
same substance, which is something not even Eunomius can accept.51
It is here that Basil turns to the question of the Sons eternal generation
and returns to the idea of infinity. In response to Eunomiuss claim that
the Son was generated in time according to the Fathers will, Basil starts by
asking why, if it were not an eternal good for the Father to be the Father,
God would accept a lesser good and become a Father? Instead we must
remember, says Basil, that the God of everything is Father from infinity (
), which means that the Fathers eternity includes a Son, because
the generation of the Son extends from before the aeons.52 As with Hilary
and Gregory, Basil believes that the names Father and Son, though
they do not reveal the nature of the Father or Son, do suggest that the Son
is eternal. Since it is good for the Father to be a Father, Basil reasons, he
must always be a Father. However, since he is Father only in relationship
with a Son, then there must always have been a Son with whom he can
relate, without interval.53
Read out of context, this argument could easily be taken as another
example of the older pro-Nicene argument that names reveal nature, that
the name Father means that the Father is eternally Father by nature, which
means that in order to be the Father he must always have had a Son. It is
not, in fact, entirely clear how far removed the actual logic of this argument
is from the older motif. However, Basil is attempting to push the motif,
and extend his epistemological claims, through the idea of infinity. Basil is

not arguing from the substance of God as Father, but from what it means
for God to be infinite. The key here is his insistence that the paternity
() of the Father is proper to the Fathers eternity (but not being),
which entails a relationship between the Father and Son before time. By
talking about infinity instead of just eternity, and relationship instead of
substance, Basil has created a picture of the divine life that allows for the
possibility of generation and relationship without the interval ()
that would obtain had these events occurred within time. In the next sec-
tion, in fact, Basil embarks on a definition of aeon () in which he
defines aeon as an interval that occurs within time but not in eternity.54 His
point in this section is that the generation of the Son took place beyond
and before the aeons, which means it took place outside of time. Thus,
for Basil, there are only two ways to talk about the act of generation: it
either takes place in time, in which case the Son is createdand so is not
the creator, was not present with the Father in the beginning, and so
forth, or it takes place outside of time, in which case the Son is eternal in
the Fathers infinite eternity.55
Heir to a Tradition: Gregory of Nyssas

Contra Eunomium 1.23536
Like Hilary, Basil struggles to attain the necessary precision in his termi-
nology, especially in his use of eternity and infinity, though when pushed
by Eunomius, he does break with the classic pro-Nicene notion that names
reveal nature. In both Hilary and Basil, however, we find unmistakable
attempts to overcome the problems of the old formulations by explaining
eternal generation through the lens of divine infinity. Their opponents,
homoian and Eunomian, forced them out of the old method, in which the
human father-son analogy explained eternal generation. It was too easy to
take the analogy to a completely opposite conclusion, that the Father begat
the Son in time. But by abandoning that analogy, Hilary and Basil had to
do more than just rethink eternal generation, they had also to throw out
the epistemological presuppositions that made that analogy possible. To be
sure, we find both Hilary and Basil struggling to move completely beyond
54. Basil of Caesarea, Eun. 2.13 (Sesbo 48). Sesbo offers a helpful summary
of Basils definition of in this section at SC 305:48 n. 1. I do not agree, however,
with Sesbos suggestion that Basils use of recalls some gnostic system. It seems
more likely that Basil is attempting to find language to explain Gods eternity, and the
Sons eternal generation, through an early notion of divine infinity.
their old categories, and there are moments when it sounds like they are
still using the Father-Son analogy. But we also find them each turning to
infinity as the category that might ultimately help them explain eternal
generation and answer their opponents. It is my contention that this is
the background for Gregorys use of infinity in Contra Eunomium. As a
final piece of evidence, I want to examine a disputed passage in Contra
Eunomium 1 to see if reading it in this context helps offer some clarity
as to its meaning.
The passage in question occurs within a longer discussion of what it
means for God to be one. Eunomius has argued that each of the three
Father, Son, and Holy Spiritare one in themselves. Eunomius believes,
in other words, that there are three substances, each of which is unmixed,
simple, and so completely one.56 Gregory recognizes that Eunomius says
this in part to avoid Sabellianism, and if that is the only objective, Greg-
ory is even ready to agree. But there is a deeper problem, because what
Eunomius has really done, in Gregorys view, is to separate the three on
the level of substance so that what we end up with are three different
divine beings.57
Gregory admittedly shares Eunomiuss goal of preserving the simplicity
of the divine substance. We cannot suggest that there is greater or lesser
within God, he argues, because to do so would deny Gods simplicity. By
confessing three divine beings, however, Eunomius has actually made God
composite and heterogeneous, however inadvertently.58 Instead, Gregory
suggests that a true conception of divinity begins with the notion of infin-
ity. A quality such as goodness can only be constrained by the presence
of its opposite, which is evil in this case. When a quality like goodness
is present in an incorruptible nature, however, there is no possibility that
it can be constrained by anything. It has no limit. Gregory does not say
this here, but he presumably means that by calling the Son good along
with the Father, we are also acknowledging that the Son is infinite. What
Gregory does say is that one infinite nature cannot be greater or lesser
than another infinite nature. Therefore, to call God simple is also to admit
that God is infinite.59

59. Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 1.23637 (Jaeger 1:9596). For further discussion on the
relationship between divine simplicity and infinity in Gregory, see Anthony Meredith,
The Divine Simplicity: Contra Eunomium 1.223241, in El Contra Eunomium 1
en la Produccion Literaria de Gregorio de Nisa, ed. Lucas F. Mateo-Seco and Juan L.
Bastero (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1988), 33952.
This passage has prompted scholarly debate, primarily in response to

Mhlenberg.60 According to Mhlenberg, we may analyze this passage
along the following premises:
1. Logical premise: the limit of something is determined by the
presence of its opposite.
2. Metaphysical premise: Gods essence is simple.
a. If God is simple in himself, he is good by himself and not by
participation in goodness.
b. Because God is not composed of heterogeneous partshe is
simpleit is impossible that evil is present as his opposite;
c. Gods goodness cannot be limited;
d. Therefore God is unlimited good, i.e. he is infinite.61
Mhlenberg tries to show how Gregory arrives at the idea that God is infi-
nite, as though Gregorys intention is to build a doctrine of divine infinity.
This affects Mhlenbergs reading of the passage, not least because it causes
him to import a categoryparticipationthat is not explicitly present in
the text itself.62 If Gregory is trying to articulate a doctrine of divine infin-
ity, however, Mhlenbergs analysis largely succeeds. In Gregorys mind,
the fact of Gods simplicity, from both a logical and metaphysical per-
spective, forces us to recognize that God is infinite. The value of divine
infinity for Gregorys thought, from this perspective, is that it allows for
this more robust vision of the divine nature, i.e. that it is simple and good
by nature, not by participation.
Not all scholars have accepted Mhlenbergs presupposition that
establishing a doctrine of divine infinity was Gregorys primary goal. In
particular, two main criticisms emerge. The first is the straightforward
observation that Gregory is being polemical and not systematic, and any
attempt to explain what Gregory means must take into account his polemi-
cal agenda.63 The second criticism addresses Mhlenbergs sense of what
60. For a summary of the scholarly debate on this passage, see Geljon, Divine
Infinity, 15657. My own review of the debate largely corresponds to Geljons,
though I have tried to fill in some details for additional clarity.
61. Mhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit Gottes, 125. I have here quoted Geljons Eng-
lish translation (Divine Infinity, 157).
62. Mhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit Gottes, 11822, examines Gregorys doctrine of
participation. Mhlenberg argues that from a systematic perspective, Gregorys sense
of what we mean by participation and simplicity is crucial to Gregorys development
of divine infinity (Die Unendlichkeit Gottes, 126).
63. See W. Ullmann, Der logische und der theologische Sinn des Unendlichkeits-
begriffs in der Gotteslehre Gregors von Nyssa, Bijdragen 48 (1987): 159.
Gregory accomplishes systematically. Thomas Bhm, for example, has

agreed with the first set of critics that Gregory is not trying to put for-
ward a systematic doctrine of divine infinity, and he argues instead that
Gregory is trying to establish the relationship between Gods infinity and
incomprehensibility.64 In this reading, Gregorys problem with Eunomius is
that Eunomius allows us too much access to the divine nature. According
to Bhm, therefore, Gregory must show, by means of the argument that
God does not have greater or lesser, that Gods essence is infinite. By
doing this, Gregory is able to make Eunomiuss logic untenable and, more
constructively, establish that the divine essence cannot be known.65 Thus
for Bhm, there is no apparent connection between Mhlenbergs logi-
cal and metaphysical premises. They are all part of the same argument
designed to demonstrate absence of hierarchy in the godhead.66
Bhms critique of Mhlenberg is persuasive, as is, in many ways, his
analysis of Gregorys thought in the passage. Bhms emphasis on the
epistemological component in Gregorys argument is very helpful, and
it certainly captures an important part of Gregorys over-arching anti-
Eunomian polemic. However, by reading Gregorys treatment of divine
infinity in Contra Eunomium 1.235 in light of his polemical context, we
can shed further light on what Gregory is trying to accomplish in this
passage. Our analysis has shown that Pro-Nicenes typically used divine
infinity to demonstrate the full divinity (and eternity) of the Son. Accord-
ingly we would expect that Gregory, if he was being true to form, would
apply the insights into divine infinity that he established in Contra Euno-
mium1.235 to the Son. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that in the very
next section of Contra Eunomium, Gregory turns to a discussion of the
Sons divinityone that explicitly draws on the notion of divine infinity
that he has just established.
To illustrate how Gregory connects divine infinity to the Son here, I
will examine just one aspect of Gregorys complicated argument. Follow-
ing the infinity discussion in Eun. 1.235ff., Gregory moves immediately
to a discussion of Eunomiuss account of the Sons generation. According
to Gregory, Eunomius teaches that the Son and Spirit are works of the
divine energies.67 Eunomius is using the taxonomy of substance-energy
or power-work to show that the Son (and Spirit) is separated from the
Fathers substance and are thereby inferior to the Father on the level of
64. See Bhm, Theoria, Unendlichkeit, Aufstieg, 12331, here 123.

65. Bhm, Theoria, Unendlichkeit, Aufstieg, 131.
66. Bhm, Theoria, Unendlichkeit, Aufstieg, 127.
substance. Gregory has a number of problems with this formulation, and

working out how to explain the place of the Son in the power-energy-work
taxonomy (and how to explain relationship between substance, powers,
and energies) will become a crucial component of Gregorys anti-Eunomian
polemic.68 For now, his main problem is that by making the Son the work
of an energy, Eunomius has found another way of introducing hierarchy
into the divine substance. Gregory proves this is Eunomiuss intention by
quoting his opponent as saying that the energies that produce the works
are by definition greater and less.69 But this is precisely what Gregory
has just shown cannot happen in the simple, infinite substance of God,
which suggests that this is why Gregory drew the connection between infin-
ity and simplicity in the first place. It is at this point, in fact, that Gregory
embarks on a long explanation of equality of the Father, Son, and Spirit
that incorporates all of the elements he had used to explain divine infinity,
including simplicity and eternity.70 In other words, Gregorys argument
in Contra Eunomium 1.235 is not a self-contained explication of divine
infinity nor is it primarily a critique of Eunomiuss epistemology. Instead,
it is an attempt to establish ways of speaking about God that allow for
the Son and Spirit to be included in the infinite simplicity of the divine
substance.
Conclusions
I have argued in this essay that we can best understand Gregorys devel-
opment of divine infinity by reading Gregory in light of his pro-Nicene
tradition. If my thesis is correct, it suggests at least two conclusions about
Gregorys thought and his use of divine infinity. First, by reading Greg-
ory in light of his tradition, we can better recognize that Gregory neither
invented the idea of divine infinity himself nor established the initial
parameters that Pro-Nicenes used to employ it against their opponents.
Gregorys doctrine of divine infinity arose as part of an on-going polemical
debate about eternal generation. This context is so important to Gregory
that whenever Gregory talks about infinity in a polemical context, his dis-
cussion is almost always framed by the larger eternal generation debate.
68. This is Barness insight in Power of God. See especially chap. 57 for an
important explanation of Gregory and Eunomiuss different accounts of substance,
power, energy, and work.
70. This line of thought begins in Eun. 1.261 and it runs, in some ways, to the
end of the book.
Gregory will, of course, take the idea of infinity in directions that none of
his predecessors anticipated; this would seem to be Gregorys genius, to
see possibilities in an idea that no one else saw. Nevertheless the basis of
Gregorys development of divine infinity lies in his polemical context.
Second, reading Gregory in light of his tradition helps us understand
why divine infinity was so attractive to Pro-Nicenes, including Gregory.
The problem faced by Pro-Nicenes was how to replace the old Father-Son
motif with one that allowed for the Son to be equal to but distinct from
the Father. Homoian and Eunomian attacks on the Father-Son motif had
added a new wrinkle to this problem by forcing Pro-Nicenes to consider
the epistemological implications of their doctrine of God. The problem
with the Father-Son analogy was that it required too many qualifiers to be
effective. Taken at face value, the analogy worked better for Anti-Nicenes
than it did for Pro-Nicenes. In response, Pro-Nicenes not only abandoned
that particular analogy, but they began to reconsider how to think about
God at all. Divine infinity worked, in this context, because it allowed for a
causal relationship between the Father and the Son (which preserves their
distinction) outside of time (which preserves their unity). In other words,
by properly conceiving of God as infinite, Pro-Nicenes came to believe
that they could resolve the Trinitarian debate in ways that answered the
homoian and Eunomian critiques.
Mark Weedman is a Professor of Biblical and Historical Theology

at Crossroads College in Rochester, Minnesota

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The Polemical Context of Gregory of Nyssa's Doctrine of Divine

Journal of Early Christian Studies, Volume 18, Number 1, Spring 2010,

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

For additional information about this article

Access Provided by University of Saskatchewan at 07/27/12 6:19PM GMT

Modern scholarship has lavished a great deal of attention to Gregory

understanding of Gods infinity is the product of his own theologically

2. Mhlenberg, Die Unendlichkeit Gottes, 2988, was primarily concerned with

attacks on pro-Nicene attempts to explain eternal generation by their

polemical context is significant, because this is the book where Gregory

Gregory on Infinity and Eternal Generation

We begin with Contra Eunomium 1.34185.6 This passage is important

6. The text of Contra Eunomium 1 is in Werner Jaeger, Gregorii Nysseni Opera,

8. Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 1.34748 (Jaeger 1:12930).

Contra Eunomium 1.66691

Infinity and Eternal Generation in

Gregorys use of infinity to prove eternal generation in Contra Eunomium1

As homoian and later Eunomian theology began to gain traction, its

Hilary of Poitiers, De Trinitate 12

Basil of Caesarea, Contra Eunomium 1.7, 2.12, 2.17

45. Basil of Caesarea, Eun. 1.7.1520 (Sesbo 190).

49. Basil of Caesarea, Eun. 2.5 (Sesbo 23).

Heir to a Tradition: Gregory of Nyssas

56. Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 1.225 (Jaeger 1:92).

This passage has prompted scholarly debate, primarily in response to

Gregory accomplishes systematically. Thomas Bhm, for example, has

64. See Bhm, Theoria, Unendlichkeit, Aufstieg, 12331, here 123.

substance. Gregory has a number of problems with this formulation, and

Mark Weedman is a Professor of Biblical and Historical Theology

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