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ARTICLE 487 CIVIL CODE

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120864. October 8, 2003]

MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former


Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO, represented by his
Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the 22 August


[1]

1994 Decision as well as the 27 June 1995Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
[2]

G.R. CV No. 39875. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
[3]

Court (trial court) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 8796-M. The trial
courts Decision ordered petitioner Manuel T. De Guia (DE GUIA) to turn over to private
respondent Jose B. Abejo (ABEJO) possession of the one half () undivided portion of a
fishpond and to pay actual damages and attorneys fees.

The Antecedents

On 12 May 1986, ABEJO instituted an action for recovery of possession with


[4]

damages against DE GUIA. In his complaint, ABEJO alleged that he is the owner of the
undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond (FISHPOND) situated in
Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. T-6358 of the Bulacan Register of
Deeds. He alleged ownership over approximately 39,611 square meters out of the
FISHPONDs total area of 79,220 square meters. ABEJO further averred that DE GUIA
continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying
rent to ABEJOs damage and prejudice. ABEJO also complained that DE GUIA refuses
to surrender ownership and possession of the FISHPOND despite repeated demands to
do so after DE GUIAs sublease contract over the FISHPOND had expired. ABEJO
asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate an approximate area of 39,611 square
meters as well as pay damages.
DE GUIA, a lawyer by profession, appeared on his own behalf. He filed his Answer
on 12 January 1990 after the Court of Appeals resolved several issues concerning the
validity of the service of summons on him. In his Answer, DE GUIA alleged that the
complaint does not state a cause of action and has prescribed. He claimed that the
FISHPOND was originally owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva
Lejano as her only heir. According to him, ABEJO is not the owner of the entire
FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who authorized him to possess the entire
FISHPOND. He assailed ABEJOs ownership of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND
as void and claimed ownership over an undivided half portion of the FISHPOND for
himself. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the
improvements he introduced as a builder in good faith.
The trial court set the pre-trial and required the parties to file their pre-trial
briefs. ABEJO filed his pre-trial brief on 05 April 1990. DE GUIA filed his pre-trial
[5]

brief on 31 July 1990. DE GUIAs pre-trial brief raised as the only issue in the case the
[6]

amount of damages in the form of rent that DE GUIA should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA also
submitted an Offer to Compromise, offering to settle ABEJOs claim for P300,000
[7]

and to lease the entire FISHPOND to any party of ABEJOs choice.


Hearing commenced on 30 July 1990. ABEJO rested his case on 4 December
1990. DE GUIAs last witness completed her testimony on 22 November 1991. The trial
court summarized the evidence presented by ABEJO and DE GUIA as follows:

Evidence adduced from plaintiff shows that there are two parcels of land covering a
fishpond with a total area of 79,220 sq. m. more or less, situated at Ubihan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. 6358 equally owned by Primitiva
Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to Juan Abejo (Exh. A). The one half undivided
portion owned by Lorenza Araniego corresponding to 39,611 sq. m. was later
purchased by plaintiff from his father Teofilo Abejo (Exh. B), the only heir of the
original owner on November 22, 1983. Prior to this sale on July 30, 1974 the whole
fishpond (79,220) was the subject of a Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan
executed by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent
of Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of one Aniano Victa and defendant. The contract
provided that the period of lease shall be until November 30, 1979. When the contract
expired and defendant failed to surrender the fishpond, written demands the last of
which was on November 27, 1983 were made for defendants to pay back rental and to
vacate the premises in question (Exh. D & E). Defendant refused to deliver possession
and also to pay the rentals due. In anticipation, however, that defendant will vacate the
fishpond, plaintiff, on December 21, 1983 entered into a two year Kasunduan ng
Buwisan ng Palaisdaan with Ruperto C. Villarico for a consideration of P50,000.00
(Exh. G). This contract, despite its execution and even already notarized, had to be
cancelled and the amount of P50,000.00 returned by plaintiff to Villarico when the
defendant did not heed the demand to vacate the fishpond. For unpaid rental, actual as
well as moral and exemplary damages, plaintiff asks payment of P450,000.00
and P20,000.00 attorneys fees.
On the other hand, defendants evidence tends to show that the entire fishpond with an
area of 79,200 sq. m. was leased to him by the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano. Subsequently, defendant became the absolute owner of one half of the
undivided area of the fishpond and he questioned plaintiffs ownership of the other half
as void and fraudulent. As to the area pertaining to plaintiff, defendant claimed that he
introduced improvements worth P500,000 and being in good faith, he asked that he
should be reimbursed by plaintiff. In his pre-trial brief, however, defendant raised the
only issue which is the amount of damages plaintiff is entitled to in the form of
rental. Hence, the thrust of the testimonies of defendants witnesses particularly Ben
Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando Pea was the amount of rental of fishponds in the
same locality as the fishpond in question at a given time. However, the documentary
evidence (Exhs. 1 and 2) in support of their testimony were not offered as evidence. [8]

The trial court rendered its decision on 8 June 1992, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the


plaintiff and against the defendant and hereby orders that:

1. Defendant shall turn over possession to plaintiff one half undivided


portion of the 79,200 sq. m. fishpond who shall enjoy the benefits
and fruits in equal share with the defendant effective immediately
until such time that partition of the property is effected;

2. Defendant shall pay to plaintiff the amount of P262,500.00 by way of


actual or compensatory damages;

3 Defendant shall pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and

4. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. [9]

Aggrieved, DE GUIA went to the Court of Appeals insisting the trial court erred in
ordering him to vacate and surrender possession of the undivided portion of the
FISHPOND and to pay actual damages and attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals found
DE GUIAs appeal without merit and affirmed the trial courts decision. Upon DE GUIAs
motion for reconsideration, the appellate court reduced the compensatory damages
from P262,500 to P212,500.
Hence, the instant petition.
The undisputed facts as found by the trial court and adopted in toto by the Court of
Appeals are restated as follows:
1. The subject of the dispute are two undivided parcels of land used as a fishpond
situated in Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, originally co-owned by Primitiva
Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to Juan Abejo.
2. The FISHPOND is registered under the names of Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza
Araniego under TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds as follows:

PRIMITIVA LEJANO, Filipina, of legal age, single - share; and


LORENZA ARANIEGO, Filipina, of legal age, married to Juan Abejo,
share, ---

3. The FISHPOND has a total land area of approximately 79,220 square


meters. ABEJO is seeking to recover possession of the undivided portion of the
FISHPOND containing 39,611 square meters.
4. DE GUIA (along with a certain Aniano Victa) acquired possession of the entire
FISHPOND by virtue of a document captioned Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng
Palaisdaan (Lease Contract) executed between him and the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano. The Lease Contract was effective from 30 July 1974 up to 30 November
1979 for a consideration of P100,000.
5. The Lease Contract was executed with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo Abejo,
sole heir of Lorenza Araniego Abejo.Teofilo Abejo acquired Lorenza Araniego Abejos
undivided share in the FISHPOND by intestate succession.
6. Teofilo Abejo (now deceased) sold his undivided share in the FISHPOND to his
son, ABEJO, on 22 November 1983.
7. DE GUIA continues to possess the entire FISHPOND and to derive income from the
property despite the expiration of the Lease Contract and several demands to
vacate made by Teofilo Abejo and by his successor-in-interest, ABEJO. The last
demand letter was dated 27 November 1983.
8. ABEJO filed his complaint for recovery of possession with damages against DE
GUIA on 12 May 1986.
9. DE GUIAs claim of ownership over the other undivided portion of the FISHPOND
has not been finally adjudicated for or against him.
DE GUIA offers the verified Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage and
Contract of Lease with Preliminary Injunction signed by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano as
proof of his ownership of the other undivided half portion of the FISHPOND. Records
show that DE GUIA filed the complaint for himself and as attorney-in fact of the heirs of
Primitiva Lejano (Lejano Heirs) against Spouses Teofilo Morte and Angelina Villarico,
[10]

Spouses Ruperto and Milagros Villarico, et al. (Defendants). The case was raffled to
Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, and docketed as Civil Case.
No. 86-27-M. The complaint alleged that DE GUIA acquired his undivided share in the
FISHPOND from the Lejano Heirs in February 1986. DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs
sought to annul the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan and Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis
ng Palaisdaan, executed on 10 November 1979 by Primitiva Lejano in favor of the
Defendants. DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs claimed that Primitiva Lejano signed these
documents under duress and without consideration.
The trial court rendered judgment on 28 February 1992 against DE GUIA and the
[11]

Lejano Heirs as follows:

WHEREFORE, the evidence having shown the plaintiffs, particularly Manuel De


Guia, their successor-in-interest, not entitled upon the facts and the law to the relief
prayed for in the amended complaint, the same is hereby DISMISSED with costs
against said plaintiff.Instead, as prayed for by defendants, judgment is hereby
rendered:

1. Declaring the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan (Exhs. A & 1) dated November


10, 1979, and the Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan
(Exhs. C &3) also dated November 10, 1979, as valid for all
legal intents and purposes;

2. Ordering the Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC, Bulacan, to proceed with the


extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage;
and

3. Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants attorneys fees in the amount


of P20,000.00.

SO ORDERED. [12]

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a Decision dated 30 August 2002 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 38031. The Court of Appeals found the claim of force and intimidation
in the execution of the documents as highly improbable since Primitiva Lejanos son,
Renato Davis, witnessed the signing of the documents and found nothing irregular at
the time. The appellate court also held that assuming Defendants threatened DE GUIA
and the Lejano Heirs with immediate foreclosure, Defendants were merely exercising
their legitimate right of foreclosing the mortgaged property for non-payment of the
loan. In addition, Primitiva Lejanos lawyer and notary public, Atty. Mamerto Abao,
testified that the parties appeared before him to affirm the contents of the
documents. He also stated that he was present when Defendants paid Primitiva Lejano
Davis and her son Renato. As of this writing, DE GUIA has a pending motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. In the event the Court of Appeals Decision
attains finality, DE GUIA may lose whatever right he claims over the FISHPOND.

The Trial Courts Ruling

The trial court ruled that ABEJO has the right to demand that DE GUIA vacate and
surrender an area equivalent to ABEJOs undivided share in the FISHPOND. The trial
court explained that DE GUIAs sublease contract expired in 1979 and ABEJO acquired
his fathers share in 1983. However, the trial court pointed out that ABEJO failed to
present evidence of the judicial or extra-judicial partition of the FISHPOND. The
identification of the specific area pertaining to ABEJO and his co-owner is vital in an
action to recover possession of real property. Nevertheless, the trial court declared that
pending partition, it is only just that DE GUIA pay ABEJO a reasonable amount as rental
for the use of ABEJOs share in the FISHPOND. DE GUIA admitted this obligation when
he raised as sole issue in his pre-trial brief how much rent he should pay ABEJO. DE
GUIA even proposed P300,000 as the reasonable amount but under certain conditions
which ABEJO found unacceptable.
In determining the reasonable rent due to ABEJO, the trial court considered the
Lease Contract between ABEJO and a certain Ruperto C. Villarico which provided for a
yearly rent of P25,000 for undivided portion of the FISHPOND. The trial court declared
that the total amount of rent due is P212,500, computed from November 1983 when
ABEJO became a co-owner of the FISHPOND up to 1991 or a period of eight and one
[13]

half years. The trial court further ordered DE GUIA to pay an additional P50,000 which
represents the amount ABEJO returned to Ruperto C. Villarico when they cancelled the
Lease Contract between them due to DE GUIAs refusal to vacate the FISHPOND.
Lastly, the trial court ruled that pending partition, ABEJO as co-owner has the right
to possess the FISHPOND and to receive an equal share in the benefits from the
FISHPOND effective immediately. Until there is a partition, and while there is no
contract of lease, the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership shall govern the rights of
the parties.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. The Court of Appeals
debunked DE GUIAs claim that partition and not recovery of possession was the proper
remedy under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals pointed out that DE GUIAs
failure to respect ABEJOs right over his undivided share in the FISHPOND justifies the
action for recovery of possession. The trial courts decision effectively enforces ABEJOs
right over the property which DE GUIA violated by possession and use without
paying compensation. According to the Court of Appeals, partition would constitute a
mechanical aspect of the decision just like accounting when necessary.
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected DE GUIAs claim that the award of
compensatory damages of P242,000, computed based on the rent stipulated in the
Lease Contract between ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico, is grossly exorbitant.The
Court of Appeals clarified that the amount the trial court awarded was P262,500 and
not P242,000 as erroneously alleged by DE GUIA. The Court of Appeals pointed out
that the notarized Lease Contract between ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico carries
more evidentiary weight than the testimonies of DE GUIAs witnesses, Ben
Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando Pea. The Court of Appeals also upheld the award
of attorneys fees since the parties could have avoided litigation had DE GUIA heeded
the justifiable demands of ABEJO.
On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals reduced the compensatory
damages from P262,500 to P212,500.The Court of Appeals explained that the trial court
correctly computed the total amount of rent due at P212,500. The trial court erred,
however, in adding the sum of P50,000 representing the rent for 1983 and 1984 which
ABEJO returned to Ruperto C. Villarico. The appellate court clarified that the sum
of P212,500 was arrived at by multiplying the rent of P25,000 by 8 years. The 8 year
period already included the two months rent received from and then subsequently
reimbursed to Ruperto C. Villarico.

The Issues

DE GUIA raises the following issues in his Memorandum:


I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURTS DECISION DENYING PETITIONERS PLEA
FOR DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;

II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
TRIAL COURTS ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO
TURN OVER THE ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED PORTION OF
THE FISHPOND WHICH IS STILL UNDER A STATE OF CO-
OWNERSHIP;

III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING, IN
PART, THE AWARD OF ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES DESPITE LACK OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE SAME;
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FAVOR. [14]

In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether an action for recovery of
possession and turn-over of the undivided portion of a common property is proper
before partition; and (2) whether there is sufficient basis for the award of compensatory
damages and attorneys fees.

The Courts Ruling


The petition is partly meritorious.

First and Second Issues: Cause of Action and Turn-Over of Possession

DE GUIA contends that a co-owner cannot claim a definite portion from the property
owned in common until there is a partition. DE GUIA argues that ABEJO should have
filed an action for partition instead of recovery of possession since the court cannot
implement any decision in the latter case without first a partition. DE GUIA contends that
an action for recovery of possession cannot prosper when the property subject of the
action is part of an undivided, co-owned property. The procedural mode adopted by
ABEJO, which is recovery of possession, makes enforcement difficult if not impossible
since there is still no partition of the subject property.
Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, there is co-ownership whenever the ownership
of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. A co-owner of an undivided
parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of
dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. On
[15]

the other hand, there is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different
people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described.[16]

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, [a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an
action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal),
recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
reivindicacion). The summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer seek the
recovery of physical possession only. These actions are brought before municipal trial
courts within one year from dispossession. However, accion publiciana, which is a
plenary action for recovery of the right to possess, falls under the jurisdiction of the
proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one
year. Accion de reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership, also falls under
the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court.
[17]

Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third
person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and
asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case, however, the only
[18]

purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot
seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right
of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the
property.[19]

In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria De La Cruz


and Herminio De La Cruz, we reiterated the rule that a co-owner cannot recover a
[20]

material or determinate part of a common property prior to partition as follows:


It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually
partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate
share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete, specific or
determinate part of the thing owned in common because until division is effected his
right over the thing is represented only by an ideal portion.

As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be
to obtain recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a
specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and
the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate part of the property. Thus, the
courts a quo erred when they ordered the delivery of one-half () of the building in
favor of private respondent.

Indisputably, DE GUIA has been in exclusive possession of the entire FISHPOND


since July 1974. Initially, DE GUIA disputed ABEJOs claim of ownership over the
undivided portion of the FISHPOND. Subsequently, he implicitly
recognized ABEJOs undivided share by offering to settle the case for P300,000 and to
vacate the property. During the trial proper, neither DE GUIA nor ABEJO asserted or
manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the entire
FISHPOND. Before this Court, DE GUIA limits the issues to the propriety of bringing an
action for recovery of possession and the recovery of compensatory damages.
Following the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership, while ABEJO and DE
GUIA have equal shares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have the same
right in a qualitative sense as co-owners. Simply stated, ABEJO and DE GUIA are
owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the right of dominion. However,
they are at the same time individual owners of a portion, which is truly abstract because
until there is partition, such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified. As co-
[21]

owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of dominion over the entire
FISHPOND until they partition the FISHPOND by identifying or segregating their
respective portions.
Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-
judicial partition is the proper recourse. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible
and not subject to laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
[22]

common property unless a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership under certain
conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership under the
[23]

conditions set by law.


To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession
against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession of the entire co-owned
property. However, the only effect of such action is a recognition of the co-
ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-owned
property. Thus, judicial or extra-judicial partition is necessary to effect physical division
of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for partition is also the
proper forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from the
FISHPOND. However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition, ABEJO shall
exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the entire FISHPOND.
DE GUIA further claims that the trial and appellate courts erred when they ordered
the recovery of rent when the exact identity of the portion in question had not yet been
clearly defined and delineated. According to DE GUIA, an order to pay damages in the
form of rent is premature before partition.
We disagree.
The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-
owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the
prejudice of the co-ownership. Hence, if the subject is a residential house, all the co-
[24]

owners may live there with their respective families to the extent possible. However, if
one co-owner alone occupies the entire house without opposition from the other co-
owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other co-owners cannot demand the
payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-
owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the house.
The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house, or agree to
lease it. If they fail to exercise any of these options, they must bear the
consequences. It would be unjust to require the co-owner to pay rent after the co-
owners by their silence have allowed him to use the property. [25]

In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-owner


cannot retain it for his use without paying the proper rent. Moreover, where part of the
[26]

property is occupied exclusively by some co-owners for the exploitation of an industry,


the other co-owners become co-participants in the accessions of the property and
should share in its net profits.
[27]

The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE
GUIA. After DE GUIAs lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire
FISHPOND without paying rent. To allow DE GUIA to continue using the entire
FISHPOND without paying rent would prejudice ABEJOs right to receive rent, which
would have accrued to his share in the FISHPOND had it been leased to others. Since[28]

ABEJO acquired his undivided share in the FISHPOND on 22 November 1983, DE


GUIA should pay ABEJO reasonable rent for his possession and use of ABEJOs portion
beginning from that date.The compensatory damages of P25,000 per year awarded to
ABEJO is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the leased property, considering the circumstances at that time. DE
[29]

GUIA shall continue to pay ABEJO a yearly rent of P25,000 corresponding


to ABEJOs undivided share in the FISHPOND. However, ABEJO has the option either
to exercise an equal right to occupy the FISHPOND, or to file a new petition before the
trial court to fix a new rental rate in view of changed circumstances in the last 20 years.
ABEJO made an extrajudicial demand on DE GUIA by sending the 27 November
1983 demand letter. Thus, the rent in arrears should earn interest at 6% per annum
from 27 November 1983 until finality of this decision pursuant to Article 2209 of the
[30]

Civil Code. Thereafter, the interest rate is 12% per annum from finality of this decision
until full payment.[31]
Third Issue: Lack of Credible Evidence to Support Award of Compensatory
Damages

DE GUIA contends the P212,500 in rent awarded to ABEJO is exorbitant. He


assails as doubtful and self-serving evidence the Lease Contract between ABEJO and
Ruperto C. Villarico that served as basis for the yearly rent of P25,000 for ABEJOs
share in the FISHPOND.
DE GUIA says the trial and appellate courts should have given credence to the
testimonies of his witnesses, Ben Ruben Camargo (Camargo) and Marta Fernando Pea
(Pea) that rentals of fishponds in the same vicinity are for much lesser considerations.
This issue involves calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses. As a rule, a party may raise only questions of law in an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound
to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. More [32]

so in the instant case, where the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the
trial court.
[33]

It is not true that the trial court disregarded the testimonies


of Camargo and Pea because DE GUIA failed to present documentary evidence to
support their testimonies. Actually, the trial and appellate courts found the testimonies of
Camargo and Pea unconvincing. Judges cannot be expected to rely on the testimonies
of every witness. In ascertaining the facts, they determine who are credible and who are
not. In doing so, they consider all the evidence before them. [34]

We find no cogent reason to overturn the trial and appellate courts evaluation of the
witnesses testimonies. We likewise find reasonable the P25,000 yearly compensation
for ABEJOs undivided share in the FISHPOND. Indeed, being a question of fact, it is for
the trial and appellate courts to decide and this Court will not disturb their findings
unless clearly baseless or irrational. The exception does not obtain in this case.

Fourth Issue: Attorneys Fees

The trial court did not err in imposing attorneys fees of P20,000. Attorneys fees can
be awarded in the cases enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code specifically:
xxx
(2) Where the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
xxx
DE GUIA is a lawyer and he should have known that a co-owner could not take
exclusive possession of a common property. Although DE GUIA offered to settle the
case out of court, such offer was made under conditions not acceptable to
ABEJO. Certainly, ABEJO was still put to unnecessary expense and trouble to protect
his interest under paragraph (2), Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 22 August 1994 and Resolution dated 27 June
1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39875 is AFFIRMED with respect to
that portion ordering Manuel T. De Guia to pay Jose B. Abejo compensatory damages
of P212,500 and attorneys fees of P20,000, and MODIFIED as follows:
1. The co-ownership between Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo over the entire
FISHPOND covered by TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds is
recognized without prejudice to the outcome of CAG.R. CV No. 38031 pending
before the Court of Appeals and other cases involving the same property;
2. Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo shall equally enjoy possession and use of the
entire FISHPOND prior to partition;
3. The compensatory damages of P25,000 per annum representing rent from 27
November 1983 until May 1992 shall earn interest at 6% per annum from 27
November 1983 until finality of this decision, and thereafter at 12% per annum until
full payment;
4. Manuel T. de Guia shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rent of P25,000 from June 1992
until finality of this decision, with interest at 6% per annum during the same period,
and thereafter at 12% interest per annum until full payment;
5. After finality of this decision and for as long as Manuel T. de Guia exclusively
possesses the entire FISHPOND, he shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rental
of P25,000 for the latters undivided share in the FISHPOND, unless Jose B. Abejo
secures from the proper court an order fixing a different rental rate in view of
possible changed circumstances.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona, with Associate Justices Gloria C. Paras
and Eubolo G. Verzola concurring.
[3]
Penned by Judge Elpidio M. Catungal, Sr.
[4]
Represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera.
[5]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 182-183.
[6]
Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 212-213.
[7]
Ibid., p. 214.
[8]
CA Rollo, pp. 11-12.
[9]
Ibid., pp. 14-15.
[10]
Fe Davis Maramba, Renato Davis, Flordeliza D. Yeh, Jocelyn D. Queblatin and Betty Davis.
[11]
Penned by Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion.
[12]
CA Rollo, pp. 72-73.
[13]
Should be 1992. The 8 period is counted from November 1983 up to May 1992.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 172-173.
[15]
Si v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122047, 12 October 2000, 342 SCRA 653.
[16]
Ibid.
[17]
Javier v. Veridiano II, G.R. No. 48050, 10 October 1994, 237 SCRA 565.
[18]
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1992, Ed.
[19]
Ibid.
[20]
G.R. No.148727, 9 April 2003.
[21]
Villanueva v. Florendo, No. L-33158, 17 October 1985, 139 SCRA 329.
[22]
Article 494 of the Civil Code states, [p]rescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against
his co-owners or his co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
[23]
Prescription as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership must have been preceded by
repudiation in this manner (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of
repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence of repudiation is clear
and conclusive; (4) he has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
property for the period required by law.Santos v. Santos, G.R. No. 139524, 12 October 2000, 342
SCRA 753.
[24]
TOLENTINO, supra, note 18.
[25]
Ibid.
[26]
Ibid.
[27]
Ibid.
[28]
Pardell v. Bartolome, 23 Phil 450 (1912).
[29]
Araos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107057, 2 June 1994, 232 SCRA 770.
[30]
Article 2209 of the Civil Code provides, [i]f the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money,
and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the
legal interest, which is six per cent per annum.
[31]
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, 12 July 1994, 234 SCRA 78.
[32]
Roble v. Arbasa, 414 Phil. 343 (2001).
[33]
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 258 (2001).
[34]
Baritua v. Mercader, G.R. No. 136048, 23 January 2001, 350 SCRA 86.
SECOND DIVISION

REYNALDO BALOLOY and G.R. No. 157767


ADELINA BALOLOY-HIJE,
Petitioners,

Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:
ALFREDO HULAR,
Respondent. September 9, 2004
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court, as amended, of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51081, which affirmed the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Branch 51, in Civil Case No. 93-5871.

The antecedents are as follows:


On May 11, 1993, respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for quieting of title
of real property with damages against the children and heirs of Iluminado Baloloy,
namely, Anacorita, Antonio, and petitioners Reynaldo and Adelina, all surnamed
Baloloy. The respondent alleged, inter alia, in his complaint that his father,
Astrologo Hular, was the owner of a parcel of residential land located in Sitio
Page, Biriran, Juban, Sorsogon, with an area of 287 square meters, and that such
lot was part of Lot No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. The respondent alleged that
Iluminado Baloloy, the petitioners predecessor-in-interest, was able to secure a
Free Patent over the property through fraud on March 1, 1968, on the basis of
which the Register of Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-
16540 in his name. The respondent later discovered that in the cadastral survey of
lands in Juban, the property of his father, which actually consisted of 1,405 square
meters was made to form part of Lot No. 3353, the property of Iluminado Baloloy.
According to the respondent, even if the residential land was made to form part of
Lot No. 3353 registered under the name of Iluminado Baloloy, he had acquired
ownership of the property by acquisitive prescription, as he and his predecessors
had been in continuous, uninterrupted and open possession of the property in the
concept of owners for more than 60 years.

The respondent prayed for alternative reliefs that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered in his favor, thus:

a) Declaring the plaintiff as the absolute owner of the land in question;

b) Ordering the defendants to perpetually refrain from disturbing plaintiff in his


peaceful possession in the land in question;

c) Ordering the defendants to remove their houses in the land in question, and to
declare OCT No. P-16540, and whatever paper, form, document or proceeding
the defendants may have, as null and void and without any effect whatsoever
as far as the land in question is concerned as they cast cloud upon the title of
the plaintiff;

d) In the alternative, defendants be ordered to reconvey the title in favor of the


plaintiff as far as the land in question is concerned;
e) Ordering the defendants to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as attorneys fee plus P500.00 for
every appearance or hearing of his lawyer in court; P1,500.00 as consultation
fee; P5,000.00 as incidental litigation expenses; P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and to pay the costs.

Plaintiff further prays for such other relief [as are] just and equitable in the
premises.[3]

The Evidence of the Respondent


The respondent adduced evidence that the Spouses Lino and Victoriana
Estopin were the original owners of a parcel of land located in Barangay Biriran,
Juban, Sorsogon, designated as Lot No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. A major
portion of the property, where a house of strong materials was constructed, was
agricultural, while the rest was residential. The respondent also averred that the
Spouses Estopin declared the property in their names under Tax Declaration No.
4790. On the north of the agricultural portion of the property was the road leading
to Biriran, while north of the residential portion was a creek (canal) and the
property of Iluminado.

When Lino Estopin died intestate, his widow, Victoriana Lagata, executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale[4] on November 11, 1961 over the agricultural portion of Lot
No. 3347, which had an area of 15,906 square meters, more or less, in favor of
Astrologo Hular, married to Lorenza Hular. Shortly thereafter, on November 25,
1961, Lagata executed a Deed of Absolute Sale [5] over the residential portion of the
property with an area of 287 square meters, including the house constructed
thereon, in favor of Hular. Hular and his family, including his son, the respondent,
then resided in the property. In 1961 or thereabouts, Iluminado asked Hulars
permission to construct a house on a portion of Lot No. 3347 near the road, and the
latter agreed. In l977, Lorenza Hular, wife of Astrologo, declared the residential
land in the latters name under Tax Declaration No. 6841.[6]
Earlier, or on August 14, 1945, Irene Griarte had executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
over a coconut land located in Barangay Biriran, Juban, with an area of 6,666
square meters in favor of Martiniano Balbedina, with the following boundaries:
North, Alejandro Gruta; South, Lino Estopin; East, River Page; West, Pedro Grepal
and Esteban Grepal.[7] Subsequently, after a cadastral survey was conducted on
lands in Juban, the property of Balbedina was designated as Lot No. 3353, with the
following boundaries: North: Lot No. 3353 (portion), Alejandro Gruta; South: Lino
Estopin; West: Lot No. 3349; East: creek. A trail was then established between Lot
No. 3353 and Lot No. 3347 resulting in the decrease of Lot No. 3353 owned by
Balbedina to 4,651 square meters. He declared the property under his name under
Tax Declaration No. 191 with the following boundaries: North: Lot No. 3353
(portion) Alejandro Gruta; South: trail; East: creek; West: Lot No. 3349.[8]

On June 4, 1951, Balbedina executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No.
3353 with an area of only 4,651 square meters in favor of Iluminado. [9] The latter
declared the property in his name under Tax Declaration No. 5359. [10] Iluminado
filed an application with the Bureau of Lands for a free patent over the entirety of
Lot No. 3353 on January 5, 1960.[11] He indicated in his application that the
property was not occupied by any person and was disposable or alienable public
land. In support thereof, he executed an affidavit wherein he declared that he
purchased about one-half portion of the property in 1951 based on a deed of
absolute sale attached to said affidavit; that in 1957, he purchased the other one-
half portion, but for economic reasons, no deed of sale was executed by the parties.
He also alleged that the improvements on the land consisted of coconut trees.
[12]
The Bureau of Lands processed the application in due course.

In the meantime, Iluminado constructed his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353
near the trail (road) leading to Biriran.He and his family, including his children,
forthwith resided in said house.

On March 1, 1968, the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources


approved Iluminados application and issued Free Patent No. 384019 covering Lot
No. 3353 with an area of 9,302 square meters, on the basis of which OCT No. P-
16540 was thereafter issued by the Register of Deeds on March 1, 1968.[13]

On August 2, 1975, Alejandro Gruta had executed a deed of absolute sale


over a portion of Lot No. 3353 with an area of 4,651 square meters in favor of
Estelito Hije, the husband of petitioner Adelina Baloloy, one of Iluminados
children.[14]

Before he left for employment in Saudi Arabia in 1979, respondent Hular had his
house constructed near the trail (road) on Lot No. 3347, which, however, occupied
a big portion of Lot No. 3353.[15]

Iluminado died intestate on November 29, 1985. His widow and their children
continued residing in the property, while petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy, one of
Iluminados children, later constructed his house near that of his deceased
father. When Astrologo died intestate on December 25, 1989, he was survived by
his children, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Elena, Leo, Teresita, and the respondent,
among others,[16] who continued to reside in their house.[17]
Sometime in l991, the respondents house helper was cleaning the backyard,
but was prevented from doing so by petitioner Adelina Baloloy who claimed that
their father Iluminado owned the land where the respondents house was located. To
determine the veracity of the claim, the respondent had Lot No. 3353 surveyed by
Geodetic Engineer Rodolfo Cunanan on February 16, 1993, in the presence of
Balbedina, Antonio Baloloy and petitioner Reynaldo Baloloy. Cunanan prepared a
Special Sketch Plan of Lot No. 3353[18] showing that the house of Iluminado was
constructed on Lot No. 3353[19] near the road behind the houses owned by
Astrologo and Alfredo.[20] The engineer discovered that the residential area deeded
by Lagata to Hular had an area of 1,405 square meters, instead of 287 square
meters only.[21]

In their Answer to the complaint, the heirs of Iluminado Baloloy averred that
Iluminados house was built in 1962 on a portion of Lot No. 3353, which the latter
purchased from Balbedina, and not on a portion of Lot No. 3347 which Hular
purchased from Lagata. They alleged that Hular constructed his house on a portion
of Lot No. 3353 after securing the permission of their father Iluminado, and that
the respondent had no cause of action for the nullification of Free Patent No.
384019 and OCT No. P-16540 because only the State, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, may file a direct action to annul the said patent and title; and
even if the respondent was the real party in interest to file the action, such actions
had long since prescribed. The heirs of Baloloy prayed that judgment be rendered
in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to DISMISS
this case pursuant to paragraph 15, et seq., hereof, and/or DECIDE it in favor of
the defendants by UPHOLDING the sanctity of OCT No. P-16540 and ordering
plaintiff to:

1. RESPECT defendants proprietary rights and interests on the property in


question covered by OCT No. P-16540;
2. VACATE it at his sole and exclusive expense, and never to set foot on it ever
again;
3. PAY defendants:
a) MORAL DAMAGES at P50,000.00 EACH;
b) ACTUAL DAMAGES and UNREALIZED PROFITS
at P1,000.00/MONTH COMPUTED UP TO THE TIME OF
PAYMENT PLUS LEGAL RATE OF INTEREST;
c) EXEMPLARY DAMAGES of P50,000.00
d) ATTYS FEES and LITIGATION EXPENSES of P100,000.00;
and
e) THE COSTS OF THIS SUIT.

DEFENDANTS pray for all other reliefs and remedies consistent with law
and equity.[22]

The Evidence for the Petitioners

Sometime in 1982, Hular asked permission from Iluminado to construct his


house on Lot No. 3353 near the road leading to Biriran. Iluminado agreed, in the
presence of his daughter, petitioner Adelina Baloloy. As per the plan of Lot No.
3353 certified by a Director of the Bureau of Lands on November 6, 1961, Lot No.
3353 had an area of 9,302 square meters.[23]
As gleaned from the Sketch Plan of Lot Nos. 3347 and 3353 prepared on
February 7, 1991 by Geodetic Engineer Salvador Balilo, the houses of the Baloloy
siblings and those of Astrologo and Alfredo were located in Lot No. 3353. [24] In the
said sketch plan, Lot No. 3353 had an area of 9,302 square meters, while Lot No.
3347 had an area of 15,905 square meters. When apprised of Hulars claim over the
property, the petitioners and their co-heirs filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
with the Municipal Trial Court of Juban, docketed as Civil Case No. 331. The case
was, however, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

On December 4, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the


respondent. The fallo of the decision reads:

a/ Declaring plaintiff the absolute owner of the land in question, consisting of


1,405 square meters, more or less, and entitled to the peaceful possession
thereof;

b/ Ordering the defendants to reconvey the title to the plaintiff as far as the land in
question is concerned within fifteen (15) days counted from the finality of
the decision, failing in which, the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to
execute the necessary document of reconveyance of the title in favor of the
plaintiff after an approved survey plan is made;

c/ Ordering defendants to remove their houses from the land in question at their
own expense within fifteen (15) days after the decision has become final;

d/ Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally plaintiff the amount
of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees. P5,000.00 as incidental litigation expenses;

e/ To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[25]

The trial court ruled that the property subject of the complaint, with an area of
1,405 square meters, was part of Lot No. 3347 which the Spouses Estopin owned,
and which they later sold to Astrologo Hular. The trial court
also held that Iluminado committed fraud in securing the free patent and the title
for the property in question, and that when Victoriana Lagata executed the deed of
absolute sale on the residential portion of Lot No. 3347, she did not know that it
formed part of Lot No. 3353. It further held that the action of the plaintiff to nullify
the title and patent was imprescriptible.

The petitioners filed on December 8, 1995 a motion to reopen the case to admit
Tax Declaration Nos. 6957 and 4790 covering Lot No. 3347, under the names of
Astrologo Hular and Victoriana Lagata, respectively, in which it was declared that
Lot No. 3347 was coconut land. The trial court ruled that the motion had been
mooted by its decision.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming the decision of the
trial court, and thereafter denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The Present Petition

The petitioners, who are still residing on the subject property, filed their
petition for review on certiorari for the reversal of the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals.

The issues for resolution are:

(1) whether all the indispensable parties had been impleaded by the
respondent in the trial court;
(2) whether the said respondent had a cause of action against the petitioners
for the nullification of Free Patent No. 384019 and OCT No. P-16540; for
reconveyance and for possession of the subject property; and for damages; and
(3) whether the respondent had acquired ownership over the property
through acquisitive prescription.

The first issue, while not raised by the parties in the trial court and in the Court of
Appeals, is so interwoven with the other issues raised therein and is even decisive
of the outcome of this case; hence, such issue must be delved into and resolved by
this Court.[26]
We note that the action of the respondent in the trial court is for:
(a) reinvidicatoria, to declare the respondent the absolute owner of the subject
property and its reconveyance to him as a consequence of the nullification of Free
Patent No. 384019 and OCT No. P-16540; (b) publiciana, to order the petitioners
and the other heirs of Iluminado Baloloy to vacate the property and deliver
possession thereof to him; and (c) damages and attorneys fees.

It is the contention of the respondent that the subject property was sold by
Lagata to his father, Astrologo Hular, in 1961. He adduced evidence that when his
parents died intestate, they were survived by their children, the respondent and his
siblings Elena, Jose, Romeo, Anacleto, Leo, and Teresita. Article 1078 of the Civil
Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of the debts of the deceased. Until a division is made, the respective share
of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-
participants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to the use
and enjoyment of the same.

Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring
an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action.A co-owner
may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners
as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
[27]
Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if
such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded
co-owners.If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the
sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless
he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole
ownership over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner
thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the
subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were
aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the
respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the
prejudice of the latters siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is
erroneous.

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated
to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent
failed to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of
the Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent
sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free
Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision
of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an
indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to
the filing of the complaint including the judgment.[28] The absence of the
respondents siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing
thereof, including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[29]

Even if we glossed over the procedural lapses of the respondent, we rule that
he failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint against the petitioners;
and that he is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.

The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by the


requisite quantum of evidence. If he claims a right granted as created by law or
under a contract of sale, he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness or absence of the
evidence of that of his opponent.[30] He who claims a better right to real estate
property must prove not only his ownership of the same but also the identity
thereof.[31] In Huy v. Huy,[32] we held that where a property subject of controversy is
duly registered under the Torrens system, the presumptive conclusiveness of such
title should be given weight and in the absence of strong and compelling evidence
to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the
property until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. A
Torrens Certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the
person in whose name appears therein.[33] Such holder is entitled to the possession
of the property until his title is nullified.

The petitioners aver that Lot No. 3347 owned by the Spouses Estopin was
coconut, and not residential, land.The petitioners contend that, under the deed of
absolute sale, Victoriana Lagata executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of
Astrologo Hular, she sold the residential portion of Lot No. 3347; however, the
latter constructed his house on a portion of Lot No. 3353 which Iluminado had
purchased from Balbedina, now covered by OCT No. P-16540.The petitioners
assert that along with their mother Anacorita and their brother Antonio Baloloy,
they constructed their houses on a part of Lot No. 3353, titled in the name of their
father Iluminado; hence, they could not be dispossessed of the said property. The
petitioners posit that, whether the house of Hular was constructed on a portion of
Lot No. 3353 of the property of Balbedina or Gruta is irrelevant because both
properties are now covered
by OCT No. P-16540 under the name of Iluminado, their predecessor-in-interest.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Victoriana Lagata owned the subject
property, which turned out to be 1,405 square meters, and sold the same to
Hular. In contrast, the RTC declared in its decision that while under the deed of
absolute sale executed by Irene Griarte in favor of Balbedina, Lot No. 3353 had an
area of 6,666 square meters, Griarte actually owned only 4,651 square meters; a
portion of the lot was actually owned by Lino Estopin. Hence, Balbedina sold only
4,651 square meters to Iluminado[34] because he was aware that he owned only
4,651 square meters of the land. It also held that, unknown to Lagata, a portion of
Lot No. 3347 was declared as part of Lot No. 3353 when the lands in Juban were
surveyed. The trial court concluded that Lagata erroneously declared, under the
deed of absolute sale executed on November 25, 1961 in favor of Hular, that the
property was part of Lot No. 3347.
The trial and appellate courts erred in their decisions.

The evidence on record shows that Irene Griarte owned a parcel of land with
an area of 6,666 square meters, more or less.[35] When she sold the property to
Martiniano Balbedina on August 14, 1945, it was bounded on the south by the
property of Lino Estopin. There was no trail yet between the property of Griarte on
the south and of Lino Estopin on the north. In the
meantime, however, a road (trail) leading to Biriran was established between the
property of Balbedina on the south and that of Lino Estopin on the
north. Thereafter, a cadastral survey of the lands in Juban was conducted by the
Bureau of Lands. The property of Balbedina was designated as a portion of Lot
No. 3353, while that of Estopin was designated as Lot No. 3347. The other portion
of Lot No. 3353, with an area of 4,561 square meters, belonged to Alejandro
Gruta. Because of the construction of the road, the property of Balbedina, which
was a part of Lot No. 3353, was reduced to 4,651 square meters. Balbedina
declared, under Tax Declaration No. 391, that Lot No. 3353 had an area of 4,651
square meters and was coconut land[36] and that his property was bounded on the
south by a trail (road). Lino Estopin declared Lot No. 3347 under his name for
taxation purposes, in which he stated that his property was bounded on the north by
the trail going to Biriran.[37] Clearly, then, Lot No. 3353 and Lot No. 3347 had a
common boundary the trail (road) going to Biriran.

Balbedina sold his property, which was a portion of Lot No. 3353, with an
area of 4,651 square meters to Iluminado Baloloy on June 4, 1951. [38] Under the
deed of absolute sale, the property was bounded on the south by the trail (road)
owned by Lino Estopin.[39] The English translation of the deed of sale attached as
page 85 to the RTC Records, which both the trial court and the appellate court
relied upon, is incorrect.
The original deed of absolute sale, which is in Spanish, states that the
boundary of the property on the south is con camino, Lino Estopin, while the
English version of the deed, indicates that the property is bounded on the south by
Lino Estopin. Being an earlier document, the deed in Spanish signed by the parties
therefore should prevail.Conformably to such deed, Iluminado Baloloy declared in
Tax Declaration No. 5359 under his name that the property is bounded on the south
by a trail,[40] and not by Lot No. 3347 owned by Lino Estopin.

The respondent failed to adduce any documentary evidence to prove how the
Spouses Estopin acquired the disputed property. The respondents reliance on the
testimonies of Melissa Estopin, the daughter of the Spouses Estopin, and on
Porfirio Guamos as well as the May 8, 1993 Affidavit of Martiniano Balbedina,
and the deed of sale executed by Victoriana Lagata on November 27, 1961 in favor
of Astrologo Hular to corroborate his claim over the lot in question, is misplaced.

First. Per the testimony of Porfirio Guamos, the witness of the respondent,
Lino Estopin purchased the disputed property in 1941 from Irene Griarte and
insisted that there was a deed of sale evidencing the sale:

Atty. Dealca:
Q The area of the land in question is 1,405 sq. m., you claim that way back in
1944 the owner of the land was Lino Estopin; 41 to 44?
A 1941.

Q And you said that Lino Estopin was able to acquire the land by purchase?
A That was very long time when Lino Estopin sold the property.

Q My question is whether you know because you testified earlier that Lino
Estopin was able to acquire the land by purchase; do you confirm that?
A Yes, Sir.

Q From whom?
A From Irene Griarte.

Q Were you present when that sale was consummated?


A I was not there.

Q So you do not know how much was it bought by Lino Estopin from Irene
Griarte?
A No, Sir.

Q You do not know whether a document to that effect was actually drafted and
executed?
A There was.

Q Have you seen the document?


A I did not see but there was a document.
Q You maintain there was a document but you did not see a document, is that it?
A In my belief there was a document.

Q In your belief, how did you organize that belief when you did not see a
document?
A I insist there was a document.

Q That is why, why are you insisting when you did not see a document?
A Well, during the sale that document was used.

Q How was it used when you did not see that document?
A When the deed of sale was executed I did not see the document, but I insist
there was a document.

Q Thats why, how were you able to say before the court that there was a
document when you contend that you did not see any?
A There was basis in the sale the sale was based on a document. You cannot sell a
property without document? (sic)

Q Is that your belief?


A Yes, Sir.

Q But you did not see any document?

Atty. Diesta:

Already answered.

Witness:

A I did not see.

Atty. Dealca:

Q You said that that document was used when the property was sold by Lino
Estopin to Alfredo Hular. . .
A In 1961. Yes.[41]
However, the respondent failed to adduce in evidence the said deed or even
an authentic copy thereof. The respondent did not offer any justification for his
failure to adduce the same in evidence. As against the respondents verbal claim
that his father acquired the property from Lagata, the Torrens title of Iluminado
Baloloy must prevail.[42]
Second. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence any tax
declarations over the disputed property under the name of Irene Griarte and/or
Lino Estopin, or realty tax payment receipts in their names from 1941 to
November 1961. The documents are circumstantial evidence to prove that Irene
Griarte claimed ownership over the disputed property and that Lino Estopin
acquired the same from her. After all, such tax declarations and tax receipts can be
strong evidence of ownership of land when accompanied by possession for a
period sufficient for acquisitive prescription.[43]

Third. The respondent even failed to adduce in evidence Tax Declaration No. 4790
covering the two parcels of land under the name of Lino Estopin to prove his claim
that Lot No. 3347 consisted of agricultural and residential lands.We note that the
petitioners appended a certified true copy of Tax Declaration No. 4790 under the
name of Victoriana Lagata over Lot No. 3347 to their Motion to Reopen the Case.
In the said declaration, Lot No. 3347 was described as coconut land; this is
contrary to the respondents claim that the said lot was then residential, and that the
boundary of the property on the north was the road to Biriran which, in turn, is
consistent with the petitioners claim.[44]Unfortunately, the trial court denied the said
motion on the ground that it was mooted by its decision.

Fourth. During the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the lot of Gruta and that of
Balbedina, inclusive of the subject property, were designated as Lot No. 3353 with
a total area of 9,302 square meters under their names, while that of Lino Estopin
was designated as Lot No. 3347 with an area of 15,906 square meters. Iluminado
Baloloy applied for a free patent over Lot No. 3353, including the disputed
property, under his name. The respondent failed to adduce any evidence that the
Spouses Estopin and/or Astrologo Hular opposed Balbedina and/or Iluminados
claim of ownership of Lot No. 3353 during the survey and after the filing of the
application. A propos is our ruling in Urquiaga v. Court of Appeals: [45]

As succinctly observed by respondent Court of Appeals in assessing the


totality of the evidence

We do not agree with defendants that they are also the occupants and possessors
of the subject lot just because it is adjacent to their titled property. Precisely, the
boundaries of defendants titled property were determined, delineated and
surveyed during the cadastral survey of Dipolog and thereafter indicated in their
certificate of title in order that the extent of their property will be known and
fixed. Since the subject lot was already found to be outside their titled property,
defendants have no basis in claiming it or other adjacent lots for that
matter. Otherwise, the very purpose of the cadastral survey as a process of
determining the exact boundaries of adjoining properties will be defeated.

Defendants own title, O.C.T. No. 0-357 (in the names of Jose Aguirre and Cristina
Gonzales), in fact belies their claim of occupation and possession over the
adjacent subject lot. Examining said title, we note that: (1) the cadastral survey of
Dipolog was conducted from January, 1923 to November 1925; (2) defendants
titled property was one of those lots surveyed and this was designated as Lot No.
2623; (3) during the survey, it was already determined and known that Lot No.
2623 is bounded on the northeast, southeast, southwest and west by Lot No. 4443
(as we have seen in our narration of facts, the subject lot is a subdivision lot of
Lot No. 6552 which was originally identified as Lot No. 4443-B-1, Dipolog
Cadastre 85 Ext.: hence, the subject lot is a portion of Lot No. 4443); and (4)
O.C.T. No. 0-357 was issued on October 11, 1965 on the strength of the judgment
rendered on July 31 (sic), 1941 by the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Norte in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral Record No. 756.

From the foregoing facts, we find that as early as January, 1923 when the
cadastral survey was started, the boundaries of Lot Nos. 2623 and 4443 were
already determined and delineated. Since the subject lot was surveyed to be part
of Lot No. 4443, it means that during that time defendants predecessors-in-
interest never claimed ownership or possession over the subject lot. Otherwise,
they would have complained so that the subject lot could be excluded from Lot
No. 4443 and included in Lot No. 2623, they being adjacent lots. It is obvious
then that defendants predecessors only claimed Lot No. 2623 and they pursued
their claim in Cadastral Case No. 6, LRC Cadastral Record No. 756 until O.C.T.
No. 0-357 was issued to them. The contention of defendants that they and their
predecessors-in-interest occupied and possessed the subject lot since time
immemorial therefore is not true.[46]
Fifth. Under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, Lagata sold
to Astrologo Hular Lot No. 3347, and not Lot No. 3353. In Veterans Federation of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[47] we ruled that:

Petitioner VFP maintains that the deed of sale was valid and enforceable
and that it was perfected at the very moment that the parties agreed upon the thing
which was the object of the sale and upon the price. The parties herein had agreed
on the parcel of land that petitioner would purchase from respondent PNR, and
the same was described therein; thus, petitioner VFP cannot conveniently set aside
the technical description in this agreement and insist that it is the legal owner of
the property erroneously described in the certificate of title. Petitioner can only
claim right of ownership over the parcel of land that was the object of the deed of
sale and nothing else.[48]

Sixth. Under the said deed of sale dated November 11, 1961, Victoriana
Lagata sold Lot No. 3347 which had an area of 15,906 square meters and covered
by Tax Declaration No. 4790. The deed does not state that what was sold was only
a portion of Lot No. 3347, excluding therefrom the disputed property. This is
understandable, since the subject property is a portion of Lot No. 3353 owned by
Alejandro Gruta and Iluminado Baloloy, and not of Lino Estopin and/or Victoriana
Lagata. Lagata could not have sold a portion of Lot No. 3353 which she does not
own. As the Latin adage goes: NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET.
Seventh. The Balbedinas Affidavit dated May 8, 1993 offered by the
respondent to prove the contents thereof is inadmissible in evidence against the
petitioners. Balbedina did not testify; as such, the petitioners were deprived of their
right to cross-examine him. The said affidavit is thus hearsay and barren of
probative weight. The affidavit varies the contents of the deed of absolute sale
which he (Balbedina) executed in favor of Iluminado more than forty years
earlier. In the said affidavit, it was made to appear that Balbedina sold to Iluminado
on June 4, 1951 only a portion of Lot 3353 with an area of 3,333 square meters,
when under the said deed of absolute sale, the property that was sold consisted of
4,651 square meters. The affidavit is proscribed by Section 9, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.
...

It bears stressing that the deed of absolute sale executed by Balbedina in


favor of Baloloy was notarized by the Justice of the Peace who was an Ex-Officio
Notary Public; hence, entitled to full probative weight.

Eighth. The Special Sketch Plan of Lot No. 3353 prepared by Geodetic Engineer
Rodolfo P. Cunanan[49] cannot prevail over OCT No. P-16540. In fact, the plan
even buttressed the case for the petitioners because it shows that the subject
property is a portion of Lot No. 3353, and not of Lot No. 3347, covered by OCT
No. P-16540 under the name of Iluminado Baloloy, the deceased father of the
petitioners.

Ninth. The conclusion of the RTC that Lagata in fact sold a portion of Lot No.
3347 under the deed of absolute sale dated November 25, 1961, unaware that the
property was a part of Lot No. 3353, is based on mere speculations and surmises.

Iluminado Baloloy included in his application for a free patent the property of
Alejandro Gruta, and was able to secure a free patent over said property in addition
to his own. As such, Gruta, not the respondent, is the proper party to assail such
free patent, as well as OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based thereon.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The


decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the respondent
is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.


Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman

(On official leave)


MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

AT T E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.


Chief Justice

* On official leave.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Mario L.
Guaria III, concurring.
[2]
Penned by Judge Simon D. Encinas.
[3]
Records, p. 63.
[4]
Id. at 86.
[5]
Id. at 84.
[6]
Exhibit I, Records, p. 78.
[7]
Exhibit E.
[8]
Exhibit 13-A.
[9]
Exhibit D.
[10]
Exhibit 9, Records, p. 141.
[11]
Exhibits H and J.
[12]
Exhibit F, Records, p. 78.
[13]
Exhibit H, Id. at 477.
[14]
Exhibit G.
[15]
TSN, 19 May 1995, pp. 34-35.
[16]
TSN, 26 August 1993, p. 31.
[17]
TSN, 21 October 1994, p. 4.
[18]
Exhibit A.
[19]
Exhibit A-1.
[20]
Exhibit A-3.
[21]
Exhibit A.
[22]
Records, pp. 14-15.
[23]
Exhibit 3.
[24]
Exhibit 21.
[25]
Records, pp. 183-185.
[26]
Villegas v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 69 (2001).
[27]
TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VOLUME II, 1989 ED., p. 157.
[28]
Salvador v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 239 (1995).
[29]
Belo and Trust Company v. Alejo, 364 SCRA 812 (2001).
[30]
Heirs of Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 362 SCRA 31 (2001).
[31]
Ray v. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 36 (1999).
[32]
365 SCRA 490 (2001).
[33]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 366 (1999).
[34]
Exhibit D.
[35]
Exhibit E.
[36]
Exhibit 13-D.
[37]
Exhibit B.
[38]
Exhibit D.
[39]
Ibid.
[40]
Exhibit 9.
[41]
TSN, 26 August 1993, pp. 22-24.
[42]
Urquiaga v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 738 (1999).
[43]
Serna v. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 527 (1999).
[44]
Records, p. 201.
[45]
301 SCRA 738 (1999).
[46]
Id. at 742-743.
[47]
345 SCRA 348 (2000).
[48]
Id. at 357.
[49]
Exhibit A.

FIRST DIVISION

ARNELITO ADLAWAN, G.R. No. 161916

Petitioner,

Present:

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairman),

- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and
NARCISA M. ADLAWAN, Promulgated:
Respondents.
January 20, 2006

x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review is the September 23, 2003


Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which
set aside the September 13, 2002 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806,
and reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment [3] of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392,
dismissing petitioner Arnelito Adlawans unlawful detainer suit
against respondents Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan. Likewise
questioned is the January 8, 2004 Resolution [4] of the Court of
Appeals which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties dispute over
Lot 7226 and the house built thereon, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 8842,[5] registered in the name of the late
Dominador Adlawan and located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of
Minglanilla, Cebu. In his complaint, petitioner claimed that he is
an acknowledged illegitimate child[6] of Dominador who died on
May 28, 1987 without any other issue. Claiming to be the sole heir
of Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot
7226 and the house built thereon. [7] Out of respect and generosity
to respondents who are the siblings of his father, he granted their
plea to occupy the subject property provided they would vacate
the same should his need for the property arise. Sometime in
January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to vacate the
house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for
quieting of title[8]with the RTC. Finally, upon respondents refusal to
heed the last demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000,
petitioner filed the instant case on August 9, 2000. [9]

On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, 70


and 59 years of age, respectively, [10] denied that they begged
petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned property and
stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house
standing thereon since birth. They alleged that Lot 7226 was
originally registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon
Adlawan[11] and the ancestral house standing thereon was owned
by Ramon and their mother, Oligia Maacap Adlawan. The spouses
had nine[12] children including the late Dominador and herein
surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa. During the lifetime
of their parents and deceased siblings, all of them lived on the
said property. Dominador and his wife, Graciana Ramas Adlawan,
who died without issue, also occupied the same. [13] Petitioner, on
the other hand, is a stranger who never had possession of Lot
7226.

Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia needed


money to finance the renovation of their house. Since they were
not qualified to obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of Lot
7226 in the name of their son Dominador who was the only one in
the family who had a college education. By virtue of a January 31,
1962 simulated deed of sale, [14] a title was issued to Dominador
which enabled him to secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral.
Notwithstanding the execution of the simulated deed, Dominador,
then single, never disputed his parents ownership of the lot. He
and his wife, Graciana, did not disturb respondents possession of
the property until they died on May 28, 1987 and May 6, 1997,
respectively.

Respondents also contended that Dominadors signature at the


back of petitioners birth certificate was forged, hence, the latter is
not an heir of Dominador and has no right to claim ownership of
Lot 7226.[15] They argued that even if petitioner is indeed
Dominadors acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is
doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana.
[16]

On February 12, 2002, the MTC dismissed the complaint holding


that the establishment of petitioners filiation and the settlement
of the estate of Dominador are conditions precedent to the
accrual of petitioners action for ejectment. It added that since
Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, who died 10 years
thereafter, her legal heirs are also entitled to their share in Lot
7226. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:

In View of the foregoing, for failure to prove by preponderance of


evidence, the plaintiffs cause of action, the above-entitled case is
hereby Ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[17]

On appeal by petitioner, the RTC reversed the decision of the


MTC holding that the title of Dominador over Lot 7226 cannot be
collaterally attacked. It thus ordered respondents to turn over
possession of the controverted lot to petitioner and to pay
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. The
decretal portion thereof, provides:

Wherefore, the Judgment, dated February 12, 2002, of the


Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, is
reversed. Defendants-appellees are directed to restore to plaintiff-
appellant possession of Lot 7226 and the house thereon, and to pay
plaintiff-appellant, beginning in August 2000, compensation for their
use and occupation of the property in the amount of P500.00 a month.

So ordered.[18]

Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioners motion for execution


pending appeal[19] which was opposed by the alleged nephew and
nieces of Graciana in their motion for leave to intervene and to
file an answer in intervention.[20]They contended that as heirs of
Graciana, they have a share in Lot 7226 and that intervention is
necessary to protect their right over the property. In addition, they
declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing
respondents to stay in Lot 7226 until a formal partition of the
property is made.

The RTC denied the motion for leave to intervene. [21] It,
however, recalled the order granting the execution pending
appeal having lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the petition
filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals. [22]

On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the


decision of the RTC and reinstated the judgment of the MTC. It
ratiocinated that petitioner and the heirs of Graciana are co-
owners of Lot 7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject respondents
from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own
name and as the sole owner of the property. Thus
WHEEFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated
September 13, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7,
in Civil Case No. CEB-27806 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Judgment dated February 12, 2002 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392 is REINSTATED. Costs
against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence,


the instant petition.

The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner


can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment.

Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate


son and the sole heir of Dominador. He in fact executed an
affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted property. In
ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned January
31, 1962 deed of sale validly transferred title to Dominador and
that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited
ownership of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that
the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked
by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner
of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only
by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10
years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987. [24] By
intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners
of Lot 7226.[25] The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not
make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the
share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and
not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The Court
of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no authority to
institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226.

Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-


owners over Lot 7226, he can on his own file the instant case
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in


ejectment.

This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of


possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful
detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion
publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).
[26]
A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be
stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the
possession of the litigated property, the action should be
dismissed.[27]

The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino,


explained

A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining


all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to
be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of
the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself
and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.
(Emphasis added)[28]
In Baloloy v. Hular,[29] respondent filed a complaint for
quieting of title claiming exclusive ownership of the property, but
the evidence showed that respondent has co-owners over the
property. In dismissing the complaint for want of respondents
authority to file the case, the Court held that
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of
actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion
publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an
action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of
all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the
others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the
rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of
the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the
possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the
other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming


sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he be
declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-
owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed
the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of the case
in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the
respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its
possession, to the prejudice of the latters siblings. Patently then, the
decision of the trial court is erroneous.

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent


was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property,
as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the rule. It must,
likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also an
indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought the
nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent
No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any
decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that
the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all
the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the
judgment. The absence of the respondents siblings, as parties,
rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the
judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to those present. [30]
In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought
the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own
benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even
executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the disputed
property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly
maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize
the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of
succession to the property of his father, Dominador.

In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioners claim that


he has the legal personality to file the present unlawful detainer
suit because the ejectment of respondents would benefit not only
him but also his alleged co-owners. However, petitioner forgets
that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property
and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession
of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages
to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot
successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners.
Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said
heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as fictitious heirs, the
State will inherit her share [31] and will thus be petitioners co-owner
entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.

The present controversy should be differentiated from the


cases where the Court upheld the right of a co-owner to file a suit
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. In Resuena v. Court of
Appeals,[32] and Sering v. Plazo,[33]the co-owners who filed the
ejectment case did not represent themselves as the exclusive
owner of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa
Santiago,[34] the complaint for quieting of title was brought in
behalf of the co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in
common.[35] Similarly in Vencilao v. Camarenta,[36] the amended
complaint specified that the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-
owns the controverted properties.

In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the


existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or
exclusive owner of the litigated lot. A favorable decision therein
would of course inure to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to
his co-owners as well. The instant case, however, presents an
entirely different backdrop as petitioner vigorously asserted
absolute and sole ownership of the questioned lot. In his
complaint, petitioner made the following allegations, to wit:

3. The plaintiff was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir of
the late DOMINADOR ADLAWAN who died intestate on 28 May 1987
without any other descendant nor ascendant x x x.

xxxx

5. Being the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole heir of


the deceased Dominador Adlawan, the plaintiff became the
absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION, of the
aforementioned house and lot x x x. (Emphasis added) [37]

Clearly, the said cases find no application here because


petitioners action operates as a complete repudiation of the
existence of co-ownership and not in representation or
recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper.
As noted by Former Supreme Court Associate Justice Edgrado L.
Paras [i]t is understood, of course, that the action [under Article
487 of the Civil Code] is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-
owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for
himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper. [38]
Indeed, respondents not less than four decade actual
physical possession of the questioned ancestral house and lot
deserves to be respected especially so that petitioner failed to
show that he has the requisite personality and authority as co-
owner to file the instant case. Justice dictates that respondents
who are now in the twilight years of their life be granted
possession of their ancestral property where their parents and
siblings lived during their lifetime, and where they, will probably
spend the remaining days of their life.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 23,


2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921
which reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment of the Municipal
Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, dismissing petitioners
complaint in Civil Case No. 392, and its January 8, 2004
Resolution, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby


certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 31- 43. Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices
Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Arturo D. Brion.

[2]
Id. at 61-65. Penned by Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr.

[3]
Id. at 59-60. Penned by Judge Gerardo E. Gestopa, Jr.

[4]
Id. at 57-58.

[5]
Id. at 71.

[6]
Born on April 10, 1967; Rollo, p. 72.

[7]
RTC records, p. 103.

[8]
Docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-23205 before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 5; Rollo, pp. 73-81.

[9]
RTC records, p. 1.

[10]
CA rollo, p. 14.

[11]
Originally covered by OCT No. 3496 (See Deed of Sale of One Parcel of Land, Rollo, p. 70 and TCT No. 8842,
at Rollo, p. 71, which cancelled OCT No. 3496).

[12]
Except for respondents, the other siblings are already deceased.

[13]
RTC records, pp. 20 & 80-81.

[14]
Rollo, p. 70.

[15]
RTC records, p. 81.

[16]
Id.

[17]
Rollo, p. 60.

[18]
Id. at 65.

[19]
Id. at 92.

[20]
Id. at 84-89.

[21]
Id. at 92.
[22]
RTC records, p. 314.

[23]
Rollo, p. 43.

[24]
Article 998 of the Civil Code, provides:

ART. 998. If a widow or widower survives with illegitimate children, such widow or widower shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, to the other half.

[25]
Article 1078 of the Civil Code, states:

ART. 1078. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition,
owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased.

[26]
De Guia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120864, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA 114, 125.

[27]
Baloloy v. Hular, G.R. No 157767, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 80, 90-91.

[28]
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Edition, p. 157.

[29]
Supra.

[30]
Id. at 90-92.

[31]
Article 1011 of the Civil Code reads:

Art. 1011. In default of persons entitled to succeed in accordance with the provisions of the preceding
Sections, the State shall inherit the whole estate.

[32]
G.R. No. 128338, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 42.

[33]
G.R. No. L-49731, September 29, 1988, 166 SCRA 84.

[34]
G.R. No. 161817, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 690.

[35]
Id. at 694.

[36]
140 Phil. 99, 101-102.

[37]
RTC records, pp. 1 & 2.

[38]
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. II, 1999 Edition, p. 294.

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