1.

Some voting Rules for Determining Social Preference

We have seen how difficult it is to define a relation better than between sport
teams that agrees with all the comparative judgments we might make about them.
Viewed logically, this problem is not essentially different from trying to define
which of two candidates in an election on is better than the other in society eyes, i.e.
in the collective judgment of the electorate. We saw that a familiar way of
determining the national ranking od the top ten teams in college sports was
originally designed by Bordo as a mean of identifying the true will of voters in
political elections, i.e. which candidate they truly preferred the most, second most,
and so on. But there is no end to the ways we might try to define this relation of
social preference between any two candidates x and y, which we abbreviate by xPy.
In fact, Bordo, proposed his B-rule for defining xPy as an improvement on the older
most first place votes rule for defining this relation, and long after Condorcet
proposed another improvement which we call the C-rule. Here then, in the order
that were proposed are these three rules for defining xPy in terms of the individual
preferences xPy; which are themselves assumed to be asymmetric and transitive
(i.e. we assume both xPiy -> -yPix and (Pxiy & yPiz) -> xPiz), which allows us to
define an election as a finite set of individual preference rankings.
M: xPy <-> x has more first place votes than y (or if the same, then more second
place votes, or.)
B: xPy <-> B(x) > B(y), where B(x) and B(y) are the respective total pointss of x and
y by the rank order rule.
C: xPy <-> x ranks above y in more individual preference rankings that not (i.e. a
majority of voters prefer x to y.
2. Some elections and questions. Election E, is worthy of further reflection. Though
many of us thought that the social rankings of the B and C rules were more
reasonable than that of the M-rule, the f act is that something very close to this rule
is the easiest to apply. In order to illuminate any further qualities or flaws in the M-
rule, considers the following queries about its use in Ei.
a) What happens if the z drops out of the race? If we remove z from all seven of
these individual rankings, leaving everything else as it is in Ei, what then would be
the social preference x and y according to M-rule?
b) What happens if one of the two voters who prefer z the most say M s.t., changed
her ranking (ballot) to y, z, x and hence voters; for y instead of z? who then would
be the winner according to the M-rule? What might have led Ms.t to so vote for y if
she really preferred z the most?
TABLES
2. Two Reasonable Conditions on Voting Rules and a Consequence
In attempting to generalize the familiar majority rule to decide elections with three
or more candidates we are confronted with a plethora of such rules: in addition to
the familiar M, B, and C rules for defining the social preference relation xPy in terms
of individual preferences xPiy, many other such rules are logically possible. Worse
yet, we have seen that even these three rules can disagree sharply about xPy even in
fairly simple elections, but in way in which our social intuitions are unable to clearly
resolve. This raises the question: can we formulate a few conditions or axioms that
any reasonable rule, if it exists, might deserve to be called an ideal democratic
voting rule. Now there is a class of so called judges rules in which voters award any
number of points from 1 to some number n to each candidate, but where any such
award exceeding the median award by more than a pre-assigned amount would be
disregarded. We then can define xPy to mean that x has been awarded more points
than y, but we have seen that, although a rule is reasonably motivated, it can
nevertheless violate the following very reasonable.
Unanimity condtion: ixPiy & -> xPy. Any rule for defining xPy which did not satisfy
this condition, would not be responsive to the people, allowing for the imposition
of a social preference that was rejected by every individual. However, we have seen
that M, B and C rules all satisfy this condition, so it fails to help us decide between
these democratic rules. On the other hand so it fails, we have seen that the C-rule
can violate
Transitivity (xPy & yPz) -> xPz. In any election in which this condition is violated we
cannot say unambiguously who is the most preferred candidate or winner. Worse
yet, any attempt to break an intransitive cycle of social preferences by means of
pairwise runoff elections will be subject to arbitrary factors; whoever controls the
order of such runoffs can determine their outcome. Both the M and B rules,
however, satisfy the transitivity condition even though they can disagree sharply
about social preferences in some elections. So neither of these conditions can decide
for us which of these familiar rules might be closer to being an ideal voting rule. The
question now rises, however, as to what we can logically infer about any such rule
that happens to satisfy both of these conditions. To answer this question we
formulate two definitions:
A voting rule R is any definition of xPy that implies that xPy -> -yyPx
Taste of Dictatorship: a voting rule R gives some individual d a ;taste of dictatorship
in an election E with some pair od alternatives x and y iff (i)xPdy in E, (ii) yPix, for all
id, (iii) R implies xPy in E.
Theorem 1. Any voting rule that satisfies both (U) and (T) gives a taste of
dictatorship in some elections.
Proof Consider E3 and assume (for reduction) that such an R gives no one such a
tatse in E3 . Then R must imply yPa2 in E3 for otherwise the rightmost voter in E3
would get such a taste. Similaryly R implies the chain of social preferences yPa2,
a2Pa3, a3Pa4, a4Pa5, a5Pax. Since R satitsies (T) it must imply yPx by the chain lemma.
But R must imply xPy in E3 by condition (U) since the voters in E3 unanimously
prefer x to y. Hence we have xPy -> yPx by the definition of a voting rule; and finally
yPx by modus ponens. Thus we have deduced the contradiction yPx &-yPx from
our assumption that such an R gave no one a taste of dictatorship in E2. So R cannot
imply yPa2 in E3 , but rather yPa2, giving the rightmost voter a taste of dictatorship.
He is the only voter preferring a2 to y; all the others prefer y to a2.
Remark We see that both the M and B rules gives him such a taste because it
interrupts his ranking to mean that he prefers a2 to y by five times more than each of
the other voters prefer y to a2! The M-rule, on the other hand gives him such a taste
because he gave a2 a first-place vote and no one else gave a2 such a vote. Note that
the taste of dictatorship given to the leftmost voter for her preference for x over a5
makes x the most socially preferred candidate according to the B and M rules.
2a The Rule of dictatorship and its Properties

While theorem 1 answers our question about what the satisfaction of the conditions
of unanimity of transitivity might imply together about voting rule, it also raises a
further question: if these two conditions on such a rule are sufficient for it to give
someone a taste of dictatorship, what further conditions might there be that would
be sufficient to it actually dictatorial? That is, if these conditions are sufficient to
insure that some individual d must get his or her way some of the time (i.e. in some
elections) with respect to some pair of alternatives, might there be further
conditions that together with these two conditions sufficient to insure that some
individual got their way all of the rime on all of the alternatives. We might expect
that such a further condition, if it existed, would not be one which we would want
any candidate for an ideal democratic voting rule to satisfy, given that is the
dictatorial rule that it implied is the most undemocratic rule imaginable. That is, it
comprises the most extreme violation of the democratic principle if the equality of
all voters, allowing as it would only one individuals vote to count in determining
social preference. As a prelude to answering our new question above, let us
formulate explicitly the rule of dictatorship is clearly the simplest of all voting rules,
namely, D: xPy <-> xPdy, for a fixed individual d, for all x, y, in all elections E.
To investigate the properties of this dictatorial D-rule, as we shall call it, we begin by
proving
Claim 1: The D-rule satisfies the unanimity condition (U) ixPiy -> xPy. For if
everyone prefers x to y, then so must d, who is just an individual. Clearly, we must
have ixPiy -> xPdy.
Claim 2: The D-rule satisfies the transitivity condition (T)(xPy & yPz) -> xPz, for
according to the D-rule xPy just means xPdy, so we must have (xPdy & yPdz) -> xPdz,
since we have assumed as an axiom that the D-rule. Theorem 1 implies the following
trivial but useful
Corollary: The D-rule sometimes gives the dictator a taste of dictatorship. This
simple fact will prove useful later in proving further theorems, but let us meanwhile
convince ourselves of
Claim 3: The D-rule cannot be manipulated, that is, could not reward the dictator
for any insincere or strategic vote of the kind that we have seen that could be
rewarded if either the M-rule or the B-rule were being used. If x,y,z,w, are his true
preferences and he submits his ranking as his ballot, it becomes the social ranking. If
instead, he submitted the insincere ranking y,x,z,w, for example, then y would be
the winner under the D-rule, but he truly prefers x to y. Let us collect these three
claims together and call the result.
Theorem 4. If R is dictatorial, then R satisfies conditions (U) and (T) and cannot be
manipulated. Easy as it is to prove, this theorem is somewhat disquieting, telling us
as it does that the dictatorial D-rule has none of the flaws we have found in any of
the other democratic voting rules we have examined such as the M, B, or C rules or
the judges rule. However, the D-rule is clearly not a democratic rule to exclude it as
a candidate for such a rule. In view of theorem 4 we have no other recourse but to
rule out dictatorial rules by means of the condition of non-dictatorship on any
voting rule R that is to be a candidate for an ideal democratic rule, namely (D) R
shall not be dictatorial, that is, should not be of the form R: xPy <-> xPdy, for a fixed
d. The M, B, and C-rules clearly all satisfy this condition (D) of not being dictatorial.
3 The Manipulability of Social Rules and a Condition to prevent it.
We have seen examples of how the M and B rules can be manipulated in this sense:
by submitting ballots different from their true preferences voters can cause these
rules to select as winners of some elections candidates they actually preferred to the
ones who would have won had they voted sincerely. To see just what it is about
these rules that allows them to be manipulated in this way, let us examine whether
the C-rule could ever reward such insincerity. In fact, if Mr.s prefers x to y and votes
accordingly, and the C-rule nevertheless selects y as the winner, there is nothing he
could have done about this. For he could only have mispresented his reference
between y and some other candidates but according to the C-rule this would have no
effect on the social preference between y and someother y to the bottom of his
ballot, this might indeed hurt ys chances against some other candidate z, but not
against x: for the C-rule does not, as does the B-rule , distinguish between x being
just above y in a ballot and being, say three notches above y. if these are two
candidates z and w between x and y on someones ballot, the B-rule assumes that
their preference for x over y is three times as intense as it would be if they ranked x
just above y. But the C-rule is unmoved by such considerations, as it does not
assume that individual preferences can be measured above the oridinal level. This
can be expressed by saying that the C-rule satisfies a certain condition of
independence that can be formulated as follows. Let ExyE stand for the statement
that individual preferences for x and y are the same in E as they are in E; that is,
everyone who prefers x to y in E does so also in E, and everyone who prefers y to x
in E does so also in E. We can formulate now the condition of
Independence: the social preference between any two alternatives x and y depends
only on individual preferences for x and y. that is, if some rule R implies xPy in E and
ExyE, then R cannot imply yPx in E. In particular, if R selects x as the winner of E,
then R cannot select y as the winner of E. We are now in a position to prove
Theorem 2: If a R rule for defining social preference satisfies the independence
condition, then R cannot be manipulated. Proof. If an individual prefers x to y and
submits this along with his other preferences and the rule R nevertheless selects y
as the winner, there is nothing he can do about rhis as long as R satisfies
independence. For he could only mispresent his preference between y and some
other candidate z, but on this condition that would not affect the social preference
between x and y. the only other possibility would be to rank y above his most truly
preferred x bu this could hardly help x uless R were truly perverse. This proves
Theorem 2. To prove our next theorem we need to define manipulate more
precisely. Let us say that
R is manipulatable at E if for some set of alternatives and some individual I with
the preference relation Pi in E, there exists another ordering relation Pi of which,
when substituted for Pi in E, yields another election E in which the x that R now
selects as the winner is preferable according to Pi to the y it would select in E. we can
now prove
Theorem 3: if R does not satisfy the independence condition, then R can be
manipulated in some elections. Proof. Assume that R soed not satisfy the
independence condition. Then there must exist a pair of election E, E and a pair of
alternatives x and y for which the following things hold: (a) ExyE (b) R selects x in
E, (c) R selects y in E. From (b) and (c) it follows that EE, i.e. that individual
preferences differ in E and E, and thus that for some individual I we have PiPi.
That is, that some individual reports different preferences in E than in E. From (a),
howeverm it follows that I has the same preference for just x and y in E and E, and
hence that is preferences in E and E can only differ with respect to other
alternatives. Hence we must have either (1) xPiy and xPiy, or (2) yPix and yPi x. If
(1) is true, then I can manipulate R at E by switching from Pi to Pi. If (2) is true, then
i will be able to manipiulate R at E by switching from Pi to Pi. This completes our
proof of theorem 3.
The C-rule defines xPy to mean that x ranks somewhere above y in more individual
rankings (orderings) than y ranks above x. Hence to see whether or not xPy we need
only look at the relative positions of x and y in each of these rankings, so that the C-
rule does indeed only look at the relative positions of x and y in each of these
rankings, so that the C-rule does indeed satisfy the condition of independence. From
Theorem 2 it follows that the C-rule cannot be manipulated. We have seen, on the
other hand, that the B-rule can be manipulated at certain elections. It follows from
Theorem 2 that the B-rule does not satisfy the condition of independence. Indeed,
when an individual with preferences x, y,... w manipulates the B-rule by dropping y
to the bottom of his list, he is not thereby changing the individual preferences
between just x and y, but we have seen by examples that such a move can
nevertheless cause the B-rule to select x as the winner instead of y, in clear violation
of the independence condition. Note that this is the price paid by the B-rule for its
presumption that we can measure individual preferences at the interval level, just as
e.g. we can measure temperature of individuals. Finally, we can see by relecting on
election Ei on the first handout (question (a)) that the M-rule also violates the
condition of independence. It follows from Theorem 3 that the M-rule can be
manipulated, which of course we already know.
3a The stability and instability of Voting Rules
1. The stability of voting rules. Suppose R is any voting rule and E is any election
with three or more candidates, and that R selects x as the winner in E. Suppose then
that, some other candidate z is eliminated from E that R is then applied to the
election E resulting from the elimination of z. If R must still select x as the winner in
E, we call R a stable rule. If on the other hand, R could select some other candidate y
as the winner in E, we say that R is unstable voting rule.
2. The C-rule is stable For let the C-rule select x as the winner of an election E
with four candidates, say x, y, z, w. Then it implies xPy, xPzm xPw, If now the C-rule
is then applied to the election E that results from the elimination z from all the
individual rankings in E, it must still select x as the winner, since it still implies xPy
and xPw.
3. The M-rule is unstable. To see this we need only consider the following two
pairs of elections
E 3 2 2 M xy E 3 2 2 M E 3 2 2 M xy E 3 2 2 M
x z y x x y y y x z y x x y y y
y y z y x x y y z y w x
z x x z w z w x w
w x w

These two pairs of elections exhibit the instability of the M-rule. In each pair the M-
rule selects y as the winner in E (resulting from the elimination of z) after having
selecting x as the winner in E. We also see that in each pair we have ExyE. Thus the
M-rule does not satisfy the independence condition in these elections and hence can
also be manipulated in them. Indeed, consider the elction E above with four
candidates where the M-rule selects x as the winner. If one of the two voters who
truly prefer z the most actually submits the strategic ballot y,z,w,x, then the M-rule
will select y as the winner in E instead of x, and this voter really prefers y to x.
4. The B-rule is unstable. To see this consider the following two pairs of familiar
elections
E 3 2 2 M xy E 3 2 2 M
x w y y x w y x
y x z x y w w y
z y W w y x
w z w
B(x)=15, B(y)=14
In the first pair, the B-rule selects a2 as the winner in E, but when a, drops out,
resulting in the election E, the B-rule now selects a4 as the winner. And yet we have
ExyE, these two election are equivalent with respect to a2 and a4. Thus the B-rule
does not satisfy the independence condition in these elections and hence can be
manipulated, as can be seen from the second pair of elections. Here the B-rule is
again unstable since it selects y as the winner in E (where B(y)=21, B(x)=20), but
when z drops out, the B-rule select x as the winner. But we also see that the B-rule is
manipulable in this E, since if one of the three voters who prefer x the most drops y
to the bottom of his ballot, this strategic vote will result in B-rule selecting his
favorite x as the winner.
5. The rule D of dictatorship is stable. If the dictastor preference ranking is x, y, z,
w, then x is the winner. If z drops out or dies, x is still his mpst preferred, and
hence, still the winner. Indeed, the rule of dictatorship satisfies the independence
condition and is not manipulable.
4 No Rule can Satisfy all our Conditions: Together they are Unsatisfiable
We have seen that each of our familiar rules satisfies some of our conditions while
violating others. Each of conditions is separately satisfied by particular rules, but it
does not follow that a single rule can be found which would satisfy all our conditions
at once,. Such a rule might qualify as our ideal democratic method for determining
the most socially preferred alternative in the general case, but we are now going to
see that no such rule exists. That is, that our conditions on such rules are logically
unsatisfiable. More specifically, we shall prove that any rule which satisfies the
conditions of unanimity, transitivity, and independence must be dictatorial. Our
proof of this surprising result will be broken down into three lemmas, which will be
assembled to probe theorem.
Lemma 1 xy (If R impolies xPy in every E in which xdy, then R implies xPy in
some E where xPdy but yPix for all id) proof this lemma is trivial since it merely
says that if R is dictatorial it must sometimes give the dictator a taste of dictators.
Thhis follows from the applicability of R to all elections, inclusing those such as E3, as
well as our rule for all ( ) what is true for all must be true for any particular
instance and hence also for some. Indeed, if a dictator always gets h way on
everything, then he must do so. In those elections in which everyone else prefers y
to x. Our next lemma is no means trivial and is proved under the assumption that R
satisfies the conditions (U), (T), and (I) of unanimity, transitivity, and independence
respectively.
Lemma 2 xyz (if R implies xPy in some E where xPdy but yPdy but yPix for all
id, then R implies xPz in every E where xPdz). Proof by contradiction. Assume that
R implies xPy in some E where xPdy and yPix for all id, but that, contrary to this
lemma in some other E where xPdz R does not imply xPz but rather zPx. Then there
exists another election E where, the preferences for x and y are the same as those
in E and the preferences for x and z are the same as those in E, and in which
everyone prefers y to z. That is we have (i) ExyE, (ii) ExyE, and (iii)yPiz for all I in
E. Condition (I) required in view of (i), that R yield xPy in E also. And in view of
(iii) condition (U) requires R to yield yPz in E. Transitivity inturn requires that R
also yieldxPz in E. But in view of (ii) the independence condition also requires that
R zPx in contradicting the asymmetry of social preference relations. We conclude
that but assumption that we could have zPx in E was impossible after all. In short, if
d gets his way with his preference x over y in some E, then he must get his when he
prefers x to any other z, in any election whatsoever.
Lemma 3 xyz (If R impliues xPy in some E where xPdy but yPiy for all id, then
R must imply zPy in every E where zPdy). proof by contradiction: Assume that R
implies xPy in some E in which xPdy and yPix for all id, but that, contrary to our
lemma, Some other E where zPdy, R does not yield zPy but ratheryPz. Then there
exists another election E in which we have (i) ) ExyE, (ii) ) EzyE and (iii) zPix,
for all i in E. Condition (I) requires, in view of (I), that R yield xPy in E as well. But
independence also requires, in view of (ii), that R must yield yPxz in E, and again
we have contradiction which proves our lemma.
In short, if d gets his way with his preference for x over y in some E, then he must
get his way in any election where he prefers any other alternative z to this y. we now
assemble our three lemmas to prove.
Theorem 5 xy (R implies xPy in some E where xPdy yPix for id -> uv (R
implies uPv in all E in which uPdy)) proof. Let a and b be any pair for which R yields
aPb yields aPb in some E where aPdb but bPia for all id. Taking x= a, y=b,z=v in
Lemma 2.
(1) R implies aPb in some E where aPdb bPia for all id) -> (R implies aPv in
every E where aPdv). Taking x=a, y=v, z=u in Lemma 3.
(2) If R implies aPv in every E where aPdv, then R implies aPv in some E where
aPdv vPia for all id. Taking x=a, y=v, z=u in Lemma 3.
(3) If R implies aPv is some E where aPdv but vPia for all id, then R must imply
uPv in every E where uPdv. Now, since we have assumed the antecedent of
(1), and the consequents of (1) and (2) are the antecedents of (2) and (3)
respectively, the consequent of (3) follows from our assumptopn about the
pair of alternatives a and b. Hence we have proved the conditional.
(4) If R implies aPb in some E where aPdb but bPia for all oid, then R must imply
uPv in every E where uPdv . And since u and v could have been any pair of
alternatives, and a and b could have been any other pair, we have proved
Theorem 5.
What Theorem 5 says is that any rule which gives some individual d taste of
dictatorship in some E must (if it satisfies (U), (T), and (I)_) actually be dictatorial: it
must give d his way on all alternatives in all elections. In short, any such rule giving
someone a taste of dictatorship must take that someone a dictator. Hence, we have
Theorem 6. If R satisfies the conditions (U), (T), and (I), then R must be dictorial
(converse of Theorem 4). If we now formulate a new condition which explicitly rules
out dictators, namely, the condition (D) of Non-dictatorship: ixy(xPiy -> xPy in
all E), then we also have (by the thinking womans principle)
Theorem 7 No rule for defining social preference in terms of individual preferences
can satisfy (U), (T), (I), and (D).
Moral No social tule is perfect in the sense that none can be found to satisfy all the
four conditions that, from various points of view, we might think that a reasonable
democratic such rule ought to satisfy . However, since these various points of
political view do not necessarily comprise the essence of democracy, we canot claim
to have absolutelt refused the democratic ideal. On the other hand, our proofs have
not really depended on the political interpretation of xPiy and xPy, so they can be
expected to apply to many other kinds of aggregation problems as well.
5 Axioms of U=Indifference for measuring Individual Preferences
1. We have so far formulated k=just two axioms about an individuals preference
relation, namely, that
1) xPi x-> -yPix which together amount to the assumption that Is preferences
2) (xPiy & yPiz) -> xPiz measured oridnally, but they do not tell us by how much
more; orefers x to y than he prefers y to z as would on interval measure of Is
preferences. We havetacitly assumed that an individual must prefer one of any two
alternatives to the other, i.e. xPiy V yPix. But clearly there may be alternatives
between which an individual may be indifferent in the sense that he prefers neither
to the other, i.e. xPiy &-yPix. Let us abbreviate this indifference relation by xIiy.
2. If we are ever going to measure an individuals degree of preference on an
interval scale like the Centigrade and Fahrenheit scales for measuring temperature,
our assignment of the numbers indicating these degrees must be consistent with his
preferences and indifference. Let us abbreviate the degree of preference or utility an
individual i has for x by Ui(x), which is to be a number on an interval scale like t(x)
the Centrigate temperature of x. Thus our assignment of these numbers should
satisfy both .
a) Ui(x) > Ui(y) <->xPiy Now the greater than relation utilities utilities must be
b) Ui(x) = Ui(y) <->xPiy transitive, which expressed in (b)
Must be transitive, which is not guaranteed unless we add a new axiom that
indifference is also a transitive relation relation, as well as another axiom stating
that indifference implies non-preference.
3) (xIiy & yIiz) -> xIiz
4) xIiy -> (-xPiy& -yPix)
Though axioms 1-4 are necessary for constructing an interval scale for Is
preferences, they are still not sufficient for assigning numbers indicating by how
much more I prefers x to y than I prefers y to z.
That is, how to assign a number for Ui(y) if we had numbers for Ui(x) and Ui(z).
Now in setting up an interval scale we can arbitrarily assign numbers to two items x
and z, much as the Centigrade scale arbitrarily assigns 100 degrees to boiling water
and 0 degrees to frozen water, for convenience of calculation. That the assignment
of 0 degrees is purely arbitrary is seen by the fact that the temperature of frozen
water 32 degrees on the equivalent Fahrenheit scale. So if we arbitrarily assign the
values Ui(x) =1 and Ui(z)=0 to the utilities of I for x and z, the fundamental question
is then what value any y between x and z on Is preference scale should have. Clearly
this question cannot be answered solely on the basis of our four axioms 1-4 we have
so far assumed.
3. We have seen that our axioms 3 and 4 for indifference are quite strong in so fat as
they do not logically follow from 1 and 2. To see just how strong, let c0, c1, c2, cn.
stand for cups of coffee with 0,1,2,n grains of sugar and assume that Jackie prefers
some sugar oin her coffee. That is, (5) n cnPjc0. Being human, Jackie cannot
distinguish two cups different by a single grain of sugar. Hence,
(6) n cnIjcn+1 For a single grain of sugar falls below her perceptual threshold. 5)
implies for some n.
1. c100Pjc0 say 100. Taking now n=0,1,2,99 successively in (6) yields the
indifference chm
Paradoxes of Majority Voting and Platform Voting Rules
1. Paradox of Majority Voting. This paradox shows that from reasonable or
consistent individual preferences we can sometimes derive, by a seemingly
reasonable voting rule for aggregating these preferences, social or electoral
preferences which are inconsistent. By reasonable or consistent individual
preferences we mean that the preferences of each individual voter are transitive,
and by a seemingly reasonable voting rule we mean one which respects majorities.
But such a voting rule may not yield transistive electoral preferences, and hence in
such a case will select no winner in the lection. There in lies the paradox of majority
voting. A very simple example of hthis paradox can be seen in the miniature election
E in which we have three voters v1, v2, v3 giving their preference rankings for the
three candidates x,y,z. That a voter can give her unambiguous preference ranking
means that her preferences are transitive. Let xPy stand for x is electorally
preferred to y, and suppose that our voting rule R defines xPy in terms of majorities
as follows:
R: xPy <-> a majority of voters prefer x to y. When applied to the election E we find
that xPy by a majority of voters comprised of v1 and v3, and also yPz by a majority
of voters comprised of v1 and v2. But we also find that zPx by a majority comprised
of voters v2 and v3. Thus the relation xPy of electoral preference as defined by R is
not transitive in E. If we define the winner of an election as that candidate which is
electorally preferred to all others according to the voting rule being used, then
thereis no winner in E according to the majoritarian rule R. Such intransitive
majorities can also arise in other form, such as when voting on
2. Partly Platforms, where voters are not voting on single issues, but must choose
between candidates who take positions on two or more issues. For example, let
there two issues and suppose that the alternative positions that a candidate might
on the first issue are x and x, and on the second issue y and y. The are thus four
possible platforms comprising the positions he could take on these two issues,
which we can designate as (xy), (xy), (xy) and (xy). Suppose now that the
preference rankings of three voters v1, v2, v3 are as in the election E, and that the
rule R above is being used. Then we find that
.
Again, the electoral preferences for the four platforms are not transitive, so none of
these four platforms is preferred to the three others by a majority, prefer to your
pick. Moreover, we can also see here that, if separate votes were taken on these two
issues, x would be electorally preferred to x (by v1 and v2) and y would be
electorally preferred to y (by v1 and v3). So despite the fact that a majority of voters
would prefer the alternatives x and y were the issues to be voted on sepately, the
platform (xy) is preferred to the platform (xy) by a majority comprised of v2 and
v3. Thus a platform whose alternatives, when considered separately, are both
preferred by a majority of voters may be defeated by a platform comprising
alternatives that onlyminorities actualy favor or prefer. Thus does the ordinary
paradox of majority voting also induce a paradox of platform voting. It remains to be
seen wht other paradoxes it might induce and what other kinds of voting rules
might avoid such paradoxes of vorting.
The problem of sincere voting and a paradox of unanimity
Rousseau held that when each individual enters implicitly into the social contract he
puts himself under the supreme direction of the general will, under which he
remains as free as possible consistent with the freedom of all others, and which
tends to the public good. To discover in a given situation ehat the general will is, one
must hold an election and count the votes, which shall be done according to the
majority rule. But to know that the result of the vote really is the general will,
Rousseau held that each individual must vote sincerely, that is, for what he
independently and truly believes is for the public good, free from any influence of
any clique or party. Under these conditions, he argued, we can be sure that
unanimous vote for x over y must truly represent c as the general will.
But there are many forms of elections and voting rules and in some of them the
incentive to vote insincerely is so great that some measures, in the form of bias
clauses, have to be taken to neutralize such voting. For example, it is well known
that scoring in the Olympics in such events as gymnastics and figure skating is beset
with the nationalistic bias problem, causing judges to award higher scores to
athletes from their own country. Hence, the scoring rules must have bias clauses
that throw out scores that are deemed too extreme. This is a common problem with
musical competitions. For example, a piano competition between pianists A and B
where there are three judges J1, J2, J3 might result in these scores the voting rule is
(JR) Each candidate is awarded an integral number score from 0 to 25 by each judge
as a measure of her performance. The average award is computed and any award
exceeding thois average by more than 8 points is thrown out. The candidate with the
highest total of surviving points is the winner.
To apply this judge tule to E we compute the average award, which is a little over
15 points. Since judge J3s award of 25 for A exceeds this by more than 8 points, this
award is thrown out , leaving A with 31 points and B as the winner with 35 points.
This result, however is somewhat paradoxical since the judges were unanimous in
preferring As performance to Bs. This would be truly paradoxical in the case of a
political election with any finite number of candidates and voters where the voting
rule implied that y was the winner the election even though the voters unanimously
voted their preferences for x over y. Rousseau assumed that the graver the issue, the
greater the majority that should be required to decide it, so that fot the gravest issue
(e.g. war), the closer should the majority approach unanimity, prompting him to
porpose the pnitciple:
(U) if every individual voter prefers x to y, then we can be sure that x is generally
willed to y Rousseau also proposed that the general will always exists and is unique
in every electoral setting (he was as yet unaware of the paradox of majority voting).
Since he also claimed that the general will could only be discovered by an election in
which every voter sincerely this raises question:
(Q) whether is is logically possible ot have a voting system that is democratic and
satisfies Rousseaus conditions of unanimity U and the existence of the general will,
while always eliciting only sincere voting (in the sense of never rewarding an
insincere voting). The American economist and philosopher Arrow, who proved that
these conditions on an ideal democratic voting system are logically unsatisfiable,
finally answered this question in the negative. It is to proving this result that our
next several handouts are devoted.

How do Rational Voters Vote? Sincerely or Strategically??

The traditional idealistic view stemming from Rousseau is that it would always be
rational for an individual to vote for their most preferred candidate, since then the
winner would be the candidate most preferred by the electorate. But we have seen
that with the plurality voting rule M it can something be advantageous for a voter to
vote for her second most preferred giving rise to a paradox of the second best, a
conflict between two apparently reasonable criteria for voting rationally .
Rationality 1: It is always rational for a voter to vote for her most preferred
candidate
Raionality 2: It is sometimes more rational for a voter to vote fo her second most
preferred, for such an insincere (strategic) can prevent the elction of her least
preferred candidate. No which of these prescription for rationality a voter might
follow will depend on various environ=mental factors constraining the voter. Two
important such factors are
1) the voters knowledge of the voting system being used
2) the voters knowledge of the preferences of other voters
when a voter has only knowledge of the voting system itself it would be rational for
her to vote sincerely for her most preferred. When she has knowledge of how other
voters will likely vote, it can rational for her to vote strategically for her second
choice to at least prevent the elction of her least preferred candidate, as we have in
the case of the M-rule. These is yet another principle of rationality that has been
suggested by some political scientists. Suppose that a voter has enough knowledge
of how other voters will vote to determine or estimate the probability that each of
the candidates will win, and also express the value or utility she would find or
derive from the election of each candidate numerically. Let us define her expected
utility for a candidate x as the product of the probability p that x will win the
election and the utility Us(x) that she would derive xs election: p. Ux(x).
Some have suggested that rational voter should try to maximize her expected
utility, the principle MEU discussed by Sainsbury in our text, where he raises
questions about it. SO, we have
Rationality 3 It is rational to vote for that candidate for which ones expected utlity
is the greatest. To see how this principle might be applied consider election Ei on the
voting rules handout and suppose that one of the two voters wuth the preference
ranking z,y,x assigns the probabilities p(z) =.1, p(y) =.4, p(x)=.5 of each winning, and
has utilities Ui(z) =10, Ui(y) =6, Ui(y) =1 for them. Then her expected utilities for
these three candidates are
expected utlity for z =.1 * 10=1
expected utlity for y =.4 * 6=2.4
expected utlity for x =.5 * 1=0.5
the rationality principle MEU, Rationality 3, would tell a rational voter to vote for y,
who under these assumptions has the greatest expected utility. So we might see the
MEU principle here as a more precise quantative formulation of the strategy f the
voter who did not want to throw away her voice for her favorite z. because she
didnt believe z has much of a chance to win. Of course, these numerical values for
her may seem rather arbitrary. Suppose we assume them rather to be, for example,
Ui(z) = 1, Ui(y)=.6, Ui(x)=0, which are again consistent with her preferences. Then
wed have
expected utlity for z =.1 * |x|=.1
expected utlity for y =.4*6=.24
expected utlity for x =.5 * 0=0
So again, MEU would imply that her rational voter would be for y. Is there a
principle for finding a voters utilities?

8. Analysis of Jevons Argument

1. Jevons argued against the meaningfulness of interpersonal comparisons of

utilities that the susceptibility of one mind may, for all we know, be a thousand
times greater than another. But provided that this susceptibility was different in like
ratio in all directions, we should never be able to discover this difference. Every
mind is thus inscrutable to every other mind, and no common denominator of
feeling seems to be possible. We may formulate this argument as follows:
i) Nothing we know precludes one mind being a 100-times more sensitive to utilities
than another
ii) If such sensitivity were different in like ratio all directions we may never discover
the difference
*Everevy mind is inscrutable to every other and no common denominator of feeling
is possible
a) Premise (i) is still true, but psychology might discover something precluding this
possibility. Thus Newton believed nothing kept an object moving a 1000 times
faster than any given velocity, but relativity pre precludes this.
b) Logical analysis reveals a kernel of truth in (ii), namely, that our axioms for an
ideal individuals preferences are unable to distinguish such utility functions as
occur in (c) on Handout 7, where one is a 1000 times greater that the other. No
more than the axioms of geometry can distinguish similar figures from each other.
c) The conclusion would not validly follow until psychology actually discovered the
possibility in premise (i).
2. Economists have never been able to define what Jevons called a unit of labor, or
suffering, or enjoyment. But they have also never agreed to why they have been
unable to define such a unit/
a) some argue that to calibrate measures of preference intensity in two persons we
need an absolute zero a universally accepted point of least happiness, which seems
precluded by the subjectivity of taste desire
b) since our axioms for individual preferences imply only the existence of interval
scales for them, those who would demand an absolute zero for them conclude that it
is meaningless to compare different interval utilities.
3. In view of the difficulty of comparing utilities economists try to show economic
science is possible without assuming utility functions. An important step in this
direction was the discovery that
(OS) Two ordinally similar utility function (which by definition imply the same
ordinal preference rankings will predict the same choices of commodities at given
prices and income. So that if
(BO) Choices of commodities (as reflected in purchasing behavior) are all we can
observe, then
(OI) Ordinally similar utility functions are observationally indistinguishable
*(M) It is scientifically meaningless to try to distinguish such utility functions, and
the existence of utility functions id ==s not empirically relevant to any observable
purchasing behavior.
4. Implicit in this argument for the conclusion (M) is the idea that if one could have
predicted behavior using the assumption (U) that utility functions exist that mere
ordinal preference rankings (O) would not predict (i.e. of O(OS) were not true), then
the assumption (U) would have been empirically relevant. More specifically, it
would be empirically relevant had we discovered that, for economic laws E1, E2, E3,
observable behaviors, the following logical relations obtained: B validly followed
from these laws together with (U) but not from them together with (O). One sees
that the relations envisaged in the box, would have established the scientific
meaningfulness of (U) in precisely the same way as Newton established the
empirical relevance of his controversial laws of universal gravitation. The discovery
of (OS) above shows that this cannot be done for (U), at least not by reference to the
purchasing behavior of individual consumers, though the might be other kinds of
economic phenomena that it does predict. In any case, we are left with the problem
formulating this logical criterion of empirical relevance in a precise manner.

9. Elections, Decathlons, and Measurement

1.Decathlons are athletic contests comprising ten different track and field events,
which are won by the athlete amassing the highest total score. The winner is
generally considered to be the best all around athlete. It is instructive to compare
decathlons with elections, e.g. those using the B-rule, where the winner is also the
candidate amassing the most total points. Elections have a finite number of voters
who each submit their ordinal preference ranking of candidates whereas in
decathlons we have rather a number of event in which the athletes compete. Though
an event a guite difference from a voter, it shares with voters the essential property
of producing a transitive ordering of the athletes who compete in it. Let us spell out
the logical analogues between elections and decathlons as follows (xBy abbreviates
x is a better all around athlete that y)

2.Election Decathlon

1 1 1 1 R E1 E2 E3 E4 E10 S
x y w z
y x z w
1 Individuals (voters)
2 Alternatives (candidates)
3 Preferences of individuals for
candidates
4 Voting rule R for defining xPy
5 X is preferred to y by individual e
(xPey)
6 e is indifferent between x and y (xIey)
7 e prefers x to y by twice as much as she
prefers to w (Ue(x) - Ue(y) = z(Ue(z) -
Ue(w)) indifferent
8 e prefers x to y by more than another
individual f prefers z to w (Ue(x) - Ue(y)
> z(Ue(z) - Ue(w))
This claim is meaningless unless we
can define common units for the
individuals e and f.
Events
Competitors (athletes)
Perfomances of competitors in an event
Scoring system S for defining xBy
X beats Y in event E
X and Y tie in event E
X beats Y by twice as much in event E as Z
beats W in E (the same event)
X beats Y in E (the high jumo) by more than
Z beats W in F (100 yard dash)
Scoring systems have to adopt arbitrary
criteria to make sense of such claims.

3.What conditions would we want our scoring rule for defining xBy to satisfy? Well
(U) If X beats Y in every event, then X must rank above Y in the decathlon (that is,
xBy)
(T) If xBy and yBz, then our rule must imply xBz (So we can have the best athlete!)
(D) No one event shall determine the overall ranking in he decathlon. (No dictatorial
event) Clearly these conditions could not be violated without sacrificing the
meaning and purpose of the decathlon. Hence we can apply Theorem 7 to conclude
that
~(I) Any scoring system satisfying these conditions must violate the independence
condition, i.e. the definition of xBy cannot be independent of how x and y rank
relative to other competitors.

4.Imagine a decathlon before there we rulers and watchers, when akk the
performances couls only be measured ordinally. We could only rank the order of
finishing the 100 yard dash, fo example, by eyeballing the order in which the
athletes ctoss the finishing line. Clearly, any reasonable scoring system would again
have to satisfy (U),(T),&(D), whereupon it would again have to violate (I). Once ratio
level measurement was developed for perfomances, the problem of making sense of
8 above woulf present itself. Manipulability would not be a problem, but allowing
for an intense minority would be. X might finish barely ahead of Y in six of the
events, but if Y beasts him badly in the other four events he could well have to be a
better all around athlete than X. this would depend on what arbitrary convention
the scoring rule adopts to make sense 8.
How Rational is it believe in Gods existence? Pascals Wager

1. By using what is generally regarded as the first ever application of the principle of
maximizing ones expected utility, Pascal argued that it is rational to believe in the
existence of God, at least as he conceived in the Christian religion. The main premise
on which Pascal bases his proof is (P) Either there is no God, or there is a God whose
properties are those posited by the Church. This premise entails that the whole
Christian theology of salvation is entailed by the existence of God including the
eternal life and happiness of those who reach heaven and damnation of those who
are consigned to hell. Given this Pascal states the following
Theorem: It is reasonable (i.e. rational) to believe in God, for which he offers the
following
Proof: If God exists, he is infinitely incomprehensible to us. But wither he exists or
he does not exist, and we cannot possibly know which is true. However, both our
present and future lives may be affected by the alternative we choose to believe in.
hence, since eternal life and happiness is a possible consequence of one choice (if
God exists), and since nothing is lost if we are wrong about the other choice (God
does not exist and we choose to believe that he does exist), then given the stakes,
the reasonable gamble is to believe that God exists. Indeed, to remain unbelieves in
God is to take an infinitely unreasonable risk since one does not and cannot know
which alternative is true.
Here Pascal takes the probability that God exists equal to the probability he doesnt
exist = . And the utility U(God exists) = , so that the expected utility of believing
that he exists equals * = !? Shades of Galileos paradox. This is Pascals
Wager. As he explains: Every gambler wagers with certainty to win with
uncertainty, and nonetheless he wagers the finite with certainty to gain the finite
with uncertainty, without sinning against reason. There is not an infinite distance
between that which one bets and the uncertainty of gain: this is false. Ther is, it is
true, an infinity between the certainty of winning and the certainty of losing, but the
uncertainty of winning is proportional to the certainty of what one wagers
according to the proportion of the chances of gain or loss. And thus it comes to be
that if there are as many chances on one side as on the other, the stakes are equal.
Presupposed by Pascals wager is a conception of
2. Belief Some argued against Pascals reasoning that one cannot just choose to
believe in something, certainly not in God. Other philosophers such as Leibniz
argued against it that This argument shows nothing about what one ought to
believe, but only about how one ought to act. That is to say, it proves only that those
who do not believe in God should act as if they did. But Pascals point is that if they
do act as if they believe in God, they will come to actually believe in him. Believe is
catching according to Pascal: if you go along with pious people, giving up bad habits,
and follow a life of holy water and sacraments intended to stupefy one into belief,
you will end up believing in God. More specifically, the unbeliever who takes holy
water and attends masses will become more reconciled to these apparently
meaningless practices as he finds that they help him overcome his passions,
especially pride, which have been his greatest obstacle to belief. No, one cannot just
choose to believe in God in the spot. But one can decide to act in such away that one
will very probably come to believe in him. Pascal calls this course of action the
Wager that God exists. To wager that he does not exist is simply to stop bothering to
think about such things.

The problem of Scientifically meaningful statements

1. Let us call a statement meaningful if it is true or false, i.e. if we can believe it
has a truth-values, however difficult it may be to actually determine it.
Scientists are confident that some claims about Jupiters surface are true, but
even if direct observations of revealed some of them to be false, they would
thereby qualify as scientifically meaningful. Lt us call sentences for which we
can conceive some kind of observations measurements, or experiments that
would establish their truth or falsity observation sentences. The
observations and measurements may take many years, as in the case of
Keplers discovery of his first law that planets move in elliptical orbits. Thus
all observation sentences are scientifically meaningful, or as we shall
sometimes say, empirically relevant. However,
2. We cannot claim that all scientifically meaningful sentences are observation
sentences. The truth-values many great hypotheses in science cannot be
determined by direct observation, but are nevertheless regarded as
meaningful, some even true. Indeed, some were initially viewed as
incomprehensible, e.g. Newtons hypothesis of universal gravitation stating
that any two bodies in the universe with masses m1 and m2 at any disdtance
r from each other, mutually attract each other with a gravitational force G,
that is directly proportional to the product of their masses and universely
proportional to the square of the distance between them. In short G =
m1m2/r^2. This incredible hypothesis provided no conceivable mechanism
by which two bodies light years apart could attract each other
instantaneously. Nevertheless, Newton built a strong logical case for the
empirical relevance of his law (G) by showing that many observation,
sentences, such as Keplers law K, that could not be explained by his three
general laws of motion L1,L2,L3, that is, could not be logically deduced from
them, did become logically explained when (G) was added as an additional
premise. Many observation sentences O can be explained by just L1,L2,L3,
but many more of them cannot be and only become logically deducible when
we add (G). So the Newtonian criterion for the empirical relevance or
meaningfulness of a new hypothesis H is that together with other laws or
assumptions, assumed to be meaningful themselves, one can deduced
logically observation sentences I that cannot be so deduced form those other
laws alone. This allows us to test H as well, for if such a sentence proves to be
false, we will typically conclude that H us false
3. Darwins theory of evolution is generally accepted in the scientific
community as true, specifically, its account of mans evolution from animals
by a long and gradual process of evolution driven by natural selection and
random variation even though Darwin could no more specify a causal
 mechanism for such variation, even though Darwin could no more specify a
causal mechanism for such variation that Newton could for gravitation. No
one would now deny that evolution is a meaningful hypothesis, but many
f=do question its truth. Indeed, many believe that the true account of how
man came to be what he is Creation science, whose fundamental hypothesis
is that God create the world and everything in it. But there are also many
who regard this hypothesis as scientifically meaningless. So we ask: could
this creation hypothesis be shown to qualify as empirically releant under our
Newtonian criterion? Consider this argument, which is valid, and whose
conclusion is false. Hence one of its premises must be false. But which one?
This is the problem of evil for Christianity. Note that
a) this argument becomes invalid without premise (iii), the Creation
hypothesis. It follows that
b) since we can observe the evil in the world, this hypothesis would pass
Newtons test for empirical relevance if we counted premises (i) and (ii)
as meaningful. But then G would be a false meaningful claim.

Logic between the finite and the infinite

1. Aristotle propose as a basic principle of his formal theory of sound logical

reason that
(F) any proof of the validity of an inference from a set Gamma of premises to
a conclusion A must contain only a finite number of steps, sentences, and
applications of rules; and hence that
(C) If A can be proved to validly follow from an infinite set Gamma of
premises, then A can be proved to follow from some finite subset of these
premises (Aristotles compactness principle)
By way of questioning the infinite divisibility of lines and the resulting
infinity of their points, Aristotle distinguished between an actual infinity and
mere potential infinity, of points on it, and denied that any line has an actual
infinity of points on it while granting that it may have a potential infinity of
points on it. Thus Aristotle was prepared to deny the validity of this
inference: for if it was logically valid, then by his compactness principle (C), a
proof of its validity could use inly a finite number of its infinitely man
premises, from which the conclusion would clearly not follow. This raise
some important questions about the scope of logic, as well as the precise
meanings of the words finite and infinite. Our clue for these finally
emerged from

Galileos Paradox, in which he managed to convince himself by apparently

acceptable reasoning of two contradictory propositions. N = {1,2,3,..n} be
the set of all integers and E ={2,4,6,2n} be the set of all even numbers, and
let N and E stand respectively for the number of members in each of these
sets. Galileo argued for each of the following calims

 Many mathematicians, including Leibniz, puzzled over this paradox until it
was finally realized that it really concealed the long sought precise definition
of an Infinite set: a set which can be put into one-to-one correspondence with
a proper subset of itself. A finite set then is simply a set which cannot be put
into one-to-one correspondence with a proper subset of itself. These
definitions are due to Dedekind and Cantor, and constitute a resolution of
Galileos paradox, which can be applied, to analyzing
Zenos Paradox of Achilles and Tortoise. If Achilles is to overtake the tortoise
who has been given a lead, there must a one-to0one correspondence
between the distance considered as a set of points or positions that he has
to cover and the set if points covered by the tortoise. And his correspondence
must be such that the time it takes Achilles to reach any point is the same as
it takes the tortoise to reach the corresponding point. So if Achilles starts at
point z0 and the tortoise with its head start at z1, and the tortoise has
reached point z2 when Achilles arrives z1, and the tortoise reaches z3 when
Achilles reaches z2, and so on; then for Achilles to overtake the tortoise, the
distance (number of points) covered by Achilles must be equal to that
covered by the tortoise. That is we must have distance covered by Achilles =
{z0,z1,z2,} = distance covered by tortoise = {z1,z2,z3}. The tortoise
itenery is a proper subset of the points covered by Achilles, but as in Galileos
3) above, they have the same cardinal number. Zeno could not accept that a
subset could be equal to the whole set.

Paradoxes of Vagueness: Navigating up and own Slippery Slopes

1. Vague predicates are those for which there are objects comprising borderline
cases which we do not now whether then predicted applies to them or not.
We may actually know a mans height or how many grains there are in a
collection without knowing whether to call the man tall or the collection a
heap. One common view is the semantic theory, according to which in such
cases there is realy no objective facts would sanction the ascription of the
predicate to an object. One version of this theory even defines a borderline
case as one for which any such objective fact about the matter is lacking. On
this theory there is no fact making ascription of the vague predicate true of
an object.
Another view of ague predicates is the epistemis theory, according to chich
there are objective facts which determine the correct application of vague
predicates to objects, but that in borderline cases where we are unsure of its
application, we simply cannot know whether it applies since we are ignorant
of these facts. Whatever ones view of such predicated is, they give rise to
2. Paradoxes of vagueness. One is the paradox of the heap going back to the Greeks.
grains