AIR FRANCE VS CARRASCOSO availability is confirmed, then the air

[RE: PROPRIETY OF TORT IN PRE-EXISTING CONTRACTS] passenger is placed in the hollow of the
handle of an airline. There will be no
security on the part of the passenger. Thus,
This involves a complaint for damages filed by
in order to achieve stability in the relations
CARRASCOSO, the passenger, against AIR
between the passenger and air carrier,
FRANCE, the airline company.
adherence to the ticket as issued is
desirable.
FACTS:
1. CARRASCOSO was issued a roundtrip
Hence, CARRASCOCO should have been
ticked by AIR FRANCE, through PAL, from
granted the first class seat having his ticket
Manila to Rome.
being confirmed by the AIR FRANCE
2. There was no problem with his flight from
employee. And when the same was denied,
Manila to Bangkok.
AIR FRANCE should be held responsible.
3. The problem, however, was upon his arrival
at Bangkok, an AIR FRANCE manager
2. As to the issue on the propriety of damages,
approach CARRASCOSO and compelled
truly CARRASCOSOs complaint alleged
the latter to vacate his first class seat to give
breach of contract, however, the stress of
way for a white man alleged to have a better
the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
right thereof.
4. Since CARRASCOSO has already seated,
Three elements exist here that would show
he initially refused to vacate said first class
that the award for moral damages is proper:
seat. But because of the alleged humiliation
a. There was a contract of carriage;
and embarrassment brought about by the
b. There was breach of such contract
demands of the AIR FRANCE manager,
when AIR FRANCE failed to furnish
CARRASCOSO vacated the seat in protest
CARRASCOSO the first class
and transferred to the tourist class.
transportation as agreed;
5. This prompted CARRASCOSO to file an
c. There was bad faith when AIR
action for damages against AIR FRANCE
FRANCEs employee compelled
for the inconvenience and embarrassments
CARRASCOSO to vacate the seat after
brought about by the breach of contract.
he was already seated, to give way for a
white man whose alleged better right
CFI: ruled in favor of CARRASCOSO
was not established on the records; and
CA: affirmed, with slight modification in the amount
d. That CARRASCOSO suffered mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
Hence, this petition by AIR FRANCE.
feelings, and social humiliation.
AIR FRANCEs defense:
ART. 21, NCC. Any person who willfully
a. That the ticket did not guarantee his first
causes loss or injury to another in a
class ride because it was still subject to the
manner that is contrary to morals, good
availability of the first class seats; hence,
customs, or public policy shall
CARRASCOSO is not entitled to the seat
compensate the latter for the damage.
since it was no longer available because the
white man has a better right than him;
3. Moreover, the award for damages is proper
b. That CARRASCOSOs claim for damages is
based on tort. Since the relation of a
predicated on a breach of contract, and
passenger and air carrier is contractual in
thus, the award for moral damages is
nature, and since the contract of carriage is
improper for failure of the court to find bad
attended with public duty, the act that
faith on the part of AIR FRANCE.
breaks the contract, i.e. by negligence or
malfeasance of the public carriers
ISSUE: WON AIR FRANCE is liable for damages.
employee, may constitute a tort. Damages
is proper.
HELD: YES. AIR FRANCE IS LIABLE.
WHEREFORE, SC AFFIRMS the decisions of the
1. If as AIR FRANCE underscores, a first-class
lower courts, with costs against AIR FRANCE.
ticket holder is not entitled to a first class
seat, notwithstanding that the seat (*S/N: SC used the term quasi-delict wrongfully)
COCA-COLA VS CA, GERONIMO
[RE: PROPRIETY OF TORT IN PRE-EXISTING CONTRACTS]
This involves a complaint for damages filed by
GERONIMA, the proprietress of Kindergarten
Wonderland, against COCA-COLA, the
supplier of soft drinks.
FACTS:
1. GERONIMO complains that the soft
drinks supplied to her by COCA-COLA
were adulterated based on
examination by the Regional Health
Office. Said soft drinks contained small
foreign particles although still unopened.
2. As a result, there was a sharp decline of
her sales from 10 cases to only 2-3
cases per day, leading to the closure of
her business, were she became jobless
and destitute.
3. This prompted GERONIMO to file an
action for damages against COCA-
COLA on the basis of the latters
reckless and negligent manufacturing of
adulterated soft drinks (quasi-delict).
COCA-COLAs defense: it moved to dismiss
the case on the ground:
a. That the action has already prescribed
since the action for damages based on
quasi-delict (which prescribes for 4
years) is improper since there is a pre-
existing contract between the parties;
b. And that the action for damages is
actually based on the breach of
warranty under ART. 1561, which
prescribed for 6 months. Thus, the case
has long prescribed.
RTC: granted COCA-COLAs motion to
dismiss; that the complaint is based on
contract and not on quasi-delict.
CA: reversed in favor of GERONIMO; that the
complaint is based on quasi-delict because the
complaint alleges COCA-COLAs reckless and
negligent manufacturing of the adulterated soft
drinks.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the action for damages is based
on quasi-delict or on breach of warranty.
HELD: It is based on quasi-delict.
The court here enumerated the possible
remedies of a vendee against the vendor:
a. Action for breach of warranty against
hidden defects, under the law on sales;
b. Annulment of contract, with damages,
under the law on obligations; or
c. Action for damages, under the law on
quasi-delict.
Here, GERONIMO correctly opted for an action
for damages under quasi-delict.
Although:
a. GR: the existence of a pre-existing
contract bars the application of the rules
on quasi-delict;
b. EX: actions which break the contract
may also be a quasi-delict.
The existence of a contract between the
parties does not bar the commission of a tort
by the one against the other and the
consequent recovery of damages therefor.
Thus, the court held that liability for quasi-delict
may still exist despite the presence of
contractual relations.
WHEREFORE, SC denies COCA-COLAS
petition.
(*S/N: SC still wrongfully uses the term QD.)
REGINO VS PANGASINAN
[RE: PROPRIETY OF TORT IN PRE-EXISTING CONTRACTS]
This involves a complaint for damages filed by
REGINO, a first year computer science student,
against PCST (Pangasinan Colleges of Science
and Technology) and teachers GAMUROT and
BALADAD.
FACTS:
1. PCST held a fund-raising campaign dubbed
as the Rave Party and Dance Revolution.
In relation to it, PCST required each student
to pay for 2 tickets with a price of P100
each.
2. Accordingly, the PCST teachers announced
that it will give incentives of plus points in
the exams upon payment of the tickets.
However, those who will not pay shall be
denied to take the final examination.
3. The problem here is that REGINO refused
to pay the tickets on two grounds:
a. Her family is financially incapable to pay
the same; and
b. Her religion prevents her from attending
dance parties.
4. As a result, REGINO was disallowed to take
the exam, despite her pleas.
5. This prompted REGINO to file a complaint
for damages as a pauper litigant. (tort)
PCSTs defense: that the case be dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the
case should have been filed before CHED and not
the RTC.
RTC: dismissed the action for damages for lack of
jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
ISSUES:
A. WON the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is applicable.
B. WON there is sufficient cause of action for
damages.
HELD:
A. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES IS NOT APPLICABLE.
The action here is based on damages,
which is governed by the Civil Code, and
thus the jurisdiction falls within the court.
And since REGINO was not asking for the
reversal of the policies of the PCST, nor did
she demanded to take the final exams,
there were no administrative matters to
speak of; thus, CHED had no jurisdiction
over the case.
B. THERE IS SUFFICIENT CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR DAMAGES.
1. Here, there was a contractual relations
between the parties, i.e. a school-student
contract.
2. The terms of said contract is defined at the
moment of its inception, i.e. upon enrollment
of the student. This contract should govern
the parties for the entire school year.
The problem in this case is that
PCST imposed revenue-raising
measures belatedly, i.e. only in the
middle of the semester, and not at
the start of the school year.
Thus, PCST cannot unilaterally
impose the same to the prejudice of
the employees. By doing so, it
violated the contract they entered
into.
3. As a rule, action that violate a contract may
also be a tort.
Here, PCST, as an academic
institution, may be held liable for tort
for violating the said school-student
contract.
4. As to the defense of academic freedom, it
will not apply.
Academic freedom allows the school
to set standards, which it should
meticulously observe without
discrimination against certain
students.
Hence, PSCT should have abided
on the standards it imposed at the
beginning of the school year. It
cannot unilaterally impose other
standards thereafter. By doing so
makes the school liable.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED and the
assailed orders REVERSED.
(*S/N: Court properly used tort)
LOADMASTERS VS GLODEL &
R&B
[RE: SOLIDARY LIABILIY OF JOINT TORTFEASORS]
This involves a complaint for damages filed by R&B
Insurance company against GLODEL and
LOADMASTERS.
FACTS:
1. COLUMBIA entered into an insurance
contract with R&B Insurance Co. to have
COLUMBIAs shipment of 132 bundles of
electric copper cathodes insured.
2. Thereafter, COLUMBIA engaged the
services of GLODEL for the release and
withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and
the subsequent delivery thereof to
COLUMBIAS warehouses in Bulacan and
Valenzuela.
3. In turn, GLODEL engaged the services of
LOADMASTERS for the usage of the
latters delivery trucks.
4. Problem is, one of LOADMASTERS
delivery truck bound for Bulacan failed to
arrive at COLUMBIAs warehouses.
5. Upon investigation, the Isuzu truck was
found but no longer with the said cargos.
6. This prompted COLUMBIA to file a claim for
insurance indemnity against R&B, which
R&B granted.
7. Now subrogated by the rights of
COLUMBIA, R&B filed a complaint for
damages both against GLODEL and
LOADMASTERS. (breach of contract of
carriage)
RTC: held ONLY GLODEL liable for damages.
CA: however, held BOTH GLODEL &
LOADMASTERS SOLIDARILY LIABLE, the latter
being the agent of the former.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON LOADMASTERS is solidarily liable
with GLODEL.
HELD: Both LOADMASTERS & GLODEL are
solidarily liable as joint tortfeasors.
1. GLODEL IS LIABLE.
GLODLEL, as a customs broker, is
considered a common carrier, which
is required to exercise extraordinary
diligence.
Here, there was negligence on its
part as it failed to take precautionary
measures to prevent the
hijacking/robbery. It could have
provided escorts to accompany
LOADMASTERs trucks in delivering
the cargoes. His defense of force
majeure is unavailing.
2. LOADMASTERS IS ALSO LIABLE.
Although the robbery/hijacking was
allegedly caused by its employee-
driver, LOADMASTERS as
employer, is likewise liable for failure
to exercise diligentissimi patria
familias (diligence of the good
father of a family) in the selection
(culpa eligiendo) and supervision
(culpa in vigilando) of its employees.
(ART. 2180)
LOADMASTERS defense: That it is not
privy to the contract between GLODEL &
COLUMBA.
This lacks merit. Quasi-delict, by
definition, exists without any pre-
existing contractual relations
between the parties. Thus, privity of
contracts cannot be a defense in
issues involving quasi-delict.
3. BOTH GLODEL AND LOADMASTERS ARE
SOLIDARILY LIABLE AS JOINT
TORTFEASORS. (ART. 2194)
As a rule, where the concurrent or
successive negligent acts or omissions of
two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination, the direct
and proximate cause of a single injury to a
third person, it is impossible to determine in
what proportion each contributed to the
injury or damage to a third party, they
become joint tortfeasors and are
solidarily liable to the resulting damage
under ART. 2194, NCC.
BARREDO VS GARCIA
[RE: SCA FOR DAMAGES]
This involves a separate civil action for damages
filed by GARCIA spouses, the parents of the
deceased 16 year old FAUSTINO GARCIA, as
against BARREDO, the owner of MALATE
TAXICAB.
FACTS:
1. This arises from a head-on collision
between:
a. MALATE taxicab:
i. Driven by FONTANILLA; and
ii. Operated by BARREDO; and
b. Carretela:
i. Guided by DIMAPALIS; and
ii. With passenger FAUSTINO.
2. When the carretela overturned, FAUSTINO
got injured which led to his subsequent
death.
3. This prompted FAUSTINOS PARENTS to
file a criminal action against the taxi driver
FONTANILLA, with reservation of their right
to file a separate civil action. Eventually,
FONTANILLA was convicted.
4. Later, the PARENTS filed a separate civil
action against employer BARREDO.
CFI: granted the SCA for damages.
CA: affirmed with modifications in the amount..
Hence, this petition.
BARREDOS defense: That he cannot be held
primarily liable for damages
. that, although this habitual method is allowed by
He argues, that since the case invokes a
criminal action, the governing law should
have been the Revised Penal Code, which
only imposes a subsidiary liability on the
employer. There being no civil claim filed on
the criminal action, the employers
subsidiary liability does not arise. Hence,
BARREDO could not be made liable as an
employer.
GARCIAS defense: That the governing law is the
Civil Code, where damages may be allowed for
actions not punishable by law. Hence, BARREDO
can be made primarily liable.
ISSUE: WON GARCIAS PARENTS may bring a
SCA holding employer BARREDO directly and
primarily liable for damages under the Civil Code.
HELD: YES. BARREDO is primarily liable as
employer under the Civil Code.
The court here actually gave 2 instances of
employers possible liabilities:
1. SUBSIDIARY liability, under the RPC, for
the criminal negligence of the employee,
through the institution of the same along
with the criminal action; or
2. PRIMARY liability, under the CC, for acts
not punishable by law, which may be
instituted in a separate civil action against
the employer, independent from the criminal
action;
Thus, GARCIAS parents have the freedom to
choose either of said options. Here, GARCIAs
opted to file a SCA for damages against
BARREDO, thereby making him primarily liable for
the damage.
This is allowable as it is the more convenient,
speedy, and expeditious way to obtain relief
considering that the driver: (a) may be imprisoned
or (b) may have no sufficient property to seize for
purposes of enforcing the judgment.
The Court here stresses the problem of over-using
the method of seeking damages only by virtue of
the civil responsibility arising from a crime. It said
our laws, it would practically render nugatory and
useless the most expeditious and effective remedy
based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual. Thus, the SC here encourages to
perpetuate the ancient and additional remedy of
filing independent civil actions, not depending on
the issues, limitations, and results of a criminal
prosecution. This is more likely to secure an
adequate and efficacious redress for better
safeguarding of the private rights of the parties.
BLTB CO. VS CA, CARDEMA
[RE: SCA FOR DAMAGES]
This involves an independent civil action for
damages filed by CARDEMA, a passenger of a
Chevrolet car, against BLTB, a bus company which
collided with the Chevrolet car.
FACTS:
1. Around 5AM, a CHEVROLET car, driven by
Delos Reyes, with his son and CARDEMA
as passengers, drove along the right lane of
the Manila South Superhighway, going
NORTH.
2. At the same time, a BLTB bus driven by
ILAGAN was also driving on the same
Superhighway, but on the left lane, going
SOUTH.
3. However, fronting BLTB bus was a cargo
truck. So, BLTB wanting to overtake the
cargo truck, drove speedily to the opposite
lane, which is where the CHEVROLET car
was driving.
4. So, upon seeing the incoming bus and with
the attempt to avoid collision, the
CHEVROLET car instinctively swerved
right, but to no avail, because the
overspeeding BLTB bus already collided on
the left portion of the CHEVROLET car.
5. In effect, DELOS REYESs son died and
CARDEMA was injured.
6. As to CARDEMA, she was prompted to file
a civil action for recovery of actual,
compensatory, and moral damages with
attorneys fees.
RTC: granted the award of damages.
CA: affirmed.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari.
BLTBS defense: it invoked CORPUS VS PAJE
which held that independent civil actions are not
allowed in cases of reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence. Thus, accordingly, CARDEMAs civil
action is premature pending resolution of the
criminal case against driver ILAGAN.
ISSUE: WON the civil action for damages may
prosper.
HELD: YES. The civil action for damages may
prosper.
1. CORPUS VS PAJE is not applicable.
Here, BLTB failed to take into consideration the
distinction between the CORPUS case and the
case at bar.
a. In CORPUS, the civil liability is
predicated on criminal negligence.
Hence, by filing it independently is not
allowed pending resolution of the
criminal case.
In the case at bar, however, the civil
liability is predicated on quasi-delict,
which is an independent source of
obligation. Such quasi-delict is based on
the alleged negligence of ILAGAN as
driver of the BLTB.
b. In CORPUS, the civil case was filed only
after 5 years during which the appeal on
the criminal action was pending. Even if
it was predicated on quasi-delict, the
action had already long prescribed,
hence dismissible on said ground.
In the case at bar, however, the civil
action under quasi-delict was filed only a
few months after the mishap. Hence, it
was timely and properly filed.
2. Since the action was based on quasi-delict,
being an independent source of obligation:
a. It is not intended to be merged with
the criminal action; and
b. It is not required that the injured
party seek out a third person
criminally liable whose prosecution
is a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil rights.
c. What is merely required is that:
i. There is an act or omission:
1. Without willful intent
2. But by mere negligence
or inattention;
ii. Which causes damage to
another.
VIRATA VS OCHOA
[RE: SCA FOR DAMAGES]
This involves a SCA for damages filed by the
VIRATAs, who were the heirs of the deceased
pedestrian, Arsenio Virata, as against OCHOA
and BORILLA, the driver and operator of a
jeepney, respectively.
FACTS:
1. ARSENIO VIRATA was walking along
Taft Avenue, Pasay City, when suddenly
he was bumped by a passenger jeepney
driven by BORILLA, who was the
employee of OCHOA.
2. This prompted the VIRATAS to file an
action for homicide through reckless
imprudence against BORILLA, with
reservation to file a separate civil action
for damages against the driver.
3. Later, a separate civil action for
damages was filed by the VIRATAS
based on quasi-delict against driver
BORILLA and employer OCHOA.
OCHOA/BORILLAS defense: They filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the
criminal action already acquitted BORILLA,
arguing that such acquittal bars the filing of the
SCA for damages.
ISSUE: WON the SCA for damages may
prosper notwithstanding the acquittal of the
driver in the criminal action.
HELD: YES. The SCA for damages prospers.
In negligence cases, the parties have the
freedom to choose between an action under
the RPC or under ART. 2176 of the NCC on
quas-delicts. What is prohibited under ART.
2177, NCC is double recovery for the same
negligent act.
Hence, nowhere does the law disallows the
filing of a separate civil action, even when the
criminal action is rendered to acquit the
supposed negligent party.
Although an acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence may bar an action for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, such
acquittal will not bar a subsequent civil action
for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa
acquiliana.
Here, VIRATAS reserved their right to file a
separate civil action for damages, the source of
the obligation thereof is quasi-delict, and not an
act or omission punishable by law. Thus, said
civil action for damages on quasi-delict may
prosper irrespective of the drivers acquittal in
the criminal case.
ABS-CBN VS CA, RBC

(SEE SEPARATE DIGEST)

GILCHRIST VS CUDDY
[RE: DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA N/A]
This involves an application for ex parte
mandatory injunction filed by GILCHRIST
against CUDDY and another application for ex
parte preliminary injunction against ESPEJO &
ZALDARRIAGA.
FACTS:
1. CUDDY here is the owner of a film
ZIGOMAR.
2. Initially, CUDDY entered into a contract
with GILCHRIST to have said film rented
for film-showing in his theater for a
rental price of P125, the delivery thereof
was supposed to be made a week after
the contract was entered into.
3. However, days prior to the delivery of
the film, CUDDY returned the P125 to
GILCHRIST, claiming that CUDDY made
other rental arrangements with ESPEJO
& ZALDARRIAGA for the price of P350.
4. This prompted GILCHRIST to file an
application for injunction against
CUDDY, to compel the performance of
the contract, and against ESPEJO AND
ZALDARRIAGA, to prohibit the film-
showing.
ISSUE: WON ESPEJO & ZALDARRIAGA are
liable for interfering with the contract between
CUDDY & GILCHRIST.
HELD: YES. They are LIABLE.
By principle, everyone has a right to enjoy the
fruits and advantages of his own industry,
enterprise, skill and credit.
a. GR: If disturbance or loss was due to
competition or exercise of like rights by
others, there is damnum absque
injuria (loss without injury).
Thus, there is no cause of action and
there is no liability.
b. EX: where there is some superior right
by contract or otherwise is interfered
with.
Thus, there is legal injury which gives
rise to a cause of action and/or liability.
Here, DAI is not applicable because it is
no longer without injury.
Here, ESPEJO & ZALDARRIAGAS only
motive for the interference on the GILCHRIST-
CUDDY contract is the formers desire to make
profit from exhibiting the film in their theater.
- Truly, there was no malice.
- But that fact alone does not relieve them
from legal liability for interfering in the
contract which caused CUDDY to
breach his contract with GILCHRIST.
- Such liability arises from an unlawful
act.
BPI EXPRESS VS CA,
MARASIGAN
[RE; DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA N/A]
This involves a complaint for damages filed by
ATTY. MARASIGAN against BECC (BPI
Express Card Corp.) in relation to the
dishonoring of the formers credit card.
FACTS:
1. ATTY. MARASIGAN was issued a credit
card by BECC.
2. Problem is, ATTY. MARASIGAN has
consistently exceeded his credit limits,
although this was initially tolerated by
BECC.
3. However, there was default in the
payment of the October 1989 account
with an outstanding balance of
P8,987.94.
4. According to ATTY. MARASIGAN, he
could not pay the October 1989 account
yet because he was still in Quezon City
attending professional and personal
matters.
5. In view thereof, BECC proposed to pay
P15,000 instead, in order to include the
future accounts.
6. Thus, ATTY. MARASIGAN issued a
check of P15,000 which was post-dated
on Dec. 15, 1989.
7. However, the check was not
immediately delivered to the head of
collection department. Thus, BECC sent
an ordinary mail to ATTY. MARASIGAN
informing him of the temporary
suspension of the privileges of his credit
card and his inclusion in the Caution
List.
8. But, confident that the said issuance of
his check already relieved from liability,
ATTY. MARASIGAN invited guests at
Caf Adriatico.
9. Problem is, when ATTY. MARASIGAN
presented his credit card for payment,
this was dishonored. In effect, it was one
of his guests who shouldered the bill
instead.
10. This, to ATTY. MARASIGAN, was
considered embarrassing, thereby
prompting him to file a complaint for
damages against BECC.
RTC: ruled in favor of ATTY. MARASIGAN and
held BECC liable for damages for abuse of
rights in contravention of ART. 19, NCC.
CA: affirmed.
ISSUE: WON there is damnum absque injuria
thereby relieving BECC from any liability.
HELD: YES. There was DAI. BECC is not
liable.
Damnum absque injuria means loss or damage
without legal injury. In this case,
a. There was damage on the part of ATTY.
MARASIGAN, that is the humiliation and
embarrassment brought about by the
dishonored credit card; but
b. There was no legal injury caused by
BECC. There was no abuse of rights
under ART. 19, because:
a. BECC was legally authorized to
suspend the credit card, based
on the terms and conditions of
the credit card, which provides:
That the credit card may
be automatically
suspended upon
nonpayment of the
outstanding balance within
30 days from the original
billing.
b. The fact that ATTY MARASIGAN
issued a check cannot be
deemed tantamount to payment,
because check, unlike cash, is
not a legal tender.
Hence, the issuance of the
postdated check is not
effective payment at all.
c. There was no abuse of rights
because there was no malice or
bad faith on BECCs part in
suspending the credit card. In
fact, it had already provided
special accommodations for
ATTY MARASIGAN to settle his
obligations.