Laurel v Garcia

FACTS:
2 consolidated cases on the bidding for Roppongi land. Pursuant to Repatriation Agreement with Japan (for lives lost in
WWII), Phil acquired 4 properties (Roppongi, Nampeidal, Kobe commercial, and Kobe residential). Roppongi, listed under "gov't
sector," used to be the site of Phil embassy (transferred to Nampeidal, since needed major repairs but remained undeveloped). A
proposal for lease agreement (Japan will construct 2 buildings in Roppongi and 1 in Nampedai, Phil will pay rent; but no change of
ownership) was present to Pres Aquino but was not acted upon. Pres Aquino issued EO296 allowing non-Filipinos to avail of
government property (4 properties mentioned in whereas clause). VP Laurel argued property is of public dominion. Respondents
argued laws of Japan applied in acquisition of title to property. Respondents also argued that Executive and Congress intended to
convert such properties to private use through overt acts: transfer of Phil embassy, AO/EOs issued, holding of public bidding (which
failed), Senate resolution (deferment of bidding to another date) , and court decision (dismissing complaint to enjoin second
bidding).
ISSUE:
1. W/N Roppongi property may be alienated by Phil government.
2. W/N law of Japan should apply.
HELD:
1. YES. First, no question that property is of public dominion since it belongs to the state and is intended for some public service (Art
420, par 2). However, conversion only happens if property is withdrawn from public use (abandonment cannot be inferred from non-
use alone). Second, assuming that property is no longer of public dominion, any conveyance requires concurrence of Executive and
Legislative (Admin Code). Thus, Executive alone (as in this case) does not have authority to sell, but said property may be alienated
by the Phil government (needs concurrence with legislative through a law; none in this case).
2. NO. First, conflict of law situation only arises when (i) there is a dispute on title or ownership and (ii) a foreign law on land
ownership is asserted. In this case, no question that property belongs to Phil and no Japan law presented. Second, the DOJ opinion
on who can acquire the Roppongi lot (based on Japan law) need not be discussed since there is no showing that the property, at
present, may be sold.
J. Cruz, Padilla, and Sarmiento (Concurring)
J. Feliciano (Dissenting): CC does not provide for procedure on conversion (under Ignacio case, Executive or Legislative may show
intent to convert; same for property of public dominion and property of municipal corps). Assuming that property is patrimonial,
Public Land Act authorizes Sec of Agriculture to sell or lease land of private domain (not limited to agri land).