RATIONALITY, SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND FREUDIAN ESPITEMOLOGY

The significance of Freud for understanding the development of the scientific enterprise is most
sharply set forth in French Conventionalism. (See Baston Bachelard, La Formation de L'Esprit
Sci ent i fique: Contribution a une Psychanalyse de la connaissance objective [Paris: Librairie
Philosophiq ue J. Vriu ,1938].) The Bachelard school of scientific philosophy was totally
opposed to the Positivism as developed in the Machian school in Germany. (See my forthcoming
God, Creation, Rationality of Scientific Development with special attention to T. Kuhn's Theory
of Scientific Progress.)

Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, has had profound impact on the contemporary
view of man. Whether his philosophical, theological, or even psychological theories are accurate
or inaccurate, it must be admitted that his work and writings have revolutionized the Western
world's concept of "rational" man. His name has often been placed alongside those of Copernicus
and Darwin as one of three historic threats to man. Freud's revolutionary thrust was that man is
not in rational control over his destinyrather, much of man's behavior is a result of
subconscious drives and instincts.

Freud's influence is evident. His concepts began to be felt in neurology, psychology, and
psychiatry, and later in medicine in general and the other helping professions. Then he began Co
be taken seriously by philosophers and theologians. Now his influence has filtered down through
all of society into school textbooks, advertisement in mass media, the home, and even the church
itself.

He was one of the revolutionary thinkers of our time, changing part of our world by changing the
way people look at it. La Piere says that Freud "had the unusual distinction of providing the
twentieth century with a new and very radical idea of man, and of living to see that idea rise to a
position of dominance in the thought of Western peoples."1

But what of the validity of Freud's concepts? From what philosophical perspectives does he write
and what are his presuppositions? Is he consistent in his approach? Those are large and important
questions and this paper will focus on one salient philosophical problem involved: the theory of
knowledge in the work of Sigmund Freud.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the epistemology implicit in Freud's writings. Granted,
"Freud was no philosopher."2 And statements in Freud explicitly related to a theory of knowledge
are extremely few. But even major doctrine does have an epistemology, even if implicit, and
Freud's is no exception. The subject becomes vital when that doctrine attacks not only the church
but the very heart of the Christian faithwhich Freud's does.

We will look at the few direct comments Freud made on the subject of knowledge and then
examine briefly his approach. We will take notice not only of his philosophical background and
leanings, but also of the direction in which his implicit philosophy leads. The thesis of this paper
is that Freud, while professing to hold to a purely scientific approach, is non-scientific in his
methodology and in his conclusions, and that Freud's epistemology is false as clearly
demonstrated in his own writings.
 Theory of Knowledge and Psychoanalysis

Epistemology

According to Hamlyn, "Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, is that branch of philosophy

which is concerned with the nature and scope of knowledge, its presuppositions and basis, and
the general reliability of claims to knowledge."3 Epistemology is important, then, when one
studies Freud because Freud makes certain knowledge claimsclaims about man, his nature, his
thought, his behavior, and his religion. Because Freud presents a revolutionary concept of man
and delivers a seemingly fatal blow to man's religion, it becomes imperative to examine the
presuppositions, bases, and reliability of his claims to knowledge.

Kaplan writes, "The aim of epistemology is to provide a theory of knowledge which accounts for
the origin content, and validity of knowledge, in whatever form it occurs."4 The form in which it
occurs in Freud is implicit, but it is there. Therefore, following Kaplan's categories, the questions
become as follows:

1. What are Freud's claims about knowledge?

2. How does he arrive at them?
3. Are they demonstrably true?

Concerning the difference between the tasks of psychology and those of epistemology, Hamlyn
writes:

Epistemology differs from psychology in that it is not concerned with why men
hold the beliefs that they do or with the ways in which they come to hold them.
Psychologists can, in principle, give explanations of why people hold the beliefs
they do, but they are not necessarily competent, nor is it their province, to say
whether the beliefs are based on good ground or whether they are sound. . . . The
epistemologist, however, is concerned not with whether or how we can be said to
know some particular truth but with whether we are justified in claiming
knowledge of some whole class of truths, or, indeed, whether knowledge is
possible at all.5

Assuming this distinction is accurate, it appears that Freud, as a physician and psychologist, is
out of line when he attempts to justify his knowledge claims. Nevertheless, he does make such
claims and he does attempt to justify them. This leads us to the first question arising out of
Kaplan's categories: what are Freud's claims?

Freud's Theory of Knowledge

More than once Freud assumes the position of an empiricist and a postivist and claims that
knowledge can be gained only by scientific observation of experiences. For example, in his
classic The Future of an Illusion, he writes, "But scientific work is the only road which can lead
us to a knowledge of reality outside ourselves."6 Later in the same work he restates his premise,

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only in a milder form, this time concerning the possibility of knowledge of reality: "We believe
that it is possible for scientific work to gain some knowledge about the reality of the world . . ."7

In his New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud writes that there is no other source of
knowledge of the universe than the "intellectual manipulation of carefully verified observations,"
which he calls research. He states further that no knowledge can be gained by "revelation,
intuition, or inspiration."8 Levi describes Freud's Weltanschauung as "simply an adherence to the
acknowledged principles of nineteenth century scientific methodology."9 Freud claims that
psychoanalysis is a science, and it may be described as a "natural science" and as an "empirical
science."10

Freud takes an uncompromising stand upon the method of empirical science. He claims that the
systems of philosophy and religion and the creations of art have met certain needs of man, but
they are illusions and as such cannot be considered sources of knowledge. As a matter of fact,
they sap whatever precious energy could otherwise be directed toward reality.11

Freud writes that religion is an illusion of man, derived from human "wishes." As such, it "need
not be necessarily false." It is just that whatever relations it may have to reality are disregarded,
since those relations cannot be verified.12 This is supposedly totally unlike his psychoanalytic
method, which he calls scientific investigation. His very last statement in The Future of an
Illusion is a courageous one indeed: "No, our science is no illusion. But an illusion it would be to
suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere."13

He first claims that reality is objectiveit is that which exists outside man and independent of
man, and the adequacy of knowledge is measurable by the degree to which that knowledge
corresponds with reality. This correspondence with the external world he calls "truth," and that
truth is the aim of scientific investigation.

However, in 1915-16 and 1916-17, in his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis at the Vienna
Psychiatric Clinic, Freud admitted that psychoanalysis is symbolic interchange and not publicly
verifiable. "The dialogue which forms the analysis can have no audience. The process cannot be
demonstrated. It can only be reported secondhand."14 Levi is correct when he calls this "frank
denial of objectivity."

Then toward the end of his life, in An Outline of Psychoanalysis, the last work of any importance
by him, Freud returned to the question of empirical validity. The "empirical methodology" of his
psychoanalysis had been severely criticized when he finally wrote, "So we endeavor to increase
the efficiency of our sense organs as far as possible by artificial aids; but it is to be expected that
such efforts will fail to affect the ultimate result. Reality will always remain 'unknowable.' . . .
What we 'know' is only a reproduction or reflection in the internal world of our thoughts of what
is actually present in the external world."15 Freud has come a long way from his first bold
statements on knowledge and his scientific method of psychoanalysis.

Critique of Freud's Epistemology

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The first problem with Freud's theory of knowledge is his assumption that scientific work is the
only road which can lead to a knowledge of reality. Shrader suggests that the obvious objection
to such an assumption is that man does come to know reality in various non-scientific ways, for
example, through such normative disciplines as ethics.16 Other philosophers correctly point out
that certain a priori statements are operative before the scientific method is employed, and that
knowledge may be obtained before or without its physical verification. Still another exception
involves the fact that not all truths are reducible to physical examination.

The second epistemological problem is one of inconsistency. Freud asserts that only scientific
claims describe reality and only they should be believed. He then asserts that his claims describe
reality and they should be believed. Whether or not his first assertion is true (which it is not), it is
incumbent on Freud to present a scientific foundation for his own claims. This he does not do.17
There are no "facts" in psychoanalysis. The analyst interprets rather than observes.18 And as
stated above, the interchange is not publicly verifiable and the process cannot be demonstrated.

He offers no scientific explanation of his claims that man needs a father-God, that cannibalism
and incest are natural instincts, or that religion arose out of the behavior of the primal horde,
narcissism, or the Oedipus Complex. In fact, Adler, Fromm, Jung, and others from the early
Freudian school have theories of man and religion which directly oppose many of Freud's so-
called "scientific" views. Shrader concludes by saying that while Freud demands a scientific
analysis of reality he fails to provide such an analysis in his own theories.19

Since Freud, in two of his major works, admits that his psychoanalytic method is not
comprehensive, not complete, not self-contained, and not proved but merely hypothetical, it
seems strange that he can describe his method as scientific.20 Further, it is appalling that Freud,
who confesses that psychoanalysis is incapable of adequately explaining any phenomenon, can
call religion an illusion because it cannot be proved and because there are no scientific grounds
for its claimsand yet he still calls his method scientific and not an illusion.

Shrader states that a good case can be made for the thesis that psychoanalysis is neither empirical
(observational) nor scientific.21 Riceour calls psychoanalysis a "retarded form of observational
theory" and says that its "hypotheses" are "metaphors." He draws a sharp distinction between it
and psychology.

The third problem with Freud's epistemology concerns testability. MacIntyre states that, when it
comes to the truthfulness of Freud's doctrines, two criticisms must be taken very seriously:

1. The fact that a great deal of his theory remains untested, and that where there is experimental
or clinical evidence on particular issues, Freud is sometimes clearly mistaken.22
2. That the psychoanalytic theory is in principle unfalsifiable, untestable, and therefore
empirically vacuous.

Maclntyre allows that Freud's claims do at times involve predictions about human behavior
which have been tested, with the results sometimes proving and at other times disproving his
claims. The fact remains, however, that most of his major claims simply are not testable and

4
could never be supported empirically--such as the divisions of human mental functioning into the
id, ego, and super ego.

Popper claims that "falsifiability" or refutability is a criterion of the scientific status of a theory,
and he holds that any theory that is not refutable by an conceivable event is non-scientific. As an
example, he contrasts the Marxist theory of history with Freud's psychoanalytic theory. Popper
concludes that, whereas Marx's theory was testable, but in fact falsified, Freud's theory was
simply non-testable, irrefutable.23

Concluding Remarks (cf. also Jung's influence on Hermeneutics)

A thorough epistemological study of the psychoanalytic movement has yet to be written, but
such a study would be quite valuable. On the one hand, the influences of "scientific"
psychoanalysis are too readily accepted by many "Christian" counselors (albeit subconsciously),
and on the other hand, its philosophical ramifications are too quickly brushed aside by
theologians.

Freud was the child of nineteenth century scientific materialism, the materialism of Helmholtz
and Mach, which took for granted the assumptions of physicalism and determinism.24 According
to Habermas, Freud began with Nietzsche's epistemology, which operates on two postivist
assumptions:

1. The traditional critique of knowledge, from Kant to Schopenhauer, advocated an unverifiable

claim, that is, the knowing subject's reflection on itself.
2. Only that information which meets the criteria of empirical-scientific results counts as
knowledge in a rigorous sense.25

Levi observes that Freud imperceptibly moved from the epistemology of Locke to that of Kant
without crossing the stage of Hume, which comes in between.26 He began with a representative
theory of perception quite adequate to his mechanistic biology. But in investigating man's inner
life, he was compelled to move farther toward the idea of a psychical apparatus not accessible to
direct perception. The unconscious was a ding-an-sich, beyond the reach of immediate
perceptual knowledge.

Toward the end of his life, Freud arrived at a Kantian phenomenalism, distinguishing between
appearance and reality. Such a view was far removed from the "naive realism and the easy
scientific optimism of his youth."27 Now he resigned himself to saying, reality will always
remain unknowable. Such an impasse was unavoidable.

Alston addresses himself to the question of the validity of Freud's epistemological claims. How
can theoretical principles couched in these terms be put to an empirical test? "Thus it would
seem that before psychoanalytic theory can enjoy a firm empirical foundation, its practitioners
must either develop explicit and workable objective criteria for the adequacy of interpretations of
clinical phenomena in terms of unconscious factors, or do more to derive testable general
hypotheses from the theory, or do both.28 I conclude that Freud's epistemology is invalid and
inconsistent, and that Alston's is an unrealistic hope.

5
 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1967 ed. s.v. "History of Epistemology," by D. W. Hamlyn.

________. s.v. "Logical Status Psychoanalytic Theories," by William P. Alston.
________. s.v. "Sigmund Freud," by Alasdair Maclntyre.
Freud, Sigmund. An Outline of Psychoanalysis. New York: W. W. Norton, 1949.
________. Delusion and Dream and Other Essays. Edited by Philip Rieff. Boston: Beacon Press,
1956.
________. The Future of an Illusion. Translated by W. E. Robson Scott. Revised and edited by
James Strachey. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1964.
________. Moses and Monotheism. Translated by Katherine Jones. New York: Random House,
1939.
________. New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. Translated by W. J. H. Sprott. New
York: W. W. Norton, 1933.
________. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud.
Edited by James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1953-.
________. Totem and Taboo. London: Hograth Press, 1950.
Habermas, Juergen. Knowledge and Human Interests. Translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro. Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971.
Kaplan, Abraham. "Freud and Modern Philosophy." In Freud and the 20th Century, edited by
Benjamin Nelson. New York: World Publishing, 1957.
La Piere, Richard. The Freudian Ethic. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1959.
Levi, Albert William. Philosophy and the Modern World. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1959.
Popper, Karl. "Scientific Theory and Falsifiability." In Problems of Philosophy, edited by J. A.
Mourant and E. H. Freund. New York: Macmillan, 1964.
Shrader, K. S. "A Critique of Freud's Philosophy of Religion." Philosophy Today 19 (Fall, 1975)
213-27.

James D. Strauss

6
1
Richard La Piere, The Freudian Ethic (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1959), p. 33.
2
Juergen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 214.
3
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "History of Epistemology," by D. W. Hamlyn.
4
Abraham Kaplan, "Freud and Modern Philosophy," in Freud and the 20th Century, ed. Benjamin
Nelson (New York: World Publishing Co., 1957), p. 210.
5
Hamlyn, "History of Epistemology," p. 9.
6
Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. W. D. Robson-Scott, rev. and ed. James Strachey
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 50. See also New Introductory Lectures, pp. 159-60,
175-76.
7
Freud, Illusion, p. 90.
8
Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. W. J. H. Sprott (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1933), p. 216, Lecture 35.
9
Albert William Levi, Philosophy and the Modern World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1959), p. 152.
10
Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katharine Jones (New York: Random House,
1939), pp. 282, 253.
11
Levi, Philosophy and the Modern World, p. 152.
12
Freud. The Future of an Illusion, p. 49.
13
Ibid., p. 92.
14
As quoted by Levi, Philosophy, p. 154.
15
Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1949), p. 105.
16
K. S. Shrader, "A Critique of Freud's Philosophy of Religion," Philosophy Today 19 (Fall, 1975):
215.
17
Ibid., p. 219.
18
Ibid., p. 227, footnote 52.
19
Ibid., p. 219.
20
Freud, Lectures, p. 182, and Moses, p. 282.
21
Shrader, "Critique," p. 227.
22
Alister Maclntyre, "Sigmund Freud," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 3:252.
23
Karl Popper, "Scientific Theory and Falsifiability," in Problems of Philosophy, pp. 547ff.
24
Levi, Philosophy, p. 151.
25
Habermas, Knowledge, p. 290.
26
Levi, Philosophy, p. 159.
27
Ibid.
28
William P. Alston, "Logical Status of Psychoanalytic Theories," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
6, 516.