Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Joshua Gans
Tirole Mini-Course, 2010
xt Increased
New Goods Productivity
at t
t
A Appropriated
Increase in
Knowledge
δ H A (At + A t ) t +1
A
Future Knowledge
R&D Productivity
Spillover
• Publications
• But disclosures assist competition: choice to disclose is endogenous
d : level of disclosure
∂F Easier to reverse
Pr(Entry) = F(d) >0
∂d engineer
Innovator Π
− F(d)(Π − π )
Maximises Monopoly
Profit
Competitive
Profit
d =0
*
• Suppose that the innovator is not the ‘best’ agent to commercialise the
innovation
• Example: established firm with complementary assets that must otherwise
be duplicated at cost higher than the monopoly profits.
• Suppose that disclosure requires effort and is also non-contractible (tacit
knowledge; Arora, 1995) but increases profits, Π’(d) > 0. Will only choose to
disclose prior to agreement (no profit sharing)
• Innovator appropriates some share of the gains from trade
∂s ∂s
∂d∂s
<0
Possible that markets for ideas work best when the price
is equal to zero!
Commercial Patent-Paper
1
Science Pairs
Patent
(i)
0 Secrecy Open Science
• Scientist
U= w + bS d
wage kudos
• Firm (Funder)
Random
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (id PAT + d − α id PAT d)
Pr(Disclosure) Fixed
= Pr (entry) Cost, θ
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
0 0
Π
− k − w − Pr(successful entry)(Π − π )
Monopoly capital Competitive
Profit cost Profit
Pr (successful entry)
= (1 − i ρ )Pr(entry)
= (1 − i ρ ) ( (1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d))
Patent
strength
Commercial Patent-Paper Pairs
Science
Open
Secrecy
Science
Kudos
Patent
strength Commercial
Science
Patent-Paper Pairs
Open
Secrecy Science
Kudos