Critical Naturalism or the Naturalization of the Social: a Dialectical Critique of Bhaskar’s Philosophy of Social Science Samir Gandesha {Some eminons wil be sare bye mast mae pach ‘ede mot mc ton wtb ean however even oaph he me developed anges he lat and chnctensies in commen wid ela detcoea evel, jut hs igs wih arent peal on, mt te spared ou fa he deceit vad odontal nh any—wtch as sey from the wenty of te sabject, humanity. andthe aes sare exellent esc Tae she Doadty of hse morn enon wh demote he Stemiy and harwiounes een sell len ins pting Mass, Crd ‘The loss of memory is transcendental contin of scence, All eiicaton i forgetting. Horkheimer and Adomo, Dialectic of Enlightenment ‘According to Roy Bhastar, the fundamental problem within the pilosophy of social scence centres on the degree to which soclty can be studied im the same way as nature. In The Possibility of AUTHOR'S NOTE! wa stat Les Pic, Mica! Seto on on nae ‘notre prog hp commen oro eta eof pe 2 (Citical Naturalism or the Naturalization ofthe Social ‘Nauralism-—through a crique of both posivism and hermeneutics — ‘Bhaskar attempts to delimit the wean fra imited «crt realsm {na manner similar to Kant’ efforts to ascerai the limits of pre rea- son (CE. Kant, 1934). Bhaskar’s erica elim agrees with positivism as 0 the essential unity of scientific logic and with philosophical ‘hermeneutic in terms ofits sensitivity wo the specificity ofits object of ingiry.! In this pope, I propose to utlne the rudiments of Bhaskars ‘old atempt o elaborate aerial naturalism, before subjecting ito 8 critical interrogation. The question I wish to pose isthe folowing: oes social seientifie naturaliem, however eral, naturalize, and hence onologize, seca elatons? Critical Naturalism Bhaskar’ critical naturalism, based on a wanscendental realist ‘ontology and a corespondingepisiemology,alempis to chart a mide path between positivism, on the one hand, and hermeneutics on the ‘ber. Bhaskar makes the somewhat dubious cli that despite the di ferences between the two positions, in terms of thee substantive ‘methodological approaches tothe study of sciety, they are both based ‘onan empiricist ontology; tht iso sy, bth discourses coasier the “rea” to be that which is immediatly given to sense perception and ‘experience® Against such an empiricist ontology, Bhaskar argues ‘emphatically thatthe “real” mast not be conceived of in immediate {erm reality isnot comprised ofthe phenomenal or surface forms ‘which preset themselves to sense perception, Rather, ality consists ofthe underlying, ranscendental conditions of possibilty for such forms. Is in this manner that Bhaskar endeavours to ditnguih his leanscendenial realism from the empiricist realism of positivism and | Thi mien othe pei of he bj eect Ailes ‘oe palin he Mchoachat Eh, Aina tgas nso Mn Pas ‘St “Oar cat oli cence il be negate tins ch ety ‘Aetna lon fot etme ee of cic not toed hc fer any mre tas i al pro of (9) nd Cader (375. 2s aoe hacen teas homens ime pein, ‘else snr gen nen wedi wey sae pcp Reh ‘nay aly surpass natePROBLEMATIQUE hermeneuties. ‘This distinction between the transcendental ontological structure of ‘object and hic empirical forms i made clearer ail by Bhastar's dis tinction between the “iransitive” and “intransitive” dimensions of objects. The late constitu the possibilty conditions of science they ‘me the necessary causal relations which hold independently of the knowledge of them. Thus the inransive dimensions of abject ae ‘analogous 10 Kan's conception of noumens—the Ding-An-Sich (or ‘thing-in-tse)—though, for Kan, these were not knowsble. In ‘Bhaskar's ‘overlooked by positivism and hermeneutics alike. The transitive dimension of social objects ae his- terically contingent, they are consanily inthe process of tansmuia tin. “White this mension of social objets falls under the rubric of philosophical sociology the inansiive dimension constitutes the sub Jet mater of pilosphical onology.. Here itis possible to delet a lose resemblance between Bhaskar formulations and the basesuper- Structure metaphor within historical materialism; this is elation to Which we will turn below. In Bhaskar's view, iis imperative 0 ‘cablish a distinction between the necessary and contingent dimen. sions ofthe object inorder to avoid reducing being to thought |e follows from this that science i the poction of knowledge of the invansive dimensions of objects. Scien method consists of “the movement a any one level from knowledge of manifest "nao knowledge ofthe stractres that generate them” (Bhaskar 1979: 17), Objects ofseienifc inquiry ae never merely given empirically or ae they “determinate chunks of the woed”. Rather, they ae real suetures whose actual presence and appropiate concep’ mast be gen ‘ate by the theoretical and experimental work of science, In order 10 ‘Sudy societies and people, we must know what kinds of things they ‘inorder wo atin seientifc knowledge of them.3 ‘Bhaskar ths poses the following question: what propries do soci- 3, Now isi con pone which Bhar ihe fm Katt Hee enh Kaan cite nel we tem nase Iwi fei ote wet ew eb oi Hepl rN Py (Citical Naturalism or the Naturalization ofthe Social ‘tes and people possess that might make them possible objects of Knowledge for us. In contrast to Kant, whose “anscendenial ded tion” moves from the object to its subjective conditions of possibility Bhaskar dos te exact opposite. He begins withthe subjective faci ‘ty of scientific lnowledge and then deduces the posbilty conditions ofthat knowledge which are located in the object. This is precisely the difference between Kants critical idealism snd Bhaskar’ rita real fm. For Kant, the transcendental possibility conditions ines in the ‘knowing, consiutive subject For Bhaskar, in contrat, the objects, in ight ofits imranstive dimensions, ranacendenal, Bhaskar's ask is tus to do forthe object, what Kant does for pure reason or tanscen ental subjectivity in is frst critique. ‘Tha isto say, he must show that ‘ot only in explanations inthe domains ofthe human sc- ences (and psychological) predicates ae irreducible (hich s consistent with a anscendental deals inerpre- ‘ation oftheir satus), but tha realitc interpretation of social scenic (and psychological theory in pinepe acceptable; that is tht some possible objects designated by social scientific (and psychological) theory are real (Bhaskar, 1979: 1619), Bhaskar goes on to delimit the properties of societies and individu als and their interetation. He singles ou three models for considera ion, subjets them toa critique, and then posits model of his own, Mode! Tis Weter's theory of social action, in which socal objects re onstituted by intentional or meaningful action. In Bhaskar's view, this model is undermined by it volutarim insofar as it accords pei. ‘macy othe agency of atomistic individuals inthe contttion of soci ty. Mode! II is Durkheimian theory which, in contrast to the ‘Weberan approach, understands the socal tality as possessing a ie fits own, standing over and above the individual, What characterizes this model is a rifcation ofthe socal, According to Bhaskar, these {wo aninomic models oa large extent strvture the Geld of social the This ic wht Kant meas when eer his “Capea eso” ia me ris. tates the primary fhe bj opsson othe pinay oh ‘Sa its lonon sa ein 2PROBLEMATIQUE ‘o7y—te various schools of phenomenology, existentialism and even ‘Marxism are vaiaons on these two themes. ‘The thi model is what Bhaskar calls the “ialectical mode” and is represented by the work of Peter Berger and hit collaborators. This ‘model atlempts to syathesize the antinomic poles represcnied by Models | and Il. In the dialectical model, there exists a circular rela. tionship—as opposed 10 the linear logics of Weberian and Durkheimian discourses—wterein society forms the individuals who ‘emselves form society. tn thi view, iis no possible o character the social structure apart from the human acti ‘Berger's Marxist-Heglin model implies tha here i a quale di ference between social and natural facts The social san objetfic tion ofthe man, while mani the internalization of te consciousness ofthe sac ‘A first glance, argues Bhaskar, th dialectical model appears 10 ‘sccount for both the subjective or internal spect of society as well a ‘ts objective or external dimensions. The respective problems of vol ‘ntarsm and reification in Weberian snd Durkbeimian social theories ave thereby avoided. On close inspection, however, this model is revealed wo be seriously awed. In Bhaskat's words “in seeking 10 ‘avoid the eros of both stereotypes, Model IT succeeds nly in comm bining them” (1979: 42). People and society are not, scoring 0 ‘Bhaskar, dialectically related, “ey do nt constitute (wo moments Of the same process. Rather they refer to radially different kinds of thing” (1979: 42), This, ofcourse, has to-do withthe distinction hetween tanshive and intransitive dimensions ofthe social. While individuals comprise the historiclly-contngent or tensive dimen sions of the object, society, as a tality, consis the intansiive or ‘uanscendenal dimensions of the obec of social science. ‘The fondamental weakness ofthe dialectical approach is that it pos- fulaes that men make or create society through action. However, according to Bhaskar, it is only accurate to sae that men ansfrm or ‘reproduce what is already made. Social life cannot therefore be reduced to the creative aciviy ofthe individual: society is aber, 9 5. Sach» wearin ssp mat ey he wf Lac ch ha fais then ae Th ply ec ha Giitial Naturalism or the Naturalization ofthe Social secessary condition for any intentional ction at all (1979: 43). This is Wwhat Bhaskar calls the “wansformatonal mode” of society which is {ymbolized by the analogy of the sculptor who must work only with the materials and tols avaiable wo him.® Bhaskar's"ransformationl model” incorporates both a notion ofthe “dalty of structure” aswell, a conception ofthe “duality of praxis”, "Society", according to Bhaskar, is both the ever-present condition (material cause) and the continually reproduced outcome of human agency. And praxis both work, that is conscious production, and (nor ‘mally unconscious) reproduction of the conditions of pro- action, that is society (1979: 43-4), ‘Bhaskar therefore makes a sharp ditncion betwee he genes of human actions which lie nthe reasons of inividats, onthe one and, and the roctres governing the reprodection and vasfomaton ‘sci ete onthe oer, This sa dsincton thn, between he social and the peychologial scenes paraleling Kans between he wnscendenl and enpirial subj Thowg ect is 8 necssary condition for nentons action, and vice-versa ne ie {etal model wich coneives ote cladoeship in cca ts, {in Bhaskar’ mal limasy, since the social e-eistsindivioas ‘se wancenden ground forthe late Marx’s Critique of Political Economy ‘As alluded to etir,Bhaskar’scritea realism bears marked afin ties with Marx's critique of politcal economy which i presened in its ‘most systematic frm in Capial. Gers argues that there are two theo retical foundations on which Marx's “science” rests (Geras, 1972: 285-86) The fet is based on a conception of the task of scientific ‘iscourse per se, it deals withthe concept of scienifiiy. For Mars, 6 Thine an Anton sey 1. Bimar noes enc of Cid “reentry on it own {Thorac ht om iti wal feouy 0 Ge iri of Marr's eqn opal cman. Asal de ea tel, wl be gud ‘haw Mrs rt ei cyst at hasa ”PROBLEMATIQUE {his concept is premised on a dusts between appearance and reaiy; ‘tno sich dualism existed, the notion of science would be supervous ‘The task of science as such i to mave from the level of appearances 0 ‘he undettyng realy concealed by i. This understanding scence i 8 applicable othe study of nature as it iso political economy for as Macx states, scientific analysis of competition isnot possible before we have a conception ofthe inner nature of capil, juss the apparent motions ofthe heavenly bodes arena intel sible 0 any but him who is scquainied with ii real ‘motions, motions which ae ot dietly percepible by the senses (ited in Gers, 1972: 285). According © Gers, this conception of scientific is hardly sais- factory fort provides no concrete justification as to wy it equally applicable othe critique of polical economy K does no, in other words, explain why there exists auch a rte between the escnee of socal relations and the form in which they appear to the subject, (Gera argues tat taken on its own, this answer isnot etely slisaciony. Ik makes of Marx's primary methodological injunction to hater the obviousness of immediate appearances —an abstract procedural rule which must form part of the ‘equipment of every scieace regardless ofthe content of that science, of the nate ofthe object of study (1972: 286), ‘ene, this frat theoretical foundation, doesnot speily how the ature of he object of socal science must aso be premised on ana ‘omic relationship between sease-perepton and cognition. {In Gera view, itis the second heretical foundation ihe doctrine of “commodity fetishism"—which eaublshes precisely the conditions f posit ofthe aninomicsrcture ofthe understanding within the ‘rtcular mode of roduction characterized by generalized commod. 'y production. ‘The esence of eishism ie tat it consties a disjne tw between social relaons andthe manner in which they ar exper ‘nce by its agens. The commodity, i is absraciness, conceals the (Critical Naturaliam or the Naturalization ofthe Social fact that itis the objectification of human labor power, the embod ment of socal relations of production. Hence, the fetshization of ‘commodities gives rise oa frame in which social relations cake onthe tppearance of relations between things. Feuishism is ultimately a thingifcaion ora misrecognition of human powers. As Lakacs (. 1971) and Adorno (cf. 1982) have argued in very different ways, this process of reification ofthe socal proces is reflected atthe level of Thought. The antinomic relation between real scil relations and the form in which they appear to sense-perception, finds its reflection in the “aninomies of bourgeois thought". Ii reflected, for instance, in the Kantian antinomies-between transcendental and empirical sub- ject, fact and value, is and ought, phenomenon and noumenon, form ‘nd content, etc—which esablish the finitde of human understand- ing. This aninomie stacture, elective of the diremptios ofcapial- iat social elation, i universalzed and is sai 0 characterize the Hints ‘and possibilities of human reason per se. I is precisely this type of thinking that thinkers from Fiche (o Gramsci have auerped wo over “Toming our atention back to Bhaskar, we can se that there exists a very lose similarity between his eitical realism and Marx's fst or ‘miversl conception of science, Both discourses agree tha science as ‘soch is premised on an asymmetry between being and though, essence ‘and appearance. The modus operandi of science isto move from the level of manifest content, to te Intent structures which give rie to it. ‘The real cannot, therefore, be understood as immediacy, but srr, that which makes posible manifest phenomena. The ation between ‘philosophical sociology and philosophical onoiogy—the former deal- {ng withthe “transitive” dimension of objects and the later dealing with the “intransitive” dimension of objects—has as its analogue ‘Marr's base-sopesicture metaphor. I is important bee te empha size that in this context, base is understood a5 prection in general. ‘The prodction and reproduction of social life is thus a transcendental condition of possibility of human existence. This dimension of the ‘socal is ieducible and therefore intransitive. The particular forms in ‘which social relations of production manifest themselves are, in con- ‘unt, historically contingent. AS Bhaskar states, “although it can bePROBLEMATIQUE stablished a prin that material production isa necessary condition of social ie, itcannot be proved that its an ukimaely determining one” (1979: 3). ‘The Naturalization of the Social? Despite the similares between Bhastar's method and Marx's con- ception of science, thee are aso considerable differences. Insofar as “Marx grounds his social scence ona specific understanding of com- ‘modiyfishism, he, by extension, limits its scope. Marx's concep of social scence i fundamentally dialectical, as opposed to tanscenden- tal (foe the diference between dalecsical and amine methods, = Hege’s rtiqae of Kan in Hegel, 1977), frit makes provision for ts ‘own se-overcoming, is own negation; that is wo say, Marrs theory is hermeneutically inked 9 praxis. This is precisely what Anthony Giddens means when he asets that social science, by i very nate, Participates in "Joule hermencuic": socal seience emerges within Fistral and philosophically delimited social field and subsequently ‘hs determinate, material effects on that horizon (Giddens, 1982: 1- 1, tis the aim of Masist theory w contibue tothe revolutionary ‘overcoming ofthe conditions of is own existence a8 sich-—capialist social elaions. For insane, nthe "Poslace™ wo the second edion (of Capital Vol 7, Marx states that in its rational form (ihe dialectic) isa scandal and an abomination to the bourgeoisie and its docrnaire spokes- ‘men, because it includes in ts positive understanding of wha exis a simultaneous recognition of is negation, its imevitable destruction; because it regards every historically ‘developed form as being in a uid sate, in motion, and therfore gasps its wansient aspect as well and Because it oes not et self be impressed by anything, being in its ‘very essence ral and revolutionary (Mara, 1977 103). Because dialectical method is based on the dynamic unity of frm and content, not only is the object conceived as being vulnerable to negation, but so 00 must dialectical thought give way 1 is own neg Critical Naturalism or the Naturalization of the Social tion (Adorno, 1973) ‘Marxist theory thus demonstrates (despite positivist imrpret- tions) a hermeneutical sensitivity to the specificity of its object. As (Geras makes quite clear in his critique of Althusser's hypostaization fof the antiomy between science and ideology, Mar leaves open the possiblity of 2 reconfiguration ofthe relationship between manifest {nd latent content in post-capialist social order. Geras reminds ws that “Mart anticipates 8 social formation where, precisely, men will ‘contol ther relations of production, rather than being controled by them, where they will therefore cease tobe functionaries and bearers” (Germs 1972: 291), In other words, in this post-capitalist social forma tion the antinomy between science and ideology, latent and manifest content, will be radically reconfigured, Geras’ critique of the binary oppositions within strucuralist ‘Marxism is equally applicable to erica! naturalism. Bhaskar takes 2 particular undersanding of science which is suited oa speci object. {nd aniverzlizes i. Hence, he relationship between the anscenden tal andthe empirical is hypostatized and, ulimacly, naturalized; tis shown 0 inhers inthe very stncture of societies as such, Because itis ‘based on a forgeing!® ofits own situatedness within specific social relaions!, Bhaska's erica realism ultimately doesnot serve as an adequate propaedeutic fr ideology critique, bt, rather, merely perpet ‘esa reification which bears the marks of those relations. ‘As Marx indicate in the Grandrisse, bourgeois politcal econo- ‘mists reity capitalist socia relations precisely because—i their forge ting ofthe historicity of socal relations —they iniversalize the partic lar, As we ave suggested above, this is precisely what we seein he 9.0. h Coben mts» sin eget steph om daly ent promis, ‘hen he wagers tnt Massa cece mas pooner so "eg ‘ve See Cate, (7). 1°” iene ing at hasta in como wih Ge. Gers esa ve ‘tte overcoming 3 eileibn hat wthog wo with mares Ta i Son ot Brera Pity sng ote bea of sna srg, (Ge gos in ter spi meme hat “What fe spn] mse oe Til ltt ronda nr it a Contes pos fst” (9723). He women oink ‘herein a even dere lu ewe ema nis 11” ey, star (989) mr mem chi rte mai in pbc con (rath "New Rely” prepa by Martin Toy 3PROBLEMATIQUE Critique of Pure Reason, in which Kant univeealizes the cognitive limitations of human relations as they existed ata parce historical ‘moment. Just as Kantian philosophy must be histrcized, Bhasar's ilosophy of science canbe said o be applicable only as a method 1 2 particular object—capitalist socety—in which tere dors exis» rup- ture between manifest and latent coment. Bhaskar is quite righ in ‘emphasizing thatthe task of science is wo push Beyond the level of| ‘manifest content, inorder vo ave atts undetyng «Inte possibl- ‘y conditions. However, when this method is universalized as pias: ‘phy of social sence pe se, it betrays its own emancipatory intent ‘emalizes the specific relation between essence and appearance, sci- fence and ideology. Despite Bhaskar's attempt 10 incorpor ‘Aristotelian insights ino his discourse, he fails wo pay auentionencugh to the paniculaity of the object. His critical natralism therefore demonstrates far more affinities with posi in its emphasis on th nity of scnuie method, Because it refuses to acknowledge is own historic? andthe possibility ofits own diletcal negation, cried ‘naturalism actualy coarbuts to a efeation ofthe sci Itdoes not admit of the possbily of a suture of slenie consciousness of ‘qualitatively different nature in a post captlist social formation in hich he direct produces are not estranged from the products of tee labour power. A necestary condition of the philosophy of socal ence, in contrast with Bhaska's rial nauralism, i remembrance ‘of its own embeddedness in social and political siruggtes.> A® dao once wr te conception of wu is ineatcal om the ‘ereton ofa ve society. Works Cited ‘Adomo, T.W. (1973) Negative Dialectics, ans. E.B. Ashton, New York: Seabury Press 1982), "Subject and Object”, in rao and Gebhardt (1982) Cridcal Naturalism or the Naturalization of the Soci ‘Arto, A., and Gebhardt, E. (1982), The Essemial Frankfurt School ‘Reader, New York: Continua, Bhaskar, Roy (1979),The Possibility of Naturaliom New Jersey Homanites Press. (1989), Reclaiming Realty, London: Verso. Blackburn, R.(ed.) (1972), Ideology in Social Science, Glasgow: Fontana, Cohen, G. A. 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