[G.R. No. 131442.
July 10, 2003] DEVELOPMENT
BANGUS FRY FISHERFOLK DIWATA MAGBUHOS, ANGELITA
BINAY, ELMA GARCIA, VIRGILIO PANGUIO, ARSENIO
CASTILLO, ARIEL PANGUIO, ANTONIO PANGUIO,
ANTONIO BUNQUIN, GENEROSO BUNQUIN, CHARLIE
DIMAYACYAC, RENATO PANGUIO, ATILANO BUNQUIN,
CARLOS CHAVEZ, JUAN DIMAYACYAC, FILEMON
BUNQUIN, MARIO MAGBUHOS, MAURO MAGBUHOS,
NORA MAGBUHOS, JEOVILYN, GENALYN and JORVAN
QUIMUEL, minors, represented by their parents
FELICIANA and SABINO QUIMUEL, MARICAR
MAGBUHOS, minor, represented by her
parents CARMELITA and ANTONIO MAGBUHOS, MARLO
BINAY, minor, represented by his parents EFRENITA and
CHARLITO BINAY, and the BANGUS, BANGUS FRY and
other MARINE LIFE OF MINOLO COVE, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE ENRICO LANZANAS as Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch VII, THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES Region IV, represented by its Regional
Executive Director and its Regional Director for
Environment, THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,
ORIENTAL MINDORO ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO,
herein represented by GOVERNOR RODOLFO VALENCIA,
PUERTO GALERA MAYOR GREGORIO DELGADO, VICE
MAYOR ARISTEO ATIENZA, and MEMBERS OF THE
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PUERTO GALERA, JUAN
ASCAN, JR., RAFAEL ROMEY, CENON SALCEDO, JERRY
DALISAY, SIMON BALITAAN, RENATO CATAQUIS,
MARCELINO BANAAG, DANIEL ENRIQUEZ, AMELYN
MARCO, GABRIEL ILAGAN, MUNICIPAL ENGINEER
RODEL RUBIO, and MUNICIPAL PLANNING and
COORDINATOR WILHELMINA
LINESES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the Order[2] dated 7 November
1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7 (Manila RTC),
dismissing petitioners complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.
The Facts
On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G.
Principe (RED Principe) of Region IV, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), issued an Environmental Clearance
Certificate (ECC) in favor of respondent National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a
temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San
Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and
breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone. [3]
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of
NAPOCORs power barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former
mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a
safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power barge would
provide the main source of power for the entire province of Oriental
Mindoro pending the construction of a land-based power plant in
Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the mooring facility was valid
for two years counted from its date of issuance or until 30 June 1999. [4]
Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro,
Puerto Galera,[5] sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. RED
Principe, however, denied petitioners plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July
1997, petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the issuance
of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility.
Impleaded as defendants were the following: (1) NAPOCOR, (2) RED
1
Principe, (3) DENR Region IV Technical Director for Environment
Oscar Dominguez, (4) Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative
(ORMECO), which is engaged in the distribution of electricity in
Oriental Mindoro, and (5) certain officials of Puerto Galera.
[6]
Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint to include as
additional defendants the elective officials of Oriental Mindoro
represented by then Governor Rodolfo G. Valencia. Petitioners further
prayed for the demolition of mooring structures that respondents had
already built.
On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the
trial court issued a 20-day temporary restraining order enjoining the
construction of the mooring facility. However, the trial court lifted the
same on 6 August 1997 on NAPOCORs manifestation that the
provincial government of Oriental Mindoro was the one undertaking the
construction of the mooring facility.[7]
On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents
ORMECO and the provincial officials of Oriental Mindoro moved to
dismiss the complaint. These respondents claimed that petitioners
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, rendering the complaint
without cause of action. They also asserted that the Manila RTC has
no jurisdiction to enjoin the construction of the mooring facility in
Oriental Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTCs territorial
jurisdiction.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no
need to exhaust administrative remedies. They argued that the
issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of Presidential Decree No.
1605,[8] Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160, [9] and the
provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 (DAO
96-37) on the documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also
claimed that the implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of
its terms.
In its order of 7 November 1997, the trial court granted the motion
and dismissed petitioners complaint.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial courts order dismissing the complaint reads in part:
Aftercarefulevaluationandanalysis,thisCourtfindstheMotiontoDismiss
tenableandmeritorious.
Petitionershaveclearlyfailedtoexhaustalladministrativeremediesbefore
takingthislegalactioninCourtxxx.
ItisxxxworthmentioningthatthedecisionoftheRegionalDirectormay
stillbexxxelevatedtotheOfficeoftheSecretaryoftheDENRtofully
complywiththeprocessofexhaustionofadministrativeremedies.Andwell
settledistheruleinourjurisdictionthatbeforebringinganactioninor
resortingtotheCourtsofJustice,allremediesofadministrativecharacter
affectingordeterminativeofthecontroversyatthatlevelshouldfirstbe
exhaustedbytheaggrievedparty(Pestanasvs.Dyogi,L25786,February27,
1978).Andpetitionersfailuretoexhaustadministrativeremediesrendershis
[sic]petitiondismissible(Chiavs.ActingCollectorofCustoms,177SCRA
755).Andadismissalonthegroundoffailuretoexhaustadministrative
remediesistantamounttoadismissalbasedonlackofcauseofaction
(Baguirovs.Basa,Jr.,214SCRA437;Pinedavs.CFIofDavao,111Phil.
643;Sarabiavs.SecretaryofAgriculture&NaturalResources,L16002,May
23,1961;Gone,etal.vs.DistrictEngineer,et.al.,L22782,August29,1975;
AbeAbe,etal.vs.Manta,et.al.,L4827,May31,1979)althoughitdoesnot
affectthejurisdictionofthecourtoverthesubjectmatter(Mun.ofLa
Trinidad,etal.vs.CFIofBaguioBenguet,etal.,L33889,June28,1983).
Moreover,thisCourtfindstheOppositionofthePetitionershighlyuntenable
andbereftofmeritsthatthecontrovertedactinquestionispatentlyillegaland
therewasanimmediateneedforjudicialintervention.
TheECCinquestionwasissuedbytheRegionalOfficeoftheDENRwhich
hasjurisdictionandauthorityoverthesamexxx.Andcorollarytothis,the
issueastowhetherornottheMinoloCoveiswithintheenclosedcovesand
watersembracedbyPuertoGalerabayandprotectedbyMedioislandisa
clearquestionoffactwhichtheDENRmayappropriatelyresolvebefore
resortingto[the]Court[s].
ThisCourtislikewiseawareandcognizantofitsterritorialjurisdictioninthe
enforcementofWritofInjunction.Thattruly,[a]writofinjunctioncanonly
beenforcedwithin[the]territorialjurisdictionofthisCourtbutnotforacts
whicharebeingorabouttobecommittedoutsideitsterritorial
jurisdiction.Thus,inPhilippineNationalBankvs.Pineda,197SCRA1,the
2
HonorableSupremeCourtruled:RegionalTrialCourtscanonlyenforcetheir
writsofinjunctionwithintheirrespectivedesignatedterritories.Furthermore,
wefindtheissuanceofthepreliminaryinjunctiondirectedagainstthe
ProvincialSheriffofNegrosOccidentalajurisdictionalpaux[sic]pas(from
BlackDictionarymeansjurisdictionalfalsity)astheCourtsofFirstInstance
nowRegionalTrialCourt[s],canonlyenforcetheirwritsofinjunctionwithin
theirrespectivedesignatedterritories.
Andfinally,thisCourtisnotunmindfuloftherelevantandsquareapplication
inthecaseatbarofPresidentialDecreeNo.1818,ExecutiveOrderNo.380
datedNovember27,1989,andCircularNo.291oftheSupremeCourtthat
theNationalPowerCorporation(NPC)isapublicutility,createdunder
speciallegislation,engagedinthegenerationanddistributionofelectric
powerandenergy.ThemooringsiteofNPCinPuertoGalera,Oriental
Mindoroisoneofitsinfrastructureprojectsfallingwithinthemantleof
ExecutiveOrderNo.380,November27,1989xxx.
AndasheldbytheSupremeCourtinthecaseofNationalPowerCorporation
vs.HonorableAbrahamP.Vera,etal.,170SCRA721,courtsarewithout
jurisdictiontoissueinjunctivewritsagainst[the]NationalPower
Corporation.ThelatterenjoystheprotectivemantleofP.D.1818,(Circular
No.291).
xxx
Injunctioninthiscaseisnotamereancillary[sic]writbutthemainaction
itselftogetherwiththeAnnulmentoftheEnvironmentalClearanceCertificate
(ECC).Evenassumingarguendothatthecourt[can]annultheECChowcan
thelatterenforcethesameagainsttheProvincialGovernmentofOriental
Mindorowhichwasimpleadedbythepetitionersasanecessarypartytogether
withtheOrientalMindoroElectricCooperativeandthegovernmentofficials
ofPuertoGalera,OrientalMindoro,whoseactsandfunctionsarebeing
performedoutsidetheterritorialjurisdictionofthiscourt?xxxIndisputably,
theinjunctionandannulmentofECCasprayedforinthepetitionare
inseparablexxx.
Theconclusion,therefore,isinescapablethatpetitionershavefailedto
exhaustalltheavailableadministrativeremediesandthisCourthasno
jurisdictiontoissuetheinjunctivewritprayedforintheAmended
[Complaint].[10]
The Issue
The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners
complaint for lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law. Such jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
reliefs sought.[11]
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners
principal cause of action is the alleged illegality of the issuance of the
ECC. The violation of laws on environmental protection and on local
government participation in the implementation of environmentally
critical projects is an issue that involves the validity of NAPOCORs
ECC. If the ECC is void, then as a necessary consequence,
NAPOCOR or the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro could not
construct the mooring facility. The subsidiary issue of non-compliance
with pertinent local ordinances in the construction of the mooring
facility becomes immaterial for purposes of granting petitioners main
prayer, which is the annulment of the ECC. Thus, if the court has
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of the ECC, then it
has jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners complaint.
Petitioners complaint is one that is not capable of pecuniary
estimation. It falls within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts under Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. The question of whether
petitioners should file their complaint in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila or Oriental Mindoro then becomes a matter of venue, to be
determined by the residence of the parties.[12]
Petitioners main prayer is the annulment of the ECC. The
principal respondent, DENR Region IV, has its main office at the L & S
Building, Roxas Boulevard, Manila.Regional Executive Director
Principe of the DENR Region IV, who issued the ECC, holds office
there. Plainly, the principal respondent resides in Manila, which is
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. Thus, petitioners
filed their complaint in the proper venue.
3
 On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to
issue injunctive writs is limited to acts committed or about to be
committed within their judicial region.[13]Moreover, Presidential Decree
No. 1818 (PD No. 1818) prohibited [14] courts from issuing injunctive
writs against government infrastructure projects like the mooring facility
in the present case. Republic Act No. 8975 (RA No. 8975), which took
effect on 26 November 2000, superseded PD No. 1818 and delineates
more clearly the coverage of the prohibition, reserves the power to
issue such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for
its violation.[15] Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental
Mindoro RTC can issue an injunctive writ to stop the construction of the
mooring facility. Only this Court can do so under PD No. 1818 and later
under RA No. 8975. Thus, the question of whether the Manila RTC has
jurisdiction over the complaint considering that its injunctive writ is not
enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is academic.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity
of the issuance of the ECC, although it could not issue an injunctive
writ against the DENR or NAPOCOR. However, since the construction
of the mooring facility could not proceed without a valid ECC, the
validity of the ECC remains the determinative issue in resolving
petitioners complaint.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the
courts, he should first avail of all the means afforded by administrative
processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery is
still available, with a procedure prescribed pursuant to law for an
administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first
exhaust such remedy before resorting to the courts. The premature
invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint without cause
of action and dismissible on such ground.[16]
RED Principe of the DENR Region IV Office issued the ECC
based on (1) Presidential Decree No. 1586 (PD No. 1586) and its
implementing rules establishing the Environmental Impact Statement
System, (2) DAO 96-37[17] and (3) the Procedural Manual of DAO 96-
37. Section 4[18] of PD No. 1586 requires a proponent of an
environmentally critical project, or a project located within an
environmentally critical area as declared by the President, to secure an
ECC prior to the projects operation. [19]NAPOCOR thus secured the
ECC because the mooring facility in Minolo Cove, while not an
environmentally critical project, is located within an environmentally
critical area under Presidential Proclamation No. 2146, issued on 14
December 1981.[20]
The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR
Regional Directors on the implementation of PD No. 1586 are found in
Article VI of DAO 96-37, which provides:
SECTION1.0.AppealtotheOfficeoftheSecretary.Anypartyaggrievedby
thefinaldecisionoftheREDmay,within15daysfromreceiptofsuch
decision,fileanappealwiththeOfficeoftheSecretary.Thedecisionofthe
Secretaryshallbeimmediatelyexecutory.
SECTION2.0.GroundsforAppeal.Thegroundsforappealshallbelimitedto
graveabuseofdiscretionandseriouserrorsinthefindingsoffactwhich
wouldcausegraveorirreparableinjurytotheaggrievedparty.Frivolous
appealsshallnotbecountenanced.
SECTION3.0.WhoMayAppeal.Theproponentoranystakeholder,including
butnotlimitedto,theLGUsconcernedandaffectedcommunities,mayfilean
appeal.
The DENR Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 explains these
provisions thus:
FinaldecisionsoftheREDmaybeappealed.Thesedecisionsincludethose
relatingtotheissuanceornonissuanceofanECC,andtheimpositionoffines
andpenalties.Byinference,thedecisionoftheSecretaryontheissuanceor
nonissuanceoftheECCmayalsobeappealedbasedonthisprovision.Resort
tocourtspriortoavailingofthisremedywouldmaketheappellantsaction
dismissibleonthegroundofnonexhaustionofadministrativeremedies.
Therighttoappealmustbeexercisedwithin15daysfromreceiptbythe
aggrievedpartyofsuchdecision.Failuretofilesuchappealwithinthe
requisiteperiodwillresultinthefinalityoftheREDsorSecretarys
decision(s),whichcannolongerbedisturbed.
AnappealshallnotstaytheeffectivityoftheREDsdecision,unlessthe
Secretarydirectsotherwise.
Therighttoappealdoesnotpreventtheaggrievedpartyfromfirstresortingto
thefilingofamotionforreconsiderationwiththeRED,togivetheREDan
opportunitytoreevaluatehisdecision.(Emphasisadded)
4
 Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside of Puerto
the DENR Secretary and immediately filed their complaint with the Galera Bay as protected by Medio Island, [24] PD No. 1605 does not
Manila RTC, depriving the DENR Secretary the opportunity to review apply to this case. However, petitioners assert that Minolo Cove is one
the decision of his subordinate, RED Principe. Under the Procedural of the enclosed coves of Puerto Galera[25] and thus protected under PD
Manual for DAO 96-37 and applicable jurisprudence, petitioners No. 1605. This is a question of fact that the DENR Secretary should
omission renders their complaint dismissible for lack of cause of action. have first resolved. In any event, there is no dispute that NAPOCOR
[21]
Consequently, the Manila RTC did not err in dismissing petitioners will use the mooring facility for its power barge that will supply 14.4
complaint for lack of cause of action. megawatts of electricity to the entire province of Oriental Mindoro,
On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC including Puerto Galera. The mooring facility is obviously a
Petitioners nevertheless contend that they are exempt from filing government-owned public infrastructure intended to serve a basic need
an appeal with the DENR Secretary because the issuance of the ECC of the people of Oriental Mindoro. The mooring facility is not a
was in patent violation of existing laws and regulations. These are (1) commercial structure; commercial or semi-commercial wharf or
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1605, as amended, (2) Sections commercial docking as contemplated in Section 1 of PD No.
26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), 1605. Therefore, the issuance of the ECC does not violate PD No.
and (3) the provisions of DAO 96-37 on the documentary requirements 1605 which applies only to commercial structures like wharves,
for the zoning permit and social acceptability of the mooring facility. marinas, hotels and restaurants.
Petitioners contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160
an act exempts a party from complying with the rule on exhaustion of Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government
administrative remedies,[22] this does not apply in the present case. Code to emphasize the legislative concern for the maintenance of a
Presidential Decree No. 1605 sound ecology and clean environment.[26] These provisions require
Presidential Decree No. 1605 (PD No. 1605), [23] as amended by every national government agency or government-owned
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1605-A and 1805, declares as ecologically and controlled corporation to hold prior consultations with the local
threatened zone the coves and waters embraced by Puerto Galera government unit concerned and to secure the prior approval of
Bay as protected by Medio Island. This decree provides in part: its sanggunian before implementing any project or program that may
Section1.Anyprovisionoflawtothecontrarynotwithstanding,the cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable
constructionofmarinas,hotels,restaurants,othercommercialstructures; resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of
commercialorsemicommercialwharfs[sic];commercialdockingwithinthe animal or plant species. Sections 26 and 27 respectively provide:
enclosedcovesofPuertoGalera;thedestructionofitsmangrovestands;the Section26.DutyofNationalGovernmentAgenciesintheMaintenanceof
devastationofitscoralsandcoastlinebylargebarges,motorboats,tugboat EcologicalBalance.Itshallbethedutyofeverynationalagencyor
propellers,andanyformofdestructionbyotherhumanactivitiesarehereby governmentownedorcontrolledcorporationauthorizedorinvolvedinthe
prohibited. planningandimplementationofanyprojectorprogramthatmay
Section2.xxx causepollution,climaticchange,depletionofnonrenewableresources,loss
Nopermitfortheconstructionofanywharf,marina,hotel,restaurantsand ofcropland,rangeland,orforestcoverandextinctionofanimalorplant
othercommercialstructuresinPuertoGalerashallbeissuedwithoutprior species,toconsultwiththelocalgovernmentunits,nongovernmental
approvaloftheOfficeofthePresidentupontherecommendationofthe organizations,andothersectorsconcernedandexplainthegoalsand
PhilippineTourismAuthority.(Emphasissupplied) objectivesoftheprojectorprogram,itsimpactuponthepeopleandthe

5
communityintermsofenvironmentalorecologicalbalance,andthemeasures Under DAO 96-37, an ECC applicant for a project located within
thatwillbeundertakentopreventorminimizetheadverseeffectsthereof. an environmentally critical area is required to submit an Initial
Section27.PriorConsultationsRequired.Noprojectorprogramshallbe Environment Examination, which must contain a brief description of the
implementedbygovernmentauthoritiesunlesstheconsultationsmentionedin environmental setting and a documentation of the consultative process
Sectionxxx26hereofarecompliedwith,andpriorapprovalofthe undertaken, when appropriate.[29] As part of the description of the
sanggunianconcernedisobtained:Provided,Thatoccupantsinareaswhere environmental setting, the ECC applicant must submit a certificate of
suchprojectsaretobeimplementedshallnotbeevictedunlessappropriate locational clearance or zoning certificate.
relocationsiteshavebeenprovided,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthe Petitioners further contend that NAPOCOR, in applying for the
Constitution. ECC, did not submit to the DENR Region IV Office the documents
proving the holding of consultations and the issuance of a locational
In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,[27] the Court interpreted these provisions in this
clearance or zoning certificate. Petitioners assert that this omission
manner:
Section27oftheCodeshouldbereadinconjunctionwithSection26thereof renders the issuance of the ECC patently illegal.
The contention is also without merit. While such documents are
xxx.
part of the submissions required from a project proponent, their mere
Thus,theprojectsandprogramsmentionedinSection27shouldbe
absence does not render the issuance of the ECC patently illegal. To
interpretedtomeanprojectsandprogramswhoseeffectsareamongthose justify non-exhaustion of administrative remedies due to the patent
enumeratedinSections26and27,towit,thosethat:(1)maycausepollution; illegality of the ECC, the public officer must have issued the ECC
(2)maybringaboutclimaticchange;(3)maycausethedepletionofnon [without any] semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply,
renewableresources;(4)mayresultinlossofcropland,rangeland,orforest with the pertinent laws; when manifestly, the officer has acted without
cover;(5)mayeradicatecertainanimalorplantspecies;and(6)otherprojects jurisdiction or has exceeded his jurisdiction, or has committed a grave
orprogramsthatmaycallfortheevictionofaparticulargroupofpeople abuse of discretion; or when his act is clearly and obviously devoid of
residinginthelocalitywherethesewillbeimplemented. any color of authority.[30]
Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as RED Principe, as chief of DENR Region IV, is the officer duly
petitioners admit,[28] the mooring facility itself is not environmentally authorized under DAO 96-37[31] to issue ECCs for projects located
critical and hence does not belong to any of the six types of projects within environmentally critical areas.RED Principe issued the ECC on
mentioned in the law. There is no statutory requirement for the the recommendation of Amelia Supetran, the Director of the
concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of the mooring Environmental Management Bureau. Thus, RED Principe acted with
facility. It is another matter if the operation of the power barge is at full authority pursuant to DENR regulations. Moreover, the legal
issue. As an environmentally critical project that causes pollution, the presumption is that he acted with the requisite authority.[32] This clothes
operation of the power barge needs the prior approval of the RED Principes acts with presumptive validity and negates any claim
concerned sanggunian. However, what is before this Court is only the that his actions are patently illegal or that he gravely abused his
construction of the mooring facility, not the operation of the power discretion. While petitioners may present proof to the contrary, they
barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not violate Sections 26 and must do so before the proper administrative forum before resorting to
27 of RA No. 7160. judicial remedies.
Documentary Requirements for On the Alleged Non-Compliance with the Terms of the ECC
ECC Applications Lastly, petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately
seeking judicial recourse because NAPOCOR is guilty of violating the

6
conditions of the ECC, which requires it to secure a separate ECC for
the operation of the power barge. The ECC also mandates NAPOCOR
to secure the usual local government permits, like zoning and building
permits, from the municipal government of Puerto Galera.
The contention is similarly without merit. The fact that
NAPOCORs ECC is subject to cancellation for non-compliance with its
conditions does not justify petitioners conduct in ignoring the procedure
prescribed in DAO 96-37 on appeals from the decision of the DENR
Executive Director. Petitioners vigorously insist that NAPOCOR should
comply with the requirements of consultation and locational clearance
prescribed in DAO 96-37. Ironically, petitioners themselves refuse to
abide with the procedure for filing complaints and appealing decisions
laid down in DAO 96-37.
DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to
address complaints for the cancellation of an ECC. Under Article IX of
DAO 96-37, complaints to nullify an ECC must undergo an
administrative investigation, after which the hearing officer will submit
his report to the EMB Director or the Regional Executive Director, who
will then render his decision. The aggrieved party may file an appeal to
the DENR Secretary, who has authority to issue cease and desist
orders. Article IX also classifies the types of violations covered under
DAO 96-37, including projects operating without an ECC or violating
the conditions of the ECC. This is the applicable procedure to address
petitioners complaint on NAPOCORs alleged violations and not the
filing of the instant case in court.
A Final Word
The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to
safeguard and maintain the ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This
Court recognizes the utmost importance of protecting the environment.
[33]
Indeed, we have called for the vigorous prosecution of violators of
environmental laws.[34] Legal actions to achieve this end, however,
must be done in accordance with established rules of procedure that
were intended, in the first place, to achieve orderly and efficient
administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 137266. December 5, 2001]
ANTONIO M. BERNARDO, ERNESTO A. DOMINGO, JR. and JESUS
C. CRUZ, petitioners, vs. BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR.,
BENJAMIN "BENHUR" D. ABALOS, JR., DR. EDEN C.
DIAZ, ROMEO F. ZAPANTA, ARCADIO S. DE VERA and
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari[1] seeking the nullification of Resolution
No. 98-3208 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En
Banc promulgated on December 1, 1998 dismissing the complaint for vote
buying filed by petitioners against respondents.
On April 21, 1998, petitioners Antonio M. Bernardo, Ernesto A.
Domingo, Jr. and Jesus C. Cruz filed with the COMELEC a criminal
complaint against respondents Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., Benjamin C. Abalos,
Jr., Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Romeo Zapanta and Arcadio de Vera for vote buying in
violation of Section 261, paragraphs (a), (b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC), in relation to Section 28 of Republic Act 6646 and Section 68 of
the OEC. The complaint, docketed as E.O. Case No. 98-110,[2] alleged that:
1.OnApril14,1998(Tuesday),respondentMandaluyongCityMayor
BenjaminS.Abalos,Sr.,andhissonrespondentBenjamin"Benhur"C.
Abalos,Jr.,candidateforCityMayorofthesamecityintheMay11,1998
elections,conspiringwithrespondentsDr.EdenC.Diaz,SchoolsDivision
Superintendent,RomeoF.Zapanta,AssistantSchoolsDivision
Superintendent,andArcadiodeVera,President,MandaluyongFederationof
PublicSchoolTeachers,sponsored,arrangedandconductedanallexpense
freetransportation,foodanddrinksaffairfortheMandaluyongCitypublic
schoolteachers,registeredvotersofsaidcity,attheTayabasBayBeach
Resort,Sariaya,QuezonProvince.
2.Amongtheidentifiedpublicschoolteacherspresent,broughtinaround
twelve(12)buses,wereCorazonMayoya,PrincipalofHighwayHills
ElementarySchool,herAssistantPrincipalandMr.DantedelRemigio;Mrs.
Diaz,PrincipalofMandaluyongCityHighSchoolandMr.Alvia;Mrs.
Parillo,AndresBonifacioElementarySchool;Mrs.GregoriaIgnacio,
PrincipalofDoaPilarGonzagaElementarySchoolandMrs.Bolantes;Mrs.
Diaz,Principal,NuevedeFebreroElementarySchool;Ms.Magsalin,
PrincipalofMandaluyongScienceHighSchoolandMrs.RitaBondayril;
7
Mrs.DeVera,FabellaElementarySchool;Ms.Anselmo,PrincipalofIsaac
LopezElementarySchoolandMrs.Fayton;Mrs.SylviaLiwanag,District
Supervisor,DistrictII,Mrs.Nalaonan,PrincipalofAmadoT.Reyes
ElementarySchool;Mrs.TeresitaVicencio,MandaluyongCityElementary
School;OfficersoftheMandaluyongFederationofPublicSchoolTeachers
namely:Mrs.ErlindaIlagan,Treasurer;Ms.NancydeLeon,Auditor;Ms.
FortunataGondran,PRO;Mr.NenitoPumariga,BusinessManager;Mr.Jose
Guerrero,Sgt.atarms;andBoardMembersMs.VirginiaCarillo,Ms.Wilma
Fernandez,Mr.ArturoMoralesandMr.TeddyAngeles.
3.Duringthewholedayaffair,thebackgroundmusicloudlyandrepeatedly
playedoverthesoundsystemwasthepoliticaljingleadvertisementof
MandaluyongCitycandidateforMayor,BenjaminBenhurAbalos,Jr.,sangto
thetuneofthesongSHALALALALA.
4.SomeoftheparticipantsworeTshirtswiththenameofcandidateBenhur"
Abalos,Jr.,"printedinoversizedcoloredletters.
5.MayorBenjaminAbalos,Sr.deliveredaspeechwhereinheofferedand
promisedtheMandaluyongCitypublicschoolteachersandemployeesa
hazardpayofP1,000.00,andincreasingtheirallowancesfromP1,500.00to
P2,000.00forfood,orwithatotalofP3,000.00whichtheywillgetbytheend
ofthemonth.
6.Theoffersandpromisestosaidpublicschoolteachers,whoaremembersof
theBoardofElectionInspectorsofMandaluyongCityandregisteredvoters
thereat,weremadeafewweeksbeforetheelectiontoinduceorunduly
influencethesaidteachersandthepublicingeneral(theotherguests)tovote
forthecandidacyofBenjamin"Benhur"Abalos,Jr..
7.TheoffersandpromisesofMayorAbalos,Sr.,andtheenthusiastic
acceptanceofsaidmonetaryincreaseofallowancesbythepublicschool
teachersandemployeesofMandaluyongCity,isaviolationofSection261
pars.(a),(b)and(j)oftheOmnibusElectionCodeagainstvotebuyingand
voteselling.[3]
The Director[4] of the Law Department of the COMELEC conducted a
preliminary investigation. All the private respondents filed separate counter-
affidavits[5] with prayer to dismiss the complaint.
On November 26, 1998, the Director of the Law Department submitted
his findings to the COMELEC En Banc recommending that the complaint be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
On December 1, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed
Resolution No. 98-3208[6] dismissing the complaint "for insufficiency of
evidence to establish a prima facie case,"
Consideringthatthiscomplaint,beingcriminalinnature,musthaveallits
allegationssupportedbydirect,strong,convincingandindubitableevidence;
andthatthesubmittedevidenceofthecomplainantaremereselfserving
statementsanduncorroboratedaudioandvisualrecordingsandaphotograph;
andconsideringfurtherthattheevidenceoftherespondentshavemore
probativevalueandbelievablethantheevidenceofsaidcomplainants;and
thattheburdenofprooflieswiththecomplainantsandnotwiththe
respondents.[7]
On February 09, 1999, petitioners, without first submitting a motion for
reconsideration, filed the instant petition with this Court.
They alleged therein that the COMELEC En Banc, in issuing Resolution
No. 98-3208 dated December 1, 1998, acted "with apparent grave abuse of
discretion."[8]
The petition must fail.
Petitioners did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the
COMELEC level. Specifically, they did not seek a reconsideration of the
assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution as required by Section 1, Rule 13 of
the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, thus:
Section1.WhatPleadingsarenotAllowed.Thefollowingpleadingsarenot
allowed:
xxx
d)motionforreconsiderationofanenbancruling,resolution,orderor
decisionexceptinelectionoffensecases;
xxx.(Emphasisours)
It is not disputed that petitioners complaint before the COMELEC
involves an election offense. But in this petition, they conveniently kept silent
why they directly elevated to this Court the questioned Resolution without
first filing a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc. It was
only after the respondents had filed their comment on the petition and called
this Courts attention to petitioners' failure to comply with Section 1 of Rule 13
that they, in their Consolidated Reply, advanced the excuse that they "deemed
it best not seek any further dilatorymotion for reconsideration', even if
allowed by Sec. 1 (d) of COMELEC Rule 13."[9]
8
 Petitioners' failure to file the required motion for reconsideration utterly Petitioners' complaint expressly states that no supporting affidavits were
disregarded the COMELEC Rules intended "to achieve submitted by the complaining witnesses [14] to sustain their charge of vote
an orderly, just, expeditious and inexpensivedetermination and disposition buying. Suffice it to state that the absence of such supporting affidavits shows
of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission."[10] the frailty of petitioners' complaint. Indeed, it is vulnerable to dismissal.
Contrary to petitioners' statement that a resort to a motion for WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
reconsideration is "dilatory," it bears stressing that the purpose of the said SO ORDERED.
motion is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed [G.R. No. 127139. February 19, 1999]
to it.[11] If the error is immediately corrected by way of a motion for JAIME C. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. CITY OF MANILA and HON.
reconsideration, then it is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse. But BENJAMIN A.G. VEGA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Branch
if the COMELEC refuses to correct a patently erroneous act, then it commits a 39, respondents.
grave abuse of discretion justifying a recourse by the aggrieved party to a DECISION
petition for certiorari. QUISUMBING, J.:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil This petition for review on certiorari, assails the Order[1] of the Regional
Procedure, as amended, can only be resorted to if "there is no appeal, or any Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, promulgated on October 24, 1996,
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of dismissing Civil Case No. 96-77510 which sought the declaration of nullity of
law."[12] Having failed to file the required motion for reconsideration of the City of Manila Ordinance No. 7894, filed by petitioner Jaime C. Lopez.
challenged Resolution, petitioners' instant petition is certainly premature. The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
[13]
Significantly, they have not raised any plausible reason for their direct Section 219 of Republic Act 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government
recourse to this Court. Code of 1991 requires the conduct of the general revision of real property as
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC cited a valid reason for follows:
dismissing petitioners' complaint against private respondents for vote GeneralRevisionofAssessments[2]andPropertyClassificationThe
buying. The COMELEC found that the evidence of the respondents have provincial,cityormunicipalassessorshallundertakeageneralrevisionofreal
"more probative value and believable than the evidence of the complainants;" propertyassessmentswithintwo(2)yearsaftertheeffectivityofthisCode
and that the evidence submitted by petitioners are "mere self-serving andeverythree(3)yearsthereafter.
statements and uncorroborated audio and visual recording and a photograph." Although R.A. 7160 took effect on January 1, 1992, the revision of real
Moreover, Section 28 of Republic Act 6646 provides: property assessments prescribed therein was not yet enforced in the City of
SEC.28.ProsecutionofVotebuyingandVoteselling.Therepresentation Manila. However, the process of real property valuation had already been
ofacomplaintforviolationsofparagraph(a)or(b)ofSection261ofBatas started and done by the former city assessor.
PambansaBlg.881supportedbyaffidavitsofcomplainingwitnesses In 1992, the schedule of real property values in the city was prepared and
attestingtotheofferorpromisebyorofthevotersacceptanceofmoney submitted to the City Council of Manila, but for unknown reason, was not
orotherconsiderationfromtherelatives,leadersorsympathizersof acted upon. Nevertheless, despite the inaction of the City Council, there was a
candidate,shallbesufficientbasisforaninvestigationtobeimmediately continuous update of the fair market values of the real properties within the
city.
conductedbytheCommission,directlyorthroughitsdulyauthorizedlegal
Until the year 1995, the basis for collection of real estate taxes in the
officers,underSection68orSection265ofsaidBatasPambansaBlg.881.
City of Manila was the old, year-1979, real estate market values.
xxx.(Emphasisours) Mrs. Lourdes Laderas, the newly appointed City Assessor of Manila,
received Memorandum Circular No. 04-95 dated March 20, 1995, from the

9
Bureau of Local Government Finance, Department of Finance. This
memorandum relates to the failure of most of the cities and municipalities of
Metropolitan Manila, including the City of Manila, to conduct the general
revision of real property. For this purpose, Mrs. Laderas embarked in a
working dialogue with the Office of the City Mayor and the City Council for
the completion of the task.
After obtaining the necessary funds from the City Council, the City
Assessor began the process of general revision based on the updated fair
market values of the real properties.
In the year 1995, the increase in valuation of real properties compared to
the year-1979 market values ranges from 600% to 3,330%, but the City
Assessors office initially fixed the general average of increase to
1,700%. Mrs. Laderas felt that the increase may have adverse reactions from
the public, hence, she ended up reducing the increase in the valuation of real
properties to 1,020%.
In September 1995, the City Assessors Office submitted the proposed
schedule of fair market values to the City Council for its appropriate
action. The Council acting on the proposed schedule, conducted public
hearings as required by law. The proposed ordinance was subjected to the
regular process in the enactment of ordinances pursuant to the City Charter of
Manila. The first reading was held on September 12, 1995, the second on
October 28, 1995, and the third on December 12, 1995. In between these
dates, public hearings on the general revision, which included the schedule of
values of real properties, were had, viz.; on September 28, 1995, October 5, 12
and 19, 1995 and November 27 and 29, 1995.
The proposed ordinance with the schedule of fair market values of real
properties was published in the Manila Standard on October 28, 1995, and the
Balita on November 1, 1995. On December 12, 1995, the City Council
enacted Manila Ordinance No. 7894, entitled: An Ordinance Prescribed as the
Revised Schedule of Fair Market Values of Real Properties of the City of
Manila. The ordinance was approved by the City Mayor on December 27,
1995, and made effective on Jan. 01, 1996. Thereafter, notices of the revised
assessments were distributed to the real property owners of Manila pursuant to
Sec. 223 of R.A. 7160.[3]
With the implementation of Manila Ordinance No. 7894, the tax on the
land owned by the petitioner was increased by five hundred eighty percent
(580%). With respect to the improvement on petitioners property, the tax
increased by two hundred fifty percent (250%).
As a consequence of these increases, petitioner Jaime C. Lopez, filed on
March 18, 1996, a special proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the City
of Manila Ordinance No. 7894 with preliminary injunction and prayer for
temporary restraining order (TRO). The petition alleged that Manila
Ordinance No. 7894 appears to be unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory. The case was originally raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 5, which issued the TRO on April 10, 1996.
On the same date, Manila Ordinance No. 7905[4] took effect, reducing by
fifty percent (50%) the assessment levels[5] (depending on the use of property,
e.g., residential, commercial) for the computation of tax due. The new
ordinance amended the assessment levels provided by Section 74, [6] paragraph
(A) of Manila Ordinance No. 7794.
Moreover, Section 2 of Manila Ordinance No. 7905[7] provides that the
amendment embodied therein shall take effect retroactively to January 1,
1996. The same provision indicates the maximum realty tax increases, as
follows:
Sec.2xxxProvided,however,thatthetaxincreaseonresidentiallandsand
improvementsshallinnocaseexceedbytwohundredpercent(200%)ofthe
taxleviedthereonincalendaryear1995andthetaxincreaseoncommercial
andindustrialland,buildingsandotherstructuresshallnotexceedbythree
hundredpercent(300%)ofthetaximposedthereonincalendaryear1995;
Providedfurther,thatthetaxonalllandsandimprovementsshallinnocase
belowerthanthetaximposedthereonincalendaryear1995.
As a result, Manila Ordinance No. 7905 reduced the tax increase of
petitioners residential land to one hundred fifty-five percent (155%), while the
tax increase for residential improvement was eighty-two percent (82%).
The maximum tax increase on classified commercial estates is three
hundred percent (300%) but the tax increase on commercial land was only,
two hundred eighty-eight percent (288%), and seventy-two percent (72%) on
commercial portion of the improvement.
On April 12, 1996, respondent filed a motion for inhibition of the
presiding judge of RTC, Branch 5, alleging that Judge Amelia Andrade had
shown markedly indulgent attitude towards the petitioner. Hence, Judge
Andrade inhibited herself and directed the forwarding of the case record to the
Clerk of Court for its re-raffle to another branch of the court.
10
 Despite the amendment brought about by Manila Ordinance No. 7905, I. DID THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT IN CIVIL CASE NO.
the controversy proceeded and the case was re-raffled to Branch 39 of the 96-77510 ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER
court which acted on the motions submitted by the parties for resolution, viz.: FAILED TO EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE
1) application for preliminary injunction by the petitioner, and 2) motion to REMEDIES, AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION OUGHT
dismiss by the respondent. The reason relied upon by the City of Manila for TO BE DISMISSED? AND;
the dismissal of the petition was for failure of the petitioner to exhaust II. DID THE RESPONDENT COURT ERR IN FAILING TO
administrative remedies. CORRECTLY APPLY SECTIONS 212 AND 221 OF THE
On May 9, 1996, the court directed the issuance of a writ of injunction LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991?
and denied, in the meanwhile, the motion to dismiss by the respondent. The Petitioner contends that when the trial court ruled that it has jurisdiction
reason for the denial of the respondents motion to dismiss was not detailed to over the case, the question of whether he needs to resort to the exhaustion of
avoid a repetition of the unfortunate situation in RTC-Manila, Branch 5, administrative remedies becomes moot and academic. He claims that resort to
wherein the counsel for the respondent assumed bias on the part of Judge administrative remedies on constitutionality of law is merely permissive as
Andrade. provided by Sec. 187 of R.A. 7160, viz.:
On May 22, 1996, the respondent filed the instant motion for xxxProvided,further,Thatanyquestionontheconstitutionalityorlegality
reconsideration on the denial of its motion to dismiss. The movant-respondent oftaxordinancesorrevenuemeasuresmayberaisedonappealwithinthirty
aside from reiterating the basic ground alleged in its motion to dismiss (30)daysfromtheeffectivitythereoftotheSecretaryofJusticewhoshall
underscored the additional premise, which is the happening of a supervening renderadecisionwithinsixty(60)daysfromthedateofreceiptoftheappeal.
event, i.e., the enactment and approval of the City Mayor of Manila Ordinance xxx(emphasissupplied)
No. 7905. Petitioner further asserts that the question of the constitutionality of the
On October 24, 1996, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss filed city ordinance may be raised on appeal, either to the Secretary of Justice or
by the respondent. The dismissal order was justified by petitioners failure to the Regional Trial Court, both having concurrent jurisdiction over the case, in
exhaust the administrative remedies and that the petition had become moot accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. He states that at the time he
and academic when Manila Ordinance No. 7894 was repealed by Manila instituted this complaint, it was premature to resort to the remedies provided
Ordinance No. 7905. Notwithstanding, the trial court likewise resolved all by R.A. 7160 because he has not received the formal notice of assessment yet,
other interlocking issues. hence, he could not be expected to pay under protest and elevate the
The dispositive portion of the trial courts order is as follows: exorbitant assessment to the Board of Assessment Appeals.
WHEREFORE,findingthemotiondatedMay19,1996filedbytheherein On the other hand, respondent argues that the adjustment of the fair
respondentonMay22,1996sufficientlywelltaken,theorderdatedMay9, market values of real properties in the City of Manila was long overdue, being
1996isherebysetaside.Letthepetitionfiledbythehereinpetitioneron updated only after fifteen (15) years.According to the respondent, petitioner
March8,1996be,asitis,herebyDISMISSED.Theorderofpreliminary filed the case, merely to take advantage of the situation to gain political
injunctiondatedMay9,1996,isalsosetasideandthewritofinjunction mileage and help advance his mayoralty bid.
likewiseissuedpursuantthereto,dissolved. As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the
SOORDERED.[8] action of an administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied for sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests upon the
lack of merit. presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its
Hence, the petitioner now comes before this Court raising in his petition mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it
the following issues: properly. Therefore, where a remedy is available within the administrative

11
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts,
not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter
by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to
courts.[9] This rule, however, admits certain exceptions.[10]
With regard to questions on the legality of a tax ordinance, the remedies
available to the taxpayer are provided under Sections 187, 226, and 252 of
R.A. 7160.
Section 187 of R.A. 7160 provides, that the taxpayer may question the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance on appeal within thirty (30) days
from effectivity thereof, to the Secretary of Justice. The petitioner after
finding that his assessment is unjust, confiscatory, or excessive, must have
brought the case before the Secretary of Justice for questions of legality or
constitutionality of the city ordinance.
Under Section 226 of R.A. 7160, an owner of real property who is not
satisfied with the assessment of his property may, within sixty (60) days from
notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals.[11]
Should the taxpayer question the excessiveness of the amount of tax, he
must first pay the amount due, in accordance with Section 252 of R.A.
7160. Then, he must request the annotation of the phrase paid under protest
and accordingly appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals by filing a
petition under oath together with copies of the tax declarations and affidavits
or documents to support his appeal.[12]
The rule is well-settled that courts will not interfere in matters which are
addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulations of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and
training of such agencies.[13] Furthermore, the crux of petitioners cause of
action is the determination of whether or not the tax is excessive, oppressive
or confiscatory. This issue is essentially a question of fact and thereby,
precludes this Court from reviewing the same.[14]
We have carefully scrutinized the record of this case and we found no
cogent reason to depart from the findings made by the trial court on this
point. As correctly found by the trial court, the petition does not fall under any
of the exceptions to excuse compliance with the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, to wit:
Oneofthereasonsforthedoctrineofexhaustionistheseparationofpowers
whichenjoinsuponthejudiciaryabecomingpolicyofnoninterferencewith
matterscomingprimarilywithinthecompetenceofotherdepartment.xxx
Therearehoweveranumberofinstanceswhenthedoctrinemaybedispensed
withandjudicialactionvalidlyresortedtoimmediately.Amongthese
exceptionalcasesare:(1)whenthequestionraisedispurelylegal,(2)when
theadministrativebodyisinestoppel;(3)whentheactcomplainedofis
patentlyillegal;(4)whenthereisurgentneedforjudicialintervention;(5)
whentheclaiminvolvedissmall;(6)whenirreparabledamagewillbe
suffered;(7)whenthereisnootherplain,speedyandadequateremedy;(8)
whenstrongpublicinterestisinvolved;(9)whenthesubjectofcontroversyis
privateland;and(10)inquowarrantoproceeding(citationomitted).
Inthecourtsopinion,however,theinstantpetitiondoesnotfallwithinanyof
theexceptionsabovementioned.xxx
xxxInstantpetitioninvolvesnotonlyquestionsoflawbutmoreimportantly
thequestionsoffactswhichthereforeneededthereceptionofevidence
contrarytothepositionoftherespondentbeforethehearingofitsmotionfor
reconsideration
Now,onthesecondexceptionontheruleofexhaustionofadministrative
remedies,supra,thereisnoshowingthatadministrativebodies,viz.,The
SecretaryofJustice,theCityTreasurer,BoardofAssessmentAppeals,and
theCentralBoardofAssessmentAppealsareinestoppel.Onthethird
exception,itdoesnotappearthatOrdinanceNo.7894ortheamendatory
OrdinanceNo.7905arepatentlyillegal.Rethefourthexception,inthelight
ofcircumstancesaspointedelsewhereherein,thematterdoesnotneeda
compellingjudicialintervention.Onthefifthexception,theclaimofthe
petitionerisnotsmall.Rethesixthexception,thecourtdoesnotseeany
irreparabledamagethatthepetitionerwillsufferifhehadpaidorwillpay
underprotestaspertheordinance.Hecouldalwaysaskforarefundofthe
excessamounthepaidunderprotestorbecreditedthereofifthe
administrativebodiesmentionedinthelaw(R.A.7180[15])willfindthathis
positionismeritorious.Retheseventhexception,thecourtisoftheopinion
thatadministrativereliefprovidedforinthelawareplain,speedyand
adequate.Ontheeightexception,whilethecontroversyinvolvespublic
interest,judicialinterventionasthepetitionerwouldlikethiscourttodo
shouldbeavoidedasdemonstratedhereinbelowinthediscussionofthethird
issue.Theninthandtenthexceptionobviouslyarenotapplicableintheinstant
case.[16]
12
 Proceeding to the second issue, petitioner contends that the respondent a)levyinganannualadvaloremtaxonrealpropertyandan
court failed to apply correctly Sections 212 and 221 of R.A. 7160. The additionaltaxaccruingtotheSEF.
pertinent provisions are set forth below: b)fixingtheassessmentlevelstobeappliedtothemarketvaluesof
Sec.212PreparationofScheduleofFairMarketValuesBeforeany realproperties;
generalrevisionofpropertyassessmentismadepursuanttotheprovisionsof c)providingnecessaryappropriationtodefrayexpensesincidentto
thisTitle,thereshallbepreparedascheduleoffairmarketvaluesbythe generalrevisionofrealpropertyassessments;and
provincial,cityandthemunicipalassessorsofthemunicipalitieswithinthe d)adoptingtheScheduleofFairMarketValuespreparedbythe
MetropolitanManilaAreaforthedifferentclassesofrealpropertysituatedin assessors.[17]
theirrespectivelocalgovernmentunits[LGU]forenactmentbyordinanceof The preparation of fair market values as a preliminary step in the
thesanggunianconcerned.Thescheduleoffairmarketvaluesshallbe conduct of general revision was set forth in Section 212 of R.A. 7160, to
publishedinanewspaperofgeneralcirculationintheprovince,cityor wit: (1) The city or municipal assessor shall prepare a schedule of fair market
municipalityconcerned,orintheabsencethereof,shallbepostedinthe values for the different classes of real property situated in their respective
provincialcapitol,cityormunicipalhallandintwootherconspicuouspublic Local Government Units for the enactment of an ordinance by the sanggunian
placestherein. concerned. (2) The schedule of fair market values shall be published in a
Sec.221.DateofEffectivityofAssessmentorReassessmentAll newspaper of general circulation in the province, city or municipality
assessmentsorreassessmentsmadeafterthefirst(1st)dayofJanuaryofany concerned or the posting in the provincial capitol or other places as required
yearshalltakeeffectonthefirst(1st)dayofJanuaryofthesucceeding by law.
year:Provided,however,Thatthereassessmentofrealpropertyduetoits It was clear from the records that Mrs. Lourdes Laderas, the incumbent
partialortotaldestruction,ortoamajorchangeinitsactualuse,ortoany City Assessor, prepared the fair market values of real properties and in
greatandsuddeninflationordeflationofrealpropertyvalues,ortothegross preparation thereof, she considered the fair market values prepared in the
calendar year 1992. Upon that basis, the City Assessors Office updated the
illegalityoftheassessmentwhenmadeortoanyotherabnormalcause,shall
schedule for the year 1995. In fact, the initial schedule of fair market values of
bemadewithinninety(90)daysfromthedateanysuchcauseorcauses
real properties showed an increase in real estate costs, which ranges from
occurred,andshalltakeeffectatthebeginningofthequarternextfollowing
600% - 3,330% over the values determined in the year 1979. However, after a
assessment. careful study on the movement of prices, Mrs. Laderas eventually lowered the
The petitioner claims that the effectivity date of Manila Ordinance No. average increase to 1,020%. Thereafter, the proposed ordinance with the
7894 and the schedule of the fair market values is January 1, 1996. He schedule of the fair market values of real properties was published in the
contends that Sec. 212 of the R.A. 7160 prohibits the general revision of real Manila Standard on October 28, 1995 and the Balita on November 1, 1995.
property assessment before the approval of the schedule of the fair market [18]
Under the circumstances of this case, there was compliance with the
values. Thus, the alleged revision of real property assessment in 1995 is requirement provided under Sec. 212 of R.A. 7160.
illegal. Thereafter, on January 1, 1996, the Sanggunian approved Manila
Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the steps to be followed Ordinance No. 7894. The schedule of values of real properties in the City of
for the mandatory conduct of General Revision of Real Property assessments, Manila, which formed an integral part of the ordinance, was likewise
pursuant to the provision of Sec. 219 of R.A. No. 7160 are as follows: approved on the same date.
1.ThepreparationofScheduleofFairMarketValues. When Manila Ordinance No. 7894 took effect on January 1, 1996, the
2.TheenactmentofOrdinances: existing assessment levels to be multiplied by the market value of the property

13
in computing the assessed value (taxable value) subject to tax were those Industrial50%25%
enumerated in Section 74 paragraph (A) of Manila Ordinance Number 7794. (2)OnBuildingsandotherstructures:
Coming down to specifics, we find it desirable to lay down the (a)ResidentialFairMarketValue
procedure in computing the real property tax. With the introduction of OverNotOver
assessment levels, tax rates could be maintained, although tax payments can P175,000.000%0%
be made either higher or lower depending on their percentage (assessment 175,000.00P300,000.0010%5%
level) applied to the fair market value of property to derive its assessed 300,000.00500,000.0020%10%
value which is subject to tax. Moreover, classes and values of real properties 500,000.00750,000.0025%12.5%
can be given proper consideration, like assigning lower assessment levels to 750,000.001,000,000.0030%15%
residential properties and higher levels to properties used in business. [19] The 1,000,000.002,000,000.0035%17.5%
procedural steps in computing the real property tax are as follows:
2,000,000.005,000,000.0040%20%
1)Ascertaintheassessmentleveloftheproperty
5,000,000.0010,000,000.0050%25%
2)Multiplythemarketvaluebytheapplicableassessmentlevelofthe
10,000,000.0060%30%
property
(b)Commercial/IndustrialFairMarketValue
3)Findthetaxratewhichcorrespondstotheclass(use)ofthe
OverNotOver
propertyandmultiplytheassessedvaluebytheapplicabletax
300,000.0030%15%
rates.[20]
300,000.00500,000.0035%17.5%
For easy reference, the computation of real property tax is cited below:
500,000.00750,000.0040%20%
MarketValuePxxx
750,000.001,000,000.0050%25%
MultipliedbyAssessmentLevel(x%)
1,000,000.002,000,000.0060%30%
AssessedValuePxxx
2,000,000.005,000,000.0070%35%
MultipliedbyRateofTax(x%)
5,000,000.0010,000,000.0075%37.5%
RealPropertyTaxPxx
10,000,000.0080%40%
=====
(3)OnMachineries:
On April 10, 1996, Manila Ordinance No. 7905 was enacted and
Class
approved to take effect, retroactively to January 1, 1996. As a result of this
new ordinance, the assessment levels applicable to the market values of real Residential50%25%
properties were lowered into half. A comparative evaluation between the old Commercial80%40%
and the new assessment levels is as follows: Industrial66%40%
AssessmentLevels (4)OnspecialclassesTheassessmentlevelsforalllands,buildings,
Ordinance7794Ordinance7905 machineriesandotherimprovementsshallbeasfollows:
OldNew ActualUse
(1)OnLands: Cultural15%7.5%
Class Scientific15%7.5%
Residential20%10% Hospital15%7.5%
Commercial50%25% LocalWaterDistricts15%7.5%

14
 GOCCengagedinthesupplyand tax. The lower taxes will ease, in part, the economic predicament of the low
anddistributionofwaterand/or and middle-income groups of taxpayers. In enacting this ordinance, the due
degenerationandtransmissionof process of law was considered by the City of Manila so that the increase in
electricpower10%5% realty tax will not amount to the confiscation of the property.
Despite the favorable outcome of Manila Ordinance No. 7905, the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
petitioner insists that since it was approved on April 10, 1996, it cannot be Order of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39 in Civil Case No. 96-
implemented in the year 1996. Using Section 221 of R.A. 7160 as basis for his 77510 is hereby AFFIRMED. COSTS against the petitioner.
argument, petitioner claims that the assessments or reassessments made after SO ORDERED.
the first (1st) day of January of any year shall take effect on the first (1st) day THIRD DIVISION
of January of the succeeding year.
Contrarily, the trial court viewed that Manila Ordinance No. 7905 affects UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION),
the resulting tax imposed on the market values of real properties as specified Petitioner,
in Manila Ordinance No. 7894.Therefore, this supervening circumstance has
rendered the petition, moot and academic, for failure of the petitioner to - versus -
amend his cause of action. The trial court said:
Amerecursoryreadingofhispetitionthathequestionedfairmarketvalues LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
andtheassessmentlevelsandtheresultingtaxbasedthereonasimposedby Respondent.
OrdinanceNo.7894.Thepetitioner,however,failedtoamendhis
petition.Thus,itisclearthatthepetitionhasbecomemootandacademic.As G.R. No. 191427
correctlystatedbytherespondent,thefacts,viz.,thetaxratesonlevel
prescribedbyOrdinance7894uponwhichthepetitionwasanchoredno Present:
longerexistbecausethetaxratesinOrdinanceNo.7894havebeenamended,
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
otherwise,impliedlyrepealedbyOrdinanceNo.7905.Ifonlyforthis,the
BRION,
petitioncouldbedismissedbutthiscourtfollowedtheadviceoftheSupreme BERSAMIN,
CourtinthecaseofNationalHousingAuthorityvs.CourtofAppeals,et.al. VILLARAMA, JR., and
(121SCRA777)thatthecasemaybedecidedinitstotalityresolvingall SERENO, JJ.
interlockingissuesinordertorenderjusticetoallconcernedandendlitigation
onceandforall.[21]
Although, we are in full accord with the ruling of the trial court, it is Promulgated:
likewise necessary to stress that Manila Ordinance No. 7905 is favorable toMay 30, 2011
the taxpayers when it specifically states that the reduced assessment levels
shall be applied retroactively to January 1, 1996. The reduced assessment DECISION
levels multiplied by the schedule of fair market values of real properties,
provided by Manila Ordinance No. 7894, resulted to decrease in taxes. To that
extent, the ordinance is likewise, a social legislation intended to soften the CARPIO MORALES, J.:
impact of the tremendous increase in the value of the real properties subject to

15
The present petition for review on certiorari assails the Court of Appeals
Decision[1] dated October 27, 2009 and Resolution dated February 23, 2010 in
CA-G. R. SP No. 107449.
Universal Robina Corp. (petitioner) is engaged in, among other things, the
manufacture of animal feeds at its plant in Bagong Ilog, Pasig City.
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, through
its Pollution Control Division Monitoring and Enforcement Section, after
conducting on March 14, 2000 a laboratory analysis of petitioners corn oil
refinery plants wastewater, found that it failed to comply with government
standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990.
LLDA later issued on May 30, 2000 an Ex-Parte Order requiring
petitioner to explain why no order should be issued for the cessation of its
operations due to its discharge of pollutive effluents into the Pasig River and
why it was operating without a clearance/permit from the LLDA.
Still later, the LLDA, after receiving a phone-in complaint conducted on
August 31, 2000, another analysis of petitioners wastewater, which showed its
continued failure to conform to its effluent standard in terms of Total
Suspended Solids (TSS), Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD), Color and
Oil/Grease.
Hearings on petitioners pollution case were thereafter commenced on
March 1, 2001.
Despite subsequent compliance monitoring and inspections conducted by the
LLDA, petitioners wastewater failed to conform to the parameters set by the
aforementioned DAOs.
In early 2003, petitioner notified LLDA of its plan to upgrade the wastewater
treatment facility (WTF) of its corn oil refinery plant in an effort to comply
with environmental laws, an upgrade that was completed only in 2007.
On May 9, 2007 on its request,[2] a re-sampling of petitioners
wastewater was conducted which showed that petitioners
plant finally complied with government standards.
Petitioner soon requested for a reduction of penalties, by Manifestation and
Motion[3] filed on August 24, 2007 to which it attached copies of its Daily
Operation Reports and Certifications[4] to show that accrued daily penalties
should only cover a period of 560 days.
After conducting hearings, the LLDA issued its Order to Pay [5] (OP)
dated January 21, 2008, the pertinent portion of which reads:
16
 After careful evaluation of the case, respondent
is found to be discharging pollutive wastewater computed in
two periods reckoned from March 14, 2000 the date of
initial sampling until November 3, 2003 the date it
requested for a re-sampling covering 932 days in
consideration of the interval of time when subsequent
monitoring was conducted after an interval of more than 2
years and from March 15, 2006 the date when re-sampling
was done until April 17, 2007 covering 448
days[6] for a total of 1,247 days.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is
hereby ordered to pay within fifteen (15) days from receipt
hereof the accumulated daily penalties amounting to a total
of Pesos: One Million Two Hundred Forty-Seven
(Thousand) Pesos Only (PHP 1,247,000.00) prior to
dismissal of the case and without prejudice of filing another
case for its subsequent violations. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to reconsider, praying that it be ordered to pay only
accumulated daily penalties in the sum of Five Hundred Sixty Thousand
(P560,000) Pesos[7] on grounds that the LLDA erred in first, adopting a
straight computation of the periods of violation based on the flawed
assumption that petitioner was operating on a daily basis without excluding,
among others, the period during which the LLDA Laboratory underwent
rehabilitation work from December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 (covering 212
days); and second, in disregarding the Daily Operation Reports and
Certifications which petitioner submitted to attest to the actual number of its
operating days, i.e., 560 days.
By Order[8] of July 11, 2008, the LLDA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration and reiterated its order to pay the aforestated penalties,
disposing of the issues thusly:
On the first issue, while it is true that the Authority
failed to state in its OP dated 21 January 2008 the basis for
actual computation of the accumulated daily penalties, the
Authority would like to explain that its computation was
based on the following, to wit:
The computation of accumulated daily penalties
was reckoned period [sic] from 14 March 2000 the date of
initial sampling to 03 November 2003 the date when its
letter request for re-sampling was received which covers
932 days computed at 6 days per week operation as
reflected in the Reports of Inspection. Since subsequent
inspection conducted after two (2) years and four (4)
months, such period was deducted from the computation.
Likewise, the period when the LLDA Laboratory was
rehabilitated from December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 was
also deducted with a total of Two Hundred Twelve (212)
days.
On the second claim, the same cannot be granted
for lack of legal basis since the documents submitted are
self-serving. The period from 15 March 2006 to 17 April
2007 was computed from the date of re-sampling when it
failed to conform to the standards set by law up to the date
of receipt of its letter request for re-sampling prior to its
compliance on May 9, 2007. The period covers 342 days.
Hence, respondent is found to be discharging
pollutive wastewater not conforming with the standards set
17
 by law computed from March 14, 2000 November 3, 2003
which should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial intervention.
covering 932 days and from March 15, 2006 April 17, 2007
covering 342 days for a total of 1,274 days. [9]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by

Petitioner challenged by certiorari the twin orders before the Court of
Resolution of February 23, 2010, it filed the present petition.
Appeals, attributing to LLDA grave abuse of discretion in disregarding its
documentary evidence, and maintaining that the lack of any plain, speedy or
Petitioner cites deprivation of due process and lack of any plain,
adequate remedy from the enforcement of LLDAs order justified such
speedy or adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying
recourse as an exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative
with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
remedies prior to judicial action.

The petition fails.

By Decision of October 27, 2009 the appellate court affirmed both
LLDA orders, which it found to be amply supported by substantial evidence,
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
the computation of the accumulated daily penalties being in accord with
cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must
prevailing DENR guidelines. The appellate court held that while petitioner
allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
may have offered documentary evidence to support its assertion that the days
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.
when it did not operate must be excluded from the computation, the LLDA [10]
The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and
has the prerogative to disregard the same for being unverified,
provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience
hence, unreliable.
also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.[11]
The appellate court went on to chide petitioners petition for certiorari
as premature since the law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of
Executive Order No. 192[12] (EO 192) was issued on June 10, 1987
the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy
for the salutary purpose of reorganizing the DENR, charging it with the task
of promulgating rules and regulations for the control of water, air and land

18
pollution as well as of promulgating ambient and effluent standards for water
and air quality including the allowable levels of other pollutants and
radiations. EO 192 also created the Pollution Adjudication Board under the
Office of the DENR Secretary which took over the powers and functions of
the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to the adjudication of
pollution cases, including the latters role as arbitrator for determining
reparation, or restitution of the damages and losses resulting from pollution.[13]
Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the
DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR
Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the
LLDAs findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous.
As for petitioners invocation of due process, it fails too. The
appellate court thus aptly brushed aside this claim, in this wise:
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not
always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding.
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the
charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due
process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.
. . . Administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it
is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard
before the case against him is decided.
Here, petitioner URC was given ample opportunities to be
heard it was given show cause orders and allowed to
participate in hearing to rebut the allegation against it of
discharging pollutive wastewater to the Pasig River, it was
given the chance to present evidences in support of its
claims, it was notified of the assailed Order to Pay, and it
was allowed to file a motion for reconsideration. Given
these, we are of the view that the minimum requirements
of administrative due process have been complied with
in this case.[14] (emphasis in the original)
In fine, the assailed LLDA orders of January 21, 2008 and July 11,
2008 correctly reckoned the two periods within which petitioner was found to
have continued discharging pollutive wastewater and applied the penalty as
provided for under Article VI, Section 32 of LLDA Resolution No. 33, Series
of 1996.[15]LLDAs explanation that behind its inclusion of certain days in its
computation of the imposable penalties that it had already deducted not just
the period during which the LLDA Laboratory underwent rehabilitation work
from December 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 (covering 212 days) but had
also excluded from the computation the period during which no inspections or
compliance monitorings were conducted (a period covering two years and
four months) is well-taken.
19
 It is noted that during the hearing on June 19, 2007, the LLDA gave
petitioner the opportunity to submit within fifteen (15) days.any valid
documents to show proof of its non-operating dates that would be necessary
for the possible reduction of the accumulated daily penalties, [16] but petitioner
failed to comply therewith.
As earlier noted, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion to
which it attached Daily Operation Reports and Certifications, which
voluminous documents were, however, unverified in derogation of Rule X,
Section 2[17] of the 2004 Revised Rules, Regulations and Procedures
Implementing Republic Act No. 4850. Absent such verification, the LLDA
may not be faulted for treating such evidence to be purely self-serving.
Respecting LLDAs decision not to attach any evidentiary weight to
the Daily Operation Reports or Certifications, recall that the LLDA conducted
an analysis of petitioners wastewater discharge on August 31, 2000, upon
receiving a phone-in complaint. And it conducted too an analysis on May 3,
2002 in the course of periodic compliance monitoring. The Daily Operation
Reports for both August 31, 2000[18] and May 3, 2002[19] submitted by
petitioner clearly manifest that the plant did not operate on those dates. On the
other hand, LLDAs Investigation Report and Report of Inspection [20] dated
August 31, 2000 and May 3, 2002, respectively, disclose otherwise. Petitioner
never disputed the factual findings reflected in these reports. Thus spawns
doubts on the veracity and accuracy of the Daily Operation Reports.
Petitioner asserts that LLDA had not credited it for undertaking
remedial measures to rehabilitate its wastewater treatment facility, despite the
prohibitive costs and at a time when its income from the agro-industrial
business was already severely affected by a poor business climate; and that the
enforcement of the assailed LLDA orders amounted to a gross disincentive to
its business.
Without belaboring petitioners assertions, it must be underscored that
the protection of the environment, including bodies of water, is no less urgent
or vital than the pressing concerns of private enterprises, big or small.
Everyone must do their share to conserve the national patrimonys meager
resources for the benefit of not only this generation, but of those to follow.
The length of time alone it took petitioner to upgrade its WTF (from 2003 to
2007), a move arrived at only under threat of continuing sanctions, militates
against any genuine concern for the well-being of the countrys waterways.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 27, 2009
Decision and the February 23, 2010 Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G. R. SP No. 107449, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 142571 : May 5, 2006]
NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner, v. LEONCIO C.
ENCISO, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeks to nullify and set aside the Decision
20
dated March 20, 20001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 59681 affirming an earlier decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 141, in its
Civil Case No. 94-005, an action for a sum of money with
damages thereat commenced by the respondent against the
herein petitioner, its Administrator and its Assistant
Administrator for Systems and Operations and Equipment
Management.
Succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
decision are the following undisputed facts:
Records show that in 1984, defendant-appellant [petitioner]
National Irrigation Administration (NIA) commenced the
widening of the Binahaan River in Brgy. Cansamada, Dagami,
Leyte. This project was divided into small sections costing not
more than P50,000.00 each so as not to require public
bidding. However, pre-bidding was nevertheless conducted by
NIA and participated in by different contractors to determine
the possible lowest bid which shall serve as the cost of the
project. With this arrangement, contractors are assigned to
work on specific sections without formal contracts. When the
works for the assigned sections are completed to NIA's
satisfaction, NIA will then prepare the requisite contract and
other pertinent documents so that the contractor can collect
payment.
Plaintiff-appellant [respondent] Enciso, doing business as a
contractor under the name LCE Construction, worked on a
portion of the river from "station 16 + 400 to station 16 +
900". His first billing of P227,165.90 was paid by NIA.
However, his second and final billing of P259,154.01 was
denied on the ground that the work done on the right side of
the river was not accomplished. [Words in bracket supplied.]
Respondent finally instituted a complaint for collection of a
sum of money with damages and attorney's fees with the RTC
of Makati City, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 94-005 and
eventually raffled to Branch 141 thereof. Petitioner and co-
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies and lack of cause of
action. The RTC denied the motion and proceeded to trial.
In a decision dated February 27, 1998, the RTC rendered
judgment for respondent, as plaintiff, holding petitioner, as
defendant, liable, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
defendant National Irrigation Administration to pay plaintiff
the sum of P259,154.01 with legal rate of interest of 12% per
annum effective on 1 August 1985 until fully paid;
P50,000.00, as and for attorney's fees; and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Both parties went up to the Court of Appeals (CA). For its
part, petitioner contended that the trial court erred in denying
its motion to dismiss and thereafter holding it liable to
respondent. On the other hand, respondent interposed that
the trial court erred in failing to hold petitioner's co-
defendants personally liable for damages and in adjudging
petitioner NIA solely liable based on the face value of the
work accomplished in 1985. The CA, however, found no
reversible error in the appealed decision and affirmed it as
follows:rbl r l l lbrr
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed
decision which is in accord with the evidence and
jurisprudential principle on the matter, the same is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Only petitioner NIA came to this Court via this Petition for
Review raising the following issues for resolution:
the court of appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the
regional trial court denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
(annex "c" hereof) which averred, among other things, that
respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies
available to him under the law.
21
the court of appeals erred in declaring that petitioner is liable
to respondent for the alleged work at petitioner's project
though the alleged assignment was done in violation of
existing rules and regulations.
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Petitioner raised the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies in its appeal before the CA, on account of
respondent's failure to file his claim before the Commission on
Audit (COA) prior to instituting a complaint for collection of
sum of money with the RTC. Instead of addressing the
question, however, the CA discussed NIA's separate and
distinct corporate personality from the government or the
State, which is a non-issue. What the CA failed to rule upon
is, given the fact that NIA is a government entity vested with
a separate corporate personality from the State, whether NIA,
being a government entity disbursing public funds or tax-
payers' money is subject to the jurisdiction of COA such that
any claim for collection of sum of money against it, specially
in this instance where it is not covered by any written
contract, must be initially lodged before the COA.
The issue should have been resolved in the affirmative.
Among the powers vested upon COA as provided for in
Section 26, Presidential Decree No. 1445, are the following:
SECTION 26. General jurisdiction. - The authority and powers
of the Commission shall extend to and comprehend all
matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and controls,
the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the
preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten
years, the examination and inspection of the books, records,
and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and
settlement of the accounts of all persons respecting funds or
property received or held by them in an accountable capacity,
as well as the examination, audit, and settlement of all claims
of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said
jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or controlled
corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-
governing boards, commissions, agencies of the Government,
and as herein prescribed, including non-governmental entities
subsidized by the government, those funded by donations
through the government, those required to pay levies or
government share, and those for which the government has
put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the
government. [Emphasis supplied.]
COA, as one of the three (3) independent constitutional
commissions, is specifically vested with the power, authority
and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining
to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property owned or held in trust by the government,
or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities. To
ensure the effective discharge of its functions, COA has been
empowered, subject to the limitations imposed by Article
IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution, to define the scope of its audit
and examination and establish the techniques and methods
required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing
rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant
or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds
and properties.2
In the instant case, when determining the regularity of
disbursement of public funds by the petitioner NIA for the
alleged services rendered by respondent in the widening
project involving a portion of Binahaan River in Barangay
Cansamada, Dagami, Leyte more specifically, from station 16
+ 400 to station 16 + 900 thereof, the accounting and
auditing principles, rules and regulations set by COA must be
taken into consideration. In this light, it is highly doubtful
whether respondent may compel petitioner NIA's officers to
release payment of his claims without any previously
approved contract for the supposed river-widening project in
22
violation of existing COA rules and regulations, without
subjecting said official to administrative and/or personal
liabilities and/or accountabilities.
Be that as it may, for the supposed refusal or failure by the
concerned public officials to act over respondent's money
claim or even the mere inaction for an unreasonable period,
the proper and immediate remedy of the respondent was to
file his claim with the COA, such inaction or refusal to pay
being tantamount to disallowance of the claim. Only after
COA has ruled on the claim, may the injured party invoke
judicial intervention by bringing the matter to this Court on
petition for certiorari .
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a doctrine of long
standing and courts have clear guidelines on the matter. Paat
v. Court of Appeals3 wrote:
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first
before court's judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of
action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver
or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of
cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for
one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser
expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of
controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of
justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away
from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has
been completed and complied with so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct
its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are not
amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not
an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its
flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of
the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2)
when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when
the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the
part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there
is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears
the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a
claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land
case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
Petitioner had timely raised this ground to dismiss the action
before the RTC, and since there is no showing that
respondent's case falls under any one of the accepted
exceptions, petitioner's motion to dismiss should have been
granted, forthwith dismissing the case for lack of cause of
action.
Anent the second issue, the legality or regularity of
petitioner's payment of respondent's claim may be best
addressed in a proper case before the COA, considering that
there might be factual matters involved therein, which is
definitely not within the province of the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari .
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The appealed
decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
23
respondent's Complaint before the RTC is DISMISSED for lack
of cause of action, with costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.

24