THE MORAL SANCTION

T HE idea of a moral sanction has given rise to innumerable

:disputes in the past due in large measure to the wrong
starting point taken by the thinkers who discussed this subject.
Both the philosophers who defend the existence of a moral
sanction and those who combat this doctrine soom at times to
have entered into a veritable conspiracy against a correct under-
standing of the subject, with the result that oftentimes the
arguments of each side miss fire and generally end nowhere.
In this paper it is our purpose to throw some light on this
problemand to try to make our solution of it acceptable to every
school of philosophical thought.
I quotea text from St. Thomas which sums up perlectly the
point I should like to make. He writes:
Wherever there exists a well-regulated order of ends it is necessary
that this established order lead to an end; anything which separates
itself from that order at the same time separates itself from its end.
That which exists by reason of an end becomes necessary given that
end, and this to the extent that if the end is to be attained the means
necessary to achieve it must be adopted. Given these means, freed of
course from any outside interference, the end necessarily follows. God
has ordained a certain order for human acts in as far as their end is
concerned, and this end is happiness. It follows, therefore, assuming
this order to be solidly established that those who follow its dictates
will obtain their end, happiness; in other words, they will be rewarded;
and that those who disturb this order by the commission of sin will not
obtain their end, happiness; in other words, they will be punished.
In the above quoted statement, St. Thomas defines very
clearly both his own and my position on the subject of moral
sanctions. For man, ethics is the art of arriving at his final
end; this is its only role and ultimate purpose. N ow, the end
of man is the good, that is to say, it is the periection itself of
49
50 The Moral Sanction

man, either individually or collectiv:ely taken. Therefore, moral

good musthe understood as, over and above the acceptance by
man of his end, fidelity in the use of then1.eans which alone can
bring hirn to this ,end. According as this end, the good, is
achieved, happiness or unhappiness comes to us. Given this
moral sanction, we experience joy in its achievement; in its
absence we ar:e haunted and tortured by our loss.
N ow it is easy to see that these ideas are homogeneous. But
it is only by joining them together in asound and logical union
that we can hope to discover the solution of our problem. To
separate them would be to create innumerable difficulties for
ourselves.
If virtue ean be looked upon as the means to happiness, virtue
must of itself be able toproducehappiness. On the other hand,
since vice is a denial of these means, it cannot but fall short
of ever producing true happiness. Those writers, therefore,
who advocate an ethics ,different from ours must be attacked
from the side of the fundamental difficlllties which their sys-
tems present in the light of the above fact; that is to say, if
they are prepared to deny the existence of all moral sanctions
this can only mean that they are prepared 'at the same time to
maintain that the end and the means necessary to the achieve-
ment of this end, in as far as the eternal destiny of mankind
is eoncerned, have no causal dep'endence one on the other. In
other words, they roust be prepared to defen,d the idea that we,
for example, can go to London hy ,going to Berlin, that we
arrive nowhere even though we ,do proceed by the correct route,
or that it is even virtuous on our part to be completely ,dis-
intereste.d as regards our journey towards eternity, provided
only that in our actions we are guided hy and follow our own
fancies.
Su,ch assumptions are, of course, entirely unacceptable. It ia
simply not true that the means ean be separated from the end,
either psychologically or in fact. Nature is the ,creation of an
 A. D. Sertillanges 51

All-wise God; even human thinking is destined by the very law

of its being to try to unite itself with this Wisdom. These two
fundamental ideas contain within themselves the power to settle
satisfactorily our whole problem. We must be careful, how-
ever, to analyze these ideas in as thorough a fashion as possible
so as not to be led by our analysis to conclusions which are not
contained in the premises.
The ancient Greeks, from whom we 8hould not refuse to
borrow any sound doctrine which they held (and the efforts
which they made toestablish an acceptable ethics were really
surprising irom whatever point of view we study them) , de-
clared that man, like everything else in this universe was made
for the attaimnent of certain purposes, purposes which are
determined by his very nature, which his will, if it be upright,
must seek,and which all his efforts should tend to realize.
These efforts naturally should be crowned by happiness, since
happiness is nothing but the perfeetion of that which is experi-
enced in each of our actions. It is in the correct union and
subordination of these actions, one to another, that we find troe
happiness, the flowering of good.
Admirable as all this i8 in theory, the Greeks were not able
to guarantee that virtue should necessarily be followed by the
possession of its natural and logical result, happiness. I have
no doubt that both Plato and Aristotle would have given their
approval to the iollowing sentiment of St. Thomas: " If human
order has been solidly established it i8 necessary that those who
accept and govern their lives according to these principles
should attain happiness."
Facts, however, in this case conquered theory, and in spite of
that optimism which was so characteristic of Greek thought,
they were obliged to acknowledge that human order has not
been solidly established, that in large measure nature is gov-
erned by chance and that the triumph of the wicked, to use a
Biblical expression, and the oppression of the just is nothing
52 The Moral Sanction

short of a shock to the religious soul and a seandal to all man-

kind. The optimism of Christianity, on the other hand, is
more robust and vigorous than was that of an Aristotle, for the
simple reason that it is not only founded on firmer prineiples
but beeause our whole philosophy is shot throughand through
with it. In thiscontext, however, we must never forget that
moral sanetions are not merely a sort of reward extrinsie to
effort on our part or unrelated to duty. On the contrary, they
are the natural result of these very things, areal aehievement
on {)Ur part. They are not to be thought of as a kind of outside
intervention in our moral autonomy sinee God, Who by His
law commands such actions, must be regarded as apart of this
autonomy, being its Creator and its Source.
I have prefaeed the above remarks in order to make the more
easily intelligible the arguments which are to follow.
:My contention is that morality is simply the eorrect attitude
of mankind in its seareh for happiness. A good act is one
which binds together the desire for happiness with happiness
itself. A bad, or sinful aet, is 000 which cannot attain such a
purpose; that is to say, one whieh eannot achieve happiness.
With reference to the means leading to happiness, these
means are good, and are, at least theoretically, what we eall
virtues. But, in order that we may be able actually to aehieve
happiness, by means of anaet of virtue whieh per se is capable
of achieving happiness, it is neoessary that order be solidly
established. By this we :mean to assert (1) that the means and
the end be joined together in 'a way that is soundly logical;
(2) that this union of end and means be not hampered in its
working and results by any extrinsic obstacles in the presence
of which morality is helpless. Given these conditions, morality
aehieves by and of itself a sanetion, for the bond which joins
the virtuous act with its resultant, happiness, isas unbreakable
as is the relation whieh exists between a determined cause and
its necessary effect. Of course thc obstacles which may inter-
 A. D. Sertillanges 53

vene between the good we seek and the good we actuallyachieve

are legion in number. There are, for example, obstacles due to
heredity, to environment, obstacles which beset the course of the
interior life, all of whichconspire to shatter that inner harmony
which reasoncan see should exist between our acts and their
natural results.
All are agreed that a particular virtuous act may not profit
a man personally, yet may be of great value to other people,
or to the welfare of society. Much has been written recently
on the question of the so-called collective effects of virtuous
living on the part of the individual. Certainly such an idea
contains some truth, nor is its value negligible, for individual
effort can scarcely be thought of as virtuous from every angle
unless it be subordinated to the welfare of the group. But it is
evident that such an answer to our problem only serves to push
back the real difficulty, for collective results cannot be guar-
anteedany more than individual resultscan be. 'rhey, too,
are beset, as far as their consequences are concerned, by the
selfsame obstacles which diminish the results of the actions of
individuals.
Moreover, since morality is so essentially a personal matter,
it should and must produce results, first of all, in terms of the
individual. We are willing to agree that those results which
are beneficial to the individual should likewise be of value to
others, thus giving added proof of the solidarity which binds
the members of the human family one to another; and morality
of its very nature includes such an idea. But it is also neces-
sary to hold that the individual should not be sacrificed to the
good of the whole, since the welfare of the individual is, in the
last analysis, the ultimate objective of all group action. The
desire for happiness which is implanted in every individual is
not a matter relative to the individualalone; it embraces all
who are human beings like himself; it even includes God.
This desire for happiness, too, prescinds in a certain manner
54 The Moral Sanetwn

from self, for if the order, of which we have spoken, is solidly

established, virtue should be its own rewal'd. Certainly, if a
virtuous man by any chance should succumb irrevocably to the
powers of evil, such defection might be considered an absolute
evil. lt is not, however, in any sense of the word a total evil,
in spite of the fact that it must be looked upon as irremediable.
Even the complete happiness, present and future, of the race
would not of itself compensate fr such an evil, for humanity is
nothing but the individuals who in every eentury have gne
to make it up, and for that reason humanity eannot but experi-
enee in itself the effects of the good 01' evil acts of every man
who has ever lived upon the earth.
lt must be coneeded, therefore, that an order solidly estab-
lished is not of itself capable of causing happiness to flow from
virtue. But we may weIl 'ask: Is such a situation definitive
01' is it merely transitory? Does it represent a total 01' merely
a partial and fragmentary outlook on human destiny? A pagan
01' paganizing philosophy considers such a view as totally and
completely representati\le f all the facts, and so convinced
argues from this assumption. A Christian philosophy, on the
other hand, protests against such an attitude for it regards
human ;destiny as something both wider and loftier than the
pagan makes it out to be, and by consequence the Christian
concludes that reality, including God and human life as weIl,
is continued beyond all our experience here below, and because
of this fact good actions contain within themselves the seeds of
happiness, w'hile evil actscan only lead to unhappiness.
Perhaps the metaphor f the seed to which reference has just
been made may serve somewhat to clarify this thought. If a
seed is kept in a granary, manifestly it does not produce fruit,
despite the fact that it 'has within itself the power to do so.
lt can be said to have within itself fruit potentially, and we can
even express the belief that later on it will actually produce
fruit. The same may be said of the position which Christian
 .... _-_ _. ----- - .. _---------
...

A. D. Sertillanges 55

philosophy takes on this subject. According to our view, merit,

the concomitant of every good act, is the equivalent of happi-
ness, a paper money, as it were, given to us in place of happiness,
the value of which is assured and which shall be redeemed by
us in another world. As a matter of actual fact, virtue en-
counters and becomes one with happiness under the aegis of
merit. N ow, this is precisely what we mean by a moral sanc-
tion. For such a sanction becomes a surety bond since we
expect ,and look forward to happiness when this sanction has
succeeded in furnishing us with a justification for our acts.
It now remains to be seen whether we are justified in believ-
ing in the idea of merit as sanction. If we cannot do so it
would be easy to show, by means of a more or less developed
treatment of the obstacles which are always found in the path'
of those who attempt to do good, that the very idea of an ade-
quate moral sanction is false, and that, byconsequence, the
idea of merit has no real value either.
It was Herbert Spencer who praised to the very skies the
so-called natural sanctions of morality. By natural sanctions
I mean those which have their origin in nature itself. These
sanctions, however, are but pseudo--sanctions and are devoid of
any ethical character. The reason for this statement is that
they do not possess any intentand are, therefore, outside the
realm of morality strictly taken. N or are the so-called social
sanctions much different in character from natural sanctions for
the l'ieason that social environment acts upon us according to
law much in the same way as nature itself does. Sociology is
interested only in the facts of environment. But morality, in
the abstract at least, has little or nothing to do with, and is
more or less shut off from, the influence of environment.
According to this point of view, the sanctions of conscience have
a value, even if it be only available for literary purposes. Of
course such san<ltions possess no real and lasting value, since the
internal life of man, from whieh these acts proceed, is itself
subject to change.
56 The Moral Banction

In order that an accord between morality and its normal

consequences may be hoped for, it is necessary that morality
regulate not only the goodness 01' evil of our acts but the uni-
versal reality which exists OOth in and outside of us as indi-
viduals, that is to say, that it govern nature, society, the body
and soul of the moral subj'ect, for all these play their parts in
the sanctioning of human acts. In short, we :must appeal to
the creative will itself. That is precisely what we do when
we act according to the dictates of reason.
In nature there is no action without its corresponding re-
action. Everything which rebels against an established order
necessarily meets some l'esistance from that order; on the con-
trary, everything which acts in accordance with an established
order is itself developed thereby. This, of course, is nothing
but the law of self-preservation, a law which is applicable to
the realm of living beings where punishment 01' reward for
actions follows almost spontaneously on thecommission of such
acts. The same law holds goodas far as human beings are
concerned. We look upon it asan act oi justice that he who
does good should be rewarded, while he who sins against order
should be punished, that the order itself may be restored
thereby. The popular expression ' restoration of public order'
is profoundly philosophical for it is towards the restoration of
order that every reaction works. As a matter of fact, it is real1y
but another way of expressing the instinct of self-preservation.
There exists, we must not forget, a certain instinct looking
towards the preservatin of order in general as weIl as towards
the preservation of any particular order, for being in general
is certainly a type of being. Being in general also defends its
right to existence. If it isa question f the internal unity
which makes up human personality,conscience, the rector oi
this unity, reacts either by means oi rem.orse 01' by means oi
the happiness begotten of a virtuous action. If it is ,a question
oi the body social, authority, the representative of the unity of
 A. D. Sertillanges 57

the group, reacts by means of penalties 01' rewards. If it is a

question of the totality of beings, in arealm where morality is
supreme, -there will continue to exist certain incomplete reac-
tions for the reason that the order of the uniVierse, while em-
bracing individuals within itself, does not, however, suppress
their existence. However, God, the Author of aU order, plays
the principal role in the work of bringing to a conclusion, of
embracing, and of setting right aU possible particular reactions.
Certainly it is -the duty of him who represents an order to
defend it against aU disturbances of that order and to reward
those who act in harmony with its demands. And this con-
clusion is aU the more trueas we approach an order which is
more perfect than every other order. Where anarchy reigns,
the individual must look to ,his own defense. In a civilized
country, justice defends both the individual and the com-
munity. And the moral order which is, because oi God its
Author, both absolute and perfect, must centralize, as it were,
its punishments, not in the sense that ev:ery punishment roust
come directly from God, but that, in the last analysis, every
punishment must be His work and even some punishments must
come directly and personally from Hirn.
Many reasons are advanced by writers who share with us
this opinion. AU these reasons merely develop the argument
from St. Thomas which we have already cited. "Wherever
there exists an order weIl established for the attainment
of an end, it is necessary that this order lead to the end;
to deviate from such an order is at the same time not to attain
the end." Both Ohristian optimism and the honor due God
delD:and that we believe that the order which He has ordained
.is well-established. Since virtue is proposed to us as a means
of obtaining happiness, and has no other rcason for existence,
it should produce happiness for aU those who live virtuously. N 01'
can there be any question of God abandoning us; we may even
go so far as to say that Godcannot .abandon usand be true to
58 The Moral Sanction

Himself. It is on some such assurance as this that at bottom

the wholeduty of man rests. As Kant has said somewhat
obscurely but nevertheless profoundly: "The free will should
beable to place itself in accord with that to which it is subject."
We ought to subject oUTselves to the morallaw because it repre-
sents order, the universal means for the attaining of those
beneficial results which the very functioning of all things
demands. It is also a means to happiness for oUTselves fr we
are, as all must realize, in eonstant relation with the whole of
reality. If this means reveals itself as multiple, or if it mani-
f.ests itself to a point where it lllUSt be considered pUTely eon-
tingent, if the results sought by a vigorous virtuous effort are
not certain, then in whose name, we ask, can we bestow an
absolute character upon the moral law? Ras the order of the
universe the right to command me without guaranteeing me
beforehand for the sacrifices I shall make?
Egoism does not enter at all into this problem; it is a question
purely and simply of the efficacy of action itself. We cannot
be assured of the results of moral actions, strictly taken, unless
we accept and live under the regime of justice, unless our envi-
ronment makes up a moral order, unless the universe itself be
subject to the law of God as we individuals are subject to its
sway. If this world is, on the contrary, 'rooted in evil,' as
the Apostle says, and if only evil exists as the final cause of all
things, as the last and definitive truth and not as something
merely iJerrnporary, then neither am I, the individual, bound
by any law. In such acase we might be able to have reCOUTse
to a morality of pUTe sentiment founded on sympathy or on
pity, on the love of danger, etc., but moral obligation could not
be said to exist under such circumstances. If, on the other
hand, the world is governed by the good, if all reality is moral,
then by consequence it follows that a good action or a bad
action done in this kind of an ambient will not be able to pro-
duee each the selfsame results. Moreover, and a fortiori, the
 ._.- --- .. _.. _------------

A. D. Sertillooges 59

reactions themselves are not interchangeable, that is to say,

good cannot become evil or evil, good. If it should happen,
a thing which is daily occurring, that our immediate environ-
ment produces evil, that vice helps one to succeed and virtue
only brings failure, that egotism is profitable and brotherly love
but injures one, then we cannot but conclude that there must
exist somewhere in the moral order which is far distant from
our present environment an Omnipotent God Who will make
His presence and intervention feIt in our affairs, and Who as
the Supreme Governor and Chief of this moral order will restore
it to its equilibrium; in other words, that the head of this order
will himself vindicate the rights of the order. "Revenge and
reward are mine," saith the Lord.
Given these principles, it is easy to answer an argument
which has an apparent value but is at bottom extremely super-
ficial. It is the argument which, since Guyot's time, has been
repeated ad nause.am by our contemporaries to the effect that a
sanction against evil only serves to double the evil done, while
a sanction for good does away with whatsoever good there may
be inan action.
To the superficial observer it does appear that a sanction for
evil can but double the evil under the pretext of curing it.
There is a grain of truth in this statement, but the truth does
not lie where the proponents of the argument place it. They
would like us to believe that a sinful act is an evil and that the
punishment must be super-imposed on this original evil, thus
making two sins instead of one. To argue thus would be like
saying: Gangrene is an evil; the amputation of a limb infected
by gangrene is also an evil; therefore, the amputation of a
gangrenous limb is a double evil. Eut it is evident that in this
argument the actual number of evils is confused with their
summation, a process which changes aItogether the kinds of
evil under consideration. Two evils do exist in the ease oi
moral evil; on the one hand, a sin, on the other, punishment
60 The Moral Sanction

for sin. Hut they stand in such a relation to each other that
from 'a synthesis of them good itself is p,roduced, the good oi
the moral order.
Sin is an evil; punish,ment abstractly considered is likewise
an ,evil, hut that sin should he subjected in this manner to a
sanction, is a good, inasmuch as the sanction shows fortll
the order of nature over which justice presides. If it we~e
otherwise sanction would be 'a universal evil, an evil of God
Himself, if one may be permitted to use such a phrase. What
I mean to say is that .a sanction instead of heing a relative
would he an absolute evil.
It is alsocontended that a sanction for good ends by cor-
rupting even the good ,done. This statement can be understood
as meaning that :either on the part of the divine order the
sanction corrupts the good done because it corrup.ts virtue by
the very act of sanctioning it, or on the part of the moral
agent who should act at all times from wholly distinterested
mO,tives and should therefore, under penalty of not being really
ethical, refuse to accept or even to desire a sanction for his acts.
The 'first alternative is hut the expression of an outrageous
paradox. To contend that it is sinful to do good for Olle who has
acted virtuously, for the reason that the subsequentapproval
may alter the purity ofhis actions, is simply a gamble. If it
were as true as it may be at the same time flalse that a moral
agent slhould disregard all sanctions, it follows that it would be
no less illogical to say, it is an evil :to insist upon even this kind
of sanction. Fr we can then truly say that the less a man
desires any sanction, the more he shall merit hy his acts. The
soldier who fights out of asense 0& purepatriotism merits a
military decoration more than he whose aim in fighting, no
matter how legitimate that aim ,may be, was solely io obtain a
decoration.
This,however, is on1y one and that a small side 01 the ques-
tion. In this context it is important to ap'preciate that the
 A. D. Sertillanges 61

above argument disregards completely the fundamental nature

of a moral sanction. It assumes that sanctions are netero-
geneous to virtue, for the reason that they are to be regarded
as a species of disturbing element in the pursuit of good. We
havedemonstrated that there exists a perfect homogeneity
between virtue and its sanction, which is nothing but the per-
fection of virtue itself. One is but the natural and logical
means to the 'attainment of the other. Virtue contains the idea
of sanction in its very definition for virtue is, if it exists at all,
the means we use to reach our end. It is very much like a
father promising areward to his son :Vor progress in school.
If the father said: " Study and you shall receive a watch from
me," we can say that the father Ihad given the son a wrong
incentive to study. But if the father said: "Study in order
that you may become some day a learned man," it is easy to see
that tlhe latter sanction is quite different from the former.
To 'attain learning is a natural and 'adequate reward for a
student. Learning is the normal outcome of study, and it is
essentially ethical that such a result should follow upon study.
If, however, sucha result does not follow, this is due to
influences not moral, but physical and psychological. Good to
the good: this is precisely what our thesis presupposes, an
assumption which is based on the idea that reality, because of
its creation by God, is moral and that, therefore, the good is not
only the law but the principle of all things. Now, when we say,
good to the good, we mean, of course, the truly good, the good
which both defines morality andbestows upon it its proper
object. Why should ,any one attempt to depreciate the value
of this good ~ We assert again and again that sanctions are
not something extrinsic to the moral order, something added to
it like a chocolate frosting to a cake, 01' a whipping given to a
badchild. Sanctions are the normalconsequences of our
actions. They must, therefore, be viewed not only in their
62 The Moral Sa,nction

relation to our immediate environment, but in relation to their

own total environment, wihich is divine.
We may now say a word eoneerning the ofher aspect of the
objeetion made. Why, we ask, should not one diesire sanetions
sinee they are ineluded in the very reason for willing ~ The
will is an appetite fr the good. The good will is that whieh
tends towards the highest good; such adefinition exhausts its
nature. The good is the end of man. Therefore, sinee the
sanetion sought by a moral agent is nothing but his own end,
the reaSOll :for his virtuous aets, w,here is there any egotism
involved in such a desire ~ Is it egotistie to will theend whieh
we are in duty bound to strive for ~ The' egotist aets out
oI a false ,conseienee of self, unmindful of the Divine Self
and all other selves bound to Hirn. But he who aets within
the limits of the regimen of order acts for the good of the whole,
including his own welfare. Should not the individual desire
that whieh is the complement of all being ~ ean the individual
make of himself an exception to universal law ~ Every indi-
vidual is in eommand of 'his own destiny and welfare, but these
are neeessarily ineluded ill the welfare of others. The indi-
vidual, however, must first of all seek his own happiness, sinee
it has been eommitted to his care.
Aeording to the Christian tradition, sanction is a greater
good thaneven virtue itself, inasmuch as sanetion is the en:d of
virtue. An ethies like that of Kant, whieh believes in a moral-
ity without an ohjeet, may refuse to virtue the actual achiev~
ment of a sueeessful outcome, led to this conelusion by the
theory that in morality not the being but the intent alone is of
value. As a matter of fact, "re do not put a value Oll the intent
llntil after we have accepted the being, and oocause of our
evalu'ation of being. Merely to act, in our eyes, has no meall-
ing at all, exc1ept on condition that we are acting to achieve
something. This somethil1g, the end of man, is first willedby
us and then aehieved, otherwise all our efforts would be in vain.
 A. D. Sertillanges 63

As in the absolute realm which God rules over, there can be no

unsuccessful activity since all acts must attain His purposes, so
likewise the end-result of our moral effort is precisely that
sanction which we have been discussing.
In conclusion, the very nature of the moral good as we have
defined it, .demands the existence of an adequate sanction.
Certainly, that which we possess mentally as the so-called intent
at the beginning of an act must be realized w'hen the act itself
is completed. If the chiefof our ethical desires is a well regu-
lated will to happiness, the pursuit of an end in every way
conformable to human nature, then the pursuit of that end
which is so conformable to the nature of man must itself be
conformable to the laws of nature. Happiness is precisely that
result which we should disoover as the terminus of every moral
effort on our part, provided, ofcourse, that we do not fail in
observing all theconditions requisite to the attainment of such
happiness.
Theconditions which depend upon us we are obliged to meet
and to fulfill personally. As for the conditions which da
not depend upon us, the Stoics claimed that they do not count,
since happiness or sorrow flows only from those conditions over
which man hasoontrol. But Aristotle, Plato, or a modern
pagan finds himself incapable of accepting such a paradox, and
therefore takes refuge in fatalism. The Christian has recourse
to the idea of Providence, by bringing God into his theories of
nature and of man. By reason of God that which appears not
to depend upon us is found to depend upon us after all. The
moral will becomes the rule of the universe, it fashions the
universe according to its own ideals, it successfully achieves that
which it desires, using both the universe and the self as means
towards such an achievement. Certainly, this is a lofty con-
ception of man. However, its fundamental optimism is but
faith in God .and the philosophical acceptance of the Kingdom
of God, which includes and sanctifies all things by making
64 The Moral Sanction

moral that which appears at first sight somethingquite foreign

to a moral order, and in the end by bringing to God all those
beings which are travelling in His direction as likewise those,
but by a different route, that of justiee, which will to separate
themsel~es from Hirn.
A. D. SERTILLANGES.
Membre de Z'Institut, Paris.