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JEA N -LU C m a r i o n is professor o f philosophy at the Sorbonne. Among his many books are
God without Being (1991) and On Descartes Metaphysical Prism (1999), both published by the
University o f Chicago Press.
Marion, Jean-Luc, 19 4 6-
[Questions cartsiennes. English]
Cartesian questions : method and metaphysics / Jean-Luc Marion ; foreword by Daniel
Garber.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-226-50542-1 (cloth : alk. paper). ISBN 0-226-50544-8 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Descartes, Ren, 159 6 -16 50 . I. Title.
B 18 7 5 .M 3 3 6 1 3 19 9 9
194 dc2i 98-38335
CIP
T he paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American
National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence o f Paper for Printed Library
Materials, a n s i Z 3 9 .4 8 - 19 9 2 .
Contents
Publishers Note, vii Foreword by Daniel Garber, ix
Daniel Garber
University of Chicago
CHAPTER ONE
rather than through their own self-evidence or the role of the authori
tative hermeneut. The significance is found not in the dreams them
selves (nor in the divinatory framework for their eventual interpre
tation), but in the mastery exercised over them by a mere man
{Discourse, AT VI, 3 , 1. 22 and 8 ,11. 16 -17 ; see letter to Voetius, AT
VIII, 2, 91, 1. 28) who, while asleep, stops dreaming and begins to
think. Strange moment, outside of dreams although still in sleep, in
which the dream becomes the object, thought rather than dreamed,
of a thought that is neither asleep nor awake. What is most remark
able (184, 1. 12) here clearly originates not in dreams, but actually
in the movement that distances them, metamorphoses them from
impenetrable states of (unconscious) consciousness into objects to
be apprehended by a thinking consciousness. With singular assur
ance, Baillet points out that what is remarkable is precisely that
doubting whether what he had just seen was a dream or a vision,
not only did he decide while asleep that it was a dream, but he also
interpreted it before he awoke (184,11. 1215). This mention of the
two decisions made by Descartes points to a new direction in our
analysis. First, Descartes portrays his dreams as mere dreams rather
than visions. Moreover, the dreams remain insignificant as long as
they are not interpreted. This decision, besides confirming our previ
ous hypothesis on the intrinsic insignificance of dreams, underlines
an essential pre-interpretation: Before interpreting his dreams, and
in order to be able to do so, Descartes posits that they require inter
pretation. Interpreting the need for interpretation, Descartes masters
in advance all potential meaning, by submitting it to a condition of
original possibility namely, the interpretation itself as single locus
of meaning.
But any interpretation entails an interpreter, who is hypothesized
to be superior to the passive and unintelligent recipient of the dream,
and alone privy to meaning. The usual schema conjoins, and estab
lishes a hierarchy among, dream, interpreter, and recipient of the
dream. But here Descartes establishes himself as the interpreter of
his own dreams. He folds into one the two roles of interpreter and
recipient; or rather, since these roles are endowed with contradictory
characteristics, he disengages himself from the role of recipient (pas
sive and unintelligent) and raises himself up, in an act that shatters
the divinatory framework, to the role of hermeneut, of an authorita
tive producer of meaning. Moreover, the hermeneut could not pro
vide an authoritative meaning if he were not privy to it and had not,
DOES THOUGHT DREAM? 9
therefore, already mastered it. By establishing himself as the herme-
neut of his own dreams, Descartes actually raises himself up to the
level of inspiration. He becomes his own inspiration. Eventually, this
self-inspiration will lead to a new theory of enthusiasm (184, 11. 19 -
28), but it is deployed immediately through a multistranded self-
interpretation. By reexamining all the elements of the third dream
that were insignificant until then, Descartes the hermeneut explicates
meaning to Descartes the patient. And this meaning, as I shall try to
demonstrate here, announces theses found in Descartes subsequent
philosophy, in short, in Descartes the philosopher. Wearing the three
masks of hermeneut, meaning, and recipient, Descartes comes for
ward masked in his dreams: Actors, taught not to let any embar
rassment show on their faces, put on a mask. I will do the same. So
far, I have been a spectator in this theater which is the world, but
I am now about to mount the stage, and I come forward masked
{Cogitationes privatae, 213, 11. 4-7). He is hidden from the gaze of
the public (AT I, 23, 1. 24), but especially from his own gaze, as
if he were blind to the light that he already carries within him. Des
cartes therefore first reveals his own thought to himself, a thought
that comes forward hidden (to himself first of all) under the mask
of insignificant dreams. By interpreting these dreams as meaning
ful in a Cartesian sense he reveals himself to himself as a thinker.
Let us retrace this interpretive path, step by step.
(a) He judged that the Dictionary could only mean all the Sciences
gathered together (184,11. 15 -17 , examining the conundrum of 182,
1. 32). Rather than read this as a simple banality (the cumulative sum
of knowledge), we should refer here to the inaugural thesis of the
Regulae: It must be acknowledged that all the sciences are so closely
interconnected that it is much easier to learn them all together than
to separate one from the other . . . ; they are all interconnected and
interdependent (361, 11. 12-18). This fundamental thesis actually
appears before 1628, for instance in the Cogitationes privatae: If we
could see how the sciences are linked together, we would find them
no harder to retain in our minds than the series of numbers (AT
X, 2 1 5 ,11. 2-4). It also occurs in a probably contemporary fragment
of the Studium bonae mentis: the things that I will have said hold
together so tightly and are so interconnected that each one follows
from the others (204,11. 10 -11); and in another fragment mentioned
by Poisson: For all the sciences are linked, so that no one of them
can be possessed perfectly, without the others following of them
10 CHAPTER ONE
way in unreliable sciences. The search for a path does bear on the
road in life (iter vitae), but first and foremost on the proper road
of truth (rectum iter veritatis) and the road of truth itself (via veri
tatis).n The widening of the question on the iter is a product of its
deepening perspective: The point is not to find the truth simply for
the sake of finding it, even by chance. We must identify it with cer
tainty (that is, according to the method), choose the via veritatis ac
cording to the method, that is, seek the odos according to the methodos
that orders the search. The path follows the path of the path: This
repetition makes the Quod vitae sectabor iter? sound like the open
ing of a question on the methodical essence of the path. We are here
truly beneath the Regulae, although we already discern the future
echoes of Rule I V and Rule V.
(d) By the verse Est et Non, which is the Yes and No of Py
thagoras, he understood Truth and Falsity in human understanding
and the profane sciences (184, 1. 38-185, 1. 2). Rather than com
menting on the allusion to the famous mathematician,19let us restrict
our discussion to the purely Cartesian evidence of the text, especially
insofar as it approaches (self-)evidence from a Cartesian perspective.
The disjunction between yes and no is clear-cut and excludes a third
term; on the basis of this oneiric fact, the interpretation reaches con
clusions about the relation between truth and falsity in human un
derstanding and the profane sciences, in other words, in the very
sciences that will be ruled by the method ten years later. But, pre
cisely, the method defines the truth on the basis of self-evidence,
which rejects a middle ground between true and false: never to ac
cept anything as true if I did not have evident knowledge of its truth:
that is, carefully to avoid precipitate conclusions and preconceptions,
and to include nothing more in my judgments than what presented
itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I had no occasion
to doubt it (Discourse, 18, 11. 16-23). Or as stated in the Regulae:
we reject all such merely probable cognition and resolve to believe
only what is perfectly known and incapable of being doubted (nec
nisi perfecte cognitis et de quibus dubitari non potest, statuimus esse
credendum, 362, 11. 14-16). And therefore, concerning all such
matters of probable opinion we can, I think, acquire no perfect
knowledge (De omnibus ergo quae sunt ejusmodi probabiles opin
iones, non perfectam scientiam videmur posse acquiere, 363,11. 14 -
16).20 Before self-evidence held as criterion of, and synonym for,
DOES THOUGHT DREAM? 13
40, 11. 5-10). As early as 1619, dreaming and waking, dreaming and
sleeping, interpretation and deduction no longer differ much from
one another, for they are already viewed as modes of the cogitatio.
Thus, in 1619, with the indifference of interpretation to the differ
ence between waking and sleeping, we witness nothing less than the
awakening of the cogitatio. Which may be just as valuable a discovery
as that of the foundations of a wonderful science.
If, paradoxically, the dreams of 1619 are a manifestation of the
pure cogitatio in its sober reduction of all affections, we can make
three additional remarks.
(a) With the cogitatio as a given, can we infer an outline of the
cogito, sum? In fact, in 1619, two of its elements have already ap
peared, although in a disjointed fashion. On the one hand, we discern
an outline of the egjas which in the exercise of self-interpretation (and
self-inspiration) controls the realm of its own mind, gains an almost
complete mastery over its thoughts, and already realizes that noth
ing lies entirely within our power except our thoughts (Discourse,
AT VI, 2 5 ,11. 23-24; see letter to Mersenne, 3 December 1640, AT
III, 249, 11. 4-13). On the other hand, although it is exercised
through the interpretation of thoughts, this power does not coincide
with the certainty of the ego. The ego does maintain its primacy (self
interpretation, etc.) and does discover the cogitative reduction, but
does not yet experience its certainty in the actual exercise of the cogi
tatio. The ego exerts control and the cogitatio reduction, but the inter
vention of the ego has not yet become a cogitative reduction, nor has
the latter culminated yet in the existing ego. The presence of this
gap should not come as a surprise in 1619, especially since ten years
later it is still not bridged in the Regulae, and it is perhaps not bridged
either in the Discourse on the Method.1^
(b) If the cogitatio is the centerpiece of the three dreams, along
with their dual and strict conceptual interpretation, what is the role
of enthusiasm? We can say unhesitatingly that enthusiasm plays a
very limited role at best. First, because it does not inspire the dreams.
And also because it undergoes a radical critique, in the very passage
that seems to consecrate it (184,11. 19-28): The divinity of Enthusi
asm (184,11. 23-24) supposing that the expression is actually from
Descartes, since the text glossed here by Baillet simply mentions en-
thusiasmum (217, 1. 19) intervenes simply to explain the graves
sententiae that are more often formulated by poets (even by the
most mediocre of them, 184, 11. 20-21) than by philosophers. In
i8 CHAPTER ONE
ment will only appear in 1641. In other words, does the metaphysics
stated by the method coincide with the metaphysics stated by itself?
In this context, the Discourse on the Method, especially Part Four,
is akin to a closed arena in which method and metaphysics are en
gaged in a struggle. This confrontation leaves us with only a limited
set of possible positions, of which the most radical amounts to deny
ing that a confrontation is taking place at all, insofar as the method
for the first time unifies science, which is thereby finally freed from
any metaphysical foundation. This was the thesis of L. Liard: In
Descartes thought, science taken in itself and limited to its own field
is independent of any considerations on the essence and the origin
of all things. . . . Conversely, Cartesian metaphysics is independent
of science, since what characterizes his physics and makes it into
something entirely new and without precedent is the absence of any
metaphysical idea. From Baillet to A. Boyce Gibson, many critics
have solved the problem in this manner, by denying that it could
actually be posited.5 The debate therefore cannot take place, for lack
of a common battleground. Instances of interference are, however,
too numerous to allow such an extreme and simplistic position to
remain tenable in the long run.
Yet, if we believe that method and metaphysics do indeed clash
in the Discourse, we can still approach their confrontation in two quite
different ways. We might accept the necessity to continually search
for a commentary on the Discourse in the Meditations, which is what
E. Gilson set out to do, while presupposing, with H. Lefvre, that
the metaphysics is constant and sufficiently intangible that it seems
impossible to base a history of [Descartes] thought on a chronology
of the works. 6 In this hypothesis, the continuity between 1637 and
1641 is reinforced, so that any shortcoming of the Discourse or any
divergence from the final statement of the metaphysics found in the
Meditations simply reveals a temporary and insignificant imperfec
tion, which can be corrected without a solution of continuity by a
subsequent development.7
However, this reconciliation by means of continuity suffers from
a considerable weakness, since it does not take into account an impor
tant difference between 1637 and 1641: Whereas the Meditations
raises its very slight and so to speak metaphysical reason for doubt
(AT VII, 36, 11. 24-25) to such a level that one has to invoke an
omnipotent God (i.e., deceiving God ) and genius malignus in
short, a summa dubitatio (460,1. 3) the Discourse only acknowledges
WHAT IS THE METAPHYSICS WITHIN THE METHOD? 23
the fact that we are often in error. This gap between the different
levels of acceptance of doubt is repeated when the boundaries of
doubt are drawn: In one case, doubt even affects common evidence,
mathematical and logical truths, and all external existences; in the
other case, only sensory knowledge vacillates in the usual fallibility,
but nothing else. Thus, in Part Four the Discourse lacks the theoreti
cal moments that bring the Meditations into the hyperbolical, that is
to say metaphysical, realm. This is an undeniable textual fact, which
was conclusively established by Ferdinand Alquie. Besides, Descartes
himself declares in 1637 that he thus doubts everything that is mate
rial thereby admitting that he leaves all intellectual evidence un
touched.8
We must therefore present a third hypothesis to account for this.
Alquie gave it a famous, although rather extreme, formulation: If the
Discourse is entirely silent on the deceiving God and the genius
malignus, as well as on doubt about the existence of the outside world
and mathematical truths as they define the metaphysical starting
point for the Meditations, one must logically conclude that, in 1637,
Descartes had not yet formulated the definitive version of his meta
physics. The usual counter argument namely, that the Discourse is
not unaware of the definitive metaphysics but limits itself to outlining
it actually contradicts itself, since from the fact that Descartes did
not present an elaborated metaphysics in the Discourse in 1637, we
cannot conclude that he had at that time elaborated any metaphysics
at all. The undeniable absence of themes that are essential to the
metaphysics of the Meditations prevents us from granting a meta
physical status to the Discourse. Moreover, Alquie adds, when the
Discourse enunciates a genuinely metaphysical theme, such as I
think, therefore I am {DM, 32, 1. 19 = 33, 1. 17), we must suspect
that, conceptually, it has not yet reached its full metaphysical role.
Hence, the cogito of the Discourse is not the foundation of all truth,
but the most certain of all truths. The conclusions Descartes draws
from this concern science rather than ontology. 9Thus, in 1637, the
themes we encounter either are not metaphysical or have not yet
attained a metaphysical status, and strictly metaphysical theses are
lacking. Thus, in Part Four of the Discourse the method absolutely
forbids the deployment of metaphysics except in the unrecogniz
able form of metaphysical remnants stifled by the blind certainty of
methodical science.
We must now examine the metaphysical status of the Discourse in
24 CHAPTER TWO
light of these three hypotheses, and especially in light of the last one,
which is the most powerful and best argued of the three.
the term explicitly: I do not know whether I should tell you of the
first meditations that I had there, for they are perhaps too metaphysi
cal and uncommon for everyones taste. And yet, to make it possible
to judge whether the foundations I have chosen are firm enough, I
am in a way obliged to speak of them (DM, 31, 11. 14-20). Thus,
as early as 1637 we encounter metaphysical meditations, which antici
pate the (questionable) translation of the Meditationes de prima philo-
sophia of 1641 by the due de Luynes in 1647. We also encounter an
early parallel to the metaphysical reason for doubt of 1641 (AT
VII, 36 ,11. 24-25). The metaphysical intention of the project of 1637
is thus borne out, as an intention, in the texts.12
A second fact supports this first conclusion: Beyond the Medita
tions, the Discourse also anticipates the Principles of Philosophy, thanks
to its discussion of the principles of philosophy (DM, 8, 1. 31).
The Discourse does not simply debate the principles of the other
sciences (DM, 29, 11. 28-29), but also doubt[s] the principles
(DM, 15, 1. 22; see 21, 1. 31; 70, 1. 29; 73, 1. 14) that is, the usual
principles in order to replace them with simple and general . . .
principles, namely, the principles [I] had discovered (DM, 64,
11. 27, 29). The ambition to substitute some principles concerning
knowledge as a whole for others would in itself be sufficient to estab
lish the metaphysical legitimacy of the Discourse, since it is specifically
echoed in the 1647 preface to the French translation of the Principia:
the principles of knowledge, i.e., what may be called first philoso
phy or metaphysics (AT IX, 16, 11. 13-16 ) or, in other words,
metaphysics, which contains the principles of knowledge (AT IX,
1 4 ,11. 8-9). But there is more: In 1637, where does Descartes unveil
the principles of the philosophy [he] use[s] (DM, 71, 1. 7), those
he attributes to himself, my principles (DM, 7 7 ,1. 2 = 7 5 ,1. 17)?
Precisely in Part Four, in which, observing that this truth I think,
therefore I am was so firm and sure that all the most extravagant
suppositions of the skeptics were incapable of shaking it, I decided
that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the
philosophy I was seeking (DM, 3 2 ,11. 18-23). Reiterating what was
established in Part Four, Part Five confirms it with the resolution
. . . to assume no principle other than the one I have just used to
demonstrate the existence of God and of the soul (DM, 41, 11. 1 -
4). This principle which is indeed metaphysical, since it guarantees
their true principles to all sciences is also metaphysical for another
reason: It clearly concerns two of the privileged objects of any spe
26 CHAPTER TWO
of the infinite, that is of God (AT VII, 45, 11. 28-29); idea of a
supremely perfect and infinite being (46, 11. 11-12 ). Yet this idea
of the infinite does not coincide, in extension or in understanding,
with the idea of most perfect being, which is why Descartes carefully
distinguishes between them, at least in 1641. For, in 1637, the only
three occurrences of the infinite always associate it with perfection
(DM, 35, 11. 4-6; 39, 11. 4-5; 43, 11. 7-8): In the Discourse the same
single concept of divine essence determines and legitimizes, without
distinguishing between them, two proofs as different as the so-called
ontological argument and the demonstration by the idea of the infi
nite. To deduce existence twice from the same concept (perfection)
is a logical monstrosity; it is therefore not surprising that in 1637,
whereas the a priori proof is given more or less definitive form (to be
sure, thanks to the weight of tradition), the a posteriori proof remains
incomplete. For if existence is perhaps not a true predicate of the
concept, then it is obviously impossible to predicate two existences
from a single concept! In 1641, on the contrary, Descartes establishes
the validity of the a posteriori proof by assigning it a specific concept,
supreme God, eternal, infinite (AT VII, 40,11. 16-17), substance
that is infinite (45,11. n - 12 ) . And it is precisely because the concept
of the infinite appears as absolutely unconditional that it precedes,
according to the reasoning of the order of reasons, the concept of
supreme perfection; and thus also that, in spite of the natural order,
the a posteriori proof governs the a priori proof. The Discourse does
not justify the anteriority of the a posteriori proof or base it in reason
on a specific concept of the divine essence: Arguably, we may doubt
whether or not the Discourse, even though it formulates literally an
a posteriori proof, is able to truly think it, since it appears to base it
on a concept that actually authorizes another proof. Moreover, by
obscuring the idea of the infinite, the concept of supreme perfection
also prevents access to Descartes most original theoretical advance
in rational theology. Hence, we must conclude that the Discourse, far
from offering a perfectly elaborated metaphysics of divine existence,
provides only a metaphysics of the most perfect being, which limits
the essence of God, and thus his existence, to one of the possibilities.
But there is more, or actually less, (c) For, in 1641, the Replies
(which cannot be separated from the Meditations) introduces a third
and last path to God, which uses the principle of causality and leads
to the causa sui.14 It is unnecessary to emphasize here the incommen
surable historic and historical significance for metaphysics as a whole
30 CHAPTER TWO
of a doctrine that accomplishes its essence in this way and thus leads
it to perfection: Descartes introduces here the principle of reason,
which, although it will remain latent until Leibniz, already possesses
its full strength. Yet in 1637 the Discourse is entirely silent on any
thing remotely akin to the causa sui, and, more important, on the
principle of causality, which in 1641 will lead to the causa sui as early
as Meditation I I I (AT VII, 40,11. 21-23) and will be repeated in the
Replies (108, 11. 18-22; 164, 1. 28-165, 1. 3; 238, 11. 11- 17 ) . This
complete desertion of causality is proven by a rather strange lexico
logical fact: Unlike the other parts of the Discourse, Part Four never
;15
uses the word cause this absence of cause is a textual clue to the
absence of causality in the conceptual realm i.e., causality under
stood as the metaphysical principle, without exceptions, of existence.
Further, the previously noted absence of the infinite is explained and
confirmed by the absence of causality: Meditation I I I introduces the
definition of God as infinite (a supreme God, eternal, infinite, AT
VII, 40,11. 16-17), while, on the same page, presenting the principle
of the evidence of causality (Now it is manifest by the natural light
that there must be as much [reality] in the efficient and total cause
as in the effect of that cause, 40, 11. 21-23). The Discourse lets out
the infinite nature of God precisely at the same time when it keeps
causality under wraps. Therefore, the Discourse cannot present a per
fectly elaborated metaphysics of the proofs of the existence of God,
not only because of the unilateral privilege granted to perfection
against the infinite in divine essence, but also, and in equal part,
because it neglects causality as a metaphysical principle for existence,
as it can be applied in the case of ideas (41, 3), and therefore even
to the idea of infinite, thus even God himself (PW II, 166), and
therefore to the idea and the existence of God. In short, the Discourse
remains silent on two of the three determinations of the divine es
sence listed and combined in the Meditations namely, the infinite
and the causa sui and those are the most original and powerful of
the three.
It is surprising to see that some eminent interpreters, who are at
odds on many important points, agree in attributing the use of cau
sality to the Discourse, against obvious textual evidence. I shall men
tion only two authors. In his commentary, E. Gilson maintains that
Descartes innovated by using the principle of causality in a manner
unknown to scholastics and that Descartes metaphysics consists
entirely in accounting for the real content of thought by means of
WHAT IS THE METAPHYSICS WITHIN THE METHOD? 31
the principle of causality. 16These comments hold true for the Medi
tations, but absolutely not for the Discourse. Alquie completes the
formula we have followed until now by confusing, for once against
all chronology, what is true for 1641 with what is missing in 1637:
a perfectly elaborated metaphysics concerning the proofs of the exis
tence of God (as in the Meditations, God is here proved successively
as a cause for His own idea, as a cause for myself insofar as I cannot
survive for one moment without Him, and finally by the ontological
proof). 17 In fact, no cause concerning God is found in the Discourse.
We should therefore say: If in 1637, as Alquie argues, Descartes has
not yet established a genuine metaphysics, it is first because he is
unaware of the metaphysical dignity of the principle of causality and
therefore is prevented from proving the existence of God as cause
for the idea of the infinite, as cause for the ego, and as cause for
Himself. If we acknowledge the metaphysical shortcomings of the
Discourse which, following Alquie, we do it is for an entirely dif
ferent, or even opposite, reason than the one Alquie gives: for falling
short first with regard to the proofs of the existence of God and next
with regard to the infinite and causality. But to follow ones teacher
does not mean repeating what he has said; rather it means conveying
his intentions through other means, so as to confirm them by shifting
them. Descartes, more than anyone, was aware of this shortcoming
in his metaphysical essay in the Discourse; he even admitted it by
attributing it to the failure of the proof of the existence of God more
than to any other doctrine. His diagnosis appears on two occasions,
almost in the same terms: The lack of precision concerning doubt
and thought, however damaging it may be, is especially so because
it is the only thing that makes obscure the proof of the existence
of God, that is to say, it makes my proof of the existence of God
difficult to understand. Or again: I agree, as you observe, that there
is a great defect in the work you have seen, and that I have not ex
pounded, in a manner that everyone can easily grasp, the arguments
by which I claim that there is nothing at all more evident and certain
than the existence of God and of the human soul. Thus he admits
frankly to Father Vatier: It is true that I have been too obscure in
what I wrote about the existence of God in this treatise on Method,
and I admit that although the most important, it is the least worked
out section in the whole book. 18 We do indeed witness a metaphysi
cal failure in 1637, and Descartes is the first to admit it, but it affects
primarily and principally the demonstration of the existence of God
32 CHAPTER TWO
1. 9; 27, 11. 9, 10; 36, 1. 16; quoties, 25, 1. 12) it is actually performed.
In 1641 the ego lacks even the slightest hint of permanence and culmi
nates in the atomic iteration of its performance; it exists with less
certainty than the / of 1637, which does not acknowledge any tem
poral condition.
(b) Furthermore, in 1641 it is only a question of presenting what
Descartes modestly calls just one thing, however slight [mini
mum quid], that is certain and unshakable (24,11. 12 -13 ) in other
words, a minimum of unshakable certainty, but a minimum quid (11.
26, 27), such that its temporalization certifies it only while it is hap
pening. On the contrary, in 1637 the Discourse has other objectives:
Since it ignores the temporal conditions of the first certainty, it im
mediately erects the minimum quid to the level of first principle
(DM, 3 2 ,1. 23). In 1641 the existence of the ego remains an intermit
tent minimum and never pretends even to the interim of the principle;
it possesses therefore less certainty than that claimed by the / of 1637,
which is immediately assured of the principle.22
(c) A third point confirms the first two. We know that in 1641 the
term substantia does not occur in the first two Meditations (nor in the
first half of the third) and that it qualifies the ego and I am a
substance (AT VII, 4 5,1. 7) only after it has been introduced into
the conceptual assembly of the a posteriori proof of the existence of
God (40,11. 12-20). How can we explain the lag of the ego with regard
to substantiality? Precisely because in 1641 the ego cogito does not
last permanently nor does it have the rank of principle, and thus it
does not exhibit any of the properties of substance or even explicitly
contradicts them. It certifies its existence only through the act of
thinking, without being able to certify it permanently, independently,
that is, as a substance. In order to attain substantiality, the ego of
1641 has to do more than think; it has to first suppose substantiality
in God, then by a return from the infinite to the finite, it has to infer
it in the mens humana. In 1637, on the contrary, the I think claims
from the outset a full and permanent existence, since, from the first
thought, it accomplishes the last existence: From this I knew I was
a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think (DM,
3 3 ,11. 3-5). Thus, the Discourse gives the I the metaphysical title par
excellence of substance, so that for Descartes I think anchors the
determination of the substance in general, in the sense in which for
Aristotle ousia formulated the response to the question xi TO ov
( what is being? ). The Meditations, by comparison, appears signifi
WHAT IS THE METAPHYSICS WITHIN THE METHOD? 35
ence deals with simple natures of the material kind objects that can
be apprehended only through the senses and the imagination. And
even though the common notions or principles of logic apply to both
the intellectual and the material domains, the mind nonetheless has
to proceed quite differently according to whether its knowledge de
pends on the pure intellect ( ab intellectu puro ) or on the intellect
as it intuits the images of corporeal things (ab eodem imagines
rerum materialium intuente, A T X, 419: CSM I, 45). The distinc
tion between simple natures that are intellectual and those that are
material corresponds to the distinction between metaphysics and
physics, and hence also to that between understanding and imagina
tion. This contrast, which Descartes articulated explicitly only after
1630,13 is central to his work throughout the subsequent years and
is a recurring theme in the Meditations and Principles: the part of
the mind which is of most help in mathematics, namely the imagina
tion, does more harm than good in metaphysical speculations ; or
again, it generally happens with almost everyone . . . that if they
are accomplished in metaphysics they hate geometry, while if they
have mastered geometry they do not grasp what I have written on
first philosophy. 14 In short, the appearance of homogeneity that the
simple natures present is specious: In reality, they belong to faculties
and sciences that are radically distinct the material simple natures,
grasped by the imagination, belonging to physics and mathematics;
the intellectual simple natures, apprehended by the understanding,
belonging to metaphysics. What is more, the mind must make a
choice between these two areas of inquiry, since metaphysics tran
scends and is external to physics and mathematics, providing the
foundations for these sciences; that indeed is its essential and defining
function.
This last point could lead us to accept the following straightfor
ward claim: The Regulae does not therefore . . . contain any trace
of metaphysics. On the contrary, the uncertainty that remains in that
work about the nature of the mind, and its tendency to assume all
truths under the same program, shows plainly that when he wrote the
Regulae, Descartes thought was still operating at a purely scientific
level. 15 In this view, the function of the Regulae would be limited
to constructing a theory of science, realized in mathematical and
physical terms, without crossing the border into metaphysics at any
point. But this thesis is immediately open to a decisive counter
example: The Regulae does refer to the purely intellectual simple na
5o CHAPTER THREE
tures, though not making any use of them, and thus already acknowl
edges the domain of thought that will later be revealed as the province
of metaphysics: the idea which represents for us what knowledge
or doubt or ignorance is, or the action of the will which may be called
volition, and the like (AT X, 419: CSM I, 44). At the very least we
have to admit that, if the Regulae does not actually unfold a Cartesian
metaphysics, it nonetheless articulates its fundamental concepts and
assigns them a primary importance. This in turn raises the following
question: Why does Descartes not undertake to provide at least a
sketch of his metaphysics in the Regulae, given that he already has
the requisite conceptual materials at his disposal?
This question is doubly pressing when we observe that the Regulae
takes us right up to the brink of metaphysics. It does not merely
identify the intellectual simple natures (Rule X II), but also, even as
early as Rule III, attempts to link one of them with a (real) common
simple nature, thus hinting, even at this early stage, at propositions
that are strictly metaphysical. Among the examples he gives of knowl
edge by intuition (intuitus), Descartes mentions even before geo
metrical knowledge (the definitions of the triangle and the sphere)
the elements of the future cogito of 1637 and 1641: everyone can
mentally intuit that he exists, that he is thinking ( uniusquisque
animo potest intueri, se existere, se cogitare, AT X, 368: CSM I,
14). This clause juxtaposes an intellectual simple nature (cogitare)
and a common simple nature (existere). So what more do we need
here to enable us to reach the first principle of metaphysics? Nothing,
except for the necessary link between these two simple natures
nothing, in other words, but the act of putting them in the right
order. The failure to take this final step is all the more astonishing,
given that Rule X I I proceeds to link intellectual simple natures ( if
Socrates says that he doubts everything, it necessarily follows that
he understands at least that he is doubting, AT X, 421: CSM II,
46), and also links two instances of the common simple nature, exis
tence (I am, therefore God exists [sum, ergo Deus est], ibid.)16
What is more, each of these two necessary linkings of simple natures
relates to the components of the cogito (doubt-thought; finite exis-
tence-infinite existence); all that is lacking is the final linking of the
elements in a single chain (doubtthought, finite existenceinfinite
existence). So if the Regulae does not succeed, there and then, in
articulating the metaphysical pronouncement that is the cogito, it is
not due to any incompatibility between metaphysical pronounce
WHAT IS THE METHOD IN THE METAPHYSICS? 51
ments and the simple natures, or to any ignorance of the intellectual
and common simple natures, or to any general inability to link them;
what is missing is simply the capacity to establish a necessary order
between the simple natures that make up the cogito. With the doctrine
of the simple natures, the Regulae is already equipped with all the
elements required for articulating the first proposition of metaphys
ics; the transition to metaphysics depends not on any new elements
or concepts, but merely on the necessity that links them and this
necessity depends in turn on order.
The hypothesis that I am putting forward that the Regulae con
tains the elements of metaphysics (the intellectual simple natures) but
not their ordering (their necessary linking with the common simple
natures) allows us to take a fresh look at the verdict of Alqui and
the much discussed problem he attempted to resolve. Instead of
marking out an uncrossable frontier between the Regulae (and Dis
course) and the Meditations a frontier designed to preserve the gap
between method and metaphysics we should recognize that meta
physics is itself embedded in the theory of method, in the Regulae;
but it is present as a possibility that the Regulae does not grasp or
unfold.17 This hypothesis can only be confirmed after a further inves
tigation, which will aim to establish that the simple natures do indeed
have a metaphysical status and function in Descartes later works.
in the First Meditation, then in the Fifth Meditation, and finally, the
most tricky case of all, in the Third Meditation.
The First Meditation does not precisely, or primarily, call into
doubt the truths of mathematics, which appear almost as an after
thought in the eighth paragraph; rather the attention is directed in
the first instance to what are called the simpler and more univer
sal things [magis simplicia et universalia], or again the simplest
and most general things ( simplicissimae et maxime generales res,
A T VII, 20, 1. n , 24: CSM II, 14). What are referred to here are,
of course, the simple natures, as is shown by at least three consider
ations.19 First, the items introduced here owe their logical primacy
to their simplicity; this simplicity rests not on an ontic but merely on
an epistemic foundation, and arises solely in virtue of their containing
something certain and indubitable ( aliquid certi et indubitati,
AT VII, 20,1. 27). These items thus possess the essential characteris
tic of the simple natures simplicity as far as our knowledge is con
cerned, and simplicity defined by that knowledge. Second, the terms
in question allow us to know the truth of what is perceived by the
senses, while in no way admitting the slightest similarity between the
idea perceived and the corresponding thing. Those ordinary familiar
events ( usitata ista, AT VII, 19, 1. 11: CSM II, 13), like wearing
clothes and sitting in front of the fire, are cast into doubt, but they
nonetheless presuppose more elementary notions ( particularia ista,
ibid., 29) such as stretching out ones hands, moving ones head, and
so on; and these particulars in their turn, whether true or false, can
only be conceived of by presupposing concepts that are absolutely
simple and universal ( simplicia et universalia vera, A T VII, 20,
1. 11). This relationship, which arbitrarily links the pure object of
sensation to the realm of perfect intelligibility, in effect reinforces
the coding established in Rule X I I whereby simple natures are
encoded as sensations.20 The terms that figure in the conclusion of
the First Meditation thus perform the function of the simple natures
of Rule X II. Third, and most important, the First Meditation pro
vides a list of simple and universal things [simplicia et universalia]
that reproduces what Rule X I I had termed material simple natures.
This is true despite a certain difference in the way the terms are
grouped: In 1627 the list reads shape, extension, movement, etc.
(AT X, 419: CSM I, 45), while in 1641 corporeal nature in general
is explicated as extension, the shape of extended things, the quantity
or size and number of these extended things, the place in which they
WHAT IS THE METHOD IN THE METAPHYSICS? 55
may exist, the time through which they may endure, and so on (AT
VII, 20: CSM II, 14). The first three concepts enumerated here ex
actly match the first three simple natures that are listed, while the
later items also correlate closely enough, since they correspond with
some of the common simple natures (unity, duration: A T X, 4 19 ,1.
22: CSM I, 45).
Once we have grasped this parallelism between the Regulae and
the Meditations, we can go on to explore its consequences. It seems,
first of all, that the starting point of the Meditations the project of
establishing science by means of hyperbolical doubt is nothing else
than the point reached by the end of the Regulae namely, science
operating on the simple natures, both material and common. The
second phase of the Cartesian enterprise does not begin out of noth
ing, but builds on secure achievements gained in the first phase; ac
cordingly, the interpretation of the idea as a simple nature remains
operative in the Meditations, at least in part. A further piece of evi
dence comes to mind here: It is only the material simple natures that
make their appearance at this point in the Meditations; there is no
mention of the intellectual simple natures. Moreover, these material
natures enter the game only to be disqualified by means of the hyper
bolical doubt: he may have brought it about that there is no extended
thing, no shape, no size, no place (AT VII, 21, 11. 4-6: CSM II,
14). It is thus that the simple natures enter the realm of metaphysics;
but since they are merely material (and common) simple natures,
they make their entrance only to find themselves disqualified from
participating. In one way there is nothing remarkable about this situa
tion; yet in another way it is surprising enough. What we encounter
is the outcome of the doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths
(found in the letters to Mersenne of April and May 1630): When the
authority of metaphysics in the strict sense is invoked, the laws of
mathematics that regulate physics (via an encoding process) find
themselves transcended and hence disqualified. All that the system
of doubt developed in 1641 does is to give a negative interpretation
to the incommensurability of the sciences,21 based on the idea of the
incomprehensible, which had been interpreted in a positive way in
the 1630 discussion of the foundations of science. The sciences that
are based on the material (and common) simple natures are thus al
ways subordinate to metaphysics. To confirm this hypothesis, we
shall first attempt to uncover further textual evidence in its favor in
the Meditations.
56 CHAPTER THREE
VII, 140, 1. 2: CSM II, 100; and AT VII, 189, 1. 10: CSM II, 133).
From this perspective, God thus lies at the extreme limit of the sim
ple natures; indeed, if one reflects on the extremely fragile and ambig
uous status of the term substance, He is outside their domain alto
gether.
We thus arrive at the following relatively straightforward schema:
The material simple natures, which alone are subjected to hyperboli
cal doubt (First Meditation), are reinstated immediately after that
doubt has been removed (Fifth Meditation). The intellectual simple
natures are equivalent to the res cogitans and its modes, and hence,
as the ego, take precedence over the material simple natures (Second
Meditation). And as for God, He transcends both types of simple
natures (Third Meditation). According to this schema, the First and
Fifth Meditations (and hence the Sixth) precisely mark out the hori
zons of mathesis universalis (the universal science of the Regulae).
The ego, by contrast, makes use for the first time of the potentiality
of the intellectual simple natures, which the Regulae had referred to
without developing, and achieves a new dimension of mathesis univer
salis. Lastly, God transcends absolutely all the simple natures, com
pletely escaping the bounds of mathesis universalis and revealing a
horizon that is absolutely metaphysical in nature.
Nevertheless, the above schema should not be adhered to over-
rigidly. The very fact that it is so neat and schematic prevents its
doing justice to several pieces of textual evidence that point in the
opposite direction toward a close link between God and the simple
natures, and hence toward a more subtle relationship between
mathesis universalis and metaphysics. To begin with, God exists; in
deed, the sole ambition of the Meditations (in which the existence
of God . . . is demonstrated, AT VII, ry: CSM II, 12) is to prove
as much: we must conclude that God necessarily exists (AT VII,
45: CSM II, 31). Now existence belongs to the (real) common simple
natures; moreover, in the Fifth Meditation, we find existence linked
to essence by what the Regulae called a necessary conjunction [con-
junctio necessaria] between simple natures. The comparison be
tween the relation between a triangle and its properties, on the one
hand, and the essence of God and his existence, on the other, only
serves to reinforce our interpretation of existence as a simple nature.
Other properties of God could undoubtedly also be expressed in
terms of common real simple natures in particular eternity (by
comparison with duration) and unity. What is more, the debate on
64 CHAPTER THREE
the boundary between the possible and the impossible for divine om
nipotence would have had no sense if Descartes and his critics had
not been prepared to accept implicitly that logical principles and
common notions could relate, at least in principle, to God; what is
at issue here is common logical simple natures. Accordingly, all the
common simple natures remain relevant to inquiries about God.
In the second place, God thinks, that is, He assumes the most
important simple nature, that of thought (cogitatio). This assertion,
though absent from the Meditations, appears several times in subsid
iary texts: the most perfect power of thought which we understand
to be in God ; the clear and distinct idea of uncreated and indepen
dent thinking substance ; divine thought. 30We must not underes
timate the importance of this, especially since it attributes to God
the most crucial of the intellectual simple natures, despite the fact
that the Third Meditation had reduced all such natures to the ego
alone and made them incommensurable with the idea of God. Conse
quently, along with the cogito that subsumes them all, the intellectual
simple natures relate to God as well. And hence all the simple natures
(except the material ones)31 can be attributed to God, subject to the
standard caveat that operates when we are dealing with the infinite.
The upshot is that the frontier between method (mathesis univer
salis) and metaphysics cannot merely be analyzed in terms of a dis
tinction between two types of simple natures. The primary object of
metaphysics, the human mind (mens humana) is defined entirely in
terms of the intellectual simple natures. It thus relates to universal
mathesis, by focusing on at least one of its remaining possible objects
of inquiry, and by dealing with the common simple natures and the
most important of the intellectual simple natures. Should we not,
therefore, conclude that metaphysics too belongs to mathesis univer
salis and is simply one among the many objects of the method of
inquiry described in the Regulae? I believe that there is one final
criterion that absolutely rules out such a conclusion, and in so doing
allows us to mark out in a quite emphatic way the true frontier be
tween method and metaphysics. The criterion in question is hinted
at in the definition of mathesis universalis employed during the discus
sion of some order or measurement [aliquis ordo vel mensura]. 32
The essential point to grasp is the meaning of the contrast between
order and measurement, and the best way to do this is to consider
first of all the simplest and most frequent examples provided in the
Regulae and the Essays (excluding the Meteorology). In these exam-
WHAT IS THE METHOD IN THE METAPHYSICS? 65
et renomme (the space of the world and the sky is not capacious
enough [nest assez capable] for the flight of her perfection and re
nown; Brantme);6 the soul harboring a revelation, lhomme nest
point capable dune si grande clart, des commandements dont
notre coeur nest point capable (man is not capacious enough [nest
point capable] for so great a light; commandments for which our
heart is not capacious enough).7 The modern usage, in which capable
(of) denotes a sufficient power, a capacity ready to act, is the opposite
of this earlier signification. When did the passage from one semantics
to the other occur? O. Bloch and W. von Wartburg, rejecting the
idea of the persistence of the ancient meaning until the seventeenth
century, date the appearance of the modern meaning in the sixteenth
century; however, M. Rat has maintained that both meanings
persisted throughout the seventeenth century.8 The Dictionnaire de
VAcadmie, in 1678 and again in 1695, attributes the active significa
tion to man: capable, qui a des qualits requises pour quelque chose,
entreprenant et hardi (having the qualities required for something,
enterprising and bold). Here the passive meaning plays a secondary
role: the word then se dit des choses, et dans cette acception il na
gure dusage quavec tenir ou contenir (is said of things, and in
this sense, it is used, with few exceptions, only with to hold or to
contain). If we admit that roughly between the sixteenth and seven
teenth centuries9the main meaning of capable/ capacit shifted, evolv
ing from a receptive passivity to an active capacity, we will seek more
than a precise, but impossible, dating for this semantic reversal
rather, we will seek to examine its mechanism. How, and by what
stages, did one meaning of the term shift to the other?
Before going any further, let us refer to the Latin semantics and
to capax / capacitas. Contrary to the ambivalence of the French, the
meaning here is purely passive, indicating a receptive capacity
(contenance). In Cicero, for instance (Orator XIV, 104), Demosthe
nes . . . non semper implet aures meas: ita sunt avides et capaces, et
semper aliquid immensum desiderant (Demosthenes . . . does not
always fill up [implet] my ears, which are so hungry and capacious
[capaces] and always desire something huge); or in Lucan, Urbem
. . . generis capacem humani (a city . . . large enough . . . for all of
humankind; Pharsalia, I, 5 11-13 ). Capacity, then, which capax itself
translates from the Greek, khoreticos / dektikos, as indicated, for exam
ple, by the Latin version of the fragments of Saint Ireneus.10 This
signification requires a specific construction, which indicates the link
7o CHAPTER FOUR
evaluate the differences they reveal between D h D2, and D3. These
correspondences can be classified in the following translation/equiv
alency formulas (see tables i and 2).
Remarks concerning D0 (table 1):
(a) All the equivalencies correspond to one of the formulas indi
cated here.
(b) A' and E' are the artificial doubles of A and E simply because in
a sequence such as capable d en / dont + infinitive and substantive,
French syntax is unclear as to which, infinitive or substantive, is a
complement of capable. The same syntagm can be interpreted with
reference to 1.1 as well as to 2. The same is true for formula C with
reference to formula B.
(c) By periphrase, we simply mean the negative definition of any
Latin signifier that translates capable, and replaces capax, but without
being posse.
(d) It becomes immediately obvious that in some cases the occur
rences of capable cannot be rendered by capax (formulas E, E', and
F). These are the formulas we will need to examine first.
By applying the formulas of table 1 to our test material, we obtain
the results shown in table 2. Hence the following remarks:
A
(a) Capable, which occurs 15 times, is translated 7 times as capax;
thus, more than half the occurrences of capable are not rendered as
capax.
(b) Capax includes a verbal complement (gerundive or verbal ad
jective) 4 out of 7 times.
(c) The occurrences of capable include an infinitive object 8 out
of 15 times.
(d) D (two uses) is the only formula in which capax and capable
correspond to each other syntactically. Both, moreover, are followed
by a verbal object.
A
(a) Capable is translated as capax 5 times only that is, in less
than half of the 13 occurrences.
(b) Capax is followed by a verbal object (gerundive or sometimes
verbal adjective) 3 out of 5 times.
(c) Capable is followed by an infinitive object 11 out of 13 times
(formula F).
Table 1
D
Translated
Formulae
i. Capable + determinative complement I. Capax + genitive
1.1 . Capable + substantive-------------------- 11 Capax + genitive substantive = A
1.1 . I d . ------------------------------ genitive gerundive = B
III Capax +
verbal adjective
1.2. Capable + indefinite complement III Id. C
< 1 .2 . I d . ------------------------- 11 Capax + genitive substantive = A' >
Formulas
(l) 2, 14. Les plus grandes mes sont capables des plus grands (1) Excelsiores animae, ut majorum virtutum, ita viti-
vices. orum capaces sunt. 541, 13 - 14 . A
(2) 17, 10. Parvenir la connaissance de toutes les choses dont (2) Methodus quae me deduceret ad cognitionem eorum
mon esprit serait capable. omnium quorum ingenium meum esset capax. 549,
26-29. A
(3) 28 ,4 . L acquisition de toutes les sciences dont je serais capa (3) me ad omnium rerum cognitionem perventurum, cu
ble. jus essem capax. 555, 4041. A
(4) 7 6 ,30 . D autant plus sujets de faillir et moins capables de v (4) Minusque veritatis percipiendae capacia. 582, 32. B
rit quils sont plus pntrants et plus vifs.
(5) 6 9 ,18 . S il y a quelquun qui en soit capable (sc. y ajouter (5) Siquis earum perficiendarum sit capax. 578, 37. C
beaucoup de choses, et les appliquer lusage).
(6) 7 1, 27. Capables de passer plus outre que je nai fait. (6) Si ulterius progredendi, quam fecerim, sint capaces.
580, 1- 2 . D
(7) 73, 18. Capable de trouver. (7) capaceum esse maxima quaeque . . . inveniendi. 581,
1-2 D
(8) io, 2326. Ainsi je me dlivrerai de beaucoup derreurs qui peu (8) ita sensim multis me erroribus liberabam, men-
vent offusquer notre lumire naturelle et nous rendre temque veris rationibus agnoscendis aptiorem redde-
moins capables d entendre raison. bam. 545, 26-27.
15 27. Pour juger quils sont moins capables de distinguer le Omitted
vrai davec le faux.
(9) 25, 14. Ceci fut capable ds lors de me dlivrer. (9) hoc sufficiens fuit ad me liberandum. 554, 17 - 18 .
(10) 32, 202 1. Les plus extravagantes suppositions que les scep
tiques ntaient pas capables de lebranler . . .
(11) 35, 8 9. Connatre la nature de Dieu autant que j''en serais ca
pable.
(12) 66, 9. Si en (sc. profiter au public) suis capable.
(13) 48, 30. Cette chaleur est capable de faire quelle se dilate.
(14) 57, 19 - 2 1. Il ny a point dhommes si hbts et si stupides . . .
quils ne soient capables d arranger ensemble diverses
paroles.
(15) 78, 17. Que je fusse capable dy russir.
I
t\ (Passions de lame)
^2
ti (Passiones animae)
Formulas
(1) nulla sit inordinatio animi cujus capaces non sint. 78. A
Formulas
(8) capables de mouvoir. 15-340, 9. (8) posse movere. 9. F
(9) capables d tre mus. 34-354, 23. (9) illis modis quibus moveri possunt. 18. F
(io) capables de les arrter. 78-386, 26. (10) nullius momenti non minus possint res eos detinere.
37 - F
(II) capables de leur nuire. 94-399, 13. (11) posse ipsis nocere. 45. F
(12) point de sagesse humaine qui ne soit capable de leur (12) quae possit illis resistere. 96. F
rsister.
(I 3) capables de goter le plus de douceur en cette vie. (13) magis gustare possint. 98. F
212-488, 14.
d 3
Formulas
(1) que la raison des hommes est capable de possder : (1) ad omnes cognitiones curiosissimas, qus humana ra-
496, 20. tio possidere valet, acquirendas. 68, 3. E
(2) ceux qui en (sc. travailler cet ouvrage) sont moins (2) qui minime ad id perficiendum apti sunt. 74, 7. E
capables. 507, 9 -10 .
(3) pourvu quils se sentent incapables d en entreprendre (3) quia scilicet ad nova percipienda inepti sunt. 75, 16. E
de nouveaux. 509, 22.
(4) encore que je ne me sente pas capable den retirer au (4) licet non experiar me ullum hine fructum percipere
cun profit. 502, 16. posse. 7 1, 10. F
(5) je vous rends capable de trouver. 503, 22. (5) aptos vos reddidere, ut possitis proprio motu omnes
reliquas invenire. 72, 1. F
WHAT IS THE EGO CAPABLE OF? 77
(d) D (three uses) is the only formula in which there is correspon
dence between capax and capable.
The results of Dx are therefore confirmed, and the formulas used
are simplified.
A
(a) Capax is never a translation of capable.
(b) Capable is always followed by an infinitive.
(c) The number of formulas used is reduced to E and F the
only two that do not use capax.
1
sum Since this first dialogue has been examined elsewhere, we
need not resume the discussion of it here. In the second dialogue,
we may pose the question as follows: What does cogito mean; in
particular, what does cogitare, thinking, contribute to the formula co
gito, ergo sum? Saying thinking is really not enough, if we wish
to think what thinking might be. Thus Michel Henrys interrogation,
concerning the indeterminacy of cogitare in the Cartesian cogito, at
least as the latter is usually interpreted. We shall resume this discus
sion here, for it matters as much to Cartesian studies as it does to
the most determinate advances of contemporary phenomenology.
But the fact remains that, given the presupposition that cogitare is
equivalent to vor-stellen, the redoubling of the thought of the self into
one ecstasy from another can lead only to the dissolution of the cogito
(me cogitare), in an exodus from the self without end or assurance
at least of the ontic variety.
Even though they lead to precisely opposite conclusions, the inter
pretations of the cogito, ergo sum proposed by Husserl and Heidegger
agree on one postulate: Like all other cogitationes, the cogitatio sui
submits to intentionality, to its ecstasy, and therefore to representa
tion. In fact, it doubtless submits to them with greater rigor than
other cogitationes do, since it alone redoubles within itself what is
represented on top of what represents, as it disengages what repre
sents, which is presupposed elsewhere but always concealed. The
cogito, ergo sum redoubles an ecstasy, whether that of intentionality
or that of representation. In this perspective, even without taking into
consideration the opposing judgments that Husserl and Heidegger
contrive to make about it, we must immediately emphasize just which
aporia it is that renders the cogito, ergo sum absolutely impracticable:
Intentional and representative ecstasy rends with an impassable cae
sura the transcendent from the immanent, and the represented from
what represents; the being that carries out the cogito remains sepa
rated from the being it knows as its cogitatum, whatever it may be.
Therefore the ego, far from becoming reconciled to itself by reconcil
ing itself to a certain existence which Descartes certainly meant to
establish must admit that it gains thereby only an empirical exis
tence, and not the pure I, which remains alienated by itself from
itself. Transposed into Cartesian terms, the aporia of a cogito, ergo sum
interpreted intentionally would be formulated as follows: If doubt
disqualifies the relation between every idea (every representation) and
its ideatum (what is represented), and if the existence of the ego or
even its performance of thinking constitutes an ideatum, then how
are we to certify that the representation of that ideatum and it alone
constitutes an exception to the disqualification of even the most pres
ent of things that are evident? In short, if the cogito, ergo sum height
ens representation, then it too, like all representations, must be van
quished by the blow of doubt. For why should it be certain that I
think, that I am, if I also represent these things to myself?
Since the ecstasy that intentionality institutes is exercised hence
forth between the ego and itself as its own cogitatum, it must be ac
knowledged that what the representing ego represents no longer coin
102 CHAPTER FIVE
cides with this ego, since what we have here first is that which is
represented: No cogitatum, not even that of the ego, may be identified
with a cogitans. Kant saw this consequence and made it one of his
themes, marking in advance the final contradiction in an interpreta
tion of the cogito, ergo sum in terms of representation. The I, always
comprised within the horizon of representation, must accompany
every representation, but in order to remain itself, it must remove
itself from that arena and never be counted as an object: The I
think must be capable of accompanying all my representations, for
otherwise something would be represented within me which abso
lutely could not be thought, which amounts to saying that the repre
sentation would either be impossible or at least be nothing for me.
As correlate of all our representations, the I, to be sure, is capable
of accompanying all representations of objects. But in virtue of the
fact that it remains a simple traveling companion of objectivity, it
can never itself claim to be an object.8 As representations traveling
companion, the pure I makes representation possible, without for
all that benefiting from it or obtaining existence from it. If the appela-
tion of representation may sometimes be conceded to the I, this is
always subject to a restrictive condition: the simple representation
I, for itself empty of all content, which can never be said to be a
concept, but only a pure consciousness which accompanies all con
cepts. 9
Kant concludes by disjoining precisely what Descartes intended
in all rigor to conjoin. On the one hand, the ego cogito, understood
as the transcendental I, exercises to be sure a primitive unity; but as
this spontaneity is not sensible, and as only sensible intuition is given,
the primitive unity of the I can never be given to us in a representa
tion; and therefore the transition from the ego cogito to an actual sum
can never be legitimate: That which thinks can never be represented
as existent.
On the other hand, what could be represented in the case of the
I would have to be registered within sensible intuition, and therefore
satisfy the conditions of objectivity within experience, in order to
appear within it as phenomenon and as object. If the I is to think
itself as existent, it must become other than itselfan objectivized
i; if the I is to be (according to existence), it must be (in its essence)
only an i: /, as intelligence and thinking subject, know myself as
object thought, insofar as I am also given to myself in intuition
but only as I know other phenomena, that is, not as I am for the
DOES THE COGITO AFFECT ITSELF? 10 3
very subjectivity with the aid of concepts that, far from being prior
to it, ultimately derive from it just such concepts as intentionality
and representation.
If the ego cogito alone makes possible the depiction of representa
tion, and thereby that of intentionality, we must then exclude in prin
ciple the idea that the model of representation or of intentionality
could suffice to make the ego cogito intelligible. If the ego cogito engen
ders intentionality, then intentionality can neither comprehend nor
confirm it; above all, it cannot count against it.
A third reason above all enjoins us from maintaining the represen
tative or intentional interpretation of the cogito, ergo sum: the fact
that Descartes condemns it expressis verbis. If we retain Heideggers
formula that cogito means cogito me cogitare (rem) we observe that
Descartes uses it to the letter at least once, but precisely to condemn
it, leaving no opportunity for appeal.
3. Passion of Oneself
Among the functions of the soul Descartes distinguishes two genera:
the first, namely, are the actions of the soul; the others are its pas
sions (Passions de V me, a. 17). How should these passions be char
acterized? All the sorts of cases of perception or knowledge to be
found in us can generally be called its passions, because it is often
not our soul that makes them such as they are, and because it always
receives them from things that are represented by them (ibid.). Ac
cording to this definition, the passions appear first of all to consist
of perceptions, cases of knowledge, representations ; they are
imposed on the soul by things that act on it; it is consequently
passive. Thus, the passions, far from constituting an exception to the
general ecstatic displacement of representation, actually repeat it.
Nevertheless, a more attentive reading of this definition discloses
io 8 CHAPTER FIVE
the indication of an exception within it: Given that the passions are
generally perceptions, Descartes specifies that the soul often
submits to them because of external things. Why does he add often
here? The answer, of course, is that this is not always the case. Cir
cumstances could be found in which cases of perception and knowl
edge are found in us, and therefore received passively, but in which
it is still the soul that makes them such as they are. It is often,
not always, that the soul suffers passions that it does not cause. We
must conclude that sometimes it causes passions (or representa
tional perceptions) by itself, which it nevertheless suffers in short,
that sometimes the soul affects itself.
Is there textual confirmation for such a conclusion? Certainly. For,
when he examines what the first causes of the passions are (a. 51),
Descartes attempts to specify what it is that most closely determines
the last and most proximate cause of the passions of the soul . . .
the agitation with which the spirits move the little gland in the middle
of the brain. Among these first causes he distinguishes first the
temperament of the body alone (with no external object) and,
chiefly, those external objects themselves which are the most com
mon and principal cause of the passions. But then he admits another
cause, which is indeed exceptional but undeniable: though they [the
passions] may sometimes be caused by the action of the soul. Some
times the soul causes its own passions. That is why it was correct to
say that it is only often and not always that the soul does not make
them what they are.
Other texts confirm this rare but undeniable production by the
soul of its own passions. Thus, while the souls absolute power over
its volitions may be opposed to the independence of the passions,
which depend absolutely on the actions [of objects] that produce
them, an exception must be maintained: the soul suffers its passions
except when it is itself their cause (a. 41). Hence the soul can in
deed cause its own passions, in certain exceptional cases, without
external objects. So, strictly speaking, it indeed affects itself, by itself;
it suffers the passion of self. In short, it is auto-affected.
But since this possibility is only realized sometimes (a. 51),
and as an exception, can it have any significant uses and examples?
Descartes appears to have pointed out at least two. First, the auto-
affecting of the soul is undeniably confirmed in the case of volitions,
since they can be called excitations of the soul which have reference
to it, but which are caused by it itself (a. 29). Nevertheless, when
does th e c o g it o a f f e c t its e lf? 109
volitions each having the soul as cause immediately rules out the pos
sibility of opposing them on the schema of representational ecstasy,
which would distinguish the object from the thought of that object.
(b) When bare will wills, does it always will an object? In one sense,
it certainly always wills a quasi-object, which serves as its objective
something which is solely intelligible. Now what specific example
of this does Descartes give? For example to attend to its own nature
(a. 20). The example is surprising, for we already know that when
perception and volition are really only a single thing (a. 19), percep
tion has the soul as cause. Here will has its own nature hence,
itself again as object, so that in the end what we have is a volition
causing itself, willing itselfhence, as such, indiscernibly from a
perception of the wills own circularity, which is to say the souls.
In the closed circle of a thought perfectly perceiving and willing
itself, where are we to introduce an object on the schema of the ec
static displacement of representation? If we still wished to apply the
concept of representation, we would at the very least have to amend
it radically, the result being a representation without any object other
than the objective of a volition caused by itself and made to will its
own nature. But would not such a representation of a nonobject be
equivalent to a nonrepresentation? It matters little where the negation
crops up (as representation without object or as representation),
provided that it appear clearly that the perception of a volition fo
cused on itself emphatically exceeds the exercising of ecstatic repre
sentation, and of intentional displacement. And so the second result
is achieved: Descartes admits, in certain cases of volition, a perception
without a real object other than the soul itselfa perception without
ecstatic representation.
the first of all the passions (a. 53), its primacy infects generosity,
which issues directly from it.19 Generosity, deriving from or rather
deploying wonder as such, is the beneficiary of its primacy in the
order of passions and therefore in morals. Is this ethical primacy re
lated to the metaphysical primacy that the Discours de la mthode rec
ognized twenty years earlier in its premier principe I think, there
fore I am (AT VI, 32, 1. 19; CSM I, 127)? The internal coherence
of Cartesian thought requires that a relation be acknowledged be
tween these two primacies. But is it one of rivalry or rather of identi
fication? We shall now try to show that the ethical primacy, far from
being opposed to the metaphysical primacy, in fact repeats and so
fulfills it.
But generosity also preserves, within its own definition, the global
architecture of the cogito, ergo sum, wherein thought, in the very re
markable case in which it is a thought related to itself, becomes a
principle, and hence an existence. Generosity is defined similarly, by
a like reference of the self to itself: it is our own merit that we esteem
or scorn (a. 151); true generosity . . . makes a man esteem himself
as highly as he can legitimately esteem himself (a. 153). Generosity
therefore repeats the act of the cogito, but it does so by rescuing it
from any risk of ecstatic or intentional interpretation, since it dis
penses with any trace of representation, in virtue of four aspects of
the concept. It is therefore appropriate for us to examine these char
acteristics.
(1) Generosity is marked first by a perfect auto-affection of the
soul: we can thus esteem or scorn our own selves (a. 54); one can
esteem or scorn oneself (a. 151). This is not a passion provoked by
an external object, since it is born of self-satisfaction in Descartes
words, a satisfaction de soi-mme (aa. 63 and 190). If we still wish
to speak of an effect, we shall have to specify that this is an effect
on the soul of which the cause depends only on ourselves (a. 190),
for this cause is [nothing] other than the volition we feel within
ourselves (a. 158). And these causes are . . . marvelous (a. 160)
indeed, since in this exceptional case they and that which suffers their
effects form but a single thing. The circle of cogitatio of self by self
is repeated and maintained, but now in the form of an affecting (an
action or causation) of self by self. This, it must be admitted, might
be described as auto-affecting.
(2) But would not generosity, if it remains a passion,20 still need
to be assigned an object and a real one? In answering this question,
DOES THE COGITO AFFECT ITSELF? 113
more than the thing itself, but it concerns not so much simple value
as a things true value [juste valeur] 25 a value of a value. One
esteems oneself only at ones true value (a. 161). True value is
distinguished from simple value by a clear and distinct criterion;
true value relates a things value to the ego that is representing it: if
it [the soul] knew distinctly their [things] true value, its contentment
would always be in proportion to the greatness of the good from
which it proceeded. I observe also that the greatness of a good, in
relation to us, should not be measured only by the value of the thing
which constitutes it but principally also by the manner in which it
is related to us. 26 Thus, to examine the true value of all the things
that we can desire or fear or to examine the true value of all the
goods whose acquisition seems to depend in some way on our con
duct 27 still remains a work of cogitatio one, moreover, that is not
a derived or secondary use, but a work of the true office of reason.28
Reason always officiates by the exercise of cogitatio, but cogitatio does
not always represent objects objectified ecstatically, with intentional-
ity; it can also take as quasi-objects value, or better true value,
which is doubly unreal, and hence doubly immediate to the ego.
This is, in fact, why only such a nonecstatic representation can
provide access to generosity, inasmuch as generosity is constituted
by an esteem of self according to a representation of res cogitans as
will by cogitatio as esteem. For only a cogitatio comprehending itself
in the mode of auto-affection could attain the auto-affecting of the
res cogitans esteeming itself. Only the presentation of cogitatio in es
teem is suited to the auto-affecting of the will, which is immediate
to self in the generosity in which a man feels within himself a firm
and constant resolution to use it [that will] well (a. 153). Will knows
and represents itself only as the volition we feel within ourselves
(a. 1 58); hence it thinks itself only in the mode of esteem. When the
soul knows itself as will, and auto-affects itself by its good use,
it thinks according to esteem, as an absolutely nonintentional modal
ity of cogitatio; therefore, in esteeming itself, it thinks itself noninten-
tionally, it feels itself, in short it auto-affects itself. Thus esteem
appears as the modality of cogitatio that is most expressly appro
priated to generosity, understood as a primitive formulation of the
cogito.
(4) A final difficulty remains. The cogito leads to a sum, sometimes
redoubled by an existo. Can we find an equivalent ontic result in
ii 6 CHAPTER FIVE
self is not free to entirely free itself from its own egoism: Morally,
it may overcome the inconvenience of egoism that is to say, the
external appearance it offers to the gaze of others (which, in this
regard, is real) but not its injustice, that is to say, the intimate
constitution of the self by itself (and according to which it appears
to itself). Relative and moral egoism conceals an absolute egoism, to
be taken in the extra-moral sense of the term. The self suffers from
and enjoys, indivisibly, an original, extra-moral, and pre-moral ego
ism that is both involuntary and constitutive, one that we can al
ways stigmatize for it always precedes the purely moral denuncia
tion. I am not free, nor is the self within me, to be unjustly egoistical,
for if I were not egoistical, I would simply not be, since I exist only
through the ego. Pascal stresses that the egoism of the self does not
simply, or primarily, result from a secondary and moral decision
of the subject, but that it radically amounts to the definition of man
as subject or more precisely (for the subject, far from directing it,
undergoes this revolution) as ego. If man defines himself to himself
as an ego that relates to itself constantly through its cogitatio, he must
establish himself as the single and necessary center of any possible
world. Of any world signifies, first and foremost, of the world of
the objects of a now unified science, but also of the world of the
supposed subjects, more often termed the world of the loved ob
jects. In short, the self-referential establishment of the ego cogito (me
cogitare rem) is not only a concern of the theoretical realm of knowl
edge (as explicitly developed by Descartes), it also is the arbiter of
the so-called practical realm (which may in fact be just as theoretical)
of acknowledgment of and by others. Pascal, in the curt and misun
derstood pronouncement quoted above, refers the usual worldly and
moral egoism to its contemporary and Cartesian foundation: The de
termination of man as an ego determines all his behaviors from the
start. Moreover, while this ensures the unity of the mathesis universalis
in the theoretical realm, it imposes on man an egoism of principle
in the practical domain. In short, moral egoism necessarily results
from an extra-moral determination; Pascals condemnation is aimed
not at a perverted liberty but rather at a metaphysical necessity. For
metaphysics does not remain a neutrality that cannot be apprehended
by Pascals gaze: Egoism, if it results from the theoretical establish
ment of the ego as definition of man, nevertheless affects negatively
the very possibility of an access to the other as such. The metaphysics
of the ego, as elaborated by Descartes, radicalizes egoism and deepens
120 CHAPTER SIX
In more directly Cartesian terms, we may ask whether and how the
ego (cogito) sees other minds, if not other egos. In order to pose this
question and attempt to answer it, we will proceed in a very straight
forward manner by examining whether the ego (cogito) admits and
encounters other mentes throughout the ordo rationum of the Medita
tions. It is therefore a question of reading the Meditations again not
according to the goal it sets for itself, but according to the goal that
by definition surpasses objectivity, namely, the otherness of the mind,
the mind of the other.
19, 1. 6) who put their damaged mind (mens) to poor use, they have
no mind, they have lost it, and with it, almost their humanity: As
amentes, they do not exhibit other minds that could be compared to
mine, which thereby remains unique. Do others emerge in the paint
ers (19 ,1. 31) mentioned next? No, for this is only an epistemological
model, designed to allude to the Cartesian doctrine of perception,
and not an existential observation establishing the existence of other
egos.6 Do others surface in those (nonnulli, 21, 1. 17) who prefer to
escape hyperbolic doubt by admitting any lower principle other than
an omnipotent God? Obviously not, for this is the doxographic origin
of other theses and not an existential assumption. There remain those
who are mistaken, and truly mistaken: others [who] go astray in
cases where they think they have the most perfect knowledge (21,
11. 8-9). The fact remains that they go astray, especially insofar as
they are not aware of their own errors, and therefore they forfeit all
certainty about what they believe they see as well as about what they
are; they thus disappear completely from the theoretical horizon now
opened by doubt and its constraints. Meditation I thus mentions four
potential figures of the other, only to reject them one after another;
others are acknowledged only to be eliminated. Outside of myself,
there are no minds [nullas mentes] (25, 11. 3-4).
Yet one might object that the elimination of others in Meditation
I could be a temporary negation that prepares for a subsequent resto
ration, similar to the restorations enjoyed successively by the ego (in
Meditation II) , God (in Meditation I II ) , mathematical truths (in
Meditation V), and the physical world (in Meditation VI). This
would be the most elegant and satisfactory hypothesis; yet it is flawed,
because it is not supported by the texts. Meditation IV, although it
sets forth a doctrine of error by invoking the finiteness of my under
standing, does not attempt even a sketch of an intersubjective defini
tion of truth: The mention of the whole universe [omnis universitas
rerum] (55,1. 28 = 61,1. 21) in no way announces an intersubjective
constitution of the world. Meditation VI, which could reestablish oth
ers, as it reestablishes the world of the senses and sensation dismissed
by Meditation I, remains astonishingly silent on the occurrences of
other mentes that were called into doubt: Madmen, mistaken folk,
even painters are not mentioned; the case of the man afflicted with
dropsy is discussed, but only insofar as it represents a human body
in general the body of a man [hominis corpus] (84, 11. 19-20),
a body suffering from dropsy [corpus hydrope laborans] (85, 11.
DOES THE EGO ALTER THE OTHER? 12 3
and hats, and above all of their otherness; upon entering the field of
the intuitus, they become objects, they inherit their identity from it
and lose their originating phenomenal initiative that by which they
discover themselves to be what they think they are. Their humanity
remains borrowed, a concession, a restoration like a face made out
of wax that lends itself to our gaze but that cannot see. People have
no more of a face than wax does. This is a reduction of otherness to
objectivity, whereby the other becomes even more invisible insofar
as it is masked by the visible evidence of its judged objectivity. Can
we know others without accepting also to be acknowledged by them?
Can we be acknowledged without losing control of knowledge? Des
cartes does not envisage this for a single moment, which is why Pas
cals attack touches him so directly.7
5. Love or Representation
This rather extreme conclusion may seem too abrupt to remain bal
anced and equitable. Besides, it opens itself to a massive counter ar
gument: If the ego did in fact exclude any acknowledgment of an alter
ego, and hence if transcendental subjectivity on principle denied any
intersubjectivity, then Descartes should have refrained from elabo
rating a doctrine of love. Yet not only did he provide a thorough and
subtle doctrine, but he also elaborated it starting from the passions of
the soul; thus from the mens and the ego. Intersubjectivity is therefore
deployed against the background of subjectivity, and the ego does
indeed acknowledge an alter ego. We shall have to accept this refuta
tion if Descartes doctrine of love actually reaches an alter ego and
contradicts the autarkic solitude of the ego. This is what we now have
to examine.
Love is one of the passions. And passions are defined as confused
sensations, sensations or very confused thoughts, a confused
thought, aroused in the soul by some motion of the nerves in other
words, animi pathemata and confusae quaedam cogitationes.12 Interpret
ing the passions in general as thoughts and cogitationes, even confused
ones, signifies that the ego still determines that which it nonetheless
undergoes. In fact, the passions, although confused, depend on the
ego just as much as the other cogitationes do, and actually doubly so.
On the one hand, passions depend on the ego simply because of what
they represent and the eventual confusion of the represented (cogi-
tatum) does not alter this dependence in the least. On the contrary,
the absence of an object distinct from the ego increases the depen
dence of the passions on the ego. Not only do the passions share
the passivity of intellection understanding is the passivity of the
mind 13 but also, since they are caused by some movement of the
132 CHAPTER SIX
with the restatement of the cogito, ergo sum, now transposed in terms
of desire: imagining that it . . Hence, it becomes impossible to
distinguish between a concupiscent love and a benevolent love, for
given that the essence of love implies the representation of its ob
ject by an anterior, prior ego, it seems illusory or contradictory to
demand the disappearance of the self, as is the case, for instance, in
the Augustinian opposition of uti to frui. Moreover, the antinomy
that opposes love of self to the point of scorn for God to love of
God to the point of scorn for the self would also become untenable,
insofar as it questions the anteriority of the ego in any and all love,
as a result of the primacy of representation. For Descartes, benevo
lence and concupiscence concern only the effects of love and not
its essence, 19 which is invariably determined by the ego cogito.
(b) Thus follows what can be called the formal univocity of love.
From the standpoint of the cogitatio: [Consider, for example] the
passions which an ambitious man has for glory, a miser for money,
a drunkard for wine, a brutish man for a woman he wants to violate,
an honorable man for his friend or mistress, and a good father for
his children. Although very different from one another, these pas
sions are similar in so far as they partake of love. 20 In what way are
they similar, in spite of what opposes them to one another? They are
similar insofar as they all partake of the single definition of love. But
how can a single definition a supposed definition of love encom
pass such heterogeneous passions, and according to what common
characteristic? For in all cases it is a question of forming a whole
with an object, at times desiring only to possess it (thus considering
oneself superior to it) and at other times desiring the well-being of
these objects (thus considering oneself to be inferior to them). In
both cases, esteem, thus the cogitatio, determines, starting from the
ego, whether the union of the whole must benefit the ego or instead
its object. Thus the unity of the figures of love, even extreme ones,
still rests upon the representational primacy of the ego; thus the ab
straction of objects becomes possible from the single standpoint of
the ego, no matter whether the object is equal to or greater or less
than us.21 Besides, the fragility of the distinctions introduced in the
end by Descartes to hierarchize the very dissimilar passions to which
he grants the name of love is clear. On the one hand, the four lower
forms are supposedly easily distinguishable insofar as they aim only
at the possession of the objects . . . , not the objects themselves.
On the other hand, when it is a question of maintaining the possibility
DOES THE EGO ALTER THE OTHER? 13 5
cised by the ego, it would hold the rank of (active) cause and no
longer simply of an effect (passive and representable). This new rank
granted to the other would thus imply that we need to reinterpret
the moral philosophy and the doctrine of the passions of the later
Descartes from the standpoint of the ontotheology of causality and
no longer although this is what we have done all along here from
the single standpoint of the ontotheology of the cogitatio.2(> An in-
depth study alone will be able to test the accuracy of this hypothesis.
(b) During his polemic with G. Voet, Descartes at the very least
sketched a motifnamely, charity that would justify the inversion
mentioned above from the other viewed as a represented object to
the other acknowledged as a free cause. He defines charity as fol
lows: haec Charitas, hoc est, sancta amicitia, que Deum prose-
quimur, et Dei causa etiam omnes homines, quatenus scimus ipsos
a Deo amari. 27 That is, the charity by means of which we seek God
causes us, because of God himself, to also seek all [other] men; and
we do so only as a consequence and imitation of the love that we
know God has for them. Thus, loving others does not result from a
direct relation between the ego and others since, as we have seen, this
relationship is regulated by the logic of representation, which reduces
the other to a simple represented object, thus an alienated one, and
prevents the strict love of an other. Loving others results from an
indirect relation, mediated by God, between others and the ego: The
ego loves God and knows that God loves other men; thus, imitating
God, the ego loves these other men. We should therefore be less sur
prised now with Descartes recourse to charity as an essential concept
of any social and political relationship.28Rather, we should stress the
theoretical function of charity: The other can be loved only if the
ego gives up trying to represent it directly and accepts aiming for it
indirectly through the unobjectifiable par excellence that is, God.
The ego loves the other precisely insofar as it successively gives up
trying to represent it, loves the incomprehensible, and then comes
back to the other as it is loved by the incomprehensible. Thus the
function of charity is to enable the ego to pass beyond the ontotheol
ogy of the cogitatio, in order to finally reach the other as such.
These two possible arguments indicate at the very least that an
essential part of Descartes moral doctrine has yet to be examined
and understood. They indicate also that his strictly metaphysical situ
ation still remains to be determined. To represent or to love one
must choose. Did Descartes in the end detect this?
CHAPTER SEVEN
ity. If the concept already encompasses the necessary Being, then and
only then its very possibility as a noncontradictory concept produces,
without a sufficient external reason, necessarily effective existence.
This last formulation thus finally confers full ontological rank on the
argument. Kant and Schelling, for instance, will understand the argu
ment on the basis of its Leibnizian formulation, though in order to
critique it: God exists by virtue of his concept of necessary existence,
provided that this concept is possible. Let us note, however, that
Descartes himself had anticipated this development: In a very peda
gogical commentary on his a priori proof he reformulates in the hori
zon of possibility and necessity the argument that was initially made
on the basis of perfection: Possible or contingent existence is con
tained in the concept of a limited thing, whereas necessary and perfect
existence is contained in the concept of a supremely perfect being. 14
At any rate, the Cartesian argument eventually reaches an ontological
status only to the extent that the concept of the essence of God im
plies that the necessary existence necessarily exists, or as Schelling
wrote: God is not only the necessary being, but he is necessarily
the necessary being; this is a meaningful difference. 15
These three stages on the road to an ontological interpretation of
the argument still call for a fourth one. To review them, we have only
to follow Hegel, who was the first to see that the two characteristics of
the argument to proceed from a concept of the divine essence and
to identify the divine essence with (necessary) Being itself do not
constitute two independent and parallel demands, but rather eventu
ally merge with one another. According to Hegel, Anselm, just like
Descartes after him, does not present in his argument a demonstra
tion that can be said to belong to rational theology. On the other
hand, Anselm reaches on this occasion the essential speculative truth,
the unity of thinking and Being [die Einheit des Denkens und
Seins]. 16The now ontological argument discovers, in the partic
ular case of God, what the cogito had already foreseen namely, that
thinking, as thought and independently of its factual representational
content, passes from itself to Being, provided that it may reach specu-
latively the truth of the concept. The argument was actually antici
pating the truth of science as a whole that is to say, the metaphysi
cal truth par excellence although in an unsatisfying and almost'
sophistic way, since it was held back in simple representations. In
the particular case of God, Anselm and Descartes after him had
foreseen no less than the move from the concept in general, according
IS THE ARGUMENT ONTOLOGICAL? 145
to its intrinsic requirement, to effectivity, as it is thought in itself
and for itself by the accomplished science of logic.17 God does not
come into existence so much through his concept of a necessary
and absolute Being but rather through the concept itself, free from
any and all determinacy. The ontological argument concerns and de
fines first of all the concept as such, rather than God. To be sure, it
can and must characterize God in particular, but even this results
from the fact that God is not a concept, but the concept par excel
lence, the concept personified. In his own way, Schelling will develop
the same thesis: We should not proceed from the concept of God to
his existence, but according to the order of positive philosophy; set
out from the concept of pure undubitable existing and, inversely,
prove the divinity of undubitable existing. 18 The concept of the ex
isting (Iexistant) takes the rank of an absolute "prius, without speci
fying the existence of God. It is only in a second movement that
Gods divinity will follow from the concept of the existing. The onto
logical argument, now brought back to its full speculative dignity,
becomes not only the prime metaphysical proof of the existence of
God, but also the dissolution of the essence of God in the concept,
where metaphysics is accomplished. The argument becomes fully on
tological only with the replacement (Aufhebung) of God by the con
cept what came to be called, shortly after Hegel and Schelling, the
death of God.
the limit (and possibly a limit that must continuously be pushed far
ther) of its own power to conceptualize. God may eventually
appear in and for thought only when the limit of what thought can
think, the maximum limit of the thinkable (id quod majus cogitari
potest) has been reached, when thought encounters something it can
not surpass and thus conquer, namely that than which a greater
cannot be thought (id quo majus cogitari nequit). As long as thought
can still think by means of concepts, it cannot grasp God; it does so
only when it can no longer proceed, at least by using concepts. God
begins when the concept ends. The fascination this argument imme
diately exerts on us, regardless of, and previous to, any discussion
of its eventual logical validity obviously derives from the authentically
critical character Anselm assigns it. For that than which a greater
cannot be thought (id quo majus cogitari nequit) does not define God,
even negatively. It does not pretend to grant access to a transcendent
term (or being); it simply designates the limit that will be encountered
by any possible cogitatio when it attempts to think God in other
words, when it attempts to think beyond the maximum limit of the
thinkable for a finite thought. Before exposing itself to God, and in
order to do so, thought that reaches that than which a greater cannot
be thought reaches the limit of its own capacity to know. Hence,
if, following Kant, transcendental never means a reference of our
cognition to things, but only to our faculty of cognition, 21 then one
must paradoxically conclude that the argument seeks a term that tran
scends cogitatio only in the transcendental test of the limits of the
power of this cogitatio itself. Any critique of the argument that would
begin by neglecting its resolutely critical dimension, in order to dis
qualify it as simply dogmatic, would immediately annul itself, and
Kant, paradoxically, was the first to ignore the fact that his opponent
could withstand his critique by using its own weapons.22 In other
words, Anselm seeks what transcends all thought (God) only through
the critical test of the transcendental and never conquers it as an
object. Could this not be confirmed by making reference, by means
of a second and similar paradox, to the other opponent par excellence
of Anselm, namely, Thomas Aquinas? Does not Aquinas refuta
tion of the argument rest on the fact that God is not known to himself
for us (per se notum quoad nos), and hence, does it not acknowledge
that Anselm did not use any concept or definition of the divine es
sence? As opposed to the focus of the traditional debate, what opposes
Aquinas and Anselm may thus hinge not so much on the recourse
14 8 CHAPTER SEVEN
4. Beyond Essence
We now must examine whether Anselms argument also departs from
the second characteristic of its metaphysical interpretation. The
question can be stated as follows: Can the presupposed existence of
God be identified with the essence par excellence? In other words,
does the Anselmian argument, like the ontological argument, rest
upon a determination of Gods nature on the basis of essence, itself
understood as an unrestricted Being par excellence? In short, can
that than which a greater cannot be thought be thought (even nega
tively) starting from the question of essence, of ousia, of Being or
not?
152 CHAPTER SEVEN
back to the injunction to think the best: ponder as best you can what
kind of good this is and how great it is. But, since thinking the best
and the supreme good necessitates that thought not limit itself to its
representative and conceptual functions, but rather bring to bear the
function of love since the blessed ones will love in the degree that
they will know thought must dare deploy its desire: Desire the
simple good which itself is every good [bonum]. 33 If it is a question
of knowing God as melius and supreme good, thought must not lean
on the impossible concept of an inaccessible essence, but rather on
its own desire, and thus, deprived of any other recourse, on its love.
The same recourse to melius outlines the basic architecture of the
Monologion. Let us simply mention two indisputable points:
(a) The first demonstration, which here again aims to establish
the existence of God, opens with the thesis that there is something
that is the best [optimum], the greatest, the highest of all existing
things (chapter I, 13, 3-4). It is deployed only on the basis of the
question of the good and in the direction of the supreme good. The
first chapter opposes various goods, for they are only through another
(per aliud), to the one good, since it is through itself (per se), and
thus reaches the supreme good; but the transcendence of this magnum
is itself absorbed in the greatest good: Now, what is supremely good
is also supremely great (15, 10 -11). The second chapter goes from
relative quantities to something . . . supremely great in order again
to reduce the quantitative sovereignty to that of the greatest good:
it is necessary that something be both supremely great and su
premely good (15, 11. 17 and 21). The third chapter eliminates the
kinds of good that are not in themselves like the sole thing that is
through itself (ipsum unum per seipsum), and finally thinks the latter
as an optimum: Therefore, there is some one thing which . . . exists
most greatly and most highly of all (16, 26-28). The fourth chapter
is based on the principle of eminence, concluding that: Therefore,
necessarily, there is a nature which is so superior to any other or
others that there is no nature to which it is ranked as inferior (17,
24-25). These four chapters are summarized in the definition of the
existence of a nature, or substance, or Being that is indeterminate
except insofar as it reveals itself, in decreasing order as the supreme
good, the supreme greatness, the supreme Being or subsistence in
short the highest of all things (17, 32-33; 18, 2-3). The access to
God as something that exists, or even as a substance, is therefore not
set out according to the regulatory idea of the essence or even of a
IS THE ARGUMENT ONTOLOGICAL? 1 55
maximum, but, beyond essence and the majus cogitari nequit (which
is properly speaking absent here), according to the regulatory idea
of the good. Through the eminence of the good God transcends ev
erything that exists.
(b) This theoretical decision appears even more clearly, if possible,
during the discussion of substance. Following Augustine, Anselm is
reluctant to call God a substance, even a supreme and primary sub
stance, since substance always implies a relation, at least a possible
one, to the notion of accident. However, here he tolerates the name
of substance, at the express condition that it be based on the principle
of melius, thus seen in the perspective of the sovereign good. In this
sense, just as it is blasphemous to suppose that the substance of the
Supreme Nature is something which in some respect it would be
better not to be, so this substance must be whatever in every respect
it is better to be than not to be. Substance can now be understood
no longer as a relative category but as a particular (and probably privi
leged) function of melius: to be such that nothing better, at least ac
cording to the hierarchy of the categories, could exist that it itself is
not i.e., it alone is that than which nothing is better. 34Therefore,
God can be granted the name of substance that is to say, the meta
physical title par excellence of ousia only on the condition that He
receives it as a particular case of melius i.e., under the aegis of the
good.
By substituting melius for majus, the good for ousia, Anselm pre
cludes, for the second time now, the possibility of a metaphysical
interpretation of his argument. It is thus rather surprising to see that
the best interpreters at least as far as we know have not stressed
this radical decision. Actually, the sources that scholars have at times
attempted to assign to the formula that than which a greater cannot
be thought (id quo majus cogitari nequit)iS confirm, on the contrary,
that when Anselm passes to melius, he does so under the aegis of
Augustine. Here are some examples:
already opened to the listening mind. The question, even when set
ting out to demonstrate that the sovereign good exists, does not pri
marily consist in thinking it in terms of the two alternatives of being
or not being; for being does not define or exhaust Gods essence, nor
can it reach the eminence of the good. Being offers a path, a humbly
indispensable path, to the overeminent good of a God who must be
loved. Although the question of being also concerns God, God is
never circumscribed within the question of being, as a horizon that
would precede or predetermine Him. God is, in order simply to give
Himself and to receive praise.
Then, if the argument is not properly speaking ontological, can
what Anselm reaches by means of it, and what he calls God, belong
to an ontotheology? Any ontotheology defines a locus and a function
for the divine by maximizing the determinations of the being of be
ing; hence, being par excellence concentrates and accomplishes in
itself the common characteristics of any being. Evidently, an onto
theology can only establish this predetermined figure of the divine
as being par excellence on the basis of the conditions that are estab
lished in general for common being, thus justifying and exemplifying
it. But if Anselms argument does not define God by means of the
norms of an ontology, it cannot inscribe Him in the architecture of
any ontotheology either. Besides, the Proslogion could not include
God in an ontotheology since in general it does not establish a mean
ing of the being of being: How could it determine a being par excel
lence on the basis of being, when it leaves the being of common being
entirely indeterminate? The complete indifference of the Proslogion
toward the question of being, and particularly toward the determi
nation of the being of being in general, prevents it and forbids it from
pretending to determine God onto(-theo-)logically.
The argument is therefore not ontological because, first of all, it
does not belong to ontotheology. These two findings only confirm
that Anselms enterprise is not concerned with the question of be
ing but instead with that of the sovereignty of the good. Thus, far
from unconsciously inaugurating the metaphysical enterprise of the
demonstration of the proofs of the existence of God and hence the
'death of God Anselms argument marks, on the threshold or in
the margins of the emerging metaphysics, a thought of God that is
absolutely free.
Notes
Chapter One
1. L a Naissance de la paix, A T V , 619, 11. 6 -9 . T h is ballet (which we
attribute to Descartes, according to G . Rodis-Lew is, Descartes: Biographie
[Paris, 1995], p. 349, in spite o f R. A. Watson, Ren Descartes D id N ot
Write L a Naissance de la Paix, A P A Proceedings 62 [1989], and Descartes
nest pas lauteur de L a Naissance de la paix, Archives de Philosophie 53,
no. 4 [1990]) was performed on 9 December 1649, that is, about thirty years
after the dreams. These two dates bracket the entirety o f Descartes strictly
philosophical work.
2. Thus, J . Maritain: It is undeniably very annoying to find at the origin
o f modern philosophy a cerebral episode, to quote Auguste Comte, which
would call forth from our savants, should they meet it in the life of some
devout personage, the most disturbing neuropathological diagnosis (The
Dream o f Descartes, Together with Some Other Essays, translated by M . L .
Andison [New York, 1944], pp. 1 5 - 16 ) .
3. AT X, 54, 1. 3ff.
4. M ore than in Freud himself, who remained very circumspect in his
Briefe an Maxime Leroy ber den Traurn des Descartes, in Gesammelte Schrif-
ten, vol. 12 (Vienna, 1934) (French translation first published in M . L e R oy,
Descartes, le philosophe au masque [Paris 1929], vol. 1, p. 89ff., and later in
F . Pasche, Mtaphysique et Inconscient, Revue franaise de psychanalyse
[19 8 1]), we find a significant example of this in D. Lew in Bertram, Dreams
and the Uses o f Regression (New York, 1958), or (for a Jungian approach) in
M . L . von Franz, Der Traum des Descartes, Zeitlose Dokumente der Seele (Zu
rich, 1952).
5. See G . Poulet, L e Songe de Descartes, in Etudes sur le temps humain
(Paris, 19 51), vol. 1, p. 63ff.; J.-M . Wagner, Esquisse du cadre divinatoire
des songes de Descartes, in Descartes et le Baroque, Baroque 6 (1973);
J . Barchilon, L es songes de Descartes du 10 novembre 16 19 et leur inter
prtation, Papers o f French Seventeenth Century Literature 20 (1984).
I2 NOTES TO PAGES 3 - 6
ply led by custom, thinking that wisdom and science are not very different
. . . those people should be ta u g h t. . . N ot only are the two quite different,
but . . . they are almost never found together, . . . each usually prevents
the other: someone who is very learned is scarcely wise, and one who is wise
is not learned. There are indeed some exceptions, but they are quite rare.
And, later: Science is a great piling up of others goods; it is the careful
collection o f what one has seen, heard said, and read in books (De la sagesse,
III, 14 [Bordeaux, 16 0 1; Paris, 1604; Paris, 1986], pp. 685-87). Or also:
Science is in truth a fine ornament . . . but not everyone agrees on how
to rank it . . . I place it well below . . . wisdom (I, 61; ibid., p. 365). F o r
Montaigne, similarly: Learned we may be with another mans learning: we
can only be wise with wisdom o f our own (Essays, I, 25), and T ru ly,
learning is a most useful accomplishment and a great one. Those who despise
it give ample evidence o f their animal-stupidity. Y et I do not prize its worth
at that extreme value given to it by some, such as the philosopher Erillus
who lodged Supreme Good in it, holding that it was within the power o f
learning to make us wise and contented. That, I do not believe nor what
others have said: that learning is the M other o f virtue and that all vice is
born o f Ignorance (Essays, II, 12 , A n Apology for Raymond Sebond,
p. 489). Pascal will maintain this opposition: Jesus without wealth or any
outward show o f knowledge has his own order o f holiness. . . . With what
pomp and marvelously magnificent array he came in the eyes o f the heart
which perceive wisdom (Penses, Br. 793, L . 308; translated by A. J. K rail-
sheimer [New York, 1966], p. 124), with Descartes clearly in mind: write
against those who probe science too deeply. Descartes (Br. 553, L . 360/
1; trans., p. 220).
16. We are following Leibniz here (see M arion, Ren Descartes: Rgles
utiles et claires, p. 96). Sapientia, although rarely encountered, is found in
A T X , 375, 1. 24, studium sapientiae, and 442, 1. 7, altior sapientia.
17. T h is is F . Alquis interpretation in Descartes, vol. 1, p. 577. Compare
with the theme o f the lost traveler, Discourse, 16, 1. 3 0 - 1 7 , 11. 4 and 24, 11.
I8 -2 5 . T h is lends a very different conceptual dignity to the project o f a
pilgrimage to Loretto (A T X , 186, 1. 3 4 -18 7 , 1. 2; 2 17 , 1. 25ff.), since it is
a path determined by theology with an eye toward morals. See the comments
by S. Breton in Egars en quelque fo r t. . . : L e problme du commence
ment, in Libres commentaires (Paris, 1990) chap. 1.
18. Fo r rectum veritatis iter, see A T X , 366, 1. 6; for veritatis via
see 36 0 ,1. 24; 399, 11. 2 2 -2 3 ; 4i> H- 2 3 -2 5 ; 4 0 5,11. 1 5 - 1 6 ; 425, 11. 1 0 - 1 2 .
Fo r this theme in the Discourse, see M arion, A propos dune smantique
de la mthode, Revue internationale de philosophie 103, no. 1 (1973). (See
also G . Crapullis comments and my replies in Bulletin cartsien IV , A r
chives de philosophie, 38, no. 2 (1975): 280-85.)
19. T h is recollection o f Pythagoras may perhaps be confused with others
NOTES TO PAGES 12- 18
o f famous texts o f the N ew Testament: M atthew 5:37, 2 Corinthians 1 : 1 7
19, Jam es 5:12.
20. See F . Alqui, Descartes, vol. 1, p. 586.
2 1. On the melon, see the successive hypotheses proposed by G.
Rodis-Lew is: the encyclopedia o f knowledge (in L oeuvre de Descartes [Paris,
19 7 1], pp. 5 iff., 452) and omnipotence ( L alto e il basso e i sogni di
Descartes, Rivista difilosofia 80 (1989): 2oyff.). G . Sebba suggests the possi
bility o f an error in the text ( melon instead o f Melzm, op. cit., pp. 14,
52). B ut the likely explanation for the wind may be found in the actual
yards o f the College o f L a Flche (now used as a military academy): it really
does blow through two arched doors, facing each other at two opposite sides
o f a square yard, creating a strong stream o f air, which is really felt by those.
who cross the yard to go to the college chapel.
22. In 16 19 the little portraits in copperplate ( 1 8 4 , 11. 7 -8 ) resist self-
interpretation, since they enter into it only as a last-minute anecdote: he
sought no further explanation for them after an Italian painter paid him a
visit on the next day ( 1 8 5 , 11. 68). A strictly theoretical interpretation will
appear only in the Optics o f 1637, which uses this example to explicate what
I have elsewhere termed defiguration : Y ou can see this in the case of
engravings: consisting simply o f a little ink placed here and there on a piece
o f paper, they represent to us forests, towns, people, and even battles and
storms; and although they make us think o f countless different qualities in
these objects, it is only in respect o f shape that there is any real resemblance
(A T V I, 1 1 3 , 11. 8 - 1 5 ; see Marion, Su r la thologie blanche de Descartes [Paris,
19 8 1], section 12 , pp. 2 3 1 63). Here the dream does seem to be premonitory,
in spite of (rather than because o f) its original interpretation.
23. A T X , 1 8 2 , 1. 4; 1 8 5 , 1. 20; 186, line 1. See F . Alqui, Descartes, vol.
1, p. 59. We do not see why a connection between the malus Spiritus of
16 19 and the malignus genius o f 16 4 1 should a priori be incongruous. On
this point J. Maritain, The Dream, p. 15: Could it be by any chance cousin
to the Mischievous Genius o f the Mditations? although an isolated occur
rence, was quite pertinent.
24. Emphasis added. See the same indifference toward consciousness in
A T V II, 461, 11. 2 1- 2 8 .
25. T h e history o f the cogito in the Cartesian textual corpus has yet to
be written (see below, chapter 5, 2). Only then will it be possible to evaluate
F . Alquis analyses o f the metaphysical distance between the cogito o f 1637
and that o f 16 4 1 (see below, chapter 2, 1).
26. See J. Deprun, Descartes et le gnie de Socrate (Note sur un trait
perdu et sur une lettre nigmatique), in L a passion de la raison: Hommage
Ferdinand Alqui, edited by N . Grimaldi and J .- L . M arion (Paris, 1983),
p. I 3 5 f f , appearing also in De Descartes au romantisme: Etudes historiques et
dogmatiques (Paris, 1987).
NOTES TO PAGES 2 0 - 2 2
Chapter T w o
1 . I have tried to answer these questions in Sur l ontologie grise de Des
cartes (Paris, 1975), 30, pp. 18 1- 8 3 . See W. Rd, L explication rationelle
entre mthode et mtaphysique, in Le Discours et sa mthode, pp. 8ff.
2. Letter to Mersenne, M arch 1637, A T I, 349, 11. 2 328.
3. T o X , M ay 1637, respectively A T I, 3 7 0 , 11. 10, 2 2 - 2 3 , 2 5 -2 8 . Simi
larly: In this Plan [i.e., Discourse] I explain a part of my method, I try to
prove the existence o f God and o f the soul apart from the body (T o M er
senne, Leiden, M arch 1636, A T I, 3 3 9 , 11. 2527). For a more general diag
nostic, see the essays in Problmatique et rception du Discours de la Mthode
et des Essais, edited by H. Mchoulan (Paris, 1988), including my introduc
tion, pp. 9 - 2 1 .
4. T h is hypothesis does not assume that the Meditations are deployed
without a method, or even without the method. M any clues indicate the
opposite, including the following statement: And finally, I was strongly
pressed to undertake this task by several people who knew that I had devel
oped a method for resolving certain difficulties in the sciences not a new
method (for nothing is older than the truth), but one which they had seen
me use with some success in other areas; and I therefore thought it m y duty
to make some attempt to apply it to the matter in hand (Letter to the Sor-
bonne, A T V II, 3 , 11. 2228). Similarly, see the formula rationum mearum
series et nexus ( the proper order of m y arguments and the connection
between them, Preface to the Reader, A T V II, 9, 1. 29; see also 36, 1. 30,
A T X , 383, 11. 2 4 -2 5 , 382, 11. 1 3 14). See below, chapter 3, 6.
5. L . Liard, Descartes (Paris 1882), pp. 223 and 69, respectively. How
ever, in all fairness, we should stress that Liard admits that a profound
unity, which should be stressed, is hidden beneath this dualism (p. 274);
in fact, the unity namely, the metaphysical sanction o f science is very
superficial. Which is exactly A. Boyce Gibsons position: The appeal be
yond science, however, leaves the details of science unquestioned. Meta
physical sanction is one thing; metaphysical intrusion, another (The Philoso
phy o f Descartes [London, 1932], p. 8). A. Baillet was probably the first to
propose this line o f interpretation: It is claimed nevertheless that what little
he [Descartes] offered is more worthy o f the title logic or entry into Philoso
phy and all the other sciences than Aristotles Organon, because it is more
simple and less Metaphysical and it appears more proper to minds which
are not yet prepared with any knowledge (La vie de M. Descartes, IV , 2;
[Paris, 16 9 1], vol. 1, p. 283). See, on the other hand, H. Caton, T h e Status
o f Metaphysics in the Discourse on M ethod, M an and World, 5, no. 4
(1972).
6. Respectively, E. Gilson, Ren Descartes: Discours de la Mthode, texte
et commentaire (Paris, 1925), p. 284; and H. Lefvre, Le criticisme de Descartes
NOTES TO PAGES 2 2 -2 5 167
(Paris, 1958), pp. 3 0 2 -3 . F . Bouillier clearly illustrates this thesis by stating
that Descartes entire philosophy is present, in abridged form, in the Dis
course on the Method (Histoire de la philosophie cartsienne, 3rd ed. [Paris,
1868], vol. 1, p. 61).
7. Thus Bouillier: L et us now examine how in Meditation III, he devel
ops and strengthens by new demonstrations what he had only alluded to
and sketched in the Discourse on the Method (op. cit., vol. i, p. 87; see
also p. 67). In the same perspective, G . Rodis-Lew is stresses the continuity
between the Discourse and the Meditations so much that a potential weakness
in the argument in 16 37 is simply explained by circumspection ( L oeuvre
de Descartes [Paris, 19 7 1], pp. 220, 228). See also, in spite of its great subtlety,
the recent contribution by J.-M . Beyssade: Finally, against all the propo
nents o f a chronological explanation, we maintain that as early as 16 2 8 -
1629 (the date assigned in the Discourse to these first meditations which are
examined in Part Four), Descartes knew exactly what one could expect, and
what one could not, from metaphysical doubt ( Certitude et fondement:
L vidence de la raison et la vracit divine dans la mtaphysique du Discours
de la Mthode, in L e Discours et sa mthode, op. cit., p. 363). T h e origin of
this interpretation can probably be traced back to Father Nicolas J. Poisson:
There are therefore many things in the Method that I will momentarily
ignore when I know that I will encounter them somewhere else; at which
point, M r. Descartes having spoken about them at greater length, I will also
add the explanations that I deem necessary (Commentaires ou Remarques sur
la Mthode de Ren Descartes [Vendme, 1670], p. 12 1).
8. T o Mersenne, M arch 1637, A T I, 3 5 3 , 1. 14. Although H . Lefvre (Le
criticisme de Descartes, p. 3o6n.i) criticized F . Alquis thesis (La dcouverte
mtaphysique de l homme [Paris, 1950, 1987], pp. 14 7-4 8 ), I follow Alqui
who, besides, reaches conclusions similar to those o f O. Hamelin (Le systme
de Descartes [Paris, 19 1 1 ] , p. 116 ), E. Gilson (op. cit. pp. 286ff., 290, etc.),
and H. Gouhier (Essais sur Descartes [Paris, 1937], pp. 294ff.) in spite of
his acknowledgment in L a pense mtaphysique de Descartes (Paris, 1962),
p. 25.
9. Alqui, L a dcouverte, pp. 145, 146, 150 (see also p. 154 ; or Descartes:
Oeuvres philosophiques [Paris 1963], vol. 1, p. 6o4n.i). In this sense, showing
that the Discourse does not contradict the Meditations and even at times an
nounces it (which J.-M . Beyssade saw so well) is not enough to prove
the chronological invariance o f Descartes metaphysics between 1637 and
16 4 1.
10. Alqui, L a dcouverte, p. 147.
1 1 . A X , 27 April 1637(F), A T I, 3 7 0 , 11. 2 6 -2 7 ; or Letter to Mersenne,
M arch 1637, A T I, 349, 1. 26.
12. Basing him self on the Dictionnaire de l Acadmie (1694 edition), vol.
2, p. 2 3 1, Gilson suggests that metaphysical here would simply mean abstract.
NOTES TO PAGES 2 6 - 3 1
Even Alqui contests this reductionist interpretation, arguing that the med
itations mentioned by Descartes [concern] precisely metaphysics as such
(Descartes: Oeuvres, vol. 1, p. 6oin.3). Actually there is no contradiction
between these two positions, since Descartes, in line with his contemporar
ies, and following Aristotle, defines metaphysics as abstraction par excel
lence; abducere mentem a sensibus ( withdrawing the mind from sensa
tion ) is the equivalent o f making the metaphysical meditation possible (see
additional remarks in Su r le prisme mtaphysique de Descartes [Paris, 1986],
chap. 1, 2, especially pp. 2 3 -3 3 ). I f Descartes seems hesitant here (Des
cartes: Oeuvres, vol. 1, p. 602), it is not about the metaphysical character of
this project, but rather about how to present it.
13. Aristotle, Metaphysics, A 3, 982 a 3; see also 982 b 8; B 2, 996 b 3
4, b 3 1 - 3 3 . T h e occurrences o f K , 1059 a 35, b 13 , 1060 a 4, 6, etc. are
probably apocryphal. P. Aubenque, who uses this formula as the central
theme in his classic thesis, stresses that Aristotle him self presents the sci
ence o f being as being a science that is only sought and probably continu
ally sought (Le problme de l tre chez Aristote [Paris, 1962], p. 267). Let
us note, however, that the text mentioned here (see Z 1, 1028 b 2) does
not precisely concern the science that is being sought but the QV sought
jiovjievov. Another Cartesian formula is philosophy which I and other
devotees are engaged in pursuing (Letter to Voetius, A T V III, 2, 26, 11.
2-3).
14. On the emergence o f the causa sui, see the comments in Jean -Lu c
M arion, Sur la thologie blanche de Descartes (Paris, 1981), 18. On its onto-
theological function, see S u r le prisme mtaphysique de Descartes, 1920.
15. T h e occurrences o f cause que (DM, 32, line 1; 38, 11. 19, 27, 29;
39, 1. 2 1) cannot constitute an objection here, since they indicate only a
relatively undetermined relation, rather than efficiency or a foundation. Effet
appears only once in Part Four, meaning en effet (34, line 1). These data
come from the indispensable computerized work o f P. A. Cahn, Index du
Discours de la Mthode de Ren Descartes (Rome, 1977). Th e absence o f cause
in Part Four must hold our attention, especially since the word appears
twenty one times in the other parts o f the text (cause, 14 times; cause, 7);
the verb causer appears on three occasions (4 4 , 1. 8; 5 5 , 1. 13 ; 5 6 , 1. 27). Thus
the scientific use of causality is deployed at the same time that metaphysics
refuses causality. T h is paradox in itself would be worthy o f study.
16. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 3 2 2 -2 3 ; see also p. 324.
17. Alqui, L a dcouverte, p. 147. Same judgment, several years later,
upon editing the Discourse: the idea o f God, being superior to me, can only
have been caused by God. See Meditation / / / (Descartes: Oeuvres, vol. 1,
p. 605). And again: T h e principle o f causality used here [DM IV] consti
tutes for Descartes a rational evidence (vol. 1, p. 606). Alqui here does
exactly what he criticized Gilson for namely, commenting on the Discourse
NOTES TO PAGES 3 1 - 3 5
This principle and this extreme form of causality make it possible to attain
God from his idea, because God Himself, since 1630, is defined as an effi
cient and total cause; the conceptual weakness of the Discourse is evident in
its inability to incorporate this existing given. On the significance o f this
formula, see M arion, Su r la thologie blanche de Descartes, 1, pp. 28689. On
the essential, yet obscure, link between substance and causality, see Norman
Kem p Smith, New Studies in the Philosophy o f Descartes (London, 1952),
chap. 12: Substance and Causality : T h e Roles Assigned to Them in
Descartes Philosophy.
29. Except that dpendance (DM, 34, 11. 8 -9 , 1 6 - 1 7 ; 35, 11- 25, 26) re
places effet, and that dpendre (34 ,1. 29; 3 3 ,1. 6; 36, line 1) encompasses tre
caus (see note 17 above). On the conflictual relationship between the various
Cartesian concepts o f God, see M arion, Su r le prisme mtaphysique de Des
cartes, 18, pp. 253-57 (perfection), and 19 (contradiction). That work,
which concentrated on the completed metaphysics, did not attempt an analy
sis o f the Discourse; this study aims to remedy the shortcoming.
30. H. Lefvre notes that the demonstration o f the Discourse is thus
simply stopped at the level o f Meditation I I (Le criticisme de Descartes,
p. 312). But, in addition to the essential differences that remain even in this
common section, one must above all determine why the Meditations could
thus be split. It is, and can be, only because o f the irruption o f the principle
o f causality.
Chapter Three
1. Fo r an overall treatment o f this question, see Marion, Su r l ontologie
grise de Descartes.
2. T h is was clearly shown by J.-R . Armogathe, Smanthse d lD EE/
id e a chez Descartes, in ID E A I V Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico
Intellectuale Europeo (Rome, 1991). T h is also answers E. M . Curleys lucid
pronouncement that the Regulae is an early work and is inconsistent with
the teaching o f Descartes mature works (Descartes against the Skeptics
[Cambridge, M ass., 1978], p. 103).
3. See also A T X , 4 1 5 , 11. 16 -2 0 , and 4 4 1 , 11. 9 - 1 2 . T h e interpretation
o f the idea as figure goes back to the beginning o f Descartes career: the
imagination employs figures in order to conceive o f bodies (Cogitationes
privatae, A T X , 2 17 , 1. 12); The World, A T X I, 176, 11. 9 -2 5 , and A T X I,
178 and 714 ; Conversation with Burman, 31: ideam seu potius figuram
(A T V, 162; ed. J.-M . Beyssade [Paris, 19 8 1], p. 83). See also the commen
tary in Rgles utiles et claires pour la direction de l esprit, translated and edited
by M arion, p. 2 3 1.
4. Obviously, this characteristic o f Descartes figura / idea as real differs
17 2 NOTES TO PAGES 4 4 - 4 9
from Aristotles eidos or skhema, for the figure is imposed on the thing by
the knowing mind as a means o f knowing, rather than emanating from the
thing as its own phenomenon. (See M arion, Su r Vontologie grise de Descartes,
21.)
5. See A T X , 4 1 4 , 11. 1 6 - 1 7 ; 4 1 5 , 11. 2 0 - 2 1 , 27ff. See also the common
sense where these ideas are received, Discourse, A T V I, 55, 11. 2021.
6. For instance, A T V II, 34, 1. 23; 35, line 1; 40, 1. 7; 4 1, 1. 20; 78, 1.
27, etc. See also Principles o f Philosophy, I, 17, A T V III, 1, 1 1 , 7, etc.
7. Examples: ideas sive notiones, A T V II, 440, 1. 14; our ideas or
notions, Discourse, A T VI, 38, 1. 2 1, and 40, 11. 8 -9 ; there were certain
thoughts within me which . . . came solely from the power o f thinking within
me; so I applied the term innate to the ideas or notions which are the forms
o f these thoughts (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, A T V III, 2, 3 5 8 , 11. 1
5). See also A. Hart, Descartes Notions, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 3 1, no. 1 (1970).
8. Omnis rei idea sive conceptus, A T V II, 166, 1. 14.
9. [I]deas or sensations, A T V I, 85, 1. 18; 2 10 , 1. 16, etc.
10. Respectively, the marginal addition to the Latin translation of the
Discourse (1644), A T V I, 559; T o Mersenne, 16 June 16 4 1, A T III, 383, 11.
2 - 3 ; T o Mersenne, Ju ly 16 4 1, A T III, 392, 1. 2; Replies, A T V II, 18 1, 11.
7 - 8 , and 160, 11. 7 - 8 .
1 1 . Cf. Marion, Su r Vontologie grise de Descartes, 22, pp. i32 ff.; and Des
cartes, Regies utiles et claires pour la direction de Vesprit, translated and edited
by Marion, pp. 239^ See also Hamelin, Le systeme de Descartes, pp. 8 5 !;
and B. ONeil, Cartesian Simple Natures, Jou rn al o f the History ofPhiloso
phy 10, no. 2 (1972).
12. Should we add to these lists the recapitulation, or rather the brutal
transformation, o f the Aristotelian categories outlined in Rule VI, (A T X ,
38 1, 11. 2 2 ff.: C S M I, 2 1 - 2 2 ) ? T h e answer is yes, insofar as the procedure
here conforms only to epistemological requirements; but a negative answer
is suggested insofar as the categories in question are for Descartes contami
nated by the source from which they are derived, and will shortly disappear
completely from the Cartesian system, taking on a wholly new significance.
13. Th e letter to Mersenne o f 15 April 1630 introduces both the term
metaphysics (and its associated philosophical issues) and the doctrine of the
creation o f the (mathematical) truths regarded as eternal (A T I, 144, 11.
4 and 15 ; and 145, 11. 7 ff).
14. See, respectively, letter to Mersenne o f 13 November 1639 (A T II,
622, 11. 13 - 1 6 ) , and Principles o f Philosophy (dedicatory letter: A T V IIIA ,
4 , 11. 36: C S M I, 192). See also the same distinction, in an extremely trun
cated form, in the letter to Elizabeth o f 28 Ju ne 1643: Metaphysical
thoughts, which exercise the pure intellect, help to familiarize us with the
notion o f the soul; and the study o f mathematics, which exercises mainly
NOTES TO PAGES 4 9 5 5 173
Chapter Four
1. Concerning these questions, one may consult the issue of Revue inter
nationale de philosophie 103 (1973), Etudes philosophiques et informa
tiques, including m y contribution, A propos de la smantique de la mth
ode (pp. 2748), on the Discourse.
2. Fo r an overview o f the indexing work on the Cartesian corpus, see
Bulletin cartsien III, in Archives de philosophie (1974), in particular the
contribution b y J.-R . Armogathe, pp. 453ff. See also Computers and Humani
ties 5 (19 7 1): 3 15 . Unfortunately, as o f 1990 there are still very few sources
available for this kind o f work: A. Robinet, Cogito 75, in Mditations mta
physiques: Texte dfinitif avec indexation automatise. . . (Paris, 1975); J.-R .
Armogathe and J .- L . M arion, Index des Regulae ad directionem ingenii de Ren
Descartes (Rome, 1976); and P.-A . Cahn, Index du Discours de la Mthode
de Ren Descartes. Compared to the situation for the works of Montaigne,
Pascal, Spinoza, Malebranche, Bacon, Bruno, or Kant, the fate o f the in
dexing efforts for the works o f Descartes is disappointing. T h e hopes of the
1970s have in this case not materialized. Nevertheless, add now Concordance
to Descartes Meditationes de prima Philosophia, prepared by K . M urafumi,
M . Sasaki, T . Nishimura (Hildesheim, 1996); and J.- L . M arion, J.-P . M as-
soni, P. Monat, L . Ucciani, Index des Meditationes de prima Philosophia de
R. Descartes (Besanon, 1996).
3. See the attempt by A. Robinet, and the philogrammes extracted from
the variants o f the text o f Malebranche, from edition to edition, particularly
NOTES TO PAGES 6 8 - 6 9 177
in Malebranche et Leibniz lordinateur: D e P IM yi M O N A D O 72,
Revue internationale de philosophie 103 (1973): 4956; Hypothse et con
firmation en histoire de la philosophie, Revue internationale de philosophie
(19 7 1): 119 -4 6 ; Premiers pas dans lapplication de linformatique ltude
des textes philosophiques, in 1 Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellet-
uale Europeo, edited by M arta Fattori and M. Bianchi (Rome, 1976); and
Ordo / ordre dans loeuvre de Malebranche, in 11 Colloquio Internazionale
del Lessico Intelletuale Europeo (Rome, 1979); and finally Res et nihil dans
Ethica 77, in I I P Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intelletuale Europeo
(Rome, 1982).
4. I am following the Saussurian terminology. T h e issue here is to deter
mine the linguistic value o f capable and then o f capax; i f the linguistic
values do not overlap, one may conclude that the meanings are not equiva
lent. B ut linguistic value itself can only be detected after the completion
o f a syntactic study: In all these cases what we find, instead o f ideas given
in advance, are values emanating from a linguistic system. I f we say that
these values correspond to certain concepts, it must be understood that the
concepts in question are purely differential. T h at is to say they are concepts
defined not positively, in terms o f their content, but negatively by contrast
with other items in the same system (Course in General Linguistics, trans
lated by Wade Baskin [London, 1974], part 2, chap. 4, p. 115 ) . This study
utilizes the same methodology as the translation according to the Cartesian
lexicon o f the Regulae, published as Rgles utiles et claires pour la direction
de l esprit ou la recherche de la vrit. T h is methodological option was dis
cussed and for the most part approved by G . Sebba in Retroversion and
the History o f Ideas: Jean -L u c M arions Translation o f the Regulae o f D es
cartes, Studia Cartesiana 1 (1979). See the approval, in spite o f a few reser
vations, given the present study by P. Costabel, Bulletin cartsien V I,
Archives de philosophie 40, no. 3 (1977): 293 1.
5. Gargantua, I, 20, in Oeuvres compltes, edited by G . Demerson (Paris,
1973), p. 94; translated by Donald M . Fram e (Berkeley, 19 91), p. 47 which
transcribes Horace exactly: Bring us bigger [capaciores] cups, m y boy (Ep-
odes, IX , 33; translated by David M ulroy, Horaces Odes and Epodes [Ann
Arbor, 1994]). L iv y also contributes to this oenological semantics by speak
ing o f an individual vini capacissimus (IX , 16, 13), who in other words
holds his wine well.
6. Brantme, Des dames, I, Discours V, Marguerite, reine de France et
de Navarre, in Oeuvres compltes, edited by M rim e (Paris, 1890), vol. 10,
p. 188.
7. Calvin, Institution chrtienne, III, p. 130 (15 4 1; reprint, Paris, 19 11 ) ,
and III, 7, 14 (1560 edition, in Corpus reformatorum, vol. 22, col. 188). See
also the texts cited by E. Huguet, Dictionnaire de la langue franaise du X V Ie
sicle (Paris, 1932).
NOTES TO PAGES 6 9 - 7 1
magna est, quo capax aeternorum. Neque enim illius aliquando non capax
erit, etiamsi numquam capiens fuerit (The soul is great in proportion to
its capacity for the eternal [quo capax aeternorum]. F o r even i f it never
attains to it, it never ceases to be capable o f it; translated by Irene Edmonds
[Kalamazoo, M ich., 1980], p. 148). All these confirm the equivalence be
tween capacitas and imago.
29. Respectively, Summa theologiae, Ilia , q. 9, a. 2, resp. (see ad 3m)
trans. (New York, 1966), vol. 49, p. 89 (modified); la Ilae, q. 1 1 3 , a. 10, c.
(trans., vol. 30, pp. 19899 [modified]), which again confirms the equiva
lence between capax Dei and ad imaginem (Dei).
30. T h e relation between capacitas and participatio is accomplished in
desire, understood in the sense o f the epektasis o f Gregory o f Nazianzus and
Saint Paul (see J. Danilou, Platonisme et thologie mystique [Paris, 1944],
pp. 309 ff.).
3 1. Contra gentes, I, 7; trans. (London, 1924), vol. 1, p. 14 (modified).
See the exposition o f the same thesis, without the explicit mobilization of
the concept o f capax Dei / capacitas, successively in: Summa theologiae, la
Ilae, q. 9 1, a. 4, resp.: homo ordinatur ad finem beatitudinis aeternae, quae
excedit proportionem naturalis facultatis humanae, ut supra habitum est
(man is designed for the goal o f eternal bliss, which exceeds the proportions
o f natural human faculties, as was held above; q. 5, a. 5 [this text, which
we examine below, uses capax]); Contra gentes, III, 148: Sed ulterius ultimus
finis hominis in quadam veritatis cognitione constitutus est, quae naturalem
facultatem ipsius excedit . . . Si igitur homo ordinatur in finem qui ejus
facultatem naturalem excedit, necesse est ei aliquod auxilium divinitus ad-
hiberi supernaturale per quod tendat ad finem (mans ultimate end is fixed
in a certain knowledge of truth which surpasses his natural faculty . . . I f
man is ordered to an end which exceeds his natural faculty, some help must
be divinely provided for him, in a supernatural way, by which he m ay tend
toward his end; The Summa Contra Gentiles [London, 1924], p. 147).
32. Respectively, Summa theologiae, la Ilae, q. 5, a. 5, ad 2m; trans., vol.
16, p. 13 3 ; and De malo, q. 5, a. 1; translated by John Oesterle (Notre Dame,
Ind., 1995), p. 2 1 1 . See also De veritate, q. 8, a. 3, ad 12m , which hierarchizes
the various degrees o f blessedness without taking into account ones power
to attain it.
33. Respectively, Summa theologiae, Ilia , q. 1, a. 3, ad 3m; trans., vol.
48, p. 19; then H a Ilae, q. 24, a. 3, resp.; trans., vol. 34, p. 43. We should
note the parallel with the clear opposition between capacitas and power in
Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, prol., pars 1, q. unica, n. 75: Igitur in hoc magis
dignificantur natura, quam si suprema sibi possibilis ponetur ilia natural is
[sc. perfectio]; nec mirum est, quod ad majorem perfectionem sit capacitas
passiva in aliqua natura, quam ejus causalitas activa se extendat (In this,
nature is much more dignified than if it is supposed to be the highest possible
n o t e s to pa g es 9 0 -9 1 183
were born men before we became Christians we cannot believe that anyone would
seriously embrace opinions which he thinks contrary to that right reason which
constitutes being a man, simply in order to cling to the faith which makes him
a Christian (Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, A T VIII, 2, 353, 1. 26354,
line 1) opposes faith and reason, favoring the latter, because it has admitted
the primacy of nature over grace forgetting, with the theologians of pure na
ture, that nature itself, as the first gift given to the believer, stems from the
single grace that is the filial adoption, comprised in the original recapitulation.
Similarly, in the Conversation with Burman, again: We must leave the latter
point for the theologians to explain. For the philosopher, it is enough to study
man as he is now in his natural condition (A T V, 159, 11. i6 ff).
4 1. T o Mersenne, M arch 1642, A T III, 54, 11. 1 1 17; emphasis added.
Descartes, in order to avoid any possibility o f confusion, clarifies: I have
said nothing about the knowledge o f God except what all the theologians
have said (544 , 11. 17 - 19 ) . We find the same gap between natural knowledge
and supernatural blessedness in the Letter to [Silhon], M arch -A p ril 1648,
A T V, 136, 1. 1 4 - 1 3 7 . See Rgles utiles et claires, pp. 296-98.
42. T o Descartes, 13 September 1637, A T I, 408, 11. 2 6 -28 .
43. Other mentions: the natural happiness reserved to the pagan phi
losopher (To Princess Elizabeth, 4 August 1645, A T IV, 267, 11. 2426);
with regard to the present life (T o Chanut, 1 February 1647, 608, 1. 4).
44. Respectively, Benedict of Canfeld, L a Rgle de perfection, II, 2, edited
by J . Orcibal (Paris, 1982), p. 290; Franois de Sales, Trait de l amour de
Dieu, III, 15 (edited by A. Ravier [Paris, 1969], p. 522; translated by John
K . Ryan [Rockford, 111., 1975], vol. 1, p. 199); Brulle, Discours de l tat et
des grandeurs de Jsus, V III, in Oeuvres compltes (edited by J.-P . Migne [Paris,
1856], col. 297), and Elvation sur sainte Madelaine, X III (ibid., col. 579).
45. Trait de la nature et de la grce, II, 18, in Oeuvres compltes, vol. 5,
pp. 79, 80. Note the hesitation between Je me communique tous les esprits
autant quils en sont capables; et par la Raison dont je les fais participants,
je les unis entre eux et mme avec mon Pre and notre force, notre capacit
vient de vous (Mditations chrtiennes et mtaphysiques, II, 13 and V , 19,
vol. 10, pp. 22, 56).
46. Principles on Nature and Grace, 1 (see 14); trans. (London, 1973),
p. 195.
Chapter Five
i. M artin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarie and
Edward Robinson (New York, 1962), 6, p. 46. German text at Sein und
Zeit, 24, 11. 2 2 -2 4 . See m y study L ego et le Dasein: Heidegger et la de
struction de Descartes dans Sein und Zeit, Revue de mtaphysique et de
morale 92, no. 1 (1987).
i8 6 NOTES TO PAGES 9 7 - 1 02
Chapter Six
1. Pascal, Penses, 597.
2. On the inclusion of metaphysics in its Cartesian embodiment in the
hierarchy of orders, see Marion, Sur le prisme mtaphysique de Descartes,
chap. 5, 22-24.
3. The question arises of exactly where, for instance, M. Gueroult thinks
he can juxtapose two characters of the ego that are, in my view, incompatible.
On the one hand, its absolute solipsism: I alone am known; I alone exist.
Do there exist other substances outside of me . . . I know not, I cannot
speak of this. On the other hand, a so-called universalism: One sees how
little this self is individual; for the I of the individual implies the you of
the other, that I exclude from myself certainly, insofar as I posit myself as
substance, but that I am positing, at the same time (outside of myself). One
sees by this to what extent Descartes is at the ends of a transcendental inter
subjectivity (Descartes Philosophy Interpreted according to the Order o f Rea
sons, vol. 1, p. 71). What we actually see is to what extent Gueroult is here
closer to Fichte than to Descartes, as is often the case elsewhere.
4. On the fundamental invisibility of what is not in the mode of objectiv
ity, see J.-L . Marion, L intentionalit de lamour, in Prolgomnes la
charit (Paris, 1986, 1991).
5. Respectively, Letter to Mersenne, 1 1 November 1640, A T III, 235,
11. 1 5 - 1 8 and 239, 1. 7.
6. See the clarification on this point in Marion, Sur la thologie blanche
de Descartes, pp. 319 23.
7. It is utterly remarkable that Pascal, without doubt purposely, used
and reversed the Cartesian example in Penses, 688: No longer does the ego
inspect men from above in search of identification, but on the contrary the
ego, from below and reduced to the rank of a seen self, withstands the gaze
of another ego, which it definitely is not. See Marion, Sur le prisme mtaphy
sique de Descartes, chap. 5, 24, pp. 344ff. G. B. Matthews has clearly estab
lished that in the episode of the hats and the coats that were (eventually)
animated, Descartes was not approaching the question of the otherness of
other people, but simply that of the animation or the pure mechanism of
bodies ( Descartes and the Problem of Other Minds, in Essays on Descartes
Meditations, edited by A. O. Rorty [Berkeley, 1986], pp. 14 152).
8. Besides, otherness or diversity does not directly concern souls or peo
ple (in the sense of the otherness of another person) but things, res a me
diversae (39, 1. 15; 40, 1. 2; 73, 11. 9 -10 ; 75, 11. 8-9), or substances (79, 1.
15); similarly, for separation (29, 1. 4) and exteriority (25, 1. 26; 38, 1. 12),
it is a question of simple nonidentity rather than a relationship between two
egos. As for an animated being, its otherness from the ego is mentioned only
ig2 NOTES TO PAGES 126-134
to be immediately refuted: do not require me to posit a source distinct
from myself (44, 11. 910).
9. For example, Recherche de la vrit, Eclaircissement X I, in Oeuvres com
pltes (Paris 1964), vol. 3, pp. i63ff. See the analysis in which Alqui brings
Descartes and Malebranche together on a point that seems to divide them,
in Le cartsianisme de Malebranche (Paris, 1974), pp. 9 1101. Conversely,
on the phenomenological difficulty of such a representation of the self,
see above, chapter 5 , 1.
10. See Marion, Sur le prisme mtaphysique de Descartes, chap. 2.
1 1. Besides, if the we reappears at the very conclusion of the Meditations,
it is precisely to point out its weakness: we must acknowledge the weakness
of our nature (90,11. 15 -16 ). The weakness of the we reciprocally underlines
the strength of the ego. The same analysis of the solitude of the ego and the
reduction of others could be conducted from the Discourse on the Method
and the Principia, probably with the same results.
12. Respectively, letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647, A T IV, 606, 1. 12;
605, 11. 2 0 -2 1; 6 0 2, 1. 27-603, line 1; and Principles o f Philosophy, IV, 190,
AT VIII, 1, 317, 11. 24-25.
13. Letter to Regius, May 1641, A T III, 372, 1. 12.
14. The Passions o f the Soul, 27 and 29, A T X I, 350, 11. 16, 18, 24.
15. Ibid., 79, A T X I, 3 8 7 , 11. 4 and 12; and 80, 3 8 7 , 11. 20-24. See also
letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647, A T IV, 603, 11. 912.
16. The Passions o f the Soul, 79, A T X I, 387, 11. 36. See 80, 387,
11. 18-24. On the relationship between the theoretical ego and the ego of
affection, see two different approaches: K . Hammacher, La raison dans la
vie affective et sociale selon Descartes et Spinoza, Les tudes philosophiques
(1984, no. 1); and, especially, Henry, Gnalogie de la psychanalyse, chaps.
1 and 2.
17. As stigmatized by D. Dubarle, this is, to say the least, a lacuna, a
serious lacuna in the Cartesian philosophy of the human other ( Ontologie
de la subjectivit, Revue de VInstitut Catholique de Paris [April-June 1988]:
126).
18. The Passions o f the Soul, 80, A T X I, 387, 11. 23-26, and 82, 389,
1. 17. See 79, join itself willingly to objects that appear to be agreeable to
it, things it deems bad, A T X I, 3 8 7 , 11. 4 -6 and 8. It is noteworthy that
love mobilizes first a representation and then a will, thereby mimicking the
two moments of the true theoretical judgment, as found in Meditation IV.
19. The Passions o f the Soul, 81, A T X I, 388, 11. 1 0 - 1 1 .
20. Ibid., 82, A T X I, 388, 1. 24389, 1. 6.
21. Letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647, A T IV, 6 11, 11. 34. See The
Passions o f the Soul, 81: to some object, whatever its nature may be, A T
X I, 388, 11. h 12; 82: Nor do we need to distinguish as many kinds of
NOTES TO PAGES I 3 5 - I 3 9 193
Chapter Seven
1. Respectively, Proslogion, I, edited and translated by J. Hopkins and H.
Richardson (Toronto, 1974). See the following: uncomplicated arguments
[vulgaribus argumentis] (Monologion, preface; ed., 7, 9); and the logic of
my argument [connexionem hujus meae argumentis] (Reply to Gaunilo, III,
133, 9); and Descartes, A T VII, 1 1 5 , 1. 22; see also A T VII, 6 5 , 1. 20. Here
I follow A. Koyr, for whom Anselms argument does not seem to be an
ontological proof in the exact sense of the term (L ide de Dieu dans la
philosophie de saint Anselme [Paris, 1923 and 1984], p. 193).
2. Meditatione de cognitione, Veritate et Ideis, in Die philosophischen
Schriften, edited by C. J. Gerhardt (Hildesheim, i960), vol. 4, p. 425.
194 NOTES TO PAGES 1 3 9 - 1 4 3
logie ancienne et mdivale 27 [1970]: 4off.). In his first scholarly work, Alqui
stressed and perfectly understood the critical and transcendental status of
the thought as applied to God: Saint Anselm does not intend to define
God in thought but outside thought. . . . God is defined not in thought but
by relation to it. He is defined as exterior to thought, or at least as constitut
ing for it a limit that cannot be crossed, as an obstacle to thought, some
thing that thought will be aware of as a limit, which it will run up against,
which will block it from proceeding further (L argument ontologique chez
saint Anselme: Les critiques de Gaunilon et Saint Thomas dAquin [diss.,
1929 ], pp. 17 -18 ).
24. See Reply to Gaunilo: (a) It is not rational to deny what one only
understands to some extent (aliquatenus): For is it reasonable for someone
to deny what he understands [and to do so] because it is said to be identical
with that which he denies because he does not understand? Or if he ever
denies something which to some extent he understands, and if that thing is
identical with something which he does not at all understand, is not what
is in question more easily proved about that which to some extent he under
stands than about that which he does not at all understand? Therefore, [on
the one hand] it cannot even be plausible for someone to deny any knowledge
of that than which a greater cannot be thought (which when he hears of,
he understands to some extent) because he denies any knowledge of God
(in no respect thinking the meaning of the word God). On the other hand,
if he denies any knowledge of God because he does not at all understand
[the meaning of the word God], then is it not easier to prove what in some
sense is understood than what is not at all understood? (VII, 136, 1. 25
137, 1. 3). (b) It is no more rational to accept only what one fully (penitus)
understands: But if you say that what is not fully understood is not under
stood and is not in the understanding, then say as well that someone who
cannot stand to gaze upon the most brilliant light of the sun does not see
daylight, which is nothing other than the suns light. Surely that than which
a greater cannot be thought is understood and is in the understanding to
the extent that the above statements are understood about it (Reply to Gau
nilo, I, 132, 5-9).
25. Reply to Gaunilo, VIII, 137 (27; see 14 ,18 ). Gilson stressed this point:
Saint Anselm simply said that taking a look at things was enough to permit
making the conjecture of quo maius cogitari nequit, and that starting from
this notion, even if it is only conjectural, the proof could be developed com
pletely (op. cit., p. 8; see also p. 56). A. Koyr also admits that the proof
starts from an indirect concept and is not expressing the essence of God
and remains an indirect demonstration (op. cit., pp. 2 0 1 - 2 ) . Similarly, J.
Paliard writes: God resembles nothing else, belongs to no other conceptual
classification. The idea of God must be understood in an entirely different
way: not the essence being offered to the gaze of man, but the designation
NO TES TO P AG E 1 5 1 1 99
graeca, vol. 44, p. 377, A, edited by Danilou, S C I bis [Paris, 1987], p. 210;
translated by Abraham J. Malherbe and Everett Ferguson [New York, 1978],
p. 95); Dionysius: I f only we lacked sight and knowledge so as to see, so
as to know, unseeing and unknowing, that which lies beyond all vision and
knowledge. For this would be really to see and to know; to praise the Tran
scendent One in a transcending way, namely through the denial of all beings
(Mystical Theology, II, PG, vol. 3, p. 1025 A; translated by Colm Luibheid
[New York, 1987], p. 138); Augustine: We are talking about God, so why
be surprised if you cannot grasp it? I mean: if you can grasp, it isnt God
(Sermo 117 , 5, P L , vol. 38, col. 663; trans., vol. 3 part 4, p. 2 11); Is He
perhaps to be sought even when found? For things incomprehensible must
be investigated, lest one think he has found nothing, when he has been able
to find how incomprehensible that is which he was seeking. Why then does
he so seek, if he comprehends that which he seeks to be incomprehensible
. . . ? (De trinitate, X V , 2, 2; trans., p. 199). This tradition is continued
by Nicholas of Cusa ( that which satisfies the intellect, or that which is its
end, is not that which the intellect understands. Nor can that which the
intellect utterly does not understand satisfy it, but only that which it under
stands by not understanding; . . . only the intelligible which the intellect
knows to be so intelligible that this intelligible can never be fully known can
satisfy the intellect, De visione dei, X V I; Philosophisch-theologische Schriften,
edited by L . Gabriel; German translation by D. and W. Dupr [Vienna,
1967], vol. 3, p. 166; translated by H. Lawrence Bond [New York, 1977],
pp. 26667) and Descartes ( the idea of the infinite, if it is to be a true idea,
cannot be grasped at all, since the impossibility of being grasped is contained
in the formal definition of the infinite, A T VII, 368, 11. 24).
28. Proslogion, V, 10 4 , 1. 9. See the following instances: Therefore You
are truly . . . whatever it is better to be than not to be (XI, 110 , 11. 1-3 );
and Is there anyone, for example even if he does not believe in the real
existence of what he conceives who is unable to think that if there is some
thing good which has a beginning and an end, then that good is much better
which has no end though having a beginning. And just as the latter is
better than the former, so something having neither beginning nor end is
better still (Reply to Gaunilo, VIII, 137, 18-22); or For we believe about
the Divine Substance whatever, absolutely speaking, can be thought to be
better than its contradictory. For example, it is better to be eternal than not
to be eternal, better to be good than not to be good or rather, to be good
ness itself than not to be goodness (Reply, X , 139, 11. 3-6). We should
therefore proceed carefully when speaking of a movement of thought to
ward an optimum and a maximum posited as the Absolute (P. Vignaux,
Structure et sens du Monologion, Revue des sciences philosophiques et tho-
logiques 31 [1947]: 2 1 1 ; reprinted in De saint Anselme a Luther [Paris, 1976],
p. 95); here we must not distinguish between the two terms, but we note
NOTES TO PAGES I 5 2 - 1 5 4 201
that neither of them appears in Anselms text. Koyr introduces, somewhat
carelessly, an Ens perfectissimum that one would be hard pressed to locate in
the text (op. cit., pp. 41, 43-44, 46-47), since neither summe perfectum nor
perfectissimum seems to appear even once in Anselms text (according to G.
R. Evans, A Concordance to the Works o f St. Anselm [New York, 1984], vol.
3, p. 1032; and Opera omnia, edited by F. S. Schmitt, vol. 6: Index generalis
personarum et rerum, p. 275). This confirms my hypothesis in Sur le prisme
mtaphysique de Descartes, pp. 26ff.
29. Proslogion, X IV , n i , 11. 89. The same reduction is encountered
elsewhere: No one denies that God is the highest good, since something
that is less than something else is by no means God, and anything that is
not the highest good is less than something else since it is less than the
highest good (Epistula de incarnatione Verbi, VIII, 22, 11. 2426); or Just
as from the highest good nothing comes except goodness and all goodness
is from the highest good, so too from the highest essence nothing comes
except essence, and all essence is from the highest essence. Hence, since the
highest good is the highest essence, it follows that all goodness is essence
and all essence is good (De casu diaboli, I, 2 3 4 , 1. 292 3 5 , 1. 3). Here minus/
majus (less/more) are to be understood explicitly starting from summum,
(highest) and summum starting from bonum (good).
30. The indeterminacy of that than which a greater cannot be thought
left to itself is made clear when it is confused, which is actually inevitable,
with a simple greater than all things [majus omnibus] ; thus Anselm firmly
rejects this error of Gaunilo (Reply, V, 134, pp. 24ff.; see above, note 21).
On the contrary, the principle that nothing is greater or better than God
(Cur Deus homo, I, 13; translated by Eugene Fairweather [Philadelphia,
1956], p. 181): It [Gods mercy] cannot be conceived to be greater or more
just ; see II, 20) should be specified with precise attributes, such as justice
( You are so just that you cannot be thought to be more just, Proslogion,
X I, 109, line n ) and clemency ( You are more clement than I could ever
imagine, Oratio, XIV, 56, 29-30) or kindness ( God is so kind . . . that
nothing kinder can be conceived, Cur Deus homo, 1, 12, 70, 7; trans., p. 121).
31. See chap. VI, 104, 1. 20; chap. IX , 107, 1. 10, and 108, 1. 12; chap.
X IV , i n , 1. 9 ( highest of all things, than which nothing better can be
thought ; translated by Thomas Williams [Indianapolis, 1995], p. 108 [mod
ified]), chap. X V III, 1 1 4 , 1. 21. This same principle is repeated in chap. XI,
n o , 1. 2. The occurrences of melius are inventoried in G. R. Evans, op. cit.,
vol. 2, pp. 852ff. (p. 8i9 ff for majus).
32. Summe bonus: chap. IX , 107, 1. 20, and chap. X , 109, 1. 5. Summum
bonum: chap. X X II, 117 , line 1, and X X III, 117 , 1. 5 (appearing as the
complete, one, total, and unique good ; trans., p. 114).
33. Respectively chap. X X IV , 11. 2526; chap. X X V I, 1 2 1 , 11. 9 -10 ; and
chap. X X V , 118 , 1. 17.
202 NOTES TO PAGE 15 5
34. Monologion, X V , 29, 18-20. See also chaps. X X V I-X X V II. Here
Anselm follows Augustine (De trinitate, V, 2, 3; VI, 5, 7; and VII, 5, 10)
and Boethius: Relation for instance cannot be predicated at all of God; for
substance in Him is not really substantial, but supersubstantial (De trinitate,
IV, edited by H. F. Stewart, E. K. Rand, and S. J. Tester [Cambridge,
1978], p. 16; trans. [Cambridge, 1946], p. 17). He also anticipates Thomas
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, la, q. 29, a. 3, obj. 3 and ad. 4. On this question,
see a few indications in Koyr, op. cit., p. 172; and Marion, Sur le prisme
mtaphysique de Descartes, p. 23off.
35. Curiously, F. S. Schmitt (op. cit., p. 102, n.) quotes Monologion,
L X X X , 86, 19 - 2 1, for majus, where it is not mentioned, as well as Mono-
logion, X V, 29, 17 - 2 1, which precisely uses only melius and melior, just as
the texts by Augustine and Boethius that I have cited. Seneca, a non-
Christian author, is the only one among the texts cited to confirm the majus:
What is God? The mind of the universe, all that you see and all that you
do not see. Let his greatness be held to account, that than which nothing
greater can be thought [nihil majus excogitari potest], he alone is above all,
he maintains his work both within and without (Naturales quaestiones, I,
Praefatio, in Oeuvres compltes, edited by M. Nisard [Paris, 1877], p. 391).
This is the best indication that Anselms theoretical decision simply went
unnoticed. Other authors cite the texts that privilege the use of melius, al
though they never seem to detect the importance of this decision: A. Daniels,
Quellenbeitrge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gottesbeweise
im dreizehnten Jahrhundert, mit besonderer Bercksichtigung des Argu
ments im Proslogion des heiligen Anselm, Beitrge zur Geschichte der Philo
sophie des Mittelalters 8, nos. 1 - 2 (1909). See also J. Chatillon, De Guil
laume dAuxerre saint Thomas dAquin: L argument de saint Anselme
chez les premiers scolastiques du XHIe sicle, in Spicilegium Beccense I ;
Alqui: Quo nihil majus, Saint Augustine said, Quo nihil melius. Saint
Anselms majus is more vague, more undetermined, op. cit., p. 17; K . Barth,
op. cit., pp. 65 and 75; N. Malcom, in The Ontological Argument: From
Anselm o f Canterbury to Contemporary Philosophers, edited by A. Plantiga
(New York, 1965), p. 142; J. Vuillemin, op. cit., p. 157; W. L. Gombocz,
whose argument follows that of Vuillemin (Zu Semantik des Existenzprdi
kates und der ontologischen Arguments f r Gottes Existenz von Anselm von Can
terbury [Vienna, 1974]); and even K . Kienzier (Glauben und Denken bei An
selm von Canterbury [Freiburg, 1981]). It is true that H. U. Von Balthasar
and P. Gilbert clearly pointed out the primacy of summum bonum in the
Monologion, as well as its Augustinian origin, but they unfortunately do not
pursue the same reasoning for melius in the Proslogion (respectively, Herrlich
keit, II, op. cit., p. 255; and Dire l ineffable: Lecture du Monologion de saint
Anselme [Paris, 1984], p. 63fr.). As for R. Brecher, although he clearly made
the distinction between majus and melius ( Anselm was generally careful to
NOTES TO PAGE 156 203
distinguish between them ) and identifies the latter with the sovereign good
even in the Proslogion ( This distinction between Gods ontological suprem
acy and his goodness is retained throughout the Proslogion ), in the end he
only considers melius to be a gloss for majus ( Greatness in Anselms Onto
logical Argument, Philosophical Quarterly 24/95: 97, 98).
36. Respectively P L, vol. 32, col. 735 (C SE L, vol. 32, p. 145; and BA,
vol. 13 [Paris, 1962], p. 588, noted by F. S. Schmitt, op. cit.); then P L, vol.
34, col. 22 (mentioned by F. S. Schmitt, op. cit.; and J. Vuillemin, op. cit.,
p. 93); and P L, vol. 32, col. 1355 (cited by Koyre, op. cit., p. 17 2 ^ 3; and
by J. Vuillemin, op. cit., p. 17, without commentary); finally, cited edition,
p. 276. See also the parallel with: nothing is better than God himself and
It is therefore to be wished that men would bring to these inquiries such
a clear intellectual perfection as might enable them to see the highest good,
that than which nothing is better or higher, next in order to which comes
a rational soul in a state of purity and perfection (De moribus Manichaeorum,
I, 1 1 , 19, then II, 1, 1; P L , vol. 32, cols. 1319 and 1345; trans. [Grand
Rapids, Mich., 1983], vol. 4, p. 69). Or even: the highest good is that than
which there is nothing higher. But God is good and than Him nothing can
be higher. God is therefore the highest good (De duabus animabus contra
Manichaeos, V III, 10; P L, vol. 42, col. 10 1; trans. [Grand Rapids, Mich.,
1983], vol. 4, p. 101). Or still: the highest good, than which there is nothing
higher, is God (De natura boni contra Manichaeos, I; P L, vol. 42, col. 551;
trans. [Grand Rapids, Mich., 1983], vol. 4, p. 351). For reference, let us
mention Cicero as a possible non-Christian source: there is nothing supe
rior to the universe, there is nothing more excellent or more beautiful. Not
only is there nothing better, but nothing better can even be thought (De
natura deorum, II, 7 , 1. 18; translated by Horace C. P. McGregor [Harmonds-
worth, England, 1972], p. 131). But if melius corrects Senecas majus, it nev
ertheless remains in the same cosmological dimension.
37. Boethius, op. cit., p. 276. Obviously, the use of the formula than
which nothing better can be thought continues after Anselm. Let us cite,
for instance, Saint Bernard: What is God? That than which nothing better
can be thought (De consideratione, V, 7; P L , vol. 182, col. 797 A); William
of Saint-Thierry: We call that highest of all than which nothing is greater,
nothing better or For nothing is better than charity, nothing more perfect
than charity, just as nothing is better than charity, so too is nothing more
pleasing than charity (De trinitate, respectively I, 1 1 and III, 2, then 3; PL,
vol. 196, cols. 896 and 9 17 -18 ); Livre des X X I V Philosophes: God is that
than which nothing better can be thought (chap. V, edited by F. Hudrey
[Paris, 1989], p. 104, which shows the parallels with the texts of Augustine);
or even Mersenne, whoever apprehends the best necessarily conceives an
actual being; for in understanding the best, the soul conceives that than
which nothing better is or can be (Quaestiones in Genesim, chap. 1, q. 1, v.
NOTES TO PAGES 1 5 7 - 1 5 9
i, ratio, V [Paris, 1623], fol. 35, who cites Proslogion, II, III, IV, V, and
X V ); and explicitly Anselms definition: God is that than which nothing
greater can be thought (ibid., fol. 37).
38. Dionysius, Mystical Theology, II; PG, vol. 3, 1025a (see above, note
27). This thesis was developed at length by P. Evdokimov, L aspect apo-
phatique de largument de saint Anselme, in Spicilegium Beccense I, particu
larly p. 239 and pp. 249ff.
39. Respectively, A T VII, 368, 11. 2 -4 ; and Monologion, L X IV , 75, 11.
n -12 .
Index
Adam, Charles, 71 revelation, 4; on man capax Dei, 87,
Alqui, Ferdinand: on Anselms onto 89; Wiggers criticism of, 92
logical argument, 1980. 23; on causal Aristotle: Baillet comparing Descartes
ity in the Discourse, 3 1, i68n. 17; on with, i66n. 5; Descartes adopting psy
the cogito in the Discourse, 23, 32, 37; chological terminology of, 44; Des
on the Discourse and metaphysics, 23, cartes generosity compared with
24, 26, 3 1, 37-38 , 39, i67n. 8, i68n. magnificence of, 189ml. 19, 2 1,
12, ln. 18; on the dreams of the i9on. 22; on ideas, 43, 46, i72n. 4;
Olympica, 162ml. 6, 7; on immediacy on metaphysics, 26, i68n. 13; simple
of the cogito, i88n. 16; on metaphys natures and categories of, 1720. 12;
ics as absent from the Regulae, 49, on thought as activity, 36; on truth
i73n. 15; on substantiality of the expressing a meaning o f being, 36
soul, i7on. 23 Armogathe, J.-R ., i63n. 13, 17m . 2,
animal sensation, 106, i88n. 14 i76n. 2
Anselm, Saint: concept of divine es Arnauld, Antoine, 33
sence in ontological argument of, Aubenque, P., i68n. 13
14 5 - 5 1; Descartes ontological argu Augustine, Saint: capax Dei in Augus-
ments compared with, 15859; Hegel tinian theology, 8 5 -9 1; on faith and
on ontological argument of, 144-45; reason, I95n. 19; on God as sub
love as foundation of ontological argu stance, 202n. 34; on incomprehensibil
ment of, 157; ontological argument as ity of God, 200n. 27
characterized by, 139; ontological ar auto-affection: Descartes on the soul
gument as not ontological, 15860; affecting itself, 108-9; generosity as,
relation of Gods existence and es 112 ; thought as auto-effective for
sence in ontological argument of, Henry, 1057
15 1- 5 6 axioms, 53
a posteriori proof for existence of God,
27, 28-29, 6 1-6 2 Baillet, Adrien, 3-4 , 8, 18, 22, i66n. 5
appetite, 90, i83n. 36 Baius, 91
a priori proof for existence of God, 27, Balthasar, H. U. Von, i9n. 25, 202n.
29 35
Aquinas, Thomas: on Anselms ontolog Barth, Karl, i96n. 20
ical argument, 147-48; on blessed Being: Anselms hierarchy of, 149; in
ness, 90, 93; on dreams from divine Anselms ontological argument, 1 5 1 -
2 q6 INDEX
Being (continued) Cartesian circle, 60
56, 159; in the cogito, 96-97; Leibniz Cassirer, Ernst, I70n. 26
on necessary Being in ontological ar causality: as absent from the Discourse,
gument, 14 344; in Malebranches 2 9 -3 1, 4 1, i68nn. 15, 17; causa sui,
ontological argument, 142-43. See 27, 28, 29-30, 158, i68n. 14; God
also ontology as efficient and total cause, 39 -4 1,
Benedict of Canfield, 94 I70n. 28; other minds as free causes,
Bergson, Henri, ign. 21 137-38
Berkeley, George, 35 causa sui, 27, 28, 2930, 158, i68n. 14
Bernard, Saint, 203n. 37 certainty: of the cogito, 34; in Des
Brulle, Pierre de, 95 cartes search for a path in life, 12;
Beyssade, J.-M ., 167ml. 7, 9, 169m 17, of perception, 106
i8 8 n .16 charity, 138, 157, i93n. 28
blessedness: Baius on, 91; finite versus Charron, Pierre, i63n. 15
infinite, 90, 92-93; human capacity Chatillon, J., 202n. 35
for, 88-89, 9 Cicero, i62n. 8, 203n. 36
Bloch, O., 69 Clauberg, Johannes, 139
bodies: corporeal ideas, 44; as reducible clear and distinct ideas, 36
to simple natures, 47. See also exten cogitatio. See thought
sion; shape; movement cogito, ergo sum: common simple na
Boethius, 156, 202n. 34 tures in, 50, 58, 175m 27; in the Dis
Bouillier, F ., 167ml. 6, 7 course, 23, 24, 3237, 38; elements o f
Brecher, R., 202n. 35 in dreams of the Olympica, 17; ele
Brossaeus, P., 163m 13 ments of in the Regulae, 50; ethical
implications of, 1 17 ; as first princi
capable/capacit: change in meaning ple, 34, 40, i69n. 22; generosity in
of, 68-69; correspondence with nonrepresentational interpretation of,
capax/capacitas, 70, 77, 81; in the m - 1 7 ; Hegel on ontological argu
Discourse, 7 0 -7 1, 72, 74; in the Medi ment and the, 14445, i95nn. 16, 17;
tations, 83-85; in Passions o f the Soul, Heidegger on Being in, 9697; Hei
72, 75, 77; posse as Latin translation deggers intentional interpretation of,
of, 7 7 -8 1; in The Search for Truth, 9 9 -10 1; Henrys nonintentional inter
7 1 72, 76, 77; in seventeenth-century pretation of, 10 5 -7 , i88n. 13; Hus
philosophy, 94-95; shift of meaning serls intentional interpretation of,
in works of Descartes, 8 1-8 5 97-99; intellectual simple natures in,
capax/capacitas: capax Dei in Augustin- 50, I75n. 27; intentional and repre
ian theology, 8 5 -9 1; correspondence sentational interpretations of, 9 7-10 5;
with capable / capacit, 70, 77, 8 1; in Kants representational interpreta
the Discourse, 72, 74, 80, I79n. 18; as tion of, 10 2 -3 , 187m 10; and other
implying a gift, 86; Latin semantics minds, 12 0 -2 1; as performative in
of, 69-70, 178m 13; in the Medita the Meditations, 33, 58
tions, 83-85; in Passions o f the Soul, common sense, 44, 45
72, 75, 77, 80; posse used in place of, common simple natures (notions): in
7781; as reduced to power, 8991, the cogito, 50, 58, i75n. 27; defined,
93-95; in The Search for Truth, 72, 48; in eternal truths, 53; in mathemat
76, 77, i79n. 18 ics, 52; and metaphysics, 55; Princi
Carraud, V ., i3n. 13 ples o f Philosophy on, 59; in Second
INDEX 207
Meditation, 58-59; types of, 48. See of, 3 1- 3 2 , 16911. 19; doubt in, 2 2 -2 3,
also logical common simple natures; 24, 25, 38; explicitly metaphysical in
real common simple natures tention of, 2427; Gods attributes
Compline, hymn of, i 6zn. 10 in, 27-28, 39-40; metaphysical situa
Concordance to Descartes Meditationes tion of, 20-42; method and metaphys
de prima Philosophia (Murafumi, Sa ics in, 20-24, 42; as middle term
saki, and Nishimura), iy6n. 2 between Regulae and Meditations, 2 0 -
consciousness: as affected, 1; as auto 2 1; Principles o f Philosophy antici
effective for Henry, 105; as inten pated by, 25; proofs for the existence
tional for Husserl, 97; reason affect of God in, 2 7-32; and solitude of the
ing, 1 - 2 ; redoubled intentionality of ego, i92n. 1 1 ; on theology, i63n. 13;
self-consciousness, 98-99. See also as transition, 37-42; universality of
thought method of, 2 1, i66n. 3
Conversation with Burman (Descartes), doubt: in the Discourse, 23, 24, 25, 38;
i84n. 40, i86n. 7 in the Discourse and the Meditations,
corporeal ideas, 44 2 2 -2 3; indubitability as criterion of
Corpus omnium veterum poetarum belief for Descartes, 12 13; f intel
latinorum (Brossaeus), 10, i63n. 13 lectual simple natures, 60, i75n. 28;
Costabel, P., i77n. 4 and the material simple natures, 56 -
(Nottingham, John, i76n. 34 57; in the Meditations, 55; and repre
Courcelles, Etienne de, 26, 70, 7 1, 78, 80 sentational interpretation of the cog
Crapulli, G ., i76n. 32 ito, 10 1
Curley, E. M ., 17 m . 2 dreams: dreaming as mode of thought
(cogitatio), 17; thought as occurring
Dalferth, I. U ., 199m 25 in, 15; and truth in the Meditations,
Daniels, A., 202n. 35 15 -16
death of God, 145, 160 dreams of the Olympica, 1 19; authen
demented, the, 1 2 1 22 ticity of, i62n. 6; in Descartes philos
Democritus, i62n. 8 ophy, 2 -3 ; as dreams not visions, 8;
Descartes, Ren: Cartesianism as mate elements of the cogito in, 17; enthu
rial phenomenology for Henry, 105, siasm as not the cause of, 3 -5 , 18;
117 ; computerized indexing of works God as not the source of, 4; rele
of, 67, i70n. 2; as founder of modern vance of, 13; religious aspects of, 1 8 -
idealism, 43; Suarez as influence on, 19; as requiring interpretation, 8; the
91, 92; as theologian of pure nature, revelation of, 16; self-interpretation
9 195. See also works by name of, 714; theoretical significance of,
desire, 87, 88 5 -7 ; thought {cogitatio) awakened by,
Desmarets, Henri, 7 1, i78n. 14 14 - 19
Dionysius, 157, 200n. 27 Dubarle, D., i92n. 17
Discourse on Method (Descartes): Duns Scotus, i82n. 33
capable / capacit in, 7 0 -7 1, 72, 74; duration, 61
capax/capacitas in, 72, 74, 80, I79n.
18; causality as absent from, 3 0 -3 1, ecstasy: in auto-affections of the soul,
41, i68nn. 15, 17; the cogito of, 23, 1 0 9 - 1 1; in Heideggers intentional in
24, 3237, 38; continuity with the terpretation of the cogito, 100, xoi; in
Meditations, 2 2-2 3, i67n. 7; Desc Husserls intentional interpretation of-
artes on shortcomings of metaphysics the cogito, 98, 99; in representa-
2 o8 INDEX
ecstasy (continued) contrasted with, 93; and reason for
tional interpretations of the cogito, Anselm, 146, 195a. 19
103, 105 falsity: Descartes rejecting middle
ego: as center of any possible world, ground between truth and, 12; proba
119 ; in dreams of the Olympica, 17, bility equated with by Descartes, 13
19; Ichspaltung of Husserl and Hei Fontialis, 139
degger, 99, 100, i86n. 5; in inten Franois de Sales, 94-95
tional and representational interpreta Frankfurt, H. G ., i73n. 19
tions of the cogito, 99105; and love, free will, 19
13 1- 3 8 ; material simple natures as Freud, Sigmund, 2, i6 in . 4
subordinated to, 61; as objectifying Froimond, L ., 92, 93
the other, 12 5-2 9 ; real common sim
ple natures as subordinated to, 61; Gaunilo, i96n. 2 1, 197m 23, 20m. 30
solitude as conceptually necessary Gnalogie de la psychanalyse (Henry),
state of, 12 9 -3 1; as thinking sub i88n. 13
stance, 32, 34 -35, 57, 58-59, i69n. generosity: and Aristotles magnifi
23. See also cogito, ergo sum cence, 189ml. 19, 2 1, i9on. 22; as
egoism, 1 1 8 - 2 1 auto-affection, 112 ; the cogito inter
enthusiasm: as not the cause of dreams preted in terms of, i n 17; as de
of the Olympica, 3 - 5 , 18; radical cri pending on esteem, h i , 112 ; ethical
tique of, 17 - 1 8 ; as relegated to imagi primacy of, 112 ; as modifying the
nation, 18 manner of being, 116 ; object of, 1 1 2
equality, 52, 59 13; ontic implications of, 1 1 5 - 1 7 ;
Essays (Descartes), 2 1, 48 and thought, 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; well-being as
essence: and existence in ontological determined by, 116
argument, 140-60; as linked to exis genius malignus: in the Meditations, 22,
tence by simple natures, 63 23; in Olympica and Meditations, 15,
esteem: as a cogitatio, 114 ; as defined 165m 23
in terms of value, 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; generosity Geometry (Descartes), 21
as depending on, 1 1 1 , 112 ; and love, Gibson, A. Boyce, 22, i66n. 5
134; object of, 11 3 Gilbert, P., 202n. 35
eternal truths, 53, 55 Gilson, Etienne, 22, 3 0 - 3 1, I07n.
evil spirit. See genius malignus 12, i7on. 23, i90n. 20, i98n. 25
existence: as common simple nature, Goclenius, Rudolf, 4, 139
48, 58, 59, 63; and essence in ontolog God: a posteriori proof for existence of,
ical argument, 140-60; as linked to 27, 2829, 6 162; a priori proof for
essence by simple natures, 63; neces existence of, 27, 29; as within the
sary link with thought, 59 bounds of rationality, 62; capacitas
extension: as not attributable to God, Dei, 85; capax Dei in Augustinian the
i75n. 3 1; passivity of, 179m 2 1; as ology, 8 5 -9 1; contemplation of, 94;
simple nature, 47, 52, 54, 56, 60; as death of God, 145, 160; deceiving
subsumed under the ego, 61 God o f the Meditations, 22, 23; Des
cartes definition of, 142; Descartes
faith: in Anselms ontological argu on three marvels of, 19; the Discourse
ment, 145-46; Descartes as favoring on the attributes of, 2728, 39-40;
reason over, i85n. 40; lumen naturale as efficient and total cause, 39 -4 1,
INDEX 209
1 7011. 28; existence proofs in the Dis of, 10 5 -7 , i88n. 13; on thoughts in
course, 2732; extension as not attrib determinacy in the cogito, 97
utable to, i75n. 3 1; as infinite sub human nature, capax Dei and the para
stance, 30, 62, 130; intellectual simple dox of, 85-91
natures as relevant to, 64; logical com Husserl, Edmund: intentional interpre
mon simple natures as relevant to, tation of the cogito of, 97-99; and other
64; love of, 135; love o f leading to minds, 129, 136; on redoubled inten-
love of others, 138; natural reason tionality of self-consciousness, 9899
attaining knowledge of, 9293; as
nonmeasurable, 65; and other minds, Ichspaltung, 99, 100, i86n. 5
12 7-2 8 , 12930; power of, 85; prop idealism, Descartes as modern founder
erties as expressible by real common of, 43
simple natures, 63; as thinking, 64; as \J ideas: as belonging to imagination, 44,
transcending material and intellectual 46; clear and distinct ideas, 36; corpo
simple natures, 63; as transcending real ideas, 44; for Descartes, 4346;
scientific thought, 40; the will as rela as figures, 44, 46, 17 m . 3; as form,
tional mode between Descartes and, 45; of God in ontological argument,
19. See also ontological argument 14 1; innate ideas, I72n. 7; in the
Gombocz, W. L ., 202n. 35 Meditations, 45-46; the mind as hav
good will, 1 1 3 - 1 4 ing the potential to produce, 84; in the
Gouhier, Henri, 1621m. 6, 7 Regulae, 43-44, 46; as thought, 45-46,
grace: and knowledge of God through I72n. 7. See also representation
natural reason, 92; and nature, 86, imagination: enthusiasm as relegated
87, i85n. 40 to, 18; ideas as belonging to, 44, 46;
Gregory o f Nazianzus, 87, i82n. 30 and material simple natures, 48, 49
Gregory o f Nyssa, i99n. 27 Index des Meditationes de prima Philo-
Gueroult, Martial, i74n. 25, i87n. 10, sophia de R. Descartes (Marion, Masso-
19m . 3 ni, Monat, and Ucciani), i76n. 2
Index des Regulae ad directionem ingenii
de Ren Descartes (Armogathe and
Hamelin, O., i7n. 8 Marion), i76n. 2
happiness, 116 Index du Discours de la Mthode de
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: and Ren Descartes (Cahn), i7n. 2
Anselm on faith and reason, 146; on infinite, the: God as infinite substance,
ontological argument and the cogito, 30, 62, 130; as incomprehensible, 62
144-45, i95nn. 16, 17; ontological Ingarden, R., i86n. 5
argument attributed to Descartes innate ideas, 172m 7
by, i94n. 4 intellectual joy, 109
Heidegger, Martin: on Being in the intellectual simple natures: as absent in
cogito, 96-97; Descartes rejection of the Meditations, 55; in the cogito, 50,
formulation of cogito of, 104; inten i75n. 27; defined, 48; and doubt, 60,
tional interpretation of the cogito of, i75n. 28; God as transcending, 63;
9 9 -10 1 linking with real common simple na
Henry, Michel: on Cartesianism as ma tures, 59, 66; metaphysical function
terial phenomenology, 105, 117 ; non- of, 58; metaphysics and understand
intentional interpretation of the cogito ing associated with, 49, 52; objects of
2 10 INDEX
intellectual simple natures (continued) logical common simple natures: and
metaphysics as, 64; the Regulae as the cogito, 175m 27; defined, 48; as
passing over, 60; as relevant to God, relevant to God, 64
64; in Second Meditation, 5758 Loretto, pilgrimage to, 18, 19, 164.
intentionality: difficulties with inten 17
tional interpretations of the cogito, love: in Anselms ontological argument,
I03~5; as fundamental property of 157; and charity, 138; concupiscent
consciousness for Husserl, 97; Hei and benevolent, 134; defined, 132;
deggers intentional interpretation of the egos claim to be the focus of,
the cogito, 9 9 -10 1; Husserls inten 118 ; formal univocity of, 134 -35 ,
tional interpretation of the cogito, 9 7- i92n. 2 1; forms of, 134 -3 5 ; f God,
99; redoubled intentionality o f self- 135; and other minds, 13 1 - 3 8 ; as a
consciousness, 98-99 passion, 1 3 1; representation of object
intersubjectivity, 12 1, 13 1 , 136 of, 135; and res cogitans, 132, 133,
intuitus. See knowledge by intuition i74n. 24; the will in, 132, i92n. 18
Lubac, H. de, i8on. 24, ig8n. 26
joy, intellectual, 109 lumen naturale, 93
Luynes, duc de, 83
Kant, Immanuel: Anselm and transcen
dental method of, 147, i96n. 2 1, madmen, 1 2 1-2 2 , 123
I97n. 22; on Leibnizian ontological Malebranche, Nicolas: capacit as
argument, 144; ontological argument used by, 95; Cartesian metaphysical
as defined by, 140; ontological argu situation as paradigmatic for, 35; love
ment as used by, 139; representa as defined by, 136; on ontological ar
tional interpretation of the cogito of, gument, 14 2-4 3; on our idea of our
10 2 -3 , i87n. 10 own soul, 126, i92n. 9; Robinets
Kienzler, K ., 202n. 35 analysis of texts of, I76n. 3
Viknowledge by intuition (intuitus)'. the Maritain, Jacques, i6 in . 2, i6sn. 23
i cogito as, 50; and other minds, 120, material simple natures: in classifica
12 4 -2 5 tion of simple natures, 48; in First,
Kohlenberger, M ., i99n. 25 Fifth, and Sixth Meditations, 53-57,
Koyre, Alexandre, I93n. 1, 20m . 28 i74n. 23; God as transcending, 63; in
mathematics, 49, 52; the sciences as
La Brosse, Pierre de, i63n. 13 dealing with, 49; in Second Medita
Lefevre, Henri, 22, i67n. 8, 17 m . 30 tion, 59-60; as subordinated to the
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 47, 95, ego, 61
136, 139, 14 3-4 4 mathematics: in First Meditation, 54;
Lessius, 91 and material simple natures, 49, 52,
letters of 1630 (Descartes): God recog 57; metaphysics distinguished from,
nized as infinite in, 39; on mathemati I72n. 14; as subordinate to metaphys
cal truths, 5 1- 5 2 , I72n. 13; on mathe ics, 55; truths of as created, 5 1-5 2 ,
matics as subordinate to metaphysics, i72n. 13
55; on simple natures as metaphysi mathesis universalis: egoism as practical
cal, 53; term metaphysics intro consequence of, 119 ; God as beyond
duced in, 51, i72n. 13 the bounds of, 63; and metaphysics,
Liard, L ., 22, i66n. 5 63-65; order and measurement in,
^linguistic value, 177m 4 6465; and pura atque abstracta
INDEX 211
mathesis of Fifth Meditation, 56; sim tures as objects of, 49, 64; mathemat
ple natures specifying conditions of, ics distinguished from, i72n. 14; and
48 mathesis universalis, 6365; the Medi
Matthews, G. B., 19m . 7 tations as metaphysical, 65-66; Medi
measurement, 6465 tations as norm for Descartes, 2 1;
Meditations (Descartes): capable / ca and method in the Discourse, 2024,
pacit in, 83-85; the cogito o f the Dis 42; order without measurement in,
course compared with that of, 33 -3 5 , 65; in the Regulae, 4 9 -5 1; simple na
37, i7on. 25; continuity with the Dis tures function in, 53; term as intro
course, 2223, 167m 7; Discourse as duced in letter of 1630, 51, i72n. 13.
middle term between Regulae and, See also ontology
2 0 -2 1; doubt in, 2 2-2 3, 55; on Meteorology (Descartes), 2 1, i79n. 21
dreams and truth, 1 5 - 16 ; as figure method: as confronting metaphysics
composed of different types of simple in the Discourse on Method, 22; Des
natures, 53, 65-66; ideas in, 45-46; cartes search for a path in life and,
material simple natures in First, 1 1 ; in the Meditations, i66n. 4; and
Fifth, and Sixth, 53-57 , I74n. 23; as metaphysics in the Discourse, 2024,
metaphysical, 65-66; method in, 42; Rule V of the Regulae on, 1 1 - 1 2 .
i66n. 4; method of the Regulae and See also mathesis universalis
the metaphysics of, 20; the mind as Montaigne, i64n. 15
active power in, 83-85; as norm for moral theology, 1 1
Descartes metaphysics, 2 1; ontologi More, Henry, I76n. 31
cal argument in Fifth, 14 1, 158; onto movement: as simple nature, 47, 54,
logical argument in Third, 158 -59 ; 56, 60; as subsumed under the ego,
other minds as conceptually impossi 61
ble in, 12 9 -3 1; other minds as omit
ted in, 12 1- 2 5 ; proofs o f existence of Naissance de la Paix, La (Descartes), 1,
God compared with those of the Dis i6 in .1
course, 2 7 -3 2 ; simple natures in, 4 3 - Nancy, J.-L ., i88n. 16
66; simple natures in First, i73n. 19; Natorp, Paul, i70n. 26
simple natures in Third, 6066; nature: Descartes as theologian o f pure
thought as indifferent to waking/ nature, 9 1-9 5 ; and grace, 86, 87,
sleeping in, 15 i85n. 40
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 136 -3 7 , Naulin, P., i96n. 21
i8gn. 16, i93n. 25 necessary Being, 14344
Mersenne, Marin: God described as ef Nicholas of Cusa, 200n. 27
ficient and total cause to, i70n. 28; Nietzsche, Friedrich, 91
on the highest good as existing, 203n. number, 61
37. See also letters o f 1630
metaphysics: as confronting method in Olympica (Descartes), 1. See also
the Discourse, 22; as defined by Des dreams of the Olympica
cartes, i68n. 12; in the Discourse on ontological argument, 139 60; An
Method, 20-42; egoism as practical selms argument as not ontological,
consequence of Cartesian, 119 -2 0 ; ex 15860; characterized as ontological,
plicitly metaphysical intention o f the 139-40; concept of divine essence in
Discourse, 24-27; as foundation of the Anselms, 14 5 - 5 1; a concept of God
sciences, 49; intellectual simple na as required in, 14 1-4 2 ; in Discourse
212 INDEX
ontological argument {continued) ble/capacit in, 72, 75, 77; capax/
and Meditations compared, 28; the capacitas in, 72, 75, 77, 80; on
essence of God in, 14 2-4 3; in depth of passion and enjoyment of
Fifth Meditation, 14 1, 158; God as pleasures, 93 ;passio in, 71
summum bonum in Anselms, 15 2 - ^perceptions: animal sensation, 106,
54, 159-60, 20m . 29; God as that / i88n. 14; certainty of, 106; external
than which nothing greater can be and internal causes of, 108, 110 ; as
thought in, 14 6 -5 1; Kants defini passions, 108; of volitions, 1 1 0 - 1 1
tion of, 140; love in Anselms, 157; perfection: in Descartes definition of
as ontological, 139 -4 5; relation of God, 27-29; in ontological argument,
Gods existence and essence in An 142
selms, 15 1- 5 6 , 159; in Third Medita phenomenology: Henry on Cartesian-
tion, 158 -59 ism as material phenomenology, 105,
ontology: Anselms argument as not on 117 ; Henrys nonintentional inter
tological, 157, 159; in the Discourse, pretation of the cogito, 10 5 -7 ; inten
37, 38, 42; ontological argument as tional and representational interpreta
ontological, 139 -4 5 tions of the cogito, 9 7-10 5
ontotheology, 39, 4 0 -4 1, 138, 160 philosophy: Descartes as modern
Optics (Descartes), 6, 2 1, i65n. 22 founder of idealism, 43; quadripartite
Opus postumum (Kant), i87n. 10 division of, 10, i63n. 13; and wis
ordering, 64-65 dom, 10. See also metaphysics
other minds: charity in relationship to, physics: and material simple natures,
138; the cogito as raising the problem 49, 57; order without measurement
of, 12 0 - 2 1; as conceptually impossi in, 65
ble in the Meditations, 12 9 - 3 1; in physiology, 65
First Meditation, 12 1- 2 2 ; in Fourth Plato, 5, i62n. 8
Meditation, 122; as free causes, 1 3 7 - Poisson, Nicholas j ., 9, i67n. 7, i69n.
38; love as approach to, 13 1- 3 8 ; the 22
Meditations as omitting discussion of, power: capacity as reduced to, 89-91,
12 1- 2 5 ; objectifying of, 12 5-2 9 ; in 93-95; Descartes shift from receptiv
Second Meditation, 12 2 -2 5 ; in Sixth ity to, 8 1-8 5 ; Posse used for capable
Meditation, 12223 in Latin translations of Descartes,
7 7 -8 1
Paliard, J., i98n. 25 Principles o f Philosophy (Descartes): on
parents, 128-29 common simple natures, 59; the Dis
Pascal, Blaise: on egoism, 118 -2 0 , 136; course as anticipating, 25; on feeble
on holiness versus wisdom, i64n. 15; ness of our nature, 93; God as effi
on human capacity to know God, 95; cient and total cause in, 41; on
on self and other, 19m . 7 simple natures, 52 -53 ; and solitude
passions, 10 7-9 ; as concerning the o f the ego, I92n. 1 1 ; substance in,
very fact of being, 116 ; as confused i75n. 29; thought as defined in, 16
thoughts, 13 1 ; defined, 107; as en probability, 12, 13
tirely absorbed in the soul, 132; gen protology, 36, 37, 38
erosity as, 1 1 2 - 1 3 , i89n. 20; love as, Pythagoras, 12, I04n. 19
13 1 ; representation required in, 109.
See also generosity; love; perceptions Rat, M ., 69
Passions o f the Soul (Descartes): rationality. See reason
INDEX 213