Cal Berkeley Wimsatt SergentLeventhal Aff NDT Round4

Berkeley WS-NDT R4
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Institutionalization never ended, it only shifted to more diffuse and harder to resist
locales failure to challenge this dooms broader decarceration and perpetuates
oppression of disabled bodies
Ben-Moshe 11 (Liat, Disabling Incarceration: Connecting Disability to Divergent Confinements in the
USA Critical Sociology 39(3) 385 403Critical Sociology 39(3) 385 403, )
The need to combine the discussion on current levels of imprisonment with discussion and data about
institutionalization, hospitalization and disablement is imperative for practical, empirical and theoretical
reasons. The most pressing is the need to expand on notions of what comes to be classified as
incarceration . This article suggests the merits of conceptualizing incarceration as including
institutionalization in a wide variety of enclosed settings, including prisons, jails, detention centers,
institutions for the intellectually disabled, treatment centers, and psychiatric hospitals. Such
formulations conceptualize incarceration as a continuum and a multi-faceted phenomenon. This
analysis is especially pressing because of the immense growth of the prison machine in the USA. For
the first time in US history, in 2008, more than one in 100 American adults was behind bars. In 2009 the
adult incarcerated population in prisons and jails in the USA had reached 2,284,900 according to the
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS, 2010). The USA incarcerates a greater share of its population, 737 per
100,000 residents, than any other country on the planet (Pew Center, 2008). Another whopping
5,018,900 people are under community corrections, which include parole and probation (BJS, 2010).
Race, gender and disability play a significant role in incarceration rates. In 2006, Caucasians/whites were
imprisoned at a rate of 409 per 100,000 residents; Latinos at 1038 per 100,000 and African-Americans at
2468 per 100,000. The rate for women was 134 per 100,000 residents and for men, 1384 per 100,000. In
2005 more than half of all prison and jail inmates were reported as having a mental health problem.
Nearly a quarter of both state prisoners and jail inmates who had a mental health problem, compared to
a fifth of those without, had served three or more prior incarcerations (Prison Policy Initiative, 2008).
The number of carceral edifices in the USA had grown as well. From 2000 to 2005, the number of state
and federal correctional facilities increased by 9 percent, from 1668 to 1821 (BJS, 2008). In contrast to
the constant expansion of prisons, deinstitutionalization and institution closure have been a major
policy trend in most US states in the past few decades. Deinstitutionalizationof people who were
labeled as mentally ill began in the 1950s. The deinstitutionalization in the field of mental retardation
gained prominence in the 1970s, although this of course varied by state. The population of people with
intellectual disabilities living in large public institutions peaked at 194,650 in 1967. By 2004, this number
had declined to 41,653 (Prouty et al., 2005).The trend in deinstitutionalization for people with
intellectual disabilities was accompanied by institutional closures across most states. By 2009, the
District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii,Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
West Virginia had closed allof their public institutions for people with developmental disabilities (Lakin
et al., 2010). In con-trast, 13 states have not closed any such public institutions (Braddock, 2002). An
accompanying shift occurred in the field of mental health with the establishment of the community
mental health centers in the 1960s and the closure of large state mental hospitals in most major cities.
In 1955, the state mental health population was 559,000, nearly as large on a per capita basis as the
prison population today. By 2000, it had fallen to below 100,000, a drop of more than 90 percent
(Gottschalk, 2010; Harcourt, 2011). Deinstitutionalization in the field of developmental disabilities
occurred about 12 years after the deinstitutionalization of public mentalhospitals, and the rate of
reduction of use of these facilities was also significantly different between the two processes. In the first
10 years of deinstitutionalization for traditional institutionsfor those labeled as mentally retarded, the
institutionalized population was reduced by 30 percentand then averaged about 11 percent a year
during the 1970s. At its height, between 1955 and1965, the deinstitutionalization in psychiatric hospitals
reduced the populations by 15 percentonly (Lerman, 1985).Over the years, some of the figures given
for deinstitutionalization of public institutions have been misleading , as significant proportions of
people were transferred to other types of institutions including nursing homes. In 2009, for instance,
12,475 people with developmental disabilities lived in state operated community residential settings
with 15 or fewer residents. In addition, between 1977 and 2009, the total number of residential settings
in which people with developmen-tal disabilities received residential services grew from 11,008 to an
estimated 173,042, an increaseof 1500 percent (Lakin et al., 2010). Because most of these newer
settings are much smaller than the massive institutions of previous decades, they are not typically
counted as institutional placements , but due to their daily routines and other aspects of life in these
settings, many people with disabilities, family members, and advocates consider them to be mini-
institutions within the community (Center on Human Policy, 2004).From this critical intersection, it
may not be surprising to also learn that physically, many institutions for those labeled as
psychiatrically or developmentally disabled that closed down during the 1980s actually re-opened a
few years later as prisons . Alabama turned three-quartersof its closed institutions (which closed in
2003) into correctional facilities (the fourth quartersuse is undetermined). Illinois closed seven
institutions, two of which became correctional facili-ties and a third a womens prison. New York State
had the absolute largest number of institutionsin the USA, seventeen of which closed between 1970 and
2010. Most of them were left as is,with future usage undetermined, but at least two became
correctional facilities (Braddock et al.,2008). These figures, although not comprehensive by any means,
serve to highlight the cyclical nature of social control and the persistent nature of incarceration as a
strategy to categorize and keep out undesirable populations . I want to be clear here, that proposing
a more thoroughly intersectional history is distinct from proposing that ableism and racism, or
asylums and prisons, are the same . It is the similarities and the distinctions that are important to
attend to, in terms of rationalizations, in terms of practices associated with them, and also in terms of
the effects on the people who are incarcerated in diversesites of confinement. For example, the
criminal justice system seems to offer certain protections to the accused and the prisoner, such as due
process during the trial and sentencing procedures, a sentence of a specified duration. However,
medical institutions allow the compulsory admittance of patients against their will based only on a
medical diagnosis, an indefinite time of commitment, and treatments that are both painful and
harmful, such as extended periods of isolation, physical restraints, and electric shock therapy . In
addition, the government and the public assume medical treatment is in the best interests of both
the patient and society, and great autonomy is given to physicians to determine the best course of
treatment (Conrad and Schneider, 1992; Goffman, 1961;Snyder and Mitchell, 2006). Incarceration in
prisons, however, seems to be operating more under the discourses of punishment and retribution,
rather than rehabilitation. This framework has its own lethal effects on the lives of those
incarcerated and formerly incarcerated , but it does not nec-essarily operate under the same processes
as medicalized settings, although both settings havemany similarities (Chapman et al., forthcoming).
The communitys failure to focus our analysis on this deeper template for
incarceration leaves our debates unable to scratch the surface of mass incarceration
and confinement
USA Critical Sociology 39(3) 385 403Critical Sociology 39(3) 385 403,
Imprisonment in prisons and in institutions are not only related in a theoretical or historicalrealm. On an
empirical level, Harcourt (2006) emphasizes that using an aggregated incarceration rate, which includes
data from hospitalization and imprisonment combined, yields very different results and implications
for research and policy. Harcourt (2006) laments that none of the above literature, which connected
prisons and institutions (for example the work of Foucault and otherhistorians of asylums, the work of
Goffman on total institutions, etc), made its way to social scientific research, especially to its
empirical/quantitative dimension (with the exception of studies thatlook into the phenomenon of
trans-incarceration, discussed later). In other words, none of the stud-ies that include confinement as an
independent variable includes institutionalization in its measureand definition of
confinement/incarceration. In social science research, including criminology, theconvention is to think of
confinement in terms of placement in jails and prisons, therefore reinforc-ing a skewed interpretation of
the rise in incarceration in the USA. Under this interpretation, the first half of the 20th century is
conceived as an era of relative stability in terms of incarceration, with an explosion in this area in the
1980s onward, in the form of immense growth in the capacity of prisons and jails. However, as
Harcourt (2006) suggests, if the data on mental hospitalization and institutionalization were also
covered in such studies under the prism of incarceration, then the rise in incarceration would have
reached its peak in 1955, when mental hospitals reached their highest capacity . Put differently, the
incarceration rates in prisons and jails today (although appallingly high by any standards) barely
scrape the levels of incarceration during the early part of the 20th century because of the then
massive confinement in hospitals . Therefore, Harcourt (2006) argues for the use of aggregated
incarceration rates, by using figuresfor imprisonment and institutionalization combined, for all future
research that examines the rela-tion of confinement to other factors such as homicide, employment,
education, crime, etc. Not to do so is to look at only a partial picture of both confinement and
incapacitation and also not to take seriously the theoretical and historical perspectives that
conceptualize incarceration more expansively . What needs to be empirically assessed, then, is not
the rise in incarceration but the systemic and lingering effects of the continuity of confinement in
modern times . What such arguments high-light is the need to reconceptualize institutionalization and
imprisonment as not merely analogues but as in fact interconnected, in their logic, historical
enactment and social effects. The theoretical and policy implications of such interconnectedness will
also necessitate bringing in disability(psychiatric, developmental, physical, etc.) as a focus in studies
on incarceration , as well as working out questions of criminality and danger in studies of
institutionalization and disablement.
Instead, must view incarceration as a continuum of carceral edifices with disability at

its core this forges a holistic understanding of oppression by better coming to terms
with peoples lived realities
Conclusion: The Incarceration Matrix and the SociologicalImagination
This article was intended as a beginning to an overdue conversation between the growing scholar-ship
on incarceration and research in the critical field of disability studies, by conceptualizing dis-ability and
incarceration very broadly. Incorporating a variety of forms of disablement withindisability studies (in
relation to psychiatrization, labeling of those with intellectual disabilitiesand institutionalization) will
hopefully generate more nuanced accounts of what gets codified asdisability as well as what gets to be
labeled, and researched, as incarceration. Broadening the scopeof research on incarceration to include a
variety of confinements (such as psychiatric hospitals,nursing homes, institutions for those labeled as
intellectually and developmentally disabled) willtake into account the work of scholars who have already
theorized the carceral along these lines(such as Foucault, Goffman, Scull and others) and can also
generate new work in this vein. It will also account for the lived reality of prisoners with disabilities
who are caught in the webs of the institution- and prison-industrial complexes. Under this
formulation, incarceration is understood as a continuum of carceral edifices, or as an institutional
matrix in which disability is a core component, not simply an added category of analysis. This call for
connecting analysis of incarceration with disability is also a call to pay attention to the lives of mostly
poor people of color who are still incarcerated worldwide in nursing homes, institutions for those
with labels of mental illness and/or intellectual disability and prisons, and bring their perspective to
bear on what Chris Bell characterized as White disability studies (2006).My main argument here is
that the history of disability is the history of incarceration . Following this argument will lead us back
to the original premise of the sociological imagination. As Mills explains, The sociological imagination
enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within society. That is its
task and its promise. (1959: 6). Therefore, sociologists who study incarceration and those who are
interested in the lived experience of people with a variety of dis-ability labels would fare well with a
more expansive view of both disability and incarceration.
Only our analysis that foregrounds interconnectivity challenges how medical and
judicial discourses of normalcy construct criminality through the medical-prison-
industrial-complexs foundational threats of social danger and allows an
understanding of incarceration that can produce change
On a theoretical level, the imperative to understand incarceration through both the prism of the
prison but also that of the institution, as this article suggests, is crucial to understanding the
underlying relations that legitimate confinement in a variety of settings. Such analysis also
underscores the relation between penal and medical notions of danger, as they relate to both
criminalization and medicalization and labeling . Historically, the connection between imprisonment
and definitions of abnormality seems to have arisen out of a new configuration of notions of danger.
From the 19th century the webs of the medical and the judicial start to intertwine with the rise of a
hybrid discourse, according to Foucault (2003). Its hybridity lies not just in the sense of amalgamation
of several discourses (legal, medical) but also in the creation of a new power/knowledge structure in
which doctors laying claim to judicial power and judges laying claim to medical power (2003: 39) lay
down an intertwined system of surveillance, which includes psychiatric progress reports on the
incarcerated, examination in court of the accused, and surveillance of at risk groups. According to
Foucault (2003), this medico-judicial discourse does not originate from medicine or law or in
between, but from another external discourse that of abnormality. The power of normalization is
cloaked by medical notions of illness and legal notions of recidivism. The history of treatment and
categorization of those labeled as feebleminded, and later mentally retarded, is also paved with
cobblestones of notions of social danger, as prominent eugenicists tried to scientifically establish
that those whom they characterized as feebleminded had a tendency to commit violent crimes. In the
late 19th century, as the eugenics movement gained momentum, it was declared that all feebleminded
people were potential criminals (Rafter, 1997; Trent, 1995). Spaces of confinement themselves, such
as psychiatric hospitals, poorhouses, prisons and institutions for those labeled as mentally retarded,
could also be perceived as operating on similar logic, from a variety of perspectives. Foucault analyzes
their discursive formations and effects as docile making and producing techniques of governance and
social control (1995). The remarkable continuity of confinement (Harcourt, 2006) is also discussed as
part of a revisionist social history of places of confinement, offered by Rothman (1971), Grob (1972,
1983), Scull (1979, 1989) and Foucault (1965, 1987, 1995) and amended by feminist historians and
criminologists such as Rafter (2004) and Kurshan (1996). The revisionist narrative marked a shift from
perspectives that saw asylums and prisons as reforming and benevolent, to more nuanced accounts
that critiqued both the consequences and intentions of reform efforts that ended in mass
incarceration. Interestingly, this neo-historiography of the institution and prison was written, and
battled, by historians and other intellectuals at a time when these institutions started to lose their
legitimacy. Most of these accounts were produced in the 1960s and 1970s when larger exposes,
lawsuits, novels, movies and ethnographies came out to reveal the decrepit conditions of asylums,
hospitals and prisons. These included Erving Goffmans Asylums(1961), the novel made into a
Hollywood film One flew Over the Cuckoos Nest(Kesey, 1962), Burton Blatts expos Christmas in
Purgatory(Blatt and Kaplan, 1974), the riots in Attica prison, and lawsuits on behalf of prisoners and
inmates in state institutions. Therefore, the debates over the reasons and usefulness of asylums in the
past should be read as directly tied to debates over decarceration and re-institutionalization at
present. The premise that all these writings share is an understanding of incarceration as a
continuum and not an isolated phenomenon that can be understood by engaging with only one
locale.
This is emblematic of ableist normalcys exclusionary praxis which makes ongoing

eugenics and extermination inevitable its devaluation of disabled people creates
treacherous terrain for all who are othered by Western society
Brown 11 , Artist Initiative Grantee at Minnesota State Arts Board Senior Academic Adviser for the College of Education and Human Development at University of Minnesota Steering Committee at Education Abroad
Network at University of Minnesota Volunteer Coordinator for Social Inclusion and Bullying Prevention at Marcy Open School see less Past 2012-2013 Buckman Fellow at Buckman Fellowship Travel and Study Grantee at Jerome
Foundation Loft Mentor Series Award Winner for Poetry at The Loft Literary Center Institute on Community Integration Post-graduate Certificate Graduate Student at University of Minnesota University of Minnesota College of
Education and Human Development/University Honors Program Liaison at University of Minnesota University Honors Program Academic Advisor at University of Minnesota University of Minnesota Learning Abroad
Center/University Honors Program Liaison at University of Minnesota Foreign Lecturer--English Studies, Cultural Awareness, Humanities at Hokkaido University of Education Educational Technologies post-grad certificate program
at University of British Columbia, Vancouver Adjunct Lecturer--Japanese Language at Wayne County Community College Adjunct Lecturer--English Composition at Wayne State University Foriegn Lecturer--English Studies, Creative
Writing, English Literature at Sophia University--Tokyo, Japan Screw normal: Resisting the myth of normal by questioning medias depiction of people with autism and their families,
http://blog.lib.umn.edu/gara0030/iggds/Screw%20Normal_FINAL_Dosch%20Brown.pdf
The one societal need in our society that is often unacknowledged, silenced, and left unexamined is
that humans have, as Michalko quoted Cornel West, the deep, visceral need to belong (Michalko,
2002, p. 81) all of us struggle with full acceptance of ourselves and our desire to be seen as
acceptable or welcome in a society that loves to label people. The media creates walls between its
ideals and the people it views as Others , such as when the media views people with autism as
abnormal mysteries. We are being taught that differences occurring from autism are wrong, and
sadly too many families depicted in the media perpetuate this negative view of their own children.
When thinking of normal henceforth, lets consider what Michalko wrote about society and his
blindness. He explained that, although society might have found ways technologically for him to
participate (he is a professor), he is still seen as strange because he is blind. He said the difference in
his blindness must be grappled with inside his being in a space between nature and culture and
normal and abnormal (2002, p. 83), and it is within this confusing, unmarked space where he has
had to build his own identity. By moving through the world with his body of blindness, Michalko
has projected himself into the social space, just as my son must project his own self, by moving
through the social space with his mind of difference; thus, society reacts to people who have
disabilities who cannot live up to the mythical norms with help, pity, ridicule, unease, and
curiosity (2002, p. 88), and it results in an unequal power structure that creates treacherous
terrain for all of us who have been Othered. Michalko (2002) noted that mainstream Western society
views all disabilities as abnormal, and it thus approaches people with disability as tragic people who
live lives not worth living; they are seen as the Other, as objects of pity, both vulnerable and
fragile (p.68). The complexity, diversity, and range of differences of all human beings in this world are
erased, denied, and ignored under a banner of sameness or normalcyand those who cannot or
will not conform are silenced and lumped into the category of Other, and dealt with suspicion for not
conforming to social construction of what is acceptable in appearance, behavior, and experience.
Eugenics, the academic Phil Smith (2008) has concluded, is still very much present in societal attitudes
toward disability. Eugenics formalized the Normal, a cultural landscape outlined in order to support
the hegemony of its inhabitants, a liberalist bourgeois class of white, able-bodied men (P. Smith, p.
419). By silencing those with perceived disabilities (or those with a particular perceived race,
ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation , etc.) and deeming them as lesser than normal humans
society is able to continue to deny that being normal is actually a socially constructed myth
(Michalko, 2002, p. 69). Phil Smith further pointed out that not so long ago those who committed the
war crimes by killing or sterilizing people they had deemed of inferior intelligence in the Nazis T-4
project were consistently given less severe convictions and higher acquittal rates (P. Smith, 2008, p.
421)revealing, indeed, that as a society we devalue the lost lives of those considered too different
from the mythical norm, which we will demonstrate later is a devaluation of human life very much
alive in media depiction of autism. Society rarely has ears for the voices or rooms reserved for those
with differences who think otherwise, and it rarely realizes that indeed people with differences also
have value and critical roles to play in society. The media maintains this gaping silence as well.
Society, Michalko has argued, either expects those deemed abnormal will get through their
differences by adapting to the dominant rules, so as to be less noticed, or it expects them to get
out by removing themselves from view, by being silent and isolated (Michalko, 2002, p. 75); and
some experts, doctors, educators, and therapists make a sizable income from attempting to enforce
these societal expectations on families.
Ableisms constitutional divide forms the blueprint for modernity this culminates in
genocidal violence and targeting of marginalized bodies this violence can only
maintain power through our silence
Campbell 8, Fiona Kumari is a Senior Lecturer in Disability Studies at the School of Human Services &
Social Work Griffith University (Brisbane) and Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies, Faculty of
Medicine, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka, Refusing Able(ness): A Preliminary Conversation about
Ableism, http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/viewArticle/46
II. Ableist Relations
Central to regimes of ableism are two core elements that feature irrespective of its localised
enactment, namely the notion of the normative (and normate individual) and the enforcement of a
constitutional divide between perfected naturalized humanity and the aberrant, the unthinkable,
quasi-human hybrid and therefore non-human. This constitution provides the layout, the blueprint
for the scaling and marking of bodies and the ordering of their terms of relation. It is not possible to
have a concept of difference without Ableism. Lets take each of these two elements separately and
explore them more closely. The Able/Not-Able Divide It is necessary to establish and enforce a
constitutional divide . The divide is at the levels of ontology, materiality and sentiency. I wish to focus
on the constitutionality of that divide between the normal and the pathological and mechanisms of
ordering. This analysis is influenced by the proposals advanced by Bruno Latour in We Have Never been
Modern. Latour speaks of the practices of translation and purification: translation, creates mixtures
between entirely new types of being, hybrids of nature and culture. The second, by purification:
creates two entirely distinct ontological zones: that of human beings on the one hand; that of
nonhumans on the other (10 1=1). The devices of translation and purification can assist us to grapple
with that which seems unholdable and elusive; the uncontainability of the disabled body.
Translation is based on the notion that structures or networks are not obvious or self-contained.
Latour uses the example of a chain flowing from the upper atmosphere, industrial strategies and onto
the concerns of government and greenies. Purification in contrast, engages in the creation of divides
of ontological distinctions, which espouse a foundational (almost first cause) self-evidence. Here,
Latour cites that partition between nature (as self contained), nonhumans and culture (created and
driven by humans). This modern critical stance, as Latour calls it, acts as the ethos or template of
modernity. In the context of ableism, Latours schema proves helpful. The processes and practices of
translation cannot be separated from the creation of that ordering category termed disability. For
many people deemed disabled, in the world of technoscience their relationship with non-human actants
has been profoundly cyborgical and hybridisable (for example the use of communication and adaptive
devices, implants and transplants). As such the networks of association between human non human
(sentient beings and machines) have always been and increasingly are pushing the boundaries of the
practices of purification. The disabled body induces a fear as being a body out of control because of its
appearance of uncontainability. The practices of purification insist on this being the case. Ableisms
constitutional divide posits two distinct and entirely clear ontological zones: disabled and abled
(normate). Latour explains without the first set, the practices of purification would be fruitless or
pointless . Without the second, the work of translation would be slowed down, limited, or even ruled
out. So long as we consider these two practices of translation and purification separately, we are
truly modern that is willingly subscribe to the critical project, even though that project is developed
only through the proliferation of hybrids down below. As soon as we direct our attention
simultaneously to the work of purification and the work of hybridization [translation], we
immediately stop being wholly modern, and our future begins to change. (11) The challenge then is to
look beyond social context, at the interactivity between the processes and techniques of purification
and translation, in particular to investigate what this interactivity clarifies and obfuscates. Even though
Latour claims that purification is not an ideology in disguise, I would assert that the existence of
processes of purification creates a simulation if you like, of the conditions of naturalism. Latours
discussion of whether relations are conscious and unconscious, or are illusion and reality is an important
one. He concludes that moderns are not unaware of what they do; rather it is the holding steadfast to
dichotomies, the divides, which makes possible the processes of translation. We can by analogy, argue
that matters of intentionality or discourse and so forth, are not critical to the emerging technologies
of ableism, but rather it is the act of holding stoically to the distinction between ableness and
disabledness. In contemporary developments in high-tech and biotechnologies, it is occasionally
possible to witness the glitches in the purview of purification, whether that is in the debates over
transhumanism, xenotransplantation or the emergent of new life in the form of artificial intelligences
(A.Is). The confusion about where human life begins and ends harks back to the Enlightenment era
where philosophers like Locke inquired What is It? in trying to make sense of the humanness of
changelings (Campbell; Locke,). The fortunes of techno-science continue to disrupt the fixity of defining
disability and normalcy especially within the arenas of law and bioethics. Whilst anomalous bodies are
undecidable in being open to endless and differing interpretations, an essentialised disabled body is
subjected to constant deferral standing in reserve, awaiting and escaping able(edness) through
morphing technologies and as such exists in an ontologically tentative or provisional state. Latour points
out the ultimate paradox of this modern constitutional divide is that whilst the proliferation of
hybrids is allowed for, at the same time this constitution continues to deny the very existence of
hybrid entities within its formulation (Latour). Contemporary conditions suggest that it is not the
event of denial that is operational; rather it is the place or significance given to such ambiguous
entities that disrupt the rather neat demarcation zones. Practices of purification continue to rein in
(successfully or otherwise) the chaos created by increasing grey zones along the continuum of
human/nonhuman difference. In the governing of prostitution, Razack points to the creation of
anomalous zone to contain and tolerate the deviance. In dealing with political prisoners, the
despised, those interned in concentration camps and institutions , Agamben indicates the
manufacturing of states of exception that exist beyond the law and spatiality to enable treatments
of those existing in the realm of a bare life. The significance of the enforcement of a constitutional
divide, for the practices of ableism, is that such orderings are not just repressive but they are
ultimately productive; they tell us stories, they contain narratives as to who we are and how we
should be. In the closing pages of We Have Never been Modern, Latour argues that as science creates
new definitions of being human, these new formations do not displace the older versions rather
humanism is redistributed. I am not entirely convinced of this emergent multiplicity and expansion of
ontologies of humanness. Contra Latour, Hayles argues that should sentiency be conceptualised on the
basis of informationalcy this new rendering would amount to a profound shift in the theoretical markers
used to categorise all life (or what is life). In this moment there is a rallying of networks scurrying to
squeeze new ontological formations of dis/ability into old systems of ordering and thus attempt to
avoid re-cognising an abundance of (post marginal, post peripheral) morphisms. Anthropomorphism
becomes the catch cry of ableism. As Latour rejoices: Morphism is the place where technomorpisms,
zoomorphisms, phusimorphisms,ideomorphisms,theomorphisms, sociomorphisms, psyomorphisms, all
come together. These alliances and their exchanges, taken together, are what define the anthropos. A
weaver of morphisms - isnt that enough of a definition? (137) What Normate Ableist Normativity?
Georges Canguilhem (69) states every generality is the sign of an essence, and every perfection the
realization of the essence a common characteristic, the value of an ideal type. If this is the case, what
then is the essence of normative abled(ness)? Such a question poses significant conceptual challenges
including the dangers of bifurcation. It is reasonably easy to speculate about the knowingness of life
forms deemed disabled in spite of the neologism of disabilitys catachresis orientation. In contrast
able-bodied, corporeal perfectedness has an elusive core (other than being posed as transparently
average or normal). Charting a criterion of Abled to gain definitional clarity can result in a game of
circular reductionism saying what it is in relation to what it isnt, that which falls away. Disability
performances are invoked to mean any body capable of being narrated as outside the norm
(Mitchell 17). Such as analysis belies the issue whether at their core womens, black and queer bodies
are ultimately ontologically and materially disabled? Inscribing certain bodies in terms of deficiency and
essential inadequacy privileges a particular understanding of normalcy that is commensurate with the
interests of dominant groups (and the assumed interests of subordinated groups). Indeed, the
formation of ableist relations requires the normate individual to depend upon the self of disabled
bodies being rendered beyond the realm of civility, thus becoming an unthinkable object of
apprehension. The unruly, uncivil, disabled body is necessary for the reiteration of the truth of the
real/essential human self who is endowed with masculinist attributes of certainty, mastery and
autonomy. The discursive practices that mark out bodies of preferability are vindicated by abject life
forms that populate the constitutive outside of the thinkable (that which can be imagined and re-
presented) and those forms of existence that are unimaginable and therefore unspeakable. The
emptying (kenosis) of normalcy occurs through the purging of those beings that confuse, are
misrecognizable or as Mitchell (17) describes as recalcitrant corporeal matter into a bare life (see
Agamben) residing in zone of exceptionality. This foreclosure depends on necessary unspeakability to
maintain the continued operation of hegemonic power (c.f. Butler). For every outside there is an
inside that demands differentiation and consolidation as a unity. To borrow from Heidegger in every
aletheia (unveiling or revealedness) of representation there lies a concealedness. The visibility of the
ableist project is therefore only possible through the interrogation of the revealedness of
disability/not-health and abled(ness). Marcel Detienne summarizes this system of thought aptly: [Such
a] system is founded on a series of acts of partition whose ambiguity, here as elsewhere, is to open
up the terrain of their transgression at the very moment when they mark off a limit. To discover the
complete horizon of a societys symbolic values, it is also necessary to map out its transgressions, its
deviants ( ix). Viewing the disabled body as simply matter out of place that needs to dispensed with or at least cleaned up is erroneous. The disabled body has a place, a place in liminality to secure the performative enactment of the normal. Detiennes summation
points to what we may call the double bind of ableism when performed within western neo-liberal polities. The double bind folds in on itself for whilst claiming inclusion, ableism simultaneously always restates and enshrines itself. On the one hand, discourses of equality promote
inclusion by way of promoting positive attitudes (sometimes legislated in mission statements, marketing campaigns, equal opportunity protections) and yet on the other hand, ableist discourses proclaim quite emphatically that disability is inherently negative, ontologically intolerable
and in the end a dispensable remnant. This casting results in an ontological foreclosure wherein positive signification of disability becomes unspeakable. Disability cant be thought of/spoken about on any other basis than the negative, to do so, to invoke oppositional discourses, is to run
the risk of further pathologisation. An example of this are attempts at desiring or celebrating disability which are reduced to a fetish or facticity disorder. So to explicate ourselves out of this double bind we need to persistently and continually return to the matter of disability as negative
ontology, as a malignancy, that is, as the property of a body constituted by what Michael Oliver refers to as, the personal tragedy theory of disability. (32) Returning to the matter of definitional clarity around Abled(ness). Robert McRuer is one of the few scholars to journey into
ableisms non-axiomatic life. He argues that ableism (McRuer refers to compulsory abled-bodiedness) emanates from everywhere and nowhere, and can only be deduced by crafty reductionisms. Contra the assertions about the uncontainability of disabled bodies which are (re)contained
by the hyper prescription and enumeration, the abled body mediated through its assumption of compulsion is absent in its presence it just is but resists being fully deducible. Drawing on Butlers work, McRuer writes everyone is virtually disabled, both in the sense that able-bodied
norms are intrinsically impossible to embody fully and in the sense that able-bodied status is always temporary, disability being the one identity category that all people will embody if they live long enough. What we might call a critically disability position, however, would differ from
such a virtually disabled position [to engagements that have] resisted the demands of compulsory able-bodiedness (9596) My argument is that insofar as this conception of disability is assumed within discourses of ableism, the presence of disability upsets the modernist craving for
ontological security. The conundrum disability is not a mere fear of the unknown, nor an apprehensiveness towards that which is foreign or strange. Rather, disability and disabled bodies are effectively positioned in the nether regions of unthought. For the ongoing stability of ableism, a
diffuse network of thought depends upon the capacity of that network to shut away, to exteriorise, and unthink disability and its resemblance to the essential (ableist) human self. This unthought has been given much consideration through the systematisation and classification of
knowledges about pathology, aberration and deviance. That which is thought about (the Abled norm) rather ironically in its delimitation becomes vacuous and elusive. In order for the notion of ableness to exist and to transmogrify into the sovereign subject, the normate individual of
liberalism, it must have a constitutive outside that is, it must participate in a logic of supplementarity. When looking at relations of disability and ableism we can expand on this idea of symbiosis, an unavoidable duality by putting forward another metaphor, that of the mirror. Here I
argue that people deemed disabled take on the performative act of mirroring in the lives of normative subjects: To be a Mirror is different from being a Face that looks back with a range of expression and responsiveness that are responses of a Subject -in-Its-Own-Right. To be positioned
as a Mirror is to be Put Out of Countenance, to Lose Face. (Narayan 141) In this respect, we can speak in ontological terms of the history of disability as a history of that which is unthought, to be put out of countenance; this figuring should not be confused with erasure that occurs due to
mere absence or exclusion. On the contrary, disability is always present (despite its seeming absence) in the ableist talk of normalcy, normalization, and humanness (cf. Overboe ) on the idea of normative shadows). Disabilitys truth-claims are dependent upon discourses of ableism for
their very legitimization. III. Disability Imaginaries Reconceptualising the Human? Phenomenological studies have long recognized the importance of focusing on the experience of th e animated living body (der Leib), in recognition that we dwell in our bodies and live so fundamentally
Before every action, there is a pause ... and a beginning again. The pause is for
through them. This intensity is captured by Kalekin-Fishman:
description, for mulling over the requirements of balance, for comparing the proposed action with
movements that are familiar, and for explaining to myself why I can or cannot do what is at hand ... In
the course of daily living, the thinking is not observable; the behavior just happens, part of what this
person does naturally. The physiology of a slight limp is part of the unmediated expression of what my
I is ... (136) In short, we cannot know existence without being rooted to our bodies. To this extent, it is
problematic to speak of bodies in their materiality in a way that distinguishes between emotions and
cognition. This generative body is shaped by relations of power, complex histories and interpreted
through a bricolage of complex interwoven subjectivities. This approach to perceiving the body in
terms of geist or animation can be applied to re-thinking peripheral bodies deemed disabled. It is this
body that infuses the discourses and animates representations. Refusing Able(ness) necessitates a
letting go of the strategy of using the sameness for equality arguments as the basis of liberal freedom.
Instead of wasting time on the violence of normalization, theoretical and cultural producers could
more meaningfully concentrate on developing a semiotics of exchange, an ontological decoder to
recover and apprehend the lifeworlds of humans living peripherally. Ontological differences, be that
on the basis of problematical signifiers of race, sex, sexuality and dis/ability, need to be unhinged
from evaluative ranking and be re-cognised in their various nuances and complexities without being
re-presented in fixed absolute terms. It is only then , in this release that we can find possibilities in
ambiguity and resistance in marginality (cf. de Beauvoir; hooks). Instead of asking how do you manage
not being like (the non-stated) us? (the negation argument), disability imaginaries
think/speak/gesture and feel different landscapes not just for being in-the-world, but on the
conduction of perception, mobilities and temporalities. Linton points out that the kinaesthetic,
proprioceptive, sensory and cognitive experiences of disabled people as they go about their daily life
has received limited attention. Nancy Mairs notes a disability gaze is imbricated in every aspect of
action, perception, occurrence and knowing. In order to return bodies back to differencein-the-human,
a re-conceptualization of knowing (episteme) is paramount . Only this knowledge is of a carnal kind,
where thinking, sensing and understanding mutually enfold. Whilst ever present in ableist normalising
dialogue, disabilitys veracity is undeniably contingent upon conversations of ableism, its production
and performance, to confer validity.
This exposition is crucially important disability is the foundational justification for

inequality the referent of disability as a justification for inequality under-grids all
other oppressions
Baynton 1, Douglas Baynton is a Prof of American Cultural History and Disability at U of Iowa,
Disability and the Justification of Inequality in American History,
http://rs1.uua.org/documents/bayntondouglas/justification_inequality.pdf
Since the social and political revolutions of the eighteenth century, the trend in western political
thought has been to refuse to take for granted inequalities between persons or groups. Differential
and unequal treatment has continued, of course, but it has been considered incumbent on modern
societies to produce a rational explanation for such treatment. In recent decades, historians and other
scholars in the humanities have studied intensely and often challenged the ostensibly rational
explanations for inequalities based on identityin particular, gender, race, and ethnicity. Disability,
however, one of the most prevalent justifications for inequality, has rarely been the subject of
historical inquiry . Disability has functioned historically to justify inequality for disabled people
themselves, but it has also done so for women and minority groups . That is, not only has it been
considered justifiable to treat disabled people unequally , but the concept of disability has been
used to justify discrimination against other groups by attributing disability to them . Disability was a
significant factor in the three great citizenship debates of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:
womens suffrage , African American freedom and civil rights , and the restriction of immigration .
When categories of citizenship were questioned , challenged , and disrupted , disability was called
on to clarify and define who deserved, and who was deservedly excluded from, citizenship .
Opponents of political and social equality for women cited their supposed physical, intellectual, and
psychological flaws, deficits, and deviations from the male norm. These flawsirrationality, excessive
emotionality, physical weaknessare in essence mental, emotional, and physical disabilities,
although they are rarely discussed or examined as such . Arguments for racial inequality and
immigration restrictions invoked supposed tendencies to feeble-mindedness, mental illness, deafness,
blindness, and other disabilities in particular races and ethnic groups. Furthermore, disability figured
prominently not just in arguments for the inequality of women and minorities but also in arguments
against those inequalities . Such arguments took the form of vigorous denials that the groups in
question actually had these disabilities; they were not disabled, the argument went, and therefore
were not proper subjects for discrimination . Rarely have oppressed groups denied that disability is an
adequate justification for social and political inequality. Thus, while disabled people can be considered
one of the minority groups historically assigned inferior status and subjected to discrimination, disability
has functioned for all such groups as a sign of and justification for inferiority . It is this use of disability
as a marker of hierarchical relations that historians of disability must demonstrate in order to bring
disability into the mainstream of historical study . Over a decade ago, Joan Scott made a similar argument about the difficulty of persuading historians to take gender
seriously. Scott noted that despite a substantial number of works on womens history, the topic remained marginal in the discipline as a whole. A typical response to womens history was Women had a history separate from
mens, therefore let feminists do womens history, which need not concern us, or My understanding of the French Revolution is not changed by knowing that women participated in it. Scott argued that research on the role of
women in history was necessary but not sufficient to change the paradigms of the profession. To change the way in which most historians went about their work, feminists had to demonstrate not just that women participated in
the making of history but that gender is a constitutive element of social relationships and a primary way of signifying relationships of power.1 To demonstrate the ubiquity of gender in social thought, Scott focused on political
history, a field in which historians were especially apt to argue that gender was unimportant, and where most historians today would imagine disability to be equally so. She chose as an example Edmund Burkes attack on the
French Revolution, noting that it was built around a contrast between ugly, murderous sans-culottes hags (the furies of hell, in the abused shape of the vilest of women) and the soft femininity of Marie-Antoinette. The contrast
Scott highlights calls on not only gender but also notions of beauty, disfigurement, and misshapen bodies that would be amenable to an analysis informed by disability. Even more striking, however, is that in addition to the
rhetoric of gender, Burkes argument rested just as fundamentally on a rhetorical contrast between the natural constitution of the body politic and the monstrous deformity that the revolution had brought forth. Burke repeatedly
referred to public measures . . . deformed into monsters, monstrous democratic assemblies, this monster of a constitution, unnatural and monstrous activity, and the like (as well as evoking blind prejudice, actions taken
blindly, blind followers, and blind obedience and alluding to the madness, imbecility, and idiocy of the revolutionary leaders). This rhetoric of mo nstrosity was by no means peculiar to the conservative cause. Tom Paine, in
his response to Burke, also found the monster metaphor an apt and useful one but turned it around: Exterminate the monster aristocracy, he wrote.2 The metaphor of the natural versus the monstrous was a fundamental way of
constructing social reality in Burkes time. By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, however, the concept of the natural was to a great extent displaced or subsumed by the concept of normality.3 Since then, normality
Normality is a complex concept, with

has been deployed in all aspects of modern life as a means of measuring, categorizing, and managing populations (and resisting such management).
an etiology that includes the rise of the social sciences, the science of statistics, and industrialization
with its need for interchangeable parts and interchangeable workers. It has been used in a remarkable
range of contexts and with a bewildering variety of connotations. The natural and the normal both are
ways of establishing the universal, unquestionable good and right . Both are also ways of establishing
social hierarchies that justify the denial of legitimacy and certain rights to individuals or groups . Both
are constituted in large part by being set in opposition to culturally variable notions of disability
just as the natural was meaningful in relation to the monstrous and the deformed, so are the cultural
meanings of the normal produced in tandem with disability .4 The concept of normality in its modern
sense arose in the midnineteenth century in the context of a pervasive belief in progress. It became a
culturally powerful idea with the advent of evolutionary theory. The ideal of the natural had been a
static concept for what was seen as an essentially unchanging world, dominant at a time when the
book of nature was represented as the guidebook of God. The natural was good and right because it
conformed to the intent or design of Nature or the Creator of nature. Normality, in contrast, was an
empirical and dynamic concept for a changing and progressing world, the premise of which was that one
could discern in human behavior the direction of human evolution and progress and use that as a guide.
The ascendance of normality signaled a shift in the locus of faith from a God-centered to a human-
centered world, from a culture that looked within to a core and backward to lost Edenic origins toward
one that looked outward to behavior and forward to a perfected future.
Last, in the face of the specter of the ghost of incarceration yet to come we must
bring this analysis to light to create cultures of resistance critique fuels uncertainty
the hanging question of what to do implores us to undertake constant
problematization that shatters the logic of normalizing incarceration
Ben-Moshe 11, Liat Ben-Moshe Syracuse University, Genealogies of Resistance to Incarceration:
Abolition Politics within Deinstitutionalization and Anti-Prison Activism in the U.S.,
http://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1070&context=soc_etd
***Gender modified --- MW
What haunts McRuers work is not the fear of impairment or even disablement, but the tyranny of
normalization . Compulsory normativity (or able-bodiedness) is always lurking, and with it the
promise of unity by segregation. Closure of large institutions has not led to freedom for all disabled
people nor has it resulted in the radical acceptance of the fact of difference amongst us. Institutional
life, whether in a prison, hospital, mental institution, nursing home, group home, or segregated
school, has been the constant , not the exception, for disabled people throughout North American
history. Harriet McBryde Johnson (2003) describes her experiences and fear of the disability gulag -
the warehouse for disabled people that is often called the institution . As she describes in her
narrative, many people with significant disabilities fear that one day they will be sent there and lose
their independence, if they are not living there already. Intersecting Johnson with McRuer, we can
conceptualize the institution yet to come as a looming presence in the lives of all people with
disabilities, even those who do not reside in them - and even for people who do not (yet) identify
with any disability or debility. The ghost of forced confinement haunts us all, but does so much more
materially and immediately for marginalized populations, especially poor people, people of color,
and disabled people or a combination of these. It is my hope, as an activist/scholar that this work
brings to light the ghost of the incarceration yet to come but also highlights abolition as praxis to
resist it . As Gordon (2004) explicated, the aim of the politically engaged intellectual is to nourish
cultures of resistance and to aid in the fulfillment of the human potential of all. In addition, and in
response to critique that claimed that his work in Discipline and Punish is not practical but only
theoretical in nature, Foucault explained that his role as an intellectual (or scholar/activist) is not to
prescribe solutions, but to open up conversations . He remarked that it is true that certain people,
such as those who work in the institutional setting of the prison are not likely to find instructions in
my book that tell them what is to be done. But my project is precisely to bring it about that they
no longer know what to do , so that the acts, gestures, discourses that up until then had seemed to
go without saying become problematic, difficult, dangerous and that it seems to be that what is to
be done ought not to be determined from above by reformers, be they prophetic or legislative, but
by a long work of comings and goings, of exchanges, reflections, trials and different analyses
(Foucault 1994: 256). Critique, according to Foucault, is sometimes the goal and sometimes the means
to a goal, often one which is not yet conceived but is used in a process of trial and error. Foucault
asserts that critique should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what
is . Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesnt have to lay
down the law for the law. It isnt a stage in programming. It is a challenge directed to what is
(Foucault 1994: 236). I contend that this challenge towards what is is the work of abolition today,
and for the future of a non-carceral society. Even for those of us who find deinstitutionalization, anti-
psychiatry and prison abolition movements to be too radical or problematic for whatever reason, I
believe activists and scholars could benefit greatly from connecting them to each other and paying
attention to the path of abolition of oppressive institutions.
People or ideas, which are perceived as radical are often characterized as dangerous, and sometimes
crazy, and these are exactly the populations we still hold behind bars and locked doors. But in terms
of abolition, people who called for the abolition of slavery were also called dangerous and some lost
their lives in the struggle, but you would be hard pressed to find people who advocate for slavery today.
One can hope that this will be the case in relation to prisons and institutions in the imminent future.
As Sebastian Scheerer (1987: 7) comments: the great victories of abolitionism are slowly passing into
oblivion, and with them goes the experience that there has never been a major social transformation
in the history of (wominkind) mankind that had not been looked upon as unrealistic, idiotic or
utopian by the large majority of experts even a few years before the unthinkable became reality .
This research attempts to ensure that abolition of the carceral in the form of deinstitutionalization,
prison abolition and anti-psychiatry do not pass into oblivion and are not only preserved but built
upon in a shared horizon combating the incarceration yet to come.
2ac
a) Underlying structure --- bio-medical colonization of disabled
bodies is foundational to broader colonization
Campbell 98, Associate Professor in Law, Griffith Law School, Griffith University, Australia
and Adjunct Professor in Disability Studies, Department of Disability Studies, Faculty of
Medicine, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka, Fiona, THE DISABLISED BODY: An Inquiry into
the Corporeality of Disability and Social Role Valorisation Theory,
https://www.academia.edu/1914452/THE_DISABLISED_BODY_An_Inquiry_into_the_Corpo
reality_of_Disability_and_Social_Role_Valorisation_Theory
The birth of medical space rendered the disablised body docile, its darkness was
dissipated through its opening up to colonisation36 in the form of modification,
improvement and disciplinary assimilation. As Thomson (1997c: 12) summarises: statistics
quantified the body; evolution provided a new heritage; eugenics and teratology37 policed its
boundaries; prosthetics normalized it; and asylums cordoned off deviance. This kind of
capturing of the disablised body is best represented in what is commonly referred to as the
medical model, a system of truth, based on the assumption that there is an: objective
reality of observed symptoms and the facticity of a disabling condition that exists in the
individual. It assumes the disability exists, regardless of whether it has been diagnosed, and that
it has been caused by factors that can be identified and studied, such as genetic flaws, disease
processes, or trauma. (Mercer 1992: 20 ~ emphasis added).
Such biomedical realism becomes dangerous, for defectiveness does not merely imply
difference. Rather, disability embodies a moral discourse38 as if malignancy were inherent in
the individual. The negativity of the disablised body is constituted by what Michael Oliver
(1996: 32) terms, the personal tragedy theory of disability, wherein disability cannot be
spoken about as anything other than an anathema (fig. 4): disability is some terrible chance
event which occurs at random to unfortunate individuals. Producing the truth about the
disablised body has been made possible through the nexus between law39 and medicine,40
in which the transgressive body, according to Foucault (1997a: 52) snares the law,
provoking effects, triggering mechanisms, calling in prejudicial and marginally
medical institutions to assist in the mastery of flesh. The hegemony of biomedical realism
has spilled over into the arena of social policy creating practices that divide the
eligible from the ineligible.41 The centrality of diagnosis is invoked by the law through
its insistence on certification under the gaze of experts with power to render corporeal
anomaly significant or not. A classic example of this, is the continued use of intelligence tests
within the World Health Organisation WHO classificatory system42 and disability
legislation,43 despite serious concerns about their validity.44 In respect of the broader
definition of the disablised body, the World Health Organisation WHO introduced in 1980
the International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps.45 Whilst allowing
for the realisation of social contexts, this model is infused within a biomedical discourse, for it:
conserves the notion of impairment as abnormality in function, disability as not being able to
perform an activity considered normal for a human being and handicap as the inability to
perform a normal social role. (Oliver 1990: 4) Leaving aside the problematic concept of
normalcy, vis vis class, race and sex, such an understanding of disablement is not surprising,
for the classification is grounded to be fully integrated with the International Classification of
Disease (Bickenbach 1993: 25). A biomedical meta-narrative of disability enables the
formulation of legislative definitions46 that can extrapolate from the general to the particular,
negating the corporeal specificity of the individual in question. The so-called objectivity of the
bio-medical paradigm in measuring the self-evidence of disability reaches its zenith in the
utilisation of tables of maims, for an assessment of percentiles of loss and rarely discloses the
basis of normative judgements47 (Bickenbach 1993: 87).
Teaching critical analysis challenges the universitys monopoly on

truth
Darts 4, Prof at U of Arizona, Visual Cultural Jam: Art, Pedagogy, and Creative Resistance,
https://steinhardt.nyu.edu/scmsAdmin/uploads/001/665/VisCultJAM.pdf
Political Edutaiiiment As we look backwards then from the first decade of the 21st century, it
readily becomes apparent how ubiquitous and pervasive the connections between
art, culture, ideology, and power continue to be. It seems almost natural, for instance,
that the CIA would have funded many of the international exhibitions of American Abstract
Expressionism during the Cold War,l that Fleetwood'Mac would have been asked tt play their hit
song "Don't Stop (Thinking About Tomorrow)" 'at Bill Clinton's inaugural gala (or that Clinton
would play his sax6ohone on MTV in what would turn out to be a defining moment in his 1992
presidential campaign); or that pop cultural icons from Ronald Reagan to Jesse "The Body"
Ventur'a, to Arnold Schwarzenegger would have run and been elected to high public office: It'
appears that we have become rather comfortable mixing our entertainment with our politics. As
postmoderri theorists like Jameson (1984, 1991) and Kincheloe (1993, 2003a) have pointed
out,'the postmodern era bf the last'30 to 40 years has witnessed a transformatiori of the
culiural dAmain into';what is now considered to be the most important political areha.
Kineh'eloe (2003a) notes thit "[al reas that were once considered trivial venues of
entertaiinment by 'political analys'ts are no"w used fort profound political Pedudation!' (p' 78);.
This shift in sites of political consciousness from the political to the cultural' realm
has important implications for teachers generally and fdr art educators specifically.
Teachers who are committed to.-examining social justice. issues and fostering democratic
principles' through their teaching are obliged to consider how their pedagogical practices attend
to the complex connections between culture and politics, and ought to evaluate how
effectively their courses prepare their students to engage as thoughtful and' informed citizens
within the contemporary cultural sphere. Though attending to these questions might
ultimately be the responsibility of all teachers, because of the inseparability of the
cultural from the aesthetic, art educators are ostensibly the best placed within schools to
directly attend to these commitments. In fact, this disciplinary positioning inside schools
has been one of the motivations in recent years for some art education theorists to call: for the
implementation of visual culture forms of art education.
Prefer our arguments theyre based on comprehensive research that
critical pedagogy in the university motivates resistance
Darts 4, Prof at U of Arizona, Visual Cultural Jam: Art, Pedagogy, and Creative Resistance,
https://steinhardt.nyu.edu/scmsAdmin/uploads/001/665/VisCultJAM.pdf
Resistance theory, a branch of critical pedagogy that' emerged' in the late 'l970s, is based on the
egalitarian notion that 'youth resistance in schools' might offer a basis for social
transformation by undermining the production of dominant social structures and
power relations (Giroux, 1983; Hall & Jefferson, 1976; Willis, 1981). Resistance theorists
have pointed out that schools are not ideologically neutral sites of learning and have challenged
their ostensible roles as democratic institutions. By uncovering the existence of school-based
opposition and resistance, particularly by rebellious groups of adolescents, resistance theory
has proven to be an influential approach in revealing the role that schools play in
the reproduction of the social relations of communities, the work- place and society as
a whole. Research 'on teenage subcultural groups conducted at England's Birmingham
Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies during the 1980s demonstrated how dominant
systems of social and cultural reproduction are consistently met with 'some degree of resis-
tance and opposition (Trend, 1992). McLaren (1989) has argued that resistance allows
students from subordinated groups to incorporate their street corner culture into
the classroom in an attempt to make schooling acknowledge their identities and
lived experiences.
1. starts with disability but never ends with it

Kincaid 13, Towards a Critical Global Disability Studies: A Case Study of the African Youth
with Disabilities Network Dissertation for the degree of MSc International Development
University of Bath Kelly Kincaid
As Goodley (2012) describes, CDS starts with disability but never ends with it: disability
is the space from which to think through a host of political, theoretical and practical issues that
are relevant to all. CDS have offered challenges to universalizing frameworks, and particularly
to the social model (Goodley, 2012); these critiques have not been universally appreciated (see
Oliver and Barnes, 2012). For Corker and Shakespeare, however, addressing the theoretical
deficit of the social model is an effort to: contribute to the emancipation of people with
disabilities whoever they are, and whatever they decide that emancipation means,
and to the development of inclusive societiesthinking globally and acting
locally at the same time (Corker and Shakespeare, 2002: 15) 1 Goodley (2012) further
asserts a global CDS can provide a lifted-out space in which activism and theory are
intertwined, in concert with contemporary lives, the complexities of alienation
and the rich hopes of resistance (Lash, 2011 in Goodley, 2012: 11).19 In Disability and the
majority world a neo-colonial approach, Grech (2012: 52) coins and describes a Critical Global
Disability Studies (CGDS) project that reflects a critical disability studies that is open,
situated around prioritising, engaging with and learning about the Global South in
its full complexity. This project engages with bodies positioned at the anxious intersection
of the global and the local (ibid: 54), examining disability across cultures, circumstances and
contexts, in which the meaning of disability is constantly changing. The CGDS project moves
disability beyond oppression, calling for an exploration of family relations. The body in disability
is accentuated. CGDS is grounded in and conversant with local contexts, socio-economics,
micro-politics, cultures, issues of poverty and global dimensions of power (Grech, 2011: 98).
This makes disability a launching point for the study of other

oppressions
Kincaid 13, Towards a Critical Global Disability Studies: A Case Study of the African Youth
with Disabilities Network Dissertation for the degree of MSc International Development
University of Bath Kelly Kincaid
2.3 From the Global to the Local: Bodies That Matter Social model stalwarts have long argued
that disablement is nothing to do with the body (Oliver, 1996: 35 in Anastasiou and Kauffman,
2010: 141); alternatively, critical theorists assert that bodies are profoundly social, that the
body and its materialitycan hardly ever shift out of focus (Grech, 2012: 62). 2.3.1 Marked by
Global Power Recalling Goodley (2011), disability is a launching point from which to
explore issues of geopolitical power and imperial consequence; bodies are sites of
the global production of disability (Meekosha, 2008; Grech, 2012; Barker and Murray,
2010). These are the politics of impairment (Meekosha, 2008), largely left outside development
discourse due to social model disability/impairment distinctions (Meekosha and Soldatic, 2011;
see Barnes and Sheldon. 2010). Within a WENA understanding of disability rights, the body
operates in social dynamics; Meekosha and Soldatic (2011: 1385) draw upon Connells
ontoformative frame to discuss social dynamics in the body. Bodies bear the mark of global
power and this becomes embodied as a social reality (ibid). Grech (2012: 54) refers to
neocolonised bodies, ruled over indefinitely by virtue of and through their specific geopolitical,
historical and ontological location.
2. Lesson Learning disability studies informs the study of other

oppressions
Knoll 12, Kristine Knoll studies Gender and Womens studies at the University of
Washington, Feminist Disability Studies: Theoretical Debates, Activism, Identity Politics, &
Coalition Building,
https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/20505/Knoll_washin
gton_0250E_10341.pdf.txt?sequence=2
Alison Kafer also noted how disability studies gave more depth to her cultural analyses
of bodies, even beyond disability to additional bodily experiences such as queerness: I do
think that disability studies has pushed me to think of the specificities of Bodies maybe
in ways I dont know if I would have otherwise. I mean feminist studies and feminist theories are
very much interested in bodies. And there are feminists who dont do disability who talk
about embodiment and embodied experience, but I think disability studies helped me see that
more. It actually made me think about bodies in their particularity, about the different
cultural weights different kinds of bodies bear, and about bodies in terms of feminist, queer, or
crip resistance.31 Disability studies provides new layers of analyses for bodily
experiences from the intersectional influences of sexism and ableism on feminism
to the influences of compulsory heterosexuality and able-bodiedness on
queerness.
But if you think the 1ac and their performance are mutually exclusive
you just vote for the perm precisely because it is incoherent
conflicted spaces best spark activism by broadening our horizons
the absence of conflict is emblematic of violent suppression
Coalition Building,
Disability studies discussions about the extent to which impairment is socially constructed, in
comparison to disability, reveal some of our distorted realities around how we view
and address our world and each other, including within minority groups (i.e.
oppressed people can oppress those within their own group with their own distorted
ideologies around identity). These conflicted, relational spaces create a spark that
helps us see various theoretical paths that may or may not hold more potential for
political action to address a social injustice. It provides an insight and opportunity
for activism. It is exciting because such contested spaces hold unlimited amounts of
potential, depending on how we engage with this political process around our identities. Such
debates around impairment among feminist disability studies scholars helps address
internalized sexism and compulsory able- bodiedness in feminist, disability studies,
and feminist disability studies circles, for example. What became clear through my research is
that feminist disability studies scholars are very concerned with how we participate in the
political process around identities, so that it not only continues, but gains speed. To leave room
for such conflicted debates of identity (e.g. identity politics and identity-based politics), many of
my participants discussed the dialectical nature of identity-based politics. Several participants
named to one degree or another that we have to risk the negative responses, such as exclusion
and isolation, when we bring up identity theories that may challenge concepts already
established by a group, because of the potential that it holds to create further liberation. At the
same time, we must work to figure out how to make such spaces better able to
sustain contentious positions and keep people included and engaged. This process,
although often difficult and dialectical in nature, makes it possible for us to see potential ways to
address oppression and then to take action to change our world.
Absent this friction emancipatory politics regresses into oppression

Coalition Building,
Identity politics and identity-based politics often determine who explores dimensions of trust
and when and how to explore them, in hopes of achieving a mutual goal of a less oppressive
society. It is inevitable that a variety of theories and methods emerge as identity or minority
groups form and wish to address a social inequality, and that these theories, methods, and goals
may be mutually supportive or in conflict with theories and goals of other identity groups
goals and theories, possibly at the same time. This is identity politics. Identity politics,
understandably, has a negative connotation because Other identity group goals often get
run over or ignored in one groups drive to address a particular social injustice.
These moments of conflict can provide clarity, however, as they provide a unique
opportunity to see a social justice issue and address it. The concern, of course, is that
the clarity that occurs when conflict happens between identity groups is not taken
up and addressed. Yet, such issues open up the potential for activism and change,
and this aspect of identity politics can be positive and lead us to practicing
identity-based politics, where we make a concerted effort to be proactive and avoid
reinforcing one form of oppression while breaking down another.
2ac Rage
Only the aff prevents rage from being subverted by ableist structures -
-- rage is coded as irrational and disabled and ultimately is
dissipated by chemical constraints, straight-jackets and ableist
technologies of sedation --- this proves the 1acs organizing towards
institution and prison abolition is necessary for indigenous
resissttance
Ogden 14 [2014, Stormy Ogden, The Prison-Industrial-Complex in Indigenous California,
pp. 57-58 in Global Lockdown: Race, Gender, and the Prison-Industrial Complex]
I write this chapter from the position of a California Indian woman, a tribal woman of
Yokuts and Pomo ancestry. I also write as an ex-prisoner and a survivor of colonization. At the
beginning of the colonization process two tools of genocide were forced upon Native people: the
bottle and the bible. Along with these tools the traditional ways of behavior and
conduct of Native people were criminalized . State and federal governments
defined Native Americans as deviant and criminal through such procedures as the
Dawes Act. With the enforcement of these new laws, Native people were locked up
in a spectrum of punishing institutions , including military forts, missions,
reservations, boarding schools, and more recently, state and federal prisons. Historically, the
most brutal methods of social control have been directed at a societys most
oppressed groups. In North America, the groups that are most likely to be sent to jail
and prison are the poor and people of color. A large proportion of people who end
up behind bars are indigenous . On any given day, one in twenty-five Native
Americans are under the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system, a rate that is
2.4 times that of whites. Native American women are particularly targeted for
punishment. For example, Native American women in South Dakota make up 32
percent of the prison population but only 8.3 percent of the general population.
Angela Y. Davis describes the prison-industrial complex as a complex web of
racism, social control, and profit . The experience of racial subordination,
repression, and economic exploitation is not new to the Native people of these
land. From the missions to the reservations, California Indians have struggled for survival in
the face of an array of brutal mechanisms designed to control and eliminate the regions first
peoples. The prison-industrial complex was built on the ancestral lands of the
indigenous people of this continent and has contributed to the devastating
process of colonization . It is essential for prison scholars and activists to understand the
colonial roots of the prison-industrial complex and to make visible the stories of Native
prisoners.
Focus on changing the self is counterproductive --- yes, theyd like to
move from local to large-scale analysis but theyll get infinitely bogged
down at square one that they cant move past -- makes the alt a
palliative, and perpetuates the status quo
Tonn 5 assoc. prof of comm. @ u of Maryland
(Mari, Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public , Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-
430)
Approaching public controversies through a conversational model informed by

therapy also enables political inaction in two respects. First, an open-ended process
lacking mechanisms for closure thwarts progress toward resolution. As Freeman
writes of consciousness raising, an unstructured, informal discussion [End Page 418]
"leaves people with no place to go and the lack of structure leaves them with no way of
getting there."70 Second, the therapeutic impulse to emphasize the self as both
problem and solution ignores structural impediments constraining individual
agency. "Therapy," Cloud argues, "offers consolation rather than compensation,
individual adaptation rather than social change, and an experience of politics that
is impoverished in its isolation from structural critique and collective action. "
Public discourse emphasizing healing and coping, she claims, "locates blame and
responsibility for solutions in the private sphere. "71 Clinton's Conversation on
Race not only exemplified the frequent wedding of public dialogue and therapeutic
themes but also illustrated the failure of a conversation-as-counseling model to
achieve meaningful social reform. In his speech inaugurating the initiative, Clinton said,
"Basing our self-esteem on the ability to look down on others is not the American way . . .
Honest dialogue will not be easy at first . . . Emotions may be rubbed raw, but we must begin."
Tempering his stated goal of "concrete solutions" was the caveat that "power cannot compel"
racial "community," which "can come only from the human spirit."72 Following the
president's cue to self-disclose emotions, citizens chiefly aired personal experiences
and perspectives during the various community dialogues. In keeping with their talk-
show formats, the forums showcased what Orlando Patterson described as "performative
'race' talk," "public speech acts" of denial, proclamation, defense, exhortation, and even
apology, in short, performances of "self" that left little room for productive public
argument. 73 Such personal evidence overshadowed the "facts" and "realities"
Clinton also had promised to explore, including, for example, statistics on
discrimination patterns in employment, lending, and criminal justice or expert
testimony on cycles of dependency, poverty, illegitimacy, and violence. Whereas
Clinton had encouraged "honest dialogue" in the name of "responsibility" and
"community," Burke argues that "The Cathartic Principle" often produces the
reverse. "[C]onfessional," he writes, "contains in itself a kind of 'personal
irresponsibility,' as we may even relieve ourselves of private burdens by befouling
the public medium." More to the point, "a thoroughly 'confessional' art may enact a
kind of 'individual salvation at the expense of the group,'" performing a "sinister
function , from the standpoint of overall-social necessities."74 Frustrated
observers of the racial dialoguemany of them African Americansechoed
Burke's concerns. Patterson, for example, noted, "when a young Euro-American woman
spent nearly five minutes of our 'conversation' in Martha's Vineyard . . . publicly confessing her
racial insensitivities, she was directly unburdening herself of all sorts of racial guilt feeling.
There was nothing to argue about. "75 Boston Globe columnist Derrick Z. Jackson
invoked the game metaphor communication theorists often link to [End Page 419] skills in
conversation,76 voicing suspicion of a talking cure for racial ailments that included
neither exhaustive racial data nor concrete goals. "The game," wrote Jackson, "is to
get 'rid' of responsibility for racism while doing nothing to solve it." 77
That actively nourishes the hegemony of liberalism

430)
Fourth, a communicative model that views public issues through a relational,

personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political inaction.
Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is achieving an instrumental
goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops
with self-expression. As Schudson puts it, "Conversation has no end outside
itself." 39 Similarly, modeling therapeutic paradigms that trumpet "talking cures" can
discourage a search for political solutions to public problems by casting cathartic
talk as sufficient remedy. As Campbell's analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the
women's liberation movement points out, "[S]olutions must be structural, not merely
personal , and analysis must move beyond personal experience and feeling . . .
Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign . . . [but] only
the very limited realm of therapeutic, small group interaction."40 Finally, and related,
a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to locate the source and
solution to such ills solely within the individual , the "self-help" on which much
therapy rests. A postmodern therapeutic framing of conflicts as relational misunderstandings
occasioned by a lack of dialogue not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring
(rather than, say, irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, provides cover for
ignoring the structural dimensions of social problems such as disproportionate black
[End Page 412] poverty. If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction, as Sheila McNamee claims,
all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material
circumstance, enabling defenders of the status quo to admonish citizens to "heal"
themselves.
Even if you conclude that we can only change ourselves, orienting our
praxis towards big targets best mobilizes action against micro and
macro oppression in a multi-front struggle
Best and Kellner 1 - Assoc. Prof Phil. and Human. U Texas and Phil. Of Ed. Chair 2001
(Steven and Douglas, Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future, Illuminations,
http://www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell28.htm)
The emphasis on local struggles and micropower, cultural politics which redefine the political,
and attempts to develop political forms relevant to the problems and developments of the
contemporary age is extremely valuable, but there are also certain limitations to the dominant
forms of postmodern politics. While an emphasis on micropolitics and local struggles can be a
healthy substitute for excessively utopian and ambitious political projects, one should not lose
sight that key sources of political power and oppression are precisely the big
targets aimed at by modern theory, including capital, the state, imperialism, and
patriarchy. Taking on such major targets involves coalitions and multi-front
struggle, often requiring a politics of alliance and solidarity that cuts across group
identifications to mobilize sufficient power to struggle against, say, the evils of capitalism or the
state. Thus, while today we need the expansion of localized cultural practices, they attain
their real significance only within the struggle for the transformation of society as
a whole. Without this systemic emphasis, cultural and identity politics remain confined to the
margins of society and are in danger of degenerating into narcissism, hedonism, aestheticism, or
personal therapy, where they pose no danger and are immediately coopted by the culture
industries.
1ar
Rage doesnt get anyone off the land --- focusing on personal survival
strategies and therapeutic expressions of anger is a palliative that
forecloses the necessity of broader change --- finishing the Tonn card
430)
Such personal evidence overshadowed the "facts" and "realities" Clinton also had
promised to explore, including, for example, statistics on discrimination patterns in
employment, lending, and criminal justice or expert testimony on cycles of
dependency, poverty, illegitimacy, and violence. Whereas Clinton had
encouraged "honest dialogue" in the name of "responsibility" and "community," Burke
argues that "The Cathartic Principle" often produces the reverse. "[C]onfessional,"
he writes, "contains in itself a kind of 'personal irresponsibility,' as we may even
relieve ourselves of private burdens by befouling the public medium." More to the
point, "a thoroughly 'confessional' art may enact a kind of 'individual salvation at
the expense of the group,'" performing a "sinister function , from the standpoint
of overall-social necessities."74 Frustrated observers of the racial dialoguemany
of them African Americansechoed Burke's concerns. Patterson, for example, noted,
"when a young Euro-American woman spent nearly five minutes of our 'conversation' in
Martha's Vineyard . . . publicly confessing her racial insensitivities, she was directly
unburdening herself of all sorts of racial guilt feeling. There was nothing to argue
about. "75 Boston Globe columnist Derrick Z. Jackson invoked the game metaphor
communication theorists often link to [End Page 419] skills in conversation,76 voicing
suspicion of a talking cure for racial ailments that included neither exhaustive
racial data nor concrete goals. "The game," wrote Jackson, "is to get 'rid' of
responsibility for racism while doing nothing to solve it." 77
That actively nourishes the hegemony of liberalism

430)
Fourth, a communicative model that views public issues through a relational,

personal, or therapeutic lens nourishes hegemony by inviting political inaction.
Whereas the objective of conventional public argument is achieving an instrumental
goal such as a verdict or legislation, the aim of social conversation generally stops
with self-expression. As Schudson puts it, "Conversation has no end outside
itself." 39 Similarly, modeling therapeutic paradigms that trumpet "talking cures" can
discourage a search for political solutions to public problems by casting cathartic
talk as sufficient remedy. As Campbell's analysis of consciousness-raising groups in the
women's liberation movement points out, "[S]olutions must be structural, not merely
personal , and analysis must move beyond personal experience and feeling . . .
Unless such transcendence occurs, there is no persuasive campaign . . . [but] only
the very limited realm of therapeutic, small group interaction."40 Finally, and related,
a therapeutic framing of social problems threatens to locate the source and
solution to such ills solely within the individual , the "self-help" on which much
therapy rests. A postmodern therapeutic framing of conflicts as relational misunderstandings
occasioned by a lack of dialogue not only assumes that familiarity inevitably breeds caring
(rather than, say, irritation or contempt) but, more importantly, provides cover for
ignoring the structural dimensions of social problems such as disproportionate black
[End Page 412] poverty. If objective reality is unavoidably a fiction, as Sheila McNamee claims,
all suffering can be dismissed as psychological rather than based in real, material
circumstance, enabling defenders of the status quo to admonish citizens to "heal"
themselves.
Affect focus undermines effective politics

Barnett, Faculty of Social Sciences The Open University (UK), 8
(Clive, Political affects in public space: normative blind-spots in non-representational ontologies,
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers Vol. 33, Issue 2, p. 186200)
The ontologisation of theory has been associated with a strong preference for models of ethical and
political agency that focus attention upon embodied, affective dispositions of subjects. This reflects the
influence of various theoretical and philosophical traditions that share a deep suspicion of
cognitivist, intellectualist or mentalist construals of human action. This follows from a widely
shared intuition that propositional knowing-that is a function of embodied knowing-how. Once it
is acknowledged that knowing-how involves all sorts of learned, embodied dispositions that are
inscribed in various types of unconscious disposition of anticipation and response, then theoretical
traditions that are too partial to a picture of a social world governed by rules, principles and
practices of reason seem constricted or even wrong-headed. Consistent with the ontological drift of
certain strands of cultural theory and Continental philosophy (Hemmings 2005; White 2000), in
human geography affect has become the sort of thing one can have a theory of, where this amounts to
the correct delimitation of the ontological status of affective forces (e.g. Anderson B 2006;
Anderson and Harrison 2006; McCormack 2007). Thrift (2004a, 464; 2007, 22335) identifies a
family of research fields concerned with affect: cultural-theoretic work on performance ; Sylvan
Tomkins seminal work on affect; Deleuze's reading of Spinoza; and Darwinian accounts.
Psychoanalysis is also acknowledged as a source, somewhat reluctantly. So-called non-
representational theory (Thrift 2007) derives a highly abstract definition of affect from this range
of work. Affect is presented as an ontological layer of embodied existence, delimited by reference to
the purely formal relationship of the capacity to be affected and to affect. In this presentation,
affect is doubly located: in the relational in-between of fields of interaction; and layered below the level of
minded, intentional consciousness. This vocabulary of the layering of thinking, feeling and judgement
is fundamental to the political resonances claimed on behalf of ontologies of affect. In principle,
post-foundational philosophies which acknowledge that practical reasoning goes on against a
background of affective dispositions and desires could be expected to reconfigure what,
following Ryle (1949, 10), we might call the logical geography of action. However, when the
post-foundationalist avowal of the importance of embodied knowing-how is interpreted in terms
of layer-cake ontologies of practice, there is a tendency to simply assert the conceptual priority of
previously denigrated terms affect over reason, practice over representation. Disputes over the
significance for social science of post-foundationalist philosophy turn on the types of priority-claim
that are assumed to follow from ontological assertions that ready-at-handedness, background or
affective attunement stand as the background to embodied action. The ontologisation of affect in recent cultural theory is associated with the explicit adoption of a layer -cake interpretation of the relationship between practice and expression.
Layer-cake interpretations present propositional intentionality as resting upon a more basic level of pre-conceptual, practical intentionality in such a way as to present propositional intentionality as derivative of this layer of practical attunement (Brandom 2002, 328). On this view, the practical presupposition of the available, ready-at-hand qualities of environments in embodied actions that treat these environments as merely occurrent, or present-at-hand, is interpreted as implying an order of conceptual priority of the practical
(Brandom 2002, 332). This model of conceptual priority puts in place a view of practical attunement as a stratum that is autonomous of propositional intentionality. It is treated as a layer that could be in place before, or otherwise in the absence of the particular linguistic practices that permit anything to show up or be represented as merely there (Brandom 2002, 80). This view of practice as an autonomous layer therefore reproduces a representationalist view of representational practices in order to assert the superiority of an
avowedly non-representational stance. In contrast to this view, we might instead suppose that the priority of practice only holds in the order of explanation (Brandom 2002, 332). This implies that we cannot understand propositional intentionality without first understanding its dependence on practice, without supposing that this requires an understanding of practic e as an intentional layer that kicks-in before others. It means presuming that the capacity to represent things as being a certain way is the result of applying an
assertional-inferential filter to things available to us in the first instance as exhibiting various sorts of practical significance. (Br andom 2002, 80) This alternative interpretation does not assert the priority of one layer over another. Rather, it reconfigures our understanding of what we are doing when representational discourse breaks out, when we say that things are thus-and-so (Brandom 2002, 80). Rejecting the layer-cake interpretation of the type of priority that practice is said to have over propositional intentionality leads to a
reconfiguration of the pragmatics of expressive rationality. Rather than supposing that acts of expression are ways of transforming an inner content into an outer expression, in a representational way, we instead think in terms of acts of making explicit what is implicit, in an inferential way (Brandom 2001, 8). An interpretation in terms of the explanatory priority of practice therefore allows us to understand in inferential terms the embodied capacity for making explicit something one can do as something one can say. This is a
capacity to translate knowing how into a knowing that which is expressed in terms of commitments and entitlements, as pu tting it in a form in which it can both serve as and stand in need of reasons (Brandom 2001, 11). The sense of implicit in this holistic-inferential account does not presume that the reasons that can be made explicit were present as the maxims behind the actions to which they are retroactively attributed. It just means there is no sharp line between unarticulated know-how and explicit knowledge (Taylor
2000); and that the latter should be thought of as providing a step towards acknowledging the responsibilities entailed in ac tions. This interpretation of the order of priority that holds between different sorts of intentionality opens up the possibility of reconf iguring the logical geography of action. It supposes that different modalities of action enact their own validity conditions that can, in principle, be made explicit in public practices of giving and asking for reasons (e.g. Bridge 2007; Flyvbjerg 2001; Lovibond 2002). This
reconsideration of the pragmatics of expressive rationality reconfigures understandings of deliberation that underlie theories of democracy, justice and legitimacy (see Habermas 2000; Brandom 2000). This overlaps with attempts to develop thoroughgoing accounts of affective deliberation in contemporary democratic theory (e.g. Krause 2007; Hoggett and Thompson 2002). This work makes explicit the relevance of affective aspects of life for deliberative models of democracy that work up from the principle of affected interest,
according to which those affected by actions and outcomes should have some say in defining the parameters of those actions and outcomes. The upsurge of interest in the theme of affect speaks in compelling ways to a recur rent problem in democratic theory: how to respect citizens as competent moral agents whilst acknowledging the web of dependen t, conditioned relationships into which they are thrown. There is an extensive literature in political science on the role that non-rational sentiments, feelings and emotions play in
the political decisionmaking processes. This is a literature which is empirically grounded (e.g. Marcus 2002), and explicitly reconfigures understandings of the relationships between rationality, reason and action (e.g. McDermott 2004). The degree to which affective capabilities can be articulated with public procedures of democratic legitimacy is a central problem in post-Habermasian critical theory's project of describing the conditions of radical democratic, pluralistic constitutionalism (e.g. Habermas 2006; Honneth 2007;
Markell 2000). Berlant's (2005a) historiography of affective publics in American culture establishes that any and all political public spheres are shaped by affective energies, while Sed gwick (2003) and Riley (2005) have explored the affective dynamics of textual practices. In moral philosophy, affect is embraced as a means of rethinking the role of partiality in deliberative practices, for example in Baier's (1994) feminist ethics of moral prejudice which roots reason in affects, or in Blackburn's (1998) Humean reconstruction of
The key thought guiding these reconfigurations of affect-with-reason is the idea that rationality
practical reason.
emerges out of situated encounters with others. This same theme underwrites the work of political
theorists reconfiguring democratic theory around an appreciation of the affective registers of justice and
injustice, expressed in an emphasis on the arts of receptivity, of listening and acknowledging and
responding (e.g. Young 1997; Coles 2005). Thrift's spatial politics of affect and Connolly's
neuropolitics of media affects sits, therefore, in a much broader range of work that is concerned with
affective aspects of political life. But the examples noted above all focus on the affective aspects
of life without adopting a vocabulary of ontological layers, levels and priority. This is in contrast to the
characteristic ontologisation of affect in human geography. The ontologisation of affect as a layer of
pre-conscious priming to act reduces embodied action simply to the dimension of being attuned to
and coping with the world. This elides the aspect of embodied knowing that involves the capacity to
take part in games of giving and asking for reasons. While the ontologisation of theory in human
geography has been accompanied by claims to transform and reconfigure understandings of
what counts as the political, this project has been articulated in a register which eschews the
conventions of justification, that is, the giving and asking for reasons. This is particularly evident
when it comes to accounting for why the contemporary deployment of affective energy in the public
realm is bad for democracy. The contemporary deployment of anxious, obsessive and
compulsive affect in the political realm is presented as having deleterious consequences on the
grounds that it works against democratic expression (Thrift 2007, 253); contributes to a style of
democracy that is consumed but not practised (2007, 248); promotes forms of sporadic engagement
that can be switched on and off (2007, 240); and generally leads to certain dispositions being
placed beyond question. There is certainly a vision of democracy as a particular type of engaged
ethical practice at work in these occasional judgements (2007, 14), but the precise normative
force of this view is not justified in any detail. The eschewing of justification arises in part because
the content of these ontologies, which emphasise various layers of knowing that kick-in prior to
representation, is projected directly onto the form of exposition. There is a particular type of
authority put into play in this move. The avowedly anti-intentionalist materialism associated with
contemporary cultural-theoretic ontologies of affect closes down the conceptual space in which
argument and disagreement can even get off the ground (see Leys 2007). In contrast, and as outlined
above, the argument pursued here follows an avowedly non-representationalist perspective
according to which assertions of knowledge, including the types of knowledge asserted by ontologies of
affect, always stand in need of reasons, precisely because they emerge as reasons for certain sorts of
commitments and entitlements (Brandom 1996, 167). On this understanding ontological
assertions act as justifications, and are subject to the demand for justification. If placing things
in the space of reasons (McDowell 1994, 5) in this sense is not acknowledged as one aspect of
practice, then recourse to the ontological register closes down the inconclusive conversations upon
which democratic cultural politics depends (Rorty 2006).

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Conclusion: The Incarceration Matrix and the SociologicalImagination

This is emblematic of ableist normalcys exclusionary praxis which makes ongoing

II. Ableist Relations

This exposition is crucially important disability is the foundational justification for

Normality is a complex concept, with

***Gender modified --- MW

Teaching critical analysis challenges the universitys monopoly on

1. starts with disability but never ends with it

This makes disability a launching point for the study of other

2. Lesson Learning disability studies informs the study of other

Absent this friction emancipatory politics regresses into oppression

Approaching public controversies through a conversational model informed by

That actively nourishes the hegemony of liberalism

Fourth, a communicative model that views public issues through a relational,

That actively nourishes the hegemony of liberalism

Fourth, a communicative model that views public issues through a relational,

Affect focus undermines effective politics

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