Republic of the Philippines respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a
SUPREME COURT period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral damages. 4
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA
SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association
with Delfin Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent
was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general
systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations'
support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment
and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were
missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The report dated
September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin
Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave
Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of
Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by
Saldivar. Verba legis non est recedendumThe airconditioner was recovered only after
petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar. 1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar
violated company reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the
company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of
partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full
knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to
inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private
respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective
October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side.
But instead of submitting an explanations three (3) days later or on October 12,
1984 private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension,
which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick
leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing
that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her)
inability to refute and disprove these findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered
petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent
position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have received
were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay private
respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the
questioned resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse
of discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private
respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years'
backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in
conflict with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate
and decisive action on any employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The
suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders
airconditioning unit inside the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar.
Under such circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse
available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive
suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of
the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is
resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending investigation any
alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. 5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right
to due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private
respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving
her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went
directly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension
without giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold
that her eventual separation from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the
victim who has not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a
property right of which a person is not to be deprived without due process, but also
the compensation that should have accrued to her during the period when she was
unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except
for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who
is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employments,
the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee
except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when
authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. An employee who is unjustly dismissed
from work shall by entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and to backwages." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present
Constitution has gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and
economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-
poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new Article emerged on
Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
and political power for the common good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is
that it leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor
ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land
Roform and Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and
Human Rights. 9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized
and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits is may be provided by law. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the
Article an Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall ensure
the rights of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The
State may provide for compulsory arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor
which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the
intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of
labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least greater protection than
heretofore accorded them, regardless of the geographical location of the workers
and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who
substantially contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor
provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice
and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light
of the special importance that we are giving now to social justice and the necessity
of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our
Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not
to be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized cause provided by law
has assumed greater importance under the 1987 Constitution with the singular
prominence labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this transcendent
policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case
of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee,
or on the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or
justness of his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in
Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-
vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which
took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible
ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered down the
constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much
less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not
only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and
payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her
status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is
"to restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from which one had been
removed" 15 and in the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of
unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her
"whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement
has not been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the
outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying
reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time (22
years of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it would be
"inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no longer be
feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; 19 or
that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; 20 or
that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have
transpired which make execution on that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an
increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or
"strained relations" or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the
employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages
and separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the
wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full
backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is
clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived
from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the
valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly
express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. 26 The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in
the statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute
there should be no departure. Neither does the provision admit of any qualification.
If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-application
of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the
reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the
employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position
where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if
reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to
adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above
principles: where the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys
the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the
extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who was
in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers in commercial
and industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman of a non-profit organization
whose primary purpose is to facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign
individuals and organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy
Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately.
Otherwisey reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is
invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human
nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting
one's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily
separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that
his relationship with his employer had already become strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems
analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such
that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer and
employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule
mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in
transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR
points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its employees from
involving themselves with any company that has business dealings with GMCR.
Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the
partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is also a supplier of
GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable position as far as
petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a
circumstance did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst,
Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the procurement of
supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems and analysis
of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of
trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of
confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of
trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some basis which must be
convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed on mere
presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Salazar and
Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed reasonably that
complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's
investigation although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's
test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither
should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most
inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's
alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations' support
manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship
with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable
activities. Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the
records.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had
already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the
opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained obviously one-
sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the
alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice his side in
view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should have been carried out to
ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar
answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the
records, we find her to have been unlawfully dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is
ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages
equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years only.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
I
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 109005 January 10, 1994
JUAN D. VICTORIA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JESUS JAMES CALISIN, respondents.
Juan D. Victoria for himself and in his own behalf.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to section 2,
Article IX of the Constitution, to set aside (a) the Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated January 22, 1993, which certified respondent James Calisin as the highest ranking
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Albay and (b) its Resolution dated February
22, 1993, which denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner.
The issue in the case at bench is the ranking of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Albay for purposes of succession.
In the May 11, 1992 Elections, the following candidates from the first, second and third districts of the
Province of Albay were elected and proclaimed as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, to wit:
FIRST DISTRICT
Name No. of Votes Garnered
1. Jesus James Calisin 28,335 votes
2. Vicente Go, Sr. 17,937 votes
3. Clenio Cabredo 16,705 votes
SECOND DISTRICT For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on
1. Juan D. Victoria 32,918 votes the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered
2. Jesus Marcellana 26,030 votes voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election. (Emphasis ours)
3. Lorenzo Reyeg 23,887 votes The COMELEC came up with the following ranking of the top three Sanggunian members:
THIRD DISTRICT
1. Ramon Fernandez, Jr. 19,315 votes NAME District Registered Votes Percent Rank
2. Masikap Fontanilla 19,241 votes of Elected Voters Obtained Dist'n
3. Arturo Osia 17,778 votes Candidates
4. Nemesio Baclao 17,545 votes
ALBAY
(Rollo, pp. 27-28) CALISIN,
Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo JESUS JAMES B. 1st 130,085 28,335 21.78 1st
Azana automatically assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice- VICTORIA,
governor. Under the law, Azana's position as vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking JUAN D. 2nd 155.318 32,918 21.19 2nd
Sangguniang member, a post being contested by petitioner and private respondent. MARCELLANA
In answer to private respondent's petition for his declaration as senior Sanggunian member for the JESUS, M. 2nd 155.318 26,030 16.76 3rd
Province of Albay, the COMELEC issued a resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying him as first in
the order of ranking with petitioner herein as second ranking member. The COMELEC based its (Rollo, p. 14)
certification on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of
registered voters in the district. the votes obtained by each winning candidate of the total number of registered voters who actually voted.
Thus, on February 15, 1993, Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III of the Department of Interior and Local In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to
Government designated private respondent as acting Vice-Governor of the province. the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution which was denied on February [1992]).
22, 1993. In the case of Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206
Hence, this petition. SCRA 710 (1992), we held that:
Petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number of . . . Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statue is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the must be given it literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or
district who actually voted therein. He further argues that a district may have a large number of registered verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the
voters but only a few actually voted, in which case the winning candidate would register a low percentage valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or
of the number of votes obtained. Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of registered voters but will and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the
may have a big voters' turn-out, in which case the winning candidate would get a higher percentage of the meaning of the words, to have used words advisely, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
votes. Applying his formula, petitioner would come out to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member. words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there
Petitioner gives the following illustration: should be no departure. . .
1. for private respondent. Petitioner's contention is therefore untenable considering the clear mandate of the law, which leaves no
107,216 (actually voted)
room for other interpretation but it must very well be addressed to the legislative branch and not to this
x 28,335 (votes obtained) = 23.40%
Court which has no power to change the law.
129,793 (registered voters) Considering the foregoing, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing
(Rollo, pp. 24, 25 and 30)
2. for petitioner the Resolution dated January 22, 1993.
121,423 (actually voted) WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
x 32,918 (votes obtained) = 25.84%
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo,
154,665 (registered voters) Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
(Rollo, p. 9). Republic of the Philippines
We are not persuaded.
The Local Government provides: SUPREME COURT
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. Manila
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or EN BANC
G.R. No. 216691 July 21, 2015
vice-mayor concerned shall become governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of MARIA ANGELA S. GARCIA, Petitioner,
the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking Sanggunian member or, in case of
vs.
his permanent inability, the second highest ranking Sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice- COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE ALEJANDRE P. PAYUMO III, Respondents.
governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled DECISION
automatically by the other Sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein. VELASCO, JR., J.:
xxx xxx xxx Nature of the Case
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in conjunction with Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,
praying for the annulment of the September 10, 20141 and January 29, 20152 Resolutions of public
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), acting through its First Division and En Banc,
respectively, in Case No. EAC [AEL] 11-2014. The assailed rulings reinstated the election protest of
private respondent Jose Alejandre Payumo III (Payumo) and effectively reversed the trial courts ruling
that it was filed out of time.
The Facts
Petitioner Maria Angela S. Garcia (Garcia) and Payumo were candidates for the mayoralty race of
Dinalupihan, Bataan during the May 13, 2013 national and local elections. In the polls conclusion, Garcia
was proclaimed winner for having garnered 31,138 votes as against Payumos 13,292. The Office of the
Election of Dinalupihan then released to Payumo a certified copy of the printed Certificate of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation (printed COCP), bearing May 15, 2013 as the date of proclamation of the winning
mayoralty candidate. As per the records, the printed COCP reflected the signatures and thumbprints of the
members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC).3
On May 27, 2013, Payumo lodged an election protest4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 in Balanga,
Bataan (RTC), docketed as Election Protest No. DH-001-13, citing the alleged prevalence of fraud and
irregularities in all the clustered precincts of Dinalupihan, heightened by the Precinct Count Optical Scan
(PCOS) machines unreliability, casting doubt on the results of the counting and canvassing of
votes.5 Anent the timeliness of the recourse, Payumo claimed that from May 15, 2013, the proclamation
date appearing on the printed COCP, he had ten (10) days, or until May 25, 2013, within which to
challenge the election results. He added that since May 25, 2913 falls on a Saturday, he filed his protest on
the immediately succeeding working day, Monday, May 27, 2013.6
In answer,7 Garcia belied the allegations of fraud and urgently moved for the dismissal of Payumos
protest. She claimed that she was proclaimed mayor on May 14, not May 15, 2013, as indicated in the
manual Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (manual COCP) 8 issued by Dinalupihans
MBOC. She, thus, argued that the election protest was filed beyond the mandatory ten-day (10-day)
reglementary period for filing an election protest, which, as she claimed in this case, lasted only until May
24, 2013, a Friday. On the ground of belated filing, Garcia urged the RTC to dismiss the election protest
outright.9
On July 1, 2013, the RTC heard the motion for preliminary determination of the affirmative defense of
prescription. Members of the MBOC of Dinalupihan took the witness stand and testified that Garcia was
proclaimed on May 14, 2013 at around 5:00PM.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Giving credence to petitioners assertion, the RTC, through its Order10 dated February 18, 2014, dismissed
Payumos protest for being barred by the statue of limitations. The fallo of the Order reads. 11
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the election protest filed by protestant Jose Alejandre P. Payumo III on
May 27, 2013 is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed one day beyond the non-extendible period
provided under Rule 2, Section 7, in relation to Rule 2, Section 12 (c), of A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC, the 2010
Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials.
SO ORDERED.
In disposing the case, the trial court cited and relied on the individual declarations of the Chairman and the
two members of the MBOC of Dinalupihan, Bataan, as well as on the manual COCP, as sufficient proof
that Garcias proclamation took place on May 14, 2013.12
Undaunted, Payumo appealed the dismissal with the Comelec, docketed as EAC (EAL) No. 11-2014,
alleging that he cannot be faulted for relying on the May 15, 2013 date indicated in the printed COCP
since it was the official Comelec document signed by all the members of Dinalupihans MBOC; that the
manual COCP was only received by Garcia, and no one else; and that he had no representative when
Garcia was allegedly proclaimed the winner.
Rulings of the COMELEC
The Comelec First Division, by its September 10, 2014 Resolution, granted Payumos appeal thusly: 13
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is GRANTED. The Order dated February 17, 2014 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 5 is
hereby ordered to proceed with the adjudication of RTC-EP Case No. DH-001-13 and resolve the same
with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Ratiocinating in the following wise:14
Evidently, appellant could not be faulted for not relying on the COCP dated May 15, 2013 because that
was the only document officially furnished him. He was unaware of the alleged Manual COCP dated May
14, 2013. The election officer himself admitted to the trial court that he could not remember if he had
posted a copy of the May 14, 2013 Manual COCP on the bulletin board of the Sangguniang Bayan as
required by Comelec Resolution No. 9648. Neither did he furnish a copy thereof to the secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan and the Municipal Treasurer.
Additionally, the Comele First Division relied on the case of Federico v. Comelec 15 (Federico) and held
that the 10-day reglementary period ought to be reckoned from the time a party became in good faith of
the issuance of the COCP, which in this case, according to public respondent, is May 15, 2013, as
indicated in the printed COCP Payumo received.16
On reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc, by its assailed Resolution dated January 29, 2015, affirmed the
holding of the First Division and disposed Garcias motion in the following wise.17
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En Ban RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Protestee-Appellee Maria Angela S. Garcia for failing to show any reversible
error on the part of the First Division UPHOLD its Resolution dated 10 September 2014 granting
Protestant-Appellant Payumos Appeal.
SO ORDERED.
As held by the En Banc:
It would be tantamount to injustice should the 10-day period to file the Election Protest in this case be
reckoned or counted from May 14, 2013, the date indicated in the Manual COCVP as Protestee-Appelle
Garcias proclamation as winner since its copy was not even furnished to Protestant-Appellant Payumo.
Clearly, Protestant-Appellant Payumos only source of information as to the date of the proclamation of
Protestess-Appelle Garcia was the printed COCVP. It indicated 15 May 2013 as the date of Protestee-
Appellee Garcias proclamation as winner. Thus, his reliance on 15 May 2013, as the reckoning date of the
10-day period to file his Election Protest was in good faith. 18
Hence, the instant recourse.
The Issue
Succinctly put, the issue in extant case boils down to whether or not Payumos election protest was filed
out of time. On the main, Garcia contends that the reckoning date of the 10-day reglementary period is
from the actual date of proclamation, which is May 14, 2013. Meanwhile, Payumo counters that Garcia
was proclaimed on May 15, 2013, and assuming arguendo that it was done on May 14, 2013, as Garcia
insists the proclamation date to be, he cannot be faulted for relying on the date appearing on the printed
COCP he received.
Respondent Comelecs Consolidated Comment, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, echoes the
sentiment of Payumo that the latter could not have known that Garcia was proclaimed on May 14, 2015
because the printed COCP, which was furnished him, stated otherwise. The Comelec likewise alleged that
Garcia failed to establish that Payumo had a representative present at the exact moment Garcia was
proclaimed winner and, thus, assuming that it were true, he could not have known that Garcia was already
declared winner on May 14, 2015.
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition.
Garcias Proclamation Date
Pivotal in resolving whether or not Payumos election protest is barred by the statute of limitations is
ascertaining when the MBOC proclaimed Garcia as the winning mayoralty candidate. The significance of
verifying this proclamation date is underscored by Rule 2, Section 12 (c), in relation to Sec. 7 of the same
rule, A.M. No. 10-4-1 SC,19 otherwise known as the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before
the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials, which provisions pertinently state:
Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contest. the court shall summarily dismiss, motu proprio, an
election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on any of the following grounds:
(a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section 10;
(c) The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;
(d) The filling fee is not paid within the period for filling the election protest or petition for quo warranto;
and
(e) In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit is not paid within five (5) days from the
filling of the protest.
Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. The election protest or petition for quo
warranto shall be filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days counted from the date of
proclamation.
Jurisprudence teaches that the rule prescribing the 10-day reglementary period is mandatory and
jurisdictional, and that the filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives the court of jurisdiction
over the protest. Violation of this rule should neither be taken lightly nor brushed aside as a mere
procedural lapse that can be overlooked. The rule is not a mere technicality but an essential requirement,
the non-compliance of which would oust the court of jurisdiction over the case.20
Aware of the repercussions that befall an election protest belatedly filed, the private parties herein advance
two conflicting dates whence the reglementary period should reckon. But between the two proposed
reckoning date, May 14, 2013, as claimed by petitioner, appears to be the correct date of proclamation.
As can be recalled, the RTC, on July 1, 2013, conducted a motion hearing to determine the timeliness of
the election protest. Records reveal that during the said proceeding, the members of the MBOC testified in
the following manner:21
Court:
Please take your seats. So, Election Officer Leonilo Miguel, Municipal Treasurer Lani Penaflor. Ms.
Socorro Sacdalan, the resolution of the Motion to Resolve Affirmative Defense on the ground that the
protest was filed out of time will be resolved base on the answers that you will give this afternoon. So, the
first question of the Court is that, when did you officially proclaim the winning candidate, the protestee,
Maria Angela S. Garcia? You give your answers one by one. So, for Election Officer Mr. Miguel, what is
your answer?
Leonilo Miguel:
Sir, we proclaimed Maria Angela Garcia on May 14.
Court:
What time?
Leonilo Miguel:
At almost 5:00 oclock, sir.
Court:
So, take your seat first. And then Municipal Treasurer Lani Penaflor, as part of the members of the
[MBOC] of Dinalupihan, when did you officially proclaim Maria Angela Garcia as the winning mayor of
Dinalupihan, Bataan?
Lani Penaflor:
Can I give my statement, sir?
Court:
Please give up (sic).
Lani Penaflor:
I, Lani Penaflor, vice-chairman of the [MBOC], do hereby certify that our functions based on general
instructions and minutes on the consolidation, canvass and transmission of votes cannot proceed on the
second step due to the problem occurred on the memory card of precinct No. 15 of Brgy. Bangal, we
resulted to only 98.75% of votes canvass as of May 14, 2013. Due to this situation, the legal counsel of
candidate Herminia Roman and Renato Matawaran cited Resolution 9700 and used it as basis to proclaim
the winner since votes cast on precinct no. 15, Brgy, Bangal, will not affect the result and raking of local
candidates. The members who waited for the instructions of Atty. Rafael Olano, Regional Election
Director who will proceed to the process of Resolution 9700 and request threshold that this group canvass
to be used for the preparation of Manual Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the winning
candidate. I do also certify the I signed last May 14, 2013 the Manual Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation of the winning candidates pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 9700. On May 15, 2013 the
password has been received and the CCS will then proceed to the second step of the general instruction
and steps presented on the CCS laptop. Afterwhich the CCS then automatically proceed on the generation
and printing of CEF No. 29, COCP and other documents related thereto. I again certify that last May 15,
2013, signed the generated reports by the CCS, one of which is CEF No. 29, Certificate of Cancass and
Proclamation of winning candidates in compliance with the general instruction. Then we proceed on
electronically transmitting the result after signing all the documents as prescribed by the GI and generated
by the CCS. I assumed that our Election Officer strictly follows the rule on the investigation of Comelec
election forms and reports set forth by the Commission on Elections. Thank you.
Court:
Okay, thank you. Ms. Socorro Sacdalan, again, as a member of the [MBOC], Dinalupihan, Bataan, when
did you proclaim Maria Angela Garcia as the winning mayor for Dinalupihan, Bataan?
Socorro Sacdalan:
We proclaimed the winning candidate, Maria Angela S. Garcia, on May 14, 2013. Sir.
Court:
What time, if you recall?
Socorro Sacdalan:
At around 5:oo oclock p.m., sir.
As the members of the MBOC individually declared, Garcia was proclaimed winner of the mayoralty race
on May 14, 2013, not on May 15, 2013 as what erroneously appears on the printed COCP.
What is more, the testimony of municipal treasurer Lani Penaflor (Penaflor), vice-chairperson of the
MBOC, conveys an explanation for the discrepancy between the dates appearing on the manual and
printed COCPs- that on May 14, 2013, at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, Garcia was proclaimed
the winner after 98.75% of votes were already canvassed; that the proclamation was done in light of the
fact that the number of voters in the unaccounted clustered precinct could no longer affect the result of the
recently concluded polls; that the lowering of the threshold was approved by the Regional Election
Director; and that the manual COCP was prepared reflecting the result of the elections.
The procedure followed by the MBOC, as outlined by Penaflor, is consistent with Comelec Resolution
No. 9700,22wherein the Commission resolved, among others, that:
1. The Municipal, City. Provincial, District, and Regional Boards of Canvassers shall proclaim the
winning candidates on the basis of the last "Group Canvass Report" generated by the CCS. By manually
preparing a Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidates. supported by a copy of the
last generated "Grouped Canvass Report", even if not all results are received by their respective CCS:
Provided, That, the standing of the candidates will not be affected by the results not yet transmitted to, and
received by, the CCS, without prejudice to the ranking of the winning candidates. For this purpose,
attached as Annex "A" is the format of the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation to be manually
prepared by the boards of canvassers;
2. The Regional Election Directors are approve requests of boards of canvassers in their respective regions
to lower the canvassing threshold to enable said boards to generate the certificate of canvass for
transmission to the next level of canvassing, For this purpose, the National Support Center shall provide
all Regional Election Directors with the "ADMIN USERNAME" and corresponding "PASSWORD"
needed to lower canvassing threshold, and the appropriate instructions on how to set the lowered coming
from the said board.
Apparently, contrary to Payumos assertion, the manual COCP is the official Comelec document in cases
wherein the canvassing threshold is lowered, In fact, clear from the language of the Resolution is that the
winners, in such instances, are proclaimed "by manually preparing a Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation of Winning Candidate," the format for which is appended to Comelec Resolution No. 9700.
It is incorrect to state, therefore, that only the printed COCP can serve as basis for ascertaining the date of
Garcias proclamation. As in this case, it is the manual COCP which contains the true and exact date of
Garcias proclamation May 14, 2013, not the printed COCP.
Payumos reliance on the date appearing on the printed COCP is misplaced. To be sure, Comelec
Resolution No. 9700 is explicit that the printed COCP becomes necessary only for purposes of
transmitting the results to the next level canvassing, and not for proclaiming the winning candidates,
insofar as local government units whose canvassing thresholds have been lowered are concerned. The
manual COCP, in such cases, are more controlling. Furthermore, it appears that May 15, 2013 is the date
the printed COCP was generated, which, as the members of the MBOC claimed, the Comelec-issued
laptop does not allow to be modified.23 And as justified by the MBOC, they were only able to produce the
printed COCP on May 15, 2013, the day after the actual proclamation, because that was only when they
were able to retrieve from the Regional Election Director the username and password for generation the
document, denominated as CEF 29.24
As aptly concluded by the RTC.25
The declaration made by the individual members of the MBOC that the proclamation of protestee [herein
private respondent] was done on May 14, 2013, coupled with the issuance of the manual certificate of
canvass and proclamation on the same date, is sufficient proof that protestees proclamation was in fact
done on May 14, 2013 and not on May 15, 2013. The printed certificate of canvass and proclamation
already on May 15, 2013 was not meant to supersede the proclamation already been done on May 14,
2013, but only to comply with the "official format" of the COMELEC, according to Municipal Election
Officer Miguel. The printed document merely affirmed what had already been accomplished with the
manually written document.
Having established that Garcia was proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate on May 14, 2013, it is
then plain to see that Payumos election protest, dated May 27, 2013, was filed beyond the 10-day
reglementary period and ought to be dismissed outright.
The ruling Federico v. Comelec is not a precedent to the instant case
Payumo next seeks refuge under the case of Federico, in which the Court indeed nullified the
proclamation of therein petitioner Renato Federico (Federico) as mayor of Santo Tomas, Batangas even
though private respondent Osmundo Maligaya (Maligaya) filed the election protest more than ten (10)
days after such fact. There, the Court reckoned the 10-ady prescriptive period not from the date of
proclamation but from the date of proclamation but from the date Maligaya received notice of the event,
rendering the actual date of proclamation immaterial. It is this holding in Federico that Payumo adamantly
urges that We apply.
The argument is specious.
Guilty of reiteration, Rule 2, Sec. 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-1 SC provides:
Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. The election protest or petition for quo
warranto shall be filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days counted from the date of
proclamation.
The above provision is the procedural equivalent of Sec. 251 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code, which states:
Sec. 251. Election contests for municipal offices. A sworn petition contesting the election of a municipal
officer shall be filed with the proper regional trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate
of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after proclamation of the results of
the election.
As can be gleaned, Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the 10-day period ought to be
reckoned from the date of proclamation and not from the date of notice. As the elementary rule in statutory
construction goes, when the words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must
be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is
says.26 This is known as the plain-meaning or verbal egis rule, expressed in the Latin maxim "verba legis
non est recedendum," or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure." 27 Since the afore-
quoted provision, as couched, us clear and free from ambiguity, its literal meaning must be applied
without attempted interpretation.28
The rationale behind the non-extendible 10-day prescriptive period is not difficult to deduce every
candidate interested in the outcome of the election is expected to be vigilant enough in protecting his or
her votes and would, therefore, enlist the aid of volunteer pool watchers in every clustered precinct to
guard against or document possible irregularities, or that the candidate would personally be present at or,
at the very least, would send representatives to the to the canvassing areas to ensure the proper tallying of
votes and to monitor the real-time results of the elections as they are electronically transmitted.
Consequently, they are expected to know of the exact moment the winning candidate is proclaimed by the
board of canvassers concerned.
True, Federico appears to have deviated from the wording of Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code but
that is only due to the peculiarities of the said case. It must be stressed that Our ruling in Federico was
based on considerations not in all fours with the case at bar.
Recapitulating Federico, the MBOC of Santo Tomas, Bantangas, on May 11, 2010, printed a COCP
showing "SANCHEZ Edna P." (Edna) as the winning mayoralty Candidate. The prompted Maligaya to file
a Petition to Annul Proclamation against Edna Sanchez on May 20, 2010. However, the petition was later
withdrawn, as agreed upon by the parties, leading to the cases dismissal. Unknown to Maligaya, a second
print-out of the COCP was then issued by the MBOC, bearing the same date "May 11, 2010," crediting the
same number of votes garnered by Edna to Federico after the latter allegedly substituted Edna as
mayoralty candidate. Federico, through the second print-out, was then declared the winning mayoralty
candidate. Claiming that Maligaya only found out this fact on May 27, 2010, he filed an election protest
against Federico on June 1, 2010.
Affirming the Comelecs ruling that the election protest against Federico was timely filed, the Court
ratiocinated thusly:29
It has been argued that there is no evidence that Maligaya became aware of the issuance of the second
COCVP in favor of Federico only on May 27, 2010. In this regard, the Court believes that the actions
taken by Maligaya after the elections and the separate proclamations of Edna and Federico strongly
indicate that he was telling the truth. Indeed, there is no rhyme or reason why he should file a petition
questioning the proclamation of Edna if he had knowledge of the subsequent proclamation of Federico.
The Court adopts with approbation his reasoning on the matter. Thus:
5.35. Private respondent pursued and prosecuted this case with the knowledge that it was Edna Sanchez
who was proclaimed, until he came to know of the alleged proclamation of respondent Federico on May
27, 2010. Consequently, he filed another petition on June 1, 2010, this time against Federico, to annul his
proclamation. The June 1, 2010 petition was filed within ten days from the knowledge of the alleged
proclamation of Federico.
5.36. The filing of SPC NO. 10-022 demonstrates that private respondent Maligaya believed in good faith
that it was Edna Sanchez that was proclaimed and that he did not initially know that there was a COCVP
in the name of Federico. SPC No. 10-022 is also a proof that petitioner did not dilly daily in protecting his
rights. There simply is no reason and it runs counter to human conduct for Maligaya to file a petition for
annulment of proclamation of Edna Sanchez if he knew all along that it was Federico who was
proclaimed.
5.37. In the same manner, the filing of the present petition against Federico shows that the proclamation of
Federico was fraudulent or at least made surreptitiously.1wphi1 Had Maligaya known of the
proclamation of Federico, he should have outrightly filed the petition for annulment of proclamation
against Federico. But because it was made without any notice to the herein private respondent, he only
knew of it on May 27, 2010, thus, the petition on June 1, 2010. Private respondent did not certainly sleep
on his rights as he filed the proper petition within the prescribed period. He could not be penalized for
belated filing when, as shown above, the COCVP of Federico was surreptitiously accomplished. Thus, the
Comelec En Banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the interest of herein private
respondent Maligaya.
To begin with, we have considered in Federico the fact that petitioner Federico therein could not have
validly substituted Edna as mayoralty candidate in Santo Tomas, Batangas, and that as a non-candidate in
the mayoralty race, he cannot legally be declared and proclaimed the winner. Thus, the nullity of the
substitution consequently led to the nullity of the proclamation. 30 Here lies the difference.
More importantly, the circumstances in Federico that (1) there were actually two different proclamations
made by the MBOC, and (2) that the second proclamation was surreptitiously made were essential in Our
ruling therein. This is in stark contrast with the case at bench where there was only one proclamation,
which was, by no means, clandestinely made. Here, there is no dispute that there was only one mayoralty
candidate proclaimed winner. Thus, the only issues pertain to when such proclamation was done, and
which document accurately reported the same. In addition, there was no allegation whatsoever of a
surreptitious proclamation for Garcias proclamation was, in fact, publicly announced. As culled from the 2. Atty. Lowell John J. Fetizanan Nationalist Peoples Coalition Party
records, the members of the MBOC testified that Garcia was proclaimed on May 14, 2013 in a well- 3. Atty. Norby Caparas Herminia B. Roman
attended ceremony.31 4. Atty. Honey Lynco Liberal Party
Atty. Pomer: 5. Fernando P. Manalili Liberal Party (Jojo Payumo)
When you said you raised the hand of the winning candidate, protestee, Maria Angela Garcia, at 5:00 6. Ramon Alfonso T. Munez Liberal Party
7. Bohjee Bobby A. Yap Liberal Party
oclock in the afternoon of May 14, 2013, were there persons present?
8. Bro. Roy Quiambao PPCRV
Leonilo Miguel:
9. Reymond Fontailla Paralegal
Yes, sir/
10. Janette Oftana Watcher
Atty. Pomer:
11. Harold Cacacho Watcher
Would you know if among those who were present there was a representative from the protestant,
12. Carlos Caringal Lawyer
Payumo? Noteworthy is that apart from Manilili, Payumo had other representatives present during the canvassing
Socorro Sacdalan:
on May 13-14, 2013. Thus, even if we entertain Payumos postulation that Manilili did not stay long
I am not aware if there are representatives of the protestant because there were many persons, people
enough to witness the canvassing proceedings from start to finish, and that he was allegedly not present at
inside the center.
Court: least during Garcias proclamation, we, nevertheless, still cannot give credence to petitioners claim of
Question from the Court. Which exact place you said you proclaimed Maria Angela Garcia at 5:00p.m. on good faith. Payumo cannot plausibly feign ignorance of Garcias proclamation since knowledge of such
May 14? fact is attributable to him not only through Manalili, but also through the other party representatives.
Leonilo Miguel: Consequently, Payumo is then barred from otherwise claiming that Garcia was proclaimed mayor on May
At the session hall of the Sangguniang Bayan of Dinalupihan, Bataan. 14, 2013.
Court: Moreover, the fact that Payumo only received a copy of the printed, and not the manual COCP, is of no
So, Atty. Pomer, do you have any other questions? moment. For as the losing candidate, he is not, under the Comelec rules, even entitled to be furnished a
Atty. Pomer:
copy of the COCP. Section 30 of Comelec Resolution No. 964836 provides that insofar as the electoral
Yes, Your Honor. Were there other winning candidates that you proclaimed on that occasion aside from the
candidates are concerned, only the winners are entitled to a copy of the COCP, viz:
protestee? Sec. 30. Distribution of COCP and SOVs. The Board shall generate and print sufficient copies of the
Leonilo Miguel:
Yes, sir. We proclaimed the vice-mayor and the eight (8) councilors. COCP and one (1) copy of the SOV to be distributed as follows:
Court: a. MBOC/CBOC
Same, May 14, 5:00 oclock? 1. To the Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) of the commission;
Leonilo Miguel: 2. To be posted on the bulletin board of the municipal hall, supported by SOVP;
Yes, sir. 3. To the Chairman, MBOC/CBOC;
Atty. Pomer: 4. To the Secretary, Sangguniang Bayan/Panlungsod;
So, the proclamation tool placed (sic) in the session hall. Was that in the same place the canvassing took 5. To the Municipal Treasurer;
6. To a winning Candidate for Mayor; Winning Candidate for Vice- Mayor; and
placed (sic)?
7. To each winning Candidate for members of the Sangguniang Bayan/Panlungsod.
Leonilo Miguel:
The wording of the afore-quoted rule is pregnant with meaning. First, its literal interpretation is that only
Yes, sir.
Atty. Pomer: the winning candidates have the demandable right to be furnished a copy of the COCP. Second, it
And that during the canvassing, there were watchers and lawyers of the candidates present, is it not? amplifies the general rule that the prescriptive period ought to be reckoned from the actual date of
Leonilo Miguel: proclamation, not from notice through service of a COCP, since the losing candidates are not even
Yes, sir. required to be served a copy of the COCP in the first place. Lastly, it warns the candidates to be more
Indeed, there is a substantial distinction between the extant case and Federico which, in the latter, vigilant in monitoring the results of the elections for them to be conscious of the deadline for filing an
prevented Maligaya, through no fault of his own, from filing an election protest within the period election protest, should they opt to contest the results.
prescribed. In sum, the Court maintains the general rule that the reglementary period for instituting an election period
Petitioner Payumo cannot be deemed to have acted in good faith should be reckoned from the actual date of proclamation, not from the date of notice. Absent any
Further constrasting the case at bar with Federico, herein petitioner Payumos claim of good faith in relyin circumstances analogous to the factual milieu of Federico, a relaxation of the rules will not be warranted.
on the printed COCP fails to persuade. Finally, as regards the MBOCs alleged disregard of the requirement under Comelec Resolution No. 9648
"Good faith" is an intangible and abstract quality with no techinal meaning or statutory definition, and it to post copies of the COCP in the designated areas, and to serve them to the other winning candidates,
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to needless to say that they do not and could not invalidate Garcias proclamation. Neither do they toll the
defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from 10-day period to file an election protest in this case since Payumo is still deemed aware of the results by
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry.32 way of notice to his agent or agents. Instead, these alleged omissions merely expose the members of the
Here, knowledge of Garcias May 14, 2013 proclamation is attributable to Payumo since he was
MBOC to possible liability should it be proven that they deviated from procedure, which issue is not yet
represented by one Fernando Manalili (Manalili) during the canvassing proceeding, as per the minutes
ripe for Us to decide.
prepared by the MBOC.33Hornbook doctrine is that notice to the agent is notice to the principal.34 And as WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 10,
appearing in the minutes, several representatives were fielded by the Liberal Party, the political banner 2014 and January 29, 2015 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in Case No. EAC [AEL] 11-2014
under which Payumo filed his candidacy, to monitor the results real-time. 35 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the February 17, 2014 Order of the Regional Trial
May 13-14, 2013
1. Atty. Mary Kristine Reyes Chu NUP/Ma. Angela Garcia Albert Garcia
Court, Branch 5 in Balanga, Bataan, dismissing Petitioner Jose Alejandre Payumo IIIs election protest for
being barred by the statute of limitations is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
PREBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(On Official Leave)
MARIA LOURDES P.A SERENO*
Chief Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996
DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during
the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the
registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14,
1995, and set the recall election on November 13,
1995. 1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement
provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition.
On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To
prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan
City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a
temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining
order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be
cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC
approval. 2
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election
an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On
January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor
General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor
General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its
law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply. 3
Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year
from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996,
and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-
Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner
maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely
four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election
only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one
(1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
[Emphasis added]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an
elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together
with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a
recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's
interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the
novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by
initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to
be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular
local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering
inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to
enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a
statute. 5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being
construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained
away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. 6
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with
the Constitution. 7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically
paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X
of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."
Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance.
Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose
and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in
the spirit that vivifieth". . . 8
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must
be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year
immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next
regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the
official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor
elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall
provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office
held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b)
of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely
seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is
hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Paras v. COMELEC Case Digest
Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)
FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall
election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take
place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year immediately
preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first
Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
ISSUE:
W/N the SK election is a local election.
HELD:
No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered
together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective
local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the
letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase regular local election
to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election
rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the Court assumed that the legislature intended to
enact an effective law. An interpretation should
be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative
or nugatory.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-
Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY
REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING
MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the Civil
Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the
most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to
a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679)
interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in
the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor
of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence
upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el uno
al otro por amor que han de consuno, [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating
the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum
et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular
connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that
the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his
lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist lest the condition of those
who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family
law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to
concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER
SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. The lack of validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to
defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was
legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil
Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon to decide whether
the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The
plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a
donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee
Petronila Cervantes, was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it
was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latters stand. Hence this
appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of
ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B.
L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that year, is indicative of the appropriate response that
should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls
within the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the
acceptance of this Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiffs complaint alleging
absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question that the donation
made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article
of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely because such a
donation was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that
when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4
Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1)
That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena
executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land
in question on February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation
of the land to the defendant which took effect immediately was made during the common law relationship
as husband and wife between the defendant-done and the now deceased donor and later said donor and
done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on
September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister and
nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in
1962 and had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A
donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the
marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20,
1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses.
They became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had
been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between
the spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the
dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. We
reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista,
7 interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is,
in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in
favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI,
LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit.
1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to
persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that
assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other,
so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed
out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist,
lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the
cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage
should likewise attach to concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any other conclusion
cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a
laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be
differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is
right would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be
attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever
any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal
provision would not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of
the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice
Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin de
sus disposiciones. 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not
necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix
Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March
28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is
reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro
indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee, J, took no part.
Matabuena v. Cervantes Case Digest
Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)
FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena donated to
Respondent a parcel of land. Later the two were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister,
Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing Art.133 of the Civil Code
Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at
the time the deceased and Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.
ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
HELD:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason
for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue
influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this
prohibition shall not apply also to common-law relationships.The court, however, said that the lack of
the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the
Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix
and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-8639. March 23, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minors Pablo Vasquez Ernesto Vasquez, Maria Lourdes
Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik. LEOPOLDO PRASNIK, Petitioner-Appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Leopoldo Prasnik filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition seeking to adopt Pablo
Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez, Maria Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik who are the minor children of
Paz Vasquez. He claims that they are also his children but without the benefit of marriage and he desires to
adopt them to promote their best interest and well-being. Since at the hearing of the
petition Petitioner acknowledged that they are his natural children, the Solicitor General opposed the
petition on the plea that he could not legally adopt them for the reason that Article 338 of the new Civil
Code which allows a natural child to be adopted by his natural father refers only to a child who has not
been acknowledged as natural child. At first the court upheld the opposition but, on a motion for
reconsideration, the court reconsidered its decision and granted the petition. Hence this appeal.
Leopoldo Prasnik was formerly married to one Catherine Prasnik but their marriage was dissolved by
virtue of a decree of divorce issued on December 12, 1947 by the Circuit Court of Miami, Dade Country,
Florida, U.S.A. Thereafter, he and Paz Vasquez lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage and out of this relation four children were born who are the minors he is now seeking to adopt.
He claims that it is his intention to marry Paz Vasquez as soon as he is granted Philippine citizenship for
which he has already applied and in the meantime he wants to adopt them in order that no one of his
relatives abroad could share in his inheritance. He averred that he had no child with his former wife and
acknowledged said minors as his natural children.
Article 338 of the new Civil Code provides that a natural child may be adopted by his natural father or
mother. The Solicitor General interprets this provision in the sense that in order that a natural child may be
adopted by his natural father or mother there should not mediate between them an acknowledgment of the
status of natural child by the father or mother as otherwise the adoption would be repugnant to Article 335
of the same Code which denies adoption to one who has an acknowledged natural child. And
since Petitioner has expressly admitted in open court that the minors subject of this proceeding are his
natural children, he is therefore disqualified to adopt under the law.
We do not agree to this interpretation. Apparently, Article 338 above adverted to merely refers to the
adoption of a natural child and not to one who has already been recognized, but there is nothing therein
which would prohibit the adoption of an acknowledged natural child even if the law does not expressly
say so. The reason for the silence of the law is obvious. That law evidently intends to allow adoption
whether the child be recognized or not. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized
children, as contended, then the provision of Article 338 would be of no useful purpose because such
children could have been validly adopted even without it. And we say so because a natural child not
recognized has no right whatever 1 and being considered legally a total stranger to his parents, he may be
adopted under Article 337. The same cannot be said with regard to an acknowledged natural child because,
his filiation having already been established, his adoption cannot be made under the general principles
governing adoption (2 Manresa 5th ed., 80). There is therefore need of an express provision allowing the
adoption of an acknowledged natural child as an exception to the rule and that is what is contemplated in
the article we are considering.
The Solicitor General, in his opposition to the petition, invokes Article 335 of the new Civil Code which
provides that a person who has an acknowledged natural child cannot adopt and considering
that Petitioner has acknowledged the minors in question as his children, he contends that he is disqualified
from adopting them under that article. We believe that the Solicitor General has not made a correct
interpretation of that article for he is confusing the children of the person adopting with the minors to be
adopted. A cursory reading of said article would reveal that the prohibition merely refers to the adoption of
a minor by a person who has already an acknowledged natural child and it does not refer to the adoption
of his own children even if he has acknowledged them as his natural children.
It may be contended that the adoption of an acknowledged natural child is unnecessary because there
already exists between the father and the child the relation of paternity and filiation which is precisely the
purpose which adoption seeks to accomplish through legal fiction. But it should be borne in mind that the
rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than those of a legitimate child and it is indeed to
the great advantage of the latter if he be given, even through legal fiction, a legitimate status. And this
view is in keeping with the modern trend of adoption statutes which have been adopted precisely to
encourage adoption (In re Havagords Estate, 34 S. D. 131, 147 N. W. 378). Under this modern trend,
adoption is deemed not merely an act to establish the relation of paternity and filiation but one which may
give the child a legitimate status. It is in this sense that adoption is now defined as a juridical act which
creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation (4 Valverde, 473).
The cases cited by the Solicitor General are not in point. 2 In said cases the Petitioners had legitimate
children of their own and so their petitions were denied. They are indeed disqualified from adopting under
the law. In the present case however, Petitioner does not have any legitimate children and his main desire
is to give a legitimate status to his four natural children. This attitude, far from being opposed, should be
encouraged. This is in keeping with the modern trend of the law concerning adoption (In re Havagords
Estate, supra).
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ.,
concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant.
Valeriano V. Rovira for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor for
appellee.
PARAS, C. J.:
Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused an, after trial, convicted of the crime of illegal possesion of
fire-arms in the Court of First Instance of Lanao under the following information:
That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of Marantao, Province of Lanao, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep and have his custody and control one Riot Gun,
Winchester, 12 GA. SN-924131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions, without firs having obtained in proper
license or permit therefore from competent authority.
In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and of the firearm and ammunitions in
question, invokes as his legal excuse or authority therefor, the appointment issued him by Governor
Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953, which reads as follows:1awphi1.net
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
For having shown good faith by previously surrending to this Office a firearm, Datu Sumaguina
Macarandang of Kamalig, Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET AGENT of peace and order
campaigns and detention of crimes. Accordingly, he is hereby authorized to hold and carry in his
possession one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA. Serial No. 942131 with twenty(20) rounds of
ammunitions for the successful execution of his hazardous mission.
Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me from time to time all activities and
whereabouts of lawless and wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of Marantoa, as well as all
matters affecting tranquility therein existing.lawphi1.net
It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or
permit; but section 879 of the Revise Administrative Code provides, as shown at lease by the subject
matter therefor, that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms. The appointment of the accused as secret agent to the assist in the maintenance
of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace
officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and accused acquitted, with costs de officio. So
ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo. Labrador and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O.
C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the
appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a
sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold
that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962
reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section
878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth
Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the
13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully
and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik),
Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the
counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun
involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the
same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit
issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would
not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be
submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not
required to get a license for his firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their
authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22
revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on
August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof
from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your
Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty.
Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the
accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon.
Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; 1 another document likewise issued by
Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on
a confidential mission;2the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11,
1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated
that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of
whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt
from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were
given time to file their respective memoranda.1wph1.t
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one
day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in
favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . .
possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." 5 The next
section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors,
or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.
Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Trial Attorney
Josefina Domingo de Leon for appellee.
CONCEPCION, JR., J:
Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegal possesion of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay the
costs.
The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, accused Jesus Santayana, was appointed as
"Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On March 9, 1962, a Memorandum
Receipt 2 for equipment was issued in the name of the accused regarding one pistol Melior SN-122137
with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise issued an undated certification 3 to the effect that the
accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt
was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and
possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On October 29,
1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the above-described pistol with four
rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and
thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which
the accused was convicted of the crime charged with its corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was
appealed to US and the accused assigned three errors allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing of
this case.
Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are whether or not the present subject matter falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613; and whether or
not the appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently authorizes him to carry
and posses firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto.
Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section 87 of Republic Act No. 286, as
amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice over cases of illegal possession of firearms. But equally
the Court of First Instance of Manila, which took cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over the offense
charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296, Court of First Instance have original
jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six
(6) months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense charged in the
information is punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day nor
more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) or more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts over Criminal Cases in
which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or fine of not more
than two hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and original to said
courts. But considering that the offense of illegal possession of firearms with which the appellant was
charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day or more
than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos
or more than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act No. 4), the offense, therefore, does not fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The Court of First Instance has
concurrent jurisdiction over the same.
As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant was appointed as CIS secret agent
with the authority to carry and possess firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant was issued a firearm in the
performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. 5 It also appears that appellant was
informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for a license or to register the said
firearm because it was government property and therefore could not legally be registered or licensed in
appellant's name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm also informed the
latter that no permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because you are already appointed as CIS agent."
At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the case of People vs.
Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the
maintenace of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the
category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by
Section 879." The case of People vs. Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August
30, 1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant's appointment as secret
agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.
Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the decision appealed
from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted. The bond for his
provisional release is cancelled. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 2122 September 13, 1905
PEDRO T. ACOSTA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DAVID FLOR, defendant-appellee.
W.A. Kincaid for appellant.
Hartigan, Marple, Solignac and Gutierrez for appellee.
MAPA, J.:
It is alleged in the complaint that at the municipal elections held on the 1st day of December, 1903, in the
town of Laoag, Province of Ilocos Norte, the plaintiff and the defendant were candidates for the office of
municipal president of the said town; that as a result of the said election the plaintiff was elected to the
said office by a majority of 100 votes, and that notwithstanding this fact the defendant has usurped said
office and unlawfully held the same since the plaintiff was the person entitled to the exercise of said
office. The complaint further sets out other acts in regard to illegalities alleged to have been committed
during the election. The prayer of the complaint is to the effect that judgment be entered against the
defendant, excluding him from the exercise of such office and that the plaintiff be declared to be entitled
to the same and that he be given possession thereof, and for such other and further relief as the facts in the
case would warrant in favor of the plaintiff.
The case having proceeded to trial, the plaintiff introduced various witnesses, all and each of whom
testified to facts which, if true, would more or less gravely affect the legality of the election. Not a single
witness, however, confirmed the allegations contained in the complaint, to the effect that the plaintiff had
obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election, nor can it be inferred from the evidence introduced
by the plaintiff that he, as a result of the said election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the office of
municipal president of Laoag, now held by the defendant.
In view of the evidence introduced at the trial by the plaintiff, and before the defendant had presented his,
the court, on the latter's motion, acquitted the defendant, imposing the costs upon the plaintiff. The court
based its action upon the following grounds: (1) That the plaintiff could not maintain the action brought by
him because he had failed to establish his alleged right to the exercise of the office in question; and (2)
that there was no necessity to inquire into the right of the defendant to hold the said office for the reason
that this question had already been determined by the provincial board after a consideration of the various
protests presented to it in regard to irregularities committed during the last election held at Laoag for the
office of municipal president and other municipal officials, and for the further reason that the presumption
is that a person holding a public office was duly appointed or elected thereto.
The plaintiff excepted to his ruling of the court, moved for a new trial, and thereafter brought the case to
this court for review. An examination of the evidence of record supports the finding of the court below to
the effect that the plaintiff has failed to prove in any way, shape, or form that he was entitled to the office
in question, as alleged by him in his complaint. There is no dispute upon this question. The appellant,
himself, when the motion of the defendant to dismiss was argued, and from the decision of which he
appealed to this court, clearly admitted that he had failed to establish his right to the exercise of the office
in question. (Page 17 of the bill of exceptions.) And on page 52 of his brief, he also assumes that he had
been unable to establish his alleged right to the office in question.
The question that we have to decide, therefore, is whether, notwithstanding what has already been said,
and notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff has failed to show that he had any right to the office of
municipal president of Laoag, he can maintain an action such as this for the purpose of excluding the
defendant from the exercise of said office on account of illegalities alleged to have been committed in the
elections.
The right to maintain such an action is especially and expressly governed by the provisions of sections
197 to 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The code, after enumerating in sections 197 and 198 the cases in which such an action may be brought and
the persons against whom they may be brought, goes on to determine with careful distinction those who
have the right to maintain such action.
Section 199 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands, or the fiscal of any province, when
directed by the Chief Executive of the Islands, must commence any such action; and when upon the
complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the two preceding sections
can be established by proof, he must commence such action."
Section 200 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands or the fiscal for a province, may, at his own
instance, bring such an action, or he may, on leave of the court in which the action is to be commenced, or
a judge thereof in vacation, bring the action upon the relation of and at the request of another person; but,
if the action is brought at the request of and upon the relation of another person, the officer bringing it may
require an indemnity for expenses and costs of the action, to be given to him by the party at whose request
and upon whose relation the same is brought, before commencing it."
Finally, section 201, under the heading "An individual may commence such action," provides as follows:
"A person claiming to be entitled to a public office, unlawfully held and exercised by another, may bring
an action therefor."
If the legislator had intended to give to all citizens alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation of
public office, he would have plainly said so in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching
importance. A simple provision would have sufficed for this purpose. Far from it, the legislator has on the
contrary especially and specifically provided in sections 199, 200, and 201 who must and who may bring
such actions; and it is very clear that it was his intention to give such right to those expressly mentioned in
the above-cited sections and to no other, following the well-known rule of law "inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius." It has been noticed that the above referred to three sections only mention the Attorney-General,
the provincial fiscal, and the individual claiming to be entitled to the office unlawfully held and exercised
by another. It is to be inferred from this last provision that the individual who does not claim to have such
a right can not bring an action for usurpation of public office.
This inference is supported by the provisions of section 202 which says that when the action is against a
person for usurping an office, the complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be
entitled thereto, with an averment of his right to the same. Why should this be required as an essential
requisite if it were not necessary that the individual bringing the action should claim the right to exercise
the office in question?
Our opinion is that the law has reserved to the Attorney-General and to the provincial fiscals, as the case
may be, the right to bring such action, an in but one case does the law authorize an individual to bring
such an action, to wit, when that person claims to have the right to the exercise of the office unlawfully
held and exercised by another. Aside from this case an individual can not maintain such action. The law, in
our opinion, does not allow of any other construction. If an individual, whether or not he has the right to
the office alleged to have been usurped by another were to be permitted to maintain such an action, it
would serve no purpose and section 201 would be evidently superfluous. It would be a useless and
redundant provision of the code.
As a consequence of what has been said no individual can bring a civil action relating to the usurpation of
a public office without averring that he has a right to the same; and at any stage of the proceedings, if it be
shown that such individual has no such right, the action may be dismissed because there is no legal ground
upon which it may proceed when the fundamental basis of such action is destroyed as is the case here.
This is what actually happened in this case. After all of the evidence presented by the plaintiff had been
introduced, it was found, and he himself so admitted that he had failed to establish in any way, shape, or
form that he had any right to the office of municipal president of the town of Laoag as he had alleged in
his complaint without foundation for such allegation. Consequently the judge very properly acquitted the
defendant of the complaint.
The appellant contends that the court below should have first inquired into the right of the defendant to the
office in question and that no other question can be raised or investigated until this point has been
determined, and alleges that the question of the right of the plaintiff to the said office does not arise until it
has been determined that the defendant is not entitled to the exercise of such office. In support of his
contention he relies upon the provisions of section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
This section provides as follows: "When the action is against a person for usurping an office, the
complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, with an averment of his
right to the same; and that the defendant is unlawfully in possession of the same; and judgment may be
rendered upon the right of the defendant, and also upon the right of the person so averred to be entitled, or
only upon the right of the defendant, as justice requires."
From the words above italicized the appellant infers that the court below should have first passed upon the
right of the defendant and afterwards upon the right of the plaintiff. In our opinion this should be done at
the same time and in the same judgment. It is immaterial what method the court may follow in the
statement and determination of the questions in the rendition of his judgment because even though the
court may pass upon the right of the plaintiff first, and the right of the defendant afterwards, or vice versa,
this procedure would not vitiate the judgment, provided the court does not fail to state therein what the
rights of the contending parties to the office are. But all of this, of course, presupposes that the action has
been properly brought and duly prosecuted to a judgment. This, at the same time, presupposes that the
plaintiff had a right to maintain his action upon the evidence submitted by him at the trial. It is impossible
to prosecute a suit without a cause of action. Therefore, whenever before judgment it is conclusively
proven that the plaintiff has no right to maintain the action since he has not the essential conditions
required by law in order to bring and maintain such action, his complaint should be dismissed and it
becomes unnecessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who has a perfect right to the undisturbed
possession of his office, unless action is brought by a person having a right to maintain the same under the
law.
It may be said that under section 202 the court may only pass upon the right of the defendant when the
justice of the case so demands. This is true, but this only refers to cases where the action is brought by the
Attorney-General or by the provincial fiscal, as the case may be. In such cases it is not necessary that there
be a person claiming to be entitled to the office alleged to have been usurped, because although there be
no such person, as in the case of a vacant office, for instance, the fiscal could and even should bring such
action against the person usurping the office in accordance with the provisions of sections 200 and 199,
respectively, as the case may be. The manner in which judgment should be rendered according to section
202 perfectly meets the various cases provided for in the three preceding sections; and it becomes the duty
of the court to pass upon the rights of the defendants only whenever it is not an essential requisite for the
due prosecution of the action that there be a person claiming to be entitled to the office thus usurped,
something which only happens where the Attorney-General or the fiscal of any province brings the action
against the usurper.
As a result of the foregoing, we can not here pass upon the validity or nullity of the election of the
defendant, for the reason, among others which it is not necessary to state here, that the defendant has no
right to maintain such an action as this.
The order of the court below appealed from, is hereby affirmed. After the expiration of twenty days let
judgment be entered in accordance herewith and let the case be remanded to the court from whence it
came for further proceedings in accordance with the law. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., concur.
Willard, J., did not sit in this case.