Veterans Federation Party v.

COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were
party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least
20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The Constitution
vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the
system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress
wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system
additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional seats for
concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent
can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent
of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups
which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress.
Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of
this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes
by the total votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes
are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute
that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted
to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most
number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to,
based on proportional representation.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs Commission on Elections
694 SCRA 477 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department Party-List System

FACTS: This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented
sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,
the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines
which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:

I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties
or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-
list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political
constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The
sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented
must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent.
The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that
represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must
have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the
party-list elections. But, since theres really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties
can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter
3 above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-
defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting
the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all
parties into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT
case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the
people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the marginalized and
underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It
is also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major political parties, to field or
sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.

If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other
cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that
by their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes,
among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political
constituencies as they are ideologically marginalized.

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs COMELEC

586 SCRA 210 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department Party List System; Proportional
Representation; Proper Computation

Statutory Construction Rule in Interpreting the Constitution Intent of the Framers vs Intent of the People

NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).

FACTS: In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial
proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.

In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from
party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes
cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this
is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-
list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is
void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in
the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to
meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying
vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower
house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of
RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD:

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one
seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from
party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the
lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May
2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55
seats allotted for party-list representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:

(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives

Hence,

(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list representatives
shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20%
shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the
2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list
seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral
or group interests in the House of Representatives.

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not
qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.

But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats
in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats
are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded
in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which
garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats
given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists
were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats.
(Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the
additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2%
of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.

How is this done?

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The
product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat
limit rule shall still be observed.

Example:

In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for
the party-list elections (15,950,900).

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has
a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the
votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.

Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats,
those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until
all the seats are occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc)
from participating in the party-list elections.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA
7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and
that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in
the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people
defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution
and the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.

Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012]
FACTS:

Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On
November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His
application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the
ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition
was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.
On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo
filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency
requirement of the local government code.

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to
show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling
that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

RULING:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the
province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have
personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every
person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a
new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement
for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.

Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed
his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and
lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that
Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin
(Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man
must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his
brothers house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that
a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is
sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the
candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that
Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San
Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-
mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it
from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations.
The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect
the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to
their manifest will.
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

Case Digest: Asistio v. Trinidad-De Aguirre, et al.

G.R. No. 191124 : April 27, 2010

LUIS A. ASISTIO, Petitioner, v. HON. THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Caloocan City, Branch 129; HON. ARTHUR O. MALABAGUIO, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Caloocan City, Branch 52; ENRICO R. ECHIVERRI, Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 1811A, Barangay 15,
Caloocan City; and the CITY ELECTION OFFICER, Caloocan City, Respondents.

NACHURA,J.:

FACTS:

On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri (Echiverri) filed against petitioner Luis A. Asistio (Asistio) a
Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City (Petition for Exclusion) before the
MeTC, Branch 52,Caloocan City presided over by public respondent Judge Arthur O. Malabaguio. Echiverri alleged that
Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of123 Interior P. Zamora St.,Barangay 15,Caloocan City, the
address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Echiverri, also a candidate for Mayor of Caloocan City, was the respondent in a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or
Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Asistio. According to Echiverri, when he was about to furnish Asistio a
copy of his Answer to the latters petition, he found out that Asistios address is non-existent. To support this, Echiverri
attached to his petition a Certification issued by the Tanggapan ng Punong Barangay of Barangay 15 Central, Zone 2,
District II of Caloocan City. He mentioned that, upon verification of the 2009 Computerized Voters List (CVL) for Barangay
15, Asistios name appeared under voter number 8, with address at 109 Libis Gochuico,Barangay 15,Caloocan City.
Judge Malabaguio rendered a decision removing the name of Asistio from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City.

Meanwhile, Echiverri filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification,which was docketed as SPA No. 10-013 (DC).
The Petition was anchored on the grounds that Asistio is not a resident ofCaloocanCityand that he had been previously
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Asistio, in his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses (Com
Memorandum),raised the same arguments with respect to his residency and also argued that the President of
thePhilippines granted him an absolute pardon.

ISSUE: Whether or not Asistios name should be removed from the permanent list of voters in Precinct 1811A of Caloocan
City.

HELD: RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.

POLITICAL LAW: right to vote

The right to vote is a most precious political right, as well as a bounden duty of every citizen, enabling and requiring him to
participate in the process of government to ensure that it can truly be said to derive its power solely from the consent of its
constituents. Time and again, it has been said that every Filipinos right to vote shall be respected, upheld, and given full
effect. A citizen cannot be disenfranchised for the flimsiest of reasons. Only on the most serious grounds, and upon clear
and convincing proof, may a citizen be deemed to have forfeited this precious heritage of freedom. In this case, even if the
appellate docket fees were not filed on time, this incident alone should not thwart the proper determination and resolution
of the instant case on substantial grounds. Blind adherence to a technicality, with the inevitable result of frustrating and
nullifying the constitutionally guaranteed right of suffrage, cannot be countenanced.

The residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in the
place where the person proposes or intends to vote. Residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean domicile, importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a persons
acts, activities, and utterances. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular
case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a
time.

Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or
change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
(3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with animo non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is known to be
among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City Second
District representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004
elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city.
Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be denied
that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has
established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. He
should, therefore, remain in the list of permanent registered voters of Precinct No. 1811A,Barangay 15,Caloocan City.

That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a non-
existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a
voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported misrepresentations in Asistios
COC, if true, might serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC),or an action to deny
due course to the COC.But they do not serve as proof that Asistio has abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City, or that
he has established residence outside of Caloocan City.

The petition for certiorari is GRANTED

Case Digest: Mitra v. COMELEC, Gonzales & Balbon, Jr.

G.R. No. 191938 : October 19, 2010

ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ANTONIO V.

GONZALES AND ORLANDO R. BALBON, JR., Respondent.

BRION, J.:

FACTS:

We resolve the Motion for Reconsideration Filed by public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and the Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Oral Arguments filed by private
respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (private respondents), dated July
19, 2010 and July 20, 2010, respectively, addressing our Decision of July 2, 2010 (July 2, 2010
Decision or Decision).We annulled in this Decision the February 10, 2010 and May 4, 2010
Resolutions of the COMELEC, and denied the private respondents petition to cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra (Mitra).

To recall its highlights, our Decision emphasized that despite our limited certiorari jurisdiction in
election cases, we are not only obliged but are constitutionally bound to intervene when the
COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its
discretion in this case, a situation where resulting errors, arising from the grave abuse committed
by the COMELEC, mutated from being errors of judgment to errors of jurisdiction.Based on our
evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, we found that Mitra did not commit any
deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC.We noted, too, that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion in its appreciation of the evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a
resident of Aborlan, Palawan.We also found that the COMELEC failed to critically consider
whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise
render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan.
On the critical question of whether Mitra deliberately misrepresented his Aborlan residence to
deceive and mislead the people of the Province of Palawan, we found that Mitra did not. In fact,
Mitra adduced positive evidence of transfer of residence which the private respondents evidence
failed to sufficiently controvert.Specifically, the private respondents evidence failed to show that
Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.

In this regard, we took note of the incremental moves Mitra undertook to establish his new
domicile in Aborlan, as evidenced by the following:(1) hisexpressed intentto transfer to a
residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his
preparatory moves starting in early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009;
(4) his initial transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for
his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the
premises he was leasing pending the completion ofhis house.Thus, we found that under the
situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, there is no reason to infer that Mitra committed any
misrepresentation, whether inadvertently or deliberately, in claiming residence in Aborlan.We also
emphasized that the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis (as it used
subjective non-legal standards in its analysis) to conclude that Mitras statement in his COC
concerning his residence was indeed a misrepresentation.In sum, we concluded that the
evidence in the present case, carefully reviewed, showed that Mitra indeed transfered his
residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period required by law.

In its Motion for Reconsideration dated July 19, 2010, the COMELEC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, asks us to reconsider our July 2, 2010 Decision. The COMELEC argues that
we overstepped our review power over its factual findings; as a specialized constitutional body,
the findings and conclusions of the COMELEC are generally respected and even given the status
of finality.The COMELEC also contends that the Court erred in taking cognizance of the present
petition since the issues raised therein are essentially factual in nature.It claims that it is
elementary that the extraordinary remedy ofcertiorariis limited to correcting questions of law and
that the factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUES: Whether the SC erred when it reviewed the probative value of the evidence presented
and substituted its own factual findings over that of the public respondent.

HELD: We resolve to deny, for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and for oral
arguments.

We note at the outset that the COMELEC and private respondent's arguments are mere
rehashes of their previous submissions; they are the same arguments addressing the issues we
already considered and passed upon in our July 2, 2010 Decision.Thus, both the COMELEC and
private respondents failed to raise any new and substantial argument meriting
reconsideration.The denial of the motion for oral arguments proceeds from this same reasoning;
mere reiterations of the parties original submissions on issues our Decision has sufficiently
covered, without more, do not merit the time, effort and attention that an oral argument shall
require.

Having said these, we shall still proceed to discuss the aspects of the case the motions touched
upon, if only to put an end to lingering doubts on the correctness of our July 2, 2010 Decision.

REMEDIAL LAW: petition for certiorari

First, both the COMELEC and the private respondents posit that the Court improperly exercised
its limited certiorari jurisdiction; they theorize that Mitras petition failed to allege and show errors
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.They also stress that the
Court should respect and consider the COMELEC's findings of fact to be final and non-
reviewable.

COMELEC's submission in this regard that the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is limited to
corrections of questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the present petition are not
appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari is wholly erroneous.This submission appears to
have confused the standards of the Courts power of review under Rule 65 and Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, leading the COMELEC to grossly misread the import of Mitras petition before the
Court.

To recall, Mitra brought his case before us via petition for certiorari, pursuant to Section 2, Rule
64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court.Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision, we
emphasized that our review (under the Rule 65 standard of grave abuse of discretion, and not
under the Rule 45 question of law standard) is based on a very limited ground,i.e., on the
jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The basis for the Courts review of COMELEC rulings under the standards of Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides that [U]nless otherwise
provided by [the] Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court provide for a separate rule (Rule
64)specifically applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.This
Rule expressly refers to the application of Rule65 in the filing of a petition forcertiorari, subject to
the exception clause except as hereinafter provided.

In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections and Dario v. Mison, the Court construed the above-cited
constitutional provision as relating to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 (although
with a different reglementary period for filing)and not to an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.Thus, Section 2 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court now clearly specifies that the
mode of review is the special civil action ofcertiorariunder Rule 65, except as therein provided.In
Ocate v. Commission on Elections, we further held that:

The purpose of a petition for certiorari is to determine whether the challenged tribunal has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.Thus, any resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues.

POLITICAL LAW: judicial power

The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the Constitution itself, in defining judicial power,
pointedly states that

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

This provision, more than anything else, identifies the power and duty of this Court in grave abuse
of discretion situations, and differentiates this authority from the power of review by appeal that
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court defines.

Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the COMELEC's position that patently
confuses the mode of review in election cases under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, with
the appellate review that Rule 45 of the same Rules provides.

We likewise reject the COMELEC and the private respondents proposition that the Court erred in
exercising its limited certiorari jurisdiction.Although the COMELEC is admittedly the final arbiter of
all factual issues as the Constitution And the Rules of Court provide, we stress that in the
presence of grave abuse of discretion, our constitutional duty is to intervene and not to shy away
from intervention simply because a specialized agency has been given the authority to resolve
the factual issues.

As we emphasized in our Decision, we have in the past recognized exceptions to the general rule
that the Court ordinarily does not review in acertioraricase the COMELECs appreciation and
evaluation of evidence.One such exception is when the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation
of evidence go beyond the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable.In this
situation, we are duty bound under the Constitution to intervene and correct COMELEC errors
that, because of the attendant grave abuse of discretion, have mutated into errors of jurisdiction.

Our Decision clearly pointed out Mitras submissions and arguments on grave abuse of discretion,
namely, that the COMELEC failed to appreciate that the case is a cancellation of a COC
proceeding and that the critical issue is the presence of deliberate false material representation to
deceive the electorate.In fact, Mitras petition plainly argued that the COMELECs grave abuse of
discretion was patent when it failed to consider that the ground to deny a COC is deliberate false
representation.We completely addressed this issue and, in the process, analyzed the reasoning
in the assailed COMELEC decision. At every step, we found that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of the evidence.

ELECTION LAW: residence

The private respondents fail to realize that the important considerations in the present case relate
to questions bearing on the cancellation of the COC that they prayed for; the main critical points
are the alleged deliberate misrepresentation by Mitra and the underlying question of his residency
in Aborlan, Palawan.

While it is undisputed that Mitras domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra adequately
proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning
2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009.As our Decision discussed and as repeated
elsewhere in this Resolution, the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing
evidence that Mitra did not effectively transfer, while the COMELEC not only grossly misread the
evidence but even used the wrong considerations in appreciating the submitted evidence.

These issues are not new issues; we extensively and thoroughly considered and resolved them in
our July 2, 2010 Decision.At this point, we only need to address some of the private respondents
misleading points in order to clear the air:
1.The private respondents reliance on the expiration date of the lease contract, to disprove Mitras
claim that the room at the Maligaya Feedmill is his residence, is misplaced.This argument is
flimsy since the contract did not provide that it was completely and fully time-barred and was only
up to February 28, 2010; it was renewable at the option of the parties.That a lease is fixed for a
one-year term is a common practice.What is important is that it is renewable at the option of the
parties.In the absence of any objection from the parties, the lease contract simply continues and
is deemed renewed.

2.In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto Princesa City, the
private respondents submitted in their Motion for Reconsideration a colored certified true copy of
Mitras alleged Puerto Princesa City Community Tax Certificate (CTC) dated February 3, 2009
allegedly showing Mitras signature.To recall, we found thatbased on the records before us, the
purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the signature of Mitra.Although the private
respondents have belatedly filed this evidence, we carefully examined therecently
submittedcolored copy of the February 3, 2009 CTC and saw no reason to reverse our finding;
the alleged signature appears to us to be a merehazy superimposition that does not bear any
resemblance at all to Mitras signature.We, thus, stand by our ruling that the February 3, 2009
CTC, if at all, carries very little evidentiary value.It did it not at all carry Mitras signature; his
secretarys positive testimony that she secured the CTC for Mitra, without the latters participation
and knowledge, still stands unrefuted.

3.The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a Certification, dated July 17, 2010, from
the Municipal Agriculturist of Aborlan, stating that its office does not have any record of the
supposed pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.This late submission was
made to show that Mitra has no established business interests in Aborlan.The Certification
pertinently states:

This is to certify that as of this date, there is no existing records/registration in our office regarding
the alleged pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan.However, the Office of the
Municipal Agriculturist is on the process of gathering data on the Master list of Farmers engaged
in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan.

We cannot give any evidentiary value to this submission for two reasons.First, it was filed only on
reconsideration stage and was not an evidence before us when the case was submitted for
resolution.Second, even if it had not been filed late, the Certification does not prove anything; it is,
on its face, contradictory.On the one hand, it categorically states that there are no existing
records of any pineapple plantation in Barangay Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan; on the other hand, it
also expressly states that its records are not yet complete since it is on the process of gathering
data on the Master list of Farmers engaged in growing High Value Commercial Crops in Aborlan.
Under what law or regulation the certifying office has the obligation to prepare a list of agricultural
business interests in Aborlan has not even been alleged.

At the risk of repetition, we reiterate that Mitras business interests in Aborlan stand undisputed in
the present case.Not only was Mitra able to present photographs of his experimental pineapple
plantation; his claim of ownership was also corroborated by the statements of Dr. Carme Caspe,
Ricardo Temple and other witnesses.

ELECTION LAW: deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC

The private respondents also claim that the Court erred in ruling that Mitra did not commit any
deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC.We likewise see no merit in this claim.One
important point in the present case is that the private respondents failed to prove that there was
deliberate material misrepresentation in Mitras statement on his required residency prior to the
May 10, 2010 elections. This, as we stressed in our Decision, is a glaring gap in the private
respondents case:

We do not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation given what he knew of his
transfer, as shown by the moves he had made to carry it out.From the evidentiary perspective, we
hold that the evidence confirming residence in Aborlan decidedly tilts in Mitras favor; even
assuming the worst for Mitra, the evidence in his favor cannot go below the level of anequipoise,
i.e.,when weighed,Mitras evidence of transfer and residence in Aborlan cannot be overcome by
the respondents evidence that he remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.Under the
situationprevailing when Mitra filed his COC, we cannot conclude that Mitra committed any
misrepresentation, much less a deliberate one, about his residence.

The character of Mitras representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of the case that the
COMELEC completely failed to consider as it focused mainly on the character of Mitras feedmill
residence.For this reason, the COMELEC was led into error one that goes beyond an ordinary
error of judgment.By failing to take into account whether there had been a deliberate
misrepresentation in Mitras COC, the COMELEC committed the grave abuse of simply assuming
that an error in the COC was necessarily a deliberate falsity in a material representation.In this
case, it doubly erred because there was no falsity; as the carefully considered evidence shows,
Mitra did indeed transfer his residence within the period required by Section 74 of the OEC.

The respondents significantly ask us in this case to adopt the same faulty approach of using
subjective norms, as they now argue thatgiven his stature as a member of the prominent Mitra
clan of Palawan, and as a three term congressman, it is highly incredible that a small room in a
feed mill has served as his residence since 2008.

We reject this suggested approach outright for the same reason we condemned the COMELECs
use of subjective non-legal standards. Mitras feed mill dwelling cannot be considered in isolation
and separately from the circumstances of his transfer of residence, specifically, hisexpressed
intentto transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible to run for a
provincial position; his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; his initial transfer through a
leased dwelling; the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and the construction of a house in
this lot that, parenthetically, is adjacent to the premises he leased pending the completion of his
house.These incremental moves do not offend reason at all, in the way that the COMELECs
highly subjective non-legal standards do.

Thus, we can only conclude, in the context of the cancellation proceeding before us, that the
respondents have not presented a convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of
effective transfer to and residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in
his COC, while the COMELEC could not even present any legally acceptable basis to conclude
that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation.

To summarize, both the COMELEC and private respondents have not shown, through their
respective motions, sufficient reasons to compel us to modify or reverse our July 2, 2010
Decision.
ELECTION LAW: the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing
evidence that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident

The evidence before us, properly considered and carefully reviewed, fully supports our conclusion
that the private respondents evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City
resident.As discussed now and in our Decision of July 2, 2010, Mitra adequately proved by
substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008,
concluding his transfer in early 2009.Given this proof, the burden of evidence lies with the private
respondents to establish the contrary.

Proof to the contrary is sadly lacking, as the dissents reliance on the Certification of the Punong
Barangay of Sta. Monica,PuertoPrincesaCityis misplaced. Theponenciacannot give full
evidentiary weight to the aforementioned Certification.

To be sure, a bare certification in a disputed situation cannot suffice to conclusively establish the
existence of what the certification alleged. The purported CTC, on the other hand, was neither
signed nor thumb-marked by Mitra and, thus, bore no clear indication that it had been adopted
and used by Mitra as his own.In our evaluation, we in fact pointedly emphasized that the Puerto
Princesa City CTC dated February 3, 2009, if at all, carries little evidentiary value in light of Lilia
Camoras (Mitras secretary) positive declaration that she was the one who procured it, while
Mitras Aborlan CTC dated March 18, 2009 carried Mitras own signature. Camora fully explained
the circumstances under which she secured the CTC of February 3, 2009 and her statement was
never disputed.

On the other hand, Commodore Hernandez declaration on its face did not controvert Carme E.
Caspes sworn statement which adequately proved that Mitras transfer to Aborlan was
accomplished, not in a single move, but through an incremental process that started in early 2008
and concluded in March 2009.

ELECTION LAW: the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of
the evidence and in using wrong considerations which lead it to incorrectly conclude that
Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan and that he committed a deliberate misrepresentation in
his COC

Contrary to the dissents view, the sworn statements of Maligaya Feedmills customers and former
employees that Mitra did not and could not have resided at the mezzanine portion of the Feedmill
cannot be given full evidentiary weight, since these statements are in nature of negative
testimonies that do not deserve weight and credence in the face of contrary positive evidence,
particularly, Carme E. Caspes testimony, cited above, that Mitra did indeed transfer residence in
a process that was accomplished, not in a single move, but through an incremental process that
started in early 2008.It is well-settled in the rules of evidence that positive testimony is stronger
than negative testimony.

Additionally, we noted in our Decision that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion,
as it failed to correctly appreciate that the evidence clearly pointed to fact that Mitra effectively
transferred his residence to Aborlan.

To buttress our finding that the COMELEC used personal and subjective assessment standards
instead of the standards prescribed by law, we cited Coquilla v. COMELEC, which characterized
the term residence as referring to domicile or legal residence, that is the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found
at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).

ELECTION LAW: the validity or invalidity of the lease contract is not determinative of
question of Mitras residence in Aborlan

Beyond the arguments raised about the invalidity of the lease contract, what is significant for
purposes of this case is the immateriality of the issue to the present case.As we emphasized in
our Decision:

The validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue before us; what concerns us is the
question of whether Mitra did indeed enter into an agreement for the lease, or strictly for the use,
of the Maligaya Feedmill as his residence (while his house, on the lot he bought, was under
construction) and whether he indeed resided there.The notarys compliance with the notarial law
likewise assumes no materiality as it is a defect not imputable to Mitra; what is important is the
parties affirmation before a notary public of the contracts genuineness and due execution.

The dissents thesis that Mitras allegation in his Motion for Reconsideration (dated February 13,
2010) before the COMELEC en banc that he had already transferred to the newly constructed
house in Aborlan negates the proposition that the lease agreement is extendible from month to
month - is misleading.The significance of Mitras statement in his Motion for Reconsideration that
he had already transferred to his newly constructed house in Aborlan must not be read in
isolation; it must be appreciated under the backdrop of Mitras explicit intention to make Aborlan
his permanent residence through an incremental transfer of residence, as evidenced by the
following:

(1) his initial transfer through the leased dwelling at the mezzanine portion of the Maligaya
Feedmill;

(2) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and

(3) the construction of a house on this lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing
pending the completion of his house.

All these should of course be read with the establishment of Mitras business interest in Aborlan
and his transfer of registration as a voter.

With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC, we see
no reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the electorates will.We cannot deny, however,
that the people of Palawan have spoken in an election where residency qualification had been
squarely raised and their voice has erased any doubt about their verdict on Mitras qualifications.

Under these terms, we cannot be any clearer.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to DENY with FINALITY, for lack of merit,
the motions for reconsideration and motion for oral arguments now before us.Let entry of
judgment be made in due course.

Domino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone legislative district
of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year
and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that
Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the
province of Sarangani where he seeks election. Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for
lack of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on
his own Voters Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the May 11,
1998 elections

Held: The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the
same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.

Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new
domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the Third
District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his
residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.

A persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a change of
domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the
kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his
permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile.
Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other
circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos lack of intention to
abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not
conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino
registered in his former barangay.

Perez v Comelec GR 133994, October 28, 1999 (Section 6 Domicile and Residence)

Facts: On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the
Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later, on March 30, 1998, petitioner, as a voter and
citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent as a candidate on the ground that he
had not been resident of the district for at least one (1) year immediately before the day of the elections as required by Art.
VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution,
dismissed the petition for disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the
Third District of Cagayan.

Issue: Whether residency in the respondents certificate of candidacy for governor actually connotes domicile to
warrant his disqualification from the position in the electoral district.

Ruling: No. As this Court said in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC: It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to
be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. There is
substantial evidence supporting the finding that private respondent had been a resident of the Third District of Cagayan
and there is nothing in the record to detract from the merit of this factual finding. The private respondent was actually a
resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years
since July 1990. Notes: The meaning and purpose of the residency requirement: The place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends
to return and remain, i.e.,his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes
of election law.

The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is
to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of
favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a
particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose
could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who
have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice

Grace Poe vs COMELEC

(Case Digest: GR 221697, GR 221698-700 March 8, 2016)
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.

May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that however, and even
afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo,
and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18,
2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a
voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB,
she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others, that she
cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were
Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three justices,
however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.

Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read Dissent)
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the
qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.

In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the election contests,
returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has
sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no
authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied
by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its
rules of procedures would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of Grace as a candidate
in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)

Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the constitutional
requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.

First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of Filipinos. The fact
that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such
that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of
her parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is based on the
finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be
covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and the general
principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary
rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile.

Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA
9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases which decree that an aliens stay in the country cannot be
counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are
different from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and
intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her familys actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on
May 24, 2005, it was for good.

Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and residency
because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when
there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the
COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her qualifications.

In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency. ##
 DELA CRUZ vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012

Issue:
With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the emerging concerns is the application of the law
on nuisance candidates under a new voting system wherein voters indicate their choice of candidates by shading the oval
corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate printed on the ballots, instead of writing the candidate's name on the
appropriate space provided in the ballots as in previous manual elections. If the name of a nuisance candidate whose
certificate of candidacy had been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still included or
printed in the official ballots on election day, should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be considered
stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?

Facts:
In this petition for certiorari, Casimira S. Dela Cruz assails COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 considering as stray
the votes cast in favor of certain candidates who were either disqualified or whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due
course but whose names still appeared in the official ballots or certified lists of candidates for the May 10, 2010 elections.
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May 13, 2010,
Casimira insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing
Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of Antique-Bugasong showed the following
results of the voting:
TOTAL RANK

DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3

DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2

PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1

Consequently, John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of Bugasong.
Considering that Pacete won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes, Casimira contends that she would have
clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or added the votes cast for Aurelio to
her votes.

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to petitions to cancel
or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material
representation shown to be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the
registered candidates, or other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination
of the true will of the electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving money or material
consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials performing electoral functions, election campaign
overspending and soliciting, receiving or making prohibited contributions) of the OEC or Section 40 of Republic Act No.
7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
In Fermin vs. COMELEC, this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68 and a petition to
cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by
different rules and have distinct outcomes.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with a "Section
68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. x xx
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC,
or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a
person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she
never filed a CoC. Thus, in Miranda vs. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified
under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate
until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be
substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate. (Additional emphasis supplied)
Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said
votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at
all, as if he/she never filed a COC. But should these votes cast for the candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied
due course be considered stray?
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such under a final judgment was
applied by this Court in Bautista vs. COMELEC where the name of the nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista (having the
same surname with the bona fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on election day because while the COMELEC
rendered its decision to cancel Edwin Bautistas COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his motion for reconsideration only on
May 13, 1998 or three days after the election. We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately tallied on
orders of the COMELEC Chairman was for the purpose of later counting the votes and hence are not really stray
votes. These separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion
caused by a potential nuisance candidate.
But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was not yet final on electionday,
this Court also considered those factual circumstances showing that the votes mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer to
only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We further
noted that the voters had constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin Bautista
as a candidate for mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. This is,
however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of newspaper
releases and other forms of notification, the voters were informed of the COMELECs decision to declare Edwin Bautista a
nuisance candidate.
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court likewise applied the rule
in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but to count them in favor
of the bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such was issued only after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably
exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voters will and frustrates the
same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec
resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the
electorate having been informed thereof through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of
election. Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voters will was similarly present in this case, if not worse,
considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for
Representative - over five thousand - which have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than
sufficient to overcome private respondents lead of only 453 votes after the recount.
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of
Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in favor of
petitioner. COMELECs changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of
significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin. We observed in Martinez:
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven
playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant number of votes
cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any
delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners try to
minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes
brought by nuisance candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the May
2010 elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at
this point is the apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate
determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. x xx
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 by
enumerating those changes brought about by the new automated election system to the form of official ballots, manner of
voting and counting of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions between manual and automated elections validly
altered the rules on considering the votes cast for the disqualified or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista and
Martinez III, COMELEC opines that these find no application in the case at bar because the rules on appreciation of
ballotsapply only to elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots.
The Court is not persuaded.
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local elections, political rivals or operators
benefited from the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of
potential nuisance candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising
the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, but still, election woes brought by nuisance
candidates persist.
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the same
position and putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system
where the voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. However, as shown in this
case, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete
the names of disqualified candidates not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot. Indeed,
what use will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted from list of official candidates
if the official ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared
as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the
legitimate candidate, notstray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of COC of Aurelio
because COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters constructive
knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude
that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate. The possibility of
confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be
discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who mistakenly
shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for
could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the same.
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-ensconced in our
jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance
candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to be
prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.
VICTORINO SALCEDO II vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO
August 16, 1999

Facts:
This is a petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Victorino Salcedo II seeking to reverse the earlier Resolution issued by its
Second Division on August 12, 1998.

Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage was evidenced by a certified true copy of the marriage contract
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without his first marriage having been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo
married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another
marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar.

Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor of the
municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them having filed their respective certificates of
candidacy However, petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of private respondent's certificate
of candidacy on the ground that she had made a false representation therein by stating that her surname was "Salcedo."
Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not legally married to
Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.

In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the time she married Neptali
Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of his existing marriage, she encouraged her husband to
take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes Celiz because the latter had abandoned their marital home. Neptali Salcedo
filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death which was granted by the court that Neptali Salcedo and Jesus
Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since 1986 up to the present she has been using the surname "Salcedo"
in all her personal, commercial and public transactions.

Comelec's Second Division ruled that since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz,
the subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is null and void. Consequently, the use by private
respondent of the surname "Salcedo" constitutes material misrepresentation and is a ground for the cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy.

However, in its en banc Resolution, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution, ruling that private respondent's
certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner
was affirmed by the division which gives rise to the petition to review such promulgation.

Issue:

1.Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy constitutes material
misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Held:

Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate
of candidacy.

A false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's
qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's
identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were
deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent. Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know
who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in favor of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were fooled into
voting for someone else by the use of such name.

The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the petition to cancel private
respondent's certificate of candidacy.

EFREN RACEL ARATEA, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO,

Respondents.G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012CARPIO, J.

FACTS: Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in 2010. Rodolfo filed a petition under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanidas
certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
for four (4) consecutive terms. The COMELEC Second Division cancelled Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy.
Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during said
elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest number of votes and were proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor,
respectively. Vice-Mayor elect Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor. Subsequently, the COMELEC En Banc
disqualified Lonzanida from running for Mayor based on two grounds: (1), Lonzanida had served as Mayor for more than
three consecutive terms without interruption; and (2) Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten counts of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Second-placer Antipolo intervened and claimed her right to be
proclaimed as Mayor because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Division ordered
the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official candidates. Aratea
asserted that Antipolo could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. Here as oned that since Lonzanidas
disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanidas
subsequent disqualification resulted ina permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-
Mayor was mandated to succeed as Mayor.

ISSUE: Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the OEC, or made a false material representation under
Section 78 of the OEC that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. Whether the second-placer or the
Vice-Mayor elect should succeed as Mayor in this case.

RULING:The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec. 78 of the OEC. It also held that Antipolo, the
"second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short,
Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo actually garnered the
highest number of votes for the position .Qualifications and Disqualifications. The qualifications and disqualifications are
laid by Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code. Section 40 expressly provides, among others:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:(a) Those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude orfor an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
of imprisonment, within two (2)years after serving sentences x section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 12. Disqualification. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to
a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate
and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.x x x False Material Representation
Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false material
representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy. Section 74 of the OEC details the contents of the certificate
of candidacy. This included among others a statement that the person filing it is eligible for said office. The conviction of
Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any
public office, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the
judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy. The penalty of prisin mayor automatically
carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual
special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the RPC, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office. The duration
of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisin mayor. On the other
hand, under Article 32 of the RPC, perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted
to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification, which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person
suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if
he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run. Lonzanida became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to
run for, any elective public office from the time the judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of
conviction was promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate
of candidacy on 1 December 2009 .Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
OEC because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office,
contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held
in Fermin v. Commission on

Elections, the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or eligibility. One who suffers from perpetual
special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files
a certificate of candidacy stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under
Section 74, then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. The
dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification under Section 68 as
the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars him from running for public office despite the
possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the LGC." In so holding the dissenting opinions write in the law
what is not found in the law. Legal Duty of COMELEC to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification Even without a
petition, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual
special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is
judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office. Effect of a Void
Certificate of Candidacy A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much
less to valid votes. Lonzanidas disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the three-term
limit; and second, he is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification. In other words,
on election day, respondent Lonzanidas disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent
Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently,
Intervenor Antipolo should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor.

Villafuerte vs. COMELEC Digest

G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014
LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE,Petitioner,v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MIGUEL R. VILLAFUERTE, Respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of the province of CamarinesSur in the May
2013 local elections. Petitioner file a with the COMELEC a verified Petition to deny due course or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of respondent alleging that the latter intentionally misrepresented a false and deceptive name/ nickname that
would mislead the voters when he declared under oath in his COC that LRAY JR.MIGZ was his nickname or stage name
and that the name he intended to appear on the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.MIGZ NP; that respondent
deliberately omitted his first name MIGUEL and inserted, instead LRAY JR., which is the nickname of his father, the
incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur,LRay Villafuerte, Jr.

COMELEC's First Division and COMELEC en banc ruled that there is no reason to cancel the COC of respondent as
matters of material misrepresentation in the COC pertains only to qualifications of a candidate and nothing is mentioned
about a candidates name.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents COC should be cancelled

HELD: No. Decision of COMELEC en banc affirmed.

POLITICAL LAW: Material misrepresentation contemplated by Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refer to
qualifications for elective office

In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false
representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the
substantive rights ofa candidate the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made
with an intention to deceive the electorate as to ones qualifications for public office. The use of surname, when not
intended to mislead, or deceive the public as to ones identity is not within the scope of the provision. Respondents
nickname is not considered a material fact, and there is no substantial evidence showing that in writing the nickname
LRAY JR. MIGZ in his COC, respondent had the intention to deceive the voters as to his identity which has an effect on
his eligibility or qualification for the office he seeks to assume.

Notably, respondent is known to the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur as the son of the then incumbent Governor
of the province, popularly known as LRay. Their relationship is shown by the posters, streamers and billboards displayed
in the province with the faces of both the father and son on them. Thus, the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur know
who respondent is. Moreover, it was established by the affidavits of respondents witnesses that as the father and son
have striking similarities, such as their looks and mannerisms, which remained unrebutted, the appellation of LRAY JR.
has been used to refer torespondent. Hence, the appellation LRAY JR., accompanied by the name MIGZ16 written as
respondents nickname in his COC, is not at all misleading to the voters, as in fact, such name distinguishes respondent
from his father, the then incumbent Governor LRAY, who was running for a Congressional seat in the 2nd District of
Camarines Sur.

Tagolino vs. HRET (G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013).

Reading through this pillar case will make you understand when a substitution of a candidate is proper.

FACTS: In this case, on November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District
of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates,
Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of College
Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-
adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement
under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richards CoC be denied due course and/or
cancelled.The COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution granting Juntillas petition without any qualification.

Richard thereafter manifested that he is accepting the resolution in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of
the necessary documents for substitution. The substitute? His wife, Ms. Lucy Torres-Gomez. Lucy accepted the
nomination and endorsement from the Liberal Party.

Juntilla, opposed the candidacy of Ms. Lucy as Richards substitute. Juntilla stated that there should be no substitution
because there is no candidate to substitute for.

The COMELEC First Division decided in favor of Juntilla, but said that the substitution was valid. The COMELEC en banc
affirmed the First Divisions resolution. The resolution hinges upon the reasoning that Richard is indeed disqualified, but
ones disqualification does not automatically cancel ones certificate of candidacy, especially when it is nominated by a
political party. In effect, the political party is still allowed to substitute the candidate whose candidacy was declared
disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a privilege given to a political party to exercise and not dependent totally to a
candidate.

At this point, the COMELEC was close to perpetuate their wrong decision. This was thereafter corrected by the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE: whether or not the substitution of Richard Gomez as a candidate valid?

HELD:
THE SUPREME COURTS RULING.

The Supreme Court said no, it is not valid.

A substitution is only valid when the candidate is disqualified. If the candidate to be substituted made material
misrepresentation in his CoC, it will result to a denial of due course/ cancellation of CoC. In disqualification, there is a
candidate to be substituted. In cancellation, there is no candidate to speak of in the first place.

Under the Omnibus Election Code, disqualification is provided under Section 68 (pursuant to Section 77), while
cancellation is provided under Section 78. Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where substitution is
permissible, that is when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party "dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause." Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases are not included in the said section and therefore, cannot
be a valid basis to proceed with candidate substitution.

RICHARD GOMEZ COMMITTED MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION RESULTING TO THE CANCELLATION OF HIS

COC.

The COMELEC First Division decision was the cause of the confusion when it used the word disqualification instead of
denied due course to and/or cancelled. Still, the COMELEC en banc could have corrected this confusion. At this point,
the Supreme Court has this to say;

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his failure to comply
with the one year residency requirement. The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word "disqualified" in the
February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting
the substitution of private respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In
short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified and not that his CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled
would mean that he could have been validly substitute by private respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy.

Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Divisions February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree the denial of due
course to and/or cancellation of Richards CoC should not have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the
invalidity of private respondents substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richards
"disqualification" is his failure to comply with the residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution
which is a ground for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC,
misrepresentation contemplated under a Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting ones qualifications for elective
office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status

Reading the case at this point is disheartening, because by the time Juntilla won the case, Ms. Lucy had two months left
before the next elections. Justice was served, only too late.

The Supreme Court further stated:

In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First Divisions February 17,
2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Departments finding that Richard was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was
not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the approval of private respondents substitution. It
overlooked the fact that the COMELEC First Divisions ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richards CoC and in
consequence, disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondents substitution.

The Court ended:

Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide candidate for the
position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she could not have
been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues
respecting private respondents own qualification to office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision rendered by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Note: HRET decided in favor of Lucy Torres.

Penera, Rosalinda A. vs. COMELEC and Edgar T. Andanar
G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Sta.Monica, Surigao del
Norte in the last May 2007 elections. The former filed her certificate of candidacy on the day before the prescribed
campaign period. When she went to the COMELEC Office for filing she was accompanied by her partymates. Thereafter,
they had a motorcade which was consist of two trucks and ten motorcycles running around the municipality convincing
the residents to vote for her and the other candidates of their political party.
Due to this, private respondent filed a petition against her alleging premature campaigning as provided in the
Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which says: Election or partisan political activity outside campaign period.--- It shall
be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in
an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period. She argued that she is not guilty
since she was not yet a candidate at that time and the campaign period has not yet started when the motorcade was
conducted.
While the petition was pending in the COMELEC, she was voted as mayor and took her office thereafter. The
COMELEC Second Division decided in favor of the complainant and found her guilty of premature campaigning. Likewise,
when she appealed in the COMELEC En Banc, the previous decision was affirmed.
Subsequently, she filed with the Supreme Court which decided against her. It held that the conduct of the
motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling under Section 79(b)(2) of the Omnibus
Election Code which says: [h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a
candidate[.] Furthermore, it was held that she should vacate the position. Now, she comes for a motion for
reconsideration using the same arguments.

ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of premature campaigning?

RULING: No, she is not.

Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. It is enough that Congress stated that any unlawful
act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. So, it is lawful if
done before the start of the campaign period. This plain language of the law need not be construed further.
Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate for. As what was decided in the Lanot Case
which says that prior to the campaign period, even if the candidate has filed his/her certificate of candidacy, he/she is
not yet considered as a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be guilty of
premature campaigning for in the first place there is no candidate to talk about. What she did was an exercise of her
freedom of expression.
JUDGMENT:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Peneras Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the
Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July
2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224.
Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.

Quinto V. COMELEC

COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned
from their positions.
FACTS:

Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto
resigned from their positions. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A.
9369.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.

HELD: NO.

In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld
the substantial distinctions between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause.

However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since
the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid
classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in neglect
or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office
work.

Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy
high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be considered as ipso facto
resigned once he files his certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable
how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.

The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan in character,
whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the
fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale.

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010

Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678,
the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered
Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No.
8678 provide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.

b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners
Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in
the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted
Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis
of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give
effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their
CoCs.

Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause.

Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs,
but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against
the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those
occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:

(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;

(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.

The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently.
As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction
exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from
plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily
overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.

Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirementif it is not germane
to the purpose of the law.

The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the
problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded
as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.

The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones
candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect
or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office
work.

If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally
rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to
the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter,
could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent
past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and
local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to
treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in
the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still
use the resources of his office to support his campaign.

As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the
inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a
greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.

There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification
simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the
second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13
of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678
are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision
of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that,
Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. RA 9369 provides that

For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period
shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy:
Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid
campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her
certificate of candidacy.

Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional

Held: No

To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The
test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth
requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive
officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."

In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned
provisions? There is.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in
office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the
deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is
accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were
elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the
law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose
wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally
compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the intervenors Motions for
Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE
this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

==============

Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or
employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be
considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.

Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law, there
would be no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later
reiterated in the proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the
overbreadth challenge raised against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of
RA 9369 must also fail.

EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO,

vs.

COMELEC and EDGAR "EGA Y" S. SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 212398 November 25, 2014

Facts: Three days before the May 13, 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by Edgar San
Luis against Emilio Ramon E.R. P. Ejercito, who was a fellow candidate and, at the time, the incumbent
Governor of the Province of Laguna. The petition alleges two causes of action: (1) Ejercito, during the
campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to the electorates of the province of Laguna health access
Orange Card with an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in voting for his favor ;(2) campaign
over-spending having a television campaign commercials alone of P23,730,784. Hence, Ejercito committed an
election offense under Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, in relation to Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code. He won and was proclaimed Governor of Laguna.

The COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the disqualification of Ejercito and upheld by Comelec en banc.
The COMELEC En Banc ruled on one of San Luis contentions in his Comment/Opposition to Ejercitos motion
for reconsideration that upon the disqualification of Ejercito, San Luis declared winner and that he was not the
second placer as he obtained the highest number of valid votes cast from among the qualified candidates.

In the instant case, Ejercito cannot be considered as a noncandidate by reason of his disqualification under
Section 68 of the OEC. Ejercito was a bona fide candidate who was disqualified, not because of any ineligibility
existing at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but because he violated the rules of candidacy.
His disqualifying circumstance, that is, his having over-spent in his campaign, did not exist at the time of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy. It did not affect the validity of the votes cast in his favor. Ergo, San Luis,
being the second placer in the vote count, remains the second placer. He cannot[,] thus[,] be named the
winner.

ISSUE: Whether or not San Luis be declared winner upon ejercitos disqualification

Held:
Section 6, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which governs Section 68 petitions for
disqualification, enunciates the rule succinctly, to wit: Section 6. Effect of Granting of Petition. In the event a
Petition to disqualify a candidate is granted by final judgment as defined under Section 8 of Rule 23 and the
disqualified candidate obtains the highest number of votes, the candidate with the second highest number of
votes cannot be proclaimed and the rule of succession, if allowed by law, shall be observed. In the event the
rule of succession is not allowed, a vacancy shall exist for such position.34

The petition for disqualification against Ejercito for campaign over-spending before the Commission isheard
and resolved pursuant to the electoral aspect of Section 68 of the OEC. It is an administrative proceeding
separate and distinct from the criminal proceeding through which Ejercito may be made to undergo in order to
determine whether he can be held criminally liable for the same act of over-spending. It is through this
administrative proceeding that this Commission, initially through its divisions, makes a factual determination on
the veracity of the parties respective allegations in a disqualification case. There is no need for a preliminary
investigation finding on the criminal aspect of the offenses in Section 68 before the Commission can act on the
administrative or electoral aspect of the offense. All that is needed is a complaint or a petition. As enunciated in
Lanot, "(a)n erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a
preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-
versa."