STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1/4)
to get a license for his firearm."
G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.
Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General F. R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower
court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a
secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient
defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition. We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an
information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized
accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in
connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by
Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of
August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his
custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without
serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having
secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding
authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower
court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel
stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in
this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and
that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent
of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine
Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he
would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being
that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly
specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document
so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following
question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six
rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his
possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having
secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding
authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes,
Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused
admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for
decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits
consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano
Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another
document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused
directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a
confidential mission;2the oath of office of the accused as such secret
agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused
"is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated
that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit
the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed
and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the
requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and
the parties were given time to file their respective memoranda.
1wph1.t
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to
two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated
from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court.
The decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of
firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition
regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in
the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal
treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails,"
are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials
and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As
such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental
duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come
only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It
cannot be set aside.
Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret
agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of
the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is
not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate
of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts
with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with
authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P.,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 116719. January 18, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PATRICIO AMIGO alias BEBOT, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an
Information reading as follows:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of FRUSTRATED
MURDER, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a
knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stab with said weapon one Benito
Ng Suy, thereby inflicting injuries upon the latter, the following injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN AND
LEFT THIGH WITH PENETRATION TO LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY,
DIAPHRAGM STOMACH, DUODENUM, PANCREAS AND
MIDTRANVERSE COLON.
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime
of murder as a consequence but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of his will, that is, because of the timely and able medical
assistance immediately rendered to the said Benito Ng Suy.
(p.1, Rollo.)
to which he pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information
was filed charging now the crime of murder, to wit:
That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a
knife, with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed with said weapon one
Benito Ng Say, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds which caused his
death and the consequent loss and damage to the heirs of the victim.
(p. 3, Rollo.)
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
with no modifying circumstance present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum to death and to pay the cost; to indemnify the
offended party the amount of P93,214.70 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
 (p. 32, Rollo.)
Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error
was committed by the trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty
of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of
the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed.
The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the
Office of the Solicitor General and as borne out by the evidence, are as follows:
On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at their
store, located at No. 166-A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy
was driving their gray Ford Fiera back home, situated at the back of Car Asia,
Bajada, Davao City. With him during that time were his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy
and a younger one together with his two year old son, who were all seated at the
front seat beside him while a five year old boy was also seated at the back of the said
vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 3-5; TSN, March 31, 1992)
On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada,
Davao City, an orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio Abogada,
suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital, Bajada, Davao City,
without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the opposite direction. This
Tamaraw was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which was situated at the
corner of the said hospital. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 4; TSN, March 31, 1992,
pp. 3 and 13)
With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Linglings
vulcanizing shop owned and operated by a certain Galadua. He was also
seated at the right front seat beside Virgilio.
Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on
collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw, causing a slight
damage to the right bumper of the latter. (TSN, March 31, 1992, p. 4)
Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the drivers seat
and confronted Virgilio Abogada who also went down from his vehicle. (TSN,
April 29, 1991, p. 5)
Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, You were not
looking, to which Virgilio retorted, I did not see you. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p.16)
While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who
was merely a passenger of Virgilio also alighted from the front seat of the
Tamaraw and instantaneously approached Benito and advised the latter to
leave since it was merely a small and minor accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991,
pp. 16-18)
A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the
former and told him not to interfere, since he had nothing to do with the
accident. (Ibid., p. 7)
Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; You
are Chinese, is it you? With a ready answer Benito said; Yes, I am a Chinese
and why? Patricio in turn replied; So, you are a Chinese, wait for a while, then
left. (Ibid., pp. 7 and 19)
Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman, but
after a lapse of about one minute, Patricio returned and arrogantly approached
Benito, asking the latter once again, You are a Chinese, is it not? To this Benito
calmly responded in the affirmative.
(Ibid., pp. 7, 19-20)
Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled Ah, so you are a Chinese,
and suddenly took a five inch knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed
Benito hitting him twice on the chest. (ibid., p. 20)
After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried
to evade his assailant by pushing Patricio away and run around the Tamaraw
but Patricio wielding the same knife and not content with the injuries he had
already inflicted, still chased Benito and upon overtaking the latter embraced
him and thrusted his knife on the victim several times, the last of which hit
Benito on the left side of his body. (Ibid., pp. 8, 10, 22)
It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera,
pleading for mercy to spare her father tried to get out of the vehicle but it was
very unfortunate that she could not open its door. (Ibid., p. 10)
Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing
to heed her pleas, Joselyn shouted for help, since there were already several
people around witnessing that fatal incident, but to her consternation nobody
lifted a single finger to help them. (Ibid., pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) Only after her
father lay seated on the floor of their Ford Fiera after being hit on the left side
of his body that she was able to open the door of the said vehicle. (Ibid., p. 12)
After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father
bathing with his own blood, embraced him, causing Patricio to cease from his
ferocious assault and noticing the presence of several people, he fled. (Ibid., p.
22)
Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran
faster than her, she was not able to overtake him, thus, she instead decided
to go back to where her father was and carried him inside the Tamaraw who
bumped them and consequently brought him to San Pedro Hospital where he
was attended to at the Emergency Room. (Ibid., p. 13)
 While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical
condition, due to multiple (13) stabbed wounds, was operated by Dr. Rolando
Chiu. After the operation, he was subsequently brought to the ICU and stayed
there for three (3) weeks. (July 12, 1991, pp. 3 and 4)
In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival,
Benito was airlifted to Manila and was directly confined at the Chinese General
Hospital. After three (3) weeks of confinement, Benito expired. CAUSE OF
DEATH - SEPSIS (an overwhelming infection). This means that the infection
has already circulated in the blood all over the body. (Ibid., pp.6-7)
(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to
the promulgation of Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been
abolished and hence, the penalty that should have been imposed for the crime
of murder committed by accused-appellant without the attendance of any
modifying circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium period
or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
Reasons out accused-appellant:
. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when
the stabbing and killing happened, the computation of the penalty should be
regarded from reclusion perpetua down and not from death penalty. Indeed,
the appropriate penalty is deducible from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Hence, there being no modifying circumstances
present (p. 5 Decision, ibid.), the correct penalty should be in the medium
period (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code) which is 17 years, 4 months and
1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.
(p. 10, Appellants Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)
The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court
in People vs. Muoz (170 SCRA 107 [1989]) thusly:
In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that in
view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, thereby eliminating
death as the original maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so,
the Court, through Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera in
People vs. Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in
People vs. Atencio, divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the
limits of which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People vs. Intino,
as follows: the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the
upper half ofreclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion
perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended
discussion, come to the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does
not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III, Section 19(1)
of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there
is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by many of
those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however, is of the
belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable
reading of the constitutional provision in question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution
abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the
remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be
divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme
intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section
19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by
reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining
penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that there is really
nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty.
The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is
a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is
plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the
records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.
xxx xxx xxx
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish
the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention
was, what we should determine is whether or not they also meant to require a
corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition
against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all
expressed in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicated therein
by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy,
assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no doubts
as to its meaning. One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even
implied. The writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that this
might be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said
another or - strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere - did not say
enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and
Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then
constituted. All but two members at that time still sit on the Court today. If we
have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine on which we were all agreed
before, it is not because of a change in the composition of this body. It is
virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after reflecting on the
question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might, and tan, for
the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not
petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to
change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should
not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing
a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.
Accordingly, with the hope that as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks,
whatever that means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for
three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution.
Instead, we return to our original interpretation and hold that Article III, Section
19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the
medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities
that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before
its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the death penalty and
another who committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying
circumstance will now be both punishable with the same medium period
although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough.
But that is the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question
of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the
Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny
although he had worked longer than others hired later in the day also paid the
same amount. When he complained because he felt unjustly treated by the
householder, the latter replied: Friend, I do you no wrong. Did you not agree
with me for a penny?
The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the
Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and
exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply them and
have no authority to modify them or revise their range as determined
exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this prerogative of
the lawmaking body.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic
aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the
offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which, conformably to
the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is still reclusion perpetua. This
is the penalty we imposed on all the accused-appellants for each of the three
murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil
indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof
is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.
(at pp. 120-125.)
The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parojinog (203 SCRA 673
[1991]) and in People vs. De la Cruz (216 SCRA 476 [1992]).
Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the
forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law,
disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED
LEX. The remedy is elsewhere - clemency from the executive or an
amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can
but apply the law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Francisco, and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.
GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent,
Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner
offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy." 1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the
event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of
litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner. 2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo,
nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na,
magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan,
sabing ganoon
ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag
explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na
pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States,
nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification
mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue
ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok
dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo.
Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think
that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no
(sic) ko.
ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel,
kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo"
mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI Eh, di sana
ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang
utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala
ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo
kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa
labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka
umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi
ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey
lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga
sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa
'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka. 3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said
act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed
a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation
of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other
purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act,
dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D.
Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez
not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's
conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly
record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing
the contents of the said recording to other person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to
Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an
order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash,
agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute
an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by
R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
personother than a participant to the communication. 4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the
case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division)
of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated
its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989
null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information
based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an
offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of
discretion correctible by certiorari. 5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution 6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the
applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends
that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private
conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In
relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the
conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that
R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a
statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law
is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other
Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by
all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any
person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the
qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his
private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers
indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of
private conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the
element of secrecy would not appear to be material. Now,
suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties
but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be
mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases
or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not
necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to
show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties
prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may
be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording,
would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within
the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your
Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the
prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases
or special proceedings?
Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape
recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the
parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting
to record the observation of one without his knowing it and then
using it against him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the
purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I
believe that all the parties should know that the observations are
being recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in
meetings of the board of directors where a tape recording is taken,
there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that
the people whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons,
we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here may be
used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand.
Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements
against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if
you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks
of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded,
without him knowing that what is being recorded may be used
against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under
Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a
public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because
the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated
by the bill. It is the communication between one person and
another person not between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with
the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore
plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision
seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where
the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,
intercepting or recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret
recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would
suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the
Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent
court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed."14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows
the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity.
The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning
"to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies
the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-
verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which
are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private
communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator
Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the
usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most,
if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do
not wish to expose. Freeconversations are often characterized by
exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the
expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken
seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among others,
has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state
here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the
nature of conversations between individuals and the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They
must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life
are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange
of communication between individuals free from every
unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the
issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension
for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did
not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither
among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following
the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused." 20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable
facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no
ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized
"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as
among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear
and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA
SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close
association with Delfin Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982,
private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner
as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom
private respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company
equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of
Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The
report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal auditor,
Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership
styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao,
owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of
petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that
Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own
personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to defraud
petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner
GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar. 1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda
Salazar violated company reglations by involving herself in transactions
conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that she signed as
a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also
appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the
Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed
private respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month,
effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to,
explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations three (3) days later
or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner
for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal
dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages,
after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was
considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these
findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered
petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent
position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she would have
received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay
private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the
questioned resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid
decision with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the
backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral
damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal
of private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two
(2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's
acts in conflict with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated
immediate and decisive action on any employee closely, associated with
Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e discovery of
the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private
respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive
suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the company
pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension does, not
signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she
was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for
the protection of the company's property pending investigation any alleged
malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. 5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's
right to due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay
with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of
October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the
Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed
her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to
evaluate her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we
hold that her eventual separation from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make
whole" the victim who has not merely lost her job which, under settled
Jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not to be deprived
without due process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to
her during the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
 Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee
except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular
employments, the employer shall not terminate the services
of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the
Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall by entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and to backwages." 7 (Emphasis
supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present
Constitution has gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social
and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Given
the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new
Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other
things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas
of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such
topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and
Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and
Human Rights. 9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits is may be provided by
law. 10 (Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under
the Article an Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate
the relations between workers and employers. The State shall
ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
baegaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory
arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of
labor which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the
fact that the intent of the framers of the present Constitution was to give
primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full protection," at least
greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the
geographical location of the workers and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who
substantially contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor
provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article on Social
Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies
"in the light of the special importance that we are giving now to social justice
and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social justice in
national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in
our Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an
employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or authorized cause
provided by law has assumed greater importance under the 1987 Constitution
with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on Social Justice.
And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code.
Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been
proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose
duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has failed
to do so, then the remedies provided in Article 279 should find, application.
Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went
further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 2, 1989
that amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence
may have generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to
labor "full protection."13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized,
much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every
right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement
and payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed
employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of
the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from
which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to give her back the income
lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past,
would perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when
reinstatement has not been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee
finds himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying
reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time
(22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it
would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may no
longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties
involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued
employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when
supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust
or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of
"antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievable
estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of
backwages and separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place
the wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who
is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to
his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory construction, if a
statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule
or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the
index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by,
the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the
court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, and to have expressed
its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. 27 Verba legis
non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure. Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the
wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of
the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when
the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations
between the employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a
position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it
is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be
generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the
employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above
principles: where the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such,
enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In-
Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer
of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to organize the
workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a warehouseman
of a non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and
maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations to the
Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied
indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can never be possible simply
because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a
result of litigation. That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of
asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could
be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on
the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become
strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems
analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence
such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations between employer
and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an exception to the general rule
mandating reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by
engaging in transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations?
Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its
employees from involving themselves with any company that has business
dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed
as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which
in turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself
in an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been
unlawfully dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar
and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years
only.

However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a This decision is immediately executory.
circumstance did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems
analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the
SO ORDERED.
procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of
systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar
did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and purchase of Paras, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ.,
supplies and company assets. concur.

In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss Cruz, J., concurs in the result.
of confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or
breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some basis Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.
which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed
on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since Separate Opinions
Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed
reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably true,
do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of
I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See
disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of
Decision, p. 2.)
suspicion derived from speculative inferences.

Narvasa C.J., concurs

To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be
most inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her
friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations' Separate Opinions
support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's
special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private
respondent is wanting from the records. I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative findings. (See
Decision, p. 2.)
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar
had already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not Narvasa C.J., concurs
have the opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained
obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994
principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a
chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination
should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FRANKLIN DRILON in his capacity as Secretary of
Justice, respondent.
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under
Rep. Act No. 7309, which among other things provides compensation for
persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but on
appeal are acquitted and ordered released.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were
convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for
the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter's wife Florida
and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of
June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute
between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were
sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their
bonds had been cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded
to judgment, however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed
for failure to file his brief.
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting
petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy
between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of
Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter barged
into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court
ruled that because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the
scene of the crime was insufficient to show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309,
sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to "any person
who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal." 1 The claim was filed with the
Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was denied on the
ground that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not
sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that
there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land
dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was
basis for finding that he was "probably guilty."
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's
ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice in his resolution dated March
11, 1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly
accused, convicted and imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No.
7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly accused and
imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, thereby making him "a
victim of unjust imprisonment." In the instant case, however,
Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim since a
reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation
is not based on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of
reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor
Rep. Act No. 7309, however, provides for review by certiorari of the
decisions of the Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in view of the
importance of the question tendered, the Court resolved to treat the petition
as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to
recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the claimant must on appeal be found
to be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the trial court.
Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and
does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was
imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already
unjust in itself," he contends. To deny his claim because he was not
declared innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two years
while his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is
only one requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to present such proof,
the presumption that the accused is innocent stands and, therefore, there
is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the crime before
he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an
accused is acquitted on appeal he must be given compensation on the
theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by the trial court. Such a reading of
sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of construction that
when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural
meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word
"unjustly" so that the provision would simply read: "The following may file
claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was
accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted
[and] imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused
is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction was "unjust." An
accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his conviction by
the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he
may be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but
because of reasonable doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable
to the complainant, because while the evidence against him does not
satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may nonetheless be
sufficient to sustain a civil action for damages. 2 In one case the accused, an
alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because of doubt as to the
ages of the offended parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless
the accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered
deported. 3 In such a case to pay the accused compensation for having been
"unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his
liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an accused
would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as
evidence of innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof
that he is guilty to the prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with
guilt," 4 so is the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing
to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place on the
prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted
that he has been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with
homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent
or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence
and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for
conviction which saved him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct
do not exist. 5
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with
the manner of his conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused
may on appeal be acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that
does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been
the victim of an "unjust conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in
the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not
unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does
respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely
on the innocence of the accused.
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What
this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco 6 applies:
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment
is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence,
and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do
an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust
judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it
must be shown, according to Groizard, that although he has acted
without malice, he failed to observe in the performance of his duty,
that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact
in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance
are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be
explained by a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only
exists in the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that
is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable
interpretation, even though there is a misunderstanding or error of
the law applied, yet in the contrary it results, logically and
reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in the
notorious violation of the legal precept.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result
of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust
accusation. The accused must have been "unjustly accused, in
consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is
important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the
accused has been wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability,
also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any
conviction even though based on less than the required quantum of proof
in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor
in filing a case in court is not whether the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt but only whether "there is reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
not an unjust accusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof
is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only an erroneous one. The SO ORDERED.
remedy for such error is appeal.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
conviction by the trial court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice
or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had Feliciano, J., is on leave.
reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused were in league,
because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was
G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993
petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only
that. Petitioner and his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims
and forced their way into it. JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there SANTOS, respondent.
was no proof that he did or say anything on the occasion. Said the
appellate court. Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.

Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.
Basbacio to have committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito
Basbacio as having said anything at all. Both fail to show Felicito
CRUZ, J.:
Basbacio as having committed anything in furtherance of a
conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the defendants.
It seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to conclude that The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the
conspiracy existed between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and
petitioner's appeal from a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Felicito Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders on
Administration on the ground of failure to post the required appeal bond. 1
that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the coming
together of the two defendants to an agreement to commit the
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code
crimes of murder and frustrated murder on two counts? Where was
as amended, providing that:
Basbacio's contribution to the commission of the said crimes?
Basbacio was as the record shows nothing but part of the
dark shadows of that night. . . . In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in
shown by concert of action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner the judgment appealed from.
with his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And what
about the fact that there was bad blood between petitioner and the victim and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as
Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed upon in view amended, reading as follows:
of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim
that he had been unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he
Sec. 6. Bond In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a
was released because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only
these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the Board of upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
Claims did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing
petitioner's claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
 bonding company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme
Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the
appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas
employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book
II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but also to post
a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee
of P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond
of P50,000 from a bonding company acceptable to the Administration
and duly accredited by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall
answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the
conditions for the grant and use of the license, and/or accreditation
and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee
compliance with the provisions of the Code and its implementing rules
and regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the Rules of the
Administration and relevant issuances of the Department and all
liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall
include the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the
surety and that any judgment against the principal in connection with
matters falling under POEA's jurisdiction shall be binding and
conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds shall be co-terminus with
the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000
with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book
II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited
workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond
requirement but suggest that the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only
to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not of the POEA. Appeals from decisions
of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following provisions of Rule V,
Book VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed
within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule;
shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee
and the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of
this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which
shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support
thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the
appellant received the appealed decision and/or award and proof of
service on the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites
aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an
appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in
escrow the amount of P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the
petitioner still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a
decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to
the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from
a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further
insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is
eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are
supposed to guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the
employer, but these claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees
whose contracts of employment have been violated. The POEA can go against
these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the conditions of its license,
the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247
(reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other
liabilities the recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a
standing fund, as it were, to be used only as a last resort and not to be reduced
with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited workers that may be
adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be enough to cover
such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be exhausted after
satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of
about P170,000 to the dismissed employee, the herein private respondent.
The standby guarantees required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if this
award were to be enforced not against the appeal bond but against the bonds
and the escrow money, making them inadequate for the satisfaction of the
other obligations the recruiter may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to
exceed the amount of P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow
money required of the recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers,
as the petitioner observes, but there is a simple explanation for this distinction.
Overseas recruiters are subject to more stringent requirement because of the
special risks to which our workers abroad are subjected by their foreign
employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective recourse. The
overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and
the escrow money are intended to insure more care on the part of the local
agent in its choice of the foreign principal to whom our overseas workers are
to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of
rules as in this case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given
effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as
a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by
Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because
of the earlier bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in
effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy;
on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17.
The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should
be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled
whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the
overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules
and the escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary
to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VII of the
POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the
POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class,
conformably to the mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than
annulling the appeal bond as a further protection to the claimant employee,
this Court affirms once again its commitment to the interest of labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It
is so ordered.
Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J, is on leave.
G.R. No. 75222 July 18, 1991
RADIOLA-TOSHIBA PHILIPPINES, INC., through its assignee-in-
insolvency VICENTE J. CUNA, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LEONARDO I.
CRUZ, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch
No. LVI, EMILIO C. PATINO, as assignee-in-insolvency of CARLOS
and TERESITA GATMAYTAN, SHERIFF OF ANGELES CITY,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ANGELES CITY, SANYO MARKETING
CORPORATION, S & T ENTERPRISES INC., REFRIGERATION
INDUSTRIES INC., and DELTA MOTOR CORPORATION, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.
Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari of the March 31, 1986 Decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court * in A.C-G.R. SP No. 04160 entitled "Radiola-
Toshiba Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Leonardo I. Cruz, et al." denying the
petition for certiorari and mandamus; and its Resolution of July 1, 1986
denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of this case, as found by the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, are as follows:
On July 2, 1980, three creditors filed a petition for the
involuntary insolvency of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan, the private respondents herein, the case
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 1548 of the then
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Pampanga and Angeles City.
 On July 9, 1980, the respondent court issued an order
taking cognizance of the said petition and stating inter
alia that:
. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the
delivery of any property owing and belonging to said
respondents-debtors from other persons, or, to any other
persons for the use and benefit of the same respondents-
debtors and/or the transfer of any property by and for the
said respondents-debtors to another, upon petitioners'
putting up a bond by way of certified and reputable
sureties. (Annex 1, Comment).
Counsel for the petitioners-creditors informed respondent sheriff
Angeles City of the aforesaid order (Annex 2, Ibid) and on March
26, 1981, also communicated with counsel for the petitioner herein
regarding same order, apprising the latter that "the personal and
real property which have been levied upon and/or attached should
be preserved till the final determination of the petition
aforementioned." (Annex 3, Ibid).
On April 12, 1983, petitioners-creditors filed second urgent motion
for issuance of insolvency order and resolution of the case, alleging
among other things, that in November, 1982, they filed an urgent
motion to issue insolvency order; on December 2, 1982, they
presented a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of Angeles City from
disposing the personal and real properties of the insolvent debtors,
Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan; on January 18, 1983,
they (sic) appealed in the Bulletin Today issue of even date a news
item to the effect that Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc. has already shut
down its factory, sometime in March 1983, through their
representative, they caused to be investigated the real properties
in the names of Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan and
they were surprised to find out that some of the aforesaid
properties were already transferred to Radiola-Toshiba Phil. Inc.;
and that in view of such development, it is their submission that
without an insolvency order and a resolution of the case which was
ripe for resolution as early as March 3, 1982, the rights and interest
of petitioners-creditors would be injured and jeopardized. (Annex
"C").
On April 15, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition to the said
motion vis-a-vis the prayer that the insolvency order (which has not
been rendered yet by the court) be annotated on the transfer
certificates of title already issued in its name (Annex "D").
On April 22, 1983, judgment was rendered declaring the insolvency
of respondents-debtors Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita
Gatmaytan.
On April 28, 1983, petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the
same second urgent motion and motion to direct respondent sheriff
to issue a final certificate of sale for the properties covered by TCT
Nos. 18905 and 40430 in its favor (Annex "E").
On February 3, 1984, acting upon petitioner's motion claiming that
ownership of certain real properties of the insolvents had passed
to it by virtue of foreclosure proceedings conducted in Civil Case
No. 35946 of the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II,
Pasig, Metro Manila, which properties were not redeemed within
the period of redemption, respondent court issued an order
disposing, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby, confirms the election of
Mr. Emilio C. Patino, as assignee of all the registered
claimants in this case, and, in consequence thereof, the
said assignee is hereby directed to post a bond in the
amount of P30,000.00 and to take his oath thereafter so as
to be able to perform his duties and discharge his functions,
as such.
The Court, likewise, sets the meeting of all the creditors
with the attendance, of course, of the assignee, on March
9, 1984, at 8:30., as by that time the proposals, which the
respective representatives of the parties-claimants desire
to clear with their principals, shall have already been
reported.
The assignee shall see to it that the properties of the
insolvents which are now in the actual or constructive
custody and management of the receiver previously
appointed by the Court on petitioners' and claimants'
proposals be placed under this actual or constructive
custody and management, such as he is able to do so, as
the Court hereby dissolves the receivership previously
authorized, it having become a superfluity. (Annex "F").
On May 18, 1984, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CLII, Pasig,
Metro Manila, in Civil Case No. 35946, issued an order directing
respondent Sheriff of Angeles City, or whoever is acting in his
behalf, to issue within seven (7) days from notice thereof a final
deed of sale over the two (2) parcels of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Titles Nos. 18905 and 40430 in favor of petitioner.
(Annex "G").
In said Civil Case No. 35946, a case for collection of sum of money
covering the proceeds of television sets and other appliances, the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, Pasig, Metro Manila,
issued a writ of preliminary attachment on February 15, 1980 upon
application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, which put up a bond of
P350,000.00. On March 4, 1980, 3:00 P.M., levy on attachment
was done in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in
the names of spouses Carlos Gatmaytan and Teresita Gatmaytan
under TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 of the Registry of Deeds of
Angeles City, per Entry No. 7216 on said titles. (Annex "A" and
"B").
On December 10, 1980, a decision was rendered in favor of
petitioner, ordering private respondents and their co-defendant
Peoples Appliance Center, Inc. to pay petitioner, jointly and
severally, the sum of P721,825.91 plus interest thereon of 14% per
annum from October 12, 1979 until fully paid; P20,000.00, for and
attorney's fees; and the costs of suit (Annex "5", Comment). After
the said decision in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 35946
became final and executory, a writ of execution for the satisfaction
thereof issued on March 18, 1981; and on May 4, 1981, respondent
sheriff of Angeles City sold at auction sale the attached properties
covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430, to petitioner as the highest
bidder, and the certificate of sale was accordingly issued in its
favor.
On September 21, 1982, the court ordered the consolidation of
ownership of petitioner over said properties; but respondent sheriff
of Angeles City refused to issue a final certificate of sale in favor of
petitioner.
On May 30, 1984, petitioners-creditors interposed their opposition,
stating among other things, that subject motion is improper and
premature because it treats of matters foreign to the insolvency
proceedings; and premature, for the reason that the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430-Angeles City were brought
to the jurisdiction of the insolvency court for the determination of
the assets of the insolvents available for distribution to the
approved credits/liabilities of the insolvents. Petitioners-creditors
theorized that the insolvency court is devoid of jurisdiction to grant
the motion referring to matters involved in a case pending before a
coordinate court in another jurisdiction (Annex "l").
Prior thereto or on July 13, 1984, to be precise, respondent court
came out with its assailed extended order with the following
decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, and also for the reason stated in the
aforequoted order issued in pursuance of a similar motion
of the movant, the Court denies, as it is hereby denied the
motion of Radiola-Toshiba, dated May 28, 1984 and directs
the latter to participate in the supposed meeting of all the
creditors/claimants presided by the duly elected assignee.
(Annex "J").
On September 8, 1984, herein petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Philippines, Inc.
(RTPI, for short) filed a petition forcertiorari and mandamus with
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court.
The then Intermediate Appellate Court, in a Decision promulgated on
March 31, 1986, denied petitioner's aforesaid petition. On April 19, 1986,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated July 1, 1986.
Hence, the instant petition. Herein petitioner raised two issues
1. WHETHER OR NOT CERTIORARI IS A REMEDY DESIGNATED FOR
THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION ONLY; and
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE REFUSAL OF THE COURTS TO ENFORCE
THE LIEN OF PETITIONER ARISING FROM A LEVY OF ATTACHMENT
NOT MADE WITHIN ONE MONTH NEXT PRECEDING THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDING IS GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The main issue in this case is whether or not the levy on attachment in
favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against
respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.
On this issue, Section 32 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as
amended), provides:
Sec. 32 As soon as an assignee is elected or appointed and
qualified, the clerk of the court shall, by an instrument under his
hand and seal of the court, assign and convey to the assignee all
the real and personal property, estate, and effects of the debtor
with all his deeds, books, and papers relating thereto, and such
assignment shall relate back to the commencement of the
proceedings in insolvency, and shall relate back to the acts upon
the adjudication was founded, and by operation of law shall vest
the title to all such property, estate, and effects in the assignee,
although the same is then attached on mesne process, as the
property of the debtor. Such assignment shall operate to vest in
the assignee all of the estate of the insolvent debtor not exempt by
law from execution. It shall dissolve any attachment levied within
one month next preceding the commencement of the insolvency
proceedings and vacate and set aside any judgment entered in any
action commenced within thirty days immediately prior to the
commencement of insolvency proceedings and shall set aside any
judgment entered by default or consent of the debtor within thirty
days immediately prior to the commencement of the insolvency
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Relative thereto, the findings of the then Intermediate Appellate Court are
undisputed that the levy on attachment against the subject properties of
the Gatmaytans, issued by the then Court of First Instance of Pasig in Civil
Case No. 35946, was on March 4, 1980 while the insolvency proceeding
in the then Court of First Instance of Angeles City, Special Proceeding No.
1548, was commenced only on July 2, 1980, or more than four (4) months
after the issuance of the said attachment. Under the circumstances,
petitioner contends that its lien on the subject properties overrode the
insolvency proceeding and was not dissolved thereby.
Private respondents, on the other hand, relying on Section 79 of the said
law, which reads:
Sec. 79. When an attachment has been made and is not dissolved
before the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is
dissolved by an undertaking given by the defendant, if the claim
upon which the attachment suit was commenced is proved against
the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove the legal costs and
disbursements of the suit, and of the keeping of the property, and
the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.
and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full knowledge of the
proceedings in the insolvent case, argue that the subsequent Certificate of
Sale on August 3, 1981, issued in favor of petitioner over the subject
properties, was issued in bad faith, in violation of the law and is not
equitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors; and pursuant to the
above quoted Section 79, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer
of the subject properties in its name.
Petitioner's contention is impressed with merit. The provision of the above-
quoted Section 32, of the Insolvency Law is very clear that attachments
dissolved are those levied within one (1) month next preceding the
commencement of the insolvency proceedings and judgments vacated
and set aside are judgments entered in any action, including judgment
entered by default or consent of the debtor, where the action was filed
within thirty (30) days immediately prior to the commencement of the
insolvency proceedings. In short, there is a cut off period one (1) month
in attachment cases and thirty (30) days in judgments entered in actions
commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Section 79, on the other
hand, relied upon by private respondents, provides for the right of the
plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolved before the commencement of
proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking given by the
defendant, if the claim upon which the attachment suit was commenced is
proved against the estate of the debtor. Therefore, there is no conflict
between the two provisions.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it may be stated that in
construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect
to every part of a statute, if at all possible. This rule is expressed in the
maxim, ut maqis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought
which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every word. Hence,
where a statute is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court
should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render
the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each
other (Javellana vs. Tayo, 6 SCRA 1042 [1962]; Statutory Construction by
Ruben E. Agpalo, p. 182).
Neither can the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment in favor of the
petitioner be considered as a fraudulent transfer or preference by the
insolvent debtors, which constitute a violation of Sec. 70 of the Insolvency
Law. In the case of Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines (100 Phil. 187,
[1956]), this Court ruled that Sections 32 and 70 contemplate only acts and
transactions occurring within 30 days prior to the commencement of the
proceedings in insolvency and, consequently, all other acts outside of the
30-day period cannot possibly be considered as coming within the orbit of
their operation.
Finally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in question were
never placed under the jurisdiction of respondent insolvency court so as to
be made available for the payment of claim filed against the Gatmaytans
in the insolvency proceedings.
Hence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the
attachment and execution of Civil Case No. 35946 of the CFI of Rizal
constitutes a freezing of the disposition of subject properties by the former
which were not within its jurisdiction; undeniably, a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, correctable by certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 1986 decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court is hereby Reversed and SET ASIDE. The attachment and
execution sale in Civil Case No. 35946 of the former CFI of Rizal are given
due course and petitioner's ownership of subject properties covered by
TCT Nos. 18905 and 40430 is ordered consolidated.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992
MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the
enforcement by respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of its
RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment,
by district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the
Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the
preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election
Supervisors and Election Registrars (Annex "A", Petition), RESOLUTION NO.
2379, approving the Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to
Resolution No. 2313 (Annex "B", Petition), and RESOLUTION UND. 92-010
holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par. (d), all of Sec.
3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections (Annex "C", Petition).
Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, having been elected in
the January 1988 local elections. He prays, more particularly, for reversal of
the position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of Paraaque
and all the other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area. He claims that the
second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which requires the
apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not specify when the
members of their Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He would
consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec. 3, which immediately succeeds par. (c),
to support his view that the elected members of these municipalities mentioned
in par. (c) should continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections.
Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the regular elections on May 11,
1992, elective members of the Sangguniang Panlunsod and Sangguniang
Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. However,
beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district."
Petitioner therefore insists that the elected members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Paraaque fall under this category so that they should continue to
be elected at large until the 1995 regular elections.
Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court observes that
petitioner does not allege that he is running for reelection, much less, that he
is prejudiced by the election, by district, in Paraaque. As such, he does
not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or substantial
interest. 1 He does not also allege any legal right that has been violated by
respondent. If for this alone, petitioner does not appear to have any cause of
action.
However, considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it
does the political exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment,
and petitioner alleging abuse of discretion and violation of the Constitution by
respondent, We resolve to brush aside the question of procedural infirmity,
even as We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory relief. We so held
similarly through Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmea v. Commission on
Elections. 2
Now on the meat of the dispute.
On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the
President on November 26, 1991. It is "An Act Providing for Synchronized
National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes." At issue in this case is the
proper interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof which provides:
Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan. The elective
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected as follows:
(a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the
elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be
elected by legislative districts . . .
(b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the
Commission shall divide them into two (2) districts for
purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan . . .
(c) The number and election of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the
Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any other
city with two (2) or more legislative districts shall continue to
be governed by the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic
Act No. 6636 . . . Provided, further, That, the Commission shall
divide each of the municipalities in Metro Manila Area into two
(2) districts by barangay for purposes of representation in the
Sangguniang Bayan. . . . and,
(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992,
elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance
with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular
elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district . . . .
On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking authority of the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, R.A. 6636, R.A. 6646 and R.A.
7166, 3 issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent resolutions in
question.
On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of
par. (d), particularly in relation to par. (c), Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, petitioner filed
with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring
whether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Paraaque and the other
municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein, which are all single-district
municipalities, would be elected by district in May 11, 1992 or in the 1995
regular elections.
Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379
approving the guidelines submitted by the Provincial Election Supervisors and
Municipal Election Registrars concerned pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and
stating therein its purpose in recommending to Congress the
districting/apportionment of Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Bayan seats, i.e., to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the
May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. In this Project of Apportionment,
Paraaque together with the other twelve (12) municipalities in the Metro
Manila Area was divided into two (2) districts with six (6) elective councilors for
each district.
On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for Clarification
by interpreting Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, to mean that the election of elective
members of the Sangguniang Bayan, by district, of the thirteen (13)
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall apply in the May 11, 1992
elections (Resolution UND. 92-010, prom. March 10, 1992). Petitioner says
that he received copy of Resolution UND. 92-010 on March 13, 1992.
On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third Resolution of
COMELEC, petitioner filed the instant petition asserting that under par. (d),
Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
and the Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of the May 11, 1992 regular
elections, shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. He would
include in this class of sanggunian members to be elected at large those of the
municipality of Paraaque.
Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in
promulgating Resolution No. 2313, Resolution No. 2379 and Resolution UND.
92-010 which clarifies, contrary to his view, that the district apportionment of
the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area is applicable to the May 11, 1992
regular elections.
We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166,
and its precursor bills on synchronized elections, Senate Bill No. 1861 and
House Bill No. 34811, and We realize the web of confusion generated by the
seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. Some framers of the law
were even fazed at the empirical implications of some of its provisions,
particularly Sec. 3 thereof, and they admitted in fact that said provisions were
susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by the sponsorship and
explanatory speeches now spread in the Journals of Congress. Hence, We
can understand why petitioner would interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if we
pursue his course, we may conclude in absurdity because then there would
have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the single-district provinces
referred to in par. (b), and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area
mentioned in the second proviso of par. (c), to be apportioned at once into two
(2) districts each if the members of their respective sanggunian after all would
still be elected at large as they were in the 1988 elections.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile.
We must therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its
reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the
legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is
its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute. If the statute
needs construction, as it does in the present case, the most dominant in that
process is the purpose of the act. 4 Statutes should be construed in the light of
the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, 5 and they
should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the
mischief, and secure the benefits intended. 6 A construction should be rejected
that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not
accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to
defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment. 7
The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note
of Senate Bill No. 1861 which states in part:
This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11,
1992, and provide for the necessary implementing details. It also
endorses reforms and measures to ensure the conduct of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections. Specifically, it seeks to: (1)
Reduce the number of positions to be voted for by providing therein
that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large, but by
district . . . .
That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A. 7166
is reflected in the "WHEREAS" clauses constituting the preamble to Resolution
No. 2379. Thus
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the
number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992
synchronized elections recommended, among others, to the Congress
of the Philippines, the districting/apportionment of sangguniang
panlungsod and sangguniang bayan seats;
WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act
7166, and approved by the President of the Philippines on November
26, 1991, adopting among others, the recommendation of the
Commission on Elections aforestated;
WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic Act 7166,
particularly Section 3 thereof, the Commission promulgated
Resolution No. 2313, directing the Provincial Election Supervisors and
Election Registrars concerned to submit, after consultation, public
hearings, and consensus-taking with the different sectors in the
community, the Project of District Apportionment of single legislative-
district provinces and municipalities in the Metro Manila area;
WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of
the district apportionment are as follows: a. compactness, contiguity
and adjacentness of territory; b. apportionment shall be based on the
1990 census of population; c. no municipality, in the case of provinces,
and no barangay, in the case of cities and municipalities, shall be
fragmented or apportioned into different districts.
This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also
manifest from the four corners of Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. 8 Thus, a careful
analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3 shows that the purpose of
districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to reduce the number of
positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and
ensure the efficiency of electoral process. Considering that the single-district
provinces and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which are all single-
districts, and under pars. (b) and (c) have already been apportioned into two
(2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the members of their Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the coming May 11, 1992,
elections, although under par. (d), the single-district cities and all the
municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise single-
districts, will have to continue electing at large the members of their
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan as they have yet to be
apportioned. But beginning the regular elections of 1995, they will all have to
be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to
apportion the single-district cities and the municipalities outside the Metro
Manila Area.
As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local
government units for purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it is clear
that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts contemplated in
par. (a), they shall continue to be elected by district; (2) for provinces with
single legislative districts, as they have already been apportioned into two (2)
districts each under par. (b), they shall henceforth be elected likewise by
district; (3) for cities with two (2) or more legislative districts, e.g., the cities of
Manila, Cebu and Davao, they shall also continue to be elected by district
under the first part of par. (c); and (4) for the thirteen (13) municipalities in the
Metro Manila Area, which have already been apportioned into two (2) districts
each under the second proviso of par. (c), they shall likewise be elected by
district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992.
Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district
cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila,
which remain single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec.
3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11,
1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to
effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166. That is the
true import of par. (d). Consequently, as We view it, where he stands, petitioner
must fall.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part of
respondent, and for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and
Nocon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989
ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO
SEVA, JUDGE OF BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM GUERRA, respondents.
Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.
Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside
of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 dismissing the petition
for certiorari against Judge Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Norte and the private respondent, William Guerra, involves a pure
question of law i.e., the coverage and application of Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise as the Public
Land Act.
The facts are undisputed.
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No.
192765, in favor of the spouses, Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso.
The said original certificate of title was inscribed in the Registration Book for
the Province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On February 28,
1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold
the property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and
Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena
Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a result of the aforementioned sale,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines
Norte was issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling Original Certificate
of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property
now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The
mortgage was subsequently released on November 22, 1973 after the
petitioners paid the amount of P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the
petitioners again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the Philippine
National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a loan of
P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine National
Bank against the mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held
on February 27, 1981. The private respondent, William Guerra, emerged as
the highest bidder in the said public auction and as a result thereof a
"Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of
Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final Deed" was
executed in favor of the private respondent.
On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of possession. The public
respondent, Judge Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the motion,
issued on September 22, 1983 an order for the issuance of a writ of possession
in favor of the private respondent. When the deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte
however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the property in the
possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate and
surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to repurchase it
under Section 119 of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984, another motion,
this time for the issuance of an alias writ of possession was filed by the private
respondent with the trial court. The petitioners, on August 31, 1984, opposed
the private respondents' motion and instead made a formal offer to repurchase
the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition and formal offer, the
trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of possession prayed
for the private respondent. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the
order but their motion was denied.
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the
respondent Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari claiming that the
respondent trial court judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order dated October 12, 1984 granting the writ of possession, and the order
dated October 22, 1984, denying their motion for reconsider consideration.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave
due course to the petition; required the parties to submit simultaneous
memoranda in support to their respective positions; and restrained the trial
court and the private respondent from executing, implementing or otherwise
giving effect to the assailed writ of possession until further orders from the
court. 3 However, in a decision promulgated on September 17, 1986, the
respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According
to the appellate court:
It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso
whose title, OCT No. P-1248, was issued on August 9, 1961, executed
a deed of absolute sale on February 28, 1970 of the property covered
by said title to spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, the
five year period to repurchase the property provided for in Section 119
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended could have already
started. Prom this fact alone, the petition should have been dismissed.
However, granting that the transfer from parent to child for a nominal
sum may not be the "conveyance" contemplated by the law. We will
rule on the issue raised by the petitioners. 4
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the appellate court
went on to hold that the five-year period of the petitioners to repurchase under
Section 119 of the Public Land Act had already prescribed. The point of
reckoning, ruled the respondent court in consonance with Monge is from the
date the petitioners mortgaged the property on December 4, 1973. Thus, when
the petitioners made their formal offer to repurchase on August 31, 1984, the
period had clearly expired.
In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for
reconsideration. Their motion apparently went for naught because on May 7,
1987, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the same. Hence, this
petition.
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts
below, their right to repurchase within five years under Section 119 of the
Public Land Act has not yet prescribed. To support their contention, the
petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of Appeals 6 and Manuel vs.
Philippine National Bank, et al. 7
On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's
decision, states that the sale of the contested property by the patentees to the
petitioners disqualified the latter from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said
property. As such, they (the petitioners) no longer enjoy the right granted to
heirs under the provisions of Section 119 of the Public Land Act. 8
In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the
petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section
119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the
affirmative, whether or not their right to repurchase had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase
their property and their right to do so subsists.
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by
the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years
from the date of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of
persons are bestowed the right to repurchase the applicant-patentee, his
widow, or other legal heirs. Consequently, the contention of the private
respondent sustained by the respondent appellate court that the petitioners do
not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they acquired the
property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The
petitioners-spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees
of the contested property. At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being
a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even on this
score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This must be so because
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the
appellate court would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the
Public Land Act which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to
preserve for himself and his family the land that the State had gratuitously
given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating it. 9 Considering
that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and
Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her
husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit
of the law. We have time and again said that between two statutory
interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue
here raised, we rule that the five-year period for the petitioners to repurchase
their property had not yet prescribed.
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority by the
respondent Court of Appeals is inapplicable to the present controversy. The
facts obtaining there are substantially different from those in this case.
In Monge the conveyance involved was a pacto de retro sale and not a
foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question raised there was whether the
five-year period provided for in Section 119 "should be counted from the date
of the sale even if the same is with an option to repurchase or from the date
the ownership of the land has become consolidated in favor of the purchaser
because of the homesteader's failure to redeem it. 11 It is therefore
understandable why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto de
retro immediately vests title, ownership, and, generally possession over the
property on the vendee a retro, subject only to the right of the vendor a retro to
repurchase within the stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a resolutory
condition.
The cases 12
pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the
other hand, present facts that are quite identical to those in the case at bar.
Both cases involved properties the titles over which were obtained either
through homestead or free patent. These properties were mortgaged to a bank
as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of the owners to pay their
indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances, the Court
ruled that the five-year period to. repurchase a homestead sold at public
auction or foreclosure sale under Act 3135 begins on the day after the
expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale is
executed thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not
otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and the
mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the private respondent on
February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the
two offers of the petitioners to repurchase the first on November 17, 1983, and
the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within the
prescribed five-year period.
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the petitioners should reimburse the private
respondent the amount of the purchase price at the public auction plus interest
at the rate of one per centum per month up to November 17, 1983, together
with the amounts of assessments and taxes on the property that the private
respondent might have paid after purchase and interest on the last named
amount at the same rate as that on the purchase price. 13
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17,
1986, and the Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the
Orders dated September 22, 1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984
of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and another one ENTERED directing the private respondent
to reconvey the subject property and to execute the corresponding deed of
reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon the return to him by the
latter of the purchase price and the amounts, if any, of assessments or taxes
he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per month on both amounts up
to November 17, 1983.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT.
DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC.
ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ,
LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO
LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS, MAJ.
CESAR DE LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO
FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO LIM, CAPT. ELMER
AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI
INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA,
COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and
MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14
COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A.
MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY
FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T.
MALLILLIN, respondents.
No. 95020 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL.
DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA., respondents.
No. 96948 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.
DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO
PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.
TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO
LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS
Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.
PA, MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA,
CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO PA, CAPT. DANILO
LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.
JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,
vs. M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .
B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL.
ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.
DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT
AND MEMBERS OF GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents. Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.

No. 97454 August 2, 1991 Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No.
STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL 93177.
MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO,
Commanding Officer of the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, petitioners,
The Solicitor General for respondents.
vs.
HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYNALDO S. RAFAEL, 1 LT
SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT.
ATANACIO T. MACALAN JR PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CRUZ, J.:p
CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO
CABREROS PMM 2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the
CANTACO PC, respondents. same parties and related issues arising from the same incident.

Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez,
Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson Aurelio, Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel
Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza.
Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.
Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson
Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.
Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.
Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that
took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny),
AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94
(Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
they are questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel
constituted to investigate the charges against them and the creation of the
General Court Martial GCM convened to try them.

Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM
No. 14, seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory
challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City are assailed oncertiorari on the ground that he has no
jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its ruling
denying bail to the private respondents.
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release
of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in
G.R. No. 95020.
I until after a thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI
Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14,
1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI
Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually
addressed to the petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned
Pre-Trial Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan
Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there to submit your
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-
trial investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of
AWs _______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date
above specified shall be deemed a waiver of your right to submit
controverting evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the
charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical
certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on
various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which
to file their objections in writing This was done through a Motion for Summary
Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and
gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-
affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the
foregoing denial and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce
their motion to writing. This was done on March 14,1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the
charges as mandated by Article of War 71, which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon. Charges and specifications
must be signed by a person subject to military law, and under
the oath either that he has personal knowledge of, or has
investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same
are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial
have been made. This investigation will include inquiries as to
the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of
charges, and what disposition of the case should be made in
the interest of justice and discipline. At such investigation full
opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine
witnesses against him if they are available and to present
anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or
mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine
available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges
are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be
accompanied by a statement of the substance of the
testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a
roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their
affidavits. while the motion for summary dismissal was denied, the motion for
reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not been able to
submit their counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested
that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the
president and members of GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act
No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory
challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the
application was denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer
for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After considering the
petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM
No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional
liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for
his release and to declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP
Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later also complained that Generals De
Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final resolution of the
appeal to be taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of
Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson
and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino
Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution
granting the right to bail to all persons with the defined
exception is applicable and covers all military men facing
court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of
General Court- Martial No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and
intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not
apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the
ground that there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and
declared null and void. Respondent General Court-Martial No.
14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the
applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which
may as well include other persons facing charges before
General Court-Martial No. 14.
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before
General Court-Martial No. 14, this Court reiterates its orders
of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot
as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with
this Court a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that they were being
detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent Judge
Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed
against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court
ordered their release.
II
The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given
several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at
the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of
their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990,
to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal
motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing.
This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the
PTI Panel resolved to recommend that the charges be referred to the General
Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process
because the investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure
to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been expressly warned In the
subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-
affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right
to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As
their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring
the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their
defense.
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be
heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of
the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71
by the PTI Panel. Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to
conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-
martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino, 1 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive
a general court-martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is
directory, not mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a
court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949),
the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by
Article 70 (The Philippine counter-part is article of war 71,
Commonwealth Act 408) can properly be construed as an
indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the Army
 General court martial jurisdiction.. The Article does serve
important functions in the administration of court-martial
procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. Its
language is clearly such that a defendant could object to trial
in the absence of the required investigation. In that event the
court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the
investigation. And the military reviewing authorities could
consider the same contention, reversing a court- martial
conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has
substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded
that Congress intended to make otherwise valid court-martial
judgments wholly void because pre-trial investigations fall
short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That Congress
has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-
martial is an indication that the investigatory plan was not
intended to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.
xxx xxx xxx
Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate
General of the Army did hold that where there had been no pre-trial
investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But this
holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge
Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial
requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way
effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's
interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947
after which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the
language here under consideration. compensable pre-requisite to the
exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial
investigation under article of war 71 would of course be altogether
irregular but the court-martial might nevertheless have jurisdiction.
Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in criminal
procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary
investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to
the regularity of the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that
issue was resolved more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa, 2 where
we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners,
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of law
as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77, as
amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets,
charging petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and
conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio
Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had
investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent
records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of
Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on
record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the
"accuser," in accordance with and in the manner provided
under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No.
77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory
application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified
in the manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the
officer administering the oath has personally examined the
affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed
and understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge
sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial investigation" was conducted by
respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No.
77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were
subpoenaed and required to file their counter-affidavit.
However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading
seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That
petitioners were not able to confront the witnesses against
them was their own doing, for they never even asked Maj.
Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be
made to answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P.
D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in
accordance with Article 8 of the Articles of War because General Order No. M-
6, which supposedly convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de
Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. The President of the Philippines, the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of
Constabulary and, when empowered by the President, the
commanding officer of a major command or task force, the
commanding officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military
area, the superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding
officer of a separate brigade or body of troops may appoint general
courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser or the
prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be
appointed by superior competent authority. ...
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa,
there is no doubt that he authorized it because the order itself said it was
issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has not been shown to be
spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form
showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM
No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is significant that General
De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said
order, as he would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly
invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he
sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other
respondents by the Solicitor General.
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was
originally provided for under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War),
as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:
Art. 18. Challenges. Members of general or special courts-martial
may be challenged by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause
stated to the court. The court shall determine the relevancy and validity
thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member at a
time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be presented
and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be
entitled to the peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall
not be challenged except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v.
Alejandro, 3 thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the
passage in 1935 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the
National Defense Act), except for a handful of Philippine Scout officers
and graduates of the United States military and naval academies who
were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of
officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer
corps of the developing army was numerically made equate for the
demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense
program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that
peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and
that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus
Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as
worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act,
made no mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by either
the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by the accused. After
December 17,1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the
Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's
Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive
program of training and education in military law, encompassing the
length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until
the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941.
After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer
corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very
large number, and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated
in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article
of War 18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one
peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of
court shall not be challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8,
empowering the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals
"to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be
referred to them.
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation,
Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military
Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for
cause may be entertained to insure impartiality and good faith.
Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a
majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A
tie vote does not disqualify the challenged member. A
successfully challenged member shall be immediately
replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the
National Security Code, which was a compilation and codification of decrees,
general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing threats to
the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on
challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the
termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The
proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the
military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the
cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other
general orders mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law and the
dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the
existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law
ceases, the law itself ceases.Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This
principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of
law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory
challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial
law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a result,
the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically
revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to
peremptory challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for
emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on
January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered
no longer operative, having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in
the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of the
previous regime.
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial
law. It is curious that the present government should invoke the rules of that
discredited body to justify its action against the accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge
may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the
proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is hoped that the accused
officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of
Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a matter addressed
to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and
apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects.
This is a problem only the political departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the
petition for certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed
by the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is
argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces
accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no
authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of
Appeals is vested with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather
irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of
Appeals 4 where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Regulation
Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to
ordinary appeals and not to the remedies employed by the accused officers
before the respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or
correcting power over the proceedings of courts-martial, and
that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to
consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But
it is equally true that in the exercise of their undoubted
discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of
discretion what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as
"grave abuse of discretion" as to give rise to a defect in
their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this
action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and
prohibition ... .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition
or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions
forhabeas corpus and quo warranto. 5 In the absence of a law providing that
the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief of
Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme
Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos.
95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military,
as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much
was suggested in Arula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is
given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General
as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason
to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the
right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous
soldiers operate within the framework of democratic system,
are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government
 for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are
paid out of revenues collected from the people. All other
insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and
against the existing political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also impress upon
this Honorable Court that release on bail of respondents
constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say
1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail,
or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order were sustained, on
"provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already
discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they
could freely resume their heinous activity which could very
well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities,
including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a
system consonant with their own concept of government and
justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the
equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal
treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where
the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused
officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military
are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because
they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had
not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and
the right to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February
18, 1991, and was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle,
hearing and decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991, by the respondent
court, where the petitioners submitted the charge memorandum and
specifications against the private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On
February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was
created and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m.
On March 20, 1991, the private respondents received the copies of the
charges, charge sheets and specifications and were required to submit their
counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of
more than one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges against
the private respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor General
thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to
complete it pre-charge investigation only after one (1) year
because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men
were involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other
witnesses, had to be interviewed or investigated, and these
inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge investigation
was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved
were dispersed and scattered throughout the Philippines. In
some cases, command units, such as the Scout Rangers,
have already been disbanded. After the charges were
completed, the same still had to pass review and approval by
the AFP Chief of Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the
following admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress
the point that if the participation of petitioner in
several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders of
Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no
charges can be filed against him or the existence of a prima
facie case warranting trial before a military commission is
wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo
Biazon (now General) to release petitioner. Respondents
must also be reminded that even if a military officer is arrested
pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite
confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates
that immediate steps must be taken to try the person accused
or to dissmiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is
responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying
the case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a
court martial may direct. 6
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge
Solano on February 26, 1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad
cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied,
after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period for appeal under Rule
41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after notice of such denial
was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the private
respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and
executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this
Court on March 12, 1991.
III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following
observations of the Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise
of judgment and discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in
order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional grounds
because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction,
any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will
amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may
be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of
discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a
writ ofcertiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted
with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify
the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the acts complained of by the
petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we
find that the right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and
in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should not have
been ordered released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are
DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory
challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent
courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I
dissent insofar as he would deny bail to accused military personnel.
The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before
conviction, with the only exception of "those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong." 1 The Charter also
states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be impaired even if the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended." 2 To deny the military officers here concerned of the
right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" the
coverage of the right.
I believe that military officers fall within "persons".
The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000
putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July
25, 1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer number alone
is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the truly disquieting thought is that they could
freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the
overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and
replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of
government and justice." 3 But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug
pushers roaming the streets of the metropolis justify a denial of the right to
bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the Solicitor General be
reproduced by 1,000 "equally dangerous" elements of society?
We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the
petitioners should not be granted the same right.
The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an
argument to deny bail. I submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First,
the Constitution does not say it. Second, we are a government of laws, not
tradition.
If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination
is in order.
G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992
LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic
Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for
early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well
as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail
of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:
Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and
employees of the National Government, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the
personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under
this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency
employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of
two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of
separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the
coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of
the program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she
was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay
for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to
the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her letter for
reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:
xxx xxx xxx
With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable
Commissioner of RA 6683 does not conform with the beneficent
purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a government
employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or casual, should
have two consecutive years of government service in order to be
entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement. Persons who
are not entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the
budget needed, the law provides that the Department of Budget and
Management will shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be
allotted to government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these
NIA special projects art entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic)
leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There is no reason why
we should not be entitled to RA 6683.
xxx xxx xxx 2
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
emphasized:
xxx xxx xxx
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The
provision of Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1
does not only require an applicant to have two years of satisfactory
service on the date of separation/retirement but further requires said
applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular
employment status as of December 2, 1988, the date of enactment of
R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual employees in
the coverage.
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of
your separation from the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project
which is contractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its
original decision.
xxx xxx xxx 3
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil
action for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under
Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:
It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-
CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual,
emergency, temporary or regular employment status. Likewise, the
provisions of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter
No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:
"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the
following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to
perform specific activities or services with a definite expected
output: i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-Time,
Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
including those of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated
National Police (PC-INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be
separated from the service for optional retirement with gratuity
under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186,
as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or
vice- versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the
enactment of this law and have received the corresponding
benefits of that retirement/separation.
 e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by
mandatory separation from the service under existing civil
service laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such officials
and employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for
the availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed
only if acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application
accepted and approved by the head of office concerned."
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to
any one of them. Ms. Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to
all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service Commission.
She held a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position
which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and
emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more
reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful,
continuous service in the government should be similarly rewarded by
the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law. 4
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment
petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment
papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service
record was issued by the Watershed Management and Erosion Control Project
(WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World
Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position
became functus officio.
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA her position is not
included in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6,
P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the
other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. The most
that a non-career personnel can expect upon the expiration of his employment
is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS
law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of
tenure is available only for the term of office (i.e., duration of project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or
retirement benefits but reorganization 5 to streamline government functions.
The application of the law must be made consistent with the purpose for which
it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the
government, it will not have any application to special projects such as the
WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the nature
of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early
retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step to
reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing the WMECP
considering its short and limited life-span. 6
5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters and local government
units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the
parties, the Court is called upon to define the different classes of employees
in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as
amended) deems an employment regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be found
in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the Civil
Service Act of 1965 R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement
Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of employees
(regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is
employed in the public sector.
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is
classified as follows:
1. permanent one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the
position to which appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in pursuance
thereof; 7
2. temporary In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes
necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment
should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position
to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility:
Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months,
but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible
becomes available. 8
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification
in an appropriate examination is required;
 (2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in
nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state
colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in
scientific or research institutions which shall establish and
maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely,
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant
Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank
as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of
whom are appointed by the President.
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service,
who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service
Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which
shall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do
not fall under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:
. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests
of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2)
tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which
is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject
to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose employment was made.
Included in the non-career service are:
1. Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their
positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal
confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed
terms of office and their personal or confidential staff;
4. Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the
government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake
a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not
available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a
specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and
performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own
responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from
the hiring agency.
5. Emergency and seasonal personnel. 10
There is another type of non-career employee:
Casual where and when employment is not permanent but
occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro
v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber
Co., 96 Phil. 945)
Consider petitioner's record of service:
Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974
designated as a laborer holdingemergency status with the NIA
Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R Division. 11 From 24 March
1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide
with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to
31 December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then
on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA UPR IIS
(Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1
June 1980, she went to NIA W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management
& Erosion Control Project) retaining the status of temporary employee.
While with this project, her designation was changed to personnel
assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status
became permanent until the completion of the project on 31 December
1988. The appointment paper 12 attached to the OSG's comment lists
her status as co-terminus with the Project.
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign assisted projects
is considered co-terminous, that is, they are considered employees for the
duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said project (CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two
(2) consecutive years government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984,
the Civil Service Commission is charged with the function of
determining creditable services for retiring officers and employees of
the national government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966
provides that all previous services by an officer/employee pursuant to
 a duly approved appointment to a position in the Civil Service are
considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that
services rendered oncontractual, emergency or casual status are non-
creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch
as some contractual, emergency or casual employment are covered by
contracts or appointments duly approved by the Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on
contractual, emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or
manner of payment therefor shall be considered as creditable for
retirement purposes subject to the following conditions: (emphasis
provided)
1. These services are supported by approved appointments,
official records and/or other competent evidence.
Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary proof
of said services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June
22, 1984, the effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement
are continuous and fulfill the service requirement for
retirement.
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency,
seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial
employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989
CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's employment as co-
terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in nature. The
OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the
status of a co-terminous employee
(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in
the service is characterized by confidentiality by the appointing
authority or that which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his
tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified
into the following:
a) co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-
existent with the duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made or subject to the availability
of funds for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when
appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing
authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent when appointment is co-
existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation,
separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the
position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a
period of 3 years" the appointment is for a specific period
and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed
abolished.
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d),
what is termed co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-
employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee is
guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is
limited to a specific period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant,
like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the latter
are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not.
It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early
retirement to regular, temporary, casual andemergency employees. But
specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP
including those of the PC-INP. It can be argued that, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have made a specific enumeration
in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro
omisso habendus est A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration
must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these
legal maxims can result in incongruities and in a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where, workers
belonging to a work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to
another were considered non-project-regular and permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects
during a span of fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a work
pool can be assumed, her service record cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal
protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated
and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of
legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not
only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification
applies only to those who belong to the same class. 17
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate
the equal protection clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that
the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of government employees
who are similarly situated as those covered by said law. The maxim
of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable maxim in
this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in
its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a
particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an
all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the
unfolding events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as
the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to
fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication. he doctrine
states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that
which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its
object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex
necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege
is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so
because the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in
eo plus sit, simper inest et minus. 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement
Law), in response to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage
of state university employees who are extended appointments for one (1) year,
renewable for two (2) or three (3) years, 19 he explained:
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement
and voluntary separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or
nature of the appointment one received, but if he opts to retire under
this, then he is covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399
(a proposal to extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording
supports the submission that Rep. Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified
group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill, on coverage of early
retirement, would provide:
Sec. 3. Coverage. It will cover all employees of the national
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits
authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary,
casual, emergency and contractual employees, regardless of age,
who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
government service as of the date of separation. The term "contractual
employees" as used in this Act does not include experts and
consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific
activities or services with definite expected output.
Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including
those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.
(emphasis supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim
the bureaucracy, hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon
early/voluntary retirement of their occupants. Will the inclusion of co-
terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such objective? In their case,
upon termination of the project and separation of the project personnel from
the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the officefunctus
officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods,
and yet, they only have to establish two (2) years of continuous service to
qualify. This, incidentally, negates the OSG's argument that co-terminous or
project employment is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient,
whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. Here,
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring
because casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the
benefits of early retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law
of trimming the bureaucracy be achieved by granting early retirement benefits
to a group of employees (casual) without plantilla positions? There would, in
such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or streamlining of
functions; it would merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the positions
remain, and future appointments can be made thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered
years of continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early
Retirement Law, as long as they file their application prior to the expiration of
their term, and as long as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for
such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of
1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a
condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7)
years of government service which need not be continuous, in the career or
non-career service, whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency,
seasonal, contractualor co-terminous including military and police service, as
evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. 21 A similar
regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-
terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping
with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to promote the physical
and mental well-being of public servants" 22 After all, co-terminous personnel,
are also obligated to the government for GSIS contributions, medicare and
income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of transience.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents
NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep.
Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had
filed an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she
is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was filed after
expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally
filed the application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the
interest of substantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she
served the government not only for two (2) years the minimum requirement
under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of
petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683,
in accordance with the pronouncements in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur but only insofar as our rulings are applied to RA 6683 applicants.
G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the information against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in
the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is,
consequently, here adopted, to wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the
Court of First Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo
Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court
resulted in the finding a probable cause that the crime charged as
committed by defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant's
plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the
ground that as justice of the peace the defendant is one of the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower
court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of the peace
is within the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense
counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of
Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz.,
pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded
from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting
on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the prosecution, the
reply of the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower
 court dismissed the information against the accused upon the
authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single
question of law: Is a justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54
of the Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no
officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial,
city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer
or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any
manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled
thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended
among the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
He submits the aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which provided the following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge
of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or
assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil
service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in
any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to
vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words
"justice of the peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to
exclude justices of the peace from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that
under Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was
modified or qualified by the phrase "of First instance", while under Section 54
of the Revised Election Code, no such modification exists. In other words,
justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e.,
judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however,
there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the
enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and
broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or phrase and
was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of
First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts
of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as
"judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge.
A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial
authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441, 422). According to Bouvier Law
Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated
questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term includes all
officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that
capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are
judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and
clarify the above conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine
Commission in 1907, and which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709,
1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No. 1709 has a
relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown later.) Act No.
1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on incorporated Chapter
18 of the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several
amendments were made through the passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and
3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to
the case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time of the Commonwealth,
the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 23 and later on
enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law enforced until June
1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved. Included as its basic
provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666,
657. The present Code was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867,
2242 and again, during the session of Congress in 1960, amended by Rep.
Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election law, the following
should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor
shall he be eligible during the time that he holds said public office to
election at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for
reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of
the First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education
shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take part in any
municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of being
deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office
 whatsoever for a term of 5 year: Provide, however, That the foregoing
provisions shall not be construe to deprive any person otherwise
qualified of the right to vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907;
Took effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal
or officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau
of Education shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner to take
part in any municipal provincial or Assembly election. Any person
violating the provisions of this section shall be deprived of his office or
employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office or
employment whatever for a term of 5 years, Provided, however, that
the foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person
otherwise qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted on
August 31, 1907; Took effect on September 15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative
Code on March 10, 1917, the provisions in question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge
of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or
assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service,
shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election
or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
(Emphasis supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387.
This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. Any
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or
assessor of any province, any officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or
employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any
candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of this section or
takes part in any election otherwise by exercising the right to vote,
shall be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than
P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more
than 2 years, and in all cases by disqualification from public office and
deprivation of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years. (Approved
December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August
22, 1938. This law provided in Section 48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees.
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, no
officer or employee of the Army, the Constabulary of the national,
provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service
officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any
manner in any election nor take part therein, except to vote, if entitled
thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative
development or history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the
first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by
defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances when
the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep.
Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry
the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the word
"judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice
of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words
"justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to
justify the conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the
peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its
operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended
in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed
congressional records which might have offered some explanation of the
discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which legislation, as indicated above, has
eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace." Having been
completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications
from these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from
the historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by
reason hid equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers
enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under that said section, the word
"judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any province." The last
mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the
peace since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase
"of any province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the
enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and not provincial officials,
then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of
the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt
that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not
included in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical interpretation of the
said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are
generally known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the
defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from
an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is
applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to
have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the operation of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can
operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.
In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature
did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were
merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case,
defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being
restrictive in nature, has more particular application to statutes that should be
strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed
against the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature and
the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted
against the state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal
statutes, defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process demand
such strict construction in order to give "fair warning of what the law intends to
do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world will
understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere
fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that
a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there
has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor
controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as
an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the
meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and again by decisions
of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.) Thus, cases
will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the
legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a
strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes
of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252 U.S. 159). The court may consider
the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance, where a literal
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the
clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p.
294). A Federal District court in the U.S. has well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such
construction of it as to deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal
statutes must be construed in the sense which best harmonizes with
their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited
in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of
criminal statutes, frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes
situations inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354;
See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the Written Law (1915) 25 Yale
L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the
purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the
judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute,
are now within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the
legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly
not. This point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge
of First Instance" and justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the
obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just one
class of judges but all judges, whether of first Instance justices of the
peace or special courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations. . . . .
 The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court,
and to so construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in
partisan political activities would weaken rather than strengthen the
judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the
Revised Election Code itself why justices of the peace should be
prohibited from electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate
courts and judges of the Court of First Instance, they are given
authority and jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs. 103,
104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and
decided inclusion and exclusion cases, and if they are permitted to
campaign for candidates for an elective office the impartiality of their
decisions in election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not
believe that the legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code, intended to create such an unfortunate situation. (pp. 708,
Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the
administrative or executive department has regarded justices of the peace
within the purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice,
etc. (G.R. No. L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the respondents,
for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No. 237, dated March
31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines, dismissing the petitioner as
justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that one of the
causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty
in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676,
which was filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under
Section 56, justices of the peace are already expressly included among the
officers enjoined from active political participation. The argument is that with
the filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that existing
laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a
proposed amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to
section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was
a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it was
filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be
considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives,
opinions, and the reasons expressed by the individual members of the
legislature even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in
ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec.
213, pp. 375-376), a fortiori what weight can We give to a mere draft of a bill.
On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices
of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected.
To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid
down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from
participating in partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old Election
Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so
enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another which expressed the
prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No. 357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied
the rule of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion
that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the Court of
Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known
as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond reason to
infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice
of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court
of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no
reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion
alterius has been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its
provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no
reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should
not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so
including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius,
should not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App.
519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court
should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON,
TERESA TUASON, CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A.
TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE
M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents.
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.
AQUINO, J.:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted
Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of
the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares,
respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint
in forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X,
wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land
located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the north
by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the east
by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which
has an area of three hundred eighty-three quiones was allegedly acquired by
their father by means of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil
Case No. 8943).
They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had
illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently
or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and
that it was registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan,
Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on
July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No.
735, were issued to defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the
Philippines and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which
leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be
declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding.
They asked for damages.
Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment.
The plaintiffs opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of
the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of
defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They insisted that a
preliminary hearing be held on those defenses.
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C.
Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares of the disputed land from the
plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in the case.
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties
the Register of Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT
No. 735 and certain transfer certificates of title derived from that first or basic
title. Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of the land
covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of determining whether the
lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included therein.
On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the
instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial
court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the
said case. After the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova answered the
petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral
argument.
The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be
questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The
supposed irregularities in the land registration proceeding, which led to the
issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same
issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower court. The
1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT No.
735, is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support
their support their action and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their
action in court.
On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT
No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs.
Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs. Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-
26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).
The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs.
Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a
reiteration or confirmation of the holding in the following cases directly or
incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acua, 59 Phil.
183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447;Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y de la
Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil.
106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117
Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro,
L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031.

Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta

movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it
becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their
action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the
courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be

relitigated again and again, consuming the court's time and energies at the
expense of other litigants: Interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills,
Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).

Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court
is directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J, took no part.