The Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Author(s): Isaac Deutscher

Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 29, No. 2
(Apr., 1953), pp. 149-155
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
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THE NINETEENTH CONGRESS OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE
SOVIET UNION
ISAAC DEUTSCHER

tT HE nineteenth
congress
oftheCommunist
PartymetinMoscowin
OctoberI952 afteran intervalof thirteenyears. The previous
congressmetinMarchI939. According to thestatutesoftheParty,
a congressshouldmeetat leastoncein threeyears. In theearlyperiodof
Bolshevisma congressusedto meetat leastonce a year. One is,ofcourse,
entitledto ask what caused such a long intervalbetweenthe last two
congresses?Did the leaders of the Party explain it to the delegates?
Well,thecongresswas givenno explanationat all. Nobodyeventriedto
justifythe longpause. But the explanationis fairlyobvious:a congress
ofthePartyis nothingmorenowadaysthana relicofa veryremotepast.
In the old days a congresswas something real; the leadersof the Party
usedto appearon theplatform to givea genuineaccountoftheiractivities;
theyused to submitcontroversies to thejudgementoftherankand fileof
theParty,and await a verdict.At presenta congressis onlyan occasion
on whichtheleadersparadesuccesses,realorimaginary, ordrawa balance
sheetfora certainperiod.
Clearlytheleadersofthe Partydid not call a congressearlierbecause
theywereeithernot in a positionto paradesuccessesbeforethe country,
or theyfeltthat theycould not draw any definitebalance sheets. The
statutoryperiodwithinwhichthe nineteenthcongressshouldhave been
convenedwas in I942, some time betweenthe battles of Moscowand
Stalingrad. That was obviouslynot a time forcongress-making. At the
end of the war a victorycongressmighthave been held,but Russiawas
thenso deep in the aftermath ofwar,in the chaosand destruction caused
bythewar,thatthe leadersagainfeltthatthiswas nota timeforthemto
facethecountry.
About I948, a changeforthe betterhad begunin Russia's economic
situation,but the change was rathermnodest, and the international
situationwas extremely confused.The Tito controversy had just started.
It was notclearhowthiswouldaffect thesituationinEasternEurope. The
cold war was in one of its initialphases,and Stalin and his lieutenants
preferrednon-committal silence.
At last this year the Politburoapparentlyfeltthat it could draw a
balancesheet,and onewhichwas fromitspointofviewquitesatisfactory.
As I have indicated,the congressdid not and could not become the
I49

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I50 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [APRIL

occasionforany generaldebate or forany real surveyof the problems

withwhichtheSovietleadershipwas confronted. Nevertheless it did offer
an opportunity fordrawinga retrospective view of the thirteenyears
betweenI939 and I952. Perhapsnothingis as revealingand instructive as
the contrastbetweenthiscongressand its predecessor.
In I939 the congressassembledjust afterthe greatpurgeshad been
concluded.The countrywas stillstunnedafterthepurges. It stillhad in
its ears the sound of the executionsand beforeits eyes the sightof the
long columnsof men marchedoffto concentrationcamps. The old
BolshevikGuard had just been destroyed.At the I939 congressStalin
announcedan end to the great purges. He declaredthat the Party
leadershipwantedto stop the hysteriaof mass denunciationsand that
manyinnocentpeoplehad suffered.A new quasi-liberalerawas to open,
and as itsembodiment BeriabecameChiefofthePoliceinplaceofYezhov.
Many people then still wonderedwhetherthe purges were really
at an end,whetherit wouldbe possibleforStalinto controltheguillotine
whichhe had set in motion,whether he himselfwouldnotbe caughtby it,
as Robespierre was caughtby theguillotinewhichhad destroyedDanton,
Hebert,and the otherleadersof the French Revolution. By I952 the
memoryofthe thirtieshad almostfaded. The Stalinregimehad become
consolidated-consolidated by the purges,consolidatedby the war, and
by the aftermathof the war. No avengerof the old BolshevikGuard
seemsto have arisen.
In anotherrespecttoo therewas a strongcontrastbetweenthe two
congresses.In I939 the Stalinistsof the old generationstill dominated
the scene-the menwho in theirmajoritythemselvestook part in the
Revolutionof OctoberI9I7. At the latest congress,in OctoberI952,
amongall the I,2oo delegatesonlytwelveor thirteen menhad takenpart
in theOctoberRevolution;only7 percentofthedelegateshad joinedthe
Party beforethe end of the Civil War in I920, and more than two-
thirdsof all delegateshad joinedonlyafterStalinhad eliminatedall his
opponentsand risento absolutepower. A new Stalinistgenerationhas
comeofage politically;and it has been one ofthe veryimportantresults
of the congressthat this new Stalinistgenerationis now represented on
the new directing bodiesof the Party,on the CentralCommitteeand on
the Praesidiumwhichhas replacedthe Politburo.
Most of these men are betweenfortyand fiftyyears of age. Their
memoriesofthe pre-Stalinist periodare dim. The menoftheold Stalinist
guard had apparentlybeen told by Stalin to effacethemselves.They
made onlybriefceremonialappearancesat the congress, and theyplayed
no significant partin its proceedings.Stalinhimselfsat on the platform,
nota livingman any more,but a deity,worshippedand glorified.It was
onlytowardstheendofthecongress thathe madea shortspeech,addressed
notso muchto theRussiandelegatesas to theleadersofthe foreign Com-
munistpartiesassembledin the box fordistinguished guests.

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I953] THE NINETEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 15I

It was in keepingwiththischangeofgenerations, or ratherwiththe

changeofguards,thatthe Partydroppeditsname,Bolshevik,thatname
whichwas once its pride,and whichhad come intouse forty-nine years
ago-in I953 it will be half a centurysince that momentousbreach
betweenthe Bolsheviksand Mensheviks at the secondPartycongress.
In yet anotherand even moreimportantrespectthe recentcongress
contrastedvery stronglywith its predecessor.In I939 the dominant
doctrinewas Socialismin one country.The yearI939 saw its apotheosis.
In I952 Socialismin one countrywas not mentionedeven once. From
a doctrinaland politicalpointof view the significance of the congress
lay primarilyin this that it put the seal, so to say, on the discardingof
Socialismin one country.This was the Party'sfinalpartingwiththat
doctrinein whichStalinismsaw forsuch a long time its raison d'dtre.
This time Stalin spoke about the new 'shockbrigades'of Communism,
thebrigadeswhichhad joinedtheSovietUnion,oncethelonelyvanguard
ofproletarian revolution.Stalin'sspeechat thefinalsessionoftheCongress
was a virtualconfessionto foreignCommunists, in whichhe told them
in his crypticway: 'Well,I had to do a lot ofveryunpleasantthingsat a
time when we were isolated,and oftenwe had to parleyand to make
compromises withthe bourgeoisworldat your expense'[that is at the
expenseofforeign communism].He mayhave had in mindthepact with
Hitlerin I939. 'But nowthingsgo mucheasier,we nowhave behindus
one-third ofall mankind.'
I may be dwellingon somewhatobvious contrasts,but sometimes
it is importantto emphasizethe obvious. We are all a littleinclinedto
thinkof Russia in out-datedterms. In the nineteen-thirties manywere
inclinedto thinkofRussiaintermswhichwouldhavebeenquiteup to date
in thenineteen-twenties. In thenineteen-forties and nineteen-fifties
oneis
inclinedto thinkin termswhichwouldhave beenveryup to date and very
realisticin the nineteen-thirties.
A similartime-lagoccurs,ofcourse,in ourthinking aboutanycountry
and any politicalmovements.But the time-lagis perhapsmost pro-
nouncedin our thinkingof Russia, because hardlyany contemporary
nationchangesso significantly fromdecadeto decadeas Russia does,and
it is naturallydifficult
to adjust one's viewsto theserapidchanges. I do
notintendto denythe elementofhistoriccontinuity-itis verystrong.
One can trace many featuresof the early Russian Tsarist Empire in
contemporary Russia. But togetherwith continuitythereis also the
strongand rapidfluxof life,and thereis the dangerof underrating the
great,momentouschangesthatoccur.
I shall tryto illustratethis by a briefsurveyof the new Five-year
Planwhichthenineteenth congresshas adopted. Forthissomefigures and
statisticsare necessary,but these figuresindicateextremelyimportant
developments likelyto affectthewholebalanceofpowerin theworldand
thetrendofworldpoliticsforyearsand perhapsdecadesto come.

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152 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [APRIL

The new Five-yearPlan is to run fromthe years I95I to I955; it

providesforan increaseover thoseyearsof the nationalincomeof the
SovietUnionby 6o percentand ofgrossindustrialoutputby 70 percent.
Employmentis to growby 6 million-6 millionmorepeople are to be
employedby theState in I955 thanin I95I. As in thepreviousplansthe
emphasisis on the developmentof heavy industry-thatis of producer
goods-the outputof whichis to riseby 82 per cent; whereasconsumer
goods are to increaseonlyby 64 per cent. The outputof steel in I955
is to be 45 milliontons. In I940, Russia's last pre-waryear, it was
i8 milliontons and it is about 35 millionnow: coal-372 milliontons
comparedwith i66 in I940; oil-7o milliontons comparedwith 3I in
I940; electricity-I58billionkilowatthours comparedwith 48 billion
in I940. I am convincedthat these targetsare not merepropaganda
stunts,and I am eveninclinedto assumethattheywillbe notonlyreached
but surpassedat the end ofthe Five-yearPlan, as was the case withthe
targetsof the previousplan. Russia is clearlyrightin the middleof a
tremendous all-outindustrialrace.
At the openingof the cold war the Russian steel outputwas either
one-eighth or one-seventh oftheAmerican.By I955 it shouldamountto
half the Americanoutput. In power-political termsthis may sound a
littleparadoxical,but is true nevertheless, that one Americanmillion
tons of steel does not equal one Russian milliontons,forthe simple
reasonthat of everymilliontonsof steelproducedin the UnitedStates
a much higherproportionmust go to keep functioning the country's
civilianeconomy.An Americanworkerwill not reach his factoryif he
has no car; he mustbe suppliedwitha car, even duringwar. In Russia
thewholeoutputofcars,that is civilian,normalpassengercars, is not
morethan65,oooa year. The same is ofcoursetrueof refrigerators and
manyotherdomesticgoods.
As a resultofa prolongedsavingofsteeland otherbasic materialsfor
capitalinvestment the level of the Russianengineering industriesis well
above the generallevel of the Russian economy. Those branchesof
industryon whichRussia's industrial-military powerdependsdirectly
are highabove otherbranches,even such as coal and steel. Whenyou
compareAmericanand Russian steel output you may arrive at the
conclusionthat in threeyears the Russian industrialpotentialand/or
outputmayreachroughlyhalfthe American;but whenyou look at the
engineering industriesyou will not go farwrongif you assumethat the
gap betweentheAmericanand the Russianengineering industrieswillbe
(and alreadyis) verymuchnarrower.Accordingly, the gap betweenthe
respectivemilitary-industrial potentialsalso appearsnarrower.
When we compareagain what the Russians expect and are likely
to achieveby I955 withwhat theyhad in I940 we see that theyexpect
withinthesefifteen yearstheirnationalincometo be doubled,theirgross
industrialoutputto be trebled,and the outputof theirengineering in-

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I953] THE NINETEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY I53

dustriesto be quadrupled. Again I do not thinkthat theseproportions

are propagandastunts. Certainly,not everyfigurethe Russians issue
about theirindustrialdevelopment is correct,but themutualproportions
in which they describe the various branches of their industries
certainlyare.
It goes almost withoutsayingthat the Russian consumergoes on
financingthis tremendously ambitiousprogrammeof industrialization.
Russia has been takingpartin thisindustrialrace withthe West almost
barefoot,halfnaked,and notverywellfed. Nevertheless weshoulddo well
not to exaggeratethis aspect of the problem. The Russian national
producthas been growingso fastthat even if a growingproportion of it
goesforcapitalinvestment and armamentthepartthatcan be allocated
for consumptionis also growing. Russia's presentpositionis in this
respectdifferent fromwhat it was in the nineteen-thirties and nineteen-
forties.Russia can now afforda little morebutter and manymoreguns.
The dilemmabetweenguns and butteris no longeras inexorableas it
usedto be in Russia. Importantpoliticalconclusions mayfollowfromthis.
I thinkthat in thisrespectRussia's situationcomparesfavourablywith
that of WesternEurope. Amongpeople whose standardsof livingrise
slowly,even veryslowly,acute politicaldiscontentis not likelyto be
widespread.The Russian people do have a visibleand obviousrise in
theirstandardofliving.Theirstandardis farbelowtheWesternEuropean,
but theyhave the satisfaction thatcomesfroma movement upwardand
forward; and they can continue to improve their standard of living
very slowly even while they expand their capital constructionand
armamentprogrammes.
In WesternEurope, on the contrary,the armamentprogrammes
alreadyimpingeand press on the standardsof living. We see this in
France,Italy,Germany,and elsewhere.I thinkthatthereis morelikeli-
hood of political dissatisfactionamong people who have to descend
fromtheiraccustomedstandardsof living,even if these are relatively
high,thanamongpeoplewhoascend,be it veryslowly,fromlowstandards
ofliving.Thiswas whattheleadersoftheCommunist Partybroughtout
at the congress.They could point to definiteachievements, to a very
definitestrengthening of theirpower-political situationin the world.
Yet Stalin and his team are also confronted withthe question-how
farcan theycarryon withthe policyto whichtheyowe theirpresent
positionof power? What is neededin orderthat this policyshouldbe
carriedon to a pointwhereRussia could findherselfmuchfurther ahead
in theindustrialand power-political race thanshe is now?
I wouldbrieflydescribetheseconditionsas the 'fivebig ifs'. Russia
can continuein thisrace:
i. is notinterrupted
If theprocessofindustrialization bywar.
2. If thediscipline,
thetotalitarian imposedon theconsumer
discipline, to
compelhimto finance doesnotbreakdown.
thisprogramme

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I54 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS [APRIL

3. If no internalconvulsion,especiallyafterStalin'sdeath (he is, afterall, a

mortalman), shakesthe system.
4. If Russian resourcesare not dissipatedand dispersedin an attemptto
keep underrigidcontrolthe Russianorbit,the countriesof Eastern and
CentralEurope and China.
5. If theequilibriumbetweenthevariouselementsoftheindustrialization-
the actual equilibriumbetween investment,raw materials,resources,
manpower-is not disturbed.
These 'five ifs', so it seems to me, dictate Stalin's lines of policy,
his desire if not to avert then at least to delay a third world war for as
long as possible, to settle in advance the succession to his Government
or personal rule, to settle relations between Russia, China, and the other
countrieswithinthe Russian orbit,and so on.
About these aspects of Soviet policy the congressdid not give us much
illumination. Stalin, however,did make a few interestingremarksin his
article in the Bolshevikwhich appeared just on the eve of the congress.
That article provided the keynote to all the debates; and it was at once
hailed in that familiar style of the ridiculous Stalin cult as one of the
greatestphilosophical and intellectualfeats of the century.
Curiouslyenough, Stalin wrote the article as a postscriptto a debate
between Soviet economists on a new text-book of political economy. (It
is interestingthat the great dictator assembled the economists of Russia
at the Kremlinto discuss in detail the new standard text-bookofeconomy.)
I shall not go into Stalin's strictlytheoretical argument,because to
non-Marxiststhis must be almost as confusingand boringas a dissertation
on some very finetheologicalpoints may be to agnostics. I am concerned
now with the remarks on international policy which Stalin dropped en
passant (I do not really think that he dropped them-he made them
deliberately).
Stalin's remarks were interestingin more than one respect. For the
firsttime he revealed somethingof a significantcontroversywhich was
going on in his entourage. He said: 'Some comrades are of the opinion
that in view of the internationaldevelopments wars between capitalist
countriesare no longerinevitable.' It is natural that thereshould be men
in Stalin's entourage who should hold this view, a view fairly common
among half-wayinformedpeople in the West, namely, that world politics
have reached the stage of a definitepolarization of two camps, one led
by the United States, the other by Russia, and that there is no room for
any thirdforcein between.
Speaking not as a politician but as a student of affairs,I deplore this
very much, but nevertheless this is the fact. Well, Stalin came out
against this view and argued that the polarization of the two camps is
merelythe 'surface of events' and that there is ample room for conflicts
between the capitalist Powers. The conflicts between the capitalist
Powers, he maintained, are more explosive that the antagonism between
capitalism and Communism. He forecastsomethinglike a revolt of either

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I953] THE NINETEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY I55

Britainor France,or Germanyor Japan,or of all thesenations-he was

notveryspecificaboutthis-againstAmericanleadership, a revoltleading
to a breakdownoftheAtlanticbloc.
Stalin went even furtherand declaredthat wars betweencapitalist
countriesare still'inevitable',whereaswarbetweenEast and Westis not.
Incidentallyat the congress,whereeveryspeakerwas and had to be
highlyenthusiasticover Stalin's Bolshevikarticle,veryfewquoted this
sentenceabout the inevitability of war betweenthe capitalistcountries;
thisseemedalmosttoo incongruous, even to the Malenkovsand Berias.
Onehad theimpression thattheytriedto tonedownthisstatementand to
indicate just this, that frictionbetweenthe nations of the Atlantic
allianceis likelyto delay the buildingup of the militarypowerof the
Atlanticbloc ratherthan to suggestthat Sovietpolicycould counton a
breakdown oftheAtlanticalliance;therewas a certainchangein emphasis
and tone,betweenwhat Stalin himselfhad said, and what was said
in
by thechiefspeakersat thecongress.
Thiswas no abstractdebateabouttheprospectsoftheworldsituation.
Impliedin each view is a certainpracticalpoliticalline. The problems
whichStalintriedto solvewere:
(a) Whetherthe contradictions in the capitalistworldwoulddevelopso
strongly thata thirdworldwarwouldnotstartas a waragainstRussia; and
(b)whether, in thecase of a thirdworldwar,Russiacouldcounton any
capitalistallies,suchas she had in thelast war,or whether theSovietbloc
wouldfinditselffighting againstthewholecapitalistworld.
If you assumethat in any foreseeablefutureRussia could findallies
in thecapitalistcamp,a definite tacticallinefollowsfromthis. If Russia
could not count on any capitalistallies,thenshe wouldfighta clear-cut
revolutionary struggle-Communism versuscapitalism.Should,however,
Russia be able to gain allies fromthe capitalistcamp,thenthe practical
politicalconclusionwould be that Russia must try to encouragethe
popularfronttacticswhichshe promotedon the eve ofthe secondworld
war,also in an attemptto gain alliesin theWest.
This issue does not seemto have been resolvedby Stalin. No indica-
tionof a clear-cutdecisionwas givenat the congress.In the Bolshevik
articleStalin issued a verycautiousappeal fortryingout popularfront
tacticson an anti-American basis,but in his shortspeechat thecongress
he seemedto contradictthatappeal, and to indicatethattheCommunist
Partiescouldreallynot hope to gain alliesin the capitalistcamp.
These werebroadlythe highlightsof the congress,or of that part
of its proceedingswhichhad a bearingon the presentinternational
situation.
Addressat ChathamHouse
I8 NovemberI952

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