Oxford Early Christian Studies The Areopagite Saint. Dionysius The Areopagite Saint Dionysius of Nyssa Saint. Gregory of Nyssa Saint Gregory Saint. Gregory Palamas Saint Gregory Palamas of Nys

OXFORD EARLY CHRISTIAN STUDIES
General Editors
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THE OXFORD EARLY CHRISTIAN STUDIES series includes
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Possidius of Calama
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Erica T. Hermanowicz (2008)
Justinian and the Making of the Syrian Orthodox Church
Volker L. Menze (2008)
The Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor
Torstein Theodor Tollefsen (2008)
Augustines Text of John
Patristic Citations and Latin Gospel Manuscripts
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Origen and Scripture
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Peter Martens (2012)
Activity and
Participation in
Late Antique and
Early Christian
Thought
By
TORSTEIN THEODOR TOLLEFSEN
1
3
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Preface
I started work on this book several years ago with the intention of
clearing up some of the mist that surrounds the topic of essence and
energies in Byzantine and Orthodox theology. In the process it turned
out to be a study of the concepts of essence and activity (energeia) in
late antique and early Christian thought, with the aim of showing that
St Gregory Palamas was a traditional thinker and no innovator in the
Byzantine tradition. The book is devoted to two rather obscure con-
cepts of ancient Christian thought, namely activity and participation.
It is my hope that those who are interested in the ancient roots of
Palamite theology will appreciate this investigation into his great
precursors in the Greek Christian world. However, the book is not
just an attempt to justify the soundness of Palamite thinking, it is
primarily a study of developments in Christian thought in late anti-
quity. The book attempts to highlight the connections as well as the
tensions between pagan philosophy and Christian philosophy.
I therefore think it will be of interest to students of the intellectual
life of late antiquity in general, and to students of early Greek
Christian thought in particular. I am grateful to my good friend
Ronald Worley who helped me clarify the English in my manuscript.
I am also grateful to Jon Wetlesen who made invaluable comments on
an earlier draft of the manuscript. I should further like to thank my
friends in the Medieval Seminar at the Department of Philosophy,
Classics, History of Art and Ideas at the University of Oslo, who are
always a source of inspiration to my work. I am grateful to Fr. Andrew
Louth and Professor Paul Blowers for critical and constructive sug-
gestions in the preparation of the nal draft of the present book.
Torstein Theodor Tollefsen
Contents
List of Abbreviations ix
Introduction 1
1. Activity and Participation in Non-Christian Thought 13
a. Plato and Aristotle 13
b. Plotinus 21
2. St Basil and Anomoean Theology 33
a. Introduction 33
b. St Basil the Great, Letter 234 35
c. Eunomius Doctrine of God 40
3. The Internal Activity of the Godhead 47
a. St Gregory of Nyssa on Trinitarian Generation 47
b. Dionysius the Areopagite on Trinitarian Generation 66
c. St Maximus the Confessor on the Internal Activity of
the Trinity 71
4. The External Activity of the Godhead: Cosmology 83
a. St Gregory of Nyssa on Creation and Participation 83
b. Dionysius on Creation and Participation 101
c. St Maximus the Confessor on Creation and Participation 118
5. The External Activity of the Godhead: Incarnation 133
a. St Gregory of Nyssa on the Incarnation 133
b. St Maximus the Confessors Ontological Analysis of
Essence and Activity 142
c. St Maximus the Confessor on the Incarnation 147
6. The Road to Salvation 159
a. St Gregory of Nyssa on Deication 159
b. St Maximus the Confessor on Salvation and Deication 169
viii Contents
7. The Theology of St Gregory Palamas 185
a. St Gregory Palamas on Energeia and Participation 186
b. The Light of Mount Tabor 201
8. Concluding Remarks 207
Bibliography 221
Index 227
List of Abbreviations
ACA Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, General Editor

R. Sorabji.
Ad. Thal. St Maximus the Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium.
CAG Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Berlin 18821909.
Cap. gnost. St Maximus the Confessor, Capita theologica et
oeconomica.
Capita 150 Saint Gregory Palamas, The One Hundred and Fifty
Chapters, (ed.) R. E. Sinkewicz (Toronto 1988).
Cat. Aristotle, Categories.
CE Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium.
CCSG Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca, Brepols, Turnhout.
De char. Maximus the Confessor, Centuriae de charitate.
DN Dionysius the Areopagite: De Divinis nominibus.
GNO Gregorii Nysseni Opera, Leiden, Brill.
Myst. St Maximus the Confessor, Mystagogia.
NPNF Select Library of the Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers of the
Christian Church, Originally published in 1886, reprinted
by Hendrickson Publishers, Peabody, Mass. 1995 (second
printing).
PG Patrologiae cursus completus, series graeca, ed.
J. P. Migne, Paris 185766.
Pyrrh. St Maximus the Confessor, Disputatio cum Pyrrho.
RCE Gregory of Nyssa, Refutatio confessionis Eunomii.
Th. Pol. St Maximus the Confessor, Opuscula theologica et
polemica.
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Introduction
This book is a study of two important concepts in ancient Christian

thought, namely activity and participation. The two concepts are
connected, and both are, from a philosophical point of view, dif-
cult and partly obscure. A central idea in the philosophy of late
antiquityin Neoplatonism as well as in Christian thinkingis the
general notion that the lower strata of being depend on higher
principles in the way that these same lower levels are constituted
by some kind of participation in these higher principles. What is the
structure of this participation? How does it come to be? What is
the medium of participation? I suggest the answer may be that lower
reality has its share in being real because of an activity (K)
manifested from reality itself, and because this activity affects a parti-
cipation in higher reality. At this point there seems to be a difference
between the original Platonic notion of participation and later devel-
opments of the idea: for Plato, what is participated in are the trans-
cendent Forms themselvesa point of view that leads to several
philosophical problems, as we shall seewhile later Platonism and
Christian philosophy have a more dynamic view of the matter. Ques-
tions that arise include how higher activity works on the lower levels,
whether lower reality participates directly in certain qualities or activ-
ities of the transcendent reality itself or in created effects of this reality.
I shall try to answer these questions. My topic is the character of
divine activity; in what connections is participation considered to take
place, how does it take place, and what is considered to be achieved
through such participation. However, I am not primarily investigating
these topics in pagan philosophy; rather I shall focus on how they are
conceived within Christian thought.
At this point I should highlight some concerns that hover in the
background, concerns that some readers may already have sensed. If
instead of activity we speak of energy and employ the expression
essence and energies, one might immediately associate this topic
2 Introduction
with a Byzantine controversy of the 14th century. In modern Ortho-
dox literature, and in modern books on Orthodox spirituality, one
discovers frequent references to the doctrine of the essence and
energy (or energies) of God, and to the importance this notion is
claimed to have for the understanding of the spiritual life. Orthodox
Christians believe the goal of the spiritual life is to participate in God,
and participation in God culminates in deication. The doctrine of
salvation is conceived as a doctrine of deication. But how could
weak, imperfect, corruptible creatures participate in the divine being?
It is considered impossible for any creature to be elevated to the level
of the divine being itself and partake of its essence. Therefore, parti-
cipation takes place because of divine energies. These are certain
powers manifested by God ad extra, and these powers perfect that
upon which they touch. The presence of divine energy makes the
creature participate in divine goodness, beauty, virtue, etc. Modern
Orthodox theologians employ, therefore, the notion of a distinction
(often said to be real) between Gods essence and energy.1
In the 14th century, there was a controversy over such a distinction
as dened in the works of St Gregory Palamas who wanted to defend
a certain spiritual practice known as hesychasm.2 The distinction, in
modern times, has been an issue between certain Roman Catholic
scholars and defenders of Palamism.3 Protestant scholars have
reacted in different ways; some are critical while others appreciate
the Palamitic intentions.4 However, the present book is not primar-
ily another contribution to the debate on Palamism, even if Palamism
is an inspiring factor behind these investigations of the concepts of
activity and participation, and despite the fact that this book contains
a chapter on Gregory Palamas, and which tries to show that Palamas
doctrine is on rather secure traditional ground and probably philo-
sophically sound. I shall avoid, as far as possible, entering into the
1
Meyendorff (1987), 186; cf. Meyendorff s introduction to Gregory Palamas, The
Triads (1983), 19.
2
From an Orthodox point of view, the classical introduction to the controversy, its
history, and theological issues is found in Meyendorff (1974). However, at least some
of Meyendorff s results should be modied, and in this book I try to make a
contribution to this, especially in chapters 7 and 8. For a more recent introduction
to the rst phase of the controversy between Barlaam and Palamas, cf. Gunnarsson
(2002).
3
See the end of this introduction.
4
Cf. Norris (1996).
Introduction 3
modern debate that argues for or against Palamitic doctrine, nor will
I make use of what is written within the trenches for and against this
particular issue. On the other hand, the topics of divine essence,
energy, deication, and participation will be central to this present
discussion. In my view, the modern reception of the controversial
distinction tends to blur the fact that the distinction and relationship
between such concepts as essence and activity, activity and participa-
tion, originally belonged to a central philosophical consideration
partly developed to highlight the relationship between higher and
lower reality, God and what comes after God; originally in pagan
thought and later in Christian thought.
The Christian God is the living God, the Creator, and Saviour
of the world. God is active. How are we to understand this divine
activity, which obviously has its foundation beyond the realm of
time and space? We speak of God as active, but how can the notion of
activity that seems to involve the idea of change and time be accom-
modated within the eternal life of God? And even if we dene the
notion of activity in such a way that it gives sense to the eternal being
of God, how shall we understand the transposition of such activity
into the created realm in space and time? How are we to understand
Gods activity, both in His own internal life and in His dealings with
creatures other than God, in creation and salvation? What relation is
there between being God and operating as God in these regards? In
what ways do Gods external effects and works depend on the being of
God? How should one understand the relationship between divine
and created activity in the soteriological dimension?
As mentioned earlier, this book is mainly a study of the Christian
idea of activity and participation, but we will start with a chapter on
pagan thought because the terminology, certain concepts, and some
important doctrines relating to the subject originated and were devel-
oped within ancient and late antique philosophy (Chapter 1). However,
there is no intention to investigate these ideas in detail from their
beginning, but only to provide a background for Christian thought.
It is natural, therefore, to comment on some aspects of Platonic and
Aristotelian philosophies, while Neoplatonism is discussed more ela-
borately before moving on to some important Christian thinkers. The
treatment of non-Christians will be limited to what is relevant to the
development of Christian concepts. When it comes to the Christians, it
will be evident that the topics of activity and participation, in different
ways, becomes central to the basic doctrine of Trinitarian generation
4 Introduction
and the concept of the inner life of the Trinity (Chapter 2 and 3), the
creation of the world (Chapter 4), the Incarnation (Chapter 5), and
salvation (Chapter 6). Throughout, the primary discussion is about
three major Christian thinkers, namely Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius
the Areopagite, and Maximus the Confessor. There will be, as already
mentioned, a chapter on Gregory Palamas (Chapter 7), wherein his
theology will be considered against the background of earlier develop-
ments of the main topic. The book ends with some concluding remarks
on topics of philosophical relevance, such as divine transcendence,
participation, and the relationship between uncreated and created
being, especially in terms of deication (Chapter 8).
It is necessary to remark on the translation of two of the most
important terms in this discussionousia and energeia. In discus-
sions of ancient philosophy, especially in connection with Aristotle
and the Aristotelian tradition, the term P is usually translated
as substance. In connection with Neoplatonist and Christian texts
from late antiquity, the same term is normally translated as essence.
I prefer the latter translation. The ousia of something is the unitary
presence of that which makes it into a being of a certain kind, i.e. the
sum of (essential) properties that a thing must have in order to be
a thing of this kind.5 This ousia could be viewed on the level of
individual as well as on the level of specic or generic being. The
term substance ( that which stands under) is not the one best suited
to express this sense because of its materialistic connotations. On the
other hand, one could probably say that the sum of properties that a
thing must have in order to be a thing of this kind expresses something
substantial regarding the thing in question, so that the ousia is the
substance of something in that respect. Essence is an English transla-
tion of the Latin essentia that is the literal equivalent of ousia.
The term K, when used in the Aristotelian corpus, is often
translated as activity or actuality. It denotes the being in act of a
particular thing. This being in act has, however, different aspects.
We shall discuss at least some of these in Chapter 1. This book will
mainly adhere to these translations, but I propose them with some
reluctance. On the one hand, the text will avoid extensive use of the
5
Property is not the best term here, since, according to the Aristotelian logic of
late antiquity, there is a distinction between predicates of property and predicates of
species or essence. However, for want of a better word, we may talk of properties
here, understood as essential properties.
Introduction 5
term energy, because this word may partly obscure the philosophical
concepts that are expressed by the word energeia. Admittedly, there
are contexts in which energy is difcult to avoid. In some connec-
tions it may make good sense and be the best alternative. Nowadays, it
seems that energy has become the established translation of the
Greek energeia in spiritual literature and whenever the topic is related
to Orthodox spirituality and Palamism. One can live with this, and
there is no ambition here to effect a change in this widespread usage.
However, now and then one gets the impression that energy is a
kind of quasi-material force almost owing into the human recipient.
Of course, the saying that divine power is somehow owing into the
recipient is often a quite adequate description of what is experienced.
But one should not conceive of or think about this divine power as if
it was some kind of material force or uidum. This is not to deny that
divine energy is manifested in the nature of material being, but one
should beware of interpreting the divine power itself as a material
force. Against the background of these considerations I choose to
translate energeia as actuality, activity, ornow and thenenergy,
depending on the context, and the transcribed form of the Greek will
be used as well.
There is one additional terminological point that should be made
the terms internal and external activity are used here to describe
how activity is related to essences. Internal activity denotes certain
processes that take place internally within a being when it is turned
towards itself in acts of contemplation, willing, and generation. In the
divine sphere, for instance, such activity is the foundation for external
activities. A divine being acts ad extra because of an act or acts ad
intra. Internal activity and external activity are primarily associated
with the philosophy of Plotinusto whom we shall turn belowbut
I consider this a fruitful terminological device that may characterize
other systems of thought as well. It should be noted that these terms
may represent more than one concept, which means that one shall
not consider them Platonic or Neoplatonic terms, but philosophical
terms suitable for different contexts.
It should also be noted that this is a book about concepts or
philosophical ideas, not about certain words. The concept of, for
instance, energeia may be expressed by other terms or formulas.
I am attempting to understand and describe how a certain reality
was conceived and expressed, not to investigate the usage of a couple
of words.
6 Introduction
As far as I know, there are no books or articles that exactly cover
the topic identied above. The closest match is Bradshaws Aristotle
East and West (2004), on which there are some remarks below, but
his subject is mainly the term and concept of energeia.6 The literature
I have found most useful is concerned with one or the other of
the concepts I am attempting to bring together systematically. One
might expect that there would be a large corpus of literature on each
of the topics individually, and in a sense there is. Almost anyone
commenting on certain Platonic dialogues (especially the Phaedo
and the Parmenides) will probably have some remarks to make on
participation. However, I have not investigated this literature system-
atically since my impression is that modern commentators on Plato
usually make no more than passing remarks on this particular topic
or point out certain well-known problems.7 What is said about Plato
in Chapter 1 is, therefore, a commonly acknowledged starting-point
for an obvious problem connected with the notion of participation.
Plato sees this problem rather clearly. However, he neither proposes
any striking solution to it nor does he bequeath such a solution to
late antiquity. It is in any case better to study the notion of participa-
tion within the period of late antiquity itself, since late-antique
systems of thought differ from those of ancient systems. A concept
of participation should be sought within the texts belonging to the
period of our main study.
If we move on to late antiquity, Sweeney (1982) has made an effort to
highlight participation in Proclus Elements of Theology, and he initially
denes it in a similar way to how I dened it above:8 Participation in
this context is the process by which (or the situation within which)
what is lower is made real and becomes related to other realities (both
peer and higher) by somehow receiving its intrinsic reality from what is
higher. Further, there is an important article by OMeara (1980) on
Plotinus that, in my opinion, points the way to a reasonable denition
of how participation may be understood even in texts written by the
Church Fathers. OMearas article was helpful when working on The
Christocentric Cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor (2008), which
6
My version of Bradshaws book is the paperback reprint from 2007.
7
Hackforth (1972), 1436, is an example of an interpreter of the Phaedo who does
not have much to say about participation as such. He seems to think that Plato has not
developed any concept in this regard.
8
Sweeney (1982), 140.
Introduction 7
contains a chapter on the concept of participation.9 However, the
description of this concept is turned in a slightly different direction
in the present book. Here the concept is described more dynamically,
since to a much larger degree I develop what I now consider the
obvious connection between participation and activity.
Bals has made a substantial contribution to highlighting the con-
cept of participation in St Gregory of Nyssa. First we have his well-
known
S` Y
(1966) and in 1969, Bals published a
conference paper on Gregory: Participation in the Specic Nature
according to Gregory of Nyssa: Aristotelian Logic or Platonic Ontol-
ogy?. In 1975 he published a paper on Origen: The Idea of Participa-
tion in the Structure of Origens Thought. Christian Transposition
of a Theme of the Platonic Tradition. In the book as well as in the
rst-mentioned article he suggests denitions of Gregorys concept
of participation. Bals summarizes this denition in the article on
Gregory:10 to participate in perfection means that one does not have
it by nature but receives it from a source; the result is a combination
between the subject that receives and the perfection that is participated
in; the subject participates in the perfection to a greater or lesser degree
according to its disposition; the subject should make progress in order
to increase its share in the perfection. All of this touches on topics to be
discussed in the chapters of the present book. However, I think there is
a basic twist in Bals conception of participation that differs from my
understanding of it: he seems to think that participation is about
participating in certain formal perfections from abovea point of
view that is rather common whenever there is talk of participation
while I think that the essential aspect of participation is that God
executes His activity in the created sphere. I do not deny that parti-
cipation in perfections occurs, but I think it occurs somewhat differ-
ently from how one usually tends to think it takes place. The concepts
of participation and activity should be linked systematically in a way
I cannot see that scholars have done before. However, an exception is
Bradshaw (2004) to whom I shall return below. There is, however, one
more problem that concerns Bals book on Gregory, namely Bals
9
Tollefsen (2008), chapter 5.
10
Bals (1969), 1082. In Tollefsen (2008), 1526, 192, 224, I criticize some aspects
of Bals ideas in his book (1966). Even though I think his contribution to the topic of
participation is important, I still think my critique is essentially correct. There is more
on this below.
8 Introduction
seems to think that the perfections participated in are created.11 I shall
return to this in the chapter on external activity below.
When we turn to the term and concept of energeia, we meet
with a topic that has been much discussed in scholarly literature,
especially in connection with Aristotles philosophy, particularly in
Metaphysics book 9 (). My interpretation of Aristotle does not
pretend to introduce something new, and, as far as my knowledge of
modern discussions goes, I do not move beyond opinions shared by
others.12 However, a recent book should be mentioned, for several
reasons. Bradshaws Aristotle East and West (2004) covers some of
the same ground as I do in this present book, but there are differ-
ences. Bradshaw interprets Aristotles doctrine of energeia, and des-
cribes certain features of the reception of Aristotles doctrine in later
systems of thought, mainly in late antique and early Byzantine
Christian thinking and in scholasticism. In this connection he also
compares Thomism and Palamism. Bradshaw addresses several im-
portant subjects, and many of his discussions and observations are
of great value, especially when he brings the two concepts of activity
and participation into contact with one another.13
I should like to put forward an example of a sound and stimulating
suggestion made by Bradshaw towards the end of his book.14 As far as
I can see, what he suggests does not play any role in his argument, and
somehow what he says could pass quite unnoticed:
The Eastern conception of synergy depends on understanding energeia
simultaneously in two distinct ways: as an activity that can be shared,
and as the natural accompaniment and manifestation of the inner
personal being (ousia) of the one who acts.
The Plotinian hypostases are not persons, however, so that the
external energeia is not yet a truly personal act.
Even if the issues connected with the theology of John Zizioulas
form no part of the main argument of the present book, the topic of
personhood has some relevance for the understanding of both
activity and participation in some contexts below. This fact immedi-
ately invites at least a comment on Zizioulas concept of personhood.
11
Cf. Bals (1966), 12930, 163, and Tollefsen (2008), 155.
Cf. Ross (1975, rst published 1924). For some more recent contributions, see
12
Kosman (1984), Witt (1989), Frede (1994), Rabbs (1998).

13
Bradshaw (2007), 17282.
14
Bradshaw (2007), 2667.
Introduction 9
Even if Zizioulas brings forth some highly valuable insights, I do not
think his concept of personhood can be argued from late antique
Christian sources.15 However, Bradshaw is correct that the Christian
concept of the hypostatic character of divine and human being in the
concrete life of activity and participation differs from the concept of
hypostasis in pagan Neoplatonism. This insight may make us sensi-
tive to certain aspects of Christian ontology that may easily pass
unnoticed. We shall return to this in the relevant contexts in later
chapters.
When it comes to Plotinus, I have proted much from Emilssons
ideas in an article of 1999, Remarks on the Relation between the
One and Intellect in Plotinus; these ideas are more developed in his
book Plotinus on Intellect (2007). Emilsson interprets the Plotinian
conception of causality as a doctrine of double activity. Of course,
some scholars had written about double activity before Emilsson, for
instance Rist in chapter 6 (Emanation and Necessity) of Plotinus
The Road to Reality (1967), who speaks of two acts that he considers
to be the formal account of the process of emanation. Lloyd speaks
of the two activities in chapter 4 of his The Anatomy of Neoplatonism
(1990). When Bradshaw interprets what he calls Plotinus theory
of two acts in chapter 4 of his book, this bears witness to a growing
awareness that Plotinus doctrine of energeia is what lurks beneath his
metaphors of emanation.
Christian authors such as Dionysius the Areopagite, St Maximus
the Confessor, and St Gregory Palamas more or less systematically
bring together the notions of activity and participation. Earlier con-
tributions to this topic are rather few. Ysabel de Andia has a chapter on
participation in her Henosislunion Dieu chez Denys lAreopagite
(1996). There is a study of importance on Essence et nergies de Dieu
(1993) in Maximus by Karayiannis. Besides this book, the most
extensive treatment of the topics of essence, activity, and participation
in Maximus is, as far as I know, in Tollefsen (2008). There is a great
deal of literature on Palamas, and judging from the titles, much of it is
relevant. On the other hand, in my experience, what is written often
carries the mark of polemics and tends to follow one main strategy:
one wants to show that St Gregory Palamas is in accordance
with tradition by citing or referring to texts by the Early Fathers
15
Cf. Zizioulas (1985). A convincing critique of Zizioulas is worked out by
Turcescu in an article available in Coakley ed. (2004), 97109.
10 Introduction
that use the terminology of essence and energies. In my opinion, this
procedure is futile, and, from a scholarly point of view, if one wants to
solve the problems inherent in the issues themselves, one has to
choose another strategy: it is necessary to penetrate the philosophical
challenges and problems involved in such use of terms from author to
author, from issue to issue, from controversy to controversy, and
from century to century. The present issue is not resolved by citing
authorities, but by meditating on philosophical matters involved in
theological conceptions. Of course, a number of books and articles
have been produced that are spiritually valuable, and many contri-
butions have been made in order to shed light on the historical
development of the Hesychast controversy. For the historical as well
as some of the philosophical and theological matters, one should
consult Gunnarsson (2002) and interesting articles by Sinkewics (see
bibliography). Concerning the theological vision and the spirituality of
Palamas I have proted from Meyendorffs contributions, but espe-
cially from Mantzaridis valuable The Deication of Man (1984), and
from Losskys The Vision of God (1983). The latter book has an
important introductory chapter that considers the Western reception
and interpretation of Palamas theology. Lossky points out that the
negative reception of Palamas by nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century Roman Catholic scholars (Martin Jugie among them) largely
depends upon the negative reception of Greek and Palamite theology
of earlier centuries.16 In this vein, Adrian Fortescue and Simon Vailh
wrote articles (respectively Hesychasm and Greek Church) for the
Catholic Encyclopedia (1903).17 Since I do not write on the Palamitic
controversy as such, I do not investigate the Western criticisms at any
length. It is, however, interesting to see that these articles are still
accessible on websites containing editions of the Catholic Encyclopedia.
16
Lossky (1983), 234. Cf. Bradshaw (2007), 2635.
17
The Roman Catholic website New Advent (www.newadvent.org.cathen/b.htm.)
gives access to the article Greek Church in the Catholic Encyclopedia (visited
03.10.2009), which presents Hesychasm in very negative terms, and Palamism as a
kind of polytheism. The website Catholic Online (www.catholic.org), which also gives
access to a version of the Catholic Encyclopedia with an entry on Hesychasm (visited
03.10.2009), is rather negative as well. The EastWest controversy over Hesychast
theology is seen as arising from the fact that the East and the West assimilated different
philosophical traditions, Neoplatonism versus Aristotelianism, and Western Thomist
Aristotelianism is, obviously, considered sounder than Eastern Neoplatonism. None of
these articles seems sound or just with regards to the treatment of their subjects, neither
philosophically, nor theologically. We shall return to this in Chapter 8.
Introduction 11
Fortescues article shows a lack of knowledge of the Greek Fathers
and claims that Platonism inuences Byzantine theology. Vailh talks
of Palamas monstrous errors and of a resurrection of polytheism.
I suppose that what may be found in these encyclopaedias still repre-
sents a Roman Catholic view, but if not, why are they still there?
1
Activity and Participation in Non-Christian

Thought
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a certain terminological and

partly conceptual continuity between pagan and Christian philosophy
in the understanding of how lower reality depends on the higher
through divine activity and creaturely participation. This chapter
seeks to show that the Christian application of the terminology and
conceptual schemes of activity and participation is a further develop-
ment of a general philosophical concern in the specic context of
Christian topics. It starts with Platos doctrine of Forms and how he
conceives of the problem of participation, moves on to Aristotles
concept of enegeia, and ends in late antiquity with Plotinus doctrine
of activity and participation as heir to the philosophical traditions of
antiquity. With Plotinus and Neoplatonism we are in the immediate
vicinity of Christian thought.
A. PLATO AND ARISTOTLE
The doctrine of Forms and of participation emerged historically with

the philosophy of Plato, so that all later philosophies containing similar
elementseven if they are very different from Platos doctrinesagain
and again suffer the fate of being labelled Platonic. The latter is, I hold,
barely justied, since later thought is characterized by many new devel-
opments, compared with Plato. It only serves to oversimplify and even
14 Activity and Participation in Non-Christian Thought
to distort matters if this label is used too often.1 However, the doctrine of
Forms and, I suppose, a notion of participation originated with Plato,
and he is the starting-point for a long development in philosophical
thought.
Plato teaches that Being belongs to the eternal Forms. These are
perfect essences and patterns for what is a mixture of being and non-
being.2 Now, this mixture does not seem difcult to interpret, because
a thing in the world of becoming has being insofar as it is like the
Form, non-being insofar as it lacks the characteristics of the Form.
The cosmos depends, consequently, on the Forms. Such an under-
standing of Platos philosophy gains support from what he says
here and there in the Dialogues, and from some of Aristotles criti-
cisms of the doctrine, while it leaves a number of questions about the
exact nature of the doctrine to be solved.
It seems to be a general Platonic notion that things at hand in the
sensible world have certain qualities or characteristics because of their
participation in the Forms: beautiful things are beautiful because of
beauty itself etc.3 In other words: sensible things depend on intelligi-
ble things for certain attributes. This has given rise to the interpreta-
tion that for Plato the Forms are a higher reality of perfectly existing
eternal entities beyond time and spacea world of Forms separate
from the visible world. One might ask, what should be the point
of doubling the world in such a way? The answer is that there are
certain qualities or perfections or structures of ethical, aesthetic,
logical, and mathematical nature that are beyond the uctuations of
this sensible world. The denition of these cannot be the denition
of something at hand within the sensible cosmos, but of a kind of
essential being beyond what we grasp through our senses.
In a description of the pagan background for Christian philosophy
in late antiquity, there is no urgent need to nd out exactly what Plato
himself meant the Forms to be, but rather to discuss what became
important in later developments. One of these points is the problem
of participation, a problem clearly grasped by Plato himself in the rst
part of his dialogue Parmenides. As it is presented, the problem of
participation according to Parmenides presupposes a distinctive view
of the Forms, namely as perfect essences of an intelligible kind.
1
Edwards (2002) has made some valuable criticisms of the application of the label
Platonic, cf., for instance, 5, 47.
2 3
Republic 477ab. Cf. Phaedo 100 de.
Activity and Participation in Non-Christian Thought 15
In Parmenides Socrates presents the doctrine of Forms in order
to counter an argument put forward by Zeno.4 Then the Eleatic
philosopher Parmenides is then put to the task of examining Socrates
doctrine.5 He asks if the participant (e ) participates in
the whole Form or in a part of it. The point is that if the participant
participates in a part, the Form cannot be an intelligible thing, since
it is divided into parts. If, on the other hand, each participant
participates in the whole Form, the one Form is somehow multiplied
in relation to the many things that participate in it. Now, the termi-
nology of participation lends itself to materialistic connotations. It is
suited to describe the division and distribution of a substance, some
wine or bread, among several participants. Socrates tries to counter
Parmenides argument by saying that the day ( ) is one and the
same while present in many places at once. It could be likewise with
the Form.6 Parmenides, however, asks using the analogy of a sail,
if the Form was spread over many persons, would not a particular
part be over each person? Socrates admits that a part will be over each
and Parmenides draws his conclusion that then, by the force of the
analogy, the Forms can be divisible into parts, with the absurdities
that follow.
Should Socrates have accepted Parmenides analogy? One might
wonder. Whether the analogy is acceptable or not depends on how
the nature of the Form is conceived. If the Form is of an intelligible
nature one might wonder if there would not have been additional
possibilities that may have been used to develop a defence of the
notion of participation without endangering the unity of the Form.
We shall return to such a defence in Plotinus. Whatever Platos
intention in letting Parmenides win the discussion at this point, it
seems difcult to believe that he did not see additional possibilities
for a defence. Perhaps it has to do with the further development of
arguments in the dialogue, but however that may be we shall not
follow him into the intricacies of the hypotheses in the Parmenides.
It is well known that Aristotle criticizes the doctrine of Forms,
especially in the Metaphysics. There is no need for us to follow him
into this critique. There is, however, another matter that is of some
interest in the present context, namely what Aristotle says about
participation. In Book A (chapter 6) he says that the plurality of
4 5 6
Cf. Tollefsen (2008), 1945. 131 ac. 131 bc.
things with the same name as the Forms possess being by participa-
tion ( ) in these Forms. He further says that Plato only ex-
changed the Pythagorean term imitation ( ) for the term
participation. Later in chapter 9, Aristotle says to claim that the
Forms are paradigms and that other things participate in them, are
empty phrases and poetical metaphors. For what is it that is making
things look at the Forms?Plato could have answered by pointing to
the Demiurge, the divine gure in Timaeus, who fashions unordered
matter into a regulated cosmos while contemplating the pattern.7
Aristotle, however, does not take this into consideration.
It is obvious that Aristotle does not consider it a serious philoso-
phical theory that paradigmatic Forms are made immanent in the
sensible cosmos by participation, but rather that these are empty terms
and metaphors of a poetical nature. I suppose he sees quite clearly the
materialistic connotations of the participation terminology. Of course,
later Neoplatonists had some difculty tting the two philosophical
giants of antiquity into (hopefully) one coherent system. Simplicius,
for example, argues that Aristotle counters popular views of the
Forms, not that he denies genuine Platonic Forms. Using the image
of the general and the army from Aristotles Metaphysics 12 ()
(1075a13), Simplicius argues that even Aristotle recognized the theory
of Forms in the mind of the Demiurge as the causative principle of the
cosmos.8 It is quite obvious that the problem of participation is
intrinsically connected with the notion of the Forms as an intelligible,
essential reality that should somehow be transported into a lower,
material kind of reality. In late antiquity the whole picture is much
changed with the introduction of the Christian Creator-God and the
tenet that this God executes His energeia in His creatures.
We now turn to the concept of energeia. Aristotle develops the
doctrine of energeia in order to address certain philosophical issues.
As this doctrine emerges within his works one sees that there are
several aspects to it. In one aspect energeia means the condition of
having emerged into the actual presence of form from the condition
of a potentiality suited to exactly that kind of presence. Energeia in
this sense may be translated as actuality. This aspect answers one
important ontological problem in the so-called central books of the
Metaphysics (Z), namely how the relationship between form and
7 8
Timaeus 28c29a. On Aristotle Physics 2, ACA: 51, CAG 9: 295.
matter merges into one unitary thing or substance. Hopefully, this
topic may be highlighted if we turn to the denition of soul given by
Aristotle in de Anima.
The denition that is most useful for our purpose is the following:9
The soul, therefore, is the rst actuality (K)10 of a natural
body, which potentially has life, and such will be a body that is
organic. An organic body is a body with organs, such as is required
by the soul in order to constitute a living being of a certain kind. Soul
and body are to each other as form is to matter, as actual is to
potential ousia. The body will only be the potential ousia of a living
being if it answers the requirements of the soul-form as the actuality
(energeia) of the complete entity. For the soul to act as the actuality of
a being, an organized matterthat is a visceral body composed of
organs adapted to the powers of the soulmust be present. The unity
of the living being is realized in this way: the organic body, potentially
possessing life, is activated by the soul-powers and emerges into
actual existence as this one living being. That the body, i.e. matter,
meets the requirements of the soul-form shows clearly why the
primary ousia of the substance is its form. In the process of genera-
tion the form has been the guiding principle (the nal cause) through
which matter has emerged into a suitable and integral component of
the composite. An existing thing, a composite substance consisting
of form and matter, is a unity, one single presence, because of the
relationship of actuality to potentiality (cf. the requirement of the
form) and of potentiality to actuality (cf. the adaptation, organization
of the matter). The being (e Z) of the thing then consists in its
matter being absorbed in an organized way in the presence of the
formal being of a particular kind.
To summarize, the sense of energeia we have met with so far is
actuality, namely the complete realization (entelecheia) of some-
thing. The relationship between potentiality and actuality (energeia)
in this regard should be understood as the relationship between
matter and form; form as substantial form or the presence of a
property, a power, a faculty, or a kind of capacity (virtue, art, science).
Here matter should be understood as being relative to the appro-
priate ontological level. To make this clearer, matter might be the
9
De Anima book 2, ch. 1, 412a27412b1.
10
It seems that K means the same as K here and in many other
contexts. Cf. Metaphysics , ch. 1, 1045b321046a2.
matter of an animal body or an artefact, or matter as an entitys
capacity relative to its actualization.
This leads us to a second aspect of energeia. It is presented, for
instance, in de Anima book 2, where one may learn to distinguish
between two levels of energeia:11 in the rst level, a man may be learned
or well-instructed (K ), for example, in grammar or mathe-
matics. But he may, at this moment, not be exercising his knowledge
because he is asleep. Even so, he is in an actualized condition compared
with a person who only has the potentiality for learning but who as
yet has not received instruction. This will be actuality in the sense we
discussed above. This sense is analogous with the sense of actuality that
arises in Aristotles denition of the soul in de Anima book 2, chapter 1:
the soul, he states, is the rst actuality of a body. The second meaning of
energeia is the one where it seems natural to translate the term as
activity, because on the basis of possession of a certain knowledge one
starts using it and becomes active as a grammarian or a mathematician,
doing grammar or mathematics.
There is still another aspect of the doctrine of energeia that needs
comment. In Metaphysics book 9 (), chapter 6, Aristotle distinguishes
between action and motion (A and ).12 An action is a
process in which the end (e ) is present. As such it possesses
completeness. A motion is a process that has a limit (). When it
stops at a certain point, the end is manifested beyond that limit. A
motion, therefore, is incomplete (I) in terms of its character as
energeia, while an action is energeia in the proper sense, because it
immediately ( ) contains its fullment. In this instance, energeia
may be translated as activity as well.
To sum up, energeia, as understood by Aristotle, is the actuality of
something or the activity of somethingon the one hand, the actuality
of a house, of a living being, or of possessing knowledge; on the other
hand, the activity of building (which as a motion is incomplete), or
seeing (which is complete in itself).
In Metaphysics 9 () Aristotle says:13 It is obvious, therefore, that
the ousia or form is actuality. From this argument it is obvious that
actuality is prior to potentiality in ousia, and as we have said, one
actuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality of
the eternal prime mover. According to the rst chapter of Metaphysics
11
Cf. De Anima book 2, ch. 5, 417a21417b2.
12 13
Cf. 1048b18-36. 1050b26.
book 12 (), there are three kinds of substances or essences (ousiai),
namely: (i) the sensible and perishable, which are involved in the sub-
lunar processes of generation and corruption, (ii) the sensible and
eternal, i.e. the heavenly bodies, and (iii) the immovable, which is the
divine. In chapter 6 he argues that motion and time cannot be gener-
ated or destroyed (as he also argues in Physics, book 8), but have always
existed. This eternal existence requires us to posit a kinetic and pro-
ductive principle that has no part in potentiality. The factual existence
of eternal motion requires a principle, he says, whose essence is
energeia (w P K), which here probably means actuality.14
All these considerations came, in late antiquity, to inspire prolonged
discussions about divine causality, about the limitation of or the limit-
less character of the power of God, and about the corruptibility or
incorruptibility of the cosmos and its timeless or temporal character.15
Aristotle argues for an unmoved mover that moves as an object of
rational desire.16 This presupposes, of course, that there exist entities
in the cosmic building that can exercise such desire. It goes beyond
this topic to enter into the details of this scenario, but Aristotles idea
is that the heavenly spheres have a share in intelligence and are able
to direct their desire for perfection towards what stands at a higher
level of perfection in the order of being. The immediate object of
processes of generation and activity in the sublunary sphere is the
actualization of the form in each being. These processes are a result
of an immanent nal causality connected with the form. However,
God is the basic principle for the existence of a world in which there
is a general striving for the actualization of form. This God func-
tions, therefore, as the universal cause which, by just being what it is,
keeps intact a cosmic according to which every being actualizes
itself in its proper place.17
We shall consider the nature of this divinity a bit closer. God is a
living being, eternal and the highest good.18 Aristotle says that the
energeia of God is pleasure (),19 and since the essence (ousia) of
God is energeia, the divine essence consists in some kind of pleasant
14
1071b20.
15 16
Cf. Sorabji (1983) and Sorabji ed. (1987). 1072b3.
17
Bradshaw (2007), 2932, tries to argue that Aristotles God is the efcient as well
as the nal cause of the cosmos, almost like Ammonius in late antiquity, cf. Sorabji ed
(2004), 1648. Bradshaws arguments are interesting and challenging, but I am not yet
completely convinced.
18 19
Metaphysics , 1072b2829. Ibid. 1072b16.
energeia. How do we translate energeia in this connection? One could
probably say that Gods activity is pleasure, that his essence is
activity (of a certain kind), i.e. the divine essence is a kind of pleasant
activity. This activity is the activity of thought, which is directed not
towards anything external, but towards thought itself.20 The divine
essence is, then, the activity of contemplative thought, and Aristotle
strives to show how the subject and the object of thought immediately
coincide in this essence. The activity of God is identical with what it is
to be God. God, as the essential activity of self-thinking, is a con-
templative act turned towards Himself. Could there be any better or
more perfect example of complete activity? In this instance it seems
quite difcult to distinguish sharply between energeia as activity
and as actuality, since the execution of this essential divine activity
is Gods actualized being. This may also be the case with mundane
energeia, such as the human act of thinking. It is not just an activity,
but also an actuality. One should probably not think of activity and
actuality as two sharply distinguished senses of energeia.
The way Aristotle understands the nature of the divine is interest-
ing in view of later developments. According to Aristotle, being and
activity coincide in God, and no mention is made of any will of God.
This seems to conne God to an internal completeness and self-
sufciency that precludes any conscious external activity on behalf
of the divinity.
As far as I can see there is no external activity in the sense of an
efcient causality that creates the world. The divine activity is not a
kind of movement that accomplishes a result beyond itself. The only
effect God has on the cosmos is the inuence the divine perfection
has on the striving of the cosmic order. This is an instance of nal
causality. Therefore, the divine activity of perfect self-contemplation
has at least this kind of effect on the sphere of being beyond itself.
Aristotle consequently lacks a doctrine of creation, something that is
interesting in terms of the much later philosopher Plotinus and the
school of Neoplatonism. This is especially the case because the second
divinity of the Neoplatonic intelligible world, the Mind, has so much
in common with the Aristotelian God, and even so is involved in the
creation of the world. As a result of my investigation into Aristotle,
I conclude that the Aristotelian God is locked up in Himself as the
20
Ibid. 1972b1821 and 1074b1535.
keystone of a well-ordered world, and that is all. However, this theory
left a lot to be desired by the philosophical schools of Neoplatonists in
late antiquity, especially because of their dogma of the compatibility
and harmony between the two giants of antiquity, Plato and Aristotle.
B. PLOTINUS
I am not going to sketch a full history of Neoplatonism as a back-

ground for discussing the Church Fathers. Rather, I shall concentrate
on Plotinus and dwell on some important features of his thought. In
Plotinus we nd an elaborate doctrine of activity and participation
that had a great effect on later Neoplatonists and on the interchange
between Platonism and Christianitywhenever that took place.
Plotinus furnishes the background, and other representatives of the
movement will be brought into the picture when relevant in connec-
tion with my treatment of Christian thinkers.
If people know anything at all about Plotinus, they will say rst that he
teaches emanation of all levels of being from a rst principle, the One.
This emanation doctrine is attested in many places in the Enneads.
Plotinus speaks of a radiation ( ) from the One, while the
One itself remains unchanged. This radiation is like the light of the sun
that passes around it.21 Plotinus also compares the radiation with the
diffusion of scent from perfumed things.22 But these and other formula-
tions of the so-called emanation doctrine are lled with metaphor.
However, these metaphors are a means of expressing a philosophical
theory that has been called the doctrine of double activity (energeia).23
This doctrine, for instance, is expressed in Ennead 5.4.2. Plotinus
says that while the One remains ( ) as intelligible, something comes
to be from it while it abides unchanged. Since the One remains as
intelligible (thinkable), something comes to be next to it, viz. thinking
or intellection () as such. This thinking thinks that from which
it came and becomes, consequently, Mind (F). The explanation of
21 22
Ennead 5.1.6. Ibid.
23
I am indebted to Professor Emilsson for introducing me to this idea of Plotinus
doctrine of causation. One could consult Emilsson (2007), the introduction and the
rst chapter for further detail. However, to the degree I contribute any further to this
line of interpretation of Plotinus, I take full responsibility for what follows.
this coming to be is given as a doctrine that in everything there is an
activity that belongs to the essence (ousia), and an activity that goes out
from the essence. Here we have the double activity, the doctrine of
internal and external activity that, according to Plotinus, belongs to all
entities.
Plotinus says that the activity of the essence is each particular thing,
while the derived activity comes from the rst one and follows it
necessarily, being different from the thing from which it derived.
Plotinus turns to an illustration (not an image or a metaphor) and
says that in re there is heat that is the content of its essence and
another heat that comes from the rst heat. There is, in other words,
an immanent activity of heat as the essence of re itself, and there is
an externally affected heat that warms what surrounds it. Plotinus
thinks that the principle of double activity is found in all complete
entities. Just as the internal activity of Aristotles God is the actuality
of the divine being, so in the same way the internal activity of any
essence, according to Plotinus, is its actuality.
The One of Plotinus is not an intellect or a self-thinking thought,
like the Aristotelian God. The subject and object of thought coincide
in the Aristotelian God as it does in the Mind of Plotinus system, but
even so these two entities have a certain dual character that the One
denitely transcends. It is not possible to conceive of any distinctions
at all in the simple being of the One. When the essence of the One
is taken to be the same as itself qua internal activity, even this
characterization could, strictly speaking, threaten its transcendent
character. To safeguard this character, Plotinus says the One is
beyond energeia.24 There is, however, no doubt that Plotinus would
normally allow the doctrine of double activity to apply to the One.
In order to penetrate deeper into the distinction between internal
and external activity, we must pose some questions: How should the
internal activity of the One be characterized? Exactly how does the
external activity arise? What is the connection between the external
activity of the One and the being of the next level, that of the Mind?
Now we try to focus on Plotinus doctrine of divine generation
and cosmic generation or creation. These two topics are intimately
connected, and this marks a major difference between Neoplatonism
in general and Christian thought, as we shall see in chapters three
24
Ennead 1.7.1. Cf. Emilsson (1999), 271, note 2.
and four of this book. I shall now treat the three questions just
enumerated.
The One is not self-thinking thought. It does not think or con-
template at all. It is not even conscious of itself.25 When it comes to
thinking, it is inactive (I), but even sosurprisingly, but
not unexpectedlyit is an activity.26 It is surprising because of what is
just stated, but not unexpected because of the need to describe the
generation of intelligible principles. In Ennead 6.8.16 this activity is
called . Even though such an activity is not conceivable by
a human mind (or any mind), Plotinus seems to think that the One is
some kind of mental act that transcends all characteristics that such
acts normally could be said to possess.
There seems, however, to be one thing that denitely characterizes
the internal activity of the One, namely its abiding or remaining.
We nd this in Ennead 5.1.6, where there is talk of the radiation from
the One: from it, while it remains unchanged (K PF b ).
The text continues: All things which exist, as long as they remain in
being ( ), necessarily produce from their own essences. In
Ennead 5.4.2 it is stated twice that when the Intelligible, i.e. the One,
abides ( ), something comes into being from it as it abides
( ) unchanged. There are other instances of this as well. Now,
what does it mean?
In Ennead 1.7.1 Plotinus says that the Good is not the Good by
activity or thought, but by reason of its . This probably means
that the One is the Good in its condition of remaining as an object
of desire, not because it acts in a certain way. The remaining is
contrasted with the conversion that the levels of being perform
towards the Good: It must remain ( ), and all things convert
(K) towards it [ . . . ]. The abiding of the One is its complete
stillness as opposed to the processes of proceeding from and convert-
ing towards it, and both of these processes are activities.
It is not easy to understand how this special energeia, which must
mean an actuality of abiding and stillness beyond all proper activity
can be the cause or source of generation. And still, the One produces
something other than itself. As we saw above, Plotinus says that
all things, as long as they remain in being, necessarily produce from
their own essences.27 The production depends on the power of these
25 26 27
Ennead 3.9.9. Ennead 5.6.6. Ennead 5.1.6.
essences and is itself established as a sort of image of a prototype.
Plotinus illustrates this point, as I have mentioned above, with per-
fumed objects that diffuse scent around them (d P). In the
Church Fathers we shall later nd a similar phrase, namely around
it, that relates to a similar ontological phenomenon. All things, when
they are perfected, produce, Plotinus says, and the One, being always
(I) perfect, produces everlastingly (I).
A comparison with Aristotle may shed some light on causality as it
is seen by Plotinus. The Aristotelian God lls the role of cause, but
only in the sense that it is the nal cause of cosmic (celestial) move-
ment. On the other hand, without God there would be no cosmic
activity in the lower regions and, consequently, no cosmos at all. The
perfect activity of the divine thinking process calls forth the activity of
love in the lower spheres. In some sense, there is an activity that
comes out of the essence of God, namely the inspired longing experi-
enced on the lower levels at the sight of God. Even so, the God of
Aristotle is not the maker of the cosmos, and the activity of love from
below springs exclusively from the lower realities themselves. Initi-
ally, the Plotinian God could be seen as playing a similar role as the
Aristotelian God in relation to the intelligible principles (the Intellect
and the Soul) and the cosmos. The One, like an unmoved mover, is
not directed towards anything but itself. Everything has its basic goal
in the One, because as Good it attracts the activity of the lower levels
of being.28 Without it, there would be no cosmos. The One, however,
unlike the Aristotelian God, is somehow a creatornot in the Chris-
tian sense, but in the sense that all lower strata of being results from
its internal energeia.
Somehow it seems comparatively easier to sketch how the Mind
arises from the One than to say what the internal activity of the One is
like. We should, however, work with a preliminary hypothesis (see
below) of what the external activity of the One is like. Eventually, it
may be possible to justify this hypothesis, as I shall try to do below.
For a start we should note that no process of time is involved in the
generation of the Mind. Even so, we have to distinguish between the
aspects of rst and second, which seemingly have a time reference,
but in reality they point to a logical sequence here. If we then say that
rst comes the procession and then comes the conversion, we do not
28
Ennead 1.7.1.
refer to time. These movements arefrom a temporal point of view
simultaneous moments within an everlasting activity.
The processionwhich is a spatial metaphoraccounts for the
distinction between the rst and the second hypostasis. The conver-
sion (another spatial metaphor) accounts for the constitution of the
second hypostasis and therefore for its identity in relation to the One.
The procession of the second being is, as procession, not yet hypos-
tasis, not yet complete. It is completed in its conversion. From this
I think it is possible to venture upon what may be a probable inter-
pretation of how Plotinus understands the constitution of the Mind.
Here then is the hypothesisthe activity deriving from the essence
of the One is the procession, and this has two aspects: (i) the constitu-
tion of the One as an intelligible object of contemplation, and (ii) the
concomitant emergence of a potential act of contemplation. Plotinus
says the thinking that sees the Intelligible, i.e. the One, and turns
towards it is being perfected by it. By itself it is indenite, but it is
dened by the Intelligible.29 Conversion has these aspects: (i) the
thinking activitys actual sight or contemplation of the One, which at
the same time is (ii) self-contemplation, i.e. contemplation of itself as
derived from the One, and which at the same time is (iii) the constitu-
tion of the thinking activity as Mind and as Being. The activity analysed
in the rst two components above is, I believe, the activity based in the
essence of the One. The activity analysed in the next three aspects is
established as the activity of the essence of the Mind, which is the new
second hypostasis. Thus what emerges changes from inchoate Mind to
Mind in the complete sense of the term. In short, these two sets describe
the procession and the conversion.
This account leaves several questions unanswered. For instance, if
the One has an internal activity, why must it have an external activity
as well? Further, exactly why does the conversion occur?
Why must the One have an external activity? I shall try to develop
an answer. The internal activity, as the remaining or abiding of an
entity in internal activity is self-contained and intransitive.30 This
could be illustrated by the activity of walking. From an Aristotelian
point of view, walking would normally be understood as an activity
29
Ennead 5.4.2. I construct my interpretation from a comparison of several texts:
Enneads 5.2.1; 5.4.2; 5.3.11; 5.6.5; 1.8.2; 3.8.11.
30
Cf. Ennead 5.3.7, on the Mind: there is nothing to which the activity is directed;
so it is self-directed.
undertaken for the sake of some determinate goal: every morning
I walk to the railway station in order to catch the train that will take
me to my job. Plotinus, however, seems to deny the Aristotelian
distinction between movements and activities proper.31 Certain
movements such as walking and cutting could be classied as
being incomplete activities only with respect to a certain result. On
the other hand, by their very execution, whether or not their object is
specied or in view at all, these activities will be dened as complete
activities: walking does not have to be undertaken for the sake of
reaching the train, or for achieving tness. It could have no purpose at
all, or have its purpose in itself; and even if it happened for some
purpose, the movement could be considered complete by its very
execution.
However, complete activities and movements quite often have
external results. Leaving footprints is an external result of walking
(if taken as a complete activity), but is in no way intended as a desired
result except in certain special cases, for example, when children (and
some adults) enjoy leaving footprints in snow or sand. Leaving
footprints is incidental to the act of walking as such, even if necessary
given certain external conditions (when walking occurs in snow or
sand of a certain quality). Plotinus says:32 Well then, if someone
walking produces footprints, do we not say that he made them? But
he did so out of being something else. This could put us in a position
to solve what seems to be an inconsistency in Plotinus. We saw above
that the production of external effects seems to result by necessity
from the internal activity. In Ennead 6.1.22 on the contrary, produ-
cing is said to be accidental: Or [we may say that] he produces
accidentally and the activity does it accidentally, because he didnt
have this in view. The point might be that the internal activity is
conducted for its own sake and is thus intransitive. From this point of
view, making is incidental. The effect is incidental to the preoccupa-
tion of the subject. On the other hand, when internal activity occurs,
it necessarily leaves external (transitive) results.
With this background we may try to answer the initial question
about why the One must have an external activity as well. The act of
walking has the incidental result of leaving footprints, something that
necessarily follows from the internal act itself, providing that there are
31 32
Cf. Ennead 6.1.16 and 22. Ennead 6.1.22.
suitable external conditions. What then about the sphere of intelligi-
ble being? The One as internal activity is for the sake of itself, and the
production of external acts is completely incidental to this for the
sake of itself. On the other hand, if this internal activity occurs, then
an external activity necessarily ensuesprovided that the conditions
are suitable. But this, one can easily perceive, brings the problem of
generation on the highest level of reality into sharp relief, for how
should we conceive of suitable conditions in this sphere?
Could we highlight this process of generation or creation? Do we
not have to know the internal activity of the One in order to say why
there will be a transitive effect? Let us assume, as suggested above, that
the internal activity of the One is a certain perfect and transcendent
mental act. As such it will be totally turned towards itself. On the
other hand, is it not naturally a characteristic feature of being a
mental act, even if elevated into the beyond, that it is in principle
intelligible, even if the act as such did not intend it, and even if no one
is in fact able to reach an adequate conception of it? If this is correct,
the One qua Intelligible will be the fundamental aspect of the activity
out of the essence of the One. To speak more carelessly: the intransi-
tive activity of super-thought will have the possible transitive effect of
being an intelligible object of thought that originates as an image of it.
It is almost as if a thinking process is expected to occur once such
an elevated intelligible object occurs. I admit this leaves a lot to be
desired, but at this stage I see no strategy by which I may come closer
to an understanding of the problem.
According to my interpretation of Plotinus, it is difcult not to
sense the gulf that emerges between the One and everything beneath
it, despite the fact that the whole intelligible and sensible cosmos
depends on the One for its being. Even if there is a beginningless act
of creation, this act of creation does not involve the One, by its will or
its thinking, in any continuity with what is below. On the other hand,
this is not a picture of reality that Plotinus is perfectly satised with.
Somehow, lower reality, Mind and Soul, and what emerges as sensible
Nature in its tension between being and non-being, depends on the
higher realities, ultimately on the One, for its being. In short, the
doctrine of double activity has to be supplemented with a doctrine of
participation, according to which lower realities depend hierarchi-
cally on the higher ones. Somehow, Plotinus thoughts on participa-
tion are just an additional aspect of his doctrine of activity. We are
still in the terrain of the metaphysical and ontological question of how
generation takes place and how the hierarchic cosmos is preserved in
its dependence on the rst principles. Fortunately, there is a highly
interesting text in the Ennead 6.45 (On the presence of being, one
and the same, everywhere as a whole) that not only sheds light on
Plotinus ideas of participation and shows how he is aware of Platos
problems from the Parmenides, but even brings forth perspectives
that are similar to what we nd in later Christian thinkers. At present
we shall turn to Plotinus thoughts in the Ennead 6.33
Plotinus begins with the problem of how the Soul is made present
to the All, i.e. the sensible cosmos, since the All is diversied in
different bodies.34 The Soul cannot be divided and distributed in
accordance with bodies, since it itself is a whole without parts. Next
Plotinus distinguishes between the true All and the imitation
( ) of the All, and once more the problem is the same, since
the true All is in nothing, but exists separately in the higher reality,
probably in the Mind as a paradigm for the sensible world.35 The true
All, if identical with the thoughts of the Mind, cannot, qua intelligible
simplicity, be divided and distributed at a lower level.
Plotinus solution to this problem has more dimensions. A rst
point turns the ordinary perspective completely around.36 We are
accustomed to think of divine omnipresencein Plotinus case the
presence of the Soul and the (higher) Allas if God is present in all
places, for all bodies. This creates an image of a divinity bodily
extended in space, in accordance with the material distribution of
bodies. Not so, according to Plotinus. Rather it is the other way
round, namely that bodies, wherever they occur, discover the in-
telligible that is one and the same undistributed and undivided reality.
Somehow, it is not the divine, the Soul or the All, that is present
everywhere, but all things are everywhere (i.e. wherever they are)
present to the intelligible. This is to say that we shall not think of
the intelligible in accordance with sensible reality, but shall consider
it in accordance with its completely different nature. There is a
further, closely related and complementary point:37 if anything is
rmly established in the All, such a thing participates in it, coincides
with it and is strengthened by it ( PF d
33
In this connection I acknowledge my debt to a very inspiring paper by Dominic
OMeara (1980).
34 35
Ennead 6.4.1. Ennead 6.4.2.
36 37
Cf. Ennead 6.4.12. Ennead 6.4.2.
PH d N PF). As we have seen, the thing
does not divide the All but nds itself in it, Plotinus says, since it is the
thing that encounters being as a whole. The intelligible principle is
present as a whole and it is wholly present to each and everything that
is able to receive it (E b K). The intelligible
principle does not move down, but things move towards it, and
because of this movement from below, into the principle, things
receive into their own constitution what they are capable of receiving.
Consequently, things somehow come to mirror the intelligible in
their own being.38 In Ennead 6.5.8 Plotinus addresses the topic of
participation in the Forms along the same lines.
A couple of problems occur here. Firstly, how are we to understand
the urge of things to move into the intelligible? Plotinus talks
of wanting (K) to be present to the intelligible,39 and of things
desiring (K ) the intelligible.40 Of course, if things are ensouled
already they may desire and want something, but if the general theory
describes how even the soul-principle becomes present on the lower
level, it seems strange to talk of desiring and wanting. Secondly, this
raises the even more general issue of how lower reality is ultimately
constituted. Is there a movement into reality from below? Do things
have a moment of spontaneous self-constitution that makes them
capable of moving into the condition of making themselves t for
the reception of higher inuences? However such questions may be
answered, Plotinus general view is that all things are generated from
above, and nothing slips spontaneously in from below the level of
divine power. It is worth noting that Christian thought avoids these
problems because of a different conception of God and His relation to
His creatures, as we shall see in the next chapters.
We saw that things mirror the intelligible in their being. At this
point one further topic launched by Plotinus may be brought into the
picture. In Ennead 6.4.3 he speaks of power and powers (
and ) from above that are effective at the lower levels.
Plotinus puts forward a question: are the higher principles present
by themselves on the lower levels of being, or are the principles
present by a certain power or powers they have?41 I do not think
38 39 40
Cf. Ennead 6.4.3. Ennead 6.4.2. Ennead 6.4.3.
41
It is interesting to note that the pseudo-Aristotelian writing On the Cosmos
distinguishes between God and his powers (chapter 6). The powers are that by which
God preserves and protects the cosmos. An ambiguity occurs in the text, because the
this is a new topic, but another way of talking about divine activity.
On the other hand, Plotinus now needs to stress how the sensible
world depends on things above, i.e. intelligible principles. He there-
fore shifts the balance a bit in the direction of stressing the continuity
between levels of reality, while the doctrine of double activity, at least
seemingly, made us sense a gap in reality between the internal and the
external activity of things. While the power or powers are denitely
associated with the external activity, what Plotinus now wants to
make clear is that the powerful inuence downwards is based on
the factual essence of higher hypostases, i.e. on their internal activity.
Plotinus says that where things do not preserve the complete
nature of the All, i.e. the All on the higher level, a power of the All
is present in such a way that the All is received to the degree that the
thing is able to receive it. The power, then, makes the All present
according to the things capacity to receive it. The power, however, is
not an independent reality. It is not cut off from the All. Still, we are
not to think of the intelligible as moving down, but of things moving
into its sphere of inuence, i.e., where the power is available. The All
is present as a whole to all things and likewise to each individual, but
in such a way that what is received is that which the receptive entities
are suited to receive.
It strikes me that the so-called willing or desiring from below
which we talked about earliermight be explained as metaphors for
some kind of principle of limitation. Such a limitation must have been
introduced into the being of entities that because of this limitation are
designed to receive a certain amount of inuence from higher entities.
However, I dont know if Plotinus has developed a theory that estab-
lishes such an institution of limiting principles. It is difcult to conceive
how these principles should have been argued for or explained, given
his doctrine of causation. On the other hand, such a theory is easier
to conceive with the Christian conception of God, something we will
return to in connection with St Maximus. For now, I would like to
conclude this section by addressing what I think is Plotinus doctrine of
participation.
To sum up: Plotinus avoids the vulgar notion of participation with
its materialistic connotations. Intelligible principles do not corre-
spond to bodily beings, like bread, for instance, that may be cut into
powers rst seem to be on a lower level of reality than the divine being itself, but later
on they seem to be closely integrated with the being of God.
pieces and received bit by bit by participants. Whenever intelligible
principles are present, they are present as a whole. They are not
localized in extended space, but spatial bodies nd the principles
wherever bodies are located and then receive the whole of the in-
telligible principle into themselves according to the limitations found
within their own constitution. The principle is received by the power
executed by it, a power that is not separated from the principle, but
rather a power of the activity ad extra of the principle that is made
present according to the receptive capacity of the recipient. We shall
nd a similar view of participation later on in Dionysius and in
Maximus the Confessor.
Plotinus takes an important step beyond Aristotle when he makes
double activity the fundamental causal principle of his system. As we
have seen, Aristotle thinks that energeia in the proper sense is com-
plete in itself. The concept of energeia as a complete act seems to have
two closely related aspects, namely that of essential actuality and that
of the complete act of a psychical kind, such as thinking or seeing.
Internal activity, according to Plotinus, is complete in itself, but even
so it generates an activity out of the essence. As procession, this
external activity is incomplete, but as conversion it is completed at
the level of the new entity. The moment of conversion is, I think, the
point at which participation takes place: the new entity somehow
turns towards the higher (cf. the wishing and desiring, commented on
earlier) and is thus constituted as itself. It is further important to note
that while the activity of the essence is identical with the essence of
the entity, the activity out of the essence is distinctbut not abso-
lutely, as we have seenfrom the entity in which it has its source. All
of this strikes me as being relevant as a background for the discussion
of essence, energeiai, and participation in Christian thought. One last
observation should be made: it seems that Neoplatonists think of
effects as being inferior to their causes. One might think the reason
lies in the nature of causation as double activity, as conceived by the
Neoplatonists. Normally what is generated seems to be an image, in
the lower levels of being, of a paradigm at the higher level. From a
Christian point of view, however, this is an aspect of the Plotinian
theory that is not acceptable in relation to divine generation, as we
shall see.
2
St Basil and Anomoean Theology
A. INTRODUCTION
The Plotinian doctrine of double activity and procession and conver-

sion had great impact on the further development of Neoplatonic
philosophy. The doctrines of divine activity and the exitus-reditus
scheme became commonplace notions in the intellectual climate
of late antiquity. I would not say, however, that they were simply
imported into Christian thought from Neoplatonism, because notions
of procession and conversion were already present in Christian spec-
ulation from other and earlier sources. In this regard some passages in
the letters of St Paul are relevant and opened Christian minds to
thinking of certain structures conceptually and terminologically, pro-
ling a Christian metaphysics that is similar on certain points to those
found in the Neoplatonist schools. Paul says, for instance, in Rom 11:
36, that all things come from God (K), exist by Him ( PF), and
have their goal in Him (N Pe).1 Further, Origen and the later
Origenists nurtured a view of the cosmos as being moved in a kind of
circle from God and back to God. Christian thinkers of early Byzan-
tium were well aware, I believe, that they conceived the cosmos in
relation to its source in an exitus-reditus scheme like the philosophers
of the Neoplatonist tradition. It is even possible that some Christians
read Neoplatonic texts or knew Neoplatonist doctrines and adopted
and adapted these critically from their own Christian criteria. We shall
return to this in some connections below.
In the Cappadocian Fathers we nd doctrines of divine energeia
and participation, together with the notion of exitus-reditus. The
1
Cf. 1 Cor 8: 6; Col 1: 16 and 20cf. Eph 1: 10. For pre-Christian and non-
Christian metaphysics of prepositions, cf. Dillon (1977), index.
34 St Basil and Anomoean Theology
latter means that creatures emerge from God in creation and convert
to God in the process of salvation. The Cappadocians, however, did
not develop a philosophical doctrine explaining the principles of such
movements in detail. We have to turn to later thinkers, such as
Dionysius and Maximus, in order to nd a more advanced philoso-
phy of procession and conversion.
The doctrine of divine energeia, internal and external, is much more
important than the exitus-reditus scheme in Cappadocian thought.
However, we shall see that in St Gregory of Nyssa the doctrine of
internal and external activity is not identical with the Plotinian con-
ception. He holds a doctrine of activity that is suited to Christian
concerns, but he does not thereby endorse or attack pagan philosophy.
What is important is that he was confronted with a doctrine of divine
energeia in the theology of the Anomoean thinker Eunomius. We shall
return to this below, rst to Eunomius and later on to Gregory.
I shall rst explain the term Anomoean. It is common usage to
speak of Aetius and Eunomius as Neo-Arian and to call the contro-
versy over their theology the Neo-Arian controversy. However, their
contemporaries called them Anomoeans because they taught that the
essence of the Son of God is unlike, I , compared with the
essence of the Father. Further, I have come to doubt that it is
historically adequate to talk of the Arian and the Neo-Arian contro-
versy. This terminology leaves the impression that the fourth century
was characterized by discussions, in two stages, of a more or less
coherent theological system with minor internal differences. In fact,
however, opinions differed so widely that it would not be fair to label
all theological conceptions that were not Nicene either Arian and
Neo-Arian. It could be acceptable to talk of the Arian controversy if
one had in mind that opinions, on both sides, differed with regard to
theological conceptions of an Arian kind. However, when it comes to
the theology of Aetius and Eunomius we are in a eld of new devel-
opments, and even if there is much in their thinking that reminds one
of Arius ideas, they developed their own conceptions beyond his.
I therefore prefer to use the label Anomoean controversy. In order to
describe the whole tenor of the fourth-century controversy, we could,
perhaps, talk about the Trinitarian controversy.2
2
Bradshaw (2007), 154, uses this term as a heading when speaking of the con-
troversies of the fourth century.
St Basil and Anomoean Theology 35
According to Gregory of Nyssa, the essence or nature of God is
beyond comprehension. In His perfection God transcends every con-
cept framed by any created intellect.3 This essence, however, is not
some level of being beyond the triadic structure of the Godhead.4 It is
precisely the essence of the triadic being of God that escapes knowl-
edge. Even so, the Church confesses certain internal relations within
this incomprehensible being of God, relations of generation and
procession. These seem to be considered some kind of internal
activities of the divine being itself. The essence, on the other hand,
should not be understood along Aristotelian or Plotinian lines as being
identical with these activities. The precise relation between essence
and activity will be investigated below. Further, the tri-hypostatic
nature is not only internally active, but acts out of its essence as well.
There is an external activity that has to do with Gods relations with
His creatures. It will soon be clear that the doctrines of St Basil and
St Gregory are best understood within the context of the controversy
over the Anomoeanism of Eunomius. To say this is not to delimit the
value of their doctrines, because the teachings on essence and activity
in these two saints are an integral part of their theological thought in
general. It is not just an external adjunct made for one particular
theological issue only.
B. ST BASIL THE GREAT, LETTER 234
Some comments on St Basils Letter 234 will lead us into the context
of the Anomoean controversy. The letter focuses on the distinction
between the essence and the energeiai of God.5 It opens with a
rhetorical question, as if put to Basil by an opponent: Do you worship
what you know or what you do not know? As Basil makes clear, the
purpose of the opponent is to entangle the respondent in the
3
CE, GNO 1, 2456, NPNF 5, 257.
4
This remark should not be taken to indicate that I adhere to the so-called de
Rgnon Paradigm, cf. Coakley ed. (2004), 26. I think it is time to reconsider this
paradigm and whatever corollaries that have been drawn from it.
5
The letter, from AD 376, is appealed to by some of those who defend the Palamitic
distinction between the essence and energies of God. Cf. Lossky (1973), 7172; Habra
(19578), 297. However, even if Basil makes such a distinction we cannot take it for
granted that he had the same thing in mind as St Gregory Palamas.
perplexity of a contradiction.6 There is a scriptural background for
the question, namely Christs meeting with the Samaritan woman at
Jacobs well in Sychar, a city of Samara. Jesus says (John 2: 22): Ye
worship ye know not what. We know what we worship; for salvation
is of the Jews. On this background the opponent knows that Basil
cannot say he worships what he does not know. On the other hand, if
he answers that he worships what he knows, the opponent may then
ask what is the essence of that which is adored, since knowledge
of God is a tenet of Anomoean thought. Then, however, Basil will
seemingly be trapped, because his theological vision does not allow
him to say we can know the essence of God. He would have to admit
his ignorance.
What then? Basil retorts that even if we admit that we do not know
the essence of God, we do not then say we are ignorant of God. Basil
points out that our thought () of God is comprised of several
attributes that we do know, such as greatness, power, wisdom, good-
ness, providence, and justness. But how, may we ask, do we know
these attributes? The answer is: from Gods activities. Now this is an
important principle in the theologies of the Cappadocian Fathers: we
observe certain activities and from these we entertain certain notions
of divine attributes. These so-called attributes are, basically, the divine
nature being powerfully active.
Basil makes his thoughts clearer in regard to the observations of
these divine activities. In the last section of the letter, he points to the
experience of saintly persons we read about in the Scriptures. Abra-
ham was called, i.e. experienced the calling of God; the disciples saw
how creation was subject to Christ, for instance, how sea and wind
obeyed Him. They witnessed that he wielded an enormous might.
Because of the call, Abraham worshipped God; because of the mighty
acts, the disciples believed in Christ and recognized his Godhead,
Basil says. Therefore, the knowledge came from the activities, and
the worship from the knowledge. Consequently, Basil can claim we
worship what we know.
One major problem remains; a problem discussed shortly after the
opening of the letter. The opponents would assert the simplicity of
Gods being. The many attributes belonging to His essence must be
names applicable to this one essence. Consequently, they must all take
6
Cf. Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric 3, ch. 18.
their basic sense from this simplicity and mean the same thing.7 Basil
tries to reduce this contention to absurdity by asking, for instance,
whether frightfulness and philanthropy are the same, or justice and
creative power. The obvious answer is no, and we are then left with
the one simple and unknowable essence and the many properties, the
names of which are recognized from the divine activities. We know
God from His activities and these come down to us, while His essence
remains unapproachable. We must distinguish, consequently, be-
tween what God is in Himself and His activities ad extra.8
His activities come down to us (e A ), but His
essence remains ( ) unapproachable. Even if these words stem
from the depths of Basils Christian heart, they resound with concep-
tions quite familiar to the Neoplatonists. God remains by Himself in
His inaccessible perfection, transcending all intellectual conceptions.
On the other hand, He proceeds towards us by His activities ad extra.
The e A is a term well known from Aristotle, who says we shall
start our reasoning with what is more known to us, and proceed
towards what is more intelligible by nature.9 According to the Chris-
tian Fathers, however, the divine nature is not intelligible to us. When
it is said that we know our God from His activities, this means that
we recognize His existence and we understand that certain properties
somehow have to be related to what He is. It does not mean that we
know His essence.
Basils thought is obviously more in line with Neoplatonic philo-
sophy than is his opponent Eunomius, who, in older research, was
held to be under the inuence of Neoplatonism.10 Eunomius argues
that the divine essence is known by its proper name of ingenerate-
ness (I). He says that when we talk of God as unbegotten,
He is not honoured in name only, in conformity with human
invention ( K ), but in conformity with truth
7
This seems to be the teaching of Eunomius Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987)
58/59. Cf. Kopecek vol. 2, (1979) 333. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa CE, GNO 2, 315. Cf. Behr
(2004), 277.
8
Bradshaw (2007), 1649, comments on this distinction in connection with the
Cappadocian doctrine of divine names. If I have understood him correctly, I think I
agree with what he says: divine names are names of the energeiai, and these energeiai
are God acting in the world. We have to distinguish, however, between God as He
comes down to us, and God as He remains beyond our reach.
9
Cf. Aristotle, Analytica posteriora 71b3372a5 and Metaphysics Z, ch. 4,
1029b312.
10
Kelly (1977) 246, Bals (1966) 25.
( I).11 This expression contains an objection adduced
against Basil, because in Basils scheme the names we use for God
are made from the observation of his activities and therefore count,
according to Eunomius, as human invention in the derogatory sense.
According to Eunomius, proper names are natural, i.e., belonging to
the nature of something in an essential way. They therefore reveal this
nature and make it somehow intelligible. When speaking of the Son,
Eunomius applies what seems to be a general principle:12 We do not
understand His essence to be one thing and the meaning of the
word which designates Him to be something else. This must be the
background for Eunomius famous saying, preserved as a fragment in
Socrates Scholasticus, which claims knowledge of the essence of God as
God knows it Himself.13 This teaching was, of course, not acceptable
to the Cappadocian Fathers, and hovers in the background of much of
their polemic against Eunomius and his adherents.
My impression is that modern scholars do not consider the thesis of
the knowability of the divine essence to be among the most basic in
Anomoean theology.14 It is quite interesting, however, that St John
Chrysostom, in his On the Incomprehensible Nature of God (De in-
comprehensibili Dei natura homiliae), makes this thesis his main target
in his critique of the Anomoeans. The Anomoeans claim, according to
Chrysostom:15 I know God as God Himself knows Himself.16 The
claim, in my opinion, is strange. Even so, I think we nd in this claim,
not some piece of doctrine at the periphery of the Eunomian system,
but rather a thesis central to the whole Anomoean theological mental-
ity. Aetius and Eunomius have a different notion of rhetoric than their
opponents, and their philosophical attitude differs as well from that of
Chrysostom and the Cappadocian Fathers.
11
Eunomius in Vaggione (1987), 413.
12
Eunomius in Vaggione (1987), 49.
13
Socrates, Ecclesiastical History 4,7; PG 67: 473b. Vaggione (1987), 16870,
accepts the fragment as genuine.
14
Vaggione (2000), 23956, writes some interesting pages on terms, concepts, and
reference that culminate in an attempt to explain the knowability thesis. What he says
is important for a further investigation into these matters. However, I do not think he
sees the problem I try to identify above. Of course, all this needs more elaboration,
which I cannot offer here since it is beyond my main topic.
15
De incomp II, 1578.
16
Chrysostom thus becomes an independent witness to the knowability thesis, and
this is not noted by Vaggione.
In my opinion, the basic problem with Anomoean theology, com-
pared with the conceptions of the Cappadocians and John Chrysos-
tom, is that the former turns God into an object of knowledge, while
in the latter God is the terrifying and adorable mystery. One may, of
course, sympathize with the idea of God as an object of knowledge, at
least to the degree that theology, as speaking of God, has to be rational
to some degree. In his recent work on the Trinitarian controversy
Behr said:17 In their own writings, Aetius and Eunomius do not claim
to know all there is to know about God, but that the words that are
used of God, if used accurately, do actually refer to him as he is, for
otherwise all theology would be fantasy. However, I am afraid that
this overlooks the problem of the Anomoean idea. In what sense may
we truthfully claim that the words we use of God are accurate? If God
is conceived along Anomoean lines, He inevitably becomes an object
of knowledge. As such, He becomes a subject of predication, and
consequently He is something the nature of which may be the subject
of discussion. In this way the divine being is conceived as a substance
among other substances, a thing among other things, even if He is
the most perfect and most eminent being that exists. The God of the
Cappadocians and of Chrysostom is not of this kind. What do the
angels do, Chrysostom asks.18 Do they ask one another questions
about the divine essence? Surely not! They glorify God. They adore
Him. They sing mystical hymns with great religious awe. They
stand before the mystery in holy fear. I think we may say that in the
Cappadocians and in Chrysostom predication is a philosophical and
theological art, and not a professional technique. I suggest we may
talk of a poetical predication or even a liturgical predication, and view
this in connection with apophatic discourse, the use of metaphors,
illustrations, and images.
In terms of the knowledge of the divine essence, Eunomius does
not reason like a Neoplatonist. His conception of divine causality, on
the other hand, could seem to resound with some Neoplatonist notes,
even if I dont think there is any inuence there either. A sketch of
Eunomius position in this regard will at least provide us with some
clues, I think, to Gregory of Nyssas doctrine of divine energeiai.
17
Behr (2004), 271.
18
De incomp. I, 30812, 321. It is interesting that at the end of the third homily
Chrysostom thinks the angels play a liturgical role.
C. EUNOMIUS DOCTRINE OF GOD
This description is constructed from two sources, namely the text

of Eunomius Liber apologeticus and the fragments of his Apologia
apologiae, preserved in St Gregorys Contra Eunomium.19 According
to the Apologia apologiae, there is a hierarchy of three essences:20 the
Unbegotten and perfect God is the rst; the second exists by reason
of the rst, and the third exists by reason of the second. There are
also certain activities that accompany the essences (H E P
KH). These activities are important for the ex-
planation of the establishment of the second and third essences. This
doctrine has a certain supercial likeness with the Plotinian system of
three hypostases, and the mention of activities ad extra could suggest
that Eunomius would like to explain the existence of the lower levels
in terms of a doctrine of double activity. He is rather vague on this point,
however. He speaks of divine foreknowledge prior to the existence of
the rst-born, i.e., Christ.21 This is the condition on which the genera-
tion of the Son takes place. It could be imagined as a kind of internal
activity in the form of a transcendent divine act of contemplation that is
expressed in the external act of making the Son. The causal mechanism
functions in a similar way to the Plotinian principle, since a hierarchy of
three beings ensues from the most perfect God to the less perfect created
Godthat is Christto the Holy Spirit.
Eunomius says the unbegotten Godhead does not share His being
with anything else. The activity that accompanies His essence is not
some kind of division or motion of the essence ( e j
B P c K).22 It is not a division of essence, since
what is simple cannot be divided and communicated and participated
in by another. In short, Eunomius rejects what he takes as the notion
of the homoousion. It is not a motion of the essence, because what is
simple and perfect in itself does not move towards anything other
than itself. This shows that the foreknowledge, mentioned above,
remains a complete act within the Godhead, with no act of essential
19
Vaggione has reconstructed the Apologia apologiae from the fragments found in
Gregorys Contra Eunomium. I point to GNO vol. 1 for these fragments. A translation
of Contra Eunomium is found in the NPNF vol. 5. I shall give the page of this
translation as well.
20
CE, GNO 1, 72, NPNF vol. 5, 50.
21
Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 64/65.
22
Liber apologeticus,Vaggione (1987), 62/63.
generation taking place. All that issues from God is an act of creation
that has, as we shall see later, as loose a connection as possible with
the being of God. According to the Liber apologeticus, the character
of the activity should be judged from what it makes or affects. Firstly,
since the effects have a beginning (and at least some have an end), the
activity must have a beginning as well. One might ask: what kind
of beginning? Does he mean a temporal beginning? Secondly, in the
Apologia apologiae Eunomius lays down a further principle when he
says its activities are bounded by its works, and its works commen-
surate with the activities.23 According to Eunomius it is not correct
to say that the same activities produced the angels and the stars,
the heavens and men. In other words, since the works differ, so do
the activities that made them. Further, he claims that the product of a
craft is commensurate with the skill that produced it, and the work
itself is neither more nor less than this skill.24 Eunomius holds to the
principle that the activity itself has a limited character in accordance
with the work that is produced. For instance, if one examined a
picture by a certain painter, one should be able to know the limita-
tions of his artistic activity and by implication the limitations of his
skill. Gregory is sceptical about this principle, and nds it absurd to
hold that all the resources of a craftsman are engaged to produce one
simple artefact. Therefore a product of a craft or a work of art only
reveals so much of the activity that produced it as its own limited
nature allows us to see.25 I believe Gregorys criticism is correct: it is a
dubious method to conclude from the production of a single work
anything about the character and limitation of the skilful activity that
made it. In Eunomius, these ideas dene one of his epistemological
principles, namely that knowledge of the product makes it possible to
know the nature of the activity that made it, and, further, knowledge
of the activity provides the clue needed to understand the essence of
the producer.26
In the Liber apologeticus Eunomius established that the Son is a
creature, and the Father is His Creator. The Son, furthermore, creates
the Holy Spirit.27 According to Eunomius view, activities ad extra
obviously have a beginning, and therefore the activity that made the
23 24
CE, GNO 1, 72, NPNF vol. 5, 50. CE, GNO 1, 150, NPNF vol. 5, 74.
25 26
Ibid. Cf. Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 58/59.
27
Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 60/61 and 68/6970/71.
Son is not without beginning. This activity should actually be identi-
ed with Gods will (), so that the Son is a creature of the will
of the Unbegotten.28 But if this is so, it seems quite strange, since
it means that the divine act or activity of will itself must have a
beginning, and time seems to intrude into the realm of the highest
manifestation of divine activity. However, Eunomius says the Son was
begotten before all things,29 and in his Expositio dei he even says that
the Son is created and has a beginning, but He is genuinely begotten
before the ages (IH e N).30 Eunomius, there-
fore, could have defended himself against the charge that Gods
activity somehow involves time. On the other hand, at this point
he exposes his doctrine to the charge of inconsistency, because in the
Liber apologeticus he argues strongly that even divine activity is not
without beginning and end.31 Why does he do that? The reason is that
if the activity is without beginning, the effects of the activity must be
without beginning as well. Of course, this is a corollary he, for obvious
reasons, wants to escape. We are left with a rather strange picture: the
Son is begotten before the ages, which must mean before time as we
know it. Further, the Son is begotten of a timeless activity that is still
not eternal or unbegotten, but has a beginning and an end. One might
ask about the kind of ontological or metaphysical sphere in which the
Sons generation takes place, but as far as I know, this is not discussed
by Eunomius. What is required if Eunomius stands a chance of being
consistent is a dimension of temporality that allows activities to have
a beginning and end between eternity and time. I cannot see that
Eunomius has given any thought to this.
The terms Father and Son seem to lay claim to a denite
relationship between two entities, so that we could imagine a kind
of communication of essence from the one to the other. This, how-
ever, is denied by Eunomius.32 The divine essence is, as said above,
simple and indivisible, and, therefore, nothing can be homoousios
with the Unbegotten. Actually, Father is not a designation of the
essence of God at all. It is the name of the divine activity.33 When St
Paul says (Col 1: 1516) that Christ is the image of the invisible God,
28
29
30
Expositio dei, Vaggione (1987), 152/153.
31
32
33
the rst-born of all creation, this means, rstly, that the Son is the
primary creature, and secondly, that He is the image of the Father qua
activity or will.34 While the term Son makes clear the essence of the
second being, the term Father manifests the activity of the Unbe-
gotten God.35 The Spirit is, nally, third in order, created by the
activity of the Son at the command of the Father, lacking godhead
and power of creation.36
What is the exact relationship between the divine essence and the
divine activity in Eunomius scheme? In the Apologia apologiae he
says the activity follows alongside (the verb ), and that it
follows or comes after (the verb ) the essence.37 As we have
seen, the activity is not an essential movement, because as such it
would be eternal by nature and have eternal entities resulting from it.
Eunomius somehow has to conceive of an ontological distinction
between the divine essence and the activity that makes the products
in order to avoid bringing the created result too close into the sphere
of the divinity as such. In other words, Father qua Father of the Son is
an activity occurring between the Unbegotten and its effect.
Gregory criticizes this understanding of activity.38 He asks what it
means for activities to follow essences: does it mean they are some-
thing else, besides the essences, or are they a part of the essences? If
they are something besides the essences, Gregory has problems with
seeing from Eunomius words whether the activity is due to natural
necessity (such as when heat follows re). He cannot bring himself
to believe, however, that Eunomius can think that the activities are
a part of the divine essence, since that would be to conceive of God
as a composite being. Gregory believes that Eunomius, despite his
vagueness, must teach that an essence must be moved deliberately
and in a self-determining way in order to produce the result.
I shall try, as far as I understand this, to summarize Eunomius
teaching on the essence and activity of God. At rst I would like to say
that contrary to what I believe is the common opinion on the matter,
Eunomian theology seems to be a kind of patchwork pieced together
in order to counter the different arguments of his opponents.39
34
Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987) 64/65.
35
36
37 38
CE, GNO 1, 72, NPNF 5, 50. CE, GNO 1, 87, NPNF 5, 545.
39
I suppose Eunomius would also be concerned with the shifting possibilities of
gaining or losing imperial or ecclesiastical favour.
God is the maker of the Son and, through Him (the Son), of the
Spirit. How does this creation take place? From the point of view of
Christian theology, one cannot accept that the Son is an accidental
result of Gods being. It cannot be that God the Father was without
intentions or without any kind of internal activity as the ontological
condition of the Sons being. Quite simple reasoning, therefore, re-
quires of a Christian philosophy that it reckons with an internal act of
the divine source. Eunomius thinks that there is such an internal act or
activity, namely, as we have seen, of foreknowledge that reasonably
must be interpreted as an act of contemplation within the divine being
itself. As such, this foreknowledge or contemplation is most likely
to be of eternal character. What results from this internal activity,
however, is an external activity that has a beginning and, possibly, an
end. It is plausible that Eunomius thinks this act is an act of powerful
willing that is limited to or designed for the creation of just that sort of
work God has contemplated within Himself. This activity is accom-
plished as an act of constituting a new being, and is somehow resident
within this new being. And then, in order to avoid any ontological
contamination of God by coming into touch with what is below, the
activity of God has to be transformed into something that follows
Gods essence, almost as a reality between God and the Son.
Can we draw any conclusions regarding any positive Neoplatonic
inuences on Eunomius thought? No, I dont think we can. He is
obviously in conict with Neoplatonism with regard to the possibility
of knowing the divine essence. Further, a Neoplatonist would not have
agreed with denying the divinity (although of a lower kind) of the Holy
Spirit. It is likewise obvious that Eunomius conception of divine will
differs from the Neoplatonic concept of divine will; and a Neoplatonist
would generally have felt the tendency to introduce a kind of tempor-
ality into the reality of the rst principle to be an intolerable violation
of its being (if that is what Eunomius does). On the other hand, the
Eunomian conception of an (external) activity that follows from the
essence could be conceived of as much like the Plotinian external
activity. However, I do not believe that Eunomius notion of external
activity was derived from any Platonic source. The way it is presented
does not bear witness to any comprehensive philosophical context for
the notion; it only seems designed to cope with problems that are a
challenge to the Eunomian system itself.
Some decades ago, it was not unusual to say that both classical
Arianism and so-called Neo-Arianism were inuenced by Platonic
and Neoplatonic philosophy. The trend has moved in quite the
opposite direction, and the Arians and Neo-Arians are acknowledged
as mainly scriptural theologians belonging to one of several Christian
traditions that came into conict in the fourth century.40 In the main
I accept this verdict. But I have become convinced that this is not all
there is to say about these heterodox theologies. There is a difference
between the mentality of Anomoeanism and what eventually was
recognized as orthodoxy, which I believe is due to an inspiration
from outside the sphere of worship and church life.41
40
Compare Bals (1966), 25, and Kelly (1977, rst published 1958), 246, with
Gregg and Groh (1981). See Behr (2004), 1324.
41
On the education of Aetius and Eunomius, cf. Vaggione (2000), ch. 2. However,
their education is one thing, how they applied it is another.
3
The Internal Activity of the Godhead
This chapter is devoted to ideas about divine generation and concep-

tions about the inner life of the Christian God. In connection with
St Gregory of Nyssa, the focus is on Trinitarian generation, about
which he has a great deal to say since he was involved in the Anom-
oean controversy. St Maximus the Confessor, on the other hand, lived
at a time when all major Christian thinkers accepted the theological
outcome of the fourth century as formulated by the Cappadocian
Fathers. For this reason there is not much to be found in his thinking
on Trinitarian generation as such, but even so, the inner energeia of
the Trinity plays a role in his theology. Maximus has important things
to say about the inner life of the triune God that characterizes his
Christian conception of God, making a radical distinction from pagan
Neoplatonism.
A. ST GREGORY OF NYSSA ON TRINITARIAN

GENERATION
St Gregory of Nyssa envisages divine activity on two levelsinternal

divine activity and an external activity.1 He does not use the terms
internal and external activity, but he denitely has a doctrine of
such activities. We shall acquaint ourselves with his terminology
below. Now, in general the talk about internal and external activity
is metaphorical. The Godhead is not characterized by any extension
1
Bradshaw (2007), 1579, argues that Gregory does not apply the concept of
internal energeia to God in order to counter an argument from Eunomius. I disagree
on this, as may be seen from the exposition above.
48 The Internal Activity of the Godhead
in space, and nothing could be internal or external to it in the spatial
sense. Internal means that which pertains to the being of the Godhead
as such. The term external may be applied in two senses, namely,
concerning the structuring of the divinity (theologically), and con-
cerning Gods activity towards created otherness, in creating, preser-
ving, and making provisions for its being and salvation (economically).
There is one important issue we must address at the start, concern-
ing the nature of double activity as conceived respectively by Plotinus
and Gregory (and Maximus). There are similarities, but there is still at
least one major difference between the two thinkers regarding their
conception of divine causality. Plotinus says the maker is better than
what is made, because it is more complete.2 In the earlier section
on Plotinus, we saw that even if external effects occur as incidental
consequences of the internal activity of a higher hypostasis qua inter-
nal activity, the internal activity would necessarily produce an external
result on a lower level of reality. According to Plotinus view, this is
how causation as double activity works; and this is a conception of
causality that cannot be generally accepted by a Christian thinker. The
Neoplatonist conception is worked out in detail by Proclus,3 and was
probably well known to St Maximus the Confessor.
Gregorys idea of divinity is not the notion of three hierarchically
arranged hypostases in a system of subordination. Rather, it is the
notion of a triad of hypostases on the same ontological level. On the
other hand, even according to Gregorys Christian conception, one
of the hypostases plays a distinctive role in relation to the other two;
namely that the Father is the cause or principle or source of the
Trinity. This does not mean, as I have pointed out, that we have
something like the hierarchy of Plotinus or an ontological difference
that would make the Son and the Spirit into lesser divine beings than
the Father. Even so, according to Gregory, the Father is somehow
essentially active, from an ontological point of view, as the condition
of the two activities of the generation of the Son and the proceeding of
the Spirit. I think it is in accordance with Gregorys intentions if we
speak of an internal activity of the Father that results in the twofold
external activity that culminates in the Son and the Spirit. As far as
I can see, it is at this point Bradshaw makes the claim that Gregory
and the Cappadocians do not include divine acts internal to the
2 3
Ennead 5.5.13. The Elements of Theology, cf. props. 7, 35, 5665.
The Internal Activity of the Godhead 49
Trinity in the divine energeiai, since, as we have seen above, Eunomius
tends to reify the energeia and make it into a something between God
and the Son, and this Gregory wants to avoid.4 I think, however, that
this is a misunderstanding. Gregory wants to avoid the Eunomian
understanding of energeia; still, he obviously presupposes a concept of
his own since it would be quite strange to claim that certain internal
processes in the Godhead are not energeiai.
Gregory obviously has no doubt that this scheme of causality may
work well within the same ontological level as the cause. Effects need
not be conceived, therefore, as always being lesser than the cause. It
all depends on the level of nature where causation occurs, or the
realm in which causation takes place, and on the nature of the causal
relationship in the actual case. In addition, Gregory could not accept a
Neoplatonic theory of double activity for the creation of the world,
because in a Christian system the cosmos could neither be incidental
in relation to Gods internal life, nor could it result by necessity from
Gods being active internally in the Plotinian sense. Gregory had
to consider and work with the suppositions that: rstly, there should
be natural continuity within the sphere of the divine, but without
essential subordination; secondly, there can be no natural continuity
between God and creation; and nally, God is a creator by a certain
modied act of will. These three points will be of primary importance
to Maximus the Confessor as well.
In addition to this modication in the concept of causation, there may
be other differences in detail. I shall now turn to Gregorys theology.
To even make a sketch of the theological (Trinitarian) controversies
of the fourth century would take us far off our track.5 The Cappado-
cians introduced certain terminological distinctions to clarify what
they understood to be the correct Christian belief and confession. In a
letter from AD 375, St Basil sums up the basic position:6 one should
distinguish, he thinks, between the community of the essence (e
e B P) and the peculiarity of the hypostases (e N
H ), something that had not been done in the past.7
4
Bradshaw (2007), 1579.
5
One could consult, for instance, Kopeceks A History of Neo-Arianism (1979), or
the recent The Nicene Faith, parts 1 and 2 by Behr (2004). The bibliography in Behr
provides a great deal of information about relevant literature.
6
St. Basil, Ep. 210.5.
7
Cf. St. Basil, Ep. 236.6. For instance, a look at Athanasius Tomus ad antiochenos
from 362, PG 26: 795810, shows how confused the terminological situation was. One
Gregory opens his Ad Petrum8 with a complaint that the failure to
distinguish between the essence as common and the hypostasis as
particular creates confusion: there are those who confess one essence
and who think that speaking of one hypostasis is equivalent, say, on
the level of nature. We have the converse situation when someone
confesses three hypostases, and believes it to be correct to speak of
three essences, namely, on the level of particular being. Following
Basil, Gregory considers the distinction between essence and hypos-
tasis to be equivalent to the distinction between common and parti-
cular. An analogy used to illustrate the Trinitarian relation is taken
from a relation that concerns human individuals. General terms, such
as man, are predicated on several subjects, but indicate a common
nature ( c ). One of them is no more man than any other.
Proper names, such as Peter, make reference to the hypostases that
are concretely existing entities. The description of a hypostasis con-
sists in a combination of particular notes of identity, a combination
that does not exist in another human being. In God we have the one
common divine nature, and if we add to this the particular notes of
identity, we arrive at the three hypostases of the Godhead. The point
of this is that the Godhead could be viewed from two different angles:
from the point of view of the essence and the point of view of the
hypostases. Both of these should be retained as valuable descriptions
(or predications), but to describe the mediation between them is the
great challenge.
However, some critics felt a difculty inherent in this way of
formulating the doctrine of the Trinity. The difculty was returned
to Gregory as the problem of three gods: if customary use of language
allows us to call three human persons three men, should we not
likewise be allowed to call the three divine persons three gods?9 If
Gregory answers afrmatively, we should say he is a tritheist. If the
answer is negative, two alternatives emerge: we should ask which
of the persons is not to be considered God; or we should wonder
whether Gregory is a Sabellian.10 Of course, neither of the main
could also consult Stead (1996), chapters 14 and 15, which contain useful information,
even though I am rather sceptical about Steads analyses.
8
The Ad Petrum fratrem de differentia usiae et hypostaseos was formerly held to
be St Basils Ep. 38. It is now considered to be a small treatise by Gregory of Nyssa,
addressed to his brother Peter. Cf. Turcescu (1997), 63.
9
Cf. Ayres in Coakley ed. (2003), 178, for the charge directed against Gregory.
10
He states this dilemma at the beginning of his Ad Ablabium.
alternatives could be admitted. Gregory does not feel free, however, to
move away from the analogy. He feels the urgent need to accommo-
date the doctrine so that it is at least intuitively grasped by believers,
and would therefore like to keep the analogy.11
In the Ad Ablabium Gregory says that the tradition of the Fathers
must be kept even if his own reasoning should not be equal to the
problem at handa reminder we shall return to below.12 He seems to
handle the problem by acknowledging a kind of philosophical realism
both in the Ad Ablabium and in the Ad Graecos. He argues that even if
it is customary to call three human beings three men, this is a custom-
ary abuse of language. It could be allowed for lower nature (custom is
hard to change, he says), but it could not be allowed when we speak
about God.13 The common nature is not just a linguistic phenomenon,
i.e., a common term which extends to several particulars, to put it in
modern language. It is a structure of being inherent in the particulars:
[ . . . ] their nature is one, at union with itself, and an absolutely in-
divisible monad, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by
subtraction, but in its essence being one and continually remaining one,
inseparable even though it appears in plurality, continuous, complete,
and not divided with the particulars who participate in it.14
This is, however, said of sensible nature, but is obviously taken to
be typical for uncreated nature to a much larger degree. A common
term, then, refers to common nature, and common nature is a
structure of being shared by the hypostases.
Gregory could not accept the corollary that if three human
persons are three men then three divine persons are three gods.
Behind this corollary lies a kind of nominalistic idea that what is, is
what is experienced as particular entities. Gregory, however, makes
the following presuppositions: rst, even in ordinary life we distin-
guish between universal and particular; secondly, that words differ
in connoting either the one or the other; thirdly, our words not only
connote, they even denote certain realities; and nally, universal
terms denote the unity of essential being, and particular terms
denote the particularity of hypostatic being.
11
Cf. CE, GNO 2, 197 on the use of analogy.
12
Ad Ablabium, GNO 3.1, 39.
13 14
Cf. Ad Ablabium, GNO 3.1, 41. Ad Ablabium, GNO 3.1, 41.
But even if this is so, it should be required that the being of the
triadic God must be intuitively grasped on the highest possible level of
abstraction from sensible analogies. Gregory sees this clearly as well.
Could Gregory really hold that to speak of three men is an abuse
of language? It seems strange. Jonathan Barnes says in a lecture on
Gregorys Trinitarian theology:15 If he thinks, for the reasons he gives,
that there is only one god in the universe, then he also thinks, for the
same reasons, that there is only one man in the worldand only one
pig and one peacock, one lion and one lamb. One wonders why
Gregory chooses to maintain the analogy in the face of the obvious
problems connected with defending it. It cannot be for its philosophical
virtues. Could it be that he does not have an ideal of a scientic
theology, but rather feels himself free to cope with different models
for the divine mystery? One should keep in mind what I said earlier on
the differences in theological attitude between the Amomoeans and
their opponents, illustrated with the case of St John Chrysostom.
At this point it is tempting to return to the quotation from Professor
Behr above: Aetius and Eunomius claim that the words we use of God,
if used accurately, do actually refer to Him as He is, for otherwise all
theology would be fantasy.16 I think the point is that we have no access
to a terminology or to certain theoretical conceptions that can lay claim
to any scientic accuracy. Even so, Gregory of Nyssa could have
claimed that theology is no fantasy. Theology is not, however, based
on logical deduction, but on the experience of the Christian commu-
nity in the context of its history. To develop a satisfactory theological
terminology is a philosophical challenge of quite another order than
the activity conducted in a school.
As a matter of fact there is a place in the Ad Ablabium itself that is
rather suggestive in this connection. First, we should note that in
Contra Eunomium Gregory argues that we do not know the essence
of the tiniest of things in this world, such as an ant, so how could
someone claim to know God?17 We only observe the activities. We do
not know the essence directly. In Ad Ablabium Gregory says we
perceive the activities of the power above and form our appellations
from them.18 The activities are probably observed in the sense that they
15
First Frede Memorial Lecture in Athens 8 April 2008, 19.
16
Behr (2004), 271.
17
CE 3,8 GNO 2, 2389.
18
Ad Ablabium GNO 3,1, 44, cf. 424 for the following.
are witnessed in the Scriptures. Maybe the Scriptures open our sensi-
tivity to divine activity in nature as well. Then Gregory presents what I
consider a rather radical principle: every name is interpretative of our
conceptions of the divine nature, but this nature itself is not included in
the meaning of any of the names we apply. The terms we use for God,
then, when reected upon, provide access, not to God Himself, but to
our understanding of concepts or thoughts we have about God. Lewis
Ayres, one of those scholars engaged in the praiseworthy enterprise of
rethinking Gregory, notices the saying, and says the divine names
enable the investigation of our ideas of the divine, but do not directly
signify the divine nature.19 Ayres, however, does not discuss the
importance of this principle at any length, and there is no hint at its
broader meaning within the clash between two theological mentalities
or worlds. Even so, Ayres comes close to the implications I will draw
below. First, one has to ask by what criteria should names or terms for
God be sanctioned? Gregory himself suggests an interesting answer to
this question. The specic context of this suggestion is found when
Gregory speaks of the one nature and three hypostases of the Trinity.20
I mentioned this above: Gregory says that even if we are not able to
justify the way we speak of the Godhead in a satisfactory manner, we
must adhere to the tradition of the Church. I think this could only mean
that the criteria for the selection of appropriate words is that the actual
word or formula is given in traditional worship and in the Scriptures. In
other words, the terms we use for God must be in accordance with the
common practice of prayer and the common sources of faith.21
Even if Ayres does not address the question of the criteria, he seems
to end up with the same conclusion:
Thus by reection on what Scripture relates to us about divine action we
may slowly build up a series of terms, conceptions (epinoiai), which we
think it appropriate to apply to Godand which are licensed by Gods
self-revelation in creation and in Scriptureeven while we know that in
a fundamental sense God remains always unknown.22
However, I think the distinction I made earlier between predication
as a professional technique and poetical or liturgical predication, is
19 20
Ayres in Coakley ed. (2004), 26. Ad Ablabium GNO 3,1, 389.
21
The author of the Dionysian corpus maintains the same principle (or at least says
he does) in the introduction to the De Divinis nominibus, Suchla 1078.
22
Ayres in Coakley ed. (2004), 26.
highly relevant in the present context. The Cappadocian Fathers are
keenly aware that there is no adequate, scientic terminology for
divine mysteries in themselves, so the only thing we are able to do
is to discover and use philosophical terms, images, and metaphors
that may be sanctioned within the theological tradition of the Church
as a liturgical community. Our only access to God is through His
activities as they are manifested in created otherness.23
By the internal and external activity of the Godhead within its own
sphere we should, in connection with Gregory, think of the activity by
which God is eternally established as a triadic being. The key-terms
here are generation and procession. The Son (Logos) is generated or
begotten of the Father; the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. The
Father is the cause of the other two hypostases, but they are not
generated in such a way that the Son is subordinate to the Father and
the Spirit to the Son, which would be the Eunomian way to under-
stand it. As regards divinity, the three are uncreated and co-eternal.
The hypostasis of the Son is generated from the unbegotten Father,
but the essence of the Son is the same unoriginated essence as the
essence of the Father. So it is likewise for the Spirit. His hypostasis has
proceeded from the Father, but His essence is identical to the essence
of the Father. The essence of all three is the same unoriginated nature.
In his Contra Eunomium and the Refutatio confessionis Eunomii
(written after Eunomius had presented his Expositio dei in AD 383),
Gregory gives an interesting analysis of generation.24 Generally, gen-
eration means to exist as the result of some cause (e K N r
). Coming to be as the result of a cause may, however, mean at
least four things: rstly, generation from matter and the artisans skill
(as when the art of house-building directs the construction of a house
from certain materials); secondly, from matter and nature (as when
the nature of the parents generates offspring from material subsisting
in their bodies); thirdly, from material efux (as when a sunbeam
issues from the sun or the radiance from the lamp); and nally, when
an immaterial cause generates in the sensible way, through the body
as instrument (for instance, the generation of a word by the mind
through bodily instruments). These four modes of generation are well
23
It seems to me that many theological textbooks treat the terminology of the
Trinitarian controversy as if a kind of scientic or philosophical strictness was
claimed or pretended. Professor Stead (1996) strikes me as an example of this.
24
CE, GNO 2, 196200 and RCE, GNO 2, 348352.
known to human beings, Gregory holds. The divine mysteries, how-
ever, transcend human thought. We need, therefore, the support of
analogies taken from what is better known to us, and Gregory tries to
adapt the four points as analogies for divine activities. We must rst,
however, exclude the corporeal sense attached to the words used.
The rst point (generation from matter and the artisans skill) is
relevant to the doctrine of creation, but not for the generation of the
Son. When we speak of the creative power of the divine skill, we do
not, as in human activity, include instruments, matter, or the material
conditions. God commanded and things came to be, without any
pre-existent material. As just stated, we exclude the corporeal sense
attached to the words.
The second point (generation from matter and nature) is relevant
to the doctrine of divine generation. Natural generation, as when a
father begets a son, is a useful analogy for the existence (o) of
the Only-begotten from the Father. The use of this kind of language,
though, is an adaptation to the limitations of the human intellect of a
doctrine that surpasses thought and speech. The manner of the divine
mystery is in itself unspeakable and beyond our power of under-
standing. To speak of him as a Son is to borrow a term that in
human language conveys the idea of birth from matter and nature. In
order to accommodate our understanding as far as we can to the
highest kind of birth, we must exclude all sensible connotations from
the word Son (place, time, circumstances, and matter). We shall only
keep the idea of nature, Gregory says, and this connotes that the
manifestation of the Son from the Father shows the close afnity and
genuineness of the offspring in relation to Him (e NE d
B K F e).25 Terms like son, father, and generation
afford sensible analogies for what transcends perception and thought.
When applied to the Godhead they are metaphors, elevated and
sanctied by Scriptural usage.
Because the second mode of generation is not sufcient to shed
light (analogically) on how the Son originates from the Father, the
third mode (material efux) is added. When Gregory rst introduces
this kind of generation he gives the following three examples of
material efuence: the sun and its beam; a lamp and its brightness;
and scents and ointments and the quality they emit. It is interesting to
25
RCE, GNO 2, 350351.
see that Plotinus metaphors for emanation contain similar illustra-
tions:26 the sun and its light, re and its heat, the snow and its cold,
and perfumed things and their diffusion. From these similarities
alone no conclusion may be drawn, however, as to Gregorys acquain-
tance with Plotinus doctrines. But his metaphors are so strikingly
similar that it is tempting to think that he read or heard similar things.
It is interesting to see that when Gregory next turns to comment on his
subject, the examples he adduces are Scriptural, and not from any
external source:27 the brightness of glory, the savour of ointment,
the breath of God. Once again the expressions should be puried from
any material conceptions, and one should only adhere to what is
worthy of God (e ), namely, that the Son is both from the
Father and with him (K PF d PF). Gregory says bright-
ness is not separated from glory and savour does not exist by itself apart
from the ointment. And likewise, no extension is set between the Father
and the Son; that is: they cannot be separated just like the two things
connected in the metaphors.
The fourth analogy (an immaterial cause generates in a sensible way)
concerns the bodily result of the immaterial process of thought: a word
(logos) that issues from the mind. Here, as could be expected, Gregory
points to the prologue of the Gospel of John. We must free ourselves
from the common notion of word and consider that the Son is not just
the voice of the Father ( F e):28 For this reason he [i.e.
St John] prepares us at his rst proclamation to regard the Logos as in
essence, and not in any essence foreign to or dissevered from that
essence whence it is, but in that rst and blessed nature itself.
Gregory does not draw any far-reaching and speculative conclusions
from his analogies. Rather, he is so sober that we should very much like
to squeeze some further insights from what he has said so far. We may
learn that the relationship between the two persons of Father and Son
has to do with nature. They are not separated as two individuals within
time- and space-coordinates (there is no extension separating them),
and the Son, being from the Father, is also in constant intimate com-
munion with Him. The Logos is a being permanently present within
the same essence as its cause. It is at least obvious that the analogies
proper to the great mystery excludes that the Son (as the effect of the
Father as cause) can be understood as a creature. Gregory in effect
26 27
Ennead 5.1.6. Heb 1: 3, Cant 1: 3, Wisd 7: 25.
28
CE, GNO 2, 200.
argues that the Son is homoousios with the Father, and by implication,
not just the Son, but the Holy Spirit as well.
Gregory is reluctant to speculate about the precise character of the
divine activity of generation and procession. Gregory is convinced
that God is to be confessed as one essence and three hypostases,
and that the three hypostases do not threaten the basic oneness or
unity of the Christian God. In fact, he moves a bit further into the
mystery in Book 3 of the Contra Eunomium, and it is here we see his
application of a causal scheme of double activity.29 Even so, Gregory
continues to emphasize that his argument is from analogy and re-
semblance. This should be carefully noted so that when he talks about
the divine will, the good divine will, or divine goodness, he tries to
reach for what is betting of God (e ), always conscious of
the fact that the divine nature transcends our grasp. Gregory speaks of
the relation between the Father and the Son, but what he says, of
course, is relevant for the Holy Spirit as well.
Gregory criticizes the opinion of those who claim that the Father
rst willed (F), and then He proceeded to become a
Father. Gregory is probably countering a Eunomian position that
claims the Son has some kind of posterior existence. According to
Gregory, there is an immediate connection ( [ . . . ] )
between the Father and the Son. The word means combina-
tion, connection and even union. What Gregory wants to emphasize,
I suppose, is that the immediacy excludes any before and after in the
generation, and that there is an eternal togetherness (union) of the
two (three) hypostases. This immediate togetherness, however, does
not exclude the willing of the Father (c F e). This
means we should accept the qualication that the rst hypostasis is
the cause of the second (and the third).
The causal principle of will is obviously the internal activity of the
rst hypostasis as the condition for the activity of the generation of
the second (and the procession of the third) hypostasis. Gregory
claims that this will is not something that occurs between the hypos-
tases, i.e., something that separates () the Son (and the Spirit)
from the Father by inserting some kind of extension between them
(u f ). The Fathers activity of will
is, consequently, not to be conceived of as a Eunomian activity
29
CE, GNO 2, 191194.
occurring as a strange being inbetween the hypostases, as if follow-
ing the being of the rst hypostasis.
It is in this connection that I perceive a problem with Bradshaws
interpretation. He says that Eunomius brings to the fore the question
of whether the divine energeiai includes internal acts of the Trinity,
such as the begetting of the Son and the procession of the Spirit.30 Of
course, it is at this point that Eunomius introduces his conception of
activity as following the hypostasis of God, an idea we have already
seen Gregory criticize. Bradshaw, however, seems to conclude that
Gregory, in fact, answers the Eunomian question negatively, which
means that there is no intermediary energeia between the three
persons.31 However, I think there has to be a certain energeia at
play in the structuring of the three-hypostatic being of God. What
else could generation and procession be? What else could an act of
will be? As far as I can see, what Gregory tries to do in the context I am
interpreting is to dene in a more exact way how such an energeia
should be conceived. Gregory obviously works with a concept of an
internal and an external divine activity in the sphere of the Godhead,
and he tries to avoid establishing these activities as ontological struc-
tures having a reality of their own that separates the divine persons.
I think his investigation is greatly important for the whole concept of
activity. Activity is not to be conceived of as a separate entity, as some
separate eld of uncreated energies having a reality of their own. It is
the Eunomian energeiai that threaten to be some sort of separate
entities, not the energeiai as conceived by the Cappadocian Fathers.
I suspect that those who criticize the concept of uncreated energies in
Palamitic doctrine think these are dened in the Eunomian way, but
that remains to be seen.32 Another matter, of course, is that we should
not think that the internal/external activity within the sphere of
the Godhead and the external activity beyond the divine being
occur in an identical manner. Internal/external acts within the sphere
of the divine being itself must have an immediacy that external divine
acts beyond Gods being cannot have since they are directed to the
establishment of what is other than God. The rst kind of activity takes
30 31
Bradshaw (2007), 157. Bradshaw (2007), 159.
32
Bradshaw is denitely not among those who criticize the concept on uncreated
energies, rather he obviously thinks that the concept is meaningful. Bals (1966), 128,
is rather critical. I shall return to his objections in connection with the doctrine of
creation.
place within the sphere of the uncreated, while the second is directed
from the uncreated to establish what is created. The one is directed to a
differentiated sameness, the other to pure otherness. The relations that
follow internal/external activities must therefore be other than the
relations that follow purely external activities. All of this, of course, is a
subject of great importance, and we shall have to keep it in mind when
we come to Dionysius, St Maximus, and St Gregory Palamas.
As we have seen, according to Gregory the concept of generation
implies a causal principle, and in divine generation this principle is
the will of the Father. This will, as an internal activity of the Father,
should not be thought to introduce any kind of separation of the
hypostases in the sense of an ontological subordination, which would
transmit a lower kind of being to the Son and the Spirit. On the other
hand, the union () of the hypostases should not blur or
exclude the hypostatic distinctness of the three persons.
At this stage one may discover some important differences by
comparing Gregorys picture with what we found in Plotinus. Even
though it is difcult to understand exactly what takes place according
to Plotinus as well as according to Gregory, at least Plotinus causal
conception seems to give sense to the procession and conversion
( and K) of a new being that is hypostatically distinct
from its cause. The Mind, as turned towards itself as derived from the
One, is constituted in its contemplative activity as something other
than the One. This constitution occurs at a lower level because it is a
fall from the perfect simplicity of the cause. Gregory, on the other
hand, conceives of the hypostatic distinctness as being constituted
on the same level of being as that of the cause. It cannot take place
below the rst hypostasis. Further, the One, whatever may occur in
its internal activity, wills only itself and is totally absorbed in itself,
while the Father is essentially turned towards willing the tri-hypostatic
distinctness. However, the Fathers willing of the tri-hypostatic dis-
tinctness and the One willing itself are both conceived of taking place
at the highest level of realityhighest level is, of course, an image,
since transcendent realities are beyond such comparative conceptions.
The point, therefore, is that while the One of Plotinus is a willed
undifferentiated unity, the One of Gregorys Christian philosophy is
a willed tri-hypostatically differentiated unity.
According to Gregory, the will of the Father is the activity that
structures the divinity from the Father as a tri-hypostatic existence in
consubstantiality. How should we understand this will? Gregory says
that this will is neither without purpose (I), nor does it
stem from natural necessity ( I). This could
be intended as an anti-Plotinian statement. If not, Gregory makes a
common philosophical point that we should not think of the internal
activity of the Father as being the nature of God that moves by
internal constraint towards becoming three. The movement of will
is purposive and not necessitated. By implication, the divine will must
be free. But if that is so, at this point one might ask if the Father could
have chosen to remain single. I suppose Gregory would have felt the
need to answer this negatively, since he surely conceives the triune
character of God as something essential to the conception of divinity
as such. We should like to gain a better understanding of the char-
acter of the divine will, in order to see if we can reach any conclusions
by which the present difculty may be solved.
Gregory says that our common experience in the sensible world is
that a wish and what we wish for are not usually present at the same
moment. In Gods simple and all-powerful nature, on the other hand,
all is present together ( F), both to will the good and to possess it.
(Note how the concept of the good is brought into the picture as
if immediately associated with the idea of God, something that is
rather common in both pagan and Christian thought.) The divine will
cannot be conceived apart from the object of will (e ), i.e., the
activity of willing is immediately conjoined with the purposive willing
of something. The will and its object, Gregory says, are indwelling and
co-existing (K d K), i.e., connected together in a
kind of immediate . Further, the will (e ) cannot
arise from any separate principle and has no motive besides the divine
nature. Rather, it originates from this nature itself.
So the good will or the act of willing ( ) coexist with the
object of will, and Gregory continues:
Since, then, the Only-begotten God is by nature the goodor rather
beyond all goodand the good does not fail to be the object of the
Fathers will, it is hereby clearly shown, both that the conjunction of the
Son with the Father is immediate, and also that the will, which is always
present in the good Nature, is not forced out nor excluded by reason of
this inseparable conjunction.33
33
CE, GNO 2, 192, NPNF vol. 5, 202However, I take responsibility for the above
translation.
I shall try to unpack these ideas systematically and analytically. We
should note the qualication that the Son is beyond the good. This,
once more, is an expression of the fact that what we are talking
about is beyond the reach of human conceptions, even though these
conceptions are purged from sensible content and are carefully
made to reach what bets God. In the tenth part of the third book
of the Contra Eunomium,34 Gregory has some interesting remarks
on the predicate good. It is a homonym, and it takes on a special
sense whenever it is predicated:35 God is the fountain of goodness and
is named from it as well while creatures are called good by participating
in the goodness of the source. The primary instance of goodness is the
source, and the basic meaning of good is derived from this source. The
proper signication of the term good, therefore, is the divine one, but
human thought has no adequate conception of this level of goodness.
When beings other than God are said to be good, the signication must
be adapted by degree to the ontological status of the participant.
However, the term fountain of goodness implies that the fountain
itself and that of what it is the fountain should be distinguished. The
essence of God transcends the good. It is somehow a good beyond
good, and the processes of divine generation and procession are within
the sphere of this goodness beyond goodness.The phrase goodness
beyond goodness may seem rather strange. Does it make any sense at
all? In Gregorys scheme it surely does. We know and name God from
His energeia, and since the manifestation of goodness is a divine
activity we say God is good. Even so, it is the act that is good, but
we should conceive of the source of the good act as good as well. Since
we do not know the source, however, we at least may talk about the
inconceivable Good beyond the good activities.
The Fathers will immediately conceives the Good beyond good,
and qua immediately conceived this Good is immediately possessed.
This is what is spoken of as the generation of the Son (and, by
implication, the procession of the Spirit). The process of generation
seems to differ from such processes in Plotinus. Gregory tries in this
connection to avoid speaking of an external activity resulting from an
internal activity. Rather he seeks to understand the constitution of the
triad by saying that the internal activity immediately possesses its
object. (As we shall see below, Gregory has more to say about this
34
CE, GNO 2, 308.
35
Cf. Aristotle, Categories, chapter 1 and Owen (1979), 1517.
so-called object of willing.) The divine will is not under constraint
from the outside, because there is nothing outside the divine being.
Further, there is no internal constraint. The Godhead of the Father,
being the one and only Godhead, takes its motive from its nature and
acts according to this nature.
Gregorys objective is to argue continually against Eunomius and
to establish his own (and his brother Basils) doctrine of God, which
he believes to be the doctrine of the Church. The way he has argued
above shows clearly that, according to Gregory, the second and third
hypostases are founded ontologically within the being or essence of
the rst hypostasis. In order to emphasize this point he says the
Father has not begotten any new essenceas Eunomius says He
hasrather, the begetting is in the essence contemplated within the
Father Himself.36 The generation (and procession) spring, therefore,
from the Fathers being and He is turned contemplatively towards His
own essence as the willing of the Good beyond good.
In another passage in the Contra Eunomium, the relation between the
Fathers will and the being of the Son is formulated in a way that makes it
possible to penetrate perhaps even further in the direction of a con-
ceivable and proper language (discourse) of the mystery:37 the Son is the
will of the Father. On this background we could say that if the Father
wills his own essence as the Good (beyond the activity of good) this will
is immediately the Son of the Father. Further, since according to
Gregory there are two generated hypostases, we must interpret him to
mean that this natural impulse of will through the Father is dual: to will
the Son as well as to will the Spirit is qua will immediately constituted as
the Son and Spirit of the Father. Maybe we could even say that the
natural will of the Father is triadic; willing to have a Son and a Spirit is
willing to be the Father of the Son and the Emitter of the Spirit. In this
way, the triadic pattern of divine life emerges. But, we should note that
this last speculation moves beyond what Gregory says in so many words.
Since divine generative activity is conceived within such a closely
knitted system, how are we to understand hypostatic distinctness
within this sphere? If we return to Gregorys Ad Petrum, he employs
the general principle of adding the particular to the common (H
H e N).38 The godhead is common, paternity is something
36 37
CE, GNO 2, 195; NPNF vol. 5, 203. CE, GNO 1, 288.
38
There is denitely something unsatisfactory about the idea of essence as com-
mon and hypostasis as what emerges if the particular is added to the common. I am
proper (Y), and if we combine these we say I believe in God the
Father. The notion of paternity includes the notion of being cause.
This is the distinctive hypostatic mark of the Father. The special
properties of the other two hypostases are pointed out in accordance
with the same principle (adding the particular to the common), but
what we gain from the text of the Ad Petrum is rather meagre if what
we searched for are distinctive marks: both the Son and the Spirit are
caused by the Father and this is distinctive for them both, but what
else could be said about them? Gregory says the Spirit is distinguished
by proceeding from the Father, being known after the Son and together
with the Son, and as having its subsistence from the Fathera saying
that seems rather evasive. The Son is the only-begotten from the
unbegotten light, which marks him off from the other two; but even
this property, one could object, does not tell us much if the point is
to distinguish between the Son and the Spirit. Of course, we have to
understand the limitations and the motives under which Gregory
works. In a radical sense this means that even the philosophical spec-
ulation elucidated above is nothing more than a way of speaking that is
within the limited understanding of created minds. He never intends to
speak in any other way. Gregory is well aware that the Gospel story
gives us plenty of distinguishing marks for the hypostases of the
Trinity: the Father is the one God that sent the Son into the world,
and the relation indicated with the terms Father and Son is a psycho-
logically and soteriologically potent metaphor of great practical sig-
nicance for the message of salvation and for spiritual life. The Spirit is
the Comforter, sent by Christ to the Church, the Giver of divine gifts.
On the other hand, when confronted with a theological challenge one
has to move into a philosophical exposition of the correct teaching
about God. In this regard one has to nd illuminating strategies of
speaking and arguing, even if the thing itself slips as a mystery beyond
what we can master from our weak intellectual resources.
In a discussion about the freedom of will we normally associate
the idea of freedom with choice between different options that we
experience in the sensible world. In the theology of Gregory this is a
rather vulgar conception of freedom. According to him, if human
sure the Cappadocians did not think that divine nature is common in the sense of an
abstract universal. I think they employ this terminology not as a strict philosophical
doctrine, but as a strategy of metaphor in order to create a glimpse of understanding
for what the thing itself is about.
activity is naturally directed towards what is good (or at least believed
to be good), then, if God by nature possesses in Himself all that is
good, He must be free in the most sublime sense when His activity is
directed towards His own being. On this level, Gregorys doctrine
shares a striking resemblance with Plotinus doctrine of the will of the
One.39 Plotinus says that he must depart from correct thinking in
order that his discourse may be persuasive. Gregory, as we have seen,
is always conscious of the fact that he has to reason analogically or by
way of resemblance, reaching for what is worthy of God without
being able to grasp what transcends knowledge. Plotinus, for the
sake of persuasion, speaks of the will ( ) of the One. The
One has activities (K), but cannot act (KE) without will,
and since the activities are the essence, the essence is identical with
will. The One is the Good and all things desire the Good. The soul, for
instance, has its true freedom when it is directed towards the Good.40
In this case it is not subject to another, but executes its self-determi-
nation. The Good, for its part, is turned towards itself, and since it
does not have its principle of movement in any other thing (there is
nothing external for it to desire), it is free in the highest degree.
Let us see what a comparison between Plotinus and Gregory might
give us. The similarities in the doctrine of divine will does not allow us
to say that Gregory knew the Plotinian doctrine of double activity. If
he did, he should have to adapt the theory in order to illuminate two
Christian doctrines: rstly, the institution of a divine triad of con-
substantial hypostases, and secondly, the creation of beings other than
God. But why should Plotinian doctrine have to be adapted? Because,
as we have seen, in the Plotinian version it suits the explanation of
how hypostases are generated in a continuous system of subordina-
tion. As such it could not be allowed within a Christian system. With
these requirements in mind we could try to sum up the doctrine of
Trinitarian generation according to Gregory.
The internal activity of the essence would thus be the internal
activity of the essence of the Father. This must be His knowing
Himself as Good and His willing this Good. Now, to know and to
will the Good must be one and the same simple act, and from this
simple act there occurs the immediate possession of the object, i.e.,
the Good that is the second (and the third) hypostasis. This second
39 40
Enneads 6. 8.13. Cf. Ennead 6.8.7.
hypostasis, however, could not be identical with an activity out of
the essence if this is a transitive act in the Plotinian sense, i.e., an act
not directly willed by the cause and terminating at a secondary level
of being. The difference is that the willing itself as Good, according to
Gregory, means to will the second (and third) hypostasis. But in
Plotinus scheme this willing of oneself is an intransitive act with
the transitive act occurring incidentally. This is not Christian doc-
trine. The Plotinian One does not will the second (and the third)
hypostases, and therefore these hypostases occur incidentally below
it. The Gregorian God wills the second (and the third) hypostases,
and because of this direct act of will, the Son (and the Spirit) are on
the level of the Father. To Gregory, the second (and the third)
hypostases are of the same essence, i.e. homoousion with the rst.
The concept of goodness, in the thought of late antiquity (as it is in
Platos Timaeus), is associated with generosity and communication of
gifts. God the Father, willing His own nature as Good (beyond the
good of external activity), immediately actualizes His being in hypo-
static communion.41
In Gregorys reections the Fathers willing the Good plays the
decisive role. On the one hand, he emphasizes that willing the Good
implies the immediate possession of the Son because the Son is the
good object willed. On the other hand, he tries to stress the imme-
diacy even stronger, and says that the Son is the Willing itself. Of
course, one could question whether the latter is a stronger expression
than the rst. It could seem that the willing the good states an object
beyond the act of willing, in which case willing the good would be an
incomplete activity in the Aristotelian sense. I do not think, however,
that Gregory sees it this way. Rather, I think he understands the
act-of-willing-the-Good as a unitary and complete act, an actuality.
Therefore the willing as such is the immediate possession. The activ-
ities of generation and procession originate from the Father, and
these acts are complete energeiai in the Aristotelian sense because
the objects are immediately possessed with the activities themselves.
To Gregory this is not a transformation of the divine being into a
41
This is not exactly in accordance with the de Rgnon thesis that Greek thought
proceeds from person to nature, cf. Heart in Coakley ed. (2004), 11112. It is not quite
the thesis of Zizioulas (1985), 1718, either, since personhood is not arranged as a
more primordial category than nature. It is rather because of the nature of the
hypostasis of the Father that the Trinity is a primordial ontological fact. Community
stems from the capability of the nature of the hypostasis.
triadic activity. The triadic activity culminates immediately in a con-
substantial being of three hypostases.
We shall conclude this section with some comments on a question
that was posed earlier: if the Father acts in freedom, could He
have chosen to remain single, i.e., without His Son and His Spirit?
I suppose Gregory would have considered this question awkward. In
a rather vulgar way it seems to reckon with a kind of time (or quasi-
temporal extension) before the generation and procession. The ques-
tion seems to amount to asking if the Father in His Godhead could
have wanted not to be Himself. If one thinks that doing the good
freely is the highest form of freedom, and that a perfect mind perfectly
knows itself as good, this mind would freely choose to remain by
itself. The Fathers free choice of Himself is the choice of Himself as
the source of primordial acts of generation. There was no before the
Trinity, not in any sense of the term before. The question of whether
the Father could have remained without the two other hypostases
amounts to asking if the eternal Principle of the eternal triune God
could have chosen not to be itself. Gregory would have found this to
be absurd.
B. DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE ON TRINITARIAN

GENERATION
The pseudo-Dionysian corpus stems from the late fth or the early
sixth century, and its author subscribes, as would be normal in his time,
to a doctrine of the triune being of God. The Trinitarian controversies
of the fourth century are history in the central parts of the Empire.
In the spiritual theology of Dionysius it seems that the Trinity is
contemplated in accordance with notions that are Neoplatonic. If
that should be the case, the problem is less in connection with Trini-
tarian theology than in connection with, for instance, cosmology. We
return to Dionysian cosmology in the next chapter.
In order to grasp Dionysius doctrine we must acquaint ourselves
with certain general terms and concepts that will be useful when we
come to the doctrines of creation and participation as well. A basic
idea of the Dionysian system is the notion of union and distinction
( and ). There is union and distinction within God in
the created world, and in the relation between God and the world.42
Another idea, basic to Dionysius doctrine of creation, is the triadic
scheme of causality: remaining, procession, and conversion ( ,
, K). It is tempting to view these terms as derived
from the Neoplatonism of Proclus,43 who says the effect remains in its
cause, proceeds from it, and converts to it. The remaining probably
means that the quality of the effect is perfectly present in the cause.
The procession accounts for the difference between cause and effect,
while the conversion means that the effect is constituted as a new
hypostasis with the reception of the quality remaining in the cause.44
Proclus causal scheme is much like the Plotinian conception of double
activity. A similar doctrine often occurs in Dionysius and is clearly
brought forward in De Divinus nominibus 4.10:45 To put the matter
briey, all being derives from, exists in, and is converted towards the
Beautiful and the Good. Dionysius is, perhaps, the rst Christian
thinker to use this triadic scheme extensively. Later, a modied version
was built into the system of St Maximus the Confessor.46
In De Divinis nominibus Dionysius says that the Father is the
originating source of the godhead (
) and that the Son and the Spirit are, so to speak, divine
offshoots () the owering and transcendent lights of the
divinity.47 The Father is the of the trinity of persons. How,
we would like to know, does the Father act as such a source, and in
what way do the other two persons emerge? Dionysius immediately
answers that we can neither say nor understand how this could be
so. This remark is quite interesting, as we shall see below, but we
should rst note that Dionysius actually alludes to a way in which the
divine causality may be understood.
Before we dive into the intricacies of the divine causality again, we
should note that, according to Dionysius, the motive behind the
general dialectic of union and differentiation is the divine Goodness.
He emphasizes this again and again. Two important examples should
be noted:
Now in order that our subject should be clearly dened beforehand, as I
have already said, we say the divine differentiations are the benevolent
42 43
DN ch. 2, Suchla 12237. Elements of theology 35.
44 45
Elements of theology 3032. DN 4.12, Suchla 154.
46 47
Cf. Amb. 7, PG 91: 1081ac. DN 2.7, Suchla 132.
processions of the Godhead. This is granted as a gift to all beings and it
ows over in shares of goodness to all, and it becomes differentiated in a
unied way.
[ . . . ] they [namely, the theologians] call the subsisting Godhead
Goodness, and because it is Good this essential Goodness extends
Goodness into all beings. And just as our sun, not by deliberation or
intention, but rather by just being itself, enlightens all things that
participate in its light, in accordance with the principle of their own
capacity [to participate], so it is with the Good [ . . . ].48
We shall return to a problem contained in the second quotation later
in the section on Dionysius doctrine of creation. What I would like to
emphasize now is this principle of Goodness: the Good is by nature
such that it gives itself to other things, it distributes itself. This idea
may be traced to Platos Timaeus in which the cause of creation is the
goodness of the Demiurge.49 Dionysius speaks about the differentia-
tions that are betting the goodness of the godhead (a b,
a IE B ).50 The primary instance of union and
differentiation is the divinity itself. The union of God is preserved in
the one essential and good Godhead. Through the Father this God-
head is differentiated into a triad of hypostases. Within this unied
triad each of the persons is preserved in an unmixed and unconfused
way in its own hypostatic characteristics.51 The reason behind the
manifestation of the triad is probably that it bets the divinity qua
good to communicate as internally related personal hypostases.
Against this background we may move to the doctrine of divine
causality. Dionysius writes that those initiated into the theological
tradition say that the differentiations (a ) within the
Godhead have to do with the benign processions and revelations
( d K) of God.52 Although the meaning of
this assertion is far from clear, I would suggest that the terms
and K indicate a two-fold perspective: rstly, in this context,
the processions refer to the ontology of the Trinitarian generation of
the Son and procession of the Spirit, while secondly, the revelations
concern the possibility for intelligent creatures to know this inner-
Trinitarian life. In short, the rst has to do with the mystery of the
divine being itself, while the second concerns what is revealed in the
48 49
DN 2.11 and 4.1, Suchla 135, 1434. Timaeus 29d f.
50 51
DN 2.4, Suchla 126. Cf. DN 2.5, Suchla 128.
52
DN 2.4, Suchla 126.
economy, and has to do with our strategies of speaking of what
cannot be understood adequately.
The Father is the origin of the Trinity, the Son and the Spirit are
processions from him. If this is interpreted according to the triadic
causal scheme the following picture emerges: the Father remains
( ) in his essentially good nature. While remaining in a Goodness
that by nature is distributive of itself, He gives rise to two processions,
namely, of the Son and the Spirit. As they proceed they are hyposta-
tically differentiated from the hypostasis of the Father. The causal
process is fullled, however, at the moment (not in the temporal sense,
of course) when the two proceeding hypostases convert (K)
to their source and are lled with it. What happens in the conversion is
that they are constituted in the same essentially good content as their
source. They are hypostatically differentiated but essentially identical
to the Father.
This description of the mystery of the Trinity is, of course, within
the dimension of what is revealed. How is that? The answer is that it
borrows both its terms and its causal scheme from the created world
and applies them to the transcendent being of God. Such an explana-
tion could never be adequate since the theological mystery always
has to be described from the point of view of the economy. As was
pointed out earlier, Dionysius says we can never understand how this
could be so.
Despite the philosophical scheme of causality involved, the
description itself is full of metaphors. The Father is spoken of as a
source. The hypostases of the Son and the Spirit are conceived in
a scheme of movement or activity as proceeding and converting
in relation to the Father, almost as if these movements took place
spatially. Is it possible to explain the process in a more conceptual,
philosophical way? I believe so, even if the explanation is quite
a hypothetical construction. However, even if the description from
a philosophical point of view could be brought on to a more advanced
level, it would still be within what is accessible to human reason and
not adequate to the divine mystery in itself.
The triadic causal scheme of Proclus is historically connected with
the Plotinian doctrine of double activity. According to Plotinus,
everything has its origin in the One. By just being itself, and without
being active as a creator, the One is the source of the next hypostasis,
the Mind. The One has an K B P, which inevitably is
accompanied by an activity K B P. As we have seen, this
activity ad extra culminates in the constitution of the Mind.53 If we
elaborate a bit further on this doctrine, we could say that the One
remains itself and its activity of essence is a kind of self-contempla-
tion, i.e., its contemplation of itself as good. This contemplation is
accompanied by an activity out of the essence as a creative activity.
This creative activity is established as the next level below, the level of
the Mind, because the activity out of the essence, as a rational
principle (a logos), is turned as self-contemplation towards itself as
a derivation from the higher level. Thus the activity out of the essence
of the One is identied as the activity of the essence of the Mind. This
activity of the essence of the Mind is not only its self-contemplation,
but at the same time its self-constitution as a new hypostasis.54 The
process is repeated in the relation between the Mind and the Soul.
In this way the Neoplatonic triad of primary hypostases is gener-
ated. It seems to me quite probable that a doctrine of double activity
(much like Plotinus) or of remainingproceedingconverting (much
like Proclus) represents the causal scheme behind Dionysius allu-
sions to the mystery of the establishment of the Christian Trinity. But,
as we have seen, according to Dionysius we can neither say nor
understand how the divine processions actually take place.55 Even
though it could seem conceptually clearer, it would not help much to
say that the Son and the Spirit are activities of the Fathers essence.
From the point of view of the philosophical doctrine employed we
know now that there is an obvious problem involved: according to the
Neoplatonic doctrine of causes, the effect, even if generated in the way
explained above, is established on a metaphysically lower level of
reality than its cause. The movement from cause to effect is a down-
ward movement from the more to the less real, from the more to the
less unied, from unity to plurality. This is not difcult to understand
since while the activity of the rst hypostasis is itself quite simple,
the activity of the second hypostasis is of a more complex kind: the
Plotinian Mind, for instance, contemplates itself both as deriving
from the higher principle and as good, i.e., as a cause for what
comes next.
Dionysius, perhaps, sees this problem clearly when he says we
cannot understand the divine generation:56 In reality there is no
exact likeness between those things that are caused and the causes,
53 54
Plotinus: Ennead 5.4.2. Cf. Ennead 3.8.14.
55 56
DN 2.7, Suchla 132. DN 2.8, Suchla 132.
for the things that are caused have within themselves only such images
of their originating sources as are possible for them, while the causes
themselves transcend and exceed the caused, according to the princi-
ple of their own origin. What Dionysius seems to nd problematic
here is that the Neoplatonic scheme of causality explains the genera-
tion of hypostases on a descending scale of perfection. Like St Gregory
of Nyssa he seems to realize that such a causal scheme is not able
to explain how the rst hypostasis may generate two more hypostases
on the same level of reality as the rst, so as to constitute together a
primordial Triad of hypostases. This problem does not necessarily
represent a weakness in Dionysius Trinitarian doctrine, but rather
indicates that he perceives the philosophical theory used to elucidate
the doctrine as being inadequate for this purpose. If this interpretation
is correct, Dionysius does not differ much from Gregorys concerns,
even if the terminology differs. Further, his acceptance of Neoplatonic
terms does not commit him to follow Neoplatonic concepts strictly, at
least not in connection with divine generation.
C. ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ON THE INTERNAL

ACTIVITY OF THE TRINITY
In the history of Christian doctrine St Maximus the Confessor is

known as the advocate of dyotheletism contra the heretical doctrines
of monenergism and monotheletismwe shall return to this in
Chapter 5 below. Maximus engagement in the Christological contro-
versy stems from his philosophy. More precisely, his engagement could
be taken to result from his basic idea of nature and its integrity. On the
other hand, his starting point is not strictly anthropological and onto-
logical; it is based on his view of the interaction between ontological,
anthropological, and soteriological motifs. Basic to his whole theologi-
cal vision is what he calls the mystery of Christ.57 This mystery brings
the beginning, end, and ontological structure of the whole economy of
salvation into the dynamic of the inner life of the triune Godhead. This
dynamic is one of the main focuses of the present section.
57
Cf. Ad Thal. 60, CCSG 22, 7381.
When we move to Maximus we arrive in a climate of controversy
where the focus has shifted from mainly Trinitarian problems to
mainly Christological ones. He does not philosophize extensively on
strategies for speaking about the constitution of Gods triadic being in
the way that the Cappadocians do. Maximus idea of the mystery of
Christ provides a new angle from which to interpret the relations
between Gods inner and outer activities. Even if this does not shed
much light on the ontological constitution of the Trinity as such, it is
quite telling for an understanding of divine activity ad extra and for a
Christian evaluation of the status and worth of created being.
In the last part of the introduction to his Mystagogia, Maximus
develops some important theological ideas on the difference between
God and creatures.58 The line of thought is rather difcult and, it
seems, full of paradox.
Because of his super-being (E)59 God is more ttingly
called non-being (e c r ). I suppose it implies that God is
more ttingly called non-being than being. The difference between
God and His creatures requires us to understand that the setting
() of super-being is the removal (I) of beings, and the
setting of beings is the removal of super-being.
Now, what does this mean? Maximus plays on the three ontological
concepts of super-being, being, and non-being. It seems to indicate
that the ontological difference between God and creatures is of such a
kind that if we speak about being as a basic ontological fact of the
created world, then we cannot speak about being in relation to God.
The difference between God and the world, between Creator and
creation, between the all-perfect God and the things He made is so
radical that we cannot make predications about them within the same
ontological scheme. The following statement, of course, is proble-
matic on this background, but it somehow has to be said: compared
with creaturely being, God is non-being. However, there is no com-
mon ground of comparison.
To use the term super-being does not signify that God is the most
perfect, the most eminent, and exalted kind of being, as if predication
could be helped by some doctrine of analogia entis. It is simply
a negation. There are simply no common concepts that could be
58
Myst., PG 91: 664bc.
59
On super-being or rather trans-being, cf. Tollefsen (2008), 165 n85.
predicated about both God and his creatures. In the Ambiguum 7,
Maximus says of this:
For it is not so that what is innite and what is delimited is present in a
simultaneous way, nor could any demonstration show the possibility of
simultaneous being (r ) of essence (c P) and what transcends
essence (e ), nor is there any possibility of leading towards
the same what is measurable and what is non-measurable, what is
conditioned and what is non-conditioned, what is not pronounced in
any categorical form and what is constituted by all of these.60
In his De charitate, we also nd a rather strong expression of the
same: the divine P has no contrary, but the P of beings have
their contrary in e c Z.61 This can only mean that since there is no
common contrary, there cannot be any common point of reference at
all between Gods being and the being of His creatures.
If, on the other hand, the setting, i.e., the afrmation, is that God is
super-being, then beings are notthey suffer removal. Taken together
this tells us that if we say things have being, then God has non-being. If we
say God has (or is) being, even super-being, then things have non-being.
Further on in the introduction to Mystagogia, when Maximus says
that both names (being and non-being) may be applied to God, he
immediately states that they are not rightfully or tfully put (
). On the one hand, Maximus allows that to afrm being of God
is to say that He is the cause of beings. In other words, we speak of God
in relation to His creatures as the source of their being. On the other
hand, to deny being to Him amounts to saying that He is not to be
characterized by the terminology of the being of beings; but as cause he
transcends all created properties, and therefore all predicates given to
created things. Maximus has stated here the Dionysian idea of apo-
phatic and cataphatic theology. In both instances, however, one makes
statements of God in His causal relationship to the world. If we speak of
God in Himself, however, no concept drawn from created otherness
will apply, neither positively nor negatively. This is also in keeping with
the Dionysian doctrine because he says that God is not in the sphere of
assertion or denial (P K PB , h I).62
Maximus repeats this idea when he says that God transcends all
afrmation and negation ( d I
60 61
Amb. 7, PG 91: 1081b. De char. 3.28, PG 90: 1025bc.
62
De mystica theologia, PG 3: 1048ab.
s K). What we have here is a radical apophatisism and a
radical notion of transcendence.
Against this background, it comes as no surprise when Maximus
says in Ambiguum 23 that the divine is unmoved (I) by
nature and essence. The reason given is that the divine is innite,
unrelated, and indeterminate ( d d I).63 In
Ambiguum 41 he saysreferring to the Incarnationthat what is
totally unmoved by nature moved (E) immovably (I)
around that which by nature is moved.64 The predicate unmoved
is known as a characteristic of Aristotles unmoved mover from the
Metaphysics . In Maximus it is reasonable to take this predicate as a
negation, an apophatic predicate. In this sense, of course, it points to
the transcendent being of God, even though it still predicates some-
thing of Him in (negative) relation to created being, and therefore is
not put in the most radical sense, as we saw in the introduction to the
Mystagogia that was commented on earlier.
Does not this predicate of unmoved indicate that the being of
God is conceived of as quite non-dynamic and stiffened? Isnt this
the God of the philosophers and not the living and acting God of
Christianity? In Ambiguum 10 Maximus says that man may learn
from Gods goodness and love that God is moved () to give
being and well-being to created things; if, that is, it is permissible to
speak of movement () with regard to God, the sole unmoved
(F F I). Rather we should speak of will () that
moves the all, draws and holds it in being.65 Taken together all this is
rather telling. God is unmoved, but we may speak of him as moving,
even if we more properly may speak of him as willing. At rst we may
turn to the distinction made by Aristotle, namely between movement
and activity.66 Movement is incomplete activity while activity proper
is the action that is complete in itself. With this in mind we might
interpret Maximus to mean that God is unmoved in the sense that
His being internally excludes the incomplete activity of movement
proper. If we say He moves, it is in the sense of executing energeia in
the complete sense. Such kind of energeia is the actuality, the im-
mediately realized all-perfect state of being without change. If we shift
our perspective to Gods creative movement, then this is an energeia
63
Amb. 23, PG 91: 1260b. Cf. Amb. 10, PG 91: 1184d1185d.
64 65
Amb. 41, PG 91: 1308cd. Amb. 10, PG 91: 1204d1205a.
66
Cf. chapter 1 above, on Aristotles conception of energeia.
that is, in the present case, the act of willing by which God gives being
and well-being. Something similar is found in Ambiguum 26, when
Maximus comments on an anti-Eunomian text from St Gregory
Nazianzen.67 Gregory criticizes the Anomoean idea of the Father as
the name of the divine energeia. Maximus distinguishes, interpreting
Gregory, between what we may understand to be an internal energeia
that is essential and, I suppose, an actuality, and an external energeia
an activity or a movement that makes, for instance, artefacts. While the
Anomoeans take the Son as being produced by such an external
activity, Maximus thinks that He is generated within the divine sphere
itself by an internal paternal activity that generates externally within
its own unied ontological level, maybe much in the same way as
described by St Gregory of Nyssa in connection with the divine will,
as we saw earlier.68
Now, willing is an activity of the divine nature. According to
Maximus, natural energeia is generally an innate distinctive mark
( ) that is naturally constitutive () for a
nature.69 This sounds as if nature or essence is constituted by the
proper energeia of a being; in other words, that essence is basically
energeia. In Ambiguum 5 Maximus says the denition of every nature
is constituted by the logos of its essential energeia.70 I think it is proper
to translate the term as actuality in these latter instances. In his
Opusculum 27 Maximus quotes several earlier Fathers about energeia,
and I choose not to translate the term as yet. We shall look at some
formulations.
A. Maximus quotes St Justin the Philosopher (the Martyr) from a
book against Euphrasius the Sophist, saying:
1. The energeia of the whole essence is the quality naturally belonging
to it. The natural and constitutive energeia is the dening difference
of the nature of the manifest thing [ . . . ].
2. The natural energeia is the essential and constitutive quality of the
whole essence, by the deprivation of which it is deprived as well of
the whole essence.
3. Natural energeia is the unmixed power that by essential differentia-
tion is preserving of all things in relation to all other things.71
67
Amb. 26, PG 91: 1265d1268b.
68 69
Cf. Gregory Nazianzus as well: Oration 39.6. Pyrrh. PG 91: 348a.
70 71
Amb. 5, PG 91: 1057ab. Th.Pol. 27, PG 91: 280cd.
B. Maximus quotes St Alexander of Alexandria, from a Letter to
Aiglon, Bishop of Cynopolis, against the Arians:
Natural energeia is the innate movement of the total essence. Natural
energeia is the essential and knowable logos of the whole nature. Natural
energeia is the power revealing the whole nature.72
C. Then Maximus quotes St Gregory of Nyssa:
The energeia is the essential movement characteristic of nature, of
which it is instituted as a property, through which [energeia] it [i.e.,
the nature] is known as essentially differentiated from other [natures].73
A nal text that should be noted is from the Chapters on knowledge
2.1, which concludes with the statement that the essence, power, and
energeia of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one and the
same ( a d Pc P d d K e d
d ).
How should this be understood? Ill try to suggest some answers.
Firstly, one cannot argue from the texts in a orilegium to what was
Maximus own conviction. On the other hand, as far as I can see, the
main sense of the quotations is consistent with citations from Max-
imus above, and even seems to teach the same. Further, I think the
three points that follow are rather reasonable: the rst point, like in
Plotinus (see the section in chapter one), the internal activity is each
thing as its actuality. The ontological status of the external activity,
therefore, must be distinguished from the internal activity in such
a way that it cannot as such be identied with what constitutes the
essence of the substance. On the other hand as the second point, the
external activity must, in a Christian system of thought, be dependent
on the internal activity (as an actuality) and cannot be of another
nature than it. Consequently it is not a creature, it is somehow divine
or God. We shall return to this in the chapters on cosmology and
soteriology. The third point: we should remember that major Chris-
tian thinkers, including the Cappadocian Fathers and Maximus, think
that God in Himself is beyond comprehension and that terminologi-
cal and conceptual strategiesabout which one has to be accurate, of
courseare adopted to the requirements of the topic one speaks
of and the angle from which one addresses it. This means there are
arenas in which one probably should have to distinguish between
72 73
Th. Pol. 27, PG 91: 280d. Th. Pol. 27, PG 91: 281a.
essence, activity, and hypostasis, and arenas in which one might say
that the essence of God is His primary (internal) activity (as actu-
ality), an activity that is the essential nature of God.
As we saw earlier, Maximus says that the natural energeia is an
innate distinctive mark that constitutes an essence. What he has in
mind could well be an activity in the proper sense (not what Aristotle
would have called a movement), namely an activity that is complete
in its execution. However, in this context the activity is not just
complete, like an act of seeing or thinking, the activity perfects and
constitutes a being. For this reason we may translate energeia as
actuality. Several of the texts above seem to have this sense, namely,
A. points 1, 2, and 3. Texts B. and C. have another kind of dynamic
character and seem to indicate external energeia: it is the power
revealing the nature and the essential movement by which a nature
is known. Energeia probably has this sense in Chapters on knowledge
2.1 as well. The general principle of the Cappadocian Fathers says that
it is by observing and knowing the activities of a substance that we
may grasp its essence. In the case of God, it may well be that the
internal energeia (actuality) that is the essence of the divine nature
denes the being of God in itself. On the other hand, this internal
energeia is precisely beyond comprehension. The energeiai from
which God may be knownto the degree possible for creatures
are the external activities of the divine being.
These points are illustrated in a text in which Maximus explicitly
addresses the topic of the movement that structures the one Godhead
as a triad of hypostases. The text is the Ambiguum 1,74 in which he
discusses passages from two of St Gregory Nazianzens sermons. Both
texts seem to speak about how the divine monad becomes the divine
triad:
Therefore the monad is eternally moved towards the dyad until it
reaches the triad.
The monad is moved because of its wealth and the dyad is superseded;
for beyond matter and form, out of which bodies are made, the triad is
dened on account of its perfection.75
What is important now is not to ask what Gregory intended, but to get
a hold of how this is understood by Maximus. It is possible, of course,
74 75
PG 91: 1033d1036c. Louths translation in Maximus (1996), 169.
that Maximus provides a good interpretation. Gregory speaks about
movement () from the monad through the dyad until it ends in
the perfected being of the triad. This Triad is the Holy Trinity of Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit. Maximus accepts Gregorys formulation of the
one outburst of radiance (e B )76 and also of
a owing ( ). In this context both terms seem to denote
activities within the being of the Godhead. However, according to
Maximus interpretation, Gregorys words do not concern what happens
within the divine being. As we have seen, he rmly believes that we are
not able to know this. What he reckons is that it is all about how we
could think economically about the generation of the Triad. It is not,
he says, an aetiology of the cause of beings, itself beyond being (B
H Z N), but a demonstration of its reverent glory
(I PF d PB I). Somehow, the explanation
or description takes its stand within the created order and speaks not of
the Trinity in itself, but of what concerns it. What should that mean?
Maybe it is to be taken in the same sense as the around him (d
P), known from Cappadocian thought? This could be interpreted
as the created order, but normally it indicates something of a more
divine character.77 I shall comment on the notion of the d P in
St Gregory of Nyssa when we come to his doctrine of creation in the next
chapter. If what Gregory teaches holds for Maximus doctrine as well,
the what is around is the divine manifestation or activity that to some
degree is knowable and which should be distinguished from the essence
(the actuality) of the divine being as such. Maximus thinks we may be
able to say something about the Trinity that is meaningful for us if we
consider the way it manifests itself, obviously in some kind of discern-
able activity.
In this connection a difference between Maximus and Gregory
of Nyssa is worth noting. Gregory frequently uses the terminology
of causality in connection with Trinitarian generation. According to
Cappadocian thought in general, the Father is the cause of the Trinity.
In his commentary on the Lords Prayer, Maximus says that the
Father is the cause of creatures. On the contrary, the hypostases of
the Son and the Spirit always coexisted with the Father. Maximus
says that the relation () between the hypostases of the Trinity
is characterized by . The terminology of causation is
76 77
Oration 40.5. Cf. Bradshaw (2007), 1669.
avoided:78 [ . . . ] being by nature from Him and in Him beyond cause
(b N) and understanding, but they are not after Him (I P
Pe) as if they had come to be subsequently by being caused
( N R). Some further remarks are appropriate.
Maximus seems to say that whenever things are characterized by
, from the verb , they are in relation to one
another. These words mean that things indicate or point to one
another. According to Aristotle and Aristotelian tradition, relatives
are not relations as such, but rather things related.79 This is denitely
the sense of relation at work in the present context as well. Father
indicates Son, and Son indicates Father. It might be asked, how-
ever, how Father could indicate Spirit? The point is that it doesnt.
But the rst hypostasis is Father and King. King indicates kingdom,
and kingdom King. The kingdom of the Father and King, according
to Maximus argument in the commentary, is to be identied with
the Holy Spirit. One might wonder how this should be taken, and
I suppose Maximus thinks of the Holy Spirit as establishing the
community of the Church. However that may be, Maximus concludes
that things related in this manner are certainly coexistent.
Maximus conception of cause and causation in this connection
is that the effect is after the cause, or subsequent to it. This after
and subsequent might indicate a temporal succession or maybe even
a metaphysical or logical dependence of the lower on the higher.
Together with the last possibility goes the notion of subordination
of the lower to the higher. Of course, with such a notion of causality in
mind, the Father cannot be the cause of the Son. However, there is no
reason to doubt that Maximus fully acknowledges the arguments of
the Cappadocian fathers, and would have found a strategy to defend
their points of view if needed.
Even if we are not able to understand Trinitarian generation in
itself, but only get a glimpse of it through what surrounds God, there
is one important theological matter that furnishes us with a glimpse
into the inner life of the Triad after all. This, according to Maximus, is
the doctrine of the divine economy of creation and salvation. Soter-
iological motives, he believes, are fundamental to the entire economy.
The divine acts towards created otherness are motivated by what
Maximus calls the mystery of Christ.
78
Expositio orationis dominicae, CCSG 23, 42.
79
Cat. 6a367, 6b287a18.
A key text in this regard is found in the Quaestiones ad Thalassium
60. Maximus comments on the text from 1 Pet 1:1920, which states
that Christ was known before the foundation of the world. Christ as
foreknown is the same as the mystery of Christ, Maximus says. The
Holy Trinity itself holds this mystery, according to its essence (
P).80 Maximus says it was foreknown () by the
Father according to His approval (eudokia), to the Son according to
His self-work (autourgia), and to the Spirit according to His coopera-
tion (synergia).81 Christ was foreknown (), not as God,
but as man.82 This is the mystery circumscribing all the ages revealing
the super-innite, great council of God, which in a manner beyond
reckoning innitely pre-exists the ages [ . . . ], Maximus says.83
This theological vision, so striking when worked out philosophi-
cally, is based on solid scriptural ground. Firstly, we have the Pauline
metaphysics of propositions, cf. Rom 11:36: For of Him and
through Him and to Him are all things, to whom be glory forever.
Amen. (Cf. 1 Cor 8:6 and Col 1:16.) Secondly, we have the Pauline
vision of the economy of salvation as founded on Gods eternal
purpose, cf. Ephesians chapter 1.
Now, there are more challenging and interesting points to be found
here. Firstly, we nd a discussion of divine foreknowledge; secondly,
a discussion about the divine activities of approval, self-work and
cooperation; and thirdly, we nd a discussion about the mystery
as the eternal motif for Gods dealings with a created otherness. The
term is used to accommodate to human weakness.
The divine purpose pre-exists the ages, and Maximus intention is
to stress clearly that this is a mystery belonging to the sphere of
Gods eternal self-contemplation, beyond the before and after of
the temporality of the ages.
Intuitively it seems reasonable that the Father eternally approved
the eternal purpose, but how could one say that the Son eternally
worked out His Incarnation, or the Spirit eternally cooperated in the
economy of the Incarnation? I suppose the intention is to say that the
Son eternally approved to work out the Incarnation, and the Spirit
eternally approved to cooperate.
As we have seen, we can distinguish between the essence of God as
internal energeia, an energeia that is a complete activity that is God in
80 81 82
Ad Thal, CCSG 22, 79. Ibid. Ibid.
83
Ad Thal, CCSG 22, 75.
Himself, and the actions of God as external activity.84 We have
further seen that the essence, power, and activity of the three hypos-
tases are one and the same. Soteriologically, this means that the
activities of approving, working, and cooperating are not separated
from one another. The eternal being of God is centred triadically on
this unied objective: to make a world and to glorify it. The three
hypostases move eternally and unied towards one another. In Chap-
ters on knowledge (2,1), Maximus dives into an exalted contemplation
of how the three hypostases dynamically coinhere in and as the
complete Godhead. The picture does not include, however, any con-
sideration of generative activity, since the coinherence Maximus
describes is the actualized condition in which God exists. The Chris-
tian God is philanthropic in His innermost life and activity. This is an
impressive and challenging picture of God. He is not beyond the
concerns of this world, but is in His own being provident. If Chris-
tianity is scandalous, I believe it is to be found here rather than in the
ontology of the incarnation.
84
If one should indicate the full process, I suppose one should have to say that the
internal activity of God the Father manifests external activities within the sphere of
divinity, and in this way He generates the Son and the Spirit. And this whole eld of
activity is the actualized triadic being of God. This is, however, not something
Maximus actually says, only an attempt to reason further on theological principles.
4
The External Activity of the Godhead:

Cosmology
A. ST GREGORY OF NYSSA ON CREATION AND

PARTICIPATION
As a preamble to this chapter I would like to reiterate the terminological

point made in the Introduction. In St Gregorys thought, we may
distinguish between Gods internal and external energeia. Gregory thinks
of the generation of the Holy Trinity as an internal activity that springs
from the Fathers will. This will is immediately, beyond all created
categories, constitutive of Trinitarian being. On the other hand, the act
of creation can be described as an external activity, external meaning
that this act makes and preserves beings that are other than God.
Eunomius, for his part, thinks there is an internal activity within God,
while the generation of the Triad itself is due to a purely external activity.
This means, therefore, that the Son and the Spirit are created beings.
According to Gregory, God the Father directs His will towards the
internal manifestation of that which, strictly speaking, transcends the
good. In this way the Son and the Holy Spirit emerge as hypostases.
This activity of will is not an act of choice, but the act of the person
of the Father in the freedom of His nature. The will is completely
transparent to Him who acts. He knows in Himself those good things
towards which He naturally moves in conrming their hypostatic
coming forth from eternity.
The established Triad of persons communicate in the divine prop-
erties of goodness, incorruptibility, power, holiness, eternity, wisdom,
righteousness, etc.1 Qua taking place in the dynamic eld between
1
Cf. CE, GNO 2, 189 and Ad Eustathium, GNO 3.1, 8.
84 The External Activity of the Godhead: Cosmology
the personswithout any extensionI suppose we should consider
these basically as activities of divine nature. Such activities should
probably be understood as the movements of the hypostases towards
or their being towards one another. We should remember that this
description is from our point of view, because the reality itself trans-
cends our grasp.
We should rst try to dene more clearly the relation between Gods
essence and His external activities according to Gregory. Gregorys
critique of Eunomius doctrine of activity is a convenient starting-
point. In his Apologia apologiae, Eunomius stated that energeiai, i.e.,
activities, follow beings.2
Eunomius has an ontological gap to ll between the uncreated
(ungenerated) God and the created (generated) Son. This gap is lled
with the activity of Fatherhood, of God being Father. In the rst book
of his Contra Eunomium, Gregory takes the following quotations
from Eunomius Apologia apologiae:3 [ . . . ] there must of course be
included in this account the activities that accompany the essences
(H E P KH) and the names clinging to
these. Eunomius speaks of [ . . . ] the activities following each of the
essences (a H PH K) . . . . The key
terms (as we saw earlier in Chapter 2) are the verbs
(accompanies) and (comes after, follows). In Chapter 2,
I argue that according to Eunomius, the divine activity is established
as a something between the Unbegotten God and the Son. This
between, of course, is not a spatial extension, but indicates the
essential separation of the two beings. I think we have here part of
the background for Gregorys frequent denial of any extension
between the divine persons.4
Gregorys discussion of the Eunomian position is important.5 By
activities, he says, Eunomius understands the powers ( ) by
which the Son and the Holy Spirit are produced. In the Eunomian
system these are activities ad extra. They have to be as such since the
being of the Son and the Spirit is completely outside the sphere of the
rst God. On the other hand, what does it mean that activities follow
the essence? Are the activities something other, apart from the
essences which they accompany, or are they a part of these essences,
belonging to the nature of the essences ( a a P x
2 3
CE, GNO 1, 723. CE, GNO 1, 72.
4 5
Cf. CE, GNO 1, 79; NPNF 5, 52. CE, GNO 1, 8688; NPNF 5, 545.
The External Activity of the Godhead: Cosmology 85
j K d B PB )? If activities are
other than, how and from whence did they come into being? If they
are the same as the nature, how were they separated from the essences
and how did they come to follow them as something external
(), instead of co-existing with them? From Gregorys point of
view, these are problems inherent in the Eunomian position.
Gregory does not nd Eunomius doctrine easy to understand, and
he comments on the interpretation that the activities emerge as
something other than the essences. As we saw in Chapter 2, if this
is Eunomius opinion, does it not imply that the divine activity is
expressed by a necessity of nature, without any divine purpose, as in
the case of heat and vapour that follow re? According to my view,
it is not unfair to ask this question. It is quite to the point. A study
of Eunomius extant works actually gives the impression that the
rst being is left in the condition of not being entangled with what
emerges below it.6 For Gregory this implies that, according to
Eunomius, the activity occurs spontaneously, without God being in
any sense engaged in the result. I have asked earlier if Eunomius
applied a Plotinian scheme of double activity, but I found no reason
to believe this. However, the way Gregory handles his opponent could
seem to imply an accusation that Eunomius, if this should be his
position, in practice adhered to a doctrine implying at least something
similar to what we know as the Plotinian position: God is turned
towards His own perfection, and what occurs as an external result of
this internal activity (qua actuality) is, on the one hand, quite coin-
cidental to the (self-centred) activity itself. On the other hand, the
external activity is a necessary, unintended result.
From Gregorys point of view, this would be, for several reasons,
an inadmissible doctrine for anyone who considers himself to be a
Christian. He does not nd it reasonable that Eunomius would teach
such a thing, and points to the fact that it turns God into a complex
() and synthetic () being, namely an essence com-
bined with or put together with an externally added activity. On
Gregorys view, Eunomius should have to agree that we must not
think of the divine activity as, he says, an accident contained in a
subject (u e K ). Gregory obviously thinks
of an accident as an external addition, and not as something naturally
6
Liber apologeticus, Vaggione (1987), 6263.
integrated with the essencewhich, logically, would be a quite nor-
mal way to conceive it. Consequently, it is quite inadmissible to speak
of the activity as if it was an accident following the essence.
Gregorys discussion of the Eunomian concept of activity is inter-
esting, since what Gregory criticizes is an idea of real distinction
between essence and energeia. Some modern Orthodox theologians,
however, have emphasized a real distinction in connection with
St Gregory Palamas theology of divine essence and energy. They
have also claimed that this distinction occurs in the major thinkers
of mainstream Orthodox tradition, including St Gregory of Nyssa.7
We will return to this question in the last chapters, but some remarks
are appropriate here. One might ask if the Eunomian real distinction
is the same as the alleged Palamite distinctionand with the alleged
Palamite distinction I mean what modern scholars have thought that
Palamas taught, not what he actually said. It strikes me that the
distinctions are similar enough that it is tempting to say they betray
the same ontological teaching. However, one may notice one important
difference, namely that modern scholars say the energeiai are God
Himself, even if under another aspect than His essence.8 Eunomius
could not have said this. We are left with the question of the exact
relation between the essence, i.e., the actualized being of God, and the
activities when God acts ad extra.
When we return to Gregory, the last question is precisely the one
we should address: what, then, is the correct understanding of the
relationship between essence and activities? According to Gregory,
Eunomius should admit that essences, moved in a deliberate and
self-determined way, produce by themselves the expected result (e
F). We cannot separate the activity of a worker from the worker
himself. In the idea of activity we comprehend simultaneously the one
who is moved with the activity, and if we think of he who is active, we
include the activity not expressed, Gregory says. He tries to make his
point clearer by an example.9 If, for instance, we consider someone
who works in metal, we comprehend two aspects, namely the work
(the activity) and the one who works (the articer). This distinction is
equivalent to Aristotles distinction between rst and second energeia.
7
Cf. Lossky (1985), 4569 and Meyendorff (1987), 186. The idea is quite common
among Orthodox theologians and writers on the spiritual life.
8
Cf. For instance Meyendorff (1974), 214.
9
CE, GNO 1, 88; NPNF 5, 55.
The articer has a skill (rst energeia), which he may execute (second
energeia). The second is based on the rst. If we remove the one, the
other has no existence either. Take away the work (second energeia),
and there is no worker (rst energeia). This, however, is only true if
there is no second potentiality = rst energeia in the Aristotelian
sense. So far, Gregorys argument is weak. Take away the worker,
and there is no work. From an Aristotelian point of view, this is true if
the work is thought to be skilled, which Gregory obviously thinks it is.
Both the activity and he who moves by it are thought of together so
that it is quite unreasonable to speak of the activity as following the
worker as some kind of going between ( ) the rst being
(the cause) and the second (the effect).
From the analogy Gregory returns to the Eunomian argument
about natures, where the energeia neither coincides with ( )
the rst nature nor combines with ( ) the second. It is
separated from the rst by not being its nature, and from the second
because the product is an active essence and not pure energeia (mean-
ing activity) by itself, according to Gregory. In this instance one might
wonder if Gregorys presentation is correct or if Eunomius is not
actually able to make the philosophical distinction between posses-
sing a skill (rst energeia) and executing it (second energeia). Of
course, it is correct that an energeia does not necessarily belong to
nature in the sense that it denes it, even if it is unreasonable to deny
that some energeiai in fact do that, such as thinking and willing as
faculties belong to human nature and actualizing it. However, even
acquired powers (i.e., skills) or faculties normally require a nature of a
specic kind. It is, for instance, difcult to imagine a carpenter or a
painter or a mathematician who is not a human being endowed with
reason. This means that some energeiai are typical for a being and
presuppose an essence of a certain kind. It is difcult to conceive of a
divine, creative activity that is not intimately connected with the
being that executes the activity. The point of the last part of Euno-
mius dictum is that the second being (the Son) is an essence that is
the external result of the activity of the rst being (the Father). The
cause of this (second) active essence must be given in advance as an
activity that does not combine with the result. From an Aristotelian
point of view, however, even if the activity (movement) in this case
terminates when the effect occurs, the activity of, let us say, house
building somehow resides in the nished product as the actualized
form (energeia as actuality) of the house.10 I think Gregory mainly
agrees with the Aristotelian principle, but he seems to argue that
Eunomius does not. In De beatitudinibus there is an example which
shows that the Aristotelian idea is somehow accepted by Gregory:
when we look at a work of art, we become aware of the presence of the
artistic skill which the artist has left as an impression on his art.11
If this interpretation is correct, it shows some important aspects
of the Gregorian concept of energeia: rstly, the analogy of worker
and work illustrates Gregorys point. If it is correct to compare the
analogy with the Aristotelian doctrine, the worker, possessing his
skill, possesses the rst energeia; the work, as an execution of activity,
is second energeia. It is rather easy to see that the external activity is
based on the internal actuality (of a skill) and is an expression of it.
The form that is left in the product, Gregory says in an obvious
Aristotelian vein, is the artistic skill of the artisan. The ontological
connection and even sameness between the skill as possessed and the
skill as produced in the work of the worker seems to be present.
Secondly, divine activity, consequently, is closely united with the
being (essence or actuality) of the one who executes it. It somehow
springs from a certain inherent power of this being. Thirdly, the
activity is not a going between or a kind of being separately existing
that occurs between the cause and the effect. And nally, activity does
not terminate completely at the moment of an accomplished external
result, but somehow resides in the result. The latter point is very
important for both cosmology and deication. We shall see below
how this understanding of activity is conrmed by several texts in the
Gregorian corpus. However, we have to make one important distinc-
tion. Gregory does not think that the form (r ) of a substance has a
divine element in it. He thinks that created forms or essences exist by
being brought from non-being to being by the act of creation. On the
other hand, such forms carry the imprint of a wise cause, and exist by
the presence of certain divine activities that institute them and pre-
serve them. The substance is created and the conditions of its being
and the perfections it may entail involve more than creatureliness.
Now, Gregorys arguments against the Anomoeans generally seem
quite reasonable, even though they sometimes create problems for his
own position. In his eagerness to ward off Eunomius he employs
10
Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics , 8: 1050a30b3.
11
De beatitudinibus Oratio 6, GNO 7.2, 141.
language that could be of good use when his own position should be
dened. Note the statement that the activity, according to Eunomius,
is separated from the rst essence because it is not its being, but,
Gregory quotes, the movement of the nature ( ). The
context seems to indicate that Gregory has misgivings about the term
movement of nature. On the other hand, we should note that
Eunomius denies that activity is the movement of the nature.12
Further, the example adduced above by Gregory (the metal-worker)
indicates that, according to his own view, the activity is at least the
movement of the artisan qua artisan. For this reason, when it comes to
God, should we not say that divine activity somehow is the movement
of the nature? Some important distinctions have to be made here.
In the rst case, the activity as the movement of the artisan qua
artisan is not the movement of the artisan qua human essenceto
be a man and to be an artisan differs according to denitioneven
though it is the human essence that makes it possible for a human
being to acquire certain faculties. We must distinguish between
natural activities such as thinking and willing, and acquired faculties
that make it possible to execute certain activities. Certain such dis-
tinctions have to be made concerning God as well. God, of course,
does not acquire faculties. But if we look from Gregorys angle, to
the internal activity of the Godhead, the generation of the Son is the
movement of the natural will of the Father qua Father of the Son. The
external activity (that is the act out of the sphere of the Godhead), on
the other hand, has to be the movement of the Holy Trinity in
relation to creatures, and this activity cannot simply be the movement
of the nature as such. If it was the movement of nature, it is difcult to
see how one should avoid thinking that creation follows naturally
from the being of God, and I am quite sure Gregory would avoid such
a consequence.13 The external activity, therefore, even if executed
by God, and therefore based on the essence of what it is to be God,
cannot be viewed as a pure movement of the essence. Now the
question is how Gregory would anchor the creative activity in the
being of God?
In Chapter 2 we saw that, according to St Basil, we cannot know
the essence of God. We know God, however, because we know
certain divine attributes, and knowledge of these are gained from an
12
Eunomius, Liber apologeticus, ed. Vaggione, 62/63.
13
Cf. De beatitudinibus, GNO 7.2, 1401.
observation of His activities. Gregory teaches the same. According to
the Contra Eunomium, the essence of God cannot be known: If, then,
the lower creation which comes under our organs of sense transcends
human knowledge, how can He, who by His mere will made the
worlds, be within the range of our apprehension?14 In De vita Moysis
we learn that it is even a characteristic for the divine being to be
beyond all characteristics.15 The Ad Eustathium teaches the same:
But the divine nature itself, as it is, remains unsignied by all the names
that are conceived for it, as our doctrine declares. For in learning that He
is benecent and a judge, good and just, and all else of the same kind, we
learn the differences of His activities, but we are none the more able to
learn by our knowledge of His activities the nature of Him who is active.16
The principle of knowing is the same as in Basil. We learn about Gods
activities (in Scripture and nature) and on the basis of them
we predicate certain properties of God, such as those just mentioned:
He is a judge, He is benecent, good, just, etc. The principle is stated
clearly in several places in the second book of the Contra Eunomium:17
For it is clear that the divine being is named according to different
meanings from the variety of His activities, so that we may think of
Him in the aspect so named. [ . . . ] it is possible to nd many
appellations for one and the same subject, according to the signi-
cances of its activities [ . . . ]. What is important here is to establish
Gregorys main principle. In addition to the possibility of framing
names from acquaintance with the activities, there is a further possi-
bility given when we conceive of the idea of Divinity:18 [ . . . ] when
once our souls have grasped the notion of divine nature, by this name
we grasp by implication the perfection which in all concepts bets
God. So, the names and terms we use for God are taken from what we
may learn of his activities and from what we may conceive as proper to
him according to the notion of Divinity.
These doctrines are illustrated, for example, in a passage from the
Homilies on the Beatitudes.19 He is commenting on the text from
Matthew 5:8: Blessed are the pure in heart; for they shall see God.
Since Gods nature is incomprehensible, knowledge of Him must be
14 15
CE, GNO 1, 250; cf. 246. De vita Moysis, GNO 7.1, 115, cf. 92.
16
Ad Eustathium, GNO 3.1, 14.
17
CE, GNO 1, 315 and 329. Cf. De an. et res. as well, PG 46: 40c.
18
Adversus Macedonianos, GNO 3.1, 91.
19
De beatitudinibus, GNO 7.2, 1401.
reached by another method than a conceptual comprehension of His
being. It is possible to see Him who made all things in wisdom from
the wisdom that occurs in all things. Gregory proposes an analogy: in
man-made artefacts it is possible to perceive the maker of the thing
with the minds eye. What follows conrms what I said just above,
even if only epistemologically: we do not really see the nature of the
artisan, but only the skilful technique that he applied to his work.
Similarly, if we look to the order of creation, we form a notion in our
minds, not of the essence of God, but of His wisdom. He who is
invisible by nature becomes visible in His activities, being seen in the
things that are around Him (E d Pe). In this same context
Gregory also applies the principle of what is proper to God according
to the notion of Divinity: we should not, as we might expect, think
that God made the world by any necessity, but rather by benevolent
intention (). We may therefore assume that goodness
should be predicated of God. From His activities and from what
is proper, given the notion of Divinity, we may comprehend many
sublime ideas within the Godhead: power, purity, immutability, being
unmixed by its contrary, etc. We may conclude that Gods wisdom
and power issue in activities that are visible in His creatures, and
that the order of nature and the notion of Divinity bear witness to
His immutability. His works tell us that He is single-minded in His
intention, and not mixed with any conicting motifs as to what He
wants to accomplish.
The predicates we may use of Him, whenever we learn from divine
activity or from what is proper to God, denote what is d P, i.e.,
around him.20 Now, what does this teach us about the relationship
between Gods essence and His activities and attributes? It is not
admissible to think or say that the essence is one thing and the
activities are other things, if this means that there are two separate
realities, even though the second depends upon the rst. The external
activities, so it seems, are certain ways in which the essence moves in a
modied sense in order to accomplish something externally. When
we consider a divine activity, we include a divine subject who does the
work. The activity is ontologically dependent upon the being that is
active, but the activity must be a certain way in which this being
modies itself in order to accomplish external acts. If we know the
20
Cf. above and CE, GNO 2, 186.
activity, we do not know the essence of the God who is active, but
only get a glimpse that there is a sublime ontological foundation for
being active in this way. To say that the activities are around God
could not mean that they are an external reality in the way that a
cloak is wrapped around a human person. It just means that the
activity is not identical with the essence of the being that acts. If we
consider the activity of carpentry, we may discover that a person
(a carpenter) is clever in his work. Even if we form the opinion that
his skill depends upon a well-suited, natural condition, we do not get
an adequate grasp of the essence of humanity in general from the
observation of this activity. In this case, however, we are better off
than when it comes to God. From several observations of human
activity, we may be able to gather what being human is, despite
Gregorys doubts about the possibility of understanding even created
essences. When it comes to God, on the other hand, even his activities
are not adequately understood. Gregory quotes the Apostle who calls
Gods ways (understood as His acts) unsearchable (Rom 11:33).21
The perfect essence, on which the activities depend, forever trans-
cends what a created mind can comprehend.
Before we can raise the question of the relation between divine
activity and created beings it is natural to ask how an eternal and
perfect internal activity can be modied in order to accomplish
temporal effects. The divine being transcends all cosmic limitations
and is completely immutable. How could such a being act according
to a temporal scheme? In his Liber apologeticus Eunomius says that
since created things begin and end, the activity of God begins and
ends as well.22 He also says, in his Apologia apologiae, that activities are
of a higher and lower order, corresponding to the work that is made: it
is not the same activity that makes the angels and stars, the heavens
and man. He also claims that the activities of a worker are bound by
his works, and the works are commensurate with the activities.23 These
doctrines are part of Eunomius argument for the knowableness of the
divine nature, and do not occupy us in this context. There is, however,
another side to these claims that presents a rather tough challenge to
the consistency of Eunomius thought. Eunomius admits that God is
21
22
23
Cf. CE, GNO 1, 723; NPNF 5, 50.
without beginning and end.24 In that case, one might expect him to
accept that God is beyond time as well. If that is so, how could he
possibly argue or explain that a plurality of divine activities come and
go in accordance with what begins and ends temporally in the created
cosmos? Gregory argues that no time extension can be conceived of in
the being of God.25 The problem now is the how of creation, i.e., the
question of the relation between the eternal being and activity of the
internal life of God, and the activity directed to make, preserve, and
work in the establishment and ordering of cosmic being.
As far as I know, Gregory never discusses this problem, but he
denitely seems to be aware of it. This is indicated in his dialogue De
anima et resurrectione when the topic of the souls origin turns up.26
From our present point of view, the most important question posed is
the following: How from the stationary nature does the moving one
come? However, this question of how (H) is denounced at the
outset of the discussion. Gregorys sister St Macrina, his Teacher in
the dialogue, points to the Apostle who says (Heb 11:3): Through
faith we understand that the ages were framed by the word of God, so
that things which are seen were not made of things which do
appear.27 The fact that () the world was created by divine will is
accepted in faith, the knowledge of the how of its making is beyond
what might be reached by human beings. We shall nd a similar
restriction in St Maximus, even though he explicitly enters somehow
deeper into the question. Macrina alludes in De anima et resurrec-
tione to two positions that seem to offer a more plausible starting-
point from a philosophical point of view, namely that the world
originated from the divine nature itself, or that the matter from
which it was fashioned had eternal existence as a reality simultaneous
with God. The rst position is one that we now should expect
Gregory to comment on. It is not easy to say which philosophers
Macrina (or Gregory) had in mind, but both allusions could point to
some knowledge of Platonic doctrines, for instance, Plotinus doctrine
of creation and Platos Timaeus. I suppose the idea behind the rst
position, as understood by Macrina and Gregory, is that creation
24
25
CE, GNO 1, 1336; NPNF 5, 69.
26
De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 121a124a.
27
The last part of this quotation is interesting in view of Gregorys doctrine of
matter: N e c K a . Visible things, according to
Gregory, are made up of intelligible forms, cf. De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 124c.
from the divine nature would make the cosmos eternal and divine.
The problem of adjusting an eternal, unchangeable divinity to tem-
poral matters might then have been avoided. The second position
seeks to avoid the same but introduces matter as an independent
cause besides God. Both doctrines are dismissed as absurd, however,
because, from a Christian point of view, what is brought into being
is of a nature different from the divine, and beings have only one
primary cause.
Even if we are left with the problem of how, and, according to
Macrina, we have no means of providing a satisfactory answer, some-
thing still seems to be gained from these reections. It is quite obvious
that for Gregory creation as a divine activity is not an activity of the
nature of God as such, but of the nature of God as modied into
knowing and willing something other than himself. Gregory says that
God made the world because He wanted to do so, and the motion
( ) of divine intention, when it wills, becomes a fact ( c B
, K, A ).28 God contemplated
the purpose and organization of the world eternally, but the plan was
realized when Gods will was joined to it: The existence of the will is
essence.
When God wills. Gregory is so much of a philosopher that he, of
course, perceives this as the core of the problem. God, as we have
seen, is not under the condition of extension ( ) in any aspect
of His being. There will be no before or after, no temporal when in
the Divinity. As we have seen earlier, the operations of divine activity
are basically manifestations of will, both in the generative processes
within the godhead and in the activities ad extra, even if the two
spheres differ radically.
In his In hexaemeron Gregory brings the concepts of divine will,
wisdom, and power into connection with each other.29 Will and
power ( and ) coincide with each other in the divine
nature, and the will ( ) is the measure of the power, which
means that God is able to do what He wants to do. The will is even the
wisdom of God, Gregory says. In His wisdom God knew the things
He would make, i.e., He possessed the plans or Forms for all creation,
and, as is now obvious, we must understand this to mean that God
knows and wills from eternity. The adaptation of the knowledge, will,
28
De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 124b.
29
In hexaemeron, GNO 4.1, 14.
and power into the creative act brings about beings having a temporal
beginning: God sets his power to bring his ideas N K by his
will. At this point exactly is the instant of the how that Macrina and
Gregory believe is beyond comprehension.
In the second book of Contra Eunomium, Gregory takes us a bit
further into the dynamics of the moment of creation.30 He says that
the power of God runs together with or agrees with His will, which is
the same teaching as we met earlier. Further he speaks of the inciting
power of the will (c c F K) that im-
mediately brings creatures forth as an accomplished fact. We met with
the term above, and translated it as motion. It indicates a rapid
motion, an onrush, something happening in a certain immediacy.
Gregory says that in the case of God there is no difference between
will and activity ( and K), and the thought or idea
( ) of God commands (E) the activity. Further, the
what-results-of-the-activity, the work (e K ), occurs simu-
ltaneously with ( ) the idea. There is nothing between the reason
(logos) of the divine intention, and the divine action (). In short,
the instantiation of creatures is a work () of the divine will
( ) that does not come to be posterior to its design ( ).
Well then, where does this bring us? In fact, it brings us to a point
where one might ask Gregory why the world is not eternal in the same
way God is. However, we have to appreciate the context of what he has
just said. He is arguing against Eunomius understanding of theologi-
cal language, and what he says about creation is part of that argument.
This means that he does not have in mind the problem of how the
eternal being of God could be related to a cosmos that begins with the
extension of temporality. On the other hand, it seems to me that we
may formulate an answer to the challenge with which we confront
Gregory, an answer that he does not explicitly develop himself. Again,
the problem is the how of creation, namely how the eternal knowl-
edge and will of God may be accommodated to temporal being. The
answer has two aspects. Firstly, we should have to conceive of a certain
modication of divine will. The eternal will of God must be under-
stood freely to include the provision that God may will the making of
what has a beginning for its own part. Gregory probably has some-
thing like this in mind when he speaks of the divine will and activity
30
CE, GNO 1, 292; NPNF 5, 273.
that immediately has its work as a result. Secondly, the divine idea in
accordance with which God wills is an idea of a certain kind of work,
namely the kind of work that is under the condition of extension in
time and space.
As we saw, God sets his ideas N K, and this may mean that
God brought his ideas into activity or that they were realized in
actuality, or even both. To explain: Gods ideas (or thoughts) could
be understood as a rst energeia in the Aristotelian sense, i.e., as an
actuality that is Gods capacity to create. When the ideas are brought
N K , they are manifested in the creative act itself, namely as
an expressed skill to actually make beings. This would be Aristotles
second energeia. The bringing of ideas N K could further
indicate not just the working as such (the second energeia), it could
even indicate the emergence into presence of something, i.e., an
essential manifestation of a created being. As we saw above, the
form (r ) or actuality (K) resides in the thing made. Accord-
ing to Gregory, Gods power brings the essences into actualization. To
use a familiar example, the art of weaving is in the thing woven. This
strikes me as especially important and we shall return to it soon. Here
we should remember the Aristotelian principle just commented on
above, namely if the result exists apart from the activity that brought
it forth, the energeia is in the thing made.
If Gregory may be interpreted along the above lines he comes close to
suggesting a philosophical solution to the problem of accommodating
the eternity of God to the temporality of beings. John Philoponus argues
in his critique of Proclus that the transition from rst to second energeia
is immediate, i.e., involves no time. (We return to comment on this in
connection with St Maximus doctrine of creation.) Certain terms used
by Gregory could suggest that he saw this possibility, namely terms that
indicate immediacy in action, such as , but there are no explicit
statements on this. We may therefore conclude that Gregory does not
try to explain the how of creation philosophically.
The concept of divine power is important in Gregorys philosophi-
cal theology. God sets His power to do what He knows and will. The
divine power is the foundation of activity. In De oratio Dominica
Gregory says that every activity is the effect of power (A a
K K I ).31 In De beatitudinibus he
31
De oratione Dominica, Oratio 3, GNO 7.2, 41.
speaks of the high status of being called sons of God and emphasizes
the divine transcendence. When the prophet asks Who has measured
heaven with a span, and water in his hand, and all the earth in his
palm?, he points, Gregory says, to just a part of the divine activity. He
does not mention the power itself, from which the activity springs, nor
does he talk about the nature, from which the power comes.32 So, the
divine nature is the ontological ground of the power and the power is
the foundation of the activity. Behind the activity we nd the power
and behind the power stands the mystery of the divine nature.33
I shall now try to interpret Gregorys view of participation.34 The act
of creation, as an external activity, is not separated from God. It is a
movement of divine will with a view to a denite purpose, and this
movement is a communication of the condition on which creatures
exist. This condition is God qua Being. Creatures exist by participation
in true Being (B F Z).35 How is this participation to
be understood? Scattered around his texts Gregory speaks of God or
His power as pervading beings, as mixed with them, as being in and
enveloping them and as tting the whole together. I think it might be
fruitful rst to refer to some of these texts.
Gregory says that God pervades () each being and that this
mixing with the all keeps beings in being (d B e e A
I K H r a Z).36 In the Anima et resurrectione
the divine power ( ) is spoken of as skilful and wise.
Gregory says it permeates all things, ts the parts together with the
whole, and fulls the whole in the parts. The power maintains every-
thing.37 In another text from the same work we hear of the ineffable
wisdom of God, which appears in the cosmos and shows us that the
divine nature and power is in every existing thing (c
d K A E s r ). Because of this presence all things
remain in being (K H r a ).38 From the Oratio
catechetica we gather that the divine is present in everything, it
32
33
Ayres, in Coakley ed. (2004), 279, argues for the importance of the triad
essencepoweractivity in Gregorys ontology. I agree.
34
Cf. Bals,
S` Y
(1966). See Tollefsen (2008), 1526, 192, 224,
for some critical remarks.
35
Cf. De vita Moysis 2.2425.
36
De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 73a.
37
De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 28a.
38
De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 44ab.
penetrates, embraces, and is seated in it (d K d K
d K ). All beings depend on He Who Is, and nothing exists
which does not have its being in God (that which is) (F a Z
KB a Z d P r c K H Z e r ).39
This terminology has a certain pantheistic ring to it. There is a
divine presence in the created cosmos, and this presence may be
described both as permeation and mixing, as envelopment or embra-
cement. God, of course, is not a body and cannot physically permeate
or embrace anything in that sense. Nor can He physically mix with
anything. These terms are obviously applied metaphorically. Even so,
there is no reason to weaken the realistic picture Gregory presents. He
obviously thinks that God is present in the whole of creation, not
present by created replicas of His perfections, but rather really present
by His uncreated power. This presence is an active one, since, as
Gregory says, God ts parts together with the whole and fulls the
whole by fullling the parts. Further, God keeps things in being and
maintains all there is. The divine presence in all things or every-
where is, consequently, the presence of powerful activity:40 [ . . . ]
because to Gods power nothing has either gone by or is about to
come since even that which we expect is comprehended with what is
present by the all-sustaining activity ( B
F F h
, h , Ia d e K H
B B F e K E).
To sum up: the metaphors are meant to tell us that the divine
power or activity is present to all beings and to the whole cosmos, and
this is probably what Gregory means by participation. However,
participation indicates that beings have qualities that do not stem
from their own nature, qualities they derive from some otherin this
case the divinesource. In this connection we should make an
important distinction between createdness or being created as such,
and the conditions by which created entities have being and certain
other qualities of a higher kind. The entities that ll the whole
cosmos are brought from non-being to being, and their natures or
essences are of a created kind. On the other hand, beings have being,
goodness, beauty, etc. from God by participation.41 Thus, Gregory
39
Oratio catechetica GNO 3.4, 63.
40
De hominis opicio 16, PG 44: 185d.
41
Cf. De vita Moysis 2.24-25; Oratio catechetica, GNO 3.4, 63; De hominis opicio
ch. 12, PG 44: 161c; Oratio catechetica, GNO 3.4, 21-2; De virginitate, GNO 8.1, 292.
thinks that the condition of being in the world is the activity of God
that makes and preserves all things. There is no created being or
goodness or beauty in this regard. Such basic qualities are the pre-
sence of God who is powerfully active. Participation, consequently, is
the presence of the divine energeia that endows created things with
certain perfections.
Is there anything disturbing in this picture? I suppose someone
might fear that there is a kind of confusion between the uncreated and
the created spheres. In fact, however, even if Gregory states his point a
bit carelessly I dont think there is any such confusion. Gregory does
not think that divine and created nature are mixed together, rather he
thinks that when something other than God is brought from non-
being to being this other cannot exist or be good or beautiful by itself.
It is not of a nature such that it can hold or generate such qualities or
capacities by its own power. This means that to be and to persevere in
being and in other high qualities is due to God alone. The beginning
and end of creatures is in Gods hands. The divine activity is not a
productive operation that begins and ends like human activities. It is a
dynamic, powerful presence, almost like a permanent, vibrating en-
ergy present in things.
At this stage we should turn to Bals conception of energeia and
participation in his important book
!`
. We
should ask: if the divine energeiai are manifested as perfections that
are participated in, why are they not uncreated energies in the
Palamitic sense? Bals says:42 It would be wrong to understand
these texts in the sense of the later Palamitical real distinction in
God between Nature and K: the repeated insistence of Gregory
on the simplicity of God would not allow this. Of course, at this stage
it is too early to make any claims concerning St Gregory Palamas
theology. However, Bals objection to a Palamitic interpretation of St
Gregory of Nyssa sheds light on a major difference in the theological
mentality between East and West concerning the topic of essence,
energeia, and participation in general. According to Bals, God is the
efcient cause of the perfection participated in by the creature, and this
perfection therefore, according to him, belongs to the created realm.43
Bradshaw has an interesting analysis of developments in Western
42
Bals (1966), 128. I criticized Balas in Tollefsen (2008) as well, but I have come
to the conclusion that the critique needs some further elaboration.
43
Bals (1966), 12930 and 163.
theology.44 St Augustine had a strict notion of divine simplicity that,
according to Bradshaw, was inuenced by Neoplatonism.45 The Au-
gustinian notion of simplicity excludes any distinctions in God, so that
any divine manifestations (such as Old Testament theophanies) either
have to be of a created nature or must be a direct appearance of the
divine being itself.46 Now, the Augustinian notion of beatitude is rather
intellectual. Augustine claims it is possible for the mind to contemplate
God in a certain limited way. He makes the distinction between under-
standing and comprehension (later well-known from Thomas Aquinas
and other scholastic thinkers). Bradshaw puts it this way:47 [ . . . ]
although the mind can understand (intelligere) God, it cannot com-
prehend (comprehendere) Him, in the sense that it cannot grasp Him
all at once as a whole. If Bradshaws analysis is sound, and it seems so
to me, some implications could be pointed out.
In the City of God Augustine argues that even if God is Trinity, God
is simple because of the one nature. Further, divine attributes are
identical with the divine being.48 According to St Basil, the divine
energeiai, which allows us to speak of divine perfections, cannot be
reduced to one simple thing. He asks, for instance, if justice and
creative power are the same, which they obviously are not.49 As we
have seen, according to Basil and Gregory the essence of God is
incomprehensible. I am convinced that the Greek Fathers generally
think of Gods essence as beyond the grasp of created intellects, not
only in this life, but in the realm of bliss as well. This is not a
limitation that is due to some weakness on our part, it is due to
the nature of the divine being as such. One could just think of St
Maximus dictum that God transcends being. Being would have been
a basic condition if anything should possess any intelligibility at all.
One might wonder if the notion of divine transcendence is not
conceived in a much more radical sense in the Christian East than
in the West. The concept of divine simplicity in the East, of course, also
depends on the idea of the unity of divine nature. But while what is
beyond nature preserves its unity, what comes down to us (in Basils
words) or is around God (in Gregorys words) is conceived in plurality:
44
Bradshaw (2007), chapter 9.
45
Bradshaw (2007), 224. Cf. Augustine, City of God 8.6.
46 47
Bradshaw (2007), 228. Bradshaw (2007), 226.
48
De civitate Dei 11.10
49
St Basil, Letter 234, commented on in Chapter 2 above.
there are several energeiai, which is natural since the divine nature itself
is the perfect source of all good things. The difference between the
typically Western and the typically Eastern Christian ontology seems
to depend on this: for the Latins Gods attributes are reduced to the
unity of nature; for the Greeks the energeiai are distinguished from
the nature as such. On this background, one may understand Bals
opinion: what is not Gods nature must be a creature. Participated
perfections are created perfections. I see, however, no reason to t St
Gregory of Nyssa into this Augustinian or scholastic pattern, but think
we have to acknowledge that there is a difference between certain
theological outlooks.
What we have looked into above is a doctrine of causation. God, as
creative and preservative cause, by His activity, is accomplishing the
conditions on which entities have being, goodness, beauty, etc. Even if
Gregory doesnt work out a sophisticated philosophical terminology
of participation, he obviously does not mean that an intelligible
principle is a quasi-material and extended substrate that is divided
and distributed to participants. He thinks rather that beings are made
present by an activity that exists dynamically as the actuality of their
emerging into presence. We could liken this to the relationship of the
radii to the centre of a circle: the radii, i.e. extended beings, are
present throughout to the non-extended centre, i.e. the non-extended
divine activity. The actuality itself of perfection is not a creature; it is
the stamp of the Artisan on his work. This is not a pantheistic
doctrine, because the distinction between the uncreated condition
and the contingent nature of creatures is not confused. In the cosmo-
logical sense then, to be and to be actualized in certain perfections is
nothing else than to participate in the divine energeia. The essential
content of beings, however, is created.
B. DIONYSIUS ON CREATION AND PARTICIPATION
When we talk of cosmology it is natural to include a discussion of the

teaching on creation and world order found in Dionysius the Areo-
pagite. Dionysius has a philosophically developed conceptual scheme
in which a lot of attention is given to the doctrine of divine energeia,
and the energeiai of created being in relation to God. However, it is a
bit surprising that Dionysius, who wrote in the fth or the beginning
of the sixth century, does not seem to teach that the world has a
beginning. The Creed confesses the Father as Creator of heaven and
earth, of all things both seen and unseen, and it professes that all
things came to be through the Son. These statements do not exp-
licitly confess a beginning of the world, only that all things are
made by God. In this regard Dionysius is in agreement with the
Creed, since he explicitly teaches that God bestows being on the
essences, and brings forth the totality of essences.50 He also says
God makes all things, perfects all things, holds all things together,
converts all things.51 The last sentence, at least apparently, is laden
with Neoplatonic terms and, perhaps, bears witness to a Neoplatonic
inuence. A third text of some interest tells us that the straight
motion of God is the procession () of His activities and the
coming-to-be of all things from Him.52
The Creed, of course, is not a philosophical statement and does not
develop a doctrine in all possible details. However, it is clear that from
the beginning of the fourth century most major Christian scholars
think that the Christian doctrine of creation encompasses more
points than is stated rather sparsely in the Creed. These points are:
rstly, that God created of His own free will; secondly, He did not
create out of pre-existent matter, rather He created ex nihilo; and
thirdly, the world was created with a temporal beginning. These
requirements, in addition to what is stated in the Creed, were made
explicit by Church Fathers such as Athanasius, Basil the Great,
Ambrose, and Augustine. The teaching about a temporal beginning
is put rather succinctly in some words from St Basils In hexaemeron:
It is possible for you to learn from which time the formation of the
cosmos began if from the present you ascend into the past you endea-
vour to discover the rst day of the origin of the cosmos. You will thus
discover from which time the rst movement [came]; then too that the
heaven and the earth rst were laid down like the foundation and the
groundwork [ . . . ].53
Basil says that when it is written In the beginning God created, this
means in this beginning according to time (K IB B
a
50 51
DN 2.11, Suchla: 136. DN 4.10, Suchla: 155.
52 53
DN 9.9, Suchla: 213. In hexaemeron 1.6, PG 29: 16b; NPNF 8, 55.
e).54 Basil says further that the world is perishable or transitory,
because what begins with time shall end in time.55
This point concerning the corruptible nature of the cosmos, even
though God may choose to sustain it eternally, emphasizes an im-
portant difference between Christianity and Neoplatonism as we shall
see in the next section on St Maximus the Confessor.
The reason behind the points enumerated above, of course, is the
conception of God as the transcendent, supreme cause of all being.
However, it seems that Dionysius conception of God contains aspects
that do not make such restrictions obvious to him. One might ask to
what degree the traditional Christian idea of the divine being in
Dionysius has suffered certain philosophical modications that make
it different in comparison with mainstream Christian thought. At least
it makes a difference in connection with the doctrine of creation, as we
shall see.
As far as I can see, there is no clear notion of divine will or freedom
(the requirement in the rst point above, page 102) in the Dionysian
corpus. Rather, creation seems to follow somehow automatically from
the being of God. On the other hand, there is no pre-existent stuff
from which God made the world (the second requirement above,
page 102). However, this does not seem to mean that the world had a
temporal beginning (the third requirement above).
In the section on Trinitarian generation, we saw that a basic idea in
the Dionysian system is the notion of union and distinction (
and ): union and distinction in God, in the created world,
and in the relationship between God and the world.56 We also made
acquaintance with the triadic scheme of causality: remaining, proces-
sion, and conversion ( , , K). We should remem-
ber what was said about this causal scheme in Proclus, and the
possibility that he inuenced Dionysius. It is also important to
remember the quotation from De Divinus nominibus 4.10 (Suchla:
154): To put the matter briey, all being derives from, exists in, and is
converted towards the Beautiful and the Good. In this scheme,
creatures are set within a provident arrangement of creation and
salvation in order to be perfected. Is this triadic scheme a piece of
Neoplatonic doctrine articially tted into a Christian conception
of creation and causality? I suppose the ancient Christian thinkers
54
In hexaemeron 1.5, PG 29: 13c; NPNF 8, 55.
55 56
In hexaemeron 1.3, PG 29: 9c-c; NPNF 8, 53. DN ch. 2.
themselves would have objected to such a notion. They probably
would have retorted that this is a Scriptural notion, and in support
they may have quoted St Paul (Rom 11:36 and Col 1:1617):
For from Him, and by Him, and to Him are all things: to whom be glory
for ever. Amen.
For in Him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are
in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or
principalities, or powersall things were created by Him, and to Him.
And He is before all things, and in Him all things consist.
These prepositional formulas suggest both that the created world is
contained somehow in God, and that creatures, when created, are
moved from God, and that they are designed to move towards God.
In this way a triadic scheme of remaining, procession, and conversion
suggests itself. A metaphysics of prepositions, however, is known from
Middle Platonism,57 and is developed in the Neoplatonic systems of
triadic causation. I think this Neoplatonic doctrine was acceptable to
Christian thinkers, at least in part, since they knew the rudimentary
Pauline metaphysics of propositions.
A triadic scheme of causality was used by Dionysius to explain the
generation of creatures from God. Dionysius interprets Gods rest
and movement in chapter 9.89 of the De Divinis nominibus. Rest is
interpreted as Gods remaining (e ) in Himself, while the move-
ment is understood as His procession (). In 9.9 Dionysius
distinguishes between Gods straight, spiral, and circular movements.
The straight movement is the procession of His activities (
H KH), and the coming-to-be of all things from Him. The
spiral movement is also connected with procession, while the circular
motion means that God holds all things together and secures the
conversion (K) of all that has come forth from Him. In all
of this we clearly see the triadic scheme of remainingprocession
conversion as applied to the causal relation between God and the
created world.
Before we proceed we should note an ambiguity in Dionysius use
of the terms remaining and procession. As we just saw, Gods
dwelling in Himself is the remaining. On the other hand, it means
the remaining of the effect in its cause as well. However, as we shall
see below, these two aspects are somehow identical. Procession, on
57
Dillon (1977), 138.
the one hand, means that something, an effect, proceeds from its
cause. On the other hand, Dionysius often tends to focus more on the
process of procession than on its result. In this sense the procession
itself is brought forward as a divine activity or power in which God
manifests His being. We shall rst focus on the moment of remaining.
Dionysius rst discusses how God remains in Himself in connec-
tion with the creative process. This divine condition of rest must be
attributed to the Holy Trinity itself. Gods transcendent being exists
in an immovable sameness, Dionysius says, and God acts (KE)
according to the same and around the same.58 Now, what are the
characteristics of this divine sameness and action within the Trinity,
i.e., the sameness and action characteristic of the condition of
remaining as relevant to the problematic issue of creation? Here it
will be useful to consider Dionysius conception of the different
names we use to speak of God.
In the second chapter of the De Divinis nominibus Dionysius
distinguishes between names expressive of unity and names expres-
sive of distinctions. Names of the latter kind are those that are proper
to each divine hypostasis, such as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Such
names express distinctions in God and function as predicates denot-
ing certain hypostatic characteristics belonging to each of the persons.
These names are not held in common and are not interchangeable.
The unied names, on the other hand, are applied to the whole
divinity, i.e., they belong to the divine nature and not to any one
of the persons specically. Of these there are two kinds: those that
express abstraction (I) and involve pre-eminence, and those
that are aetiological (a N). These aetiological terms
denote God as cause (N) of the properties found in created
being. The rst kind of terms is exemplied by the following: e
, e , e , e , e .
Examples of aetiological terms are e I, e , e Z, e
, e .
Each of these unied names denotes the whole simple being
of God. Further, they are processions betting the goodness of the
godhead (a IE B ). As such they are
ways in which He differentiates Himself, i.e., they are the divine
58
DN 9.8, Suchla: 21213.
differentiation ( ).59 The predicate I
(betting the good) points to the basic characteristic of goodness
as that which by nature distributes itself, i.e., proceeds. Even though
all the processions are divine differentiations betting the goodness of
God, in the text I am commenting on, they are primarily directed to
the creation of otherness, and do not characterize the hyper-essential
internal life of God.60 These processions are also termed powers
( ) and activities (K).61 I believe that the abstractive
terms denote the divine being in its condition of remaining within
itself, a remaining that is characterized by the divine persons being in
a certain way active or in processions towards each other. Dionysius
says that understanding the nature of the divine names for these
processions ad intra is beyond mind and knowledge.62 If my inter-
pretation is correct, divine processions or activities are considered on
two levels of reality: the abstractive terms denote them as belonging to
the intra-Trinitarian sphere, while the aetiological terms denote them
as divine activities ad extra.
In the remaining, understood in terms of their in dwelling,
the hypostases of the Holy Trinity proceed towards each other in a
way that is beyond knowledge. They are transcendentally perfect
manifestations of divine Goodness, Being, Life, Wisdom, etc. ad
intra. Considered ad extra we should note, however, that in actuality
there is no plurality of processions, because according to Dionysius,
Goodness is not one thing, Being another, Life and Wisdom as yet
other, etc. There is one God for all these good processions and the
term Goodness denotes Gods universal providence, while the other
predicates denote certain aspects of this one Goodness.63 In short, all
processions ad extra are aspects of the one procession of Goodness.
If this is so, much more should the activities ad intra constitute
one divine activity. Divine Goodness and divine Love (eros) must be
understood as basically the same. In his denition of eros Dionysius
shows the picture of well-ordered life that, I think, must be a char-
acteristic of the inner life of the Holy Trinity of persons:
And this is a power of making unity, that conjoins, that produces
commingling in the Beautiful and Good, that pre-exists through (a)
59 60
DN 2.11, Suchla: 135. Cf. DN 2.5 and 5.1.
61 62
DN 2.7 and 9.9, Suchla: 131 and 213. Cf. DN 2.7, Suchla: 131.
63
DN 5.2, cf. 2.5, Suchla: 181 and 1289.
the Beautiful and Good, and that is dealt out from the Beautiful and the
Good through the Beautiful and the Good (d K F F d IF
a e e d Ie K ), holding together things of the
same order in a mutual communion.64
The indwelling of the Holy Trinity in well-ordered activities (K)
of Goodness and Love ad intra is the starting-point of creation. As
I said above, this condition of divine rest is somehow identical with the
in dwelling of the effect in God. The effects, Dionysius says, pre-exist
more truly in their causes.65 How, then, do Gods creatures pre-exist or
dwell in Him and how do the plural causes t into the picture?
What we are confronted with now is a rather complex piece of
doctrine in which the three properties of divine Goodness, knowledge,
and will are intimately connected. There is an important section on
divine knowledge in the last part of the De Divinis nominibus 7. 2.66 In
His capacity as the cause of all things, God knows all creatures. This
knowledge, however, is not something different from Gods knowledge
of Himself. By knowing itself, the divine Wisdom knows all things
(" Ec s ), Dionysius says.
What is it, exactly, that God knows, when knowing Himself He knows
all things? God knows Himself as the One from whom all things derive
or proceed, i.e., He knows Himself as Good or in His Goodness. This
knowledge of Himself as Good, i.e., as distributive, takes the form of
conceiving within Himself all possible effects in their .67
These paradigms are pre-existing logoi that not only exist in God, but
they are identied with what He knows when knowing Himself as
Good.68 Obviously, the logoi are the plurality of causes mentioned
above. Here we see that Gods remaining in Himself (as Good) and the
remaining of the effect in Him (as a Form of what Goodness may
accomplish) are identical.
The paradigms or logoi are also called predening, divine, and
good acts of will ( f [ . . . ] d E d Ia ).69
I made the remark above that there is no clear notion of the divine
will or freedom in the Dionysian writings. The identication of the
divine Forms as , however, indicates that the Areopagite had
a notion of divine will, even if this notion is not explicitly developed
in De Divinis nominibus. Here we meet the important question of the
64 65
66 67
68 69
DN 5.8, cf. 7.2, Suchla: 188 and 1967. DN 5.8, Suchla: 188.
character of the Dionysian doctrine of creation: emanationism (strictly
speaking according to the Neoplatonic conception of causation) versus
creationism. We shall return to the Neoplatonic background before we
discuss Dionysius teaching.
Spearritt, commenting on the Plotinian doctrine of double activity
in connection with Dionysius doctrine of creation, emphasizes the
necessity involved in the production of the effect according to Ploti-
nus: (i) the cause produces necessarily the effect ad extra, and (ii) the
effect is a necessary result of the activity of the cause.70 I believe that
this emphasis on necessity requires some further qualication. I dis-
cussed this problem in the section on Plotinus above as well. Spearritt
appeals to two texts from the Enneads. The rst is from 5.1.6:
And all beings, as long as they remain in being ( ), necessarily
(I) produce from their own essences, from their present
power, a surrounding reality directed to what is outside of them, a
kind of image of the archetypes from which it was produced [ . . . ].
The second text, from 5.4.2, runs as follows:
[ . . . ] and the activity of the essence is the selfsame particular thing,
while the other activity is from that one, and must in everything follow
it, being necessarily different from the thing itself [ . . . ] (d b B
P P K K , b I K, m E d
K I s PF).
The conclusion Spearritt draws from these two texts (namely that
creation is due to necessity) is, in my opinion, a bit short-sighted.
Maybe the whole problem could be easier to understand if we use an
analogy.71 The will to walk and the act of walking could be seen as an
example of immanent activity. The leaving of footprints, on the other
hand, is an external activity. However, there seems to be but one
action. The will to walk and the walking are intransitive descriptions
of aspects of this action; the leaving of footprints is a transitive
description of what the walker does. Here we should listen to what
Plotinus says in the Ennead 6.1.22:
And one should not call all activities productions or say that they
produce something. Producing is incidental. Well then, if someone
walking produces footprints, do we not say that he made them? But
he did it out of being something else. Or [we may say] he produces
70 71
Spearritt (1968), 53 and 52. Cf. Emilsson (1999).
incidentally and the activity is incidental, because he did not have
this in view.
We could say then, that the will to walk and the walking itself are in a
restricted sense independent of the leaving of footprints, because in
most cases one does not walk with this purpose. Leaving footprints,
therefore, is usually incidental to the will and the purpose. On the
other hand, we should ask if the footprint-making is not a necessary
effect of walking as a physical act. I should think the answer would
have to be positive.
Let us return to the two texts from the Enneads appealed to by
Spearritt. The key to understanding the rst quotation is the
(as long as they remain in being). We should ask what is character-
istic of the remaining of the rst principle, the One. The One,
according to Plotinus, acts according to its will ().72 The
remaining of the One in its activity of essence must, then, be con-
nected with its will to be itself.73 On this background, the point is that
the One wills to be itself as remaining in its activity, and because
of this will to remain, the One necessarily produces an effect ad extra,
as the citation from Ennead 5.1.6 teaches. The conclusion to be drawn
from the second quotation is that if there is an activity of the essence,
which, as we have seen, is willed by the One, then an external activity
must follow it. Further, this external activity is necessarily different
from the rst activity.
There is no external or internal constraint on the One; rather it is
free in its internal activity because it has willed to act according to its
own nature. Of course, from a modern point of view one could object
that this is a strange notion of freedom, because it does not seem that
the One has any alternative, i.e., acts from free choice. However, what
is expressed here is the idea that to be free is to live according to ones
nature. The One wills to be itself, and this means that it wills itself as
Good. Goodness has the essential feature that it is distributive of itself,
but the One does not have this distributive aspect or the external
effect in view. From this we may draw the conclusion that the internal
activity of the One as an act of will is independent of creatures; as an
activity of Goodness, however, it is the necessary and sufcient
condition for the existence of creatures. The existence of creatures
72
Ennead 6.8.13.
73
This is the interpretation of John Rist (1967) 6683. I believe he is right in this.
is incidental to the internal activity of the One as an act of will, but
necessitated by the resulting external activity.
I believe these distinctions are important for evaluating the differ-
ence between an orthodox Christian doctrine of creation as compared
with Neoplatonism. Spearritt seems to suffer from a rather common
error regarding the evaluation of emanation versus creation: from a
Christian point of view, emphasis is often placed on Gods free will as
a characteristic of Christian thought, while the Neoplatonist position is
branded with the necessity of an emanationist position.74 This, I think,
is at least partly wrong. From both a Christian and a Neoplatonist point
of view the creation of the world does not follow by necessity from the
divine nature in itself. God, further, knows Himself as Good (i.e., as a
principle of distribution) and He wills Himself as such. It is at this point
that the difference between Christianity and Neoplatonism occurs. It
has to do with two things: (i) the character of the divine knowledge
and (ii) the modus of the divine will. Even if the One of Plotinus knows
itself as Good, I doubt that it implicitly knows itself as a principle of
something possibly other than itself. When it wills to be itself, it does
not will itself as an actual principle of such an otherness. Neither,
a fortiori, does it will itself as a principle of an otherness with a temporal
beginning. The question now is to what degree Dionysius follows in the
footsteps of Neoplatonism or to what degree does he come close to an
orthodox Christian approach.
In what sense are we to take the Dionysian pronouncement that the
Forms are acts of will? First we should note that the God of Dionysius
is the Christian God who contemplates Himself as a principle or
cause of something possibly other than Himself. This God, in know-
ing Himself as distributive of external effects, wills what He knows.
But, if this is so, how should this will or these acts of will, be under-
stood? Does the will include a decision to create an otherness with a
temporal beginning? I cannot nd any indications that point in this
direction. As a matter of fact, I cannot nd any texts in the Dionysian
writings that give clear information on the authors concept of divine
will in creation at all. Rather it seems that according to Dionysius,
what God knows from eternity, He wills from eternity, and, conse-
quently, the effects of that will are manifested from eternity.75
74
Additionally, what strikes me as strange in Spearritts treatment is that he does
not at all relate his discussion of Plotinus to the Dionysian doctrine of creation.
75
St Athanasius struggled to avoid this consequence, cf. Contra Arianos 1.29, PG 26: 72.
This interpretation may be supported by several texts in which
Dionysius speaks about the nature of Gods goodness. One text,
which is especially telling, is found in the De Divinis nominibus 4.1:
As for our sun, it exercises no calculation, no deliberate choice (P
m )76, and yet by the very fact of its existence
it gives light to all things that is able to partake of its light, according to
the logos of each things power; so it is with the Good, existing far above
the sun, an archetype far superior to its dull image, it sends the rays of its
whole goodness upon all things according to their capacity to receive it.77
This, of course, is an image, an analogy, but even so it does not receive
any denite Christian qualication in the context. Now, the words are
quite striking and seem indeed to teach that the creation of the world
follows eternally from the natural Goodness of God. This indicates
that Dionysius has adopted a kind of Neoplatonic concept of causa-
tion. According to Plotinus, the emergence of the effect is the eternal
result of the eternal activity of the Ones being. According to Proclus,
the eternally remaining cause has eternally proceeding and convert-
ing effects. At this point, the Dionysian doctrine of creation, there-
fore, seems to be more Neoplatonic than specically Christian. Even
if the world is created ex nihilo, even if it is created by Gods will to be
Himself as Good, and even if it is created by His will to be the cause
of something other than Himself, it does not seem to be created by
Gods free decision to give it a temporal beginning. The Dionysian
notion of the divine will seems to lack something that was important
for the great thinkers of the fourth century and which was repeated by
Fathers of the Church after Dionysius, for instance, by St Maximus
the Confessor: the divine will is such that God eternally could want
that something other than God, i.e. the world, should have a temporal
beginning of its existence.78
This interpretation could be met with at least three objections.
First, in The celestial hierarchies Dionysius states the freedom of
human beings.79 Is it not reasonable to believe a fortiori that God,
76
The sun does not execute any calculation, nor does God reason in this way. The
divine knowledge should not be confused with calculation or with discursive reason-
ing. It is more like a contemplative insight or understanding.
77
DN 4.1, Suchla: 144.
78
Cf. Maximus the Confessor: Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081ab. For a discussion of
the concept of Gods will in creation, cf. Tollefsen (2008).
79
CH 9.3, PG 3: 260cd.
as the supremely rational being, is eminently free as well? Could it not
just be a coincidence that Dionysius does not comment on the topic
of divine freedom? I would answer that it is not impossible that
Dionysius held an adequate doctrine of divine freedom, even though
the texts do not bear witness to it. But whatever his ideas on this,
his usage of the causal scheme has not received sufcient Christian
modication and seems to point decisively in the direction of a
beginningless world.
Secondly, is it true that the texts bear no witness at all to a doctrine
of divine freedom? In the De Divinis nominibus 13.2 Dionysius says:80
Without the One there is no multiplicity, but there can still be the
One when there is no multiplicity, just as one precedes all multiplied
number. If it is possible for God to exist without the world, then the
existence of the world must depend not only on a causality stemming
from Gods eternal will to act in accordance with His nature, but also
on the divine will to be the cause of an otherness with a temporal
beginning. Consequently, God could well have a will to decide that the
world should emerge from non-being in such a way that its temporal
existence had a starting-point. To this objection I would say that in the
face of the evidence I have put forward, I would be very sceptical to
construct a whole doctrine of divine will on the above citation. How-
ever, whatever the exact meaning of these words, I admit they point to
the possibility that a specically orthodox Christian doctrine of divine
freedom in the sense we speak about it now should perhaps not be
excluded. On the other hand, the weight of evidence leans against the
attribution of this doctrine to Dionysius, and I really doubt that he had
any such doctrine.
Thirdly, does not the fact that St Maximus, whose orthodoxy on
the issue of creation is beyond doubt, never criticizes Dionysius,
speak against my conclusion? Maximus is highly critical towards the
Neoplatonic doctrine of creation and explicitly argues against the idea
of a beginningless world.81 This objection is interesting. I believe
Maximus held the Dionysian writings in such high regard, stemming,
as he believed they did, from a disciple of St Paul, that he would not
admit that they could contain any erroneous doctrines. Maximus
interpreted the writings in the light of Tradition and what was
80
DN 13.2, Suchla: 2278.
81
Cf. De charitate 4.113, PG 90: 1048b1052a; Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081ab;
Ambiguum 10: 1176d1177b and 1181a1188c.
seemingly lacking in them he would probably read into them. If
Dionysius teaching is supplemented in regard to the divine will one
could argue that his Neoplatonic causal scheme actually could be
modied so that we would arrive at an orthodox result, perhaps
without any detriment to the Dionysian system. One way to modify
it would be to apply the Aristotelian distinction between rst actuality
= second potentiality and second actuality. See the section below on St
Maximus doctrine of creation. I would not deny this possibility, but is
it probable that the Areopagite himself would have accepted such an
elaboration of his philosophy? As it is then, I will conclude this
treatment with the dictum that if the Dionysian corpus belongs to
the last decades of the fth century, the author does not have an
orthodox doctrine of creation.
We shall now turn to the topic of participation. In the Dionysian
system, the created cosmos depends in a perspicuous way on God.
Dionysius says God is that for the sake of which, because of which, and
in which every source or beginning (I) exist, whether it is para-
digmatic, nal, efcient, formal, or elemental.82 This list of ve causes
is close to the standard Neoplatonic list of six that we nd in Simpli-
cius On Aristotle Physics 2.83 Dionysius list lacks the instrumental
cause, and his elemental () cause is probably Simplicius
material cause. The rst three kinds of causes could be justied
theologically by St Pauls by Him or in Him, to Him, and from
Him.84 The formal and elemental (material) belongs to the standard
conception of causes harking back to Aristotle himself. The Dionysian
vocabulary and the number of causes, however, are probably due
to some acquaintance with Neoplatonic material. All causes, in all
regions of the cosmos, on all cosmic levels, are, Dionysius says,
vertically dependent on God as the nal (for the sake of which),
efcient (because of which), and paradigmatic (in which) principle
or source.
In some places in the texts Dionysius notions come quite close to
the way participation is sketched in Gregory of Nyssa: God, Dionysius
says, holds the world together and embraces it.85 However, he gen-
erally moves far beyond what is said by Gregory in so many words.
82 83
DN 4.9, Suchla: 155. On Aristotle Physics 2, 316, 236.
84
Cf. St Paul Rom 11. 36 and DN 13.3, Suchla: 228. The texts are terminologically
quite close to one another.
85
For Gregory, see above. DN 10.1, Suchla: 214.
On the other hand, it is important to note that the Dionysian elabora-
tions on the topic of how God works immanently, is not opposed to
Christian concerns. It is a distinctive way to work out details of what
is a general Christian conception of created being: the created cosmos
depends radically on God for its being and preservation. There
cannot be any ontological or metaphysical feature or distinction
that is independent of Gods power and activity.
Dionysius adheres to the traditional notion that the motif behind
creation is the Goodness of God, Gods love for His creatures.86
Because of this love He is carried (becomes) outside of Himself
( F ) in his care for all things.87 When He is carried
outside of Himself, He comes to be in all things even as He remains in
Himself. In other words, Gods presence in the things He makes does
not indicate a complete immanence, because He is still Himself in His
transcendent being. Even so, God, the essential Good, by the fact of
his Being, extends () Goodness into the whole encompass of
beings.88 He is the Life of the living, and the Being of beings.89 That
God becomes outside of himself in beings, and extends Himself, are,
of course, images of the divine presence in created otherness. Exactly
how should this presence be understood?
First of all, we should notice that God is not stretched out like some
kind of body that is present everywhere. Even so, the Trinity is present
in all things.90 The differentiation into created multiplicity from the
undifferentiated unity of God Himself is due to the divine procession,
in accordance with which the divinity dispenses itself outwards.91 God
is the unparticipated cause ( I Y), and the only possi-
bility for participation in Him is if He acts outside of Himself.92
Gods remaining in Himself as Goodness is the internal condition for
the act ad extra that follows almost like a natural effect from the being
of God.93 One might get the impression that the internal activity of
Goodness, almost by some inherent constraint, results in external
activity. However, this is very unlike Plotinus thinking because
Gods acts are motivated by love for creatures.
86 87
88 89
90 91
92
DN 11.6 and 12.4, Suchla: 2223 and 225. Cf. Tollefsen (2008), 198200.
93
DN 4.1, Suchla: 1434.
Dionysius connects the divine procession with certain powers
( ) that cause deication, being, life, and wisdom.94 Dionysius
also says that processions and activities ( d K) come
from God in His creative and sustaining work, and that Gods straight
motion is the procession of His activities ( H KH) by
which, we may gather, all things come to be.95 In short, beings result
from Gods procession (or processions), understood as a manifesta-
tion of powers or activities to make, preserve, and direct the whole
rhythmic movement of the cosmos.
Exactly what does it mean to participate in God as a part of the
whole in this grand cosmic rhythm? We should turn to chapter 5
of the De Divinis nominibus to get a grasp of the principles at work
in the Dionysian cosmology. Dionysius works out an analogy with the
sun.96 The sun is one, but still acts in different ways on things in
the sensible world: renewing, nourishing, protecting, and perfecting
them. Further, the sun establishes differences between them and
unies them. The sun contains within its own unity the cause of all
the things that participate in it. However, this image seems to grow
out of proportion, because it is quite strange to predicate all these
activities on the sun. On the other hand, that the sun establishes
differences might just mean that the differences between sensible
things become visible only in the suns light; and that this light unies,
since all visible things are unied in this one light. Now, it is obvious
that in this picture we think of the suns rays with their light and
warmth as executing all these operations. The rst point of interest
here is the saying that the sun contains the causes of participating
things in a unity within itself. The Godhead, Dionysius continues,
contains the paradigms of all beings in a hyper-essential unity within
itself. These paradigms are essence-making logoi pre-existing in the
Godhead. The logoi are divine acts of will ( ) that predene
or predetermine beings. God made beings in accordance with these.97
The logoi or acts of will that become paradigmatic for creatures are a
unity in God, since they are obviously different ways the one and the
same divine being may be mirrored in created beings.98
The logoi are the paradigmatic causes by which God institutes the
essences of beings. Each creature, i.e., each created essence, has its
being and well-being in accordance with its logos (a e Pe
94 95
96 97 98
DN 5.8, Suchla: 1878. Ibid. DN 5.9, Suchla: 1889.
d e r d e s r ).99 Because God is the para-
digmatic cause, created essences are made according to their logoi
with the limited potentiality of receiving a denite share of the divine
qua what may be participated. As the efcient cause of beings, God
proceeds into the realm of instituted essences in order to be available
in His activities for reception by creatures. What is received are
qualities such as goodness, being, beauty, life, etc., all of which are
basically God moving dynamically or in His activities ad extra. Beings
have their being and their other qualities not as created gifts, but as
participations in the divine power. This seems to be the main feature
of Dionysius notion of participation.
However, this picture raises some questions that need to be
answered. The rst question is whether this idea brings us once
more into the Platonic dilemma found in Parmenides, concerning
the how of participation: is the intelligible again implicitly conceived
of as an extended body that may be divided and distributed? The
answer is denitely no. Dionysius, in fact, has made some progress
when it comes to the concept of participation, also in comparison
with St Gregory of Nyssa. Somehow, his ideas are quite close to
Plotinus ideas in the section on omnipresence in the Enneads, but
Dionysius seems to me to have improved on Plotinus doctrine.100
Dionysius does not view God in the simple or imaginative way as a
quasi-extended body, but rather considers the Godhead as the onto-
logical centre of the cosmos. All things are somehow projected out
from God as from the centre of the circle, and consequently all things
touchto use a sensible imagethe divine, unextended point.101
He denitely proceeds to all things, as is said in different words in
many places in the corpus,102 but this procession does not indicate a
movement over a distance, rather it means that God is active as the
transcendent centre of all being. The improvement, as compared with
Plotinus, consists in the introduction and application of divine para-
digms as logoi or acts of will that set the limits for the essential
capacity or potentiality of created being. These limits make beings
capable of receiving the divine gifts into their own being to a certain
degree: beings participate in Being, Goodness, Life, Beauty, etc., to the
degree dened by their logoi.
99
DN 5.8, cf. 4.7, Suchla: 186 and 1513.
100
I discussed this passage above, in the section on Plotinus.
101 102
DN 7.3, Suchla: 1978. Cf. for instance DN 5.10; Suchla: 18990.
There is a further aspect to all this. It becomes evident throughout
chapter four in De Divinis nominibus. First, I think we should note
the circular character of the totality of created being. Dionysius says
that all being comes from (K) the Beautiful and the Good, is in (K) it,
and converts toward (N) it.103 This idea of circular movement is
formulated in several ways in the text.104 There is a striking similarity
between Dionysian thought in this regard and a common structure
found in Neoplatonic philosophy. A famous formula in Proclus says
that an effect remains in its cause ( K B PF N ), proceeds
from it ( I PB), and converts to it (K e
P).105 The three activities of remaining, proceeding, and convert-
ing in Neoplatonism are constitutive for the being that emerges
from the higher principles. As a matter of fact, it works the same
in Dionysius. Beings are made in the creative procession, but are
intended to convert to God as the nal goal of their course. In the
activity of conversion, beings, especially intelligent ones, may parti-
cipate even deeper and more fully in the divine source in accordance
with a capacity or tness to receive the divine activity of Beauty and
Goodness into themselves.106 There is a longing or love ( and
I) from below that stretches forth to the divine activity man-
ifested towards creatures.107 Beings move into or are active towards
the divine sphere of activity. In this sphere they receive the divine
manifestation into themselves and are participants.
There are some interesting points to take notice of in this picture.
Dionysius says that God causes love and is the thing loved. He moves
towards love and He moves love. He moves in an endless circle
(I ) through, from, in, and to the Good.108 One gets the
impression that the cosmos is viewed as dynamically carried around
in a great divine movement of love. Secondlyand this is especially
relevant in the present contextone gets the impression that this
endless circle is just that, namely endless or from eternity. If that is so,
what we nd concerning creation in Dionysius deviates, as we have
seen, from mainstream Christian thought at his time. One might
wonder about this: would it not be obvious for a Christian theologian
after the era of the Cappadocian Fathers to teach explicitly that the
103 104
DN 4.10, Suchla: 154. For instance in DN 4.17, Suchla: 162.
105 106
Elements of theology, prop. 35. DN 4.4 and 4.5, Suchla: 147 and 149.
107
DN 4.7, cf. 4.4 and 4.5, Suchla: 1512, 148 and 149.
108
DN 4.14, Suchla: 160.
cosmos has a beginning? It seems puzzling how someone who wanted
to be taken seriously on the public theological scene could beat
bestambiguous in this regard.
C. ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ON CREATION

AND PARTICIPATION
The author of the Dionysian corpus probably belonged to the latter

part of the fth or the beginning of the sixth century. Proclus, who one
believes inuenced the author, lived c.41185. A pagan Neoplatonist,
he argued for a beginningless and endless cosmos. Some Christian
thinkers exposed to Neoplatonic views, seem to have accepted
such a doctrine despite the enormous inuence of the Cappadocian
Fathers.109 In 529 Justinian closed the Neoplatonist school of Athens
where the famous Neoplatonist Simplicius worked. The same year John
Philoponus, an Alexandrian Christian and member of the Neoplato-
nist school of Alexandria, responded to Proclus eighteen arguments
against a beginning of the cosmos (De aetnitate mundi contra chris-
tianos, a lost work) with his De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum.110
All of this indicates that despite the grand effort of St Basil the Great, St
Ambrose, and St Augustine, the temporal beginning of the world was
still an issue for Christians engaged in classical learning; Philoponus
was rst with a series of arguments based on the philosophical heritage
of the schools that puts Christian thought on the offensive in this
regard.
St Maximus the Confessor argues against the idea of a beginning-
less cosmos in a number of places in his writings.111 A major thinker
in spiritual matters, Maximus still has a keen philosophical mind, and
should be considered a rst-rate philosopher. Since that is so, one
might wonder which of the pagan thinkers or Christian thinkers of
the schools with whom he was acquainted. This question is hard to
109 110
Sorabji (1983), 196. Sorabji (1983), 1979.
111
I treated Maximus doctrine of creation in Tollefsen (2008), 4063, as well, but
the angle differs and some ideas are more developed in the present work. I know of no
other treatment of Maximus doctrine of creation from a philosophical point of view.
The possible connection between Maximus and Philoponus which I comment on in
this section, is, as far as I know, entirely my own hypothesis.
answer precisely. Christian authors often refer respectfully to their
Christian sources, but seldom make reference to those of outsiders.
Even so, some small texts on logic are extant which, it may be argued,
probably belonged to Maximus himself.112 However, it seems highly
probable that Maximus knew more than that and was acquainted
with the philosophy of the schools, especially with Neoplatonist
doctrines, possibly both through listening to lectures and reading
certain works. Could this be argued more specically? I believe it
can. The key here may be the Christian Neoplatonist Stephanus.113
In my book on Maximus I argued hypothetically that if Stephanus
moved from Alexandria to Constantinople (at the invitation of the
emperor) in AD 610, and if he brought with him his own book and
books by other Christian members of the Alexandrian academy, if he
gave lectures, and if Maximus was made head of the Imperial Chan-
cellery about 610, then Maximus would be in a position to listen
to Stephanus lectures, enjoy his conversation, and read the books
Stephanus brought with him.114 This hypothesis seems to me highly
probable. One might wonder which books Stephanus would probably
have brought with him? Here, of course, we are on much thinner ice.
Even so, my guess is that he brought books by Philoponus, and if not
so, that he probably lectured on Philoponus arguments against
Proclus. Why? Stephanus came from a Neoplatonist school, and
I believe he would not have avoided such an important issue in
cosmology that would be of interest to the learned representatives
of the Church. Further, even if Maximus arguments do not repro-
duce the arguments of Philoponus there are certain features of Max-
imus cosmology that betray a similarity with arguments, concepts,
and notions we nd in the Contra Proclum.115 I think Philoponus
actually brought impulses to Christian thinking about the cosmos
that left their mark on further developments, even if Maximus was
not a school-philosopher, but rather a distinctive Christian philoso-
pher or a philosopher of the Church.
112
Tollefsen (2008), 15.
113
Cf. the introduction to Philoponus, On Aristotle On the Soul 3.18 (2000), 210.
114
Tollefsen (2008), 16.
115
For instance compare Ambiguum 7, PG 91:1081ab; De char. 4,4, PG 90: 1048d
with Ioannis Philoponus, Contra Proclum 36 (Share 2004, 389), 74 (ibid., 61), 76
(ibid., 62), 78 (ibid., 63), 79 (ibid., 64); Compare Cap. gnost. 1,10, PG 90: 1085d1088a
with Contra Proclum 88 (ibid., 69). The numbers in parenthesis point to translations,
see bibliography.
We should appreciate the starting-point of Maximus cosmology. It
does not begin within a school discussion, but rather with a denite
theological insight. The cosmos, according to Maximus, exists for
the sake of the hypostatic union. The hypostatic union exists for the
sake of the deication of creatures. The deication of creatures is
because of divine goodness and love, but this motif has no further
reason since it stems from the divine mystery of triune activity in
God.116
The divine acts towards a created otherness are motivated in what
Maximus calls the mystery of Christ. A key text in this regard is found
in Quaestiones ad Thalassium 60. Maximus comments on the text from
1 Pet 1:1920, in which it is stated that Christ was known before the
foundation of the world. Christ as foreknown is the same as the
mystery of Christ. The Holy Trinity itself, according to its essence
( P), holds this mystery.117 It was foreknown ()
by the Father according to his approval (eudokia), to the Son according
to his self-work (autourgia), and to the Spirit according to his coopera-
tion (synergia).118 Christ was foreknown (), not as God,
but as man.119 This is the mystery circumscribing all the ages revealing
the super-innite, great council of God, which in a manner beyond
reckoning innitely pre-exist the ages [ . . . ], Maximus says.120
Maximus thinks, then, that what God contemplates beyond time,
in His eternal council, is executed by divine activity in such a way that
the eternal plan achieves temporal actuality. The execution of the
divine plan requires the creation of a world, which could furnish a
scene for temporal movement. Maximus does not speculate about
why the creation came about so recently, i.e., why the world is not
that old. In De charitate 4.3, he says that God is Creator from eternity,
and that He creates when He wishes. There is, in fact, no other
answer to the question of why He created now (F), than to say His
wisdom is inscrutable. On the other hand, one could know the reason
( N) why God made the world, namely that He intends to realize
the mystery, but how and why (H d a ) He created recently
() is a subject impossible for a human mind to grasp.121
St Maximus obviously sees the philosophical problem of how to
explain the accommodation of an eternal purpose into the sphere of
116 117
Ad Thal. 60, CCSG 22, 7381. Ad Thal 60, CCSG 22, 79.
118 119 120
Ibid. Ibid. Ad Thal 60, CCSG 22, 75.
121
De char. 4,25, PG 90: 1048bd.
the quite other. However, even if he does not speculate about the how
and why, he indicates the lines along which he would like to think of
the creation of the cosmos. In the 7th Ambiguum he states that beings
did not come into being along with the divine knowledge of them, but
each being gets actual being at the proper time in accordance with the
wisdom of the Creator.122 In De charitate 4, 3 Maximus speaks of
God existing eternally as Creator, and in 4, 4 he says that in the
creative act God manifested His eternally pre-existing knowledge of
beings.123
The problem of how one should reconcile Gods eternal knowledge
of beings with the act of creating a world with a temporal beginning,
confronted Philoponus as well. In the Contra Proclum he solves the
problem by employing a set of Aristotelian concepts, namely the
distinction between (i) rst actuality (energeia) = second potentiality,
and (ii) second actuality. It is possible for someone to possess
a capacity (i) without executing it (ii).124 The possession may be
considered a rst actuality that may be a potential for later activity.
Philoponus further argues that the passing from a capacity into
production is instantaneous, i.e., without the passage of time, like
when light emanates from a source of illumination. God brings
creation about just by willing it.125 What Philoponus means is that
the cosmos originates with a sequence of temporality for its own part,
and that God eternally knows and instantaneously wills this sequence.
I am convinced that Maximus is in complete agreement with this
assertion. He does not ponder the questions any deeper than this,
even though he was acquainted with the discussions of the eternity of
the world and in some texts would like to argue philosophically that
the world has a temporal beginning. There is, for instance, a very
dense argument in several steps in Ambiguum 10.126
Even if there is no philosophical analysis of the divine activity
of creation as such, it is obvious that the motif for the creation is
to be sought in the internal life of the Holy Triad, and that this is
the necessary and sufcient condition for there being a world. As
in Aristotle, God is eternally active contemplating Himself. As in
Plotinus, the internal activity beyond all characterization is the reason
122 123
Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081ab. PG 90: 1048cd.
124
Contra Proclum 624 (Share 2004, 535).
125
Contra Proclum 645 (Share 2004, 546).
126
Ambiguum 10, PG 91: 1176d1188d, cf. Tollefsen (2008), 4063.
why other things exist. But unlike Aristotle, the divine contemplation,
even if it is a contemplation of Gods own being, is a contemplation of
a triadic nature, and it has eternally conceived a mystery that is for the
sake of others, i.e. for created beings. This God and His activity are
not the Aristotelian God and His activity. And unlike Plotinus, the
existence of creatures is not an incidental result of the divine activity.
Within the eternal providential contemplation there occurs the whole
set of divine Forms (logoi) for a created otherness in all its richness
and its immanent purpose.127 In addition there occurs the divine plan
of salvation. This is not the God of Plotinus either.
The mystery of Christ is the mystery of incarnation. But this does
not mean that it is exclusively the mystery of God becoming man as
Jesus Christ. The Maximian concept of incarnation or embodiment is
broader. Always and in all Gods Logos and God wills to effect the
mystery of His own embodiment.128 Always and in all, Maximus
says. The Logos has a three-fold presence, embodiment, or incarna-
tion in relation to created otherness: in the cosmos, the Scriptures,
and in Jesus Christ.129 Now, to speak of incarnation or embodiment
in the cosmos and the Scriptures is, obviously, a metaphorical usage
of terms. The Logos as a divine person did not move into the cosmos
to make Himself present hypostatically in diverse beings, nor did He
literally or physically embody Himself in the Scriptures. Even so
He made Himself present. This presence was accomplished through
the logoi, i.e., eternally wrought divine Forms by which the Logos
makes Himself present in the world.130 Why should we speak of the
embodiment of divine Forms as an incarnation or embodiment of the
Logos? According to Maximus we should understand it this way
because the creation and salvation of the world is knit together in
one single divine purpose, exclusively bound up with the great mys-
tery. The creation of the world is the rst step towards the fullment
of Gods plan.131 Even though the Logos Himself is not hypostatically
present in created essences or natures, the logoi dening them and
delimiting their natural capacity represent Him in relation to them.
They are His patterns for creatures. The logos of being denes their
127 128
Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1077c1081b. Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1084cd.
129
Ambiguum 33, PG 91: 1285c1288a.
130
For the doctrine of logoi, see Tollefsen (2008).
131
One should read the Ambiguum 41, which contains the whole Maximian
world-view in a nutshell.
nature, the logos of well-being denes the pattern according to which
they should move, and the logos of eternal well-being denes their
destination, i.e. the nal deied state into which they should
move.132 The historical Incarnation proper, i.e., the hypostatic
union between divine and human nature in Jesus Christ, is required
if the second and third stage is to be achieved.
Even if he doesnt speculate about the how and why of creation,
Maximus offers a glimpse into the metaphysics of creation and
salvation, and in this connection we come into contact with patterns
of thought we recognize as being similar with Neoplatonism. In the
7th Ambiguum, for instance, he employs terminology that originates
from Neoplatonic sources.133 He speaks of a c ,
i.e., a procession which keeps together and a K [ . . . ]
I, i.e., a converting transference. Now, the doctrine of
proodos and epistrofe is developed in later Neoplatonism, especially
in the system of Proclus as a development of the Plotinian concept of
double activity. It is a doctrine of causation. I have pointed earlier to
the well-known words from Proclus: every effect remains in its
cause, proceeds from it, and converts to it.134 The effect must
somehow be connected with a certain internal activity of its cause.
The remaining is the presence of the effect on the level of the rst
principle. In his Elements of Theology Proclus teaches that causes
generate because of their perfection in goodness, so that the ancient
motif of goodness that by nature distributes itself is an important
premise for Proclus.135 There is, then, an internal activity of good-
ness, and from this arises the effect. The effect proceeds from its
cause according to an external activity, i.e., it differs from the cause.
The effect is fullled as a new entity in its conversion to its cause,
i.e., when the effect is perfected according to its own internal activity.
I suppose these causal patterns are familiar now from what has been
said earlier concerning Plotinus and Proclus.
It is difcult to tell exactly from which source Maximus received
his terminology of remainingprocessionconversion. It seems quite
probable, though, that a primary source must have been the pseudo-
Dionysian writings. On the other hand, Maximus could have learned
about the Neoplatonic triad by reading Neoplatonist works as well.
132 133
Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1084b1085a. Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081c.
134
Dodds ed., The Elements of Theology, prop. 35.
135
Cf. propositions 2539.
However that may be, it is very important to see how he sets the
terminology to use while making it a tool for his own concerns. He
does not transport a Neoplatonic theory into his Christian system,
but nds the terminology useful.
Maximus, then, has a doctrine of the procession and conversion of
the effect in relation to its cause, and he even has a theory of the
effects remaining in the cause. One could turn to the 7th Ambiguum
for one of his elaborations of this doctrine. All effects are originally
present in God in their logoi. The effects do not have an original
existence as particular spiritual beings in or around God,136 but God
knows in His logoi all the things He will make, intelligible as well as
sensible.137 So this at least is one aspect of the internal activity of the
divine being, its contemplation of the logoi of beings. We should
remember, however, that to speak of God in this way is a concession
to our intellectual weakness, since God is not, according to Max-
imus, intuitive thought ().138 On the other hand, we cannot
avoid speaking of God as contemplating and as having knowledge or
wisdom.139 In the De charitate Maximus says that When He willed
it, the Creator gave being to and put forward His eternally pre-
existing knowledge of beings.140 These metaphysical considerations
bring us back to the mystery of Christ. Because to know beings in
their logoi, before the foundation of the cosmos, means to know
them in the Logos or as related to the Logos. The Logos, according to
some important texts, is the centre of the logoi, and they are all
contemplated as belonging to Him.141 The point, as noted above, is
that creation and salvation both belong to one single divine purpose.
The internal activity of God, then, is the activity of love, centred on
the knowledge of and will to execute the economy. Somehow, the
whole drama of creation and salvation is based on the internal
relationship between and activity of the persons in the Holy Trinity.
The will of God is joined to His knowledge in such a way that what is
conceived in the divine being as related to an economy of the Logos is
136
This is said against the so-called Origenists, cf. Sherwood (1955).
137 138
Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081a. Cap. gnost. 2.2, PG 90: 1125c.
139
In the section on Plotinus above, we saw that he also wanted to state that God is
beyond our concepts of intellection. Even so we have to speak of God this way in order
to talk of Him as the source or beginning of creatures.
140
De char. 4.4, PG 90: 1048d.
141
Cf. Cap. gnost. 2.4, PG 90: 1125d1128a, Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081c, Myst.
ch. 1, PG 91: 668ab.
executed in a temporally structured world. The activity of will is
joined to the activity of knowledge that manifests the logoi in con-
cretely existing beings in the creaturely realm. This is what I have
called the Christocentric cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor.142
Maximus says the logoi are contemplated in Gods K
(KH K F).143 Knowledge and will are divine activ-
ities, and the logoi occur in connection with these activities of knowl-
edge and will. Actually, the logoi are conceived in the quite dynamic
way as Gods will or acts of will ( ), an idea we found in
Dionysius as well.144 One cannot divide the simple divine being into
several different properties or activities as if it was composed of
different powers. Even so, we shall have to talk of divine activities
as ways in which Gods essence become active, even if in itself this
essence is completely simple. Being simple, however, it can execute all
perfections, even if it is unfeasible to identify the nature of God, as it is
in itself, with what it naturally may execute.
So knowledge and will are activities, and the logoi occur as acts of will.
How are these logoi then to be understood? A logos, as an act of the will
of God, could be understood as (i) a denition of essence which God
eternally wanted to contemplate as a possibility of making something in
accordance with this design, or as (ii) such a denition of essence which
God chose to execute in actual existence.145 Whatever way it is under-
stood, I believe that a distinction should be made between logoi and
activities (K) to the effect that all logoi are activities because they
are divine volitions, but not all activities are logoi.146
I think the text in The gnostic chapters 1, 4750 is important when
one tries to understand Maximus teaching of divine activity or
activities. The rst chapter runs:
The Sabbath rest of God is the full return of all creatures to Him,
according to which He puts an end to their natural activity, ineffably
activating His most divine activity. For God puts an end to the natural
activity which happens to be in each being, according to which in
a natural way each being naturally moves, whenever each being
142 143
In Tollefsen (2008), of the same title. Ambiguum 22, PG 91: 1257a.
144
Cf. Ad Thal. 13, CCSG 7, 95. On Dionysius, see above.
145
This distinction is found in Thomas Aquinas as well, cf. Summa theologiae I,
q. 15, art. 3.
146
Cf. Tollefsen (2008), 16970. The interpretation that Maximus distinguishes
between logoi and energeiai is supported by Bradshaw (2007), 206, as well.
receives in due measure the divine activity, and xes its proper natural
activity around God Himself.
Before we start to interpret this chapter and its sequence, we should
keep in mind that the connection made by Maximus between cos-
mology and soteriology again and again sets its stamp on the texts.
This means that a given text may be both cosmologically and soter-
iologically relevant. Cosmological and soteriological matters will turn
up intertwined with each other. If we turn to the present text, let us
rst notice that Maximus makes a distinction between the activity of
created being and the activity of God: created being has a natural
activity, God has his most divine activity. Secondly, when a creature
draws near to God, an end is gradually put to the proper activity that
stems from its essence or nature. The divine activity somehow takes
over, and is received within each being as the mode under which the
creature xes a certain activity around God.
There is something here that is not easy to get a hold of. For a start
we have the distinction between creaturely and divine activity. Is this
distinction still at play in the last part of the chapter? Maximus says
that when a creature receives the divine activity, it xes its proper
natural activity around God. What could this mean? Are not crea-
turely activities brought to an end? What is this proper natural
activity? Could it be that some creaturely activities are brought to
an end, while other activities are executed in the mode of divine
activity? Or could it mean that the divine activity that is received
becomes the proper natural activity of the creature? (I shall try to
answer these questions, but for details relating to the topic of soter-
iology proper one should consult Chapter 6 below.) This much is at
least obvious: a doctrine of participation lurks in the background, and
this, as a matter of fact, is what we nd in the next chapters.
The word energeia does not turn up in the next relevant chapters,
but another word plays a major role, namely , plural of . As
we shall see, ergon means two things. I believe that one of these senses
is equivalent to energeia while the other is not. In The gnostic chapters
1, 48 we read that we should distinguish between two kinds of divine
works (erga), namely the works which he began to do (a z
X) and the works which he did not begin to do (z P
X). The works that God began to do are obviously to be under-
stood as created beings. This is stated explicitly in the text itself.
Maximus is talking of beings with a temporal beginning, beings
differing essentially from each other. They are called participating
beings (a Z ). In other words, he speaks of the results
of divine creative activity ad extra. Now, ergon in this sense is some-
thing made, an essence, and not an activity. Maybe ergon in this sense
is dynamically understood as that which originates within the scope
of an activity. Such an understanding would knit the creature into an
intimate relationship with the divine activity itself, something that
seems to be the concern of Maximus in this context.
Further, the works which God did not begin doing, the works that
did not happen to have a temporal beginning of their being, to quote
the text, are called participated beings (a Z ), in which
participating beings participate according to grace. Maximus gives
examples of these kinds of works: Goodness (and all that Goodness
entails), Life, Immortality, Simplicity, Immutability, Innity, and all
that is contemplated as essentially around him (d P).
In The gnostic chapters 1, 47 there is talk of the divine activity that
operates in created beings. In 1, 48 we hear of certain beginningless
divine works that are objects of participation for creatures. What are
these works and how are they related to the activity? The sequence
of the text seems to indicate that work and activity are in a way one
and the same thing. In 1, 47 we read that the creature, when it receives
the divine activity, xes its activity around him. In 1, 48 we nd that the
works of the eternal divine are contemplated in this same sphere. This
could mean that the creature xes its activity in the sphere where the
divine activity, manifested as beginningless works, naturally belongs (cf.
PH), i.e., around God. In 1, 47 we see divine activities playing an
important role in relation to the creature, taking over certain creaturely
activities, and in 1, 48 we see that participating beings partake of the
participated beings according to grace. Obviously, creatures are related
in the same way to the divine activities and to the divine works.
Consequently, activities and works are in this context ontologically the
same. There is, however, one rather curious thing to take notice of in this
connection, namely, how are we to think of Goodness, Life, Immortality,
Simplicity, Immutability, and Innity as works or as activities? I
suppose we can say that these terms that name divine perfections are
names we give to Gods being-giving, life-giving, immortality-giving,
simplifying, immutability-making, and innity-making activities.
What emerges in the interpretation up till now indicates something
of the greatest importance for the relation between Gods essence
(nature) and activity (energeia) in Maximus. He develops his teaching
in a way that will lend itself to the interpretation later offered by
St Gregory Palamas. It seems rst of all obvious that when one speaks
of works, one identies something different from the one who
made the work. That is, God in Himself, according to what He is,
differs from what He simply has made (creatures) and from what
He manifests from His own being (beginningless works). It should
also be noted in 1, 49 that God, according to Maximus, innitely
transcends all beings, both participating and participated. In a vein
that reminds one of the introduction to the Mystagogia (the last part,
interpreted earlier in Chapter 3, c.), he says that all that is categorized
by the term being, is a work of God, and belongs to the class of what is
transcended by the Godhead.
A work is generally not identied with the one working. The begin-
ningless works, further, do not seem to be just work in the subjective
sense (doing something), but is rather work as an activity culminating
in something brought forward. This would be analogous with the
Aristotelian idea that a form is settled in matter through the activity of
an artisan. When Maximus speaks of these works he calls them parti-
cipated beings (Z); how is this to be understood? A being is a thing,
an entity, a something, but it seems quite unfeasible that there
should exist beginningless, eternal beings of this kind around God
or between God and creatures, as if Maximus wanted to put an
intelligible hierarchy of lesser gods between God and created otherness.
I dont think these works are called beings because of some established
existence as entities in their own right, which they cannot have, but
rather because they are a real source of participation for created beings.
In De charitate (3, 25) one nds a chapter that obviously speaks
of the same topic as the one we are discussing above. Four divine
properties are listed: Being, Eternal being, Goodness, and Wisdom.
Note that they are not called activities or works, but properties
(N ). According to Porphyrys Isagogea text that Maximus
probably knew; he was at least familiar with the kind of logic
expressed therea property does not dene the essence of something,
but belongs to an entity in a more permanent manner than does an
accident.147 This then, adds to our understanding that there is a kind
of distinction or difference between the divine essence and the divine
properties (activities or works). However, one should not press the
147
Porphyrii, Isagoge, 12, CAG 4.1 (Berlin 1887). Cf. Rouech (1980), 912, on
property, in a handbook of logical terminology probably owned by Maximus himself.
term distinction too far, because Maximus obviously is not making
the divine into two different things, an essence and a set of activities.
I think he would have claimed to be in perfect agreement with
St Gregory of Nyssa on the teaching of the relation between Gods
essence and energeia.
As well, De charitate introduces the participation motif. When
God brought intelligent creatures into being, he communicated
(K) to them the above-mentioned properties. This,
I hold, does not mean anything other than that creatures receive the
divine activity (Cap. gnost. 1, 47) or that beginningless divine works
are to be participated in by creatures (ibid. 1, 48). In short, we are
discussing the same topic. What is especially telling in the passage
from De charitate is the distribution of properties that is envisaged.
Being and Eternal being are given to the essence of creatures, while
Goodness and Wisdom are given to the gnomic tness ( c
K). What is this gnomic tness? We shall have to return
to an interpretation of this term. Now we should note that it denotes
an anthropological concept of relevance for the doctrines of Christol-
ogy and soteriology. It points to the human will in the condition
of being prepared for the reception of Gods grace. According to
Maximus then, in the creaturely order of being, rational entities receive
Being and Eternal being. In the redemptive order they receive Good-
ness and Wisdom. Expressing it this way, I, of course, do not intend to
separate the dimensions of creation and salvation, for they are two
aspects of the one and same divine purpose or mystery. What we should
note here, however, is just that the activities, works, or properties are
distributed to creatures for their participation in accordance with a
divine scheme for their creation and salvation. All properties are not
received immediately or at the same time, even if the nature of intelli-
gent creatures, i.e., man, is designed to be a natural place for the
permanent presence of them all.
The creation of the world, as we have seen, is bringing Gods
eternal knowledge of beings into a temporal dimension. Beings have
their design in the logoi, and creation is precisely this, that entities
are called into the temporal sphere (to be accurate: into the spheres
of the ages) of participation in Gods activity in accordance with
these designs. There are logoi for individuals, species, and genera.148
148
Cf. Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1080a, Ambiguum 41, 1312bd.
Eventually, all logoi are reducible to the one Logos, which points to the
fact that each logos represents the one Logos to the creature whose
design it is.149 I suppose the logoi are both one and many because the
one Logos by His will wishes to express Himself qua designing perfec-
tion towards those beings that He creates. By an infused power
( ) Gods presence is proclaimed in all things.150 God is present
by His activity as an undivided whole in each thing in accordance with
the logos of the being of the thing.151 To be more precise, by the activity
God is present as a whole in a common way (H) and He is present
as a whole in each creature in a special way (N). God is,
however, undivided and indivisible, He neither expands nor contracts
Himself in accordance with His activity. How should this be under-
stood? I believe that Gods presence as a whole in a common way
means that all created beings (essences) have the basic ontological
character of being made participants in Being in common. Created
essences, generic, specic, and particular ones, are arranged according
to the divine pattern for the cosmos. God, in short, keeps the world fast
in His grip. The manifold is unied in the one activity of communica-
tion of Being from God. But Gods presence is not just a general
presence. He is present to every created nature. There is a logos for
each individual, and in accordance with this logos God is present as a
whole in the special way He has designed for this particular creature.
From all of this we may gather that even if Gods essence could not be
identied with what God does, His doingi.e., His activity or His
worksimplies the presence of the one who acts, a presence that He
regulates in accordance with His logoi.
Now, here we have something very similar to what we found in St
Gregory of Nyssa, where the artist left his stamp on his work.152 Like
an artist, God has left His stamp on His work, the cosmos, and we
may observe the ineffable Wisdom of God in the orderly arrangement
of the world.153 God manifests an all-sustaining activity, according to
149
Cf. Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081bc. The texts in which the one Logos represents
the centre of the circle while the logoi are the radii, points in the same direction, cf.
Cap. gnost. 2.4, PG 90: 1125d1128a, Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081c and Myst. ch. 1, PG
91: 668ab.
150
Cap. gnost. 1.49, PG 90: 1101a.
151
To this and what follows, cf. Ambiguum 22, PG 91: 12561257.
152
De beatitudinibus, Oratio 6, GNO 7.2, 141.
153
De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 44ab.
Gregory.154 It seems to me that both Gregory and Maximus think of
the divine activity in a rather special way. While human acts start
and terminate, Gods acts do not. The human activity of building
(a movement, according to Aristotle) has no existence beyond the
completion of the structure built. According to Aristotle it terminates
at the moment when the work is completed. The human activities of
thinking, of seeing, of committing virtuous acts, even if complete in
themselves as energeiai, also have their beginnings and endings,
beyond which nothing remains of the activities themselves even if
certain outcomes may still be present. Gods works neither begin nor
end, as we have seen in connection with Maximus thought. Even so,
they are accommodated instantaneously into temporality, as we saw
above, in connection with the distinction between rst and second
energeia according to Aristotle and Philoponus. The Wisdom and
Goodness observed in the cosmos is not just the stamp left by the
artist. It is a witness to the permanent presence of God, because the
world of creatures cannot exist, nor can it be an ordered structure
without Gods incessant presence that keeps what He has made in
being, order, and goodness. This is one of the reasons why Maximus
speaks of Gods works without beginning and calls these works
participated beings. In a sense, these works or energeiai are similar
to Aristotelian actualities, at least in the special sense of necessary and
sufcient conditions for the being and perfection of beings. As I said
above, it is quite out of the question to think that these works or
beings constitute an eternal assembly of entities below or around
God, something like a quasi-Origenian plethora of rational beings or
a collection of energies in the Eunomian sense. Once more, however,
like in St Gregory above, we meet the problem of simplicity and
plurality in connection with the concept of God. We shall have to
discuss this problem in Chapter 8, in the Concluding Remarks. What
is signaled with Maximus terminology, I think, is that God is a living
God, acting internally and externally, not in the sense that His acts
begin and end, but in the sense that they are somehowto use a
couple of metaphorslike a eld of energy, a radiance of light con-
stantly accompanying the divine being. Divine acts are not like human
acts in the sense that they have a restricted existence. They are loaded
with creative force. They are always making, expanding, life-giving.
154
De hominis opicio 16, PG 44: 185d.
From the philosophical point of view, the concept of a divine activity
seems to be reasonably well dened: an activity is the eternal movement
of the Holy Triad, in virtuous, creative, sustaining, and deifying acts,
based on the perfection of the transcendent nature and administered
triadically in the internal and external spheres in accordance with the
one divine will. It strikes me once more, like we saw in connection with
St Gregory and Dionysius, that the ontological content of essential
being (generic, specic, and particular) is created, but the ontological
conditions on which beings exist (Being, Goodness, etc.) are the
uncreated divine activities ad extra. We shall return to the question
of the relation between created essential activity and divine activity
below.
5
The External Activity of the

Godhead: Incarnation
A. ST GREGORY OF NYSSA ON
THE INCARNATION
It is tempting to assess St Gregorys doctrine of the Incarnation in

relation to the council of Chalcedon (AD 451). Even if there are some
interesting terminological similarities between Gregory and later
Christology, this procedure, however, is anachronistic.1 What was at
stake for the Cappadocian Fathers was the conception of divinity, not
primarily the doctrine of the Incarnation as such. Even so, these two
issues are related since they concern the Christian doctrine of salva-
tion. They are thematically connected since the Son is the captain of
[ . . . ] salvation (Heb 2:10). One may ask about the reason for the
Cappadocian focus. At rst, the answer is obviousthey were chal-
lenged by the theology of the Arians in the distinct form of the
Anomoean doctrines. If the Arian Christ was conceived as such in
relation to a doctrine of salvation, this distinctive view was present in
Cappadocian theology as well. Who is this Saviour who is able to
bridge our way to God? The answer to such a question is connected
with an understanding of what salvation really amounts to. How are
we saved, what are we saved from, and what is the content of salva-
tion? Who is competent to achieve for us what we hope for? Whatever
the Arians and Anomoeans think of this, for the Cappadocian Fathers
1
Fr. Andrew Louth has pointed out to me the temptation to interpret Gregorys
Christology in relation to Chalcedon. Ill try to keep clear of this in what follows. See
the useful article by Daley in Coakley ed. (2004). I agree that Gregorys formulations
are set within a theoretical frame worked out in a contemporary discussion that makes
them interesting in their own right.
134 The External Activity of the Godhead: Incarnation
the reason for our creation, the purpose of human existence, is to
experience communion with God, to share the divine life to such a
degree that we are deied (John 1:12): But as many as received Him,
to them He gave the K to become children of God . . . . St Basil
speaks of becoming like God and becoming God.2 Who could grant
this power, this authority (K) to become children of God in this
distinctive fashion if not God Himself? The Christology of St Gregory
has its character from this basic acknowledgement: the Son of God is
fully divine. He condescended to save us by healing our nature and
achieving for us the possibility of communion with God. As a rst
step, He deied His own humanity and this is the angle from which
we now shall address Gregorys Christology.
From the point of view of the doctrine of divine activity, what will
be discussed below is how St Gregory (and in the next two sections St
Maximus) understands the deication of the human nature of Christ.
In the next chapter we move further and focus on the deication of
human beings that is achieved as a result of Christs work for our
salvation. I think both of these phenomena are instances of participa-
tion. And no doubt, this will be particularly relevant for the topic of
uncreated energies in the Palamitic sense.
In book 3, part 3 of the Contra Eunomium, St Gregory comments
on the saying of the Apostle Peter in Acts 2:36: God hath made that
same Jesus, whom ye have crucied, both Lord and Christ. Accord-
ing to Eunomius, this is spoken of the Logos, and not the man Jesus.
Gregory, on the other hand, following his brother Basil, argues that it
was said that in Him, which was human and was seen by all. God the
Logos assumed human nature. The assumed nature, being mixed with
the divine, became through this mixture (I) what the assum-
ing nature was.3 The humanity was exalted to the dignity of Lord and
Christ:4 It follows, then, that the Apostle says that His humanity was
exalted; exalted, that is, by becoming Lord and Christ. And this took
place after the Passion. Of course, to Gregory this does not mean that
the divine and human natures were not united during the earthly stay
of the Logos. It is a plausible interpretation to take the saying in the
sense that the deication of Christs humanity was completed and
2
De Spiritu Sancto, PG 32: 109c. Aspects of Gregorys doctine of salvation are
discussed later in Chapter 6.
3
CE, GNO 2, 119.
4
CE, GNO 2, 123.
The External Activity of the Godhead: Incarnation 135
fully manifested after the Passion in the resurrected Lord. Gregory
says further:
This [lowly human nature], by mixture [I] with the innite
and boundless character of the good, remained no longer in its own
measures and properties, but was raised up by the Right Hand of God
together with Itself, and became Lord instead of servant, Christ the King
instead of subject, Highest instead of lowly, God instead of man.5
[ . . . ] the Logos is identical with the Logos, He who appeared in the
esh with Him who was with God. But the esh was not identical with
the Godhead before it was transformed and made identical with the
Godhead [ b a P Pc B d B d
e c ], so that one [thing] necessarily bets God
the Logos, and another the form of the servant.
[ . . . ] but when mixed [IE] with the divine it no longer
remains in its own limits and properties, but is taken up to that which is
overwhelming and transcendent, the contemplation of the properties of
the esh and the Godhead remains unconfused [I], so long as
each of these is contemplated by itself.6
These quotations contain several challenging assertions. What does
Gregory have in mind when he speaks of mixture here? What does it
mean that the human nature of Christ no longer remains in its own
measures and properties (K E N d N ), in
its own limits and properties (K E B d N )?
In what sense are we to take the phrase that the esh is made identical
with the Godhead ( e c )? What does it mean that
we are still able to contemplate the properties of esh and Godhead
after the assumption? Even if at rst sight it is tempting to take
Gregorys words to mean that God and man merge together to
form a new kind of entity, a third kind of nature that is a mixture
of the two, this is obviously not what he wants to say. Nor does he
want to say, even if the language is daring, that humanity is trans-
formed into divinity by essence or nature. Still, the only thing he
offers in balance to avoid such doctrines are the words on contempla-
tion: there is mixture, there is transformation and change; there
is identity, but humanity and divinity may still be contemplated in
the God-man.
We shall rst address a terminological point. Gregorys terminol-
ogy of mixture includes the noun I and the verbs
5 6
CE, GNO 2, 124. CE, GNO 2, 130.
I and .7 I think it would be strange if a
thinker of the fourth century had no knowledge at all of the differ-
ences in the terminology of mixture, since this had been an issue for
the philosophical schools. There are interesting pages on this topic in
Arius Didymus (rst century BC) and Alexander of Aphrodisias
(. early third century AD), both commenting on the Stoic Chrysip-
pus, and in Porphyrys Summikta Zetemata, preserved in Nemesius
(late fourth century AD), a Christian bishop of Emesa in Syria.8
Gregory could probably not have known about mixtures from Ne-
mesius, but he probably knew it from other sources. An indication of
this is that he obviously distinguishes between I and
, as can be seen in the quotation above.9 According to all
three sources, A, probably equivalent with I, is a blend-
ing in which the two (or more) substances that are mingled, are
somehow juxtaposed, i.e., the natural properties of each are present
even if imperceptible in the blend. Arius Didymus and Porphyry even
describe a technical device by which some liquids may be separated.10
(cf. above) is also dened as basically juxtaposi-
tion.11 All three sources understand as a fusion in which the
original qualities are changed or perish in order that some new or
third thing occurs.12 The original substances cannot be separated any
more. If we may assume that Gregory knew these distinctions, his
view so far is not particularly obscure.13 The divine Logos assumed
human nature and nature was mingled with nature, but not in the
manner of fusion (). There is no reason to believe that
Gregory, with his insistence on the distinction between uncreated
and created nature, should have confused the two realms in the
Saviour. On the other hand, the two natures are present to one
another in the most intimate way, with the effect that the human
7
CE, GNO 2, 119, 124, 126, 130.
8
Relevant excerpts from all three are most conveniently available in Soabjii
(2004), 297 and 299300.
9
CE, GNO 2, 130.
10
It is interesting to note that Arius describes the mingling of re and iron as a
mixis, where original properties of re and iron are still preserved; cf. Sorabji (2004),
300. Glowing iron is a favourite image for deied humanity among several Church
Fathers.
11
Sorabjii (2004), 300.
12
For Nemesius one should now consult his De natura hominis chapter 3, PG 40:
593b, 596ab.
13
Daley in Coakley ed. (2004), 678.
nature is exposed to the transforming power of divinity throughout
its being.
We shall turn to the topic of transformation. The rst thing to be
noted is the identity of the Incarnate one. He who was incarnated is
one subject, the subject of the Logos.14 The esh was of another
nature, and it was not identical with the nature of the Logos before
it was transformed (d B). The transformation here is
to be taken in the sense of deication of the esh. The before tells us
that the deication of the esh was accomplished afterwards; but the
question is after what? Somehow the text seems to indicate some sort
of development. We saw above that the exaltation of the human
nature of Christ took place after the Passion, and I suppose this has
to do with the resurrection, even though the process of deication
probably is thought to go on from the moment of the conception by
the Holy Virgin. Now, Gregory obviously teaches that the esh
becomes identical with the Godhead due to this transformation,
and this seems to me a rather strong expression. Identical, one
may ask, in what sense? Gregory says that the contemplation of the
properties (N ) of humanity and divinity remains unconfused.
This must mean that in contemplating the God-man one is able to
discern two sets of properties. The human properties are still con-
ceivable. They have not disappeared by being transformed into some-
thing else. This indicates, I think, that a human nature still exists after
being assumed, so that humanity is not transformed into divinity,
neither in its essence nor in its natural propertiesat least not at the
moment of the Incarnation. So, what does it mean then, to become
identical?
The humanity is made anew by participating in the divine Power.15
Gregory uses a dramatic image for the gloried humanity of Christ:
the drop of vinegar, mingled with the sea, is diluted to such a degree
that the natural property of the vinegar no longer remains in the
innity of that which overwhelms it. Even if this indicates that
humanity is diluted to the degree of being almost unrecognizable, it
still could not mean, however, that human nature and its natural
properties disappear completely in the Godhead. There would be no
point in speaking of participation if that was the case, and, as we have
just seen, Gregory holds that the properties of humanity may still be
14 15
Cf. CE, GNO 2, 122. CE, GNO 2, 132133.
contemplated in the God-man. Humanity, Gregory says, is brought
into such participation ( ) in the Godhead that is signied by
the terms Christ and Lord.16 Participation presupposes that the
participating entity still remains as an ontological fact, even if the
mode of its being is radically changed. I would hold then that
according to Gregory, human nature, with its natural properties,
still exists somehow.
On the other hand, we saw earlier that humanity no longer remains
in its own measures and properties. This denitely seems to run
counter to the interpretation I have just offered. I would prefer,
however, to take this in a sense that does not shake the solution I
am trying to work out, especially since I believe Gregory cannot
nurture the teaching that humanity simply disappears in the Godhead
when assumed. It seems to me denitely against sound ontological
principles if Gregory should have taught the transformation of one
nature into another nature without any natural or denitory marks
left. In short, when he says humanity can still be contemplated in the
deied God-man, I suppose this should be taken seriously. Then it
becomes urgent to try to gure out how these two notions may t
together; that human properties are preserved, and that humanity
does not remain in its own measures and properties.
If human nature is still to be contemplated as human, it must be
preserved in accordance with the divine Form of this nature, i.e.,
humanity and its properties must somehow be present in the gloried
Lord. According to Gregory, the natures are distinguishable in
thought, which obviously means that the essential marks of Christs
human nature remain to be contemplated.17 So, what then could it
mean for this nature not to remain in its own measures and proper-
ties? There seems to be a contradiction here.
The key, I think, must be in a conception of community of proper-
ties, communicatio idiomatum:18 [ . . . ] so that by reason of junction
and natural combination that which belongs to each becomes of both
[ . . . ]. The meaning here must be that properties belonging to the
Godhead become properties of manhood as well, and properties
belonging to manhood become properties of the Godhead. This
does not, however, immediately solve the problem, rather it seems
to create a further difculty: on the one hand, it is said that human
16 17 18
CE, GNO 2, 142. Cf. CE, GNO 2, 139. CE, GNO 2, 131.
nature no longer remains in its own measures and properties, and, on
the other hand, it is said that properties are exchanged. How could
this t together? If we keep to the idea of exchange, we must rst
admit that properties of humanity are different from divine proper-
ties. Human beings are characterized by properties of nitude while
the Godhead has properties of an innite kind. We could say sets of
different properties belong to the natures of man and God. Obviously,
we should turn to the subject of the Incarnation, the hypostasis of the
Logos. Somehow these sets of properties must be accommodated to
the mode of being of Christ. The incarnate God as a hypostasis is the
subject of properties of both limited and unlimited kinds. Christ must
be conceived as both limited and unlimited at the same time, but
according to different aspects of His composite being.
What then of the human nature of Christ? Are we to imagine that
this human nature, deied nature itself, somehow exists in a kind of
status duplex, i.e., as both limited and unlimited? I think we have to
say that there is no such thing as deied human nature itself, but only
the deied humanity of the Logos. In that case, its unlimited mode of
being is no longer within the original measures and properties: but
when contemplated qua humanity, i.e., in abstraction from its mode
of being, it is limited. If this is the case, it seems possible to hold the
following: (i) properties are exchanged, and, because of the exchange,
(ii) certain human properties are overcome, but (iii) if the natures are
considered in abstraction from their union, i.e., theoretically, two sets
of properties are discernible.
In the divine mode of being, human nature does not exist within its
own measures and properties. In the gloried Lord, human nature
exists in the mode of divine measures and properties because of the
exchange of properties. Human nature is somehow diluted like a drop
of vinegar in the sea. In more ontological language, human nature is
ontologically expanded with regard to what it is capable of. In contact
with the divine nature of its subject it suffers a radical change. It is
obvious that Gregory has to consider this change as something man
originally was made for. The change cannot transform the being of
man into something that never was intended in Gods Form of what it
should mean to be human. Maybe this kind of change looks strange to
us, and maybe such manhood is unrecognizable. Still, this potential
must be included in man who is made in Gods image and likeness.
If this interpretation of Gregorys doctrine is correct, then we could
at least say that humanity, as deied, is identical with the Godhead in
the communion of properties, not by transformation of created
nature into the uncreated. But what should be understood by proper-
ties? We have seen that the divine properties are around Him. This,
I think, is just to say that essence and properties are ontologically
different moments. Such an idea is in accordance with Porphyrys
Aristotelian logic, known from the Isagoge. I should think that several
of the learned ones of the fourth century would be acquainted with
this kind of thinking. According to Porphyry, it is the predicates of
genus, species, and difference that dene the essence of something.
Predicates of property, on the other hand, do not dene the essence,
but denote certain characteristics of a being and these characteristics
differ from its essence. Such a conception of properties is obviously
the background for the predication of Lord and Christ on the one
and same Christ qua human. Being Lord and Christ are original
properties of the Logos:19 For Lordship is not a name of His essence,
but of His authority, and the appellation of Christ indicates His
kingdom, but the idea of His kingdom is one thing, and that of His
nature is another. The same principle is clearly expressed elsewhere
in the Contra Eunomium:
As, then, we say He is a judge, we conceive concerning Him some
activity of judgement [B K ], and by the is carry
our mind to the subject, being clearly taught by this not to consider the
account of the activity to be identical with the being [ . . . ].
For every name, which you may use, is about [] the Being, but is
not it: good, ungenerate, incorruptible; but to each of these is does not
fail to be allowed.20
The is points to the subject, and the subject is Gods essence, but
the predicate itself denotes some activity or the name of a property
derived from an activity. To be God, then, is not the same as to be in
authority or in kingship; it is not the same as to be a judge, to be good,
ingenerate, incorruptible, etc. The humanity of Christ participates in
the qualications of Lord and Christ by the exchange of properties.
According to Gregorys scheme, properties are predicates, and the
ontological reality behind the properties are the divine activities. The
activities are expressions of divine Power, and the Power is founded
on the essence. The deication of Christs humanity is effected by a
movement from the divine Power into the created human nature:21
19 20 21
CE, GNO 2, 157. CE, GNO 2, 181 and 182. CE, GNO 2, 126.
[ . . . ] He mingled [ ] His life-giving Power with our mortal
and perishable nature, and changed, by the mixture [I]
with Himself, our deadness to living grace and power. This move-
ment from the Power is a divine activity executed in the creature, and
it effects a transformation that establishes a new mode of being for
humanity. The esh is of a passible nature, the Logos of an active
(KB) nature, Gregory says.22 What is gradually developed in
humanity by the divine activity is an actualized condition of existence
in divine attributes. Human nature becomes a participant in divine
characteristics. The humanity of Christ is moved beyond what is
given to it in its natural condition.
Because of the emphasis Gregory places on the passibility of
human nature, it would be expected that the change is one-sided
only: humanity receives divine attributes, while the divine nature does
not admit any human activity into Its being. However, in some places,
the activity is thought to be effective both ways, i.e., from the divine
towards the human, and from the human towards the divine. The
general principle is clearly formulated:23 [ . . . ] so that by reason of
junction and natural combination that which belongs to each be-
comes of both [ . . . ]. The Incarnation, then, includes a humanization
of the Godhead. This humanization is usually interpreted in the sense
that Logos is the sole subject of the suffering of Christ. The idea of this
mutual interpenetration is further developed by St Maximus the
Confessor, as we shall see in the next section.
I will end this section with some considerations on the problem of
the gradual deication of Christs humanity. I suppose Gregory has
no doubts as to the unity of Christ, even if it is tempting to ask about
the exact character of this oneness. The idea of a gradual deication
could foster the impression that the Christ we are talking about is not
a real unity. In all stages of His life until the resurrection there could
seem to be something in Him not yet belonging to Him as an integral
part, i.e., a human nature on its way to being somehow absorbed in
the divine subject of the Incarnation.
If it should be taken seriously that God became man, one has to
think of the God-man as a unitary being. The idea of union is basic to
the whole soteriological scheme of Cappadocian thought, as it came
to be for mainstream Eastern theology until the present. Gregory,
22 23
CE, GNO 2, 130. CE, GNO 2, 131.
I think, takes for granted that Christ is one. His concern was not with
ontological categories for the Incarnation, but with the Trinitarian
idea of the Godhead. To say this is not to diminish his Christological
insights, but just to put the balance in the right place. He did not work
out ontological categories with the purpose of highlighting the unity
of the God-man. As a matter of fact, that would have been beyond the
scope of the controversy he was engaged in. The problem is not,
however, trivial. It is interconnected with the basic soteriological
scheme as conceived by the Greek and Oriental Fathers. The next
phase of controversy showed this to the highest degree. What I am
thinking of is the clash between the strong personalities of Nestorius,
patriarch of Constantinople (patriarch 42831), and St Cyril of Alex-
andria (patriarch 41244). As a matter of fact, the title of one of
Cyrils books is just That Christ is One (c.438). From the point of view
of Cyril and his followers, the Nestorian Christ looks like a dual being,
both on the level of nature and hypostasis. The conict culminated in
the Council of Ephesus (AD 431) when Theotokos became an impor-
tant Christological term, used for Mary, to imply the unity of Christ.
As we know, this did not end the controversy. The theology and
Christology of St Maximus the Confessor, about two centuries later, is
partly developed to address the Christological problem as it evolved
beyond Ephesus.
B. ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSORS ONTOLOGICAL

ANALYSIS OF ESSENCE AND ACTIVITY
By the time of St Maximus, the theological controversy had long since

turned into a Christological controversy. With the sophistication of
Christian philosophical capacity and discussion in the fourth century,
what else could be expected? The major gures of the Church no
longer disagreed terminologically on the burning issue of the concept
of God. However, one soon discovered that the conception of the way
of the Logos into the human condition was ripe with unclaried
aspects. Chalcedon (AD 451) marks a dividing line in the history of
Christian thought, but did not, as we all know, solve the problems.
Even if one could agree on the full divinity and humanity of the
Saviour, and that the two natures were united in the one hypostasis of
the Logos, the controversy continued with the issue of the character of
the union in the God-man. By the time of Maximus, the issues of the
day concerned the energeia and will of Christ. The heresies of
the seventh century are often called monenergism and monothe-
letism. Terminologically this indicates doctrines that confessed one
energeia and one will in Christ. However, it is not as simple as that.24
According to Bathrellos, the monothelites were a group of rather
amateur theologians. They were probably primarily concerned with
matters of ecclesiastic policy. It seems, however, that there were
genuine monothelites who took for granted that two wills in Christ,
a divine and a human, would necessarily be in conict, something
that could not be accepted. On the other hand, it seems that their so-
called monenergist position was not really monenergist after all. One
usually accepted one theandric (i.e., divinehuman) energeia, i.e., an
energeia of a dual kind, with the divine aspect of the energeia as
prominent. One tended to subordinate the human energeia and make
it almost a passive instrument of Christs divinity. Whatever the exact
character of the divinehuman energeia, St Maximus has passed into
history as the theological architect of the orthodox position.
In order to get a clearer view both of Maximus Christology and his
soteriology, I shall rst discuss some important ontological structures
that he developed. As we have seen, he has a vision of a theology of
the Triune life of the one God where the motif of the economy of
creation and salvation was conceived as an eternal project of love for a
possible creaturely otherness. Beings were made for a purpose. The
purpose is dened through the divine will expressed in the logoi of
individuals, species, and genera of creatures. The logoi are not just
denitions of creatures. At the appropriate time they became acts of
making and through them God established the nal end towards
which creatures should move. The end is glorication or deication
or union with Godto make use of all three supplementary terms for
the one and same eschatological condition. In order to understand
Maximus redemptive scheme, we have to dive into an ontological
analysis of man, the creature that was made a microcosm for the sake
of the union between God and creatures (cf. Ambiguum 41).
Maximus makes an important distinction between the logos and
the tropos of a thing. The logos denes the essence or nature, the
24
For a recent discussion of the controversy, cf. Bathrellos (2004), chapter 2.
tropos describes possible modes under which the nature might exist.25
According to Maximus, the logos of man denes a creature made
up of a body and an intellectual soul.26 The mode, on the other hand,
is the scheme in which it naturally (H) acts (KE) and is
acted upon (KE), which can frequently change and undergo
alteration without changing at all the nature along with it.27
Obviously, this is about the concretization of nature, the particular
ways beings act or are acted upon on the foundation of their nature.
An example of natural acting, according to Maximus, could be a
virtuous deed. An example of being acted upon could be to be
exposed to external inuences, for instance, to divine love or to
physical conditions, to temptations and passions, but especially, as
we shall see, exposed to the transforming divine inuence. An im-
portant Maximian idea is that man could be subject to innovation
( ) in his modes, but not according to the logos of his
nature. This is relevant for the deication of man: [ . . . ] the mode
thus innovated, while the natural logos is preserved, displays a mir-
aculous power, insofar as the nature appears to be acted upon, and to
act, clearly beyond its normal scope.28 Three things should be noted
here, (i) the preservation of human nature throughout changes in
the modes, (ii) the working of divine energeia, i.e., activity, into the
natural conditions of the nature, something that modies the con-
creteness of nature into a divine mode, and (iii) the resultant modied
human activity (beyond its normal scope). On the basis of the
essence (with its natural activity), the divine activity modies, and
the human activity is modied.
In daily (secular) instances of acting, the activities, according
to Maximus, are natural, i.e., within the limits of what is given as
potentialities of nature. On the other hand, the beyond nature, is
an important theological idea and plays a central role in Maximus
thought, as we shall soon see. To ll in the picture of the ontolog-
ical structure of created being we turn to Maximus Chapters on
knowledge.
In the Chapters on knowledge (2,1) we nd that the essence, power,
and activity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one and
the same. We have already seen this triad in St Gregory of Nyssa. The
power comes from the nature (or essence), the activity springs from
25 26
Cf. Ambiguum 42, PG 91: 1341d. Ibid.
27 28
Ibid. Ibid.
the power, Gregory says.29 Maximus accepts this quite general triad,
and he uses it primarily as an ontological tool for the analysis of
created being. The rst century of texts in the Chapters on knowledge
opens with an interesting ontological reection in which this triad is
quite central. Maximus says that God, by Himself, is neither the
beginning (or origin, I), middle, or end. This rather obscure
statement is explained when he connects it with a second triad: God
is innitely beyond all essence, power, and activity (1,2). We have
now two triads that Maximus joins together: beginningmiddleend
(I- -) and essencepoweractivity (P- -
K). Both triads are put forward in relation to God, but the
being of God cannot be dened by such concepts: in short, they are
more adequate to the analysis of what is around Him, and are in this
context applied to the description of creaturely being.
It will be much easier to follow Maximus line of thought if we put
the two triads together in a diagram:
I
P K
This is presented as the basic ontological structure of created being,
especially of rational beings. Maximus says that a created being has in
itself a certain . This means, I suppose, that included in its deni-
tion is a limited set of properties to the exclusion of other properties.
For this reason it has a delimited capacity: there are certain things it
can do, certain activities it can execute in accordance with its capacity
and there are certain acts that are beyond its capacity.
A created essence, Maximus says (1,3), is the beginning (or origin,
I) of a movement () that is contemplated within it accord-
ing to its power. It is not immediately easy to say where this move-
ment belongs in the picture. However, it seems that we shall grasp it
in the following way: a being is something (i.e., a unity of essential
properties), and has as such the power to do something. Its doings are
considered to be all its movements, all its activities, that take place
between what it is from the beginning, and what it shall be in the end
when it has fullled its course and has achieved its energeia in a
certain special, soteriological sense. In Maximus train of thought the
beginning (i.e., the essence) has an ontological priority because it is
29
the basis of a power that is, he says, a middle (in the ontological
sense). The movement Maximus speaks of belongs in the ontological
scheme to the power. It looks as if we shall think of something like a
power or potential to move naturally. This power to move, for its
part, is the presupposition for the resultant energeia as the nal telos
of this power, and such energeia may be natural or it may even, when
it comes to the soteriological scheme, be beyond nature.
We should rst note that in the Chapters on knowledge as well as in
other texts, movement seems to be a general term for what Aristotle
distinguishes as actions and motions. Secondly, movement is the
middle, not in the sense of being a separate something between
essence and activity, but in the sense of being conceived after the
essence and before the activity in an ontological analysis. The power
( ) of movement should not be taken exclusively in the Aris-
totelian sense of potentiality, nor is it to be identied as a natural
faculty. Rather, power seems to contain two aspects, rstly the po-
tentiality for movements of the essence, secondly in the sense of the
execution of what the essence is capable of according to its logos. Both
these aspects seem to belong to the ontologically contemplated mid-
dle of Maximus scheme. This leaves us with a possible interpretation
of the term energeia in the Maximian triad above. The energeia turns
up as the nal result beyond the actualization of power in move-
ments. Here we may point back to Aristotles idea of energeia as
complete activity including its end. In this sense a virtue is an activity,
i.e., as a habit that is present in the soul in a complete way. This would
bring us close to what I believe Maximus intended. Energeia here is
the fullment of essence, its perfection or actuality, not in the sense of
making it present, which it already is, but in the sense of expanding in
complete activity what the essence is capable of.
Now we could ask, what is the connection between the middle
movement of power and the nal actuality? Is the nal actuality initially
present in the movement? If I correctly grasp Maximus meaning, this
would imply that to do righteous acts (movement of power) initializes
the state of being righteous (actuality), and to do good generally (move-
ment of power) initializes the state of being good (actuality). Further,
what so far is spoken of by Maximus is a kind of natural fullment of
created, rational beings. In his Opusculum 14, Maximus says:30 Power
30
Th.pol. 14, PG 91: 153a.
[or potentiality] is enmattered energeia; energeia is immaterial power
[or potentiality]. Or again, energeia is the completion of natural
power [or potentiality]. I take this to suggest two senses of energeia:
(a) the rst sentence states what Aristotle would have called rst
actuality = second potentiality. One aspect of this is power or potenti-
ality understood as a realized (or materialized) actuality at rest (one is
perhaps sleeping). The other aspect is that this enmattered energeia is in
itself the presence of immaterial capacity about to be activated. I think
this describes well the middle of the scheme presented above. (b) The
second sentence states what Aristotle would have called second actu-
ality, i.e., the nal activity or actuality achieved, which here belongs to
the end or purpose of human existence. I think this conrms the
interpretation of movement given above, and shows explicitly that
one aspect of fullment is the completion (I ) of natural
power. However, even when there is talk of the completion of natural
powers, there remains the possibility that something from beyond
created nature could enter the scene at this point. The conceptual
scheme is developed in order to also describe what happens when
what transcends nature makes itself active in the creature. But this is a
topic that should be developed below. It is quite obvious that according
to Maximus ontological anthropology human beings generally, accord-
ing to their nature, have their own distinct power (potentiality) and
capacity for kinds of activities. There is not only a human essence; there
is also the human power to act. Without this power, the essence of
humanity would be curtailed.
C. ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ON THE

INCARNATION
According to Maximus, the mystery of Christ is the mystery of divine

love. Gods will to incarnate Himself in the person of the Son issues in
the concrete manifestation of this mystery. In Maximus scheme, the
divine economy, however, is a rather complex matter. It includes
three steps, all three of them said to be embodiments or incarna-
tions:31 (i) Gods creation of the world in accordance with the logoi
31
Cf. Ambiguum 33, PG 91: 1285c1288a.
conceived eternally in Him, (ii) Gods revelation of Himself in the
Holy Scriptures, and (iii) the Logos becoming man as Jesus Christ. As
pointed out already, the historical Incarnation is Gods eternal pur-
pose, not conditioned by human sin, but motivated by the divine will
to communion. Because of sin, however, the Incarnation gained a
certain character, i.e., it was executed in such a way that it became the
remedy for sin, corruption, and death. Below I focus on those aspects
of Maximus Christology that relate to the present topic of divine
energeia in connection with the soteriological motif.
The Ambiguum 41 contains Maximus system in a nutshell. He
thinks that man was created as a microcosm with a denite task
within Gods plan. Man should act in accordance with his logos in
such a way that the whole cosmic building would end up in a
communion of peace and love across the whole spectrum of created
essential differences, to culminate in Gods self-communication
which effects the glorication of created otherness. Man abused his
natural potential, however, and moved in discord with his divine
pattern. The result of sin was cosmic disintegration, corruption, and
death. The Incarnation of the Logos was accomplished for the salva-
tion of man, and for the renewal of the cosmic building. Through the
incarnate Logos the regenerative powers and activities of God became
available for the reversion of the consequences of the fall, and through
Him all things should be united in accordance with Gods intention.32
God became a human being. What does this mean for Maximus,
and why does he think it necessary to have a correct conception of the
Incarnation? The basic point is that the Incarnation is the unication
of two ontologically absolutely distinct realms, the uncreated with the
created. Further, according to Maximus ontology, each existing being
has a certain ontological integrity, and this integrity is constitutive on
the level of the particular, the species, and the genus.33 In Opusculum
14, Maximus denes the so-called essential difference as a logos by
which the essence, that is to say nature, remains both undiminished
and unchanged, unmixed and unconfused.34 This denition ts well
together with the four famous adverbs of the Chalcedonian formula
(AD 451), confessing Christ as one and the same, out of two natures,
with no confusion, no change, no division, and no separation
32
Cf. Ambiguum 41, PG 91: 1308cd.
33
Cf. Tollefsen (2008), 100, 2056.
34
Th. pol. 14, PG 91: 149d.
(I, I, I, I). Maximus under-
stands this one hypostasis as the eternal hypostasis of the Logos.
Central to this view is the teaching that all ontological dimensions
within the being of the God-man are related in a unied way to the
one hypostasis. The problem with monothelitism and so-called
monenergism is, if we look beyond all the political intricacies of
the conict, that certain ontological and concretely ontical features
of the created human being would be suppressed. Why did Maximus
see this as problematic and heretical?
The Incarnation is the condition of salvation as deication. Max-
imus, as a conscious metaphysician, sees clearly that the preservation
of nature in its integrity means that natures cannot be melted together
in such a way so that what results is some new or third thing, being
neither one thing nor the other.35 If God became man, both must be
preserved, both divinity and humanity. The two natures must equally
exist without violation of natural or essential properties. The further
challenge comes, however, in connection with the dynamism of
natures, i.e., when natures are considered in their activities, and
especially when the divine activity is held to effect the deication of
the created nature. If man is to be deied by divine activity, and man
here is rst the humanity of Christ, secondly our humanity as in-
dividual human beings, how are we to conceive of the deied condi-
tion of humanity? The topic we move into below has two aspects:
(i) the divine and the human activities within the God-man as the
condition of human deication, and (ii) the actual condition of
deication as an act of participation. I am not going to separate
these two aspects in any strict sense in the discussion.
According to Maximus, when Adam fell, two things occurred in his
humanity: because of his deliberate choice () human nat-
ure (a) suffered transformation from incorruption to corruption; and
(b) he lost the grace of impassibility (I).36 The rst is an
ontological consequence, and the second is a moral consequence of
the fall. Both are seen by Maximus as . This obviously means
sin in the literal sense of forfeiting the purpose, missing the mark.
The one missing the mark (the moral) is culpable, sinful; the other
(the ontological loss) is innocent: man did not want to put off his
incorruption.37 As a consequence of this, the humanity assumed by
35
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1056d1057b.
36 37
Ad Thal. 42, CCSG 7, 285. Ibid.
the Logos was ontologically marked by both these weaknesses, i.e., it
was liable to passion and exposed to corruption. This means that
Christs humanity was in such a condition that it was exposed to the
psychical and physical inuences of human existence. However, being
God, He reversed the processes that made human nature exposed to
such inuences, and this reversal has to do with the way He was
divinely active in relation to His humanity. There is one point in this
connection that should be stressed, namely that Maximus did not
think Christ was born with any culpability. The Pauline He made
Him who knew no sin to be sin for us (2 Cor 5:21) does not mean
that Christ had any sinful human passions, which He gradually
overcame. Rather, when Christ assumed human nature, its natural
will was immediately deied.38 Such a doctrine would be suspect for a
monothelite. One of the things they were eager to escape was the
notion of a natural human will in the God-man, since this, they
thought, would imply that Christ was susceptible to a conict of
wills. However, Maximus claims, what seems reasonable, that a nat-
ural will belongs to human nature, and that Christ necessarily had
such a will if He assumed human nature in the complete sense.
Maximus even dares to claim that the assumed humanity is marked
with the weaknesses of the fall. One should admit a certain degree of
exposure of Christ qua human to the weaknesses of fallen humanity,
but, of course, without any culpability at any stage of the process of
formation in Marys womb or at any stage in His life as an infant or as
an adult. This can be explained one-sidedly: as God Christ reversed
the (negative) processes since He was divinely active in relation to His
humanity. If this is all Maximus has to say about the matter, one gets
the impression that despite his dyothelite position, he is not able to let
the humanity of Christ play any decisive role in the act of salvation.
However, as Bathrellos has shown, it is not necessarily problematic to
say that the Logos moves his humanity, in so far as the reality and the
authenticity of the will and the energy of his humanity are not
undermined.39 The question is how the human nature of Christ
works or executes activities within the hypostatic union. We shall
scrutinize this below.
38
Cf. Ad Thal. 42, CCSG 7, 2857. Cf. St Maximus the Confessor, On the Cosmic
Mystery of Jesus Christ (2003), 120, note 1, with an important comment on the
development of Maximus conception of will.
39
Bathrellos (2004), 93.
Christ gradually caused an ontological change in human nature
from corruptibility to incorruptibility.40 By His divine power He
actively cut off the temptation, and by the resurrection He trans-
formed His human nature into impassibility, incorruptibility, and
immortality.41 What we should like to get a clearer view of is how,
according to Maximus, the natural activity or activities in the God-
man work. By this I mean both sets of activities; the human as well as
the divine.
Maximus says in Ambiguum 5 that God became truly man in the
whole of His essence.42 A demonstration of this, he says further, is the
constitutive power according to the nature of the essence ( a
PB c ). This constitutive power could
be called a natural activity (K) that is a primary characteristic
of the power. This activity is further qualied as a form-making
movement containing all natural properties. These sayings are rather
dense. What do they mean? The ontology Maximus sketches broadly
corresponds with the ontological structures discussed in section B
above. Maximus has in mind the triad essencepoweractivity, a
triad that is, obviously, a conceptual tool for analysis. The term con-
stitutive () turns up several times throughout the
Ambiguum 5. We read of the constitutive activity and the constitutive
movement.43 We should ask what these are, and how they t into
the triad essencepoweractivity.
When one says in connection with an ontological problem that
something is constitutive for a being, like in this case for the humanity
of Christ, one makes the impression that one says something essential
about the entity in question. We should therefore ask if Maximus says
that power and activity and movement are constitutive for man, i.e.,
for the human essence, in the sense that these dene what it is to be
human? Before I attempt to answer, I should like to mention another
statement from Ambiguum 5: Maximus says that the denition of
every nature (i.e., essence) is given with the logos of its essential
activity, which seems to suggest a positive answer to my question.44
What is an essence or a nature? It is generally held to be that without
40
Ad Thal 42, CCSG 7, 2859.
41
42
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1048a.
43
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1049d1052a, 1052ab.
44
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1057b.
which an entity is not conceived to be the same thing. This could be
taken to suggest that within a being there is stored up a set of primary
properties that are this being, and it has to have these properties if it is
going to answer to the denition of what it is. This could very well be
the case, but according to the Cappadocian Fathers, and according to
Maximus as well, an essence, as the basic ontological layer in an
entity, is not something we may know immediately or adequately.
In Ambiguum 5 Maximus says that without properties associated
with activity, there is only non-being, only that which is not is without
movement.45 Negative statements of this sort are easily passed un-
noticed, but Maximus repeats the point later on: there is no nature
without movement.46 Maximus idea is obviously that what we ob-
serve of some entity is activities and movements. Activities and
movements indicate strongly a power of execution of such activities
and movements, and the presence of a power indicates an essence
from which it springs. Activities and movements are what we observe,
the power is intuitively grasped, and the essence is our concept of
what the entity at hand is according to denition. Here we have the
triad essencepoweractivity, which, as I said above, is presupposed
in what Maximus says in the fth Ambiguum.
Human activities may be of various kinds: walking, building,
teaching, doing mathematics, sensing, desiring, willing, thinking,
etc. Some are directly observable, others are not. When we dene a
human being, we dene it, as Maximus indicates, by referring to its
essential activity, i.e., that activity or those activities that it has to have
in order to be recognized as belonging to the human species. As we
have seen above, this species is an expression of a divine logos.
According to the theology of the Incarnation, Christ is the Logos of
God who assumed human nature. The person or hypostasis of the
God-man is the hypostasis of the Logos. There is no human hypos-
tasis in the being of Christ. The so-called hypostatic union is the
union between the human and divine nature in the hypostasis of the
Logos.47 These are the points to be reckoned with in an orthodox
ontology of the Incarnation.
All of this emerges in a rather sophisticated way in Maximus
scheme. There are two ontological levels to take into accountthe
level of essence and the level of hypostasis. Union and distinction are
45 46
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1048ab. Ambiguum 5, PG 1048b.
47
Cf. Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1048d, 1052ab.
observed on both levels. Maximus says there is a difference ()
between natural activities beheld without division (I) in
the natural logos of what has been united (the level of essence), and
there is a union () of natural activities beheld without confu-
sion (I) in the monadic mode of what has come to pass
(the level of hypostasis).48 He further says that one should confess the
two natures of which Christ, the Logos, is the hypostasis, and two sets
of natural activities of which He is the union with respect to both
natures, since He acts by Himself ( H [ . . . ] KH).49 The acts
committed are qualied as executed jointly, monadically, and uni-
formly (H, H, H). The activities of the esh
together with His own divine power are displayed without separa-
tion (I).
These statements are rather dense, and Ill try to interpret them. On
the level of essence there is a difference between the natural activities
of the two natures of Christ. However, in the God-man, this differ-
ence cannot amount to a division. The two sets of activities are
ontologically different, but cannot be divided in Him. Somehow
they act in a harmonious parallelism, since they co-exist or co-inhabit
one and the same entity. When Maximus says in this context that a
difference between activities is beheld without division in the natural
logos of what has been united, I think that he is speaking, not of the
logos of a nature, but of the special logos or principle of the union of
natures in Christ. On the other hand, quite generally, a logos of being
denes the essence of a thing. And quite obviously, there is a most
radical difference between the logoi of the two natures of Christ.
Maximus states this in the most emphatic language when he speaks
of afrmation and negation. What is ontologically afrmed in rela-
tion to us is ontologically negated when it comes to God: natures that
are as different as the divine and the human cannot be subsumed
under a common set of ontological categories. We are allowed to state
that man is a being, so and so qualied, so and so quantied etc.,
because of a set of categories. On the other hand, we have to negate
such statements in relation to divine nature. Since Christ comprises
two such natures, the afrmation of certain properties and the nega-
tion of these same properties meet somehow in the God-man,
and every mode of activity carries with it the human afrmation
48 49
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1052b. Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1052c.
(i.e., a certain set of categories and concepts may be applied) and the
mode beyond nature (i.e., when what is afrmed about created being
is denied about divine being).50 If we move on to the level of hypos-
tasis, the natural differences between the activities of the essences,
considered without division, enters a unied mode of concrete ex-
istence that is not the confused state of two things melted together
into a third strange thing. The two spheres of uncreated divinity and
created humanity are kept in the closest possible union, but without
being mingled together into some creature of fantasy.
Is it possible to get a clearer view of the mode of hypostatic existence
and of how the two sets of activities operate within its union? How
should this be described ontologically? As stated above, the hypostasis
of the Logos is the unity of the two sets of natural activity. He acts by
Himself, i.e., He is the one agent of the two sets of activity. He does not
act in one moment as man, in another as God. All His acts have the
most uniform character, but even so there is a certain integrated
parallelism of activity. Since, however, the two aspects of the inte-
grated activity differ so radically, we shall dwell a bit more on how they
are related in the acts of Christ, but this double scheme of activity is
also something I would like to discuss in Chapter 8.
First we should note that, according to Maximus, the Logos does
not change anything that naturally belongs to the essence of man in
the assumption of human nature.51 On the other hand, on the hypo-
static level the assumed nature is not self-moving (P), it is
rather moved by the Godhead, but not in the sense that the human
nature lacks the constitutive power, movement, or activity belonging
to its essence.52 If this is to be consistent, we must assume that the
agent of the hypostatic union (the hypostasis of the Logos) is the one
who denes the direction of the movements based on the double
nature. The essence keeps its basic properties according to the logos of
nature, but in the tropos (i.e. modication of natural properties in
concreto) the acting self isas we saw abovethe hypostasis. What is
most interesting when it comes to the play of activities in the God-
man concerns the hypostatic level.
As we have learned, Maximus claims that the Logos does not
change anything human in the Incarnation. He does not diminish
50
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1053cd.
51
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1048c, 1049c, 1049d1052a.
52
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1052ab.
human nature. On the other hand, the Logos does not become subject
to nature either, He rather raises nature up to Himself.53 The question
now is what it means to raise nature up to Himself, as balanced
against the claim that human nature is not changed or diminished.
Once again: Maximus claims that the point is not that human nature
is diminished and divine nature is enhanced within the hypostatic
union, but that Christ acts humanely beyond the human (b
K a I).54 The example adduced by Maximus
is Christ walking on the water. What is shown in His walking on
water is that the natural activity of his esh is inseparable from the
power of divinity, and He walks supported by His trans-natural
power (E ).55 The point is that it is the Logos who is
the subject of the human activity, and He executes what is in our
natural capability to do, namely walking, but He does it in the uni-
form and conjoined divine-human mode of the act, i.e., He walks on
water. Walking is a natural human activity, and this activity is con-
joined with the power beyond nature that makes possible the extra-
ordinary walking on water.56
Maximus idea is that two activities occur together or jointly. The
human activity is by nature limited by time and space, and is deter-
mined by all the laws governing the present cosmos. The divine
activity, however, transcends such limits, and performs whatever it
performs beyond all created limitations. We may say that human acts
are performed in a divine mode. The whole picture suggests that what
the Logos does in His humanity is to develop its total potential until
perfection. All human powers, all that is included in the essential
properties of man reaches the fullment eternally dened by God in
his logos for human nature.
Before we come to the concluding paragraphs of the present sec-
tion, I feel there is still a question that lurks in the background: is
Maximus able to let the humanity of Christ play any decisive role in
the Economy? Is Bathrellos correct when he says it is not necessarily
problematic to state that the Logos moves His humanity given that the
reality and authenticity of the will and energy of His humanity is not
undermined?57 Is the reality and authenticity of Christs humanity
preserved in its integrity? It is tempting to say that the humanity of
53 54
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1048c1049a. Ambiguum 5, 1049b.
55 56
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1049c. Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1049c.
57
Bathrellos (2004), 93.
Christ does not play any decisive role, since it is directed by and
transformed in its relation to the Logos. On the other hand, here we
should apply an important piece of Maximian anthropology. It is in
principle possible to maintain that Christ assumed a human nature
liable to passion, but that He never gave in to any sinful passion.
Why? Was it because His humanity immediately was ruled and
directed by His divinity? According to Maximus, that is not a precise
answer or at least not the whole answer. The answer is that His divine
person directed a natural humanity with a natural human will. This
natural will being already designed eternally by God in the logos for
human nature, a nature conceived as naturally directed towards the
good. For this reason, the hypostasis of the Logos had no need to
compel a disobedient impulse or tendency of will, He rather found in
Himself a created nature naturally activated in the harmonious re-
sponse to the divine initiative. I suppose if one looks at human nature
this way, one might say that the Logos preserved His human nature in
its integrity. In Him man became what man originally was designed
to be. There is, however, a further question: the Logos assumed
human nature, not a human hypostasis. Is the nature He assumed
sufciently human to have the required sameness or identity with
our being as humans? Would He not need a human hypostasis in
order to be human the way we are human? I suppose we could say
that it is not necessary to have a human hypostasis in order to be fully
human, if the hypostasis does not add anything extra that should be
included in the denition of man. As a matter of fact, from the point
of view of ancient thought, it does not. Individuation does not add to
the nature of the thing, nor does hypostatization. I think even Aris-
totle would have conceded that. Further, it is obvious that Christ does
not exist as human in a universal way, i.e., as if what He carried was
certain general idioms of humanity abstract from concrete existence.
Rather, His humanity was given concrete and individualized exis-
tence in the hypostasis of the Logos, and from Maximus point of
view, this was as concrete a presence in the world as any human being
could have. There is nothing seemingly (docetic) with the humanity
of Christ. Despite what is said above, one last thing should be said
concerning the difference and unity of essences and activities in
Christ. It is easy to understand that created and uncreated being
should be kept apart. However, Maximus emphasis on the unity,
without division and without confusion, is hard to penetrate. We
shall return to this below, especially in the last chapter. I would like to
make a preliminary remark here as well: is there any real union when
mixture is restricted this way? I suppose the most available solution is
to say that created properties may be brought to exist in a divine
mode. If this is to be a solution, if we are going to recognize this as a
solution, we must be able to conceive this humanity-in-the-mode-of-
divine-existence as something sufciently integrated within the being
of the Logos made esh. We shall now turn to the deication of
Christs humanity.
Maximus again and again uses the terminology that something
new happens in Christ. What is this newness? It has to do with how
activities penetrate the natural being of an entity in such a way that a
nature could be said to participate in some property that does not
belong to it naturally or originally. In a way some change occurs in
man, how is this to be understood?
Maximus says that the Incarnation is accomplished in order to
conrm human nature in new modes of being, without change in the
natural logos.58 It is a matter of circumscribing our nature by new
modes of being that are not ours, but rather transcends our nature.59
In this connection Maximus speaks of a new theandric activity, with
the well-known term from Dionysius.60 This newness is connected
with a most challenging conception of an exchange between the two
natures of Christ. The mode (tropos) of this exchange consists in that
whatever belongs by nature to each part of Christ becomes inter-
changeable with each other.61 In Ambiguum 7, Maximus speaks of the
blessed inversion that man is made God by deication and God is
made man by humanization.62 In short, the human nature of Christ
receives the inuence of divine activity into its creaturely sphere, and
the divine nature of Christ receives the inuence of human activities
into the uncreated sphere. This means that the person of Christ
executes His activities in the conjoined and uniform way we have
tried to grasp above. In this way we may say that the humanity of
Christ participates in divine activity and therefore in the properties
that characterize that activity as well, while his Godhead participates
in human activity and the properties that belong to it.
58 59
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1053bc. Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1056a.
60
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1056b. Cf. some important remarks in Bathrellos (2004),
63, cf. his note 6.
61
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1057d.
62
Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1084cd.
The psychic powers of Christs humanity are deied in the assump-
tion of humanity from the start.63 The deication of His physical
powers, however, is gradual. It is seen in His mighty works and
generally in His performing human acts beyond natural human
capacity. However, it is after the Resurrection that this (physical)
part of human nature was transformed fully from corruption to
incorruption.64 Human nature in Him, therefore, eventually becomes
fully circumscribed by new modes of being that are not ours.65 We
shall dwell further on the character of this transformation in the
section below on Maximus soteriology. On the other hand, what
could be meant with the humanization of God? This seems to be even
more of a mystery. One of the things the Godhead suffers in the
exchange of the assumption is the human birth.66 And in general, the
humanization of God is the inverse of the deication of man, in the
following sense: on the one hand, the perfect and limitless properties
of God are received into Christs humanity, and, on the other, our
human activities of thinking, willing, sensing, imagining, walking,
talking, eating, sleeping, crying, suffering, etc. are received into the
divinity of Christ.67 Every mighty act and every lowly human act have
the other dimension added to it. The strangest thing about the
mystery is that it is God the Logos who is the subject of such proper-
ties. He integrates them into His own hypostasis. God the Logos,
consequently, became man in the whole of His being.68
63 64
Cf. Ad Thal 21, CCSG 7: 127133. Ad Thal 42, CCSG 7: 287.
65 66
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1056a. Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1052c1053a.
67 68
Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1049cd. Ambiguum 5, PG 91: 1048a.
6
The Road to Salvation
A. ST GREGORY OF NYSSA ON DEIFICATION
According to St Gregory, the deication of Christs human nature is

completed with the Resurrection and Assumption. The redemptive
work of Christ and the deication of his own humanity are the
conditions for the salvation or deication of human beings in general.
In fact, when Gregory speaks of Christs humanity, he speaks of the
human nature that is common to all. What happened to Christs
humanity, therefore, concerns all human beings:1 That which hap-
pened to the man according to Christ, is a grace common to the
nature of men. But what does this mean? In book 3.1 of the Contra
Eunomium, Gregory says that the rst way to God was destroyed by
mans disobedience, and therefore Christ came as the new way.2 His
humanity was created as this new way, and the humanity of Christ
became the garment of salvation (e ). Gregory
makes two citations from St Paul (Rom 13:14, Eph 4:24): But put
ye on the Lord Jesus Christ and put on the new man, which after
God is created. Gregory comments that in a strange and special way
creation in Christs case alone was instituted anew.3 Man became
what he was meant to be according to Gods purpose. So to say that
the grace is common to the nature of men must mean that all human
beings may put on this garment of salvation and receive its effects.
How does this come about?
I think we can point to two things that, according to Gregory, make
this effective in human existence, namely the mysteries (i.e., the
1
CE, GNO 2, 294.
2
CE, GNO 2, 212.
3
CE, GNO 2, 22. Cf. St. Gregory the Theologian, Oratio 39.13, PG 36: 348d.
160 The Road to Salvation
sacraments) and the spiritual life. The life in Christ has the mysteries
as its foundation. Now, in the mysteries, certain material elements are
used, such as water in Baptism and bread in the Eucharist. The
mystical effects wrought by these means presuppose a twofold activ-
ity, one human and one divine. In Baptism, the candidate is immersed
three times in the water in imitation of Christs burial, and words are
spoken by the priest, according to the Gospel (Matt 28:19): Baptizing
them in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. This
execution of the rite is accompanied by the activity of the Spirit, who
blesses the body that is baptized and the water that baptizes.4 For that
which is active [e KF] is great, and what results from it is
wonderful. The mystery effects purication from sin, and is the cause
of renewal and regeneration (I F d I N).5
The Holy Spirit is one with the Father and the Son in essence, power,
and activity.6 It is not only the essence of God that is beyond
apprehension, his power and activity are, to some degree, incompre-
hensible as well:7 And to speak concisely, everywhere the power and
activity of God are incomprehensible and without artice, easily
producing whatever He wills, while concealing from us the minute
knowledge of His activity. I do not think this runs counter to the
general Cappadocian principle that activities are known, and are that
by which we know God. But, on the other hand, the activities are
based on the incomprehensible divine Power that is based on an
incomprehensible divine nature. It seems quite reasonable that a
created intellect is not able to know the activity of God in great detail
or in depth. Exactly how the Holy Spirit works in the mysteries and
accomplishes the purication, renewal, and regeneration, is beyond
what we can understand. We only know that this is the divine
method of working these things.
It is the Holy Spirit who makes the results of the Incarnation
effective in human life through the Church. According to the Oratio
catechetica (chapter 40), humanity itself, its intellectual faculties and
its other peculiar characteristics, do not admit of any change
( ) in Baptism. It is mans will that is cleansed from evil, if
4
In diem luminum sive in baptismum Christi, GNO 9.1, 229 and 225.
5
In diem luminum, GNO 9.1, 224.
6
Cf. Ad Eustathium, GNO 3.1, 1012, De oratione Dominica, Oratio 3, GNO 7.2, 41.
7
In diem luminum, GNO 9.1, 227.
The Road to Salvation 161
that will turns towards God. The renewal requires human coopera-
tion, and man may now journey along the path of the spiritual life.
Man is put in the position that the original character of the divine
image may function the way God intended, and as a consequence of
this the likeness with God is gradually established. To put it in an
image dear to Gregory: the soul once more becomes a mirror of divine
perfections.8 However, man is not immediately perfected or deied;
rather, a new life is made possible after baptism, a life in which man
has received the task of adjusting himself to live in accordance with
divine realities. The point is that man should be open to divine power
and inuence.
The central idea of participation could be dened thus: it is a
movement of the divine towards the human, and of the human
towards the divine. The condition of being, or of being anything
specic, is given in the divine movement that the creature admits
into itself. Somehow, this runs parallel with what happened in
Christs humanity according to the principle of the communicatio
idiomatum. There is, though, one difference. This difference has to do
with the fact that while Christ assumed a human nature, man does
not receive the divine nature into his own hypostasis. Christ has a
double consubstantiality, i.e., He is consubstantial with the Father
and with us, but we neither are nor become identical ( c P) with
the divine, we become like ( ) it.9 We shall return to this below.
Despite this, there is a twofold movement. However, since the created
nature in itself has no capacity to effect its own salvation and deica-
tion, the initiative was Gods.10 This initiative was manifested in the
original condition when man had the divine likeness before the fall,
and it is renewed and strengthened with baptismal grace. All depends
upon how man traces his steps further. If he moves in accordance
with his nature and the grace he has received, then he presents
himself in openness to God. On the other hand, God is, in the
simplicity of His nature, completely present to the creature through
the activity of His Power. The creaturely openness admits this activity
into itself and man adjusts his existence more and more in accor-
dance with the riches of the innite presence of Gods activity.
8
De virginitate, GNO 8.1, 296. cf. De hominis opicio ch. 25, PG 44: 132d137c,
De anima et resurrectione PG 46: 41b44a.
9
Cf. De anima et resurrectione ibid.
10
De virginitate, GNO 8.1, 300.
To exist this way, to an eternally increasing degree according to the
divine mode of being, is the fact of participation.
Human nature was originally invested with the virtues.11 The path
to deication consists in the reintroduction of these virtues. What
exactly is a virtue according to Gregory? In his sixth Homily on the
Beatitudes, he comments on Blessed are the pure in heart, for they
shall see God. He points to certain texts in the Scriptures that state it
is impossible to see God.12 However, to see (NE) in the Scriptures
may mean the same as to have (E): [ . . . ] the Lord does not say
that knowing something about God is blessed, but to possess God in
oneself. [ . . . ] so that we might learn that the person who has purged
his own heart of every tendency to passion perceives in his own
beauty the reection of the divine nature.13 The pure of heart are
blessed because they have God in their hearts. We could think, then,
that virtue is such a having or habit (), which is held as a divine
gift of the pure heart. On the other hand, we should be careful not to
understand this habit as a kind of static presence of a created gift.
Gregory seems to think of virtue as a work () or an activity
(K), which is dependent on God as a working or active
Power.14 We shall take a closer look at this.
In his De professione christiana, when speaking about imitation,
Gregory states that the Gospel does not order nature to be combined
with () nature, i.e., the human with the divine, but rather
it orders that Gods good activities (a Ia K) should be
imitated ( E) by man.15 But which activities of ours could be
likened to the divine activities? Gregory answers that it is those that
are free from all evil, which as far as possible are puried from
delement. Obviously, he is thinking of the virtues. The virtues,
then, are primarily mimetic activities. The same doctrine is found
in De beatitudinibus.16 He asks who the peacemakers are, and
11
De hominis opicio ch. 4, PG 44: 136bd.
12
De beatitudinibis, GNO 7.2, 1368.
13
De beatitudinibus, GNO 7.2, 138 and 142. Translated by Hall in Drobner and
Viciano (2000).
14
If my interpretation of Bals (1966) above (cf. 94-6) is correct, he denies the
participation in uncreated activity in the created order. I argue that virtues are the
result of cooperation between the presence of divine activity and human activity in
man.
15
De professione christiana, GNO 8.1, 138.
16
De beatitudinibus, GNO 7.2, p. 159160.
answers: The imitators of the divine love of men, who show forth in
their own life what is proper to the divine activity (e Y B F F
K). God ordains, Gregory continues, this activity for man as
well, to expel hatred, to resolve conict, to get rid of envy, to banish
ghting, to destroy hypocrisy, to quench the grudge which smoulders
in the heart. These should be replaced with their opposites, which are
the fruits of the Spirit: love, joy, peace, goodness, patience, and all the
good things enumerated by St Paul (Gal 5:2223). Consequently, to
have God in the heart means to execute the mimetic activity of
virtuous behaviour, which is a gift communicated by the Holy Spirit.
God is gloried in man by virtue, and, according to De oratione
Dominica, the divine Power ( ) is the cause ( N) of the
good things in man.17 It is the proper power and activity ( and
K) of the Spirit to purify from sin.18 Purication is the work (e
) of both the Son and the Spirit, Gregory says, and he seems to
indicate that the good effects of the redemptive work of Christ are
administered by the Holy Spirit, as we have seen above as well.19
However, what, exactly, is the ontological structure of imitation
( )? Gregorys works abound in the terminology of imitation.
When he speaks of likeness and archetype, the likeness is an imitation
or reection of this archetype. In De institutio christiana Gregory says
that if anyone desires close connection with another, it is necessary to
take on his mode through imitation. Therefore, if one longs to be the
bride of Christ, one must be like Christ in beauty through virtue
according to ones ability.20 I think this is just another way to express
the central idea of participation. To imitate God is to participate in
God. In principle, the logic is the same. This is also conrmed when
Gregory in De beatitudinibus considers the virtues as a kind of
incarnation of Christ in the believer.21 When he says that this is a
bolder account, I suppose it is because of the incarnational motif:
virtue is the Lord offering Himself to the desire of His hearers.
Gregory refers to several texts from the Scriptures, for instance St
Pauls saying that Christ became for us wisdom from God, justice,
sanctication, and redemption (1 Cor 1:30); and St Johns saying that
17
De oratione Dominica, GNO 7.2, 37.
18
De or. Dom., GNO 7.2, p. 401, De instituto christiana, GNO 8.1, 44.
19
Cf. De instituto christiana, GNO 8.1, 85 as well.
20
De instituto christiana, GNO 8.1, 50.
21
Christ is bread coming down from heaven and living water (Jn 6:50
and 4:10). Gregory refers to the Psalm (Ps 41:3) saying that My soul
thirsted for God the mighty, the living one; when shall I come and be
seen by the face of God? The point is that the one who has tasted the
Lord has received God into himself (K H), and he is lled with
the one for whom he has thirsted. This is in accordance with the
promise of Christ (cf. John 14:23): I and my Father will come and will
make our abode with him. The Holy Spirit, Gregory remarks, has, of
course, made His home there rst, a saying that once again makes
explicit that the redemptive economy is mediated by God the Holy
Spirit. The whole sequence culminates in St Pauls words that Christ
liveth in me (Gal 2:20).
In De institutio christiana we nd that participation in the Spirit is
interpreted by aid of a phrase of St Pauls (Eph 1:19): The activity of
His Power. St Paul, Gregory says, points to the participation in the
Spirit and the activity (K) of the Spirit with respect to those in
communion with Him, who works a certain mode () of being
in the believer.22 The indwelling of the Holy Spirit makes a new
creature.23 The activity and the grace of the Spirit are the acknowl-
edged basis for virtuous acts. The grace of the Holy Spirit possesses
the entire soul and lls it with gladness and power.24 God furnishes
the ability to do good, but Gregory emphasizes the importance of
cooperation as well when he says that (good) human activities are the
owers of labours and the fruits of the Spirit.25
All this makes it clear that virtue, as mimetic activity, should not be
understood as an imitation of an external model, but as an adjust-
ment to the presence of a divine activity of grace and goodness in the
believer.
This conclusion may be bolstered by something Gregory says in De
perfectione as well.26 Christ is the Sun of Justice, and His rays stream
forth for our illumination. These rays are the virtues, and by doing all
things in the light, we become light (H ), so that it shines
before others (cf. Matt 5:1516). The light, that is, metaphorically
shines through our actions. Christ is our sanctication (once more cf.
22
23
24
25
26
De perfectione, GNO 8.1, 1845.
1. Cor 1:30) and we prove ourselves to be true sharers of His name
when we identify with the Power of His sanctication in work ()
and not in word. Human activity should be harmonized with the
divine activity, and should be conducted in the mode of light or the
mode of Gods Power.
It is further interesting to see that virtue, in the same text from the
Beatitudinibus, which I commented on above, is connected with
happiness:27 For such is the nature of this good not only to be
sweet to the one enjoying it at the present, but in every period of
time to give actual joy. Virtue, Gregory states, is both work and
reward ( [ . . . ] ). When a just act () and the grace
of the Spirit coincide, the soul is lled with a blessed life (B
).28 Somehow, this echoes the Aristotelian idea that the
virtuous action is the possession of P :29 The human good
turns out to be the activity (K) of the soul according to virtue.
Now, the (virtuous) action, according to Aristotle, has a certain
completeness or perfection. This quality of completeness, conse-
quently, belongs to happiness as well.30 Gregory thinks that in the
virtuous action man spiritually possesses the presence of Christ, and
Christ is always complete or perfect. On the other hand, this condi-
tion of possession, as said above, is not static, because man is a
creature who gradually is transformed into a divine mode of
being:31 To achieve likeness with God is the end of the life according
to virtue. Christianity is the imitation of the divine nature. God has
no limit, and the divine nature is an innite source of goodness. Even
though the virtuous action obviously includes a certain perfect joy,
this can only be a motivation for further movement into the divine
sphere.32 Gregory says:
For it is a property of the Godhead to lack no conceivable thing which is
regarded as good, while the creation comes into excellence by partaking
in [K B] that which is better. Further, not only has it a beginning
27
28
29
Ethica Nicomachea 1098a1617.
30
Ethica Nicomachea 1097a251097b6, 1176b36.
31
De beat., GNO 7.2, 82; De prof., GNO 8.1, 136.
32
I wonder if the term happiness is appropriate in connection with Gregory (and
other Christian thinkers). Maybe happiness is the proper Greek term, while blessed-
ness is the proper Christian term; or, if not term, at least concept. Unfortunately, it is
not possible to investigate this in any depth here.
of its being, but also is found to be constantly in a state of beginning to
be in excellence, by its continual advance in improvement, since it never
halts at what it has reached, but all that it has acquired becomes by
participation [a B ] a beginning of its ascent to something
still greater, and it never ceases, in Pauls phrase, reaching forth to the
things that are before, and forgetting the things that are behind. Since,
then, the Godhead is life itself, and the Only-begotten God is God and
life and truth and all conceptions that are lofty and betting of God,
while creation takes from Him its supply of good, it may be evident
from this that if it is in life by partaking of [ ] life, it will, if it
ceases from the participation [B ], cease totally from being
in life.33
Participation in divine goodness and life, as emphasized in this
text, requires a movement of the creature in accordance with the
natural inclination to the good. The creature, then, must prepare
itself, make itself t for the reception of Gods gifts. The divine
Power and activity transforms what it touches and brings it further
into communion with God.
At this point I nd it necessary to ask if there is not a difference
between what happened to the human nature of Christ, and what
happens to the being of other humans. It somehow seems that the
deication of Christs humanity is completed in the Ascension. In the
citation from Contra Eunomium above, we nd the idea of contin-
uous advancement towards the good. This teaching is found in many
texts. For instance, some passages from De vita Moysis conform to
this picture:34 the man who is lled constantly thirsts for more. He
wants to partake, not according to what he is capable of, but accord-
ing to what God is like. The human person forever stretches out for
more. No limit interrupts the ascent to God, because there is no limit
to the Good. This is the famous doctrine of the epektasis, the constant
reaching out for more.35 As a consequence, could we say that Christs
humanity experiences the fullness of the gift at the moment He
transposes human nature to the eternal sphere, while our transforma-
tion within the same sphere is gradual to eternity? I really dont know
whether Gregory provides a denite answer to this question any-
where, but to me at least it seems like a reasonable interpretation.
33
Contra Eunomium, GNO 2, 212.
34
De vita Moysis, GNO 7.1, 11314, 116, cf. 118.
35
Cf. Louth (1992), 89, and von Balthasar (1995) part 1, ch. 2.
What happens to human nature in its constant advancement in
deication? Into which divine qualities does the presence of the divine
activity transpose the being of human persons? I suppose man devel-
ops towards what is characteristic of Christs deied humanity. We
have seen that man participates in the Good and in Life. I think this
means that when the divine power is actively present, it makes the
receptive humanity exist in the modes of divine Goodness and Life.
According to De beatitudinibus man goes out of or travels beyond his
own nature (K c F ). From mortal he
becomes immortal, from being transient he becomes eternal, from
man he becomes God.36 God brings man into near-equality (e
) with Himself. He bestows on human beings what is His
according to nature, and this amounts to a kind of equality of rank by
kinship ( a B ). These are strong words, and
witness to the realism of Gregorys doctrine of deication. To become
God is not a metaphor, but should be taken in the literal sense. In
that case, however, it requires that certain limits must be drawn.
Man becomes God, but not by being fused with the divine nature.
I have already mentioned a text in De anima et resurrectione in which
Gregory says that man does not become identical ( c P) with
the divine, he becomes like ( ) it.37 In the In canticum canti-
corum Gregory speaks about being transformed ( B)
naturally by the teaching of the Lord into the more divine.38 Man is
created for the purpose of being saved, and therefore his transforma-
tion is natural. But he is not made God by nature, he achieves a
relative divinity (cf. e ), not the absolute divine essence. We
should also remember what he said in De professione christiana:39 to
attain likeness by imitation does not mean that the Gospel orders
nature to be compounded with nature. In addition, all talk of parti-
cipation would be pointless if man was transformed into the divine
nature. Somehow, participation presupposes a more and less complete
identity, therefore, is excluded.
God accomplishes deication. It is the Holy Spirit who mediates to
man what Christ accomplished through His assumed humanity.
More precisely, deication is experienced in the ecclesial existence
36
37
De anima et resurrectione, PG 46: 41b44a.
38
In canticum canticorum, GNO 6, 29.
39
De professione christiana, GNO 8.1, 138.
through the Spirits economical adaptation of these gifts as the pre-
sence of divine activity in the believer. There is never an end to the
spiritual development of man. His deication goes on forever because
God, who is present for man to enjoy, is innite. The innite progress
is the mark of creatureliness. Only a being who has temporal exten-
sion as a characteristic of its being may make progress. However, it
seems a bit difcult to think of an innite progress, because we should
rather think that the ideas of progress and of divine innitude were
mutually exclusive. Progress includes a before and after; divine in-
nitude must be immediately complete. If something participates in
what is immediately complete, I should think it rather difcult not to
possess it totally at once. If, on the other hand, we think of deication
from the creatures point of view, we could probably say that what is
complete in itself is gradually admitted into what is nite and diaste-
matic, because the latter is only gradually made t for the reception of
the gift. Even if man is transported into the sphere of God, he is still
limited except for what he has received. I suppose we must say that
the receptiveness of human nature expands gradually even when
humanity is elevated beyond time and space in the ordinary sense.
We should say, then, that man is deied by participation, not in the
essence of God, but in His activity. Participation means that man
receives more and more of Gods activity into his being. It seems quite
obvious that Gregory operates with the idea of an ontological dis-
tinction between essence and activity in God. The tri-hypostatic being
of God is one thing; the activity by which the Trinity relates to created
otherness has its source in the essence, but is not identical with this
essence. In the immanent activity of God the divine persons commu-
nicate with each other; in the external activity God communicates
with creatures. Such a distinction between essence and activity must
be observable in created beings as well. There is a difference between
being human and doing human things, even though the second
depends upon the rst.
On the other hand, the activity could never be considered an entity
or a subsistent being in its own right, even if it is, i.e., exists. The
divine activity should not be understood as a lower divinity, a fourth
hypostasis or something of that kind. It is rather to be compared with
a eld of energy that is manifested from the divine being. But this is
an image, because the divine activity, in the precise sense, is the divine
nature or essence qua being active. The activities are around God,
and are a movement of His nature. If we say that the distinction
between essence and activity (to be God and to be active as God) is a
real distinction, all these qualications must be included. However, I
do not feel quite comfortable with the term real distinction, since it
seems to make a sharper division between essence and energeia than
admitted by the doctrines I have examined. Whenever something has
being or achieves deication, it participates in the divine activity in
such a way that it begins to exist in a graciously instituted mode. In
creation an entity is moved into the mode of being, in deication the
creature is moved into the mode of likeness and near-equality with
God. From being man, a human being becomes God by the never-
ending movement in accordance with a divine mode of being in the
Holy Spirit. Whether this is Palamism or not, we shall have to see
when we discuss the doctrine of St Gregory Palamas in Chapter 7.
B. ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ON

SALVATION AND DEIFICATION
In St Maximus, as in St Gregory of Nyssa, the economical activities of

Christ, including the deication of His humanity, are the conditions
for salvation and for the realization of the nal end of human
existence, deication. We shall try to gure out by what means this
takes place; and how man achieves this divine purpose, how the
divine activity enters into his life, and how it cooperates with the
natural activity of human beings. St Maximus conception of partici-
pation belongs in this picture as well.
Maximus dwells on the idea of the Church as the image of God in
the rst chapter of the Mystagogia. God is the universal cause that
made the cosmos and keeps it together in a well-ordered system of
unity in diversity. Likewise, the Church is the principle of unity in
diversity among the great multitude of human beings, men, women,
and childrendifferent in many respectswho are born into the
Church, and thereby are, as he says, reborn and recreated in the
Spirit.40 In this way it, i.e., the Church, graciously bestows ()
one divine form and designation, namely, to belong to Christ and
carry His name. This, obviously, means that the faithful carry the
40
Myst. 1, PG 91: 665cd.
name of Christians. The personication, when the Church is acting
like an agent, is, of course, connected with the Pauline idea that the
Church is the body of Christ, and Christ Himself is the head of this
body (1 Cor 12:1227). Maximus returns several times to this idea in
the Mystagogia, and develops it into a teaching on how human beings,
through a path of spiritual development, nally are unied with
Christ, the head of the Church, as their condition of deication.
Maximus speaks of being born into the Church and then adds that
one is reborn and recreated in the Spirit. The rst birth, obviously,
points to baptism; while the reborn and recreated could point both
to baptism and to the path of spiritual development. Even though
Maximus is a monk and in his writings mainly dwells on the spiri-
tuality of the monastic life, the Mystagogia seems to indicate a more
general soteriological scheme.
The distinction between the rst birth and the further recreation
may be highlighted from the Ad Thalassium 6, in which Maximus
comments on the grace of baptism.41 The question put to Maximus
by Thalassius sets his answer in a certain perspective: in 1 John 3:9 it
is said that he who is born of God does not sin, because Gods seed
remains in him. However, how is it possible that people born of God
through baptism are still able to sin? Maximus answers that the divine
birth is twofold. (i) On the one hand, it bestows the grace of adoption,
and this grace () is entirely present potentially (A
F). (ii) On the other hand, the grace bestowed gets activated
or is exhibited in activity ( K) when human intention
() is deliberately directed towards God.42 The redemptive
work of Christ is available for a human being through baptism, and in
baptism one is born into the ecclesial condition. One possesses the
grace of God potentially, and in the ecclesial existence this grace
becomes active when man directs his deliberate course of action
towards God. This distinction, between potentiality and activity, is
similar to the Aristotelian distinction between rst energeia = second
potentiality and second energeia: second potentiality is the possession
of a capacity, which may be executed in actual activity.
When the Christian acts in accordance with the divine logos of his
being, his natural potential for movement is brought into the sphere
of activity in a duplicated mode: natural human activity is executed in
41
42
= resolution, purpose, deliberate course of action.
cooperation with the activity of divine grace, i.e., in cooperation with
the Holy Spirit. In Mystagogia chapter 4, this ecclesial existence is
explained as a development in three stagesknown from many
Maximian texts. In this chapter Maximus speaks of the Church an
image of man, and man as an image of the Church. Man is composed
of body, soul, and mind;43 the Church consists of nave, sanctuary, and
the divine altar. Body and nave, soul and sanctuary, mind and the
divine altar mutually mirror one another. These three pairs are
respectively connected with the three stages of development, namely
the rst pair with ethical philosophy, the second with natural con-
templation spiritually interpreted, and the third pair is connected
with mystical theology. This may be summarized in a table:
Holy altar Mystical theology Mind

Sanctuary Natural contemplation Soul
Nave Ethical philosophy Body
One may intuitively grasp why these elements are arranged thus. The
nave is the place of the faithful, and in the nave the evangelical
teachings about how one should live the Christian life are proclaimed.
This focuses on how one directs ones bodily existence in accordance
with the commandments. The sanctuary is the place of the clergy, and
in the architectural structure of the building it could be conceived in
such a way that it psychologically gathers attention that is scattered in
worldly cares into a unied perspective, namely the worship of God. If
the mind is puried from distracting thoughts, logismoi, it may direct
its attention towards the nal purpose of human existence.44 With the
holy altar, where the mystery of the Eucharist is manifested, the mind
is summoned in silence to the sphere of the divine presence as such.
I should like to make one further comment on the stage of natural
contemplation. Natural contemplation is connected with the sanctu-
ary, and man is led towards it by his reason (logos).45 Maximus does
not develop his concept of natural contemplation in this connection,
43
According to Thunberg (1995) 107113, this triad seems to have replaced the
Pauline triad of spirit, soul, and body in Church Fathers after Evagrius Ponticus.
44
In Tollefsen (2008), 1768, I argue that man participates in divine simplicity,
which is an aspect of Gods energeia, when he moves according to natural contempla-
tion. The simplifying of the intention is not just due to human effort, it rather includes
the presence of divine workings by grace.
45
Myst. 4, PG 91: 672bc.
but in his other writings he says much about this.46 In contemplation
one dwells on the logoi of creatures and conceives how these converge
and become a unity in the Logos.47 Man discovers the metaphysical
structure and ontological constitution of beings and how these are
based in God. In the present text it is said that man, through the
sanctuary of the soul, conveys to God the sensible logoi, in a purely
spiritual way that is cut off from matter. As we saw above, Maximus
speaks of contemplation as being spiritually interpreted ( H
K ). It is obvious that this is not the kind of natural philoso-
phy we would nd in the philosophical schools.48 What is suggested
is not a theoretical pursuit, but a spiritual one. Even so, it is connected
with what I called earlier the metaphysical structure and ontological
constitution of beings; namely, in the sense that what is understood
is the divine ordering of things in terms of the divine plan for the
cosmos, namely that it is all designed in terms of their beginning and
ending in God.49
Ethical philosophy or asceticism, along with natural contempla-
tion, puries the soul in its relation to created beings, and changes
mans relations to things from a passionate one into a non-passionate
and loving one.50 One easily thinks that the three stages of spiritual
development are successive, so that the second follows upon the rst,
the third upon the second. This, however, is not exactly the case. In
the difcult, but highly interesting fth chapter of the Mystagogia,
Maximus shows how he thinks of the rst two stages as somehow
running parallel.51
I am not going to interpret all the details of the whole chapter, but
I will try to describe the main features of Maximus view of the well-
ordered soul. The soul has two aspects, namely a contemplative
aspect called mind (F), and an active (practical) aspect (e
) called reason (), which are the primary powers of
the soul.52 The primary activity (K) of the mind is wisdom,
46
Cf. his Cap. gnost.
47
Cf. Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1077c.
48
Cf. Cap. gnost. 1,22.
49
Cf. the Ambiguum 41, which presents the cosmic drama or plan in a nutshell.
50
If one reads the rst century of the De char. from the beginning, one clearly sees
that in the condition of love as the peak of the virtues, one not only loves God, but
loves all men equally and distributes with equity and without passion.
51
Cf. Cooper (2005), 634.
52
Cf. to this and what follows Myst. 5, PG 91: 673c676c.
while the primary activity (K) of the reason is prudence. After
having said this, Maximus builds up two columns of properties ar-
ranged according to each power of the soul. (i) Through the mind, the
following belong to the soul: wisdom (the primary activity of mind),
contemplation (), knowledge and unforgettable knowledge
( H). The purpose of all this, or the goal towards
which it is directed, is truth. (ii) Through the reason, the following
belong to the soul: prudence (the primary activity of reason), action
(A), virtue, and faith. The good is the goal towards which all this
is directed. Truth reveals the divine from its essence, while the good
reveals the divine from its activity.
What does this mean? Firstly, according to Maximus the different
elements he has enumerated inhere in a certain sequence:53 the mind
moved by wisdom attains to contemplation; the mind moved by
contemplation attains to knowledge; the mind moved by knowledge
attains to unforgettable knowledge; and the mind moved by unfor-
gettable knowledge comes to truth. Likewise, the reason moved by
prudence attains to action; the reason moved by action comes to
virtue; the reason moved by virtue attains to faith; and the reason
moved by faith comes to the good. What Maximus has in mind is
obviously a development of the activities of the soul in the direction of
perfection, which means that for him the higher levels are more
perfect and desirable than the lower. We must think then, that for
Maximus wisdom is the condition of contemplation: in order to
contemplate correctly, one must be wise, and in order to attain
knowledge one must contemplate. Beyond knowledge there is an
even more advanced stage, namely the so-called unforgettable knowl-
edge in which the mind perceives divine truth from the divine
essence. This cannot mean to know the essence itself, since in the
nal part of the introduction to the Mystagogia Maximus teaches a
radical apophatisism. It probably means to achieve the highest form
of spiritual knowledge of the divinity from God Himself.54
This interpretation is at least conrmed in part by what Maximus
says, even if his words give us more points to interpret: the mind, as
an essence, is potentially wisdom, contemplation is a habit, knowl-
edge is energeia, and unforgettable knowledge is the unceasing move-
ment (I) of wisdom, contemplation, and knowledge, that is
53 54
Myst. 5, PG 91: 676c680b. Cf. De char. 1,778; 1,100; 4,47.
of the potency, habit and act of the mindI think. As far as I can
understand, what Maximus is saying is something like the following:
the mind is potentially wisdom, and the rst step beyond this potency
is realized when the mind wisely enters contemplation and fulls
itself in contemplation as an actualization, i.e., enters the habit of
contemplation. This fullment of contemplation is knowledge, and
knowledge is, therefore, the mind in actuality or activity. I showed
above that the sanctuary is a metaphor for natural contemplation
spiritually interpreted. I suppose this means that this knowledge, as
the fullment of contemplation and as the actualization of the po-
tential of the mind, should be conceived of as a spiritual knowledge,
i.e., as knowledge in the Holy Spirit. This knowledge is a distinctive
kind of conception of the cosmos, based on the Logoslogoi structure,
with its beginning and end determined by the divine scheme of
salvation. The unforgettable knowledge, I suppose, is the condition
in which the mind is elevated towards divine truth in perpetual
movement. If the rst kind of knowledge may be compared with
the original condition of minds according to Origena condition
which did not protect them from falling from Godunforgettable
knowledge is more advanced: at this stage one meets the divine in
such a manner that one cannot fall back.55 Further, Maximus seems
to indicate that at this stage, the natural capacity of the mind reaches
its endwe shall return to this below.56
We nd a similar sequential development in connection with
reason: reason moved by prudence arrives at action, through action
the soul arrives at virtue, through virtue it arrives at faith, which is a
secure conviction of divine things. Reason possesses this conviction
by potentially being prudence. The rst step beyond this potency is
the habit that makes action a reality. The fullment of such a habit is
actualized virtue, which, analogous with the former sequence, means
that virtue is the actualized condition or the energeia of reason. Faith,
further, is beyond this, the summit, the full realization of prudence,
action, and virtue. This means that faith is the condition of reason
based on a potential that became habit, a habit that became actuality
or activity. By faith reason arrives in the good, and at this stage reason
ends its proper activities, since its created capacity has reached its
55
On Maximus understanding of the Origenist myth, cf. Ambiguum 7. Cf. De
char. 1,46.
56
Myst. 5, PG 91: 677a.
limit and cannot move any further.57 One wonders about the concept
of faith in this sequence. Is this the faith that is required at baptism, or is it
a more advanced level of faith? I suppose it has to be the latter. However, it
strikes me as a bit difcult to understand exactly what character this kind
of faith has. Maximus is so sparse with his words on this point that I feel
one has to make a qualied guess. I think the faith he speaks of is a kind
of advanced trust in Gods goodness, some mental condition of rest,
comparable with unforgettable knowledge in the parallel column.
There are three important matters that require some further com-
ment here, namely (i) the parallelism between the two columns built
respectively on mind and reason, (ii) the relation between human and
divine power, or activity, in the developments as they are described,
and (iii) the sayings that there is an end to both kinds of activity.
(i) I interpret the developments respectively from reason and
mind as short and highly condensed descriptions of the spiri-
tual stages of ethical philosophy and natural contemplation.
I believe this is conrmed by one of the ways Maximus
summarizes his teaching that these stages run parallel and,
I suppose, mutually condition or stimulate one another: he
speaks of joining reason together with mind, prudence with
wisdom, action with contemplation, virtue with knowledge,
faith with unforgettable knowledge; and none of these is inferior
in comparison with the others.58 Maximus does not think there
is a division in the psychological makeup and development of
man. Rather, he sees the intellectual and emotional aspects of
the soul, i.e., the theoretical powers and the practical powers,
which suffer a split in a disintegrated human life, in their devel-
opment towards the direction of human reintegration through
the ecclesial life in Christ.
(ii) Is this double activation or development of the potential of
human nature a purely human pursuit, or is there any kind of
divine intervention or help in the process? There is denitely
divine help at hand. Maximus says that every soul, by the grace
of the Holy Spirit and by his own diligence and serious work,
can unite them with one another, i.e., unite the pairs men-
tioned in (i) above.59 If we compare this with what we found in
57 58
Myst. 5, PG 91: 677b. Myst. 5, PG 91: 677cd.
59
Myst. 5, PG 91: 677cd.
Ad Thalassium 6, on baptism, we can understand the grace of
the Holy Spirit as the kind of activation of baptismal grace that
takes place when man moves in accordance with his logos of
being and his logos of well-being. The last logos, at least, is the
principle in accordance with which man participates in divine
activity on the levels of practical and contemplative philoso-
phy.60 The grace of the Spirit works on man when man runs
his course as he is designed to do.
I think this may be made even more specic. If we turn to a passage in
Ambiguum 7,61 Maximus endorses a topic we found in St Gregory of
Nyssa as well, even if treated rather cautiously by Gregory, namely
that the virtues are somehow an incarnation of Christ in the believer.
To be more precise, Maximus says Christ is the essence of virtue in
each person. Could this point be developed a bit more? I think it can.
There are two elements here that need to be accommodated to one
another: on the one hand, Christ as the essence of the virtues is a
gure that may be expressed in another way. In the Gnostic chapters
Maximus says that the beginningless works of God are participated in
according to grace. One such work is Goodness and what is included
in Goodness, among other things, is Virtue itself.62 This is an infused
power in human beings or, in other words, the divine activity working
in man.63 The other element is the activity of man, when it is
natural.64 The virtues, Maximus says in his disputation with Pyrrhus,
are natural for man.65 Now, from these two points we may gather that
there are two activities that come together in the ethical eld, namely
the divine Goodness working in man, and the human potential for
virtue being activated when man moves as he should. We nd some-
thing similar when it comes to contemplation. Maximus says in De
char. that when the sun of righteousnessan image of Christ, the
Logosrises in the pure mind, he reveals both Himself and the logoi
of what He has made and will make.66 According to the Chapters on
knowledge, neither the soul by its own powers alone, nor the mind by
60
On this cf. Tollefsen (2008), chapter 4, IIIIV.
61
Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081c1084b.
62
Cap. gnost. 1,4850, PG 90: 1100c1101b.
63
Cf. Cap. gnost. 1, 49 and 47, PG 90: 1101a and 1100bc.
64
Cap. gnost. 1, 47, PG 90: 1100b-c; cf. Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081d1084a.
65
Pyrrh., PG 91: 309bc.
66
De char. 1,95: PG 90: 981c.
its strength alone can attain divine knowledge and illumination. God
must condescend. He lifts man up to Himself and illuminates the
souls faculties if this is to be achieved.67
The presence of the grace of the Spirit, as divine activity activated
in cooperation with human capacity, is the presence of participa-
tion.68 How should this be understood? It obviously means that man
becomes able to perceive and know more than he could have by his
own powers alone. Man perceives and knows things that are invisible
and unknowable from the point of view of mans nature in the fallen
condition. Structures of being and divine aspects of being are grasped
that are not normally seen. This is highly interesting in connection
with St Gregory Palamas doctrine of light, which we shall turn to in
the next chapter.
(iii) We should now be in a position to comment on the nal point,
namely the sayings that there is an end to the activities of mind
and reason. The ontological structure of human beings is such
that they are designed for a certain God-willed activity. This
activity may be executed and expanded up to a certain point,
namely to the uttermost limit of creaturely capacity. I think this
must be the meaning of the saying that there is an end to the
activities of mind and reason. In the Gnostic chapters it is said
that God suspends the natural activity of created beings by
actualizing his own divine activity in them.69 The text seems
to indicate that the process is a gradual one. To the degree that
man establishes his natural activity within the limits of the
divine activity, i.e., participates in it, the natural activity of
man is suspended. I think this is also conrmed by what Max-
imus says in Ad Thalassium 22, when he speaks of the active and
passive principle in human life. The execution of the active
principle belongs to this age; in the future age man is transposed
into the condition of passivity, because he suffers transforma-
tion by grace into deication.70
At the uttermost peak, when having completed the course of ethical
and contemplative philosophy in cooperation with the activity of
67
Cap. gnost. 1,31, PG 90: 1093d1096a.
68
Cf. once more the sequence in Cap. gnost. 1, 4750.
69
Cap. gnost. 1,47, PG 90: 1100bc.
70
Ad Thal. 22, CCSG 7, 1401.
divine grace, man enters the third level of spiritual development. But
here he reaches a limit: his natural powers cannot bring him into the
completed state of deication. Man transcends his capacities, what-
ever his natural endowments, and receives from God the grace to
move beyond himself into the realm of God.71 At this level, Maximus
says, one is made god by God.72
What this actually means is a critical question. The whole drive of
Maximus thinking, his basic ontological and metaphysical convic-
tions, makes it unthinkable that any creature should be transformed
completely into something that it is not. There would be no real
salvation for human beings if they were to become what they are
notin that case they would disappear, and no continuity would any
longer exist between what man is and what he becomes. Still, it is
obvious that Maximus has a realistic view of salvation. Man is
destined to be moved into the divine realm, to be transformed by
Gods grace, and in effect to be deied. In Ambiguum 41 Maximus
says about created being that the whole [shall be] wholly interpene-
trated by God, and become all that God is, except for identity of
essence ( H H H, d A Y
K , d B P ).73 In Ambi-
guum 10 Maximus views deied man as being beyond temporal
existence, possessing the divine life of the Logos, and having achieved
the divine properties of being without beginning and enda truly
paradoxical saying.74
We shall investigate the deied condition a bit closer: (i) is it
possible to dene more precisely the ontological relation between
uncreated and created being within the condition of deication? (ii)
Exactly how should we dene Maximus conception of participation?
(i) What is the relation between uncreated and created being
within the condition of deication? As far as I can see, Max-
imus counts the four adverbs in the denition of faith from
Chalcedon (AD 451) as a basic logical tool for describing the
relation between uncreated and created being: without confu-
sion, without change, without division, and without separation
71
Cf. Cap. gnost. 1, 39 and 47, PG 90: 1097c and 1100bc; Ambiguum 10, PG 91:
1153b-c; Ambiguum 20, PG 91: 1237ab.
72
Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1084a.
73
74
Ambiguum 10, PG 91: 1144c. Cf. Tollefsen (2008), 21213.
(I, I, I, I). Ambiguum 5
conrms this, since he uses this kind of terminology several
times when he describes the relationship between uncreated
and created being in Christ, and his whole argumentation in
the text reects this kind of logic.75 According to the argument
of the text, the logic of the four adverbs regulates the ontology
of essence and activity in Christ, the God-man, and, by im-
plication, in the process of our deication.
As far as I can judge, the union of God and man in Christ, and the
union of man and God in deication are two different kinds of union,
even if there are similarities. In the rst kind of union the hypostatic
principle is the Logos of God, and the humanity of Christ is the
human nature of the Logos, regulated by the Logos as the sole subject
or concrete principle of agencyeven if it is the natural powers of the
natures that are given direction in the hypostasis. In the second kind
of union, the hypostatic principle is the human hypostasis, and un-
created being enters into this hypostasized human nature as divine
activity (not nature) transforming the human being, its nature and
hypostasis. It seems to me, however, in connection with both in-
stances, that the relation between the two spheres may be compared
with oil and water; they are in close proximity to one another in an
intimate union, but are never mixed together. In this regard, St
Gregory of Nyssas terminology of mixture could be a challenging
option. They have some kind of intimate, but parallel existence. The
rst kind of union, perhaps, is to be considered as the more close-knit
one. The union itself is strictly regulated in accordance with the
hypostatic principle. In the second kind of union, the union is, in a
more precarious sense, based on the condition of cooperation: fallen
man has to open up to the activity of Godsomething he accom-
plishes by moving along the road of spiritual developmentand to
work with God in the union. Man must be in the condition of
receptivity.76
75
Ambiguum 5, CCSG 48: 23, 25, 31. Cf. Tollefsen (2008) 200214. At this point I
still disagree with Trnen (2007) who, in the introduction to his book, complains
about the pan-Chalcedonianism making these adverbs basic logical concepts in
Maximus, cf. Tollefsen (2008), 10. I agree with Trnen that union and distinction
are basic logical concepts in Maximus thinking, but is not the so-called Chalcedonian
logic a special application of these concepts? I think they are.
76
Cf. Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1080b and Tollefsen (2008), 1856.
Deication obviously does not mean that man is transformed into
another kind of essential being. He either cooperates, orat the level
of deication properhe executes his natural activity by resting in
the mode of the divine activity: the divine activity carries the human
activity. We have to think, however, that the natural properties that
man is created with, his mind, soul, and body, together with all of his
faculties, are originally designed by God to develop into this perfect
condition beyond what we may imagine in our post-lapsarian condi-
tion of limitations, illness, weakness, moral and physical corruption,
and death. In short, spiritual development and deication is a reinte-
gration of man and a restoration of his being for the development into
the divine pattern of the logos of eternal well-being.77 We could
imagine, then, that the natural endowment of man is developed and
expanded qualitatively by the divine activity into something trans-
cending what we may be able to conceive. Man is made in such a way
that the presence of divine activity expands his powers innitely. In
the tenth Ambiguum Maximus indicates what this should be like,
when he says that such a person in such a condition has no experience
of what is present to it, and has become beginningless and endless. He
transcends the limits of temporal existence and movement circum-
scribed by beginning and end. He is not disturbed by passions and
possesses the divine and eternal life of God, the Logos.78 At a certain
level of this development into deication a self-transcending move-
ment takes place in which man, in ecstasy, goes beyond himself. This
is, I suppose, the sense of the words in Mystagogia chapter 5, where
Maximus says that Christ restores me to myselfwhich could point
to the levels of asceticism and contemplationor rather to Himself
which points beyond the human constitution as such.79 In De char-
itate we nd that the mind moves out of itself in love; that it is lifted
towards God and beyond the realm of created things.80 According to
the terminology of Ad Thalassium 60, man, in the deied condition,
enjoys God beyond rational and conceptual knowledge, in experience
and sensation (E and Y).81 This must be the condition in
which man no longer conceives of God as an object of reason or
77
Cf. Myst. 5, PG 91: 676b.
78
Ambiguum 10, PG 91: 1144c.
79
Myst 5, PG 91: 676b.
80
De char. 1,1011, PG 90: 964a, cf. Cap.gnost. 1,39, PG 90: 1097c.
81
Ad Thal. 60, CCSG 22: 77.
mind, but rather enters the union of love with the one that is loved.
Maximus denes this sensation as the experience through participa-
tion of the good things beyond nature.82 This leads us to the nal topic
in the present section: some words should be said on participation.
(ii) In the Chapters on knowledge there is a sequence of thought
(1,379, cf. 44 and 47) that indicates what Maximus has in
mind when talking about participation.83 Maximus interprets
the terms Sabbath, Sabbaths, and Sabbaths of Sabbaths. The
rst two denote respectively the practical and contemplative
levels (1,37 and 1,38). The third denotes the level of theology
(1,39). A human being is brought into the sphere of divine
inuence in an increasingly higher fashion. Gods activity in
man expands both quantitatively and qualitatively, i.e., man
participates in even more aspects of the divine activity, and he
achieves what he achieves in a more intensied way.84
According to Maximus there are three logoi that describe a human
individuals lifespan, namely the logos of being, the logos of well-
being, and the logos of eternal well-being.85 One might ask if there
is a real triad of logoi for every human being, or if the three are aspects
of one logos only. I think we shall conceive of this as a triadic pattern,
i.e., a unity in distinction, indicating that man is created as an image
of the divine being (the Trinity). The three logoi then belong together
and they constitute a single triadic conception in God. In practical
life, however, a human being may live in a disorderly fashion with
regard to this triadic ideal, thereby causing a split in its own relation
to its triad.86 Man participates in God in accordance with this triad
of logoi, but not in all three immediately. Participation takes place if
man moves in accordance with the threefold pattern of spiritual
development. In this connection we should look to a text in De
82
Ibid.
83
Cap. gnost. 1,3750, PG 90: 1097c1101b. In Tollefsen (2008), chapter 5, I tried
to dene Maximus concept of participation. What I say here could be considered as
supplementary to the claims I made there. However, I think I have moved some steps
in the direction of a more simplied and dynamic concept of participation. It is
basically the presence of divine activity in created being. Cf. The discussion in Chapter
8 below.
84
On this, cf. Tollefsen (2008), chapter 4, part IV.
85
Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1084bc.
86
Cf. Ambiguum 22, PG 91: 1348d, 1349a.
charitate (3,25).87 When God created intelligent creatures he com-
municated (K) four of the divine properties, namely
Being, Eternal Being, Goodness, and Wisdom. Being and Eternal
Being are given to the essence, and Goodness and Wisdom are
given to the gnomic tness ( c K). The last
term denotes the volitive faculty in mans concrete (i.e., hypostatic)
existence, when man is challenged to arrange his life in accordance
with or discordant with his logos. These divine properties, without
doubt, belong to the so-called beginningless divine works discussed in
Chapter 4 earlier, in the section on Maximus. In Chapters on knowl-
edge 1,4750 Maximus shows that the divine activity (K) ad
extra is manifested in works without beginning, and these are
participated beings (Z ). If we t these bits of ideas
together, we get the following picture: man is made in accordance
with his logos of being, and he receives Gods activity as Being and
Eternal Being into his created essence. If he lives according to this
logos of being, man naturally practises the virtues of his nature and
enters into a life in accordance with his logos of well-being. This
movement expands mans receptive capacity and the divine activity
becomes present from above as Goodness and Virtue.88 As man
moves on in accordance with his logos of eternal well-being, his
receptive capacity is further expanded by divine grace, and the
human being becomes a recipient of deication. At the highest level
(the Sabbaths of Sabbaths, cf. Cap. gnost. 1,39) one nds the spiritual
stillness, or rest (M c) of the rational soul, the mind
being withdrawn even from the more divine logoi of higher contem-
plation. The soul dwells wholly in God alone in loving ecstasy, and it
has become unmoved (I) in God by mystical theology. In
short, man exists with his powers transformed not in the mode of his
created activity, but in the mode of divine activity, expanded in
accordance with the purpose of his Maker into the kind of being he
was destined to become.
Participation, then, is the presence of divine activity in the creature,
a presence that may be developed if man acts according to his divine
87
De char. 3,25, PG 90: 1024bc.
88
Cf. the texts Cap. gnost. 1.4850, PG 90: 1100c1101b, De char. 1.100, PG 90:
981d984a, De char. 3,25, cf. 3.27: 1024bc and 1025a, De char. 2.52: 1001b. Cf.
Tollefsen (2008), Chapter 4.
purpose. The point is that the creaturely essence exists in a mode
given by God or executed by God.
At this point one last question arises: a similar question to one we
had to face in connection with St Gregory of Nyssa above. If created
being exists in the mode of divine activity, how are we to defend such
a theology from the accusations of pantheism? Firstly, created sub-
stances, created essences, are by nature such, namely created. Their
status as created otherness cannot be otherwise. But there is no
autonomous creation, nothing that exists on its own power. We
should ask, therefore, what are the conditions on which beings have
being? What is it that makes beings both to be and to be preserved in
being? Obviously, from a Christian point of view, the only condition
or conditions of being is found in God. Therefore, if Gods activity is
present, beings have being; if absent, then beings do not have being.
In short, beings have being and, according to Maximus, goodness,
virtue, holiness, life, immortality, innity, simplicity, and such quali-
ties or properties in a mode of cooperation with the divine. But there
is no confusion between the spheres of the uncreated and the created,
since the Chalcedonian logic we commented upon above shows the
ontological principles by which the relationship is divinely regulated.
The created cosmos is not dependent upon itself for its being. It
depends on Gods continuous presence. If this gives a correct picture
of the ontology of Greek, patristic thought, I admit that there is
probably no general agreement on this ontology. As far as I can see,
scholastic theology would disagree: beings exist by created being, not
by the presence of divine energeia that empowers them to be. We shall
discuss this a bit further in Chapter 8.
7
The Theology of St Gregory Palamas
It might be considered desirable to close the gap of more than six

centuries between St Maximus the Confessor and St Gregory Palamas
with investigations into the developments in theology and spirituality
that went on in between. However, I do not think that is necessary
since I am not writing a history of Byzantine thought. Rather, I am
trying to make sense of some basic ideas of Eastern Christian think-
ing, and part of my project is, as stated in the Introduction, to gure
out if the theology of Gregory Palamas is in accordance with major
formative representatives of the Byzantine theological tradition. My
aim in this chapter, therefore, is to discuss whether Palamas thinks
along the same philosophical lines as St Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius
the Areopagite, and St Maximus. We have followed the development
of ideas of essence, activity, and participation in connection with
divine generation, the external activity of creation, the Incarnation
of the Logos, and the salvation of man. In connection with Gregory
Palamas the scope is narrowed down. I shall treat some of the topics
I have dwelt on earlier, but in a more summary fashion. To put the
conclusion rst: I think there is no breach with the legacy of Greek
Byzantine theology, and my aim is to show that this is the case.
Rather, Palamas employs the traditional terminology and from this
point of view he tries to highlight a certain conception of spirituality.
Almost all discussions of Palamas thought somehow take the Hesy-
chast controversy as a framework. Since I shall try to make sense of
Palamas positive theology in accordance with the traditional way
of thinking, I shall not start within this frame of reference. However,
I will return to the topic of Hesychast spirituality below, since part of
my aim is to interpret the Palamite doctrine of the experience of light
according to the principles of the ontology I have tried to outline in
the foregoing chapters.
186 The Theology of St Gregory Palamas
A. ST GREGORY PALAMAS ON ENERGEIA
AND PARTICIPATION
First I shall make a short note on the translation of the notorious key
term of Palamite theology, namely K. The dominating modern
translation, as pointed out in the Introduction, is energy. However,
I am not going to shift from the terminology I have employed so far in
the present book, and therefore I continue to translate it primarily as
activity. Custom is hard to change, and I do not believe my choice
will achieve a universal following. I dont think it matters that much
either, even if I believe activityand related terminology, cf. the
Introductionis better than energy. A terminological shift may also
be helpful if one should want to break free from the modern quagmire
of discussion for and against Palamism. I admit, on the other hand,
that there are instances in which energy could be useful as a sugges-
tive alternative to activity. It is in line with my project, though, mainly
to retain a terminology that makes comparative shifts from pagan
to Christian philosophy easier, and I believe activity is better in
that regard.
We shall start with St Gregorys doctrine of God. Gregory speaks of
H Z F F.1 I fear such an expression may be misunder-
stood. It is, it seems, tempting to understand him as saying that there
are three realities or even entities to be considered concerning God, as
if the three were some sort of thing. This, however, is not the case.
I am quite sure that what is intended is that there are three ontological
aspects to be considered concerning the divine being, namely the
essence, the activity, and the triad of divine hypostases. In this
instance I feel it could give the wrong signal to speak of energy,
since that could indicate something quite foreign to Palmas mind,
namely a kind of entity in addition to the divine essence. There is an
internal dynamic of the divine being in which it is active in relation to
itself. The supreme Goodness, Palamas says, is the Trinity owing
without change from itself into itself and standing with itself
before the ages.2 These words remind one of the famous saying by
St Gregory the Theologian: therefore the monad is from the
1
Capita 150.75. We saw above that St Maximus also used this terminology of being
or beings. There is no reason to think that these thinkers gave in to some kind of
polytheistic conception.
2
Capita 150.37.
The Theology of St Gregory Palamas 187
beginning moved towards the dyad until it reaches the triad, that is
for us the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.3
In the image Palamas gives of the Trinity he tries to secure a unied
dynamic according to which the three hypostases eternally move out
from and into one another in a perfect communion of goodness and
love. Even so he follows the mainstream tradition from the Cappa-
docian Fathers in which the origin of the Trinity is the Father. He
likens the Father with mind, and what else could ever go forth from
mind than a word as from a source, he says.4 This word is not to be
compared with a word that is expressed orally, nor is it like a word
within us that is not yet said, nor is it like a word within the thinking
process, but rather it is like the immediate act of knowing of the mind.
These sayings, I assume, indicate that the word is temporally or
ontologically coextensive with the mind. This word illustrates the
Logos of God, who is also the Son of God. He is from the Father
(K F e Z) and in no sense inferior to, but rather identical
with the Fathers essence. Hypostatically he differs, of course, being
subject to generation in a way betting the Godhead.
The next move in Gregorys analogy takes into consideration that a
word does not ow from the mind without spirit.5 This spirit is not
breath, nor is it spirit in the sense of what accompanies an immanent
and discursive word within us, Palamas says. It might be a bit difcult
to gure out what exactly is meant by this last point. It seems that
Palamas thinks of a certain sensible quality that accompanies a word
in the temporally extended discursive movement or activity within
the mind, maybe a sense of force or inspiration. This conception might
be considered an elevated one, but Palamas still wants to bring us
beyond this level. However, at this step he leaves the image. Even so we
may gather from what follows that the spirit he speaks of is the
immediate love of the mind for the immediate word or knowledge it
has brought forth. Then follows the theological lesson: the Holy Spirit
is like the ineffable love of the Begetter for the ineffably begotten Logos.
At this point Palamas makes an interesting move: the Logos loves His
Father and Begetter, of course. The conclusion he draws from this is not,
however, that the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son,
even if with the Spirit some kind of natural bond between the other two
hypostases is established. The Son possesses his love for the Father, this
3
Oration 29, Third theological oration 2.
4 5
Capita 150.35. Capita 150.36.
love being the Spirit, as the Spirit proceeds from the Father together
with him. This is relevant for the discussion of the Filioque, a major
topic that is not within our concern in the present context. On the other
hand, there is a strikingly Augustinian note to the idea of the Holy Spirit
as the mutual love of the Father and the Son.6
With all this said, there could seem to be a difference between the
thinkers we have discussed in earlier chapters and Gregory Palamas
in connection with divine generation. In Capita 150.96 he quotes St
Cyril of Alexandria, who says that begetting is of the divine nature,
while creating is of the divine activity.7 On the other hand, in Capita
150.113 Palamas indicates that the divine hypostases share or com-
municate in movements or activities of power and life that belong to
the divine nature. This could be taken to move in another direction
than the adherence to St Cyril seems to indicate: the energeia plays an
important role in the internal life of the Godhead. There is obviously
an internal activity that consists in the powerful movement of the
hypostases towards one another in communion of divine life. When
Palamas accepts (with St Cyril) that generation is of the nature, there
is perhaps not that much of a difference between him and St Gregory
of Nyssa and St Maximus the Confessor. In the case of Palamas it
could just be a question of terminology. He may choose not to talk of
divine generation in terms of internal activity, even if such generation
denitely may be characterized as a special kind of such activity, as in
the theologies of other thinkers.
If we leave the subject of the Trinity behind, we come to the more
challenging topic of the divine activity ad extra, i.e., in relation to
created otherness. Palamas adheres to a radical apophatisism. In
Capita 150, in language that reminds one of St Maximus in the
introduction to the Mystagogia, Palamas says:8 If God is nature,
otherness is not nature, and if each of the other things is nature, He
is not nature; just as He is not being, if others are beings, and if He is
being, the others are not beings. This amounts to a rather clear-cut
notion of divine transcendence, and as such it seems philosophically
6
This is seen by Flogaus (1998), 22, as well. Flogaus points to a possible inuence
on Palamas from the Greek translation of the De Trinitate. I am not in the position
now to evaluate this possible inuence extensively, but have noted another saying in
the Capita 150.54 that resounds of the felix culpa in the midst of a rather Augustinian
reection. However, differences between the two thinkers abound.
7
Cf. Capita 150.143 as well.
8
Capita 150.78.
sound to me. There is no common set of categories between God and
created otherness. At this point Palamas thought comes close to
Maximus teaching in Ambiguum 7, when the latter denies simulta-
neous existence between the innite and the nite, and denies any
common ground between that which is beyond all categories and that
which is constituted by them all.9 However, the next step Palamas
makes in the text I am commenting on, comes as a surprise: If you
accept this as true also for Wisdom and Goodness and simply for all
of what is around God or said of Him, then you theologize well and in
accordance with the saints. If I understand him correctly, he ex-
presses here the thought that divine properties that are basically
divine activities, also belong to the sphere of transcendence.10
I suppose the point is that divine activities or properties are not, as
such, related to anything outside the divine sphere. They are simply
what the divine nature or essence eternally manifests within its
eternal Triadic dynamics, and that is independent of any divine
relatedness to something other than God. God is dynamically Himself
eternally, and only relates to otherness when He wills otherness to
exist. To me this seems to be a sound philosophical principle.
Palamas has a second surprise in store for us in the third step of the
same text (Capita 150.78). Despite what is just said about the divine
essence and activity, God is and is said to be the Nature of all beings,
the Being of beings, and the Form in forms as the primal Form, the
Wisdom of the wise, and simply all for all things. How could this be?
As I said in connection with St Gregory of Nyssa, this sounds
strangely pantheistic to be the words of an Orthodox Father. How-
ever, in similarity with Gregory of Nyssa, this has to do with partici-
pation. Palamas says that all things participate in God, and they are
constituted by this participation ( PF d B
), they do not, however, participate in His
nature, but in His activity (P B B PF , ,
Ia B B PF K).
In all of this, in his teaching on the divine essence and activity, and
participation, Palamas so far says nothing that is especially discordant
with the lines of thought we have found in earlier thinkers. Of course,
9
10
We found this idea above in St Gregory of Nyssa as well: the activity depends on
the Power of God, and the Power of God depends on the essence of God, and for this
reason activity basically transcends the limits of our reason.
it is philosophically sound to say that the divine activity as such, in its
immediate dependence on Gods nature, is beyond created being. Still
we have to nd out how Palamas thinks that such a transcendent
activity is accommodated to created otherness. I think his seemingly
pantheistic pronouncements are a natural consequence of the radical
doctrine of transcendence: if there is a created cosmos, all of its
conditions are in God. There cannot be anything in existence that
does not depend on God for its being and its preservation. To talk
of such conditions as being achieved through participation is a
consequence of the basic conceptions of uncreated and created nat-
ure. It does not mean, however, that the divine and the created
spheres are mixed together. It only means that beings have being,
goodness, etc., from God. They should need to have it from God in
some qualied way, since the divine essence itself is imparticipatable
(I ).11 This obviously indicates that participation means that
God is actively working in what He has made, a notion we have
met before. It seems to me to be a quite reasonable way to express
what participation is in the mainstream GreekByzantine tradition
of theological thought.
What does it mean that God is the Form in forms as the primal
Form? It is rather tempting to suppose that it indicates a doctrine of
divine Forms in the mind of God, i.e., something like St Maximus
doctrine of logoi of beings. However, things are not that clear. We
could rst note that, whatever the precise nature of Palamas teaching,
God cannot be the Form in forms in the sense that creatures are
divine by nature. He can only be the Form in forms as the one who
eternally contains formal knowledge of creatures. This is much like
what we found in St Maximus the Confessor. Maximus also says that
God in this way is the I of things; meaning, I suppose, that
He is the reality of beings, i.e., the secure foundation of their natural
being.12 The basic idea of all this is that the true essential content
of all things is preserved in God Himself. Even if this could seem to
be a reasonable interpretation, it may still be difcult to substantiate
any detailed teaching on this in the works of Palamas. We shall
investigate this a bit further.
The Capita 150.87 is highly relevant in this connection. It is
important to note, however, that Palamas builds on Dionysius in
11 12
Capita 150.75. Ambiguum 7, PG 91: 1081a.
this context, and we have to ask if he also accepts his teaching.13 First
I think we should note the terminology. He treats processions and
activities ( K) synonymously, which he should
since he comments on Dionysius. Dionysius calls these processions
and activities a d P . The term means a
participation, a sharing, a partaking. We have here a word with the
same sense as St Maximus in the term a Z ,
participated beings.14 Palamasor Dionysiusparticipation is
exactly this, something that is participated. What strikes me imme-
diately as a bit disappointing in the present chapter is that Palamas
does not seem to distinguish between logoi and activities. Such a
distinction was made by St Maximus, and applied systematically by
him.15 On the other hand, logoi are, as we shall see, activities, even if
activities of a certain kind. However, in Capita 150 Palamas does not
seem to feel the need to make any distinction in principle between
logoi as activities and other kinds of activities.
Palamas follows Dionysius further when he says that the activities
are paradigms or exemplars ( ) of beings, and exist in a
unied manner in God. Palamas quotes Dionysius who says that
these paradigms are logoi of beings that bring forth the essences of
beings. The logoi are further described as predenitions ( )
and divine and good acts of will ( ) in accordance with which
God determines and makes beings. The divine activity understood
as logoi of this kind, is essence-making, life-making, and wisdom-
making. By this activity beings are made and preserved. All of this
seems to make quite good sense, and is so far in accordance with
St Maximus doctrine of logoi. In Palamas cosmology, the activity, as
creative activity, brings beings forth and preserves them, constitutes
them in their essential characteristics, gives them life, and bestows
wisdom on created mindsif these minds move in accordance with
their divine purpose, I imagine. What might be considered somehow
strange in this context is that the creative activity as essence-making is
a so-called participation, since beings do not hold their essences by
participation, or do they? I think the most obvious interpretation is
the following: since the paradigm of a being is in the divine logos in
13
The relevant text from Dionysius is DN, chapter 5.
14
Cap. gnost. 1.48, PG 90: 1100c.
15
Cf. Tollefsen (2008), chapter 4, part IV.
God, a created being could be said to participate in the creative
activity that makes and preserves it.
Palamas asks twice in the brief chapter I am commenting on
how one could consider such activities, exemplars, predenitions, or
divine acts of will to be creations. These questions are rhetorical
questions directed to his opponents in the contemporary controversy.
Philosophically speaking it is obvious that activities of this kind
cannot be created, but spring from the eternal divine being itself. In
this regard Palamas relies upon the whole tradition of mainstream
GreekChristian thought, and if anyone should feel tempted to deny
his conclusion, he would have to reject this tradition.
There is one question that poses itself on the background of the
Capita 150.87: can we draw any denite conclusions regarding a
doctrine of logoi in Palamas? Perhaps not. The motif for his appeal to
Dionysius is primarily to secure traditional authority for his own doc-
trine of divine, uncreated energeia, not to develop a philosophical
cosmology. He accepts Dionysius as a witness. Maybe he adheres to
the details, but we cannot know for sure. It may a fortiori be doubted
that Palamas has worked out for himself anything like the metaphysics
and cosmology of St Maximus. Even so, I also doubt that Palamas would
have denied any of Maximus teachings, even if he did not consciously
integrate them into his own theological system. It cannot, therefore, be
taken for granted that he had a sophisticated doctrine of logoi.
Palamas thinks the divine activities or participations are naturally
arranged in their dependence on the divine being. He does not make
much of this idea, which indeed stems from Dionysius, but only says
that other activities, such as Providence, Life, and Goodness are
beings (Z) and participate in Being.16 The idea is not, as we shall
soon see, that there is a hierarchy of entities arranged with Being at
the top of it. Rather, what Palamas has in mind is some sort of logical
sequence within the eld of the active divine manifestation: the divine
activity is manifested as a power of Being that is diversied into
aspects such as Goodness, etc. To speak of the activity or activities
as being or beings could be misunderstoodwe should remember
this was St Maximus terminology as wellinto making them into
kinds of entities. However, Palamas examples clear the fog. Activity,
16
Capita 150.88. However, Palamas deviates from Dionysius when he considers
Being as more fundamental than Goodness. In this Palamas follows Maximus, cf.
Tollefsen (2008), 1634, and Dionysius, DN 5.2 and 11.6, Suchla: 1834, 2213.
he says, is the essential movement of nature ( P B
).17 A couple of other texts bear witness to the same dynamic
character of the activity: according to Capita 150.137 God foreknows
and provides for beings; He creates, preserves, rules, and transforms
them (, E, E, E, ,
). According to the Triads (3.2.11.), Palamas saysquot-
ing Dionysiusthat the activities are certain powers ( ) which
are deifying, essence-making, life-making, and giving wisdom
(Ka j Pf j j ). The activities,
as we can see, are not at all beings in the sense of things that myster-
iously emanate from Gods essence, rather they are God-in-activity.
There are two questions that are rather urgent in connection with
Palamas theology, namely the topic of the relation between Gods
essence and activity, and the topic of the unity and diversity of the
activity, cf. the terminology of activity and activities.
(i) The rst topic is nowadays mainly presented in the terminol-
ogy of a real distinction between essence and energy. According
to Meyendorff, since Orthodox theology teaches a doctrine of
deication, which implies a participation of created man in the
uncreated life of God, a real distinction between Gods essence
and energy is unavoidable.18 One might immediately wonder if
this is a proper way to state the matter. As we saw already in
Plotinus, an essence has two K, i.e., activities, namely an
internal and an external one. In Christian philosophy it seems
to be commonplace that there is no essence without an activity
and no activity without an essence.19 Whenever a complete
essential being occurs, it occurs as active. On the other hand, to
be something and to act in accordance with what one is, is not
the same. For instance, to be human and to execute activities
like building, doing mathematics, or going for a walk, are not
the same. One could say there is a difference between the
denition of man and the denition of a certain human opera-
tion like building something. However, the activity proper to a
being is not something totally different from what it is
17
Capita 150.143. This is presented as a quotation from St John of Damascus.
However, St Maximus quotes what he identies as a saying by St Gregory of Nyssa to
the same effect and in very similar words, cf. Th. pol. 27, PG 91: 281a.
18
Meyendorff (1987), 186.
19
Cf. Palamas, Capita 150.136.
essentially, and when Palamas says the activity is the essential
movement of nature, this precisely demonstrates that point. So
being God and executing the capacities of what it is to be God,
even if different or distinct, is not separated into two different
or distinct realms of being. In his third letter to Akindynus,
Palamas used a phrase that disturbed his addressee, speaking of
the activity as a lower divinity ( ).20 Palamas
himself, in a second version of the letter, appealing to the
authority of Dionysius, specied the term to indicate the gift
of deication received as such from Gods transcendent es-
sence. Whatever he originally had in mind with this term, I
think it is an unfortunate way to formulate what he felt needed
to be put into words, namely the unity and distinction between
essence and activity of God. Because of this terminology, Akin-
dynus accused Palamas of ditheism.21 Palamas retorts in Capita
150, where he accuses the Akindynists of imitating Euno-
mius:22 while Eunomius held that every predicate we use
about God is of the essence, in order to degrade the Son (if
God is unbegotten He cannot be begotten as well), Palamas
opponents also think that all predicates are of the essence in
order to degrade the activity to a creaturely status. How, one
might wonder, is the activity thus degraded? It is degraded if
the Akindynists distinguish between divine predicates and the
divine activity. The predicates reveal properties that somehow
are identical with the divine essence, and the essence cannot be
an object of participation. If, according to the Akindynists,
beings exist by participation, they participate in something
other than God, namely in a created activity or some such
sort of condition. Logically Palamas argument seems fair to
me, but if this is what his opponents teach, in my opinion, it is
both a breach with traditionsince both Gregory of Nyssa and
Maximus the Confessor teach otherwiseand quite meaning-
less: if the world exists because of a created activity, this must be
made by another activity, and ultimatelyin order to avoid an
innite regresswe have to accept an activity that stems di-
rectly from Gods essence.23 This nal activity must somehow
be distinct from that essence if we are to avoid a direct
20 21
Hero (1983), xv, note 44xvi. Capita 150.147.
22 23
Capita 150.126. Cf. Capita 150.73.
participation of creatures in the essence itselfsomething
every Christian thinker will avoid. Palamas says that the activ-
ity is not separate, but still differs from the essence of God,
since it is from this essence ( c c ,
b c P F F K, K K
s).24
I think it is wise to remember that Palamas was the rst Christian
thinker who was forced because of controversy into the extremely
difcult task of exhibiting in precise, philosophical language what earlier
thinkers could allow themselves to sketch in much broader terms.
What terms does Palamas use in order to keep the balance between
unity and distinction with regard to essence and activity? In Capita
150.128 he starts from an argument made by St Gregory the Theolo-
gian about the Holy Spirit, and draws the lesson that the divine
activity is contemplated in God (KE H H), but this does
not mean that there is any composition in God. The question that
eventually arises, of course, is how composition is avoided if the
activity is contemplated in God. Does not this formula tell us that
God is one thing; what is in him is another? Palamas answers that
composition is avoided because God is active, and, if I understand
him correctly, this activity is not something received or acquired, it
stems naturally from Gods being. In the next chapter (129) the topic
is developed further. Once more he points to St Gregory the Theolo-
gian as an authority who says that the activity is the movement of
God ( F). Then St John of Damascus is brought forth as a
witness, and Palamas quotes him:
Activity is the efcient (c) and essential movement of nature.
The nature from which the activity proceeds possesses the capacity for
being active. The result (I = completion) of the activity is that
which is effected by the activity. And the agent of the activity is the
hypostasis that is active.25
This quotation makes use of familiar Aristotelian distinctions between
a natures acquired capacity (i.e., second potentiality = rst energeia)
and the activity that may be executed from it (i.e., second energeia).26
24
Capita 150.127. 25
John of Damascus, Expositio dei 59.79 (Kotter).
26
We have touched upon this several times, but see especially the presentation in
the section on Aristotle in Chapter 1 above.
In chapter 131 Palamas states once more that the activity is the
efcient and essential movement of nature, and in 143 the same
is repeated. There is no doubt that he wants to emphasize the non-
composite nature of the Godhead that executes an activity natural for
it. We still wonder, though, how the balance is to be kept on the other
side of the scale: there is not just sameness, one has to make some
kind of distinction as well, the activity differs from the essence,
Palamas says,27 but how?
Palamas tries to indicate what he has in mind by introducing
certain philosophical conceptions, which he then submits to exam-
ination. He raises the question if the activity is not an accident
( ).28 However, it is characteristic of accidentsincluding
inseparable accidents and natural attributesthat they come to be
and pass away, and that some of them increase and decrease (like
knowledge in the rational soul). None of this can be the case with
what belongs to God. God does not acquire nor lose properties,
neither does he suffer increase or decrease in properties. Palamas
treats of accident in the normal way according to traditional Aristo-
telianNeoplatonist logic. He says, however, that some theologians
have called the activity a , a kind of accident. But
this is only a provisional strategy to indicate that the activity is in God
even if it is not His essence. The ontological bond between essence
and accident is too loose to have any relevance for a theological
understanding or discourse on divine essence and activity.
Palamas makes some further remarks on the so-called kind of
accident.29 Since hypostatic properties and hypostasis are neither the
essence of God nor certain accidents, does it follow that they do not
exist? The answer is obviously no. Further, if the divine activity is
neither essence nor accident, does it follow that it does not exist? Of
course not, Palamas says. Then follows an interesting, though difcult
point: if, according to the theologians, God creates not simply by
nature, but by will, then nature is one thing and willing another.
Palamas concludes that even if nature is one thing and will another it
does not follow that will does not exist, consequently God possesses
both essence and activity. The problem here is the relation between
essence and will. Is it not a traditional theological doctrine that there
is a natural will, i.e., a will that belongs essentially to rational nature?
27 28 29
Capita 150. 126. Capita 150.127. Capita 150.135.
Isnt this the orthodox legacy of St Maximus and the Constantino-
politan council of 68081? I dont think there is any need to make this
into a major problem. As far as I can understand, it is not discordant
with Maximian theology to say that will is an activity of the nature.
Rather I think this is Maximus point, not that essence and will are
identical, but rather that having the capacity of willing belongs to a
rational beings nature. And if Maximus radical apophatisism should be
taken seriously, this is all that we can say: the divine essence, beyond all
being and all properties, executes will as one of its activities.
Another kind of terminology that Palamas tries out is the termi-
nology of properties, that which is added to or belongs to something
(a from ).30 With that which belongs, he says,
one necessarily seeks what they belong to. From this he constructs an
argument against his opponents: if attribute belongs to an essence,
and if the essence does not differ from the attribute, then, if there are
many attributes, the one essence is split into many essences. What-
ever one should think of this argument, the lesson for us in the
present context is the terminology of . With this term
Palamas says that the divine activities are what belong to an essence.
They are not the essence itself, but closely related to it. I suppose this
terminology ts well into the sayings that the activity is the essential
movement of nature.
What then are we to make of all this? As I said above, Palamas was
challenged to say something about a traditional pair of concepts that
earlier thinkers could apply without being bothered too much to
precisely dene the ontological connection and distinction between
them. Further, pagan and Christian thought, Plotinus and the Neo-
platonists, the Cappadocian Fathers and St Maximus, acknowledged
the concepts of divine activity, internal as well as external, as if they
were quite meaningful notions. In its contents there is not any
perspicuous deviation between the doctrines of earlier Christian
thinkers and Gregory Palamas. Even if the different strategies Pala-
mas suggests for the clarication of the relation and distinction may
not be absolutely satisfactory, I cannot see that his philosophical point
is unsound. In any case, if it is unsound, then both the Neoplatonist
and the Christian traditions suffer the same blow.
30
Capita 150.119, cf the sequence 117119.
Meyendorff is correct that there is a distinction between Gods
essence and his activities. The activities, however, are closely con-
nected with what the divine being is essentially. I somehow sense that
the term real distinction may suggest too much of a diversity, and I
wonder if the whole question and perhaps problem of divine activity
and creaturely participation could not be viewed in a slightly different
manner. I shall return to this in the last chapter below.
(ii) We turn now to the terminology of activityactivities, i.e., to the
topic of unity and diversity in connection with the activity. In
the Capita 150 Palamas says the essence of God is one and totally
indivisible.31 Another place in the same work he repeats that the
essence is indivisible, and therefore also totally imparticipatable.32
Creatures participate therefore in the divine activity, with the
implication that Gods dynamic presence is somehow dispersed
throughout the whole range of created being by specied divine
activities. Palamas has a favourite notion he constantly returns to,
namely indivisibly divided. The terminology varies, but turns on
expressions like I , I E, or,
stated more positively, divided union ( ).33
This notion obviously concerns the topic of participation. How,
according to Palamas, is the one activity pluralized in relation to
the participants?
On the one hand the divine activity is one, but on the other hand
Palamas argues that activities have to be distinct in relation to one
another.34 If creating is not distinct from foreknowing, then Gods
foreknowledge would also have a beginning once He began to create,
a notion which is untenable. This seems to indicate a split in the one
divine activity itself, part of it being without beginning and part of it
having a beginning. Could this really be so? As we have seen, through
His activity God performs different operations, such as foreknowing,
creating, preserving, ruling, and transforming.35 The problem concern-
ing activities that are without beginning and with beginning is partly
solved by identifying activities with divine acts of will.36 Since these acts
of will spring from Gods unitary eternal will, one may say that creation
31 32
Capita 150.65. Capita 150.110.
33
Capita 150.69, 74, 81, 91, 110; Homily 35.1617.
34 35
Capita 150.138, 101, 103. Capita 150.137.
36
Capita 150.87.
is Gods instantaneous activity of making a world with a denite
temporal beginning. In the section on St Maximus doctrine of creation
above, we saw that John Philoponus argued for the immediate transi-
tion from capacity to activity based on Aristotelian principles. Further,
in at least one place in the Capita 150 Palamas indicates that the
diversication of the activity is related to or depends on the partici-
pants.37 He uses an analogy: the suns rays have two inseparable quali-
ties: light and heat. Creatures without eyes can feel the heat, but cannot
participate in light. On the other hand, creatures cannot be considered
to give an independent contribution to the diversication. If diversity
depends on creatures, it must depend on them not as they occur by
themselves, but in accordance with designs in the divine mind. This is
the way St Maximus the Confessor explains the range and intensity of
participation. As we have seen, the divine logoi set the limit to which a
creature may participate in Gods beginningless works. There is one
problem with this interpretation, however. A key text in this regard is
the Capita 150.87 in which Palamas, unfortunately, does not seem to
distinguish between logoi or paradigms on the one hand, and the divine
activity as to what is participated in on the other. Of course, logoi are
somehow activities of the divine mind, but in St Maximus they are
Gods own activity of dening or planning or conceiving of what He
wants to create. On the other hand, we cannot say for sure that Palamas
excludes such a distinction. Still we cannot argue his case as if he had a
denite doctrine in this regard.
In Capita 150.78a text I commented on abovePalamas says
that God is the Being of beings, the Form of forms, the Wisdom of the
wise, and generally all for all things. It may be a bit speculative, but
could not this indicate three different relations, namely that God is
the paradigmatic cause (Form of forms, i.e., of Maximian logoi), that
there is a natural and universal participation in being (the Being of
beings), and that there is participation in Wisdom for those rational
beings who move in accordance with the divine will? The text tells us
further that there is a natural participation in the activity common to
all, but then there are creatures who participate in accordance with
their own choice () of being near to or far from God. In
Capita 150.69 Palamas explicitly says that the activity is bestowed
I, proportionately, upon participants according to the tness
37
Capita 150.94.
of those who receive it (a c K H ),
and the activity gives the deifying radiance to a greater or lesser
degree. This is probably the context for Palamas saying (in Capita
150.78) that God is the Wisdom of the wise, i.e., as a gracious
gift to those who move in accordance with the divine purpose of
human life.
This leaves us to make the following, even if hypothetical, con-
struction: beings are conceived in Gods eternal thought in such a way
that they may be participants in divine activity to the degree that their
natures are t for such a reception, and some creatures may even
make themselves t for the reception of a more intense presence of
divine activity when they move in accordance with the divine will. In
this way the terminology of activityactivities can be explained. The
one activity is pluralized in accordance with the divinely predened
receptive potentiality and capacity of creatures.38
I leave it at that. One problem remains, though, namely the general
philosophical problem of the simplicity of God. Even if we may be
able to argue for a hypothesis concerning the unity and plurality of
the energeiai in Palamas, the more basic question of the energeiai in
relation to divine simplicity should be discussed further. I return to
this in the next chapter, and then in relation to the whole Greek
theological tradition I have investigated above.
It strikes me that we nd philosophical ideas of essence, activity,
and participation in Gregory Palamas thinking that are primarily in
accordance with what we have already seen in Gregory of Nyssa,
Dionysius, and Maximus the Confessor. The only major point that
makes Palamas thought different, is that he attempts to use a voca-
bulary that highlights the difference between essence and activity.
Now the time has come to dive into the dimension of his doctrine
that, in the strict sense, gave him his doctrinal adversaries, namely the
topic of the uncreated light.
38
Flogaus (1998), 15, says that, according to Palamas, participation necessarily
introduces a division in that which is participated. I cannot agree. As I have argued,
participation can only allow division or plurality if based on pre-established divine
principles, not by the relation to creatures as such. Flogaus argues from Capita
150.109, but I dont think this text supports his point.
B. THE LIGHT OF MOUNT TABOR
St Gregory Palamas defended the experience of light by the Hesychast

monks, rst against Barlaam of Calabria, then against Akindynus and
those who shared his or similar views. Barlaam denied that the
experience of light by the Hesychasts could be an experience of
uncreated light, the light of the divinity, or what Palamas called the
divine energeia. Akindynus fearedas we have seenthat Palamas
teaching about divine energeia implied a doctrine of twoor more
gods. This is about all we need to know about his adversaries in
the present context, since my intention is to discuss Palamas positive
doctrine on the background of the traditional philosophy of essence,
activity, and participation that I have developed throughout this
book.39
Palamas claims that the light experienced by the Hesychast monks is
the light of Mount Tabor, i.e., the light that shone from Christ at His
Transguration. The rst question, therefore, is what is this light? It is
not difcult to establish a traditional ontological context for addressing
this question. We have seen that, according to St Maximus, natural
activity is an innate distinctive mark that is naturally constitutive for a
nature.40 Both Maximus and Gregory of Nyssa teach that within the
constitution of the God-man there is a mutual activity going on between
the two united natures. How is this piece of Orthodox doctrine relevant
for the interpretation of the light? It is a common idea within the
Byzantine tradition that the essence of God transcends created minds.
God is known because of His activity in created beings. According to
Palamas, the light of Mount Tabor is this divine energeia.41
39
There is comprehensive literature available in regard to the Hesychast contro-
versy. It is difcult to even recommend some writings in order not to appear biased.
However, Meyendorff (1974), A Study of Gregory Palamas (rst published in English
1964, French original 1959) is a pioneering work. Mantzaridis (1984), The Deication
of Man, is a stimulating study of Palamite theology. There are several articles by
Sinkewics in Mediaeval Studies (1981, 1982 on Barlaam; 1986 on Palamas Capita 150,
cf. the introduction to his edition (1988) of the same work) related to the controversy.
Gunnarson (2002), Mystical Realism in the Early Theology of Gregory Palamas, is a
recent Scandinavian contribution that investigates the earliest encounters between
Barlaam and Palamas.
40
Pyrrh. PG 91: 348a, cf. Chapter 3 above, the section St Maximus the Confessor
on the Internal Activity of the Trinity.
41
Capita 150.150.
On this background some questions arise. If the light of Mount Tabor
is the divine activity, by what faculty of the soul do the apostles perceive
it? In what way is the experience of light adapted to a scheme of spiritual
development? What is the role of the Holy Spirit in the experience of
light? What does the activity as light accomplish in the beholder?
The Gospel text gives no clue to determine the exact ontological
character of the light the apostles perceived. It is open to interpreta-
tion. Even so, taking the text by itself gives the impression that the
apostles had the immediate experience of seeing light streaming forth
from the person of Christ. If ontological categories are considered
there are two possibilities. The light was either created or uncreated.
Palamas thinks it was uncreated. The question, however, is how could
uncreated light be perceived by created beings? Like St Maximus
before him, Palamas believes a change was made in the power of
perception.42 In his Homily 34 he speaks about a transformation of
the apostles senses.43 The light is obviously not perceptible to the
faculty of sight in its natural condition, but the disciples passed from
esh to spirit and the Holy Spirit wrought a transformation of their
power of sensation to a certain degree. If we turn to the Triads, we get
the impression that the perception of light is made possible when a
human being has reached a certain level in the spiritual life. The
terminology is interesting. Palamas speaks of sensation, intellection,
and knowledge, but obviously the terms are given a new content
within the conception of spiritual life as he describes it.
A closer description of the epistemic character of the experience of
light should be given in connection with the idea of spiritual devel-
opment. According to Palamas, apophatic theology by itself is an
intellectual pursuit that does not necessarily effect a change in the one
who pursues it. The experience of light takes place after a certain
development that involves a purication of the passionate soul.
Palamas speaks of the heart as the seat of the rational faculty (e
).44 Not that this faculty is located either in the heart or
outside the body as in a place, since the rational faculty is incorporeal.
Even so it is in the heart, in the sense that the rational faculty uses it as
an instrument. Palamas refers to Macarius who says the heart directs
42
Maximus, Ambiguum 10, PG 91: 1128a; Palamas, Homily 34.8. I have used
the English translation of Veniamin (2004), and the Greek text of the PG 151.
43
Ibid.
44
Triads 1.2.3.
the whole organism.45 One might ask what heart and organism mean
here. It strikes me as the most reasonable interpretation that the heart
is conceived as the spiritual centre of man. I interpret the organism as
the totality of mans spiritual being or makeup that includes the
powers of the soul and its organs. This includes the psychophysical
totality investigated in natural science, but makes sense of this totality
in a quite different context.
Since the heart is the centre of the rational faculty, the mind, which
is dispersed by the senses, has to be led back into the heart. Only thus
is it possible that the mind keeps watch () over the thoughts of
the heart. At this point Palamas introduces divine grace into the
picture: grace must rule from the heart by inscribing the laws of the
Spirit. This last probably refers to St Pauls words in Romans 8:111,
from which we gather that the law of the Spirit of life is fullled in us
who do not walk according to the esh but according to the Spirit.
The point of this, I think, is that the ascetical concentration of the
mind, watching over the desires and impulses of mans interior, is
graciously met with the active presence of the Spirit that strengthens
and guides mans steps. The Holy Spirit rules from the heart, i.e. from
the centre of mans being.
The purication separates the mind from all things through
impassibility or detachment (I).46 This description indicates
something similar to St Maximus practical or ascetical philosophy, in
which the development of virtues may be described as culminating
in detachment as the condition of love for God.47 Palamas concep-
tion of virtue could seem to be quite similar to the views we found
both in St Gregory of Nyssa and St Maximus: virtue, Palamas says in
his third homily, is ancient, since it was with God eternally. It was
instilled in our soul from the beginning by the grace of God.48 In
Palamas, like in Maximus, the virtue of detachment separates the soul
and its powers from attachment to sensible things that distract its
spiritual concentration.
Palamas seems to move one step further when he says that through
prayer the mind is united with the grace of the Holy Spirit. Through
this grace the mind arrives at the enjoyment of the divine effulgences
or ashings of divine light (H H H), and the mind
45 46
Ibid. Triads 1.3.21.
47 48
Maximus, De char. 1,13, PG 90: 961ab. Homily 3.10, PG 151: 37a.
acquires an angelic form and a deiform character (I d
c).49
There are several things to be noted here. The Holy Spirit plays a
central role in this spirituality. It is the Spirit who makes divine grace
available in practical matters as well as in the minds ascent towards
God in prayer. This grace brings the mind into the condition in which
a radical change takes place, so that the mind receives a new char-
acter. The centrality of grace transmitted by the Holy Spirit is ob-
viously of great importance in the soteriology and spirituality of
Palamas, as may be gathered from his homilies as well.50 The
human being, gathered together from its dispersal in sensible things,
concentrates on God in prayer, and by grace from above the divine
activity enters into the natural constitution of man and transforms
man in the direction of deication. In Triads 3.2.11 Palamas refers to
Dionysius and says that if we call the transessential mystery of divine
being God, Life, Essence, Light, or Word, we in fact refer to
powers that come from Him to us: deifying, making being and life,
and giving wisdom.
This deifying power or activity brings man into a new epistemic
condition. In several instances Palamas comments on this. He uses
the terminology of perceiving, knowing, and contemplating. If we
compare this with St Maximus threefold development, in which
contemplation and knowledge primarily belong to the second stage,
all this talk of perceiving and contemplating the mystery could im-
mediately strike one as a bit surprising. However, in this regard
Palamas does not teach something essentially different from Maximus.
Before I comment on the terminology of contemplation, I should like
to discuss some aspects of Palamas terminology of sensation.
If we look into the texts, Palamas employs his terminology in a
rather careful way. He speaks of a vision that is neither sensible nor
intellectual from the point of view of mans natural endowment.
Palamas tries out terms like intellectual and divine sensation
(Y a d ), intellectual sensation (a Y),
and spiritual sensation (Y c).51 The background
49
Triads 1.3.20.
50
Cf. for instance homilies 2 and 3, PG 151.
51
Triads 1.3.2021. This terminology and its context in this kind of spirituality
should be of interest for those who investigate the notion of spiritual sensation. Sarah
Coakley gave an interesting talk on this topic in Gregory of Nyssa at a colloquium in
Lund in 2009. I hope her paper will be published soon.
here is that the Gospel story tells us that the disciples perceived light.
The Hesychast experience, as known to Palamas, includes a percep-
tion of light as if somehow seen. Palamas is well aware that the
terminology of intellectual sensation is paradoxical: the activity of the
mind is not sensation, nor is the activity of sense an intellection. The
experience, therefore, is neither sensation nor intellection. He refers
to Dionysius and says it is rather a union, i.e., a union with God by
grace in the Holy Spirit. What happens to man then? The human
mind transcends () itself and acquires the angelic form
mentioned above.52 The saints contemplate (H) the divine
light within themselves (K E).53 The term spiritual sensation
is used to express that the contemplation is neither by mind nor
by body. The point is that one receives this experience by the Holy
Spirit and sees (~ ) supernaturally a light beyond light.54 Those
who see and hear are initiated into knowledge of the future, and
have science (K ) of eternal being. They receive all of this from
the incomprehensible Holy Spirit, by whom they see ( y H).55
God, Palamas says, remains entirely in Himself, and also dwells
entirely in us. He does not communicate His nature to us, rather
His own glory and splendour.56 This presence of God in us is the
presence of the divine energeia, i.e., of His activity.
What about the terminology of contemplation and vision? Nor-
mally one would think that contemplating something implies that a
subject stands in an epistemic relation to an object about which the
subject gains some sort of knowledge. This is not the way contempla-
tion is conceived by Palamas in this connection. God is beyond
knowledge and even beyond unknowing.57 Intellectual activity is
brought to a halt.58 Contemplation is here a union with God and
deication. It seems obvious that in this condition God no longer is
constituted an object of knowledge, but is met in the mystery of love.
If anything results from this that could be termed knowledge, as
indeed it does according to Palamas, it is knowledge of a rather special
kind. The mind becomes supercelestial () and receives
supernatural and ineffable visions.59 More precisely one does not
conceive of the mystery by the mind, but rather, one hears, sees,
and comprehendsto the degree that is possibleby the Spirit.60
52 53 54
Triads 1.3.4. Triads 1.3.5. Triads 1.3.21.
55 56 57
58 59 60
St Maximus the Confessor says in the Gnostic chapters that God
suspends the natural activity of created beings by actualizing His own
divine activity in them.61 This comes rather close to the teachings of
Palamas as we have met them here. If the divine activity can be
perceived at all, it seems reasonable that it is perceived as light. One
could claim the support of the New Testament, for instance, the
Gospel of John, and St Paul when he says God is dwelling in
unapproachable light (1 Tim 6:16). Palamas is not willing to explain
away the realism of the narrative of the Transguration of Christ.
There is, therefore, a kind of perception by the senses, even if this
perception is of an extraordinary kind. To employ another Maximian
idea: the perceiving is in a mode that is different from the creaturely
one. The mind is the centre of mans psychophysical constitution as a
spiritual being. If divine grace allows the presence of the activity of the
Spirit in and from this centre, man may be illuminated from the mind
to the faculty of sensation so as to see, hear, and in general perceive
something other than what is perceived quite naturally. The powers
of the mind and the senses are expanded by the new mode of being
and this mode in itself is not creaturely, it is divine. The new mode of
the mind, in the words of Palamas himself, is of an angelic or divine
form (I d c). In this divine mode he may
perceive divine things, such as the activity of the Spirit itself as
deifying light. I cannot understand that St Gregory Palamas, in this
sense, does anything other than bring out the implications already
prepared in the doctrines of the spiritual life and deication that we
nd in St Gregory of Nyssa and St Maximus the Confessor.
61
Maximus, Cap. gnost. 1,47, PG 90: 1100bc.
8
Concluding Remarks
In these concluding remarks I shall return to some of the main topics

above and discuss a few important implications. Ill start with the
concept of the dynamic being of the Christian God and move on to the
concept of participation. Next follows a treatment of essence, hypos-
tasis, and energeia, in which I offer some critical remarks on Meyen-
dorff and Zizioulas. Then I treat divine simplicity, in connection with
which I comment on certain issues raised by Bradshaw and Bals. This
is, nally, followed by a section on uncreated and created being.
THE LIVING GOD
Christian theology naturally claims that God is transcendent. God is

not subject to conditions below Him. He is the Creator of the cosmos
and the Lord of history. These claims are easy to declare but difcult
to understand. The notion of transcendence is basic to the Christian
philosophy of late antiquity and Byzantium. In a special sense Max-
imus the Confessor conceived of the notion of transcendence in such
a radical fashion that what he says is difcult to appreciate fully, even
if I believe what he says is philosophically sound. Maximus says that
God in Himself is beyond all categories that we use when talking of
created being (page 724 above), an idea repeated by Gregory Pala-
mas (page 1889 above). It is not possible to speak adequately of a
reality of that kind in any set of concepts framed by a created mind. In
this regard there is only room for a theology of complete silence. In
Christian thought, however, God Himself breaks the silence by estab-
lishing an economy of complete otherness with regard to Himself. All
talk of God, philosophical as well as metaphorical, moves within the
208 Concluding Remarks
sphere of otherness and can only count as different strategies for
talking about what cannot be grasped in itself. The criteria for
correcting concepts and images cannot be found in any other source
than in what comes after God. What comes after God is in this
regard His revelation, and this revelation is an activity executed in
created being.
Neoplatonists and Christians, when talking philosophically of God,
have no other option than to apply terms we are acquainted with
from a philosophical analysis of beings in the world. Neoplatonists
and Christians try to gure out how one could speak of God as a
source of created otherness. It is impossible to avoid the notions of
P and K in such discourse. Even if Plotinus does not nd it
adequate to speak of God as willing and contemplating, he allows
such terminology (page 23 above) in order to explain how otherness
is a result of the rst principle. The internal activity of the One is the
condition for all other levels of being resulting from an external
activity of the same One. However, Plotinus is not willing to involve
his rst principle in what comes after it, since that would threaten the
unity of the One. For this reason there is no divine economy in the
Christian sense. The Christian Godhead executes internal activity in
the triadic constitution of itself. Even if God, strictly speaking, is not
intuitive thought (Maximus, page 124 above), but transcends such
categories, He is still said to contemplate eternally the plan of the
cosmos with a view to the mystery of Christ (page 120 above). The
Christian God, therefore, is conceived of as being turned eternally and
triadically towards Himself in the activity of knowing and willing
created otherness. This knowing and willing, however, transcends
our grasp of such processes.
Meyendorff claims there is a difference between the Neoplatonist
and the Christian conceptions of divine transcendence.1 Neoplato-
nists claim, he says, that the unknowability of God is due to limita-
tions of the created mind. If one is detached from other beings and
moves beyond oneself one accedes to knowledge of the divine being.
I believe this is wrong. As I showed above (page 223), according to
Plotinus, mind has no access to what is beyond mind. The One is
denitely beyond mind. If not, it would have been Mind and not the
One. If the One is conceived as being intelligible, it is not such in
1
Concluding Remarks 209
itself: its intelligibility, to use a Christian term, is economical. It is
manifested as intelligible in the minds conversion, but it is not
intelligible in itself. To use Meyendorffs term, transcendence is a
property of God and not something that created minds can overcome.
There are differences between the Neoplatonist and the Christian
conceptions of God, but this is not the place to specify them.
How does creation come to be? We should remember the distinctive
mark of Christian thought that the cosmos has a certain age, and
therefore began a denite number of time units ago. According to
Gregory of Nyssa, God instantaneously brought His Forms into activ-
ity by His will, and made the world (page 946 above). According to
Maximus, God made the world recently, and even if Maximus does
not explicitly adopt and adapt the arguments of Philoponus (page 119
above), he seems to have tried to develop a prolonged argument to the
same effect: the world was made instantaneously and with a temporal
beginning.2 It is interesting to note that Dionysius deviates from this
understanding of creation, and rather seems to view the cosmos as a
result of Gods eternal external activity (page 11011 above). In this
regard he is not within the mainstream of Christian thought.
The heading of this sub-section is The living God. The point of
this is to emphasize that the God of Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius,
Maximus, and Gregory Palamas is not just a cosmic principle or a
principle of being, but the God who lives, loves, and cares for His
creatures. The triadic conception of the Godhead adds to this notion,
since the divine being itself exists in an eternal community of love
that eventually is given by grace to beings other than God. In Chris-
tian discourse the internal and external activity of God, therefore, is
conceived of economically, i.e., with a view to the purpose of created
being. Even if beyond the capacity of the human intellect, God is
believed to nurture love as a primary dimension of Himself.
It is worthwhile to be precise about this: the concept of providence
was much discussed in the philosophical schools of late antiquity.
Alexander of Aphrodisias denies that God knows individuals and
claims that it is below the dignity of God to attend to individuals.3
The divine activity that maintains the cosmos is evenly distributed in
the orderly arrangement and movement of the heavenly bodies; and
particular beings exist solely for the purpose of maintaining the
2
Cf. the long argument in Ambiguum 10, PG 91: 1176d1188d.
3
Sorabji (2004), 70.
species.4 Plotinus, however, thinks that providence extends to indivi-
duals, and Proclus believes that it comprises everything.5 On the
other hand, this does not mean that God has any primary concern
with what is below, i.e., in the created world. To speak of Gods care
for creatures must be a metaphorical use of terms, since there is
nothing like the Maximian or Christian mystery of Christ in these
systems. It seems fair to claim that the concept of God in the schools
amounts to a notion of a rather remote, divine principle. There is not
much of the living and loving God of the Christians to be found.
PARTICIPATION
The act of creation is a divine activity ad extra. In relation to the concept

of transcendence this means that God establishes something new, some-
thing that was not before, and, so to speak, makes room for what is not
Himself. It is obvious that such an otherness cannot be or exist by any
power inherent in it, since it has no such power, but depends in all
respects on God. This total dependence is expressed in the terminology
of participation. I admit that I have always found this notion rather
obscure. Many of us rst met this term in the philosophy of Plato, and
reading the introduction to his Parmenides one easily gets entangled in
the problem of how to conceive of it (page 15 above). On the other
hand, it now seems to me that the notion is not that difcult. I may be
wrong, but after having studied Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius, Maximus,
and Gregory Palamas with respect to their notion of participation,
I have come to the conclusion that participation is mainly used in
Christian thought to denote Gods activity in what is not God. Beings
are said to participate in God because He is present in creatures by being
active in them, by operating in them. This way of understanding is
relevant in cosmology, incarnational theology, and soteriology.
Human activities, and the activities of created being in general, are
limited in space and time. They begin and end, even if some go on for
some time. Divine activity is not such. Based on Gods inexhaustible
Power it is not limited, but goes on dynamically and invisibly, creating,
preserving, and perfecting creatures. With such a difference in mind it
4 5
Sorabji (2004), 80. Sorabji (2004), 84.
may even be tempting to use the term energy to describe this activity.
Gregory of Nyssa speaks of this activity in terms of God pervading things
and mixing with the cosmos. He also speaks of it as tting things together
and maintaining everything (page 97 above). Maximus says that God
lets beings participate in His beginningless works, which, as we have
seen, is another term for the divine activity (page 1267 above). To me all
of this seems to mean that the divine activity, in different ways, is present
in created being, working actively in particulars and in the totality, in
accordance with divine paradigms and the divine scheme of salvation
(pages 978, 11415, 12930 above). This understanding of participa-
tion probably does not run into the problems that Plato had to face in the
Parmenides. Divided Forms and divided activities seem to me to present
rather different kinds of problems. Forms are in some sense beings,
while activities are acts. An agent may distribute his activities to different
things successively, but even so it is not reasonable to say that any split
occurs in the acts due to the difference of objects he attends to. When he
does one thing, his activity is complete; when he turns to another thing,
his activity is still complete, and has not lost some part of itself. The
divine activity, however, is permanently present. It is at least present as
long as something is kept in being. It seems reasonable to me that God
may keep beings in being by one simple act of being, if this act of being is
received into different creatures as a power to be in accordance with the
capacity given to these creatures by God. Beings do not participate in
some part of Gods activity, but in the whole according to principles
limiting their receptive capacity (page 122, 129 above). Of course, we
may remember Maximus terminology, in which divine works are said
to be beings (page 1267 above). I do not think, however, that Maximus
uses this term in the static sense of something substantial, he rather
makes the claim that acts, works, or activities are realities manifested by
God in the world of being. Platonic Forms are not active, something that
makes it difcult for them to be distributed to participants. Nor is there a
divine Mind that brings the Forms into activity; if not, the Demiurge of
the Timaeus could do the job.
ESSENCE, HYPOSTASIS, AND ENERGEIA
Meyendorff was a pioneer in the scholarly work on Palamas. I think,

with due respect, that it is about time to look critically at some of the
claims he makes in his research. The term real distinction is the most
notorious. We shall return to that in the next section. We shall discuss
another matter rst. Meyendorff says that Palamas opponents shared
an essentialist philosophy as well as certain philosophical notions that
were borrowed from Aristotelian and Neoplatonist sources and given
validity by the authority of Dionysius the Areopagite.6 The philoso-
phy of Palamas adversaries is obviously seen as being rather different
from that of Palamas, and as characterized by a technical vocabulary
and stiffened thought-forms not quite able to grasp the dynamics of
Byzantine spirituality. However, we have seen that Christian philo-
sophy and theology developed throughout the centuries, bringing
with it not only a terminology that is similar to the schools, but
even addressing similar challenges in ways that are both similar and
different from the Neoplatonists. I do not make any strong claims
here as to Neoplatonisms inuence on Christian thinking. This is a
quite intricate matter, and I am rather critical about assertions of
inuence and dependence. I make the claim, however, that the two
movements coped with problems of a similar kind. It strikes me that
ancient Christian thought in some regards has more in common with
Neoplatonism than Meyendorff admits. Meyendorff seems to have a
negative attitude towards what he calls essentialism. Now, what is
essentialism? Is it the tendency to hold essential being as the most
basic ontological feature or level of reality? Meyendorffs words on
personalism seem to indicate that.7 I suppose this is a version of the
de Regnon thesis, which was put forward in 1892: Latin thinking
about the Trinity begins with divine unity and proceeds from nature
to person, while Greek thinking proceeds from person to nature.8 In
Harts words, many of us have come to believe that we must choose
between Greek personalism and Latin essentialism.9 It is in
keeping with this that Meyendorff says that Maximus afrmed,
following the Cappadocians and in the terms used by Leontius of
Byzantium, the autonomous existence of the divine person, source
and not product of nature.10 Zizioulas claims in accordance with the
same way of thinking that the ultimate ontological category which
makes something really be, is neither an impersonal and incommu-
nicable substance, nor a structure of communion existing by itself
6 7
Meyendorff (1974), 204. Meyendorff (1974), 21213.
8 9
Hart in Coakley (2004), 11112. Ibid.
10
or imposed by necessity, but rather the person.11 He even claims that
Gods being is the consequence of a free person, and that God has no
ontological content, no true being, apart from communion: In this
way, communion becomes an ontological concept in patristic
thought. The claims made by Meyendorff and Zizioulas make me a
bit uneasy. If representatives of Greek patristic thought start with
something other than the notion of essence, they start with the notion
of hypostasis, but that is not exactly the same as Meyendorffs or
Zizioulas person. However, do they really start with that? The picture
I have discovered and presented above points rather to a constantly
present dialectical shift between the notion of essence and the notion
of hypostasis. In one way it seems as if hypostasis is a mode of
essential existence in concreto. On the other hand one should be
careful not to take what, for instance, the Cappadocians say in this
regard as an ontological doctrine. When Gregory of Nyssa uses the
language of essence and hypostasis in connection with God, what he
has in mind is not a set of philosophical concepts applied to the being
of God, but rather a qualied strategy to speak of what is revealed. He
makes no claims as to what comes rst and what comes second.
Rather he applies the terms pragmatically. Of course, all three Cap-
padocian Fathers agree that the hypostasis of the Father is the source
of the hypostases of the Son and the Spirit. This, somehow, identies
a hypostatic source of the being of the two generated hypostases. On
the other hand, it is a primary concern that the generations commu-
nicate hypostases of the same nature. Further, when one comes to a
philosopher of the format of Maximus, one nds that the content of
the hypostasis is markedly natural. While Zizioulas thinks that com-
munion is a personal property, Maximus obviously thinks that com-
munion is a natural or essential property. That a particular entity is
communicative in its very being is not due to the characteristics of the
hypostasis, it is rather given in the essential constitution as such.12 On
the other hand, it is in the mode of hypostatic being that essential
contents are individualized. I think it is quite difcult if not impos-
sible to separate a concept of person from a concept of individual in
Greek patristic thought. If one emphasizes too strongly that the
person is the source of the nature or essence, one risks falling into a
nominalist position: what really exists are individuals, not natures.
11
Zizioulas (1985), 1718.
12
See Ambiguum 41, cf. Tollefsen (2008), chapter 3.
How should we then avoid tritheism? I think it is important to see the
virtues of Maximus essentialist position: individual human beings are
instantiations of structures of being that put every single individual in
relationship with every other individual. This is not even limited to
human individuals, but comprises the whole of being. In the hypo-
static mode, however, lies the possibility of living in accordance with
or discordant with nature, i.e., to live in virtuous communion with
God and His creatures, or to live in enmity with them.
Even if this had to be said, the concept of hypostasis within
Christian theology and Christian anthropology represents an inter-
esting step beyond Neoplatonism. If one considers the primary
hypostases of the Plotinian system, one gets the impression that
they are rather impersonal principles or entities. There is no com-
munion of love, no personal relatedness between the hypostases. At
this point I think Bradshaw is correct when he says that Plotinian
hypostases are not persons, however, so that the external energeia is
not yet a truly personal act.13 It seems quite obvious that in Christian
theology another kind of hypostasis turns up than what is found in
Neoplatonism. This is a kind of hypostasis in which natural energeiai,
the energeiai of the essence, become modied into personal acts. This
is a distinctive Christian conception of Gods providence. God desires
communion with His creatures. He acts to share His own good with
them. But to conceive of it in this way is not to oppose essence and
hypostasis, it is rather to acknowledge the dialectical shift between the
two in the ontological description of beings.
What shall we think, further, of Meyendorffs real distinction? I am
not very fond of the term. I feel it somehow makes the distinction
between essence and activity too radical. Palamas tried to clear the
eld, exploring different possible ways of formulating how activity is
related to essence (page 1968 above). God acts by the powers of His
nature and is active in creatures to the degree they are able to receive
His inuence into their ontological constitution. I cannot see there
are any major philosophical problems with this idea. Because of Gods
work in them, human beings receive characteristics that are divine.
This is a claim made by Eastern Christian tradition. It is substantiated
in different ways in major thinkers like Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysius
the Areopagite, Maximus the Confessor, and Gregory Palamas.
13
Bradshaw (2007), 267.
DIVINE SIMPLICITY
It is rather easy to understand Meyendorffs concerns about the so-

called real distinction: if the purpose of beings is to achieve deica-
tion, and if we do not consider it possible for creatures to become
divine by nature, how are we to think of this deication? Is it just a
metaphor? For anyone acquainted with the Greek Christian, Byzan-
tine, and Orthodox tradition, it should be obvious that it is not just a
metaphor. In this regard there seems to be no room for a created gift
that could be termed deifying grace. If that is the case, we are left
with the notion of divine energeia. Bradshaw claims that Augustine
nurtured a doctrine of divine simplicity that implies freedom from all
distinctions (page 100 above). Divine properties are basically one and
the same thing. They are all telescoped into the concept of the simple
divine essence.14 Whether or not this interpretation of Augustine is
correct, it denitely makes good sense. There is not much if anything
to be found in Augustine about divine energeia that is comparable to
the doctrines of the Greeks. Thomas Aquinas is an heir to the
Augustinian legacy even if this Augustinianism is interpreted within
the quite different context of scholasticism, and under the conscious
reception of Aristotelian categories. Thomas argues that God is sim-
ple, in the sense namely that He is neither a body, nor is He composed
of matter and form.15 God is the same as His essence or nature, and in
God essence and existence or being (esse) is one and the same.
Thomas takes up the question of whether there are accidents in
God.16 The answer, as may be expected, is no. We may remember
that one of the strategies tried out by Palamas to explain the divine
energeiai was to interpret them as accidents (page 1967 above). This
did not, however, turn out to be satisfactory. As a matter of fact, there
is something that Thomas says in the present context that seems
relevant for us:
Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing
accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capabil-
ity of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents
are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now there can be
14 15
Bradshaw (2007), 2245. Cf. Summa theologiae I, question 3.
16
Summa theologiae I, question 3, article 6.
nothing caused in God, since He is the rst cause. Hence it follows that
there is no accident in God.17
This is a striking paragraph. Thomas denies constituent accidents,
and even if these are not exactly what the Greeks understand by
divine energeiai, we surely have moved a bit closer to the real issue.
When it comes to properties, such as goodness, God is good essen-
tially, which means that such properties are identical with the essence,
i.e., the being of God.18 There is something rather curious in the
quotation above, namely Thomas argument that there can be noth-
ing caused in God since He is the rst cause. Nothing that is in God
can be caused by anything external to His being. This is quite obvious.
But does Thomas at the same time deny that God may cause some-
thing within His own sphere of uncreated being? The Cappadocians
applied the concept of causality to Trinitarian generation (page 489
above), even if Maximus seems to have been more restrictive in this
regard (page 789 above). Thomas denial of essential properties is
also strange on the basis of the Aristotelian distinction between rst
actuality = second potentiality = capacity and second actuality or
activity. Whatever we think of all this, the main point is the notion of
divine simplicity, which probably excludes the patristic concept of
divine energeia. Bals appeals explicitly to the concept of divine
simplicity when he denies that Gregory of Nyssas divine attributes
are uncreated energies in the Palamitic sense (page 99 above). This
implies, of course, that Bals thinks there is a violation of this
principle in Palamas thought. Palamas speaks of three aspects of
God, essence, hypostases, and activities (page 186 above). Where,
one may wonder, do the ways part? The Greeks as well would insist
upon divine simplicity; even Palamas does so, quoting Maximus.19
All Christians would have to distinguish between the one essence and
the three hypostases or persons in God. Quite generally one should
expect, as in Augustine, a claim that divine simplicity is an essential
feature of God. Even so, the Augustinian and the Thomistic God
seems locked up in His perfect simplicity and the only way He reaches
beyond His sphere is when by His will alone He acts as efcient cause.
Logically this makes all kinds of communication of being, grace, and
perfection into created effects of His will. I am sure this corollary is
17 18
Ibid. Cf. Summa theologiae I, question 6.
19
Triads 3.3.10.
open to criticism, and maybe deservedly so. It is, however, important
to get hold of the principal features of the two sets of ontologies that
seem to make a dividing line.
The God of the Greek Fathers we have considered above reaches
forth into the sphere of created beings in a quite dynamic manner.
I do not think the charge of violation of the attribute of simplicity
would have bothered the Greeks much. Maximus and Palamas who
quotes him, think that all the causes of things are a unity in God. This
idea is put forward in the Mystagogia (chapter 1) in the image of the
circle, its radii, and its centre. Basically all logoi are expressions of the
one Logos, and all activities are basically one divine activity. Is this
reasonable? One might at least say that the one Logos may conceive in
His unitary wisdom all logoi as different ways for created otherness to
reect the divine Source. They are a unity since they are conceived in
His eternal contemplation of Himself, even if, strictly speaking, God
transcends even contemplative thought, as we have seen (page 124
above). One might also conceive of the different activities as being
distinct in relation to creatures, but unied in their source since they
issue from one and the same divine power (page 130, 198, 200 above).
Even if it is not quite comme il faut to say so in these days of
ecumenical efforts, it strikes me that Greek and Latin Christian
thought represent two different kinds of ontologies. However,
I cannot see that the ancient Greek Christian thought lacks in philo-
sophical virtues compared with its alternative.
CREATED AND UNCREATED BEING
The nal topic involves the relation between uncreated and created
being in the cosmos at large, in the being of Christ as incarnated, and
in the process of deication. How are we to avoid mixing together the
uncreated being of God with created being in connection with the
cosmos? It all depends on what we understand with mixture (page
1347 above). As a matter of fact, Gregory of Nyssas terminology of
mixture may be a daring but rather refreshing way to consider the
mystery of communion between uncreated and created being. I have
shown that beings are created out of nothing, and according to
Maximus, there are divine logoi for particulars, species and genera
(page 12930 above). However, even if beings are by nature created,
the conditions by which they exist cannot be created. I suppose this is
a bit surprising. However, if beings exist on the basis of other condi-
tions, what should these conditions be? Perhaps one might say that
the condition of created essential being is a kind of created being. If
so, one might ask by what condition created being exists as such a
condition. The answer may involve an innite regress, so that even-
tually one has to admit that creatures exist on the condition of the
divine activity of being itself. Beings are essentially created, but the
conditions on which they exist are the creative and preservative
activity of God. According to Maximus, beings receive the divine
activity of being to the degree dened by God in the logoi of their
making (page 129 above). All of this is quite natural, since the radical
transcendence of God and Gods total mastery of otherness cannot
make room for any other source of being and preservation and
deication than God Himself by His activity.
A problem we ran into above becomes important in connection
with this. What about deication? If all reality exists by participation
in divine activity, is not all reality deied already? Not at all. On the
one hand, from a purely philosophical angle, what keeps beings in
being becomes a riddle given the present conditions initiated by the
Fall. From a non-religious thinkers point of view, God cannot be said
to be the source of that which keeps beings in being. To employ a
saying of Sren Kierkegaard, there is not anything incommensurable
with the being of beings even if corruptibility takes its toll and creates
anguish. It is obvious that created being does not possess the condi-
tion of deied existence. And if such a condition of being bears
witness to a divine source, it is in the sophisticated manner of the
fragile dialectic between life and death. On the other hand, from a
Christian point of view, the true nature of created being is not to be
judged on the basis of the present conditions of corruptibility and
limitation. Even if limitation and corruptibility are denite character-
istics of beings in the present condition, such properties do not have
to be features of the nature of beings from the perspective of the
beginning and end of the created cosmos. In the Christology of
Gregory of Nyssa one gets the impression that the humanity of Christ
is diluted to such a degree that almost nothing remains of human
nature as such (page 137 above). In Maximus and Palamas doctrine
of the deication of human beings we generally hear about becoming
all that God is, except for identity of essence, and also of becoming
without beginning and end (pages 180, 200). Even if divine and
human nature are not mixed together, human nature is ontologically
opened up for an existence in a divine mode of being. In our daily
experience this is rather beyond human nature, it is super-human.
How can a being that suffers such things be human any more? This is
a challenging question, especially since Maximus has committed
himself philosophically to the idea of the integrity of nature: Christian
doctrine does not teach mythological transformations from one nat-
ure into another or of two natures melting together to make up a new,
third kind of nature (page 1489 above). How is this problem to be
solved?
According to the Cappadocian Fathers it is not possible for created
minds to know the essence of any nature (page 52 above). Only God
knows the nature of beings. When beings are made in accordance
with the divine pattern, their paradigms, Forms, or logoi, this means
that only God knows the real denitions of beings, their potentialities,
and possible activities. Only God knows how essences are designed
with regard to an expansion of their being in accordance with the
divine purpose. I would also like to emphasize once again that
Gregory of Nyssas discussion of a mixture between the divine and
the human in Christ is a rather challenging way of conceiving of the
prospects of mans nal destiny. At least according to the kind of
thinking we nd in Greek Christian and Byzantine thought, mans
destiny is beyond his present condition, and he is made such as he is
with the potentiality of a development beyond imagination.
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Nyssa (Blackwell, Oxford), 97109.
Vaggione R. P. (2000), Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution
(Oxford).
Witt, C. (1989), Substance and Essence in Aristotle (Ithaca and London).
Zizioulas, J. D. (1985), Being as Communion (New York).
Index
activity 198200 deication 134, 137, 17881

accident 856 Dionysius:
accompany essence 40 acts of will 107
as Father 423 capacity to receive 117
beginning/end of 412 causes 113
double 212, 48, 6970 divine causality 689
follows essence 43, 84 divine freedom 11112
internal/external 5, 478 divine knowledge 107
knowledge 367 God as unparticipated 114
motion of essence 40 names, unity and distinction 1056
logoi and activities 125 union and distinction 667, 103
analogy/analogies 52, 55, 57 paradigmatic cause 116
analogia entis 72 paradigms/logoi/acts of will 107
Anomoean controversy 34 participation 11316
apophatic theology 724 providence 106
around it/him/God/them 24, 78, 91, remaining, procession, conversion
127, 140, 168, 189 1045, 106
Augustine, St 100, 215, 216 will, divine 1078, 10910, 111
distinction:
Bals, David 99101, 216 between essence and activities/
Barnes, Jonathan 52 energeiai 35, 1289, 198
Bathrellos, Demetrios 143, 150 ontological 43, 48, 1689
being, created and uncreated real 2, 86, 99, 169, 193, 198, 214, 215
21719 union and distinction/
Bradshaw, David 489, 58, 99100, differentiation 667, 678
214, 215
energeia:
cataphatic theology 724 as actuality 1617
Catholic Encyclopedia 10 complete/incomplete 18
causality: rst/second actuality 867, 96, 121,
exitus-reditus scheme 334 131, 170, 195
divine 19, 689 in translation 45
efcient/nal, Aristotle 20 energy:
list of causes 113 essence and 12
proodos, epistrofe 123 uncreated 58, 99, 134
triadic scheme 67, 69, 103 extension 84, 93, 94, 96, 168
cause, Father as 789 Eunomius:
cause, unparticipated 114 activity of Fatherhood 84
Chalcedonian adverbs 1489, ingenerateness, divine 378
1789 knowledge of divine essence 38
communicatio idiomatum on names 378
13840, 161 essence and hypostasis 4951
creation, Christian doctrine of 102
emanationism 1078 Forms:
experience and sensation 1801 and contemplation 122
228 Index
Forms: (cont.) John Chrysostom, St 389
for creation 94 John Philoponus 11819, 121
Platonic doctrine of 14
Maximus the Confessor:
Gregory Nazianzen, St 778 afrmation and negation 1534
Gregory of Nyssa, St: cause, Father as 789
community of properties 13840 Church, the 171
concept of energeia 889 deication 144, 157, 17881
contemplation of properties 1379 development, three stages 1712
creation 934 energeia 1457
epektasis 166 /works, divine 1269
freedom of the Father 66 essence as energeia 757
generation, analysis of 547 experience and sensation 1801
happiness/blessed life 165 foreknowledge 80, 120
imitation 163, 164, 165, 167 14950
mimetic activities, the virtues 1623, humanization, divine 1578
165 humanity of Christ 1556
mixing 98, 1347, 1401, 219 hypostatic union 120, 1524
mysteries, the 15961 incarnation 122
names of God 534 innovation of modes 144
participation 97101, 1378, 1614, logos 1224, 125, 12930, 143, 1478
1668 logos and contemplation 124
power, divine 945, 968, 1401, 163 logos of being 1223, 182
presence in everything, divine 979 microcosm 148
unity of Christ 1412 mode, divine 126, 155
will, human 1601 Mystagogia chapter 5 1726
wisdom, power 945 mystery of Christ 789, 120, 122
Gregory Palamas, St 2, 99 P- -K/essence-
activity/activities 198200 power-activity 145, 1512
activity dened 1923 participation 12632, 1813
apophatisism 1889 proodos/epistrofe 123
forms/logoi 1902 remaining-procession-conversion
distinction, real 1938 1234
Filioque 188 soul, well-ordered 1723
Holy Spirit, the 1878, 202, 203, 204 tropos 1434, 154
paradigms/exemplars 1912 union and distinction
participation 18991, 198200 1523, 181
sensation 2045 virtue 176
the Trinity 1868 will, divine 125
transcendence 1889 will in Christ 156
will, Gods 196 metaphor 39, 54, 55, 56
metaphysics of prepositions 104
happiness/blessed life 165 Meyendorff, John 193, 198, 2089,
hesychasm 2 21113, 214, 215
Hesychast experience 205 mixture 1347, 179, 219
Hesychasts 201 motion, incomplete energeia 18
hypostatic union, the 120 mysteries, the 15961
identity/likeness 161, 167 names 50

imitation 16, 163, 164, 165, 167 non-being 723
Index 229
Origen 33 power 2930
ousia, translation of 4 principle of limitation 30
procession/conversion 245, 67, 115
Palamism 2 remaining 23
participation: remaining-proceeding-converting 70
Aristotle 1516 will, divine 64, 109
as imitation 16 predication, God as subject of 39, 534
concluding remarks on 21011 Proclus 67, 69, 103, 117, 123
Dionysius 11316 progress, innite 168
Gregory of Nyssa 97101
Gregory Palamas 18991, 198200 simplicity, divine 367, 99100, 21517
Maximus the Confessor 12632, 1813 sun, analogy of 115
Plato 1415 super-being 72
Plotinus 279, 301
Paul, St: theandric energeia 143, 157
Col 1: 1617 104 Thomas Aquinas 100, 21516
Rom 11: 36 33, 80, 104 three men, analogy of 502
Plotinus: tritheist 50
double activity 21, 6970
emanation 21 virtue 1623, 1645, 176
generation, divine 223
internal/external activity 22, 267 will, divine 20, 5962, 634, 75, 95,
Mind, the generation of 245 1078, 10910, 125, 1967
necessity 267 will, human 1601
omnipresence, divine 289
participation 279, 301 Zizioulas, John 21213

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Oxford Early Christian Studies The Areopagite Saint. Dionysius The Areopagite Saint Dionysius of Nyssa Saint. Gregory of Nyssa Saint Gregory Saint. Gregory Palamas Saint Gregory Palamas of Nys

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OXFORD EARLY CHRISTIAN STUDIES

Titles in the series include:

Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press

Published in the United States

# Torstein Theodor Tollefsen 2012

First published 2012

ACA Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, General Editor

This book is a study of two important concepts in ancient Christian

Kosman (1984), Witt (1989), Frede (1994), Rabbs (1998).

Activity and Participation in Non-Christian

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a certain terminological and

A. PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

The doctrine of Forms and of participation emerged historically with

I am not going to sketch a full history of Neoplatonism as a back-

St Basil and Anomoean Theology

The Plotinian doctrine of double activity and procession and conver-

B. ST BASIL THE GREAT, LETTER 234

This description is constructed from two sources, namely the text

The Internal Activity of the Godhead

This chapter is devoted to ideas about divine generation and concep-

A. ST GREGORY OF NYSSA ON TRINITARIAN

St Gregory of Nyssa envisages divine activity on two levelsinternal

B. DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE ON TRINITARIAN

C. ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ON THE INTERNAL

In the history of Christian doctrine St Maximus the Confessor is

The External Activity of the Godhead:

A. ST GREGORY OF NYSSA ON CREATION AND

As a preamble to this chapter I would like to reiterate the terminological

B. DIONYSIUS ON CREATION AND PARTICIPATION

When we talk of cosmology it is natural to include a discussion of the

C. ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ON CREATION

The author of the Dionysian corpus probably belonged to the latter

The External Activity of the

It is tempting to assess St Gregorys doctrine of the Incarnation in

B. ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSORS ONTOLOGICAL

By the time of St Maximus, the theological controversy had long since

C. ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ON THE

According to Maximus, the mystery of Christ is the mystery of divine

The Road to Salvation

A. ST GREGORY OF NYSSA ON DEIFICATION

According to St Gregory, the deication of Christs human nature is

B. ST MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR ON

In St Maximus, as in St Gregory of Nyssa, the economical activities of

Holy altar Mystical theology Mind

The Theology of St Gregory Palamas

It might be considered desirable to close the gap of more than six

St Gregory Palamas defended the experience of light by the Hesychast

In these concluding remarks I shall return to some of the main topics

THE LIVING GOD

Christian theology naturally claims that God is transcendent. God is

The act of creation is a divine activity ad extra. In relation to the concept

ESSENCE, HYPOSTASIS, AND ENERGEIA

Meyendorff was a pioneer in the scholarly work on Palamas. I think,

It is rather easy to understand Meyendorffs concerns about the so-

CREATED AND UNCREATED BEING

Texts and Translations

Other texts and translations

activity 198200 deication 134, 137, 17881

identity/likeness 161, 167 names 50

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