Statcon Digest Alcheon Mustang Rodriguez

Dela Salle University
Statutory Construction By: Alcheon Mustang Rodriguez
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1.Case: People v. Carlos, 78 Phil535
Topic: Title of Statutes
Issue: Crime of treason should be reversed because PCA is unconstitutional
Fact: The appellant was found guilty of treason by the People's Court and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P7,000, and costs
-truck pulled up to the curb in front of a house on Constancia, where one Martin Mateo lived
-From the truck the accused, a Japanese spy, alighted together with members of the Japanese
military police and pointed Martin Mateo's house and Fermin Javier's house to his Japanese
companions, whereupon the Japanese soldiers broke into Martin Mateo's dwelling first and
Fermin Javier's afterwards. In those houses they seized Martin Mateo, Ladislao Mateo and
Fermin Javier, bound their hands, and put them in the truck
-where the two Mateos and Fermin Javier were tortured and from which they were released
six days later
-The reason for the arrest and maltreatment of Martin and Ladislao Mateo was that they had
refused to divulge the whereabouts of their brother, Marcelino Mateo, who was a guerrilla and
who had escaped from the Japanese. And Fermin Javier was arrested and tortured because
he himself was a guerrilla, a fact which Carlos knew or at least suspected.
why PCA is unconstitutional: 4 errors
1. Philippine law on treason, because it is also a settled principle in international law that in
such occupied territories all laws inconsistent with the occupation are being likewise
suspended and without force and effect over the inhabitants
2. because it is also a settled principle in international law that in such occupied territories all
laws inconsistent with the occupation are being likewise suspended and without force and
effect over the inhabitants
3. law created PCA is non-binding Japanese law is in force therefore making it unconstitutiona
Held: TITLE OF LAW; WHEN SUFFICIENT; PEOPLE'S COURT

ACT. The People's Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own
machinery for the
indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases. The various provisos mentioned in appellant's
brief are allied
and germane to the subject matter and purposes of the People's Court Act; They are
subordinate to its end. It is
not necessary, and the Congress is not expected, to make the title of an enactment a complete
index of its contents
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2. Case: Commission on Elections v. Cruz, G.R.No. 186616 20 November 2009, 605
SCRA 167
Topic: Title of Statutes
Issue: Whether Sec. 2 of RA 9164 Local Govt Code of 1991 is unconstitutional
Fact:
The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 8524 merely increased the term of office of barangay elective
officials from three (3) years to five (5) years. Like the Local Government Code, it can be noted that no
consecutive term limit for the election of barangay elective officials was fixed therein. The advent of R.A.
9164 marked the revival of the consecutive term limit for the election of barangay elective officials after
the Local Government Code took effect. Under the assailed provision of this Act, the term of office of
barangay elective officials reverted back to three (3) years from five (5) years, and, this time, the legislators
expressly declared that no barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms
in the same position
Held:
The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an
amendatory law to RA No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law;
hence, it cannot be considered an ex post facto law. The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has
been specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It
further asserts that laws which are not penal in character may be applied retroactively when expressly so
provided and when it does not impair vested rights. As there is no vested right to public office, much less
to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive application of RA No. 9164.
We find, under these settled parameters, that the challenged proviso does not violate the one subject
one title rule. First, the title of RA No. 9164, An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataang Elections, amending Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, states the laws general subject matterthe amendment of the LGC to
synchronize the barangay and SK elections and for other purposes. To achieve synchronization of the
barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths of the terms of office of barangay
officials and SK officials is necessary. Closely related with length of term is term limitation which defines
the total number of terms for which a barangay official may run for and hold office. This natural linkage
demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign to the general subject expressed in the title of the law.
Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators and the public they represent
were fully informed of the purposes, nature and scope of the laws provisions. Term limitation therefore
received the notice, consideration, and action from both the legislators and the public. Finally, to require
the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title an index of all the subject
matters dealt with by law; this is not what the constitutional requirement contemplates. Essentially, the
equality guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly
situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one
another on the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons
are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated differently in law. HELD: WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly AFFIRM the constitutionality of the
challenged proviso under Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 9164. Costs against the respondents.
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3. Case: Commission on Elections v. Cruz, G.R.No. 186616 20 November 2009, 605

SCRA 167
Topic: Purpose of title requirements
Issue: WON RA2259 is constitutional
Fact:
-Libarnes was nominated by the President of the Philippines, Chief of Police of Zamboanga
City, The nomination having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
- new Executive designated defendant Miguel Apostol as Acting Chief of Police of Zamboanga
City, Apostol took his oath of office as such acting
- City Mayor of Zamboanga, transmitted to Libarnes a letter of the Acting Assistant Executive
Secretary, Office of the President,Malacaan,
-Libarnes refused to turn over his office to Apostol who tried to take possession thereofas
well as his (Libarnes) property responsibility
It is conceded that the Chief of Police of Zamboanga city is a member of our civil service
system (Section 5, Republic Act No. 2260). Hence, he cannot be "removed or suspended
except for cause, as provided by law and after due process" (Section 33, Republic Act No.
2260)
Defendants' contention cannot be upheld, for said Section 34 of Commonwealth Act No. 39
is inconsistent with Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2259, which provides:
The incumbent appointive City Mayors, Vice-Mayors and Councilors, unless sooner removed
or suspended for cause, shall continue in office until their successors shall have been
elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified. Incumbent
appointive city secretaries shall, unless sooner removed or suspended for cause, continue in
office until an elective city council or municipal board shall have been elected and qualified;
thereafter the city secretary shall be elected by majority vote of the elective city council or
municipal board. All other city officials now appointed by the President of the
Philippines may not be removed from office except for cause.
Held: (NO)
It is next urged, however, that the provision in. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2259, to the
effect that "all other officials now appointed by the President of the Philippines may not be
removed from office except for cause" is a rider violative of the constitutional injunction that
"no bill which maybe enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill", that of Republic Act No. 2259, being:
AN ACT MAKING ELECTIVE THE OFFICES OF MAYOR, VICE-MAYOR AND
COUNCILORS IN CHARTERED CITIES, REGULATING THE ELECTION IN SUCH CITIES
AND FIXING THE SALARIES AND TENURE OF SUCH OFFICERS.
It is claimed that the contents of the aforementioned provision are alien to the subject of
this title and that consequently said provision is unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, we hold that said provision in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2259 is
constitutional and valid; that as Chief of Police of Zamboanga City, plaintiff Libarnes is
entitled to the benefits of the aforementioned provision; and that, pursuant thereto and to
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 2260,
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4. Inchiong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115

Topic: Purpose of Title requirements
Issue: WON RA1180(An Act to Regulate the Retail Business) is constitutional

Fact:
-Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180,
-brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional
1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty
and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or
comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations
of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by
aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In
effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1)
a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of
the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade;
Held: (NO)
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the
title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill
which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein.
The constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI,
which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise
the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation.
A cursory consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of
duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance
convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main
purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition
or nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term
regulation.
The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term
"regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules
for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms "nationalization"
or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there
would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have
made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle
governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be adopted
in the title, which would include all other provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and
prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study
of the legislators or of the public.
It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed.
The objection must therefore, be overruled.
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5. Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Phil, 17 SCRA 77

Issue: WON 1435 (Act To Provide Means For Increasing Highway Special Fund)
Fact:
-dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the collection of sales taxes from the defendant-appellee
on the ground that the law which authorizes the said plaintiff to impose and collect the same, Republic
Act No. 1435
-Republic Act No. 1435, entitled "An Act to Provide Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund" is actually
an amendment
-The amendments consist mainly in increasing the rate of specific tax on manufactured oils and other
motor fuels, diesel fuel oil, naphtha gasoline and similar distilled products.
-Aside from introducing the aforementioned amendments, however, Republic Act No. 1435 likewise
authorizes municipal boards or councils to "levy an additional tax of not exceeding twenty-five per cent
of the rates fixed in of the National Internal Revenue Code] on manufactured oils sold or distributed
within the limits of the city or municipality"
-Shell resisted the above demand and, at the trial on the complaint filed by the plaintiff municipality for
its collection, maintained that it is not liable on the said claims of the plaintiff, was unconstitutional since
it embraced more than one subject,
- two subject matters, namely: (1) the amendment of Sections 142 and 145 of the National Internal
Revenue Code and (2) the grant of a taxing power to local governments,
-Shell points out that while Republic Act No. 1435 announces in its title that it is an enactment to increase
the Highway Special Fund, Section 5 of it decrees the accrual of the collections thereunder to the Road
and Bridge Fund.
-Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 917 which reads:
(g) The term "local funds" includes funds raised under the authority of a province, chartered city, or
municipality; allotments of internal revenue accruing by law to their general funds and the "road and
bridge" funds; and other revenue accruing to their general funds and made available by resolution of
the Board or Council concerned for expenditures, but does not include apportionments or allotments
from the Highway Special Fund.
-The lower court sustained the above arguments and declared Republic Act No. 1435 as unconstitutional
Held: (YES - rendered reversing the decision appealed from)

It is true that under Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 917 the Highway Special Fund should be
distinguished from the Road and Bridge Fund. But the distinction was made therein not for the purpose
of separating one from the other but merely, among others, "to control the disposition of all funds
accruing to the Highway Special Fund." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 917). To be sure, fifty per centum of the
apportionable balances in the Highway Special Fund is assigned or allocated by the said law to to the Road
and Bridge Fund (Section 8). There can be nothing constitutionally questionable, therefore, in a law which
makes reference to the Road and Bridge Fund although its title speaks alone of the Highway Special Fund.
As above illustrated, the said two funds are, while distinguishable, directly and substantially germane
to each other. Thus, they so relate to each other that the use of one in the title do justify legislating in the
body on the other. The constitutional rule at bar is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject
expressed in its title.
-The primary purpose of the constitutional provision that "no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more that one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill," is to prohibit duplicity in
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legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature,
scope and consequences of the law or its operation
6. Phil. Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 704

Issue: WON, R.A. No. 7354 An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its
Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other
Purposes Connected Therewith Constitutional
Fact:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking privilege from the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more
than one subject and does not express its purposes;
Held: (YES)
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its
Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other
Purposes Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from
sender to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the
unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and
changing needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and
valuables, and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to
finance the overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and
messengerial services as well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of service
standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads
as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions,
rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided
for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087
and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35
dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and
conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act
violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if
the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions
of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives
of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually
render legislation impossible. As has been correctly explained:
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The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane
to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in
view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the
machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and
to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with
the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special
mention in the title.
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a
statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on
the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid,
notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a
matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal
of previous legislations connected therewith."
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the
subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be
briefly expressed in its title. As observed in one case, 6 if the title of an act embraces only
one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters
by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither
within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane
to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a
more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature
as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said
law.
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7. De Guzman v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 188

Issue: WON RA 8189 is constitutional The Voters Registration Act of 1996, embraces more than one
subjects.
Fact:
At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189
(RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996".
"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or
municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of
this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality
shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional
district."
SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONTRAVENES THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT [Article VI,
SECTION 26(1), Phil. Constitution] THAT EVERY BILL PASSED BY CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE
SUBJECT WHICH MUST BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF; and
Held: (YES)
Petitioners contention that Section 44 has an isolated and different subject from that of RA
8189 and that the same is not expressed in the title of the law, is equally untenable.
The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed
by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof",
are:
1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;
2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which
the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
unintentionally adopted; and
3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is
usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they
may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so
desire.[7]
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where, as in
this case, the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to
achieve, and if all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter
embodied in the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject and title.[8] Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related
and germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. The title of RA 8189
is "The Voters Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory
note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A
SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND
AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which provides for
the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of
registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by
providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election
officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and
procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing that the
Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details
therein.In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the
presumption is in favor of its validity.[10]
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8. Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172, 179

Issue: WON RA 3043 is unconstitutional, for having more than one subject which
not expressed in the title
Fact:
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred
Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One) was passed. This law
amended the charter of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA 3043 provides that:
a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an annual profit of 12%;
b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their customers;
c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the
supply of energy.
Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company (PPDC) assailed the said
provision. They averred that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in the title of the
amending law nor was it included in the amended law. Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was to
increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al believed that Section 3 was not germane to
RA 3043.
This statutory provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is violative of the constitutional
provision requiring that a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject,
which shall be expressed in its title
Held: (YES)
To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple
or impede proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not
unduly technical, it must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect
without expressing each and every end and means necessary for its
accomplishment. Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required
to make the title of the act a complete index of its contents. The provision merely
calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.18
More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a statute, it suffices if
reference be made to the legislation to be amended, there being no need to state
the precise nature of the amendment.
It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it
inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the
public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take
appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators."
We thus hold that there is no violation of the constitutional provision which requires that any
bill enacted into law shall embrace only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof.
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9. People v. Buenviaje, 27 Phil 536

Topic: How a title is construed
Issue:
W/N chiropractic is included in the term practice of medicine under Medical laws
provided in the Revised Administrative Code.
Fact:
-defendant is accused of the violation of the Medical Act
-said accused without having obtained from the Board of Medical Examiners the corresponding certificate
of registration for the practice of medicine
-assisting, treating and manipulating the head and body of Regino Noble for the purpose of curing him of
the ailments, diseases, pains and physical defects from which he pretended to suffer, and advertising and
offering her services as a physician, by means of cards which she distributed and by letterheads and signs
which she exposed on the door of her office
-and in newspapers which are published and circulated in the City of Manila, in which cards, letterheads,
signs and advertising she added and prefixed to her name the letters `Dra
-she had no certificate from the Board of Medical Examiners authorizing her to practice medicine
-edited and published in Manila and in which cards and newspaper advertisement the defendant prefixed
the abbreviation `Dra.' to her name; that she was graduated a doctor in chiropractic on
-the defendant is in reality accused of two separate and distinct offenses, namely, illegal practice of
medicine and illegally representing oneself as a doctor.
-Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured acertificate to practice medicine. She
treated and manipulated the head and body of Regino Noble. She also contends that practice of
chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of doctor should be
understood to refer to doctor of medicine and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that Act3111 is
unconstitutional as it does not express its subject
Held: (YES)
-appellant argues in substance that chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and
that the practice of that profession can therefore not be regarded as practice of medicine.
There is no merit whatever in this contention. Assuming without conceding that
chiropractic does not fall within the term "practice of medicine" in its ordinary
acceptation, we have the statutory definition contained in section 770 of the
Administrative Code and which clearly includes the manipulations employed in
chiropractic. The statutory definition necessarily prevails over the ordinary one.
..defendant also argues that the examination prescribed by section 776 of the Administrative
Code for admission to the practice of medicine, embraces subjects which have no connection
with chiropractic and that to require chiropractors to take that examination is unreasonable
and, in effect amounts to prohibition of the practice of their profession and therefore violates
the constitutional principle that all men have the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness and are entitled to the equal protection of the law
There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in which an examination is required
by section 778 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, relate to matters
of which a thorough knowledge seems necessary for the proper diagnosis of
diseases of the human body and it is within the police power of the State to require
that persons who devote themselves to the curing of human ills should possess such
knowledge
-The appellant contends that the prohibition in section 783 against the unauthorized use of
the title "doctor" must be understood to refer to "Doctor of Medicine" and has no
application to doctors of chiropractic. Under different circumstances that might possibly be
so, but where, as here, chiropractic is by statute made a form of the practice of
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medicine, it necessarily follows that a person holding himself out as a doctor of chiropractic
in legal effect represents himself as a doctor of medicine
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10. People v. Buenviaje, 27 Phil 536
Issue:
W/N chiropractic is included in the term practice of medicine under Medical laws
provided in the Revised Administrative Code.
Fact:
-defendant is accused of the violation of the Medical Act
-said accused without having obtained from the Board of Medical Examiners the corresponding certificate
of registration for the practice of medicine
-assisting, treating and manipulating the head and body of Regino Noble for the purpose of curing him of
the ailments, diseases, pains and physical defects from which he pretended to suffer, and advertising and
offering her services as a physician, by means of cards which she distributed and by letterheads and signs
which she exposed on the door of her office
-and in newspapers which are published and circulated in the City of Manila, in which cards, letterheads,
signs and advertising she added and prefixed to her name the letters `Dra
-she had no certificate from the Board of Medical Examiners authorizing her to practice medicine
-edited and published in Manila and in which cards and newspaper advertisement the defendant prefixed
the abbreviation `Dra.' to her name; that she was graduated a doctor in chiropractic on
-the defendant is in reality accused of two separate and distinct offenses, namely, illegal practice of
medicine and illegally representing oneself as a doctor.
-Defendant practices chiropractic although she has not secured acertificate to practice medicine. She
treated and manipulated the head and body of Regino Noble. She also contends that practice of
chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and that unauthorized use of title of doctor should be
understood to refer to doctor of medicine and not to doctors of chiropractic, and lastly, that Act3111 is
unconstitutional as it does not express its subject
Held: (YES)
-appellant argues in substance that chiropractic has nothing to do with medicine and
that the practice of that profession can therefore not be regarded as practice of medicine.
There is no merit whatever in this contention. Assuming without conceding that
chiropractic does not fall within the term "practice of medicine" in its ordinary
acceptation, we have the statutory definition contained in section 770 of the
Administrative Code and which clearly includes the manipulations employed in
chiropractic. The statutory definition necessarily prevails over the ordinary one.
..defendant also argues that the examination prescribed by section 776 of the Administrative
Code for admission to the practice of medicine, embraces subjects which have no connection
with chiropractic and that to require chiropractors to take that examination is unreasonable
and, in effect amounts to prohibition of the practice of their profession and therefore violates
the constitutional principle that all men have the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness and are entitled to the equal protection of the law
There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in which an examination is required
by section 778 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3111, relate to matters
of which a thorough knowledge seems necessary for the proper diagnosis of
diseases of the human body and it is within the police power of the State to require
that persons who devote themselves to the curing of human ills should possess such
knowledge
-The appellant contends that the prohibition in section 783 against the unauthorized use of
the title "doctor" must be understood to refer to "Doctor of Medicine" and has no
11 | P a g e
application to doctors of chiropractic. Under different circumstances that might possibly be

so, but where, as here, chiropractic is by statute made a form of the practice of
medicine, it necessarily follows that a person holding himself out as a doctor of chiropractic
in legal effect represents himself as a doctor of medicine
____________________________________________________________________
11. Alalayan v. NPCA, [supra: II, C.ii.a]
Issue: WON RA 3043 is unconstitutional, for having more than one subject which
not expressed in the title
Fact:
In 1961, Republic Act No. 3043 (An Act to Further Amend Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred
Twenty, as Amended by Republic Act Numbered Twenty Six Hundred and Forty One) was passed. This law
amended the charter of NAPOCOR (National Power Corporation). Section 3 of RA 3043 provides that:
a. contractors being supplied by NAPOCOR shall not exceed an annual profit of 12%;
b. if they do, they shall refund such excess to their customers;
c. that NAPOCOR has the power to renew all existing contracts with franchise holders for the
supply of energy.
Santiago Alalayan and the Philippine Power and Development Company (PPDC) assailed the said
provision. They averred that Section 3 is a rider because first, it was not included in the title of the
amending law nor was it included in the amended law. Second, the main purpose of RA 3043 was to
increase the capital stock of NAPOCOR hence Alalayan et al believed that Section 3 was not germane to
RA 3043.
This statutory provision was assailed on the ground that, being a rider, it is violative of the constitutional
provision requiring that a bill, which may be enacted into law, cannot embrace more than one subject,
which shall be expressed in its title
Held: (YES)
Where the subject of a bill is limited to a particular matter, the lawmakers along with the people
should be informed of the subject of proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision thus
precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject
matter of the bill. Petitioner Alalayan asserts that the provision objected to is such a rider.
To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or impede
proper legislation. To impart to it a meaning which is reasonable and not unduly technical, it must be
deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every end and means necessary for its
accomplishment. Thus, mere details need not be set forth. The legislature is not required to make the
title of the act a complete index of its contents. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating
to its subject finding expression in its title.18 More specifically, if the law amends a section or part of a
statute, it suffices if reference be made to the legislation to be amended, there being no need to state the
precise nature of the amendment
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12. Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418, 1962

Issue: WON, sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 (additional part) is
constitutional.
Fact:
-to declare null and void the disputed order dated, disqualifying petitioner Manuel A. Cordero, Trial
Attorn, from appearing as counsel for petitioner tenant in this case, or for any tenant in any other cases
before this Court
-Manuel A. Cordero as counsel for indigent petitioner tenant Vicente Salazar,
-against respondent landlord Leonardo Sta. Romana and others "for reinstatement and reliquidation of
past harvests
-Leonardo Sta. Romana file "Motion to Disqualify Counsel and To Set Hearing at Cabanatuan City, praying
among others for the disqualification of petitioner Manuel A. Cordero to act as counsel tenant Vicente
Salazar
-issued the order in question disqualifying petitioner Manuel A. Cordero and/or any other attorney from
the Mediation Division of the Department of Justice
-Because, representation by counsel of tenants who cannot afford to pay should be done by the public
defendant of the Department of Labor as
- as result, issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent judge from
enforcing his order complained of until further orders from this Court.
-Meanwhile, Congress passed Republic Act No. 2263, amending the Agricultural Tenancy Act
of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 1199) providing among others that
In all cases wherein a tenant cannot afford to be represented by counsel, it
shall be the duty of the trial attorney of the tenancy mediation commission to
represent him, upon proper notification by the party concerned, or the court
of competent jurisdiction shall assign or appoint counsel de oficio for the
indigent tenant. (Section 54, Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Section
20 of Republic Act No. 2263).
- Petitioner filed a MANIFESTATION contending "that the issue in the case at bar is now moot
and academic
-before the enactment of Republic Act No. 2263, there was no Tenancy Mediation Division in
existence nor was there any law creating the same and defining its functions, and that its
only basis for existence, therefore, are sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act No. 2263 which are
null and void because the Constitution provides that "no bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
-The decisive issue in this case is the constitutionality of sections 19 and 20 of Republic Act
No. 2263
Held: (YES)
-The title of Republic Act No. 2263 reads as follows: "AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS
OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE AGRICULTURAL TENANCY ACT OF THE PHILIPPINE." The constitutional
requirement is complied with as long the law, as in the instant case, has a single
general subject which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the amendatory
provisions no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, will be regarded as valid
-The only amendment brought about by Republic Act No. 2263 is the transfer of the function
of representing these indigent tenants to the Department of Justice, apparently to consolidate
in the latter Department the functions relative to the enforcement of tenancy laws. In essence,
therefore, there is no change in the set-up established by Republic Act No. 1199 and that
provided for by Republic Act No. 2263. There is only a transfer of functions from one
department of the government to another.
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
****(Need to Read again) 13. Insular v. Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 104
SCRA 710
Issue: Whether or not to grant the partial tax refund to ILC
Fact:
- Insular Lumber Company (ILC) is an American company engaged as a licensed forest concessionaire. The
ILC purchased manufactured oil and motor fuel which it used in the operation of its forest concession. In
1956, Republic Act No. 1435 was passed. Section 5 thereof provides that there should be a partial tax
refund to those using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions.
In 1964, ILC filed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) to have a tax refund of P19,921.37
pursuant to the said RA. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled that ILC is not covered by such
provision because Sec. 5, RA 1435 is only effective 5 years from its enactment. Hence, in 1961 the
provision ceased to be effective. ILC appealed the issue to the CTA (Court of Tax of Appeals) and the CTA
ruled the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence, the refund
provision of Sec 5, RA 1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining concessionaires cannot be
extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37 claimed, only the amount of P14,598.08
was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. The CTA did not allow the refund of the full amount of
P14,598.08 because the ILCs right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, particularly those paid during
the period from January 1, 1963 to April 29, 1963 had already prescribed. Hence, ICL was credited the
refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of the CTA.
The CIR averred that CTA should not have ruled this way: The title of RA 1435 is An Act to Provide Means
for Increasing The Highway Special Fund. The CIR contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase
Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of the Act deals with another subject which is the partial
exemption of miners and loggers. And this partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for
refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for
a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund
Held: (YES)
- Yes, but only in the amount as found by the CTA. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no
merit in the contention of the CIR. RA 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just
one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the
imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Sec 5 of the law
is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has
reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not a deviation from the general subject of the law.
The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in
legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of
the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. But that is not so for in the
passage of RA 1435 since, as the records of its proceedings bear out, a full debate on precisely
the issue of whether its title reflects its complete subject was held by Congress which passed
it.
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13. Phil. Constitution Assn. v. Jimenez, [supra: II,C.ii.a]

Topic: Effect of Insufficiency of Title
Issue: Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the subject
matter expressed in the act.
Fact:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same
allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and
Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The provision on retirement
gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of
Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
Held: (NO)
With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:
1. The Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as
sufficient to reflect their contents is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to
the subject expressed in its title, and it is not necessary that the title be a
complete index of the content.
2. The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be

expressed in its title should be reasonably construed so as not to interfere
unduly with the enactment of necessary legislation. It should be given a
practical, rather than technical, construction. It should be a sufficient compliance
with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject.
It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or
notice whatsoever to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable
vacation and sick leave privileges to members of Congress
In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of
said Republic Act 3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of
the aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
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-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Enacting Clause
- Part written immediately after the title
- States the authority by which the act is enacted
- Contains the phrases, Be it enacted by... or Now, therefore, I... by virtue of the powers
in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree...
Purview/Body of the Statute

- What the law is all about
- Should embrace one subject matter
- The provisions, although different and diverse, must be allied and germane to the subject
and purpose of the bill
- Usually divided into sections (numbered and contains a single proposition)
- Usually includes a short title, policy, definition, administrative sections, sections prescribing
standards of conduct, imposing sanctions for violations of its provisions, transitory provisions
Separability Clause
- States that if any provision is declared invalid, the remainder shall not be affected
Presumption: Legislature intended a statute to be effective as a whole and would not have
passed it had it foreseen that some part of it is invalid.
Exception: Where provisions cannot stand alone as to those left, after the void part, is not
complete and workable
-=-=-=-=-=-=--=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
16 | P a g e
14. People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535,

Topic: Body of the Statute
Issue: Crime of treason should be reversed because PCA is unconstitutional
Fact:
The appellant was found guilty of treason by the People's Court and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, to pay a fine of P7,000, and costs
-truck pulled up to the curb in front of a house on Constancia, where one Martin Mateo lived
-From the truck the accused, a Japanese spy, alighted together with members of the Japanese
military police and pointed Martin Mateo's house and Fermin Javier's house to his Japanese
companions, whereupon the Japanese soldiers broke into Martin Mateo's dwelling first and
Fermin Javier's afterwards. In those houses they seized Martin Mateo, Ladislao Mateo and
Fermin Javier, bound their hands, and put them in the truck
-where the two Mateos and Fermin Javier were tortured and from which they were released
six days later
-The reason for the arrest and maltreatment of Martin and Ladislao Mateo was that they had
refused to divulge the whereabouts of their brother, Marcelino Mateo, who was a guerrilla and
who had escaped from the Japanese. And Fermin Javier was arrested and tortured because
he himself was a guerrilla, a fact which Carlos knew or at least suspected.
why PCA is unconstitutional: 4 errors
1. Philippine law on treason, because it is also a settled principle in international law that in
such occupied territories all laws inconsistent with the occupation are being likewise
suspended and without force and effect over the inhabitants
2. because it is also a settled principle in international law that in such occupied territories all
laws inconsistent with the occupation are being likewise suspended and without force and
effect over the inhabitants
3. law created PCA is non-binding Japanese law is in force therefore making it unconstitutional
Section 14: Disqualification of SC Justices and procedure of their substitution

1. PCA deprives persons similarly situated of equal protection of the laws 2. Political offenders
accused by PC are denied of preliminary investigation while others are entitled to. 3. PO
accused by PC have a limited right to appeal while the accused charged by courts of first
instance have an absolute right to appeal. 4. Appeals involving person who held public office
under Phil. Exec. Comm and Phil. Rep or any branch are to be heard and decided by a
substantially different SC thus lacking uniformity in rulings over the same subject matter. 5.
provision change the existing rules of Court on the subject of bail 6. Art 125 of RPC: Delay in
the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authority (shall be allowed upon request
to communicate confer any time with his attorney or counsel
HELD:
1. PC is a special court with restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an emergency
and national security, operate on limited period only imposed by economic necessity and other
factors of public policy. Main concern is the trial and disposition of the cases over 6000 held
by US military to be turned over to Commonwealth government. 2. In view of the great
numbers of offenders with limited time, amount of labor will take time if all of which are
allowed to have P.I
considering theres an urgency in dis
posing the cases. P.I is n9t a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. 3. PC is a
collegiate court while CFI is of single judge. Appeal is not constitutional but a statutory right.
Admitted fact already saves court the provision of being objected from being unconstitutional.
17 | P a g e
4. No merit on contention since it is beyond the subject of constitutional guarantee.

-The disqualification of some or majority of SC to the PC and their substitution by
people from CA, not a new court in the eyes of the law. -A court possesses a separate
personality from the men who compose them -lack of uniformity: constitution does
not ensure uniformity of judicial decisions neither does it assure immunity from
judicial error. 5. granting bail to political offenders detained by US army and released to the
commonwealth but not to other political offenders 6. suspended to those political detainees
CRIME
: treason Any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or) the Government of the
Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies,
giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, shall be punished by
reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed P20,000 pesos
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15. Greenblatt v. Golden, 94 So 2d 355, 59 ALR2d 877,

Topic: Separability Clause
Issue:
Fact:
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16. Williams v. Standard Oil Co. 278 U.S, 235 73 ed. 287,
Topic: Repealing Clause
Issue: WON legislative has power to authorize agency to fix the prices of gasoline
Fact:
- Its purpose and effect are to fix prices atwhich gasoline may be sold within the state.
-The information thus collected is made available for use by the commissioner of finance and
taxation in the regulation of prices atwhich gasoline may be sold in the state. Permits for such
sale are to be issued subject to the approval of the commissioner but only at the prices fixed
and determined. Prices of gasoline are to be fixed with a proper differential between the
wholesale and retail price
- Appellees brought separate suits to enforce the act and institute criminal proceedings for
violations of it against appellees, respectively, and to have the act declared unconstitutional
and void
- The principal ground of attack, and the only one we need to consider here, isthat the
Legislature is without power to authorize agencies of the state to fix prices at which
gasoline may be sold in the state, because the effect will be todeprive the vendors
of such gasoline of their property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
- It is settled by recent decisions of this court that a state Legislature is without constitutional
power to fix prices at which commodities may be sold, servicesrendered, or property used,
unless the business or property involved is 'affected with a public interest.'
As applied in particular instances, its meaning may be considered both from an affirmativeand
a negative point of view
-Affirmatively, it means that a business or property, in order to be affected with a
public interest, must be such or be soemployed as to justify the conclusion that it has
been devoted to a public useand its use thereby in effect granted to the public
-Negatively, it does not mean that a business is affected with a public interest merely
because it is large or becausethe public are warranted in having a feeling of concern
in respect of itsmaintenance. I
Gasoline is one of the ordinary commodities of trade, differing, so far as thequestion here is
affected, in no essential respect from a great variety of other articles commonly bought and
sold by merchants and private dealers in thecountry.
Finally, it is said that even if the price-fixing provisions be held invalid other provisions of the
act should be upheld as separate and distinct. This contentions emphasized by a reference to
section 12 of the act, which declares: 'That if any section or provision of this act shall be held
to be invalid this shall not affect the validity of other sections or provisions hereof
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17. Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 44,

Topic: Bills originating from the House of Representatives
Issue:
(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are unconstitutional.
Fact:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB) financed the
Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The
Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage empowered PNB to negotiate and
sell the latter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations toit.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing Philippine Exchange
Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to
finance PHILEX's purchases. The decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might
realize was to be remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more
than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an accounting of the proceeds
which it ignored. Petitioners continued to avail of other loans from PNB and to make
unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to
settle their due and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB real
properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to extra
judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim. Petitioners
continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, if properly
liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance
that under P.D. No. 579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all
earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government. On
August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and damages
against PNb
Held:
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of this power:
First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review.
Second, the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of
constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy
can be settled on other grounds. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear
and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based
on the doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been carefully
studied by the legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with the
Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved. The present case was instituted
primarily for accounting and specific performance. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
PNBs obligation to render an accounting is an issue, which can be determined, without having
to rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. In fact there is nothing in P.D. No. 579, which
is applicable to PNBs intransigence in refusing to give an accounting.
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18. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630,

Issue: W/N the R.A. is unconstitutional for having originated from the Senate, and
not the HoR
Fact:
Tolentino et al is questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6
of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3
readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st
reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its
own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done
is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that
way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the
text) of the HB. Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed the said Senate Bill.
Held:
provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this power, the Senate may
propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure.
By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent
with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated
in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the
initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where
Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other
such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been
accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing
that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been
done.
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19. National Electrification Administration v. COA, G.R.No.143481

Issue:
Fact:
In response to pressing economic difficulties and the need to alleviate the plight of
government personnel, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed on March
3, 1994 Joint Resolution No. 01 entitled Urging the President of the Philippines to
Revise the Existing Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and to Implement the Same Initially Effective January 1, 1994.
Approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on March 7, 1994, Joint Resolution No. 01 adjusted
the salary schedule of all officials and employees of the government. Paragraph 10 of Joint
Resolution No. 01 provides that the new salary schedule shall be implemented within four (4)
years beginning in 1994.
On December 28, 1996, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 389 (EO
389) entitled Implementing the Fourth and Final Year Salary Increases Authorized by Joint
Senate and House of Representatives Resolution No. 01, Series of 1994. EO 389 directed
payment of the fourth and final salary increases authorized under Joint Resolution No. 01 in
two tranches, as follows:
Held:
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21. Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506,

Issue: Whether RA 7663 is violative of Section 25 Art 6. Whether the enumeration is
exclusive?
Fact:
The GAA contains a special provision applicable to Congress. It allowed any member of
congress the REALIGNMENT OF ALLOCATION FOR OPERATIONAL EXPENSES,
provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker are the ones
authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of
Congress themselves.
Later, President FVR signed the law, but VETOED certain provisions of the law and imposed
certain conditions: That the AFP-Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the
pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits System of the AFP
Held:
YES. Under the special provision applicable to Congress, the members of Congress
are given the power to determine the necessity of realignment of the savings in the
allotment for their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so because
hey are the ones who know whether there are savings, or deficiencies in appropriation.
HOWEVER, ONLY THE SENATE PRESIDENT AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE ARE
ALLOWED TO APPROVE THE REALIGNMENT.
Further, 2 conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2)
the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer
is to be made.
As to the special provision given to the AFP-Chief of Staff, it is also VOID. The list of those
who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. The AFP-Chief of Staff may not be given
such authority.
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Article VI, Section 25[1], 1987 Constitution
SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the
President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget. The form, content,
and manner of preparation of the budget shall be prescribed by law
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-==-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
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18. Province of Batangas v. Romulo

Issue:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions
infringe the Constitution and the LGC of 1991
Fact:
In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48 establishing the Program for Devolution
Adjustment and Equalization to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the discharge
of the functions and services devolved to them through the LGC.The Oversight
Committee under Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005,
OCD-99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres. Estrada on October6, 1999. The
guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the projects
eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and submit the project proposals and other
requirements to the DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to the DBM for
the subsequent release of the corresponding funds.Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of
Batangas, petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the
General Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of P5billion for the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) & imposed
conditions for the release thereof
Held:
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001, and the OCD resolutions
constitutea withholding of a portion of the IRA they effectively encroach on the fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the
Constitution, the State shall ensure the local autonomy of local governments. Consistent
with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the Presidents power over the
LGUs to one of general supervision, which has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control. Drilon v. Lim distinguishes supervision from control: control lays down the rules in
the doing of an act the officer has the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the
act, or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it that the rules are followedbut has
no authority to set down the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.The entire process
involving the distribution & release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF
is part of the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the
Constitution mandates that the just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs. Since
the release is automatic, the LGUs arent required to perform any act to receive the just
share it shall bereleased to them without need of further action. To subject its distribution
& release to the vagaries of the implementing rules & regulations as
sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD Resolutions would
violate this constitutional mandate.The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic
release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal
year is less than 40% of the collectionsof the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception does
not apply in this case.The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the implementation
of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control
over the IRA of the LGUs.Congress may amend any of the provisions of the LGC but only
through a separate law and not through appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include
in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate
legislation.A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited
to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit any
provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an inappropriate
provision. Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of 1991 are matters of
25 | P a g e
general & substantive law. To permit the Congress to undertake these amendments through
the GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs.The value of LGUs as
institutions of democracy is measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our national
officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should
also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.
18. Bengzon v. Drilon, 209 SCRA 133

Issue:
Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.
Fact:
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
repealed during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided
certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement
benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill
(House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to
certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed
(by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject
of the case of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication
and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their
pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for
1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however
did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: General Fund
Adjustment; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances
of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices
of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the
retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is
already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the
constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then
Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
Held:
No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic
Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme
Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much
less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove
any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained
the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive
must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item
of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but
did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other departments of the government.
26 | P a g e
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment
shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly follow the
procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and agencies.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be
supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or to be raised
by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President,
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed only for public
purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such guidelines as may be
prescribed by law.

(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the general
appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for the preceding
fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress

Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at
large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of
all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes
of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for
or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill
to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise,
it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
27 | P a g e

The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object.
(1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is
assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
28 | P a g e

Statcon Digest Alcheon Mustang Rodriguez

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Dela Salle University

Statutory Construction By: Alcheon Mustang Rodriguez

Held: TITLE OF LAW; WHEN SUFFICIENT; PEOPLE'S COURT

3. Case: Commission on Elections v. Cruz, G.R.No. 186616 20 November 2009, 605

4. Inchiong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115

Issue: WON RA1180(An Act to Regulate the Retail Business) is constitutional

5. Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Phil, 17 SCRA 77

Held: (YES - rendered reversing the decision appealed from)

6. Phil. Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 704

7. De Guzman v. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 188

8. Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172, 179

9. People v. Buenviaje, 27 Phil 536

application to doctors of chiropractic. Under different circumstances that might possibly be

12. Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418, 1962

13. Phil. Constitution Assn. v. Jimenez, [supra: II,C.ii.a]

2. The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be

Purview/Body of the Statute

14. People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535,

Section 14: Disqualification of SC Justices and procedure of their substitution

4. No merit on contention since it is beyond the subject of constitutional guarantee.

15. Greenblatt v. Golden, 94 So 2d 355, 59 ALR2d 877,

17. Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 44,

18. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630,

19. National Electrification Administration v. COA, G.R.No.143481

21. Phil. Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506,

18. Province of Batangas v. Romulo

18. Bengzon v. Drilon, 209 SCRA 133

Article VI, Section 25[2], 1987 Constitution

Article VI, Section 25[3], 1987 Constitution

Article VI, Section 25[4], 1987 Constitution

Article VI, Section 25[5], 1987 Constitution

Article VI, Section 25[6], 1987 Constitution

Article VI, Section 25[7], 1987 Constitution

Article VI, Section 27[1], 1987 Constitution

Article VI, Section 27[2], 1987 Constitution

Article VI, Section 29[1], 1987 Constitution

Article VI, Section 29[2], 1987 Constitution

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