A Thematic Investigation of The Neoplatonic Concepts of Vision and Unity

A Thematic Investigation of the Neoplatonic Concepts of Vision and Unity
Author(s): Deirdre Carabine

Source: Hermathena, No. 157, Neoplatonica: Studies in the Neoplatonic Tradition,
Proceedings of the Dublin Conference on Neoplatonism (Winter 1994), pp. 43-56
Published by: Trinity College Dublin
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23041387
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A Thematic Investigation of the Neoplatonic Concepts of
Vision and Unity
Deirdre Carabine
Perhaps one of the most

been appropriated and topersistent of Neoplatonic
have endured themes
in the writings to have
of so-called
Christian Neoplatonists, is the concept of the absolute transcendence
and unknowability of the supreme divine principle, evidence of the very
long shadow cast by Plotinus. The first Neoplatonist can be said to
stand at the beginning of the Greek tradition which is sometimes called
apophatic (but more often by the slightly misleading term, negative
theology) and Proclus at its end. Eriugena, the ninth-century Irish
philosopher, heralds the introduction of this theme into the Latin world,
for he was the first Western philosopher to have afforded the principles
of apophasis a fundamental place in his own thought. Of course, it is
true that Eriugena's employment of this Neoplatonic thematic is
mediated through his Greek Christian sources: on the one hand, the
more Plotinian form to be found in the Cappadocian philosopher,
Gregory of Nyssa, and on the other hand, the Proclean form adopted in
the writings of that most elusive figure, the Pseudo-Dionysius. In this
paper I would like to examine Eriugena's understanding of the concepts
of vision and unity, both in the light of the original Neoplatonic sources,
Plotinus and Proclus and as mediated to him through their Christian
'influences', especially Gregory of Nyssa and the Pseudo-Dionysius.
The basic questions I shall keep in mind during the course of this
discussion are as follows. Firstly, if the transcendent God is
incomprehensible, what is the human response to such a principle, and
secondly, how is this response described? I examine these questions in
the first part of my paper by drawing on Plotinus and Proclus. The
second part is concerned with Eriugena's understanding of the response
to the transcendent God: how do his expressions of the modes of vision
and unity compare with similar expressions in Plotinus, Proclus,
Gregory and Dionysius?
Plotinus and Proclus: The Ineffable/Unknowable One

The Plotinian conception of the One (developed as a reflection o
the conclusion of the first hypothesis of the Parmenides) is well known
Proceedings of the Dublin Conference on Neoplatonism, 1992
and I give only a very brief exposition of it here. Plotinus's argument

for the transcendence of the Good beyond being, which rests on the
fundamental assertion that the cause can be none of the things it
causes, concludes that as the cause of being, the One itself cannot
possess being (II 6, 1, 50-51). Considering the Plotinian understanding
of being as intellect, it is not surprising that the One should transcend
not only being but also intellect. To make the Good either thinker or
thought would be to identify it with being, it would then be necessary,
says Plotinus, to find another principle above that (VI 7, 40). The One,
as the God and cause of nous, must be beyond the 'supreme majesty of
Intellect' (V 3, 13, 1-2); it cannot, therefore, have thought, not even self
thought (III 8, 9, 15). Even if the Good were to say 'I am the Good', that
would be an affirmation of being and would posit a distinction between
the Good and his knowledge of himself (VI 7, 38, 11-16). Since the One
cannot know himself, it follows that the way of knowing is not
appropriate as a means of attaining unity with the One. It is for this
reason that Plotinus finds it necessary to develop another means of
approach to the supreme principle. Because the Good is ineffable,
unnameable and unknowable, the most we can do is point to it or make
signs about it to ourselves (V 3, 13, 5-6): we say what it is not, but we
do not say what it is (V 3, 14, 6-7). We can say that the One is, but not
what it is, for how can we describe the absolutely simple which is higher
than speech, thought and awareness? It would appear, therefore, that
Plotinus has gone as far as it is possible for him to go in attempting to
preserve the absolute unity and simplicity of the One: even the term,
'One' is inadequate and is used simply as a pointer to unity, as a
designation of its painlessness.1 We can know, therefore, what the Good
is not: it is not one of all things; but we have no knowledge of what it is.
We know only that it is the ineffable, unnameable and unknowable
source of all that is. We can seek no further; 'we can but withdraw,
silent, hopeless' (VI 8, 11,1-3; MacKenna, p. 604).
How, then, can human nature attain to such a supremely
transcendent principle? According to Plotinus, if we want to grasp the
'alone', we ought not to think at all, for since it is not nous there can be
no thinking about it (V 3, 13, 32-33). To make the One an object of
knowledge is to make it many, since it is absolutely simple, we can have
no thought about it (V 3, 14, 2-3). The key to Plotinian thought at this
point is that we must become like the One, that is, by becoming simple
and abandoning thinking, which is by nature multiple. The final goal of
the soul is (as it is in the Theaetetus), to be made like the Good and that
involves making our escape from this world: our concern is not merely
to be sinless, but to be God, as Plotinus puts it.2 Considering the huge
gap and the difference between the sensible and noetic worlds, how can
we make ourselves like the One, if the One is not like anything within
our experience? This question is not problematic for Plotinus, for we are
44
D. CARABINE
able to grasp what the One is like because there is a likeness of it in us

a likeness which exists in us because the soul has not fully descended t
the level of this world.3 When the soul has let go of all other things and
become pure thought, it becomes like nous in its contemplation of the
One. We cannot go any other way to the Good than through intellect,
for its unknowability makes it accessible only through its 'offspring'.
But we ought not to lose faith and think of the One as nothing; we
should not, as Plotinus says, fall into the sin of agnosticism, for we hav
reached the stage where we have become like the One in its simplicity.
We have 'reversed our way of thinking' by not thinking the One: w
have left ourselves open to the vision and presence of the Good:
'Our way then takes us beyond knowing; there may be no

wandering from unity; knowing and knowable must all be left aside;
every object of knowledge, even the highest, we must pass by, for all
that is good is later than This and derives from This as from the sun all
the light of day.'4
Having silenced one's intellectual faculty and conformed oneself to

the simple nature of the Good, that is, having no duality left, the soul
can do nothing else: we must not chase after the Good, says Plotinus,
'but wait quietly till it appears' (V 5, 8, 3-5; Armstrong, p. 179). 'Shut
your eyes, and change to and wake another way of seeing, which
everyone has but few use' (I 6, 8, 24-27; Armstrong, p. 259). This
awakening to the presence of the Good, which itself can neither come
nor go, is the result of putting away all otherness.5 However, th
perception of the presence of the Good cannot be called knowledge for
the Good cannot even have knowledge of itself; it is, as Plotinus puts it,
'a presence overpassing all knowledge'.6 The Good does not giv
knowledge of himself at the summit of the ascent, he gives something
better than knowledge: 'he gives them rather to be in the same plac
with him and to lay hold on him as far as they are able'.7
However, it can sometimes happen that the soul can be lifted into
an experience of absolute unity with the One. In the passages wher
Plotinus describes such union, the emphasis is placed on the passivit
of the soul, for all striving has long since been abandoned: it is the wave
of nous that lifts the soul who has been united with it into a different
realm of experience (VI 7, 35, 36-40). The use of the word 'suddenly
(eo4>VTi<;) is important in this context, for it expresses a vision or unity
which (as Armstrong explains) is not something that one can plan for,
or call up whenever one wishes.8
Here we put aside all the learning disciplined to this pitch,
established in beauty, the quester holds knowledge still of the ground he
rests on, but, suddenly, swept beyond it all by the very crest of the wave
of Intellect surging beneath, he is lifted and sees, never knowing how.'9
45
The content of the soul's 'seeing at this level is not perceptible, for
the soul is so 'oned' with the One that it no longer knows anything, not
even that it is united with the One (VI 9, 3, 11-12). Plotinus always
speaks of the unity experienced at this level in terms of light and vision,
although he emphasizes the fact that this 'seeing* must be understood
metaphorically, not in terms of having a real object present before the
eyes. The true end of the soul is to 'see' that light alone in itself, not
through the medium of any other thing, this kind of vision excludes the
possibility of the soul knowing that it is united with the One. The soul
can no longer distinguish itself from the object of its intuition (VI 9, 3,
13). The lifting of the soul from the relative solidity of the non-concept
into the light of the Good i s something which defies rational analysis.10
Although Plotinus says that it would be better not to speak in dualities,
he concedes that the light metaphor is the best way to describe that
which is scarcely vision except in an unknown mode (VI 9, 11, 22-23).
He explains this 'vision' as a unity of seer and seen: 'for there is no
longer one thing outside and another outside which is looking in, but
the keen sighted have what is seen within'.11 Thus, the object and the
act of vision have become identical (VI 7, 35, 14-16). To become sight,
that is, to become nothing but true light, is to become 'the eye which
sees the great beauty (I 6, 9, 24-25).
Unity, expressed in terms of vision and sight, tends always to
create the impression that there must be an object of vision, but
Plotinus is emphatic that the act of vision itself is the object of the
vision. The soul who has become like the One in its simplicity actually
sees the One, the source of all light, through becoming the light itself:
'seeing and the seen coincide, and the seen is like the seeing and the
seeing is like the seen' (V 3, 8, 16-17; Armstrong, p. 97). To illustrate
this point, Plotinus uses a phrase which was to become seminal in the
expression of the unity-experience in both Gregory of Nyssa and the
Pseudo-Dionysius: 'for then in not seeing it sees, and sees most of all' (V
5, 7, 29-30; Armstrong, p. 179). This is a true reversal of one's thinking,
for the soul, in turning away from all other objects of knowledge and
vision, must learn to see and to know in another way what it is to
experience being in the same place as the Good.12
The search for unity, conceived solely in metaphysical terms, would
do nothing more than refine the One out of all existence; but such a
refinement, understood in terms of the ascent of the soul to unity with
the One, adds another dimension of thought, one which is not easily
understood in terms of traditional 'text-book ontology5. It is precisely
Plotinus's own awareness of the possibility of attaining unity with the
transcendent One, that transforms his philosophical speculations into
an intimate account of the life-journey of the human soul. I now turn
my attention to Proclus, the last of the great Neoplatonists.
46
D. CARABINE
Although the ascent to unity in Proclus is expressed somewhat

differently, his understanding of the nature of the One does not differ
very many respects from that of Plotinus, as the first few lines from th
hymn to the first principle illustrate:
O You, the One beyond all,

how else can we sing of You?
What words can make Your hymn?
for no words can describe You.
What mind can perceive You?
for no mind can grasp You.
You alone are unspeakable,
though creator of all that is spoken.
You alone are unknowable,
though creator of all that is known.13
Like Plotinus, Proclus bases his conception of the One upon the
negations to be found in the First Hypothesis of the Parmenides, and it
can be stated simply enough: the One is not a particular One, but One
in the absolute sense: ou yap ti ev ecmv, aXX oarXux; ev, simply One.14
Everything that can be qualified is not what it is absolutely (VI 1096.
19-21). The basic rule of thumb followed by Proclus relies upon a
Plotinian theme: with regard to the One, additions diminish.15
One important idea in Proclus, one which will be taken up later by
the Pseudo-Dionysius and Eriugena, is that neither the human,
daemonic, angelic, divine (or demiurgic) orders can have sense
perception, opinion or knowledge of the One.16 Even Intellect itself, 'the
intelligible union which lies hidden and unutterable in the interior
recesses of Being itself (50k. 17-18; p. 589), falls short of knowledge of
the One, for all knowledge is necessarily directed at Being, not at the
One. Proclus is so meticulous in following through the notion of the
unknowability of the One, that even if we can say that it is unknowable
to us, we are ignorant of whether it is knowable to itself (VI1108 25-29).
If, then, the One is to be understood as wholly unknowable, in what
sense can the One be 'known'? What kind of knowledge is this and how
does Proclus express it? Proclus's ultimate resolution to the problem of
the apparently unbridgeable distance between the soul and the One is
based upon the understanding that the whole universe is not alien from
the One but is connected to it. In fact, it is the soul's desire which
actually constitutes its likeness to the One (IV 922. 38ff). The soul, as
third in the general hierarchy of being, possesses a kind of vision which
is by its very nature a fragmented vision; its aim is the attainment of
unified vision.
Although desire for the One is such that 'we despise all other
things in favour of the One, and never overlook the One for the sake of
47
anything else' (VII 1144. 25-30; p. 500), yet all striving falls short of the
One for the soul is denied its unapproachable object: 'impotent to
comprehend its incomprehensibility or to know the unknown, yet
according to the manner of its own procession, it loves its inexpressible
apprehension of participation in the One'.17 It is, however, this
unfulfilled desire and inextinguishable love (amor inextinguibilis),18
which keeps the soul striving for the One, for if desire was satisfied
then it would no longer search. It is because the soul's desire for the
One actually constitutes its likeness to the One that Proclus finds a way
out of the impasse he appears to have reached with regard to the unity
of the soul with the absolute unknowable One (VII 1199. 28-31). The
task of the soul is not any longer the attainment of scientific knowledge
(for this is absolutely ruled out) but the attainment of likeness to the
One, for it is only in this way that the soul can 'know' the One.19 It is
in this context that the focus and function of systematic negation in
Proclus becomes clear, for it can be understood as an instrument of
intellectual purification: the purpose of undertaking the dialectic of
negation is a removal of all multiplicity in the search for unity
'For, if we are to approach the One by means of these negative

conceptions and to emancipate ourselves from our accustomed ways of
thought, we must strip off the variety of life and remove our multifarious
concerns, and render the soul alone by itself, and thus expose it to the
divine and to the reception of divinely inspired power, in order that having
first lived in such a way as to deny the multiplicity within ourselves, we
may thus ascend to the undifferentiated intuition of the One.120
The removal of multiplicity through negation thus leaves open the

path for apprehension of the One by way of unity 'it is by the One that
we know the One (yivooaKopev... r<5 evi to ev), for like is known by
like.21 Thus, the force of negation in Proclus is not simply a logical
exercise, it is part of the great hymn to the One which ultimately opens
the path for a perception of it. The soul, having moved from a
fragmented to a more unified kind of vision, having become single and
alone in itself, no longer asks what the One is and what it is not, but
'everywhere closing her eyes, and contracting all her activity', 'content
with unity alone'.22
However, unification is knowledge of a different kind (to be learned
in a different way (VII 46K. 7-10), for it is divinely inspired knowledge
(cOTopavTeuopai), higher than scientific knowledge (VII 58K. 9-11).
Proclus relies chiefly upon Plato's Seventh Letter (341C) when
explaining how this 'knowledge' comes about: 'a divine light is kindled
in us through which there comes about - in such a way as it is possible
to us - a glimpse of it, which makes us participate in it in respect of
that part of ourselves that is most divine'.23
48
D. CARABINE
In Platonic Theology (II 11, 64), Proclus describes the ascent of th

soul from multiplicity and diversity to the peace and tranquility of t
One. The eyes are closed to everything that might prevent the so
from attaining to it (he makes reference here to the prayer to the ris
sun). Since the One is above all affirmation and negation (exaltatum e
propter simplicitatem ab omni oppositione et omni negatione24), t
negation itself must finally be negated, lest we think that we ha
finally captured the One in any linguistic or conceptual form. Th
negatio negationis (nam per negari et ipse removit omnes
abnegationes)25 signifies an end to all discourse.26 Sige in unity is the
only outcome of rising beyond all affirmation and negation at the
discursive or conceptual level. It can be understood as a movement back
through the Proclean triad: desire, silent understanding, language
(54K, 23-25), and yet it cannot be understood simply as a linguistic act,
for it is undertaken as a preparation for the ultimate goal of unification
the silence which is consequent upon negating all negations points
beyond itself to the One who is beyond all silence.27 Discourse must
eventually come to a halt in the search for unity,28 for even negations
can obstruct the pure vision of the soul which must not any longer be
attempting to attain something even the strain towards the One must
itself be abandoned.
Eriugena: Theophany, Vision and Unity

Having seen how Plotinus and Proclus conceived of the ascent of
the soul to unity with the unknowable One, I now turn to the nature of
the ascent to the unknowable divine essence and the modes of
expressing that unity in the Christian philosophy of John Sco
Eriugena.
It is well known that Eriugena stands within the apophatic
tradition, for he develops and adopts the Neoplatonic and Dionysian
concept that the infinity of the divine essence surpasses the totality of
creation and is, therefore, incomprehensible.29 However, the main point
of this paper is that while Eriugena does indeed adopt the Nyssean and
Dionysian idea that knowing the divine essence truly is achieved
through not knowing, there are some obvious difficulties regarding the
original Plotinian assertion that it is through not seeing that one truly
sees.
In the Periphyseon, the following through of

methodology of negation results in a state of 'igno
know that God is not one of all things (since he is unl
'what'), is true knowledge. In this context at least
understood as 'ineffable wisdom',30 although in term
salvation, especially as that is portrayed by Eriuge
Vox spiritualis, ignorance is almost exclusively exp
incarnation state of human nature.31 And yet the 'in
49
unknowing, for Eriugena, is knowing that God is but not what he is.32
This kind of knowledge would appear to be the limit of both the human
and angelic orders (a concept derived from Gregory of Nyssa: knowledge
that God is possible through his energeiai but knowledge of God's ousia
is impossible).33 It is very clear, then, that knowing the divine essence
is achieved through not knowing, but what about the notion that true
seeing is achieved through not seeing? How does Eriugena express the
movement from fragmented or 'double contemplation' (II 527B) to unity
or unified vision?
An early patristic motif in the Periphyseon is that the
condescension of the Word is paralleled by the upward exaltation of
humanity to the Word through love (I 449B). In view of his wide
reading in Greek patristic literature, it would not be surprising to find
Eriugena developing this thematic in terms of the ascent of the
individual soul; however, it is in the context of the cosmic adunatio
that we find this concept in Eriugena's writings: the whole of nature is
hastening upwards towards its telos (V 929Aff). In this sense,
Eriugena's thought is focused always in an eschatological direction:
eternal beatitude, achieved after death or at the end of the world (V
978Dff), heralds the entry into the contemplation of the truth (V 926C).
However, even though Eriugena's focus is centred upon the
eschatological significance of the beatific life there are elements of the
individual ascent from his Greek sources incorporated into his cosmic
account of the return of humanity to God. It is, therefore, because of the
eschatological direction of Eriugena's thought, no doubt derived from
Maximus the Confessor, which accounts for the fact that Eriugena does
not find it necessary to develop a theory of introspection, such as we
find in Augustine's Confessiones or in Gregory of Nyssa's great thematic
of seeing God in the mirror of the soul.34 The reason for Eriugena's
rejection of Gregory's notion is that just as God is understood to be
incomprehensible as existing beyond all things, so too is he
incomprehensible when contemplated in the depths of the creature.35 In
this sense Eriugena takes Gregory's negative anthropology further than
Gregory himself had done, for God is known in the mind as that, not
what he is (IV 771B-C).
In Plotinus, Proclus, Gregory and Dionysius, we find many and
various expressions of the ascent of the individual soul in the context of
an immediate experience of unity - one of the most potent expressions of
such unity can be found in Ennead VI, 9. What links these four thinkers
(even though the two Christians conceive of the ascent as a movement
into divine darkness) is that at the moment of unity, the eyes are
closed: all sense and intellect has been silenced and transcended. In
Dionysian terms, absolute unity is attained by the 'eyeless mind' beyond
all seeing and knowing (M.T. I, 3), although admittedly Dionysius
himself introduces some ambiguity when he says that the vision is
50
D. CARABINE
aperikaluptos (M.T. I, 3). The point I wish to elaborate on here is th

there is no individual 'eyeless mind' or "blinded intellect' in Eriugena
thought, no expression of an immediate or 'sudden' experience of uni
which is beyond both knowing and seeing. (There is, however, on
passage in Book II, where Eriugena, following Maximus (I Ambigu
XXXVII, 1305D-1308A) mentions aorasia which he describes as
'blindness' or 'sightlessness' and then as 'unknowing', agnosia. There
would appear to be some confusion here regarding the two terms.36 The
idea of not seeing occurs also in Book V (920A), but this time in a direct
quotation from Dionysius's Letter to Dorotheas.) According to Eriugena's
explication of final theophany, the eyes are open in order to see
whatever can be seen. The term theophany itself is expressive of a
mediated vision, which although it takes place without the operation of
the bodily senses (V 999D), does not occur with the eyes closed.
Although Plotinus speaks of vision, of seer and seen, and even of a
future time of'unbroken vision' (VI 9, 10), he is adamant that there is
no subject or object: the soul 'is prevented by that very unification from
recognizing that it has found; it cannot distinguish itself from the object
of this intuition' (VI 9, 3). Dionysius too, expresses similar sentiments:
the soul 'enters into the altogether impalpable and unseen, being wholly
of him who is beyond all things yet none of them, neither himself nor
other" (M. T. I, 1). Expressions of this kind of immediate experience are
absent in the Periphyseon, precisely because Eriugena develops only one
aspect of Nyssean and Dionysian thought, namely, an interpretation of
Is. 6:2 in terms of 1 Cor. 13:12. In Gregory's thought, vision 'face to face'
would undoubtedly compromise the objective aspect of divine
incomprehensibility: instead, the soul will search ceaselessly
throughout eternity and will always be finding out something more
about the divine essence. Desire will never be satisfied, since the Good
itself is infinite.37 But Gregory, like Dionysius, also gives expression to
a more immediate, mystical experience of entry into the divine darkness
of the presence of God (In cant. VI and XII and Vita Mos. II, 163).
According to the Dionysian interpretation of Is. 6:2, the wings of
the Seraphim cover their faces and their feet because of their unceasing
caution in the face of the bright mystery, this represents their
reluctance to attempt a brash and unpermitted search for the
incomprehensible. According to Eriugena (614D-615A and 668A-C), feet
and faces are veiled in a gesture of reverence because the Seraphim fear
to look upon the divine power in all its glory. Yet they do look in so far
as they are able, even though always beaten back by the splendour of
divine radiance. The eyes of the Seraphim are open, and there is, I
believe, a subtle difference between hiding one's eyes in the dazzling
brightness and closing them in 'luminous darkness' (Vita Mos. II, 163).
It is this aspect of Dionysian thought that predominates almost
exclusively in the Periphyseon and Eriugena develops it with reference
51
to the Augustinian interpretation of ICor. 13:12. Dionysius had simply

ignored this problematic text; Eriugena's Augustinian inheritance made
this move more difficult.
Although the vision promised in the life to come is vision 'face to
face, it is because God is invisible in himself, that the 'vision' is
mediated through theophany (I 450C, V 926CfT and 988C). No creature,
except the human nature of the Word can ascend to God without any
intervening theophany, although some theophanies ('theophanies of
theophanies') are very close to God (V 905C). I believe that Eriugena is
forced to develop the notion of theophany in this way, which he
interprets as the 'cloud of contemplation' (905C), because of his
fundamental assertion that God is and will always remain invisible.38
If he had given expression to the other aspect of Dionysian thought: of
unknowing and unseeing unity, then he would have had little difficulty
with this central Pauline text.
And yet, theophany in the Periphyseon finds only that God is, not
what he is (866Cff, 917Aff and 1010C-D). Eriugena is, therefore,
constant in maintaining the objective reference of incomprehensibility.
'Seeing' via theophany is the unceasing and endless activity of the
beatific life, although Eriugena does not adopt the Nyssean concept of
always finding out more about the divine essence. In Book V (982Bff),
Eriugena uses a very potent analogy for the theophany of beatific life,
interestingly an image used also by Plotinus (VI 9, 11): in the entry into
the secret temple each person is allotted a place according to merit and
capacity39: some are in outer porticos, some further in, and finally there
are those who enter into the 'shrine of wisdom' itself (983A) where they
behold all things in their causes in the darkness which is light. In this
sense Eriugena does indeed employ the notion of being in the same
place as God and in this instance (because he is explaining that
theophany is according to capacity and merit) there is no need to
develop a theory of spiritual sight. In his account of the seventh and
final stage of the return of the elect (1020Cff), the deified enter into God
himself, into the darkness of'inaccessible light' (ITim. 6:16), which
shall then shine as day. The closing words of the Periphyseon once
again betray Eriugena's reliance upon the light and vision-dominated
thought of Augustine: the darkness of those who truly know shall be
converted into light (1022C).
I come now to some concluding remarks. In the light of the
discussion above, it is, I think, clear that Eriugena is much more
uncompromising with regard to his expression of divine
incomprehensibility than any of his predecessors, for in the
Periphyseon, the soul never finds out what God is, only that he is.
Eriugena is at least totally consistent in following through the basic
assertions of divine invisibility and incomprehensibility to their
eschatological conclusions.
52
D. CARABINE
It is, I believe, the fact that Eriugena develops only the cosmic
centred aspect of ascent and return (especially as that is found in
Maximus the Confessor) which has wider implications than the simple
neglect of the unique ascent of each individual soul. At this point
would go so far as to say that in Eriugena's writings, there is no lonely
soul struggling in the present life with the purification of its God
concepts in order to attain unity with the incomprehensible. However,
a number of times Eriugena does make passing reference to the
attainment of unity by those who in this life have conquered the world
and have ascended into God (V 977Dff, 980B and 999C). He mention
the most conspicuous example, St Paul being rapt into the third heaven
(982A-B), but he does not develop the idea.40
It is perhaps true to say that Eriugena's explication of the
methodology of negation stops at the 'hyperphatic' way we do not find a
Proclean or Dionysian abandonment of theology in favour of the
mystical ascent. This point is, I think, exemplified by the fact that
Eriugena does not employ the ascent of Moses up the dark mountain of
God and also by the absence of any 'sudden' experience of being lifted
into unity with God. The Dionysian soul who casts itself sightlessly
against the superessential ray of divine darkness (D N. I, 4) is not a
thematic which Eriugena takes up.
I did not begin this paper with the express intention of arguing
that Eriugena's thought ignores that very potent aspect not only of
Nyssean and Dionysian thought, but also of Plotinian and Proclean
thought, although I seem to have arrived at that, perhaps, rather
dogmatic conclusion. By comparing Eriugena's expression of unity with
those of his philosophical ancestors, I wanted to see if the long shadow
of Plotinus had cast itself over him and captured his soul in the ecstatic
and unseeing love of the Good. With regard to the original Plotinian
theme of being in the presence of the Good, we have seen that Eriugena
appears to have transposed the key from the individual to the
eschatological level. It is, however, with regard to the concept of
theophany as the vision of God 'face to face' that Eriugena differs most
from the other thinkers I have mentioned. Granted his ingenuity in
attempting to unite Augustine and Dionysius, nevertheless it is
precisely Eriugena's concern with the Augustinian interpretation of
ICor. 13:12 which determines his fundamental reliance upon the
concepts of sight and vision. Perhaps this is the most compelling
explanation of why Eriugena did not fall under the spell of Plotinus in
assenting to the notion that it is by not seeing that we see most truly.
Deirdre Carabine
University College, Dublin
53
Notes
1. Plotinus, in refering to the Pythagorean etymology of the name

'Apollo' as the denial of all multiplicity, says that perhaps even this name
should be denied, for it too may not be worthy to indicate that supreme nature.
This is one passage where Plotinus comes closest to the idea of the negation of
the negation, for a denial of this name would mean 'not not-many' (VI 9, 6, 26).
The hesitancy of Plotinus with regard to the denial of the term unity (indicated
by his use of Taxa) is understandable, for the ultimate negation of the One
would leave man 'in sheer dread of holding to nothingness' (VI 9, 3, 4-6;
translation S. MacKenna, p. 616.
2. We must become what we were before we came 'here' and we do this
by looking towards the Good alone and being made like it. Before we were
born, we existed 'there' as pure souls and we must, therefore, attempt to effect
our escape from the 'disturbance' which comes of being born 'here': see VI 9, 9,
33-38 and III 4, 6, 5-6.
3. Ill 8, 5; III 8, 8-9; V 1, 10; VI 7, 31, and VI 9, 8.
4. VI 9, 4, 7-11; MacKenna, p. 617.
5. VI 9, 8, 33-45 and VI 5, 12,16-29.
6. VI 9, 4, 3; see W. Beierwaltes's chapter on henosis in Denken des
Einen (Frankfurt, 1985), pp. 123-154.
7. V 6, 6; presence is superior to the noetic order, see J. Trouillard,
'Valeur critique de la mystique Plotinienne', Revue philosophique de Louvain,
59 (1961), p. 431.
8. See Vol. V of the Loeb edition, p. 135, n. 1; further references to
'suddenly' include, V 3, 17, 28; V 5, 3, 13; V 5, 7, 23, and VI 7, 34, 13.
9. VI 7, 36, 15-19; Mackenna, p. 590.
10. VI 9, 11, 23; J. Trouillard notes that a{plwsi" is better than e[kstasi"
to describe the movement of the soul to the One, see 'Valeur critique', p. 433.
Armstrong notes that extasis is not necessarily the best word for describing
mystical union in Plotinus; see his note entire passage in the Loeb edition, vol. VII.
11. V 8, 10, 35-36; Armstrong, p. 273; see also V 8, 11.
12. Yet the soul cannot remain for long in the experience of unity with the
Good, and the reason is that while the soul is here on earth in this mortal body
'it has not escaped wholly', to the place of the Good. But there will come a time
of unbroken vision when the soul will pass over into everlasting unity with the
Good. It is in this state that the soul truly finds its peace, for it has attained to
that which it has always desired: VI 9,10,1-2, VI 9, 9 and VI 4, 14.
13. The ineffable and unknowable principle above all is celebrated
(dvutiveu)): see Platonic Theology, I 10, p. 42 (1-2) and II, 11, p. 65 (5-7): we
celebrate the first cause with a hymn without saying what he is who made
heaven and earth. The Dionysian uses of this term obviously owes much to
Proclus, see De myst. Theol. II: {)7repouoiu><; {ijivfjoai. W. Beierwaltes, Proklos.
54
D. CARABINE
Grundziige seiner Metaphysik (Frankfurt, 1965), p. 353, interprets the 'hymn

negations' at Parm. VII 1191. 32ff, in this sense. All further references in t
discussion are to the Commentary on the Parmenides unless otherwise noted
The edition used is that of V. Cousin; the surviving portion of Book VII follow
the Latin edition of R. Klibansky and C. Labowsky. Translations are tak
from Morrow and Dillon (page numbers are given in brackets).
14. VI1069. 21; see Enn. V 3,13, Iff
15. VII 1177. 20-23 (p. 527); see also P. T. II 10, p. 63 (13f!) and Elem
Theol.. prop. 8. See Enn. Ill 8, 11, 12-13 and VI 7, 38, 2-3.
16. The basic Platonic analysis of cognition as three-fold: doxa, dianoia an
nous, are each in turn applied to the One and wanting in every respect, for h
can that which is beyond all that exists be known either through sen
perception or opinion, and how can that which has no cause be the object of
scientific knowledge? See VII 48K. 3-10, and 50K. 9-10.
17. VII 46K. 3-5 (p. 587); see also 42K. 27-28 and P. T. I 22, p. 101 (25-2
appriTov yap eon ndi rrpo yvwoeux; Ttaon? em Ttavra 6iaTEivEt ra ovra. Th
unfulfilled desire of the soul is a theme employed also by Gregory of Nyss
order to protect totally the incomprehensibility of God.
18. VII 54K. 19-21; see also P. T. I 22, p. 102 (12-14): desire for the On
must be inextinguishable since it can never be fulfilled.
19. See IV 975. 36-37, VI 1081. 5, VII 48K. 16-17 and E. Th. prop. 32; see
also Enn. Ill 8, 9, 22-23.
20. VI 1094. 29- 1095. 2 (p. 442); the same sentiments are repeated i
Book VII58K. 30-34.
21. VI1081. 9-10; it is by the ineffable that we know the ineffable: P. T. I
3, p. 15 (21).
22. VII 74K. 6-9 (p. 602); see also 74K. 31, 76K. 2 and P. T. I 3, p. 16 (Iff).
See Enn. I 6, 8, 24-27.
23. 48K. 12-14. This illumination, however, is our own particular light
(particulare enim et ipsa lumen); the transcendent One can be beheld only by
its own light: icai eautou 4>wn novw Ka0apcto0ai 6uva|ievov see 48K. 16
and IV 951. 18-19.
24. 70K. 9ff; see also P. T. II 10, p. 63 (22S).
25. 76K. 6. On the negation of the negation, see W. Beierwaltes, Proklos,
p. 361ff and Appendix IV, p. 395ff and K. Hedwig, 'Negatio negationis', Archiv
fur Begriffsgeschichte, 24 (1980), pp. 7-33.
26. 76K. 6-7 (p. 603): Silentio autem conclusit earn que de ipso theoriam.
There is nothing astonishing if in wanting to know the ineffable through
discourse, one's discourse is led into the impossible, for all knowledge which is
applied to an object of knowledge which does not apply to it, destroys itself: P.
T. II10, p. 64 (2-5).
27. See R. Mortley, From Word to Silence II. The Way of Negation Christian
and Greek (Bonn, 1986), p. 116ff and W. Beierwaltes, Proklos, p. 361ff.
28. VII1196. 37-40. See also P. T. I 3, p. 16 (19ff).
55
29. II 589Aff. According to Eriugena's conception, God is

incomprehensible primarily because of his infinity; he cannot be defined or
limited in any way, since that which has the capacity to define something must
be greater than that something: Maius enim est quod diffinit quam quod
diffinitur, I 485B. All quotations are from the Periphyseon unless otherwise
noted, and are from the critical edition of I. P. Sheldon-Williams, Periphyseon,
Scriptores Latini Hiberniae (The Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1968,
1972, 1981), Books I-III; quotations from books IV and V are from the Floss
edition in Patrologia Latinae, vol. 122.
30. II 510B-C, 597D and IV 771C.
31. II 564B, 656D, 683C, IV 708D, 777C, 867C and V 963C. See also
Horn. XI, 289D and XII, 290A-B. 985D-986A: ignorance of God is the death of
the spirit.
32. I 443B, 448B, 521C-522C and IV 771B-C; knowing that God is, is a
reflection of God's own knowledge of himself, II 593C-D: Ipsius enim ignorantia
ineffabilis est intelligentia. God cannot know himself as a what because he is
infinite: II 589B; see 596A-C for the four modes of God's ignorance.
33. In the Periphyseon, ousia can be know only in so far that it is (through
the circumstantiae surrounding it); one cannot know what it is; see I 443B-C,
471Bff, 487A-B and 586C-587A.
34. See Conf. X, 6 and Gregory: In cant. II, 68 (4-10) and In beat. VI
(1270C).
35. I 443B: Nam sicut ipse Deus in se ipso ultra omnem creaturam nullo
intellectu comprehenditur ita etiam in secretissimis creaturae ab eo factae et
in eo existentis consideratus incomprehensibilis est.
36. See 534C-535A and the editor's accompanying note in Vol. II of the
edition, p. 221, n. 98.
37. Contra Eun. I, 291 (112), In cant. VI (170-181) and Vita Mos. II, 239.
38. I 448C: Non ergo ipsum deum per se ipsum videbimus quia neque
angelii videt (hoc enim omni creaturae impossible est).
39. See also D. N. IV, 11 and I, 4; also 905B-C, 926C-D and 945C-D.
40. In Book I (510C), Eriugena says that no one can draw near to the
divine essence unless by abandoning the operations of sense and intellect,
attain to not knowing in order to be restored to the unity of the transcendent.
These sentiments are, of course, a close paraphrase of the Pseudo-Dionysius
and Eriugena does not mention the concept of seeing through not seeing.
56

A Thematic Investigation of The Neoplatonic Concepts of Vision and Unity

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A Thematic Investigation of the Neoplatonic Concepts of Vision and Unity

Author(s): Deirdre Carabine

Perhaps one of the most

Plotinus and Proclus: The Ineffable/Unknowable One

and I give only a very brief exposition of it here. Plotinus's argument

able to grasp what the One is like because there is a likeness of it in us

'Our way then takes us beyond knowing; there may be no

Having silenced one's intellectual faculty and conformed oneself to

Although the ascent to unity in Proclus is expressed somewhat

O You, the One beyond all,

'For, if we are to approach the One by means of these negative

The removal of multiplicity through negation thus leaves open the

In Platonic Theology (II 11, 64), Proclus describes the ascent of th

Eriugena: Theophany, Vision and Unity

In the Periphyseon, the following through of

aperikaluptos (M.T. I, 3). The point I wish to elaborate on here is th

to the Augustinian interpretation of ICor. 13:12. Dionysius had simply

1. Plotinus, in refering to the Pythagorean etymology of the name

Grundziige seiner Metaphysik (Frankfurt, 1965), p. 353, interprets the 'hymn

29. II 589Aff. According to Eriugena's conception, God is

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