MANALO VS SISTOZA

(312 SCRA 239)

FACTS:

In a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner
questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments issued by the former
President Corazon Aquino to the respondents senior officers of the PNP who were promoted to the
rank of Chief Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation under Sec. 16 Art VII of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6975 otherwise
known as Local Government Act of 1990. Impleaded in the case is former Secretary of Budget and
Management Enriquez III who approved and effected the disbursement for the salaries and other
emoluments of subject police officers.

RULING:

It is the petitioners submission that the PNP is akin to the AFP and therefore, the appointments of
police officers whose rank is usual to that of colonel or naval captain require confirmation by the CA.
This contention is equally untenable. The PNP is separate and distinct from AFP. The Constitution no
less sets forth the distinction. Thus directors and chief superintendents of the PNP such as the herein
respondent police officers do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring
confirmation by the CA. In view of the foregoing disquisition and conclusion the respondent former
Sec. Enriquez III of DBM did not act with grave abuse of discretion in authorizing and effecting
disbursements of police officers whose appointments were valid. Petitioner theorizes that RA 6975
enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. He maintains that the respect accorded to each
department of the government requires that the court should avoid as much as possible deciding
constitutional questions. However, it is equally demanded from the court, as guardians of the
Constitution to see to it that every law passed by Congress is not repugnant to the organic law.

As consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of Sarmiento III vs. Mison, and in the subsequent cases
of Bautista vs. Salonga, Quintos-Deles vs. Constitutional Commission, and Calderon vs.Carale; under Section 16,
Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need
not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson11Congress
cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of
appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.

To so distinguish the police force from the armed forces, Congress enacted Republic Act 6975 which states
in part:

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to promote peace and
order, ensure public safety and further strengthen local government capability aimed towards the effective
delivery of the basic services to the citizenry through the establishment of a highly efficient and competent
police force that is national in scope and civilian in character. . . .

The policy force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police functions.
Its national scope and civilian character shall be paramount. No element of the police force shall be military
nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Castroverde, Krizel Mary B.

OPOSA et. al. vs FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR. as Sec. of DENR & Hon. Eriberto Rosario
GR No. 101083, July 30, 1993

J. Davide
FACTS
A civil case was filed before RTC Branch 66, National Capital Judicial Region praying for the
Cancellation of all existing timber license agreements in the country; to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements; and such
other reliefs as my be just and equitable under the premises. Petitioners are minors duly represented
and joined by their respective parents. Complaint was instituted as a taxpayers class suit and alleged
that plaintiffs are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines taxpayers and are entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the countrys tropical forests. The
minors (Plaintiff as represented by their parents) further alleged that they represent their generation
as well as generations yet unborn. It was alleged in the said complaint that there was a distortion and
disturbance in the balanced and healthy ecology as a consequence of deforestation causing several
environmental tragedies. In one of the allegations contained in said complaint, Plaintiffs stated that
they had clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Defendants likewise refused to cancel the
TLAs which are manifestly contrary to public policy enunciated in the Philippine Encironmental Policy.
Original defendant- Secretary Factoran then filed a Motion to dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds: 1. Plaintiffs had no cause of action, 2. the issue raised by plaintiffs is a political question
which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches. In opposition to the said motion,
petitioners that the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory
and that the action represents a justiciable question as it involves the defendants abuse of discretion.
The motion to dismiss filed by original defendant was granted by herein respondent judge ruling that
granting the relief prayed for in the complaint would impair contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental laws of the land. Plaintiffs then filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court asking the court to set aside the said dismissal order on the ground that
said judge gravely abused his discretion in doing the same.

ISSUE
(1)Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action to prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of the Philippine rainforests and arrest the unabated haemorrhage of the countrys vital
life support systems and continued rape of Mother earth.

(2)Whether or not the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a
political question.

RULING
Though the original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue regarding the
case being a class suit, the court ruled that the said civil case is a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Since the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable to bring all of them before the court. It
was likewise declared by the court that the plaintiffs are numerous and representative enough to
ensure the full protection of interests. Thus fulfilling the requisites for filing a valid class suit as
provided in Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. It was also decided that petitioner
minors can file a class suit for themselves, for others of their generation and for future ones-the same
being based on the concept of Intergenerational Responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned. Said right being expounded to provide that every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and harmony of nature for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.

(1) Plaintiffs alleged with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce
and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). The trial court erred in concluding that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions
and vague conclusions based on unverified data thereby failing to state a cause of action in
their complaint against the defendant. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental
legal rightthe right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is solemnly incorporated in
Section 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution:
 Sec.16 The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Said right unites with the right to health provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
Sec 15. The state shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. Furthermore, even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
specific statutes already paid special attention to the environmental right of the present and
future generations (PD 1151-Philippine Environmental Policy, and PD 1152 Philippine
Environmental Code). Thus the right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is a
s clear as the DENRs duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under
EO 192 and the administrative code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. A denial or
violation of that right by other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect and protect
the same gives rise to a cause of action. However, insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead as a party defendants, the grantees thereof for they
are indispensable parties

(2) Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of government is

not squarely put in issue. What is involved is the enforcement of a right and policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must be emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shied that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or
review. Sec 1 Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the scope of judicial power. The
said provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court the power to rule upon
even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction due to grave abuse of discretion.

With regard to the matter involving the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the
Constitution, all licenses may be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is nor a contract,
property, or a property right protested by due process clause of the Constitution in the case of Tan vs
Director of Forestry the court held that: A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
Thus the court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights. Furthermore, even
if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber license. Hence, the
non-impairment cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations of modification, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the
non-impairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is
limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral
and general welfare.

WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED being impressed with merit and the order of respondent
dismissing the case is set aside. Petitioners allowed to amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned license agreements.
 MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ versus HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
February 15, 2011

Facts:
The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via petition for certiorari and
prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7, 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee
on Justice (public respondent).

Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth Monday of July, in
accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents
Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel group) filed
an impeachment complaint [1] against petitioner.

On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo
Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another
impeachment complaint [5] against petitioner. On even date, the House of
Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the
14th Congress.

On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the Committee on
Rules instructed to include the two complaints in the Order of Business, [10] which was complied with
by their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010.

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent. [11]

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints
sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same time.

The Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published
on September 2, 2010.

After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints,
which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,[12] sufficient
in substance. The determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public
respondent, which assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of
whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon.

Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September 13, 2010, petitioner filed
with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive reliefs. The following day or on
September 14, 2010, the Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo
ante order[14] and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days.

Issues:
Procedural Issues
a. Whether or not the case presents a justiciable controversy.
b. Whether or not judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may also
lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary.

Substantive Issues
a. Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions, as to:
1. Due process of law
i. On the allegations of being bias and vindictiveness of the
Respondents chairperson (Niel Tupas, Jr.).
ii. Whether or not the indecent and precipitate haste of public
respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in form and
substance is a clear indication of bias.
iii. Whether or not public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency
of form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the
standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules.
 iv. Whether or not the Court can look into the narration of facts
constitutive of the offenses vis--vis her (petitioner) submissions
disclaiming the allegations in the complaints.
v. Whether or not there was denial of due process, due to the delay in
the publication of the Impeachment Rules. (Based on Section 3(8),
Article XI of the Constitution which directs that Congress shall
promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.)
vi. Whether or not the impeachment provisions are self-
executing. (Section 3 of Article XI.)
2. The One Year Bar Rule
a. Whether or not the 1 year bar rule reckons to start at the date of
filing of the first impeachment complaint.
b. What is the reason of the one year bar rule?
3. Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
a. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when the
respondents did not obey the one offense, one complaint rule.
b. Whether or not the rule on consolidation applies
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and
September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice,
are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September 14,
2010 is LIFTED.

Ratio:
I. Procedural Issues
a. Whether or not the case presents a justiciable controversy.
Yes
In Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives. The argument that impeachment proceedings are
beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:

The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of
the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedlygranted to
the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a
power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to
correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality.

b. Whether or not judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and

may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary.

The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicial review.

There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review
over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances.Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers
assigned to it by the Constitution.
II. Substantive issue

A. Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions.

(Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, Sec.
1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Constitution.)
 1. Due process of law
i. On the allegations of being bias and vindictiveness of the Respondents
chairperson (Niel Tupas, Jr.).

Representative Niel Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting,
while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by her with violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by
her office against Rep. Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent in
such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the finding of sufficiency of
form and substance of the complaints against her.

The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly
any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice. [26]

The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body itself.

In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely presided
over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints. [29]

ii. Whether or not the indecent and precipitate haste of public respondent in
finding the two complaints sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias.

An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of bias,

however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice[31] holds:

Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer cannot per se be

instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. For ones prompt dispatch
may be anothers undue haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the
paramount and constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar
to each case.

The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations in all phases of
work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon petitioners to
present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days or numerical
calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift completion of the
Investigating Panels initial task cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without
discounting the presumably regular performance of not just one but five state
prosecutors.
iii. Whether or not public respondent failed to ascertain the sufficiency of form
and substance of the complaints on the basis of the standards set by the Constitution and its own
Impeachment Rules.

The claim fails.

The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an exponent
of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which
committed such determinative function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the
exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form and
substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations behoove the Court to respect the
compliance by the House of its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any
contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines.

The Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there
must be a verified complaint or resolution, [36] and that the substance requirement is met if there is a
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the
committee. [37]

iv. Whether or not the Court can look into the narration of facts constitutive of the
offenses vis--vis her (petitioner) submissions disclaiming the allegations in the
complaints.

This the Court cannot do.

Francisco instructs that this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes
an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution
has left to the sound discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power[.] [39] Worse, petitioner urges the
Court to make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised, upon a hypothetical admission of
the facts alleged in the complaints, which involve matters of defense.

v. Whether or not there was denial of due process, due to the delay in the
publication of the Impeachment Rules. (Based on Section 3(8), Article XI of the
Constitution which directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.)

Promulgation must be used in the context in which it is generally understood that is, to make
known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally
understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the general must
prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense was to be used. [49]

Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to publication, the former should be
understood to have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to
determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is
permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of
court for filing and publication.

It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the
Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no position
to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.

vi. Whether or not the impeachment provisions are self-executing. (Section 3 of

Article XI.)

Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to suspend the entire impeachment mechanism
which the Constitutional Commission took pains in designing even its details.

Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a

constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as
it has always been, that . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-
executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would
give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them
entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.

Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is aimed
at effectively carry[ing] out the purpose of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse
of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on Impeachment of
the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early filing and in keeping with the
effective implementation of the purpose of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the
provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House
to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed purpose.

Impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the
punishment of the offender. [55]
The Court thus finds no violation of the due process clause.
 2. The one-year bar rule

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

a. Whether or not the 1 year bar rule reckons to start at the date of filing of the
first impeachment complaint.
NO.
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint
against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the
15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint
may be accepted and referred to public respondent.

From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement
of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least
one-third[61] of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the
House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the
same official within a one year period.

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment complaint, for it is the
matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment proceedings. The filing of an impeachment
complaint is like the lighting of a matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up
the candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the complaint
to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple
complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is
important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once
the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.

A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both illusive and illusory.

Placing an exceedingly narrow gateway to the avenue of impeachment proceedings turns its laudable
purpose into a laughable matter. One needs only to be an early bird even without seriously intending
to catch the worm, when the process is precisely intended to effectively weed out worms in high
offices which could otherwise be ably caught by other prompt birds within the ultra-limited season.

Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the actual complainants, injured
party or principal witnesses who, by mere happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a
first impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted from directly participating in the
impeachment process.

There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an impeachment complaint is
filed. Depriving the people (recall that impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a
body politic) of reasonable access to the limited political vent simply prolongs the agony and
frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been betrayed by an impeachable
officer. It shortchanges the promise of reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer
through the mechanism enshrined in the Constitution.

b. What is the reason of the one year bar rule?

The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in
a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcunas separate opinion that concurred with
the Francisco ruling.[89] Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: to
prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of]
legislation, with main reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads:

It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the element of time,
and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer should defend himself in only one
impeachment proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official functions and
duties. Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with
little time to attend to its main work of law-making.
3. Applicability of the Rules on Criminal Procedure

In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules to effectively carry out the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution, the House promulgated the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which
provides that the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable,
apply to impeachment proceedings before the House.

a. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when the respondents did not
obey the one offense, one complaint rule.
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that [a] complaint or
information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for
various offenses. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and
substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust. She concludes that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded
its own rules.

Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration.

The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge
representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the Articles of
Impeachment. [94] It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable offense.

b. Whether or not the rule on consolidation applies.

Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet order a consolidation, the
Court will not venture to make a determination on this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or
anticipatory. [97]

Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that the two impeachment complaints
were deemed consolidated,[98] her claim that consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioners theory
obviously springs from her proceeding = complaint equation which the Court already brushed aside.
 Veterans Federation Party et al. vs. COMELEC (342 SCRA 247)

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives.
Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list
representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of
the House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent
allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

Ruling:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative,
Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of
the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to
ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation
are actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR

(1) determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

(2) additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list
system

(3) additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x
additional seats allocated to first party

To apply the aforesaid formulas, do the following:

1. All the party list organizations should be ranked from highest to lowest using the 2% threshold.
2. Compute formula (1). Note the first party.
3. Compute formula (2), it will determine the additional seats for the first party, i.d. if the total votes of
the first party is at least 6% of the total valid votes for the party list system, then the first party will
have an additional 2 seats for a total of 3 seats in all. If the first party only received 4% or higher but
less than 6% of the total valid votes for the party-list system, the, the first party will get only 1
additional seat. If the votes of the first party is less than 4% of the total party-list votes, the first party
will receive 0 additional seats.
4. Formula (2) will only be used ONCE and the percentage allocation described in no. 3 will only be
used for the FIRST PARTY.
5. Compute formula (3).

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA
7941 constitutional?

Ruling:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation
are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the
proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must
have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-
list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing
significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even
legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Ruling:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well
as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations
and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then
the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all the parties
participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed one
seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party
receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be
able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to
which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties
are entitled to, based on proportional representation.

Formula simplified:

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at
the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list. We thus translate this legal
provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:

No. of district representatives

- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives

This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats.
To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998
national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:

208
x .20 = 52
.80

The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic
question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the
time and under all circumstances? Short answer is No.