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  • Klein - Is Infinitism The Solution To The Regress Problem

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    Klein - Is Infinitism The Solution To The Regress Problem

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    Igor Danilevicz
    Klein - Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem

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    vin points, must be e capacity apacity by This is the ws. reason p. then it esses. Bul expressed a subject's Fs without und to the uments for assed on the ips the per- 2 that non verceive the 4 concludes F etaim that sasons must culate them ss not estab- °s, based on ber reasons. established. At perceptual what Is per it is hard to that we ean at perceptual cn and Reatity. [CHAPTER FIVE |s Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? Infinitism Is the Solution to the Regress Problem Peter Klein The Regress Problem The locus elassicus of the regress problem is to be found in Sextus Empisicus’s Oul- Jines of Pymhonism ‘The later Skeptics band dovn Five Modes leading to suspension, namely these: the fest based on discrepancy, the second on the regress ad infinitum, the third on relativity, the fourth on hypottesis, the fifth on circular reasoning. Trat based on discrepancy’ leads us (o find that with regard (0 the object presented there has arisen bot amongst ordinary people and amongst the philosophers an interminable confer because of which we are unable either to choose a thing or reect it, and so fall back on suspension, The Mode based upon regress ad infinitum is that whereby we assert that the thing adduced as a proof of the matter proposed needs a further proof, and this egsin anotaer, and so on ad infinitum, so that the consequence is suspension [of assent], as we possess no starting-point for our argument. The Mode based upon zeativity is that whereby the jobject has such or such an appearance in selation to the subject judging and to the con comitant pereepts, but as (@ Hts ceal nature we suspend judgment, We have the Mode based upon hypothesis when the Dogmatsts, being forced to recede ad infinitum, take as their starting-point something whieh they do not establish but claim to assume as {granted simply and without demonstration, The Mode of circular rezsoning is the form used when the proof itself which ought ¢o establish the matter of Inquiry requires con firmation derived from the matter: in this case, being unable to essume elther in order to establish the other, we suspend juelgment about both. Although the three aitemetive strategies for solving the regress will be the focus of this essay, a brief discussion of the (wo other modes will be useful in understanding, what initiates the regress | i The Modes were recipes for avoiding dogmatism, Le. the disposition to assent (0 rpon-evident propositions when iti not settled whether they are true, One could focate such 2 non-evident proposition either by noting that there was credible disagreement bout It or by merely recognizing that there could be credible disagreement, For it oder to avoid epistemic hubris, the recognition that our epistemic peers could sin~ eraly eleagree with us about the truth of some proposition forces us 10 regard #48 requiring reesons in onder to tse to the desired level of credibility, rhe Regress Problem cat be put 2s follows: Which type of serles of reasons and the account of warrant associated with it, any, can inerease the credibility of a non- tevident propasition? Can a series with repeating propositions do so? Can one with @ fast member do so? Can one that is non-repeating and has no last member do so? Foundationalists and coherentsts typically adress the trilemma i. wo steps. First they cavaiely eect the iniitist option by allading co our “ire mental capaci” Second, they segue for one of the remaining, options by disjunctive elimination.” We sel cowsider the “finite mind” objection in due course. My point ere Is only that infinitism has been given a short shrift, if any shift, by epistemologists, "The argument in this paper has three essential steps: first, | will argue chat nether oundationalism nor eoiterentism can solve the regress problems second, | will present ta infintist account oF warrant and exptain how reasoning in accord with it can solve the regress problem; third, {will argue thatthe est objections to infiniti fall? Step 1: Neither Foundationalism nor Coherentism Can Solve the Regress Problem ‘The regress problem concerns the ability of reasoning to Increase he entional cre pility of a questioned proposition, I¢ iS not crucial what degree of erebiity is 21 take, The task is to produce an account of warrant, where “warrant” refers to the property possessed by propositions or beliefs such that (1 true beefs with tht prop trey ate Known" and (2) reasoning in accordance with the dictates of that esount {ncreases our rational confidence in nog-evident propositions My claim wil be that neither founcationalism ror coherentism provides such oF ‘accovot of warrant, [will not be arguing that either account of warrant is incorrect, Init be arguing that nether accourt of warrant can provide a solution to the regress problem because neither account can be employed by a self-conscious prectitions to vrerease the rational credibility ofa questioned proposition and, thus, a primary reason for adopting either foundetionslism or coberentsm has been eliminated Toundationalists and coherentists differ about the way in which warrant originates and is transfered, Varieties of foundationalism car be demarcated (i) by the features Stibastc propositions in which warrant arse, (i) by the degree of wanrant that arses fnially, and fi) by the rules of inference that transfer warrant, But ell foundation, iiss think of warrant as arising autonomously in so-called besic propositions and ping transferse to other propastions through permissible fons of Inference ‘Coherentists could think of warvent as transferring from one proposition to another ‘This for of coherentism, what 1 will call the “warrant-transfer” variety, Wolds that ome proposition, p, ttansfers its warrant to another proposition which can, in fur 132] Chapter Five assent to Ad locate greement For in ould sin- gard it a. sons and of anon se with a do so? eps. First, capacity ation.* We only that vat neither ‘ill present scan salve vm fail? tonal credi~ bility is at sfers to the 1 that prop- at account les such an) is incorrect. the regress sctitioner to mary reason xt originates the Features at that arises Toundation- sitions and erence. nto another yy holds that can in tur, pass it to another proposition, Eventually the warrant is transferred back to p. This ‘view endorses circular reasoning, Nox, I don’t think any epistemologist explicitly advocated this view ~ although the critics of coherentisin oceasionally characterize it in this way, as did the Pyrthonians and Aristotle? ‘The second variety of cokerentism ~ the form that as been advocated ~ is wat 1 will call the “warrant-emergent® form, Warrant emerges from the structure of the mutually supporting propositions.* Warrant Is nor a property of a particular proposi- tion except in the trivial sense that a proposition is warranted if itis a member of such & set of mutually supporting propositions, As the set af propositions becomes increasingly comprehensive and the mutual support intensifies, the degree of warrant for each increases. This view eschews incestuous circular reasoning in which warrant is transferred ftom some ancestor proposition to its descendants and then hack again to the ancestor. Out question is whether the account of warrant. underlying foundationalism or either of the two forms of cohecentism provides a basis for a solution to the resress problem. Let us begin with foundationalism end imagine a dialogue between Fred, ‘ie Foundationalist, and Doris, the Doubter. {Fred/Doris could be sub-persona if we are envisioning a Cartesian-style, soffo vace mecitation}. Fred asserts some proposi- tion, say p. Doris says something ~ who knows what ~ that prompts Fred to believe that he had better have reasons) for p in order to supply some missing creibility. So, Fred gives his reason, ¢\, for p. [r could be a conjunction) Now, Doris asks ‘why 1, is true, Fred gives another reason. t» This goes on for a while until Fred (deing, a practicing foundationalst) arrives at what he takes to be a basic proposition, say b. Doris will, ofcourse, ask Fred for his reason for b. But Fred, Deing a self-conscious, circumspect foundatioralist will tei Doris that b docsn't need a reason in order to possess the autonomous bit of warrant. He will say that her question "Why do you Ibelieve that x?" thouga appropriate up to this point is no longer appropriate when “p" is substituted for "xc" because b is basic. There Is no reason that supplies the autonomous warrant that b has.” Grant that foundationalism is true; b has some autonomous bit of warrant that arises because b hs some foundational property, F, such that any proposition having F is autonomously warranted, and every non-basic proposition that depends upon b for its warrant would lose some of its warrant were b not autonomously warranted. Doris should say to Fred, “I grant that b has autonomous warrant. But what | want 1o know is whether autonomously Warranted propositions are, in virtue of that fact, somewhat likely to be true.” fer worry becomes a “meta” worry. But she went meta, 0 to speak, because Fred went meta first.® Given that with regard to any proposition, once we consider whether itis true, we must hold it, deny i or withhold i (Le. neither hold nor deny i, Fred is now faced with a trilemm: , 1 He can hold that autonomously warranted propositions are somewhat likely to be tmue in virtue of the Zact that they are autonomously warranted, 2 He can deny that autonomously warranted propositions are somewhat likely ta be true in virtue of the fact that they aze autonomously warranted, {s Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? [193 j j B 4 He can withhold whether autonomously warranted propositions are somewhat likely to be true in virtue of the fact that they are autonomously warranted, i If he takes alternative 2, then using b as a reason for the first non-basic proposition i in the series is arbitrary. Holding b is not arbitrary. Doris has granted that D is i ‘autonomously warranted and she could grant that itis not arbitrary to hold a propo sition that has autonomous warrant. But if Fred believed that such propositions were hot even somewhat likely to be tre in virtue of being autonomously warranict how ‘could he think that b could provide a good reason for thinking that the penultimate proposition was likely to be true? Fred thinks tat the warrant forall of his belits fests on basic propositions, If he thought that b's possession of F was not the least bit truth conducive, then why is he using b and all the other basic propositions on ‘which the warrant for his non-basie beliefs rests? “The same applies to alternative 3. Doris fas asked whether the fact that b is autonomously Warranted makes it at all likely that b is true. Fred responds that he doesn't have an opinion one way or the other. Fred thinks b is trae but he neither has reason for thinking itis ue nor does he think that basic propositions are some- ‘what key to be true because they are autonomously warranted. So, fom Pred's point df view and Dors's, Fred ought not t0 use b as the basis for further beliefs. The mere fact that he thinks b is true Is not sufficlent for him to use b as @ reason, unless ne {thinks that his thinking that b is true somehow apakes it Ukely that b is true, IF he fakes alternative 1, then using b as his reason for the penultimate propost- tion is not arbitrary, but that is because the regress has continued. Fred has a very {good reason for believing b, namely b has F and propositions with F are likely to be true, Fred, now, could be asked to produce his reasons for thinking that b has TF andl that basic propositions are somewhat likely to be true in virtue oF possessing feature F ‘Therefore: foundationalism cannot solve the regress problem, even if it were true. {A practicing foundationalist cannot increase the rational credibility of @ questioned proposition through reasoning ‘et us turn to cobereatism, The first fom, the warrant-transfer form, is easily seen to be unable to solve the regress problem because Cail, the Coherentst, eannot increase the credibility of sorae proposition, p, by citing p in its own evidential ances- tay. If the reasoning Is to increase the credibility of the questioned proposition for Carl, then that credibility will not already be cathected to te proposition. For if i ‘were, then it is pointless to begin reasoning in Ue frst place. Presumably that is What Js wrong with circular reasoning. It eannot increase the credibility of & questioned proposition indeed, tne difficulty facing oil warrant-transfer accounts (foundationalism and this ype of coherentisny) is more serious than that credibility will not be added to the questioned proposition by reasoning. There Is a danger taat credibility will actwally diminish as the warrant is transferred” If all of the inferences employed in the rea- soning were deductive and if an appropriate form of closure holds, i would seem tat credibility would not be lost. It could even increase, But if during the transfer of were lost, as it would be, if the inference links were non- | : 134] Chapter Five dedy bec 1 ther ence tT ing? asth rior have alisn have cuss the cohe ort trary that ent, Jac set begs thee | cate cont rane exar pr prac thro: PB ity Wha beca bee he newhat ated, position rat is propo- ns were ed, how ultimate tions on hat bis 5 that he 2 neither re some- ‘a's point The mere tess he © proposi- asa very likely to wb has F assessing questioned :asily seen st, cannot tial ances- sition for 1, Por if it brat is what questioned calism and dded to the ‘ill actually in the rea. seem that transfer of + were tion deductive, then, the longer the series or the larger the eile, the more credibility would be lost. ‘The only escape from this difficulty for a warrant-transter theorist 58 to (i) limit the number of transfers allowed or (i) require that there are sufficiently strong coher- ence relations to make up forthe lost warrant or (ii) require that enough of the trans- fers are by way of deduction. Those stipulations seem entirely ad hoc The second form of eoherentism, the warrant-emergent farm, seems mote promis- ing because it eschews circular reasoning, end warrant for propositions could increase as the number of threads inthe web of propositions increases andor the web becomes ‘more lightly woven, But there is one problem with this form of coherentism. As others have pointed out, it is nothing but a type of foundationalism ~ one step foundation lism." In this case, the founslational property, F, witich all warranted propositions have, s that each is 2 member of a set of cokevent propositions, The Catl-Doris dis- ‘eussion would follow the sane general pattern as the Fred-Doris discussion where the foundational property, F, is simply the proposition’s membership in the set of coherent propositions. ‘Thus, Cat faces @tilemma similar to Fred's, discussed above. If he says either “no” or “I withhold” then vesting his credence in a coherent set of propositions is arb trary. Why should he adopt a cohetent set ratber than an incohezent set? If he says thet coherent propositions are likely to be true in virtue ofthe fact that they are cober- ent, then he faces the third hora." For either the proposition “coherent sets are ipso facto likely to contain propositions that are true” is Included in the fnitial coherent set or it isn't If tis, then he has fallen back to the warrant-trensfer, ic. question- beeing, form of coherentism. If isn't, then he has just added @ new proposition to the coherent set and the regress hes continued Now, coherentists might suggest that mere coherence is not suffictent to demar cate a set of warranted propositions. They could require, for example, that the sel contain some propositioas that have some further feature, namely that they are spost tancously endorsed or tbat their content has certain phenomenal properties (For example, see BonJour, 1985). But that is just another speeification ofthe foundations) Feproperty and the trilemma would reappear. Therefore: coherentism cannot solve the regress problem, even if it were true, A practicing cokecentist cannot increase the credibility of a questioned propasition through reasoning. Perhaps there is no solution to the regress problem ~ i.e. no way to acd credibil- lty to a proposition by reasoning. But hefore we cone to that rather dismal concu- sion, it would be appropriate to look at the third alternative. Step 2: Infinitism What Is infinitism? Infinitism is like the warrant-emergent form of coherentism because it holds that warrant for a questioned proposition emerges as the proposition, Decomes embedded in a set of propositions. (nfinitism is like foundationalism because it holds that some propositions are epistemically prior to others. But some caution is Is Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Probiem? [135] needed! if we are to be able to account for the coherentist intuition that (some) propo sitions are mutually supporting. For example, “all humans are mortal” is a reason for believing that “this human is mortal,” and the converse is true. Some have thought that the universal generalization is always epistemically prior to the particular, and thers have thougit that the particular is always epistemically prior to the general- ation. Each view runs afoul of our reasoning practice. Sometimes we offer the generalization as a reason for the particular ~ when the particular is what fs ques- tioned, Sometimes we offer the particular as a reason for the generalization ~ when the generalization is questioned. But we cannot use the generalization as a reason for the particular and the particular as a reason for the generalization in the course ef one reasoning session, That would be to fa into circular, question-begging reasoning, What we seek is an account of warrant that is net a warrant-transfer view and is not warrant-emergent finite coherentism. There is only one option remaining, What ‘we reed is warrant-emergent infinitism, Such a view leads neither to the arbitrary employment of a so-called basic propositions nor to the endorsement of circular rea soning, It can solve the regress problem because it endorses a warrant-emergent form of reasoning in which warrant increases as the series of reasons lengtivens. Infinitist results from adopting the following two principles:!” Principle of Avoiding Circutrity (PAC): forall propositions, x, if x is wamranted for a person, §, att, then forall y, ify Is in the reason-ancestry of x for at &, then x is not in the reason-ancestry of y for $ at Principle of Avoiding Abitrariness {PAA\: Fora propositions, x, if x fs warranted for a person, 5, at, then there is some reason, r, available to S for x att; and there is some Feason, ty available to S for f at, ete, an there ts no Last reason tn the sexes. PAC is realy understandable and requires no discussion. It simply recognizes that a vwatrant-trensfer view cannot solve the regeess problem by endorsing circular rea- oning, PAA, on the other hand, introduces the notion of "avaiable reasons" and sonte account ofthat is required ‘There are two conditions that must be met in order for a proposition to be avail. able to § asa reason for x att Frst, the proposition must be available to S a ¢ that fs, It must be appropriately “hooked up" to S's beliefs and other mental contents at 4. in order for a proposition to be available in this sense it need not be eccurrently believed or endorsed by S at &. For example, the proposition "352 + 226 = 578°” is available even though It might never be consciously entertained, Whether ths i best “onderstood as (a) 8 disposition to believe that 352 + 226 = 578 or (b) a second order disposition to form a disposition to believe that 352 + 226 ~ 578 is a matter of detail Uthat ean be put aside: “the second condition is thatthe proposition must be a reason for S att. Now, what males a proposition a reason need not be fleshed aut here. That's @ good thing because the issue is a difficult one and there are many alternative accounts that could be employed by tke infiniist, It is here that infnitism can (but need not) make room for externalist accounts of justification and for @ superventence requirement in which the 186] Chapter Five tio Ta te ™ in : th sit sil te) propo- -eason for e thought salar, and ¢ general offer the tis ques- n> when reason for hhe course nebegging few and is ing. What + arbitrary ‘cular rea~ xgent form ed for a x is not ted fora s. ines that a euler rea~ * and some > be avait Sat i that contents al >ecuerently 578" is this is best cond order er of detail Now, what nig because could be room for which the supervenience base is imited to non-normative facts." For example, some proposi- tion, say p, could be held to be a reason for q iff 1 p is true and it renders q probable; oF 2 p would be accepted as a reason for q in the long run by the appropriate epis- temic conmunitys or 3 P would be offered as a reason for q by an epistemically virtuous individual; or 4 there is cognitive process available to $ which reliably takes true beliefs that p into true beliefS that 9, ‘There are other possible accounts. The point is that whatever the proper account of reasons is, coherentists,fourdationalists, and infnitists will have to employ it because cach view helds that there ate reasons for at least some of our belies, So, this thorny issue can be set aside for the purposes of this essay, Nevertheless, these two conditions make clear what infinitism is committed to and, more important, what it is not committed to. For example, the mere existence of an Infinite set of propositions each of which entails the ext in the series is rot suff cient for there to be the appropriate series of reasons available which could provide the missing credibility. As has been pointed out by others, there will be an in‘inite scties of propositions each entailed by a previous one in the series for every propo- sition. The point is that not just any infinite series of propositions will do, The propo sitians must be available and they must be reasons.” Step 3: Replies to the Best Objections to Infinitism {ris now time examine what | think are the two best objections to infiniti, begin- fing with the oldest. Recall whet Sextus said: ‘The Mode based upon vegrss ad infinitum is that whereby we assert that the thing fdducel as a proof of the mater proposed neces a further proof, and this again another ‘nc 50 on ad infinitum, 50 thatthe consequence is sus pension [of assent. a5 we possess ‘no starting-point For edt argument Now, i? efficacious reasoning required that warrant originate in and be transferred from a baste proposition, this criticism would be just, But for the reasons given above, infinitism eschews such a view, The “starting point” of reasoning i, as Peirce Says: doubt. A proposition becomes questionable and, consequently, it lacks the desired rational credibility. Reasoning scratches the itch, The infinitist holds that Finding a reason for the questioned proposition, and then another for that reason, etc, Places it at the beginning of a series of propositions each of which gains warrant and tational credibility by being part of the series. Warrant increases not because we are getting closer to a basic proposition tut rather decause we are getting further from the questioned proposition, But the Pyrthonist is correct that the infinitis’s con. ception of reasoning precludes assenting to a non-evident proposition, Dogmatisin is |s Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? [a7 incompatible with practicing infinitisio, Warrant, and with it rational credibility, increases as the series lengthens; but the matter is never completely settled. Tn conclusion let me turn to the finite mind objection, Here is what John Williams says: ‘Tue [propose regress of justification of S's belie that p would certaisly require that he hholds an infinite number of beliefs This is psychologically, if not logically, impossible Ife maa can believe an infinite number of things, then there seems to be no reason why rhe cannot know at infinite number of things. Both possibilities contradict the common intution that the buaman mind is finite. Only God could enterain an infinite murnber of belies. But surely Got! is not the only justified believer. (Wiliams, 1981, p. 5) I hope that it is clear how to answer that objection. Infinitism does not require that we “hold” an infinite number of beliefs - if that means that there is some time at which an infinite number of beliefS are occurrent. Infiitism does require that there be an infinite non-repeating set of propositions each of which is an available reason for a preceding one. But some philosophers have suggested that such a set cannot be available. Avdl, for example, writes: Let me suggest one reason to doubt that numan beings are even capable of having infi~ ‘sets 0F beliefs, Consider the claim that we can have an infinite se of arithmetical belies say the 2 15 tice 1, the 4 is tice 2, etc. Surely for @ finite mind there will be some point or other at which the relevant proposition cannot be grasped... and what ‘we cannot grasp we cannot believe. I doubt that any other ines of argument show that wwe can have infinite sets of bellts; nos, if we ean, Is 1 clear how infinite epistemic chains could account for any of our knowledge. (Audi, 1993, pp. 127-8) Let us grant that such @ set is not available to us, OF course, it does not follow that there could not be an infinite set of propositions availale whose members do not increase in complexity. In fact, contra Audi, I think there is a simple argument to show that there is such 2 set Suppose we have a very limited set of concepts or vocabulary: {x is F, red, index- ical “that"}. In other words, we can believe of an object: that is red, Now imagine that there are an infinite number of red objects. We could believe of each object that it is red, Taose are different beliefs because the truth conditions of the propositions affirmed in the beliefs are distinct. ‘Are there an infinite number of red objects? 1 don't know. But that is not neces sary for my argument, All| need to show is Uhat a finite mind can ave access to an infinite number of beliefS. And I have shown that ‘tdi also claims that even if Gere were an infinite series of propositions each of which is available itis not “clear bow infinite epistemic chains could account for any of our knowledge.” Now, if knowledge required actually completing the series, knovl- ‘edge would not be possible, But why suppose that knowledge requires the highest possible degree of warrant or absolutely credible belief? As the series lengthens, warrant and credibility increase. Nothing prevents it increasing to the degree required for knowledge." 138] Chapter Five 2 “ 5 iby, illiams athe sible, why ver of ire that time at a there reason Aud, inf steal Tl be what that ow that ao not nent to index- magine set that ositions neces: stoan zach of for any | knowl } highest athens, quired Notes 1 Sextus Empisicus, Outlines of Pyrrkonism, |, 166-9. 2. For a fourdationalist employing this strategy, see Audi coherentst employing it, see Borour (1985, pp. 18-24) 7 Jone oF these objections as well others, ee treated im more detall in Klein (1998, 2004), (1993, pp. 127-8); for a (formes) 2003, 4. For this use of warrant" Plantingn (1993, p. 3, 5 Atistotle, Posterior Analytics, 73a, 7 Reba, tense of warran-emergentcoherentiem, se Boniour (1988) 7 Reson: ight supply adidonal waran, but these ae o uldimately depend upon ather tno Prepositions for their warrant. Doris could ask what reasons he har ge Detieving Fae guuation othe basic propositions, Feds reply will ete store tae ho reason for believing that conjuretion other than each conjunet” 5 (au Similar argument, see Bondour (198, pp. 9-14). | have discussed this elsewhere se Klein, 1989), & fivest Sosa dlscuses a sitar issue in his 1994 (p. 107) and in the forthcoming “False Jchotomles” to he published hy Oxfon! Univesity Dress in's volume or conference pro- seca otoring Robert Foglin, edited by Waller Simot-Anmstiong hore Aiscussed Sosa’s views in Klein (orthcoming) 10. Thus, infintsin cannot endorse a wanant-tansier view {fits was originally suggested to me by Troy Cross 11 Ido not think the expressions "warrant t ‘etstn” are original with me. But (do ‘Laurence BonJour (1985) distinguishes th {1980}. Sosa also points out thai wacrant-« “formal foundationalism.” Thus, the forms of foundationslism is not origi 12 Emest Sosa (1997) advocates seizing ‘cussed this in Klein [fortheomaing) 13. Mote that PAC and PAA are n Jointly suficient. Atleast “non need to be added in order to Issues see Klein (1971, 1981, 2003}, 14 Tis (i Hporamt because i provides the basis for an answer to the objection thar Grrntism cannot account for the supervenience of the normative ex the non-rormative {iscussel in Goldman (1972), Sosa (1980), and van Cleve (1998, especially pp. 350-1 and 356-1) {5 This objection to infinitism was deveioped in Post (1980, (1387, pp. 84-92). For my reply, sce Kiein (1999, , 312} This potential problem for ransfercolterentism™ or *warrantcemengent cober= ot recall where I first ran across those terme, i (0 types of coherentisiy, as does Eimest Seva ‘mietgent coberentisin is @ Form of what he calls ). asons for sieving is ition such ot it while ¥s further any other fon is not s justified 1g propo- s visual smear on, sre seeing ak that in he is dis- se report stification ach a way ailable to hiis for so available d accept ieving, 1 toSasa believing, ailable to ving that vd cartier, hhink that srovide $ concede, , stronger 2 that he secs & blue smear on a white surface cannot be justified unless the believe ential justitcation for i We would stil! have no argument that a belief er has available (in the stranger sense) an infer Two Problems for Infinitism First problem Hos supzose that the notion of avalability is strengthened in some such way as Pave SugGeset, so as to make it plausible that a belief B2 that is availabe os 2 reason fora belief BI is, not merely a potential reeson, but among the believers actual Feasons for BL. Given that stronger (less easily satisfied) notion of availability, infintise ~ the doctrine that a belief is justified only if the believer hee available an inferential justification for it ~ would face the following question, ihat reason can be given for thinking that any of our beliefs is such that the bellever has availabe in that stronger sense un infinitely ramidyingstracnes ae infer- ental justifications, for thinking that infnitism has not laid on jusifetion oF betier sino urement that [s never (or seldom) actualy met? With regaed to many people ino acquire a basic perceptual belief when they have appropriate perceptual experi- to the eth, Plausble to suppose that, if they entertained the general proposition to the effect that when one has such experience the perceptual heli likely to be arse auld not only believe it but also take this tact general belief to be part OF their reason for their percepiual belie. But is it equally plausible te suppose that Uiey have avalible in that same strong sense stl another belief which ls ree tacit Plausible tha there actually occur jusbfications having te endiesly ramifying strue- Feeatat infinitism says all justifications must kave, the infnitist must rovige rep- ham schemes oF panicular such structures possessed by cognitively. npr framan subjects - examples about which it would be eredible thet cae essentially Uike them actually o¢cur, This would be none too casy to do, i would, of course, be out of the question to specty individually all ofthe links in an endless chain. One can specify an tnfinite series only by providing a general 129 oF fan algorithm for finding « new member of the series no matter hew (nitely) fir the series has alteacy been extended, Such an algorithm would have ta te us, Milt spect Co a sort of belief we are sure is wel justified - eg my belle ay {lone rae inden at my driveway that there isa car there ~ how to construct an endlen _aferendally linked chata of specific premise belies, which is such that kg plausi- fie to think that in the ordinary sort of eireumstance in which (as we think) sueh a belief is Justified. that infinite series of beliefs is avaitele (in the stronger sense) to fre, hltet ofthe beliet. Specifying such an algorithm would be 2 fonnidgble mek fo fact, I am at a toss to see how i¢ could be done. 's Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? [147 Second problem |A more important, deeper problem for infinitism is this: Inference cat Justification, it cat: only transfer it from premises to conclusion. And so it cannot be that, if there actually occurs justification, itis all inferential. Tnferential justification is analogous to instrumental value in this respect. Things have value as means to other things only if ultimately some things have value in themselves and not just as means to other things. The relation x-is-a-means-to-y can only transfer to. whatever value y has; it cannot cveate any value. But there can be no value to be transferred unless ultimately something else, something other than the rmeans-end relation, does create value. Analogously, the relation p-can-be-properiy- can only transfer to p whatever justification q has; it cannot cation, But there can be no justification to be transferred unless if other than the Inferential relation, does ereate ranat originate create any jus ultimately something else, somethin; Justification. Jonathan Dancy (1985, p. 55) puts the point this way: Justification by inference is conditional justification only; [when A is infested from B ‘and C] A's justification is conditional upon the Justification of B and C, But if all justi- fheation is conditional in this sense, then nothing ean be shown to be actually nor conditionally justifies, Klein (1999, p. 313) replies to Dancy's remarks as follows: “The answer is simply that although every proposition is only provisionally justified, that is good enough if one does not insist that reasoning settle matters once and for all” But this reply misses the point. From the denial that reason (or justification) can ever settle matters once ‘and for all it follows only that every justification is provisional in the sense of defen- sible - where a justification is defeasible if itis compatible with the facts F1 consti tuting the justification that there be other facts F2 that defeat the justification, je, F2 and Fl combined would nor justify what PI alone does justify, so that facts F1 justify ‘only provided that, only so long as, no defeating facts F2 turn up. That a justifica- tion is provisional in this sense does not entail that it is inferential, By conditional justification Dancy meaas not provisional, but inferential justification, where the fact that the premise beliefs arc justified and have the inferential relation to the conclu sion explains why the conclusion belief is justified. And the point of the objection is that an endless chain of inferential justifications can never ultimately explain why any link in the chain ts justified. ‘Consider another analogy, between acceptable infercace and justification on the one hand and deductively valid inference and truth on the other, Deductively valid inference preserves, but does not ereate, truth, If « set of premises are true then the property of truth will be “teansferred” to any conclusion validly deducible from them. But, given chain of propositions that are linked by the dedvctive relation, there is nothing in that relation itself that contributes to making any of those propositions true, no matter bow extended the chain might be. ‘Analogously, acceptable inference preserves justification: if one has justification {for believing the premises then one has justification for believing anything one rec- 148] Chapter Five originate cannot be ct. Things 2 value in s-to-y can ere can be vr than the -properiy- it cannot red unless loes create fiom 8 all just ly non- simply that vugh if'one eply misses, atters once 1 of defea- FL consti- lion, ie. F2 SFI justify a justifica conditional cere the fact the eonela objection is xplain why tion on the tively valid ue then the from them. | on, there is, | sropositions justi rng one rec~ gnizes as acceptably inferable from them, But, given a chain of beliefs linked by ecceptable inference, there Is nothing in the inferential relation itself that contuibutes to making any of those beliefs justified. nothing that explains why any of them is Justified: and this is so no matter how extended the chain might be, References Dancy, J. (1885) Jatroduction to Contemporary Epistemalogy. Oxford: Biackwel &lcin, (1999) Human knowledge and the infinite regress of reasons. Ia. & Totaberlin (ed), Phitesophicol Perspectises, 13 (Epistemology). Oxford: Blackwell Reply to Ginet Peter Klein Let me begin by thanking Carl Ginet. He has helped me to see more clearly where infunitism and finitism can agree, and where and why they diverge. First, [will list the areas where fnitists and infinitists can agree, Second, an arca where I believe agreement can be reached. Third, 1 will discuss some remain- ing areas of disagreement and attempt to defend infinitism. Finally, 1 will condude with a brief remark about the basic difference between the two views. Cw ist Areas of Agreement between the Infinitist and the Finitist ALA bolie is jusited for S when epistemic ratiouality “would not forbid it (Ginet, p. 140)" A2 Thete ate some belies that require having reasons in order 10 be actually justified for 8. Those reasons must be availabe to S, and at least ust “motivate” the belief (Gine, p. 145}. he process of giving reasons for a belle! comes 10m end in actual circumstances, ‘ani what's more, the cannons of epistemic rationality do not requite thet further reasons motivate the belie in order for it to be at least partially act Susie, hotaing pine of the those reasous “Th ally ‘Ad Ina slightly extended use of “reason” such things as perceptual states, memories, or lunlerstanding the meaning of an expression are reasons that ean make a belief at least partially justified, In the case discussed by Ginet, "ne good seeson could be asiven for saying that... am unreasonable to believe that | see 2 blue smear on a wile surface” (Ginet, pe 142) 's Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? [149] An Area of Potential Agreement ‘Terms like “reasonable” or “justified” are comparative. It might be more reasonable far S* to believe that p than it is for S to believe that p. Thus, in granting (in Aa) that $ fs not unreasonable in believing p, it does not follow that S* could not be more reasonable in believing that p, For example, if § has reasons for believing that p and 5° has those reasons plus some additional ones, then $" is more reasonable in believ- ing that p than S is in believing that p. Areas of Disagreement Primaty areas of disagreement concern the ability of finitism to solve the regress problem and the manner in which warrant originates and is transferred. The fisitst hholds that some belief, say the belief that there is a blue smear on a white surface, is autonomously warranted for me in virtue of (1) the visual experience of it being ‘as if there is a blue smear on a white susface in good light a few feet in front of ine and (2) the absence of any reason for believing that the visual experience is not veridical. The warrant that azises in such a fashion is transmitted to other beliefs by inference. ‘An infinitist should point out that even if watrant or justification could arise in ‘that fashion and subsequently could be transferred by inference, such an account of warrant will not provide a basis for addressing the regress problem, i.e. to correctly describe how reasoning can increase the warrant for a proposition, say p. Why is p held to be true? A reason, say b, #8 provided. Simplifying: matters, suppose b were autonomously warranted. The finitist claims that no further reason for b is required in order for $ to be epistemically rations! in holding p. The infinitist should respond in two ways: i) The infinitist is not denying that b is actually justified to some degree or that p is justined by b to some degree. The infinitist is claiming that $ would be better justified in believing p on the basis of believing b, if $ also had a further reason for holding b. Such a reason is that b-type propositions are likely to be ‘ue in virtue of, say, general truths about the causal history of beliefs with b- type contents. {ii IP it is ageved that S is better off epistemicalty when S bas 2 reason for believ- ing that b-type propositions are likely to be tru, then the inflitist will point foul that the regress of warrant-producing reasons does not stop at b, Infinitis ‘can explain how the warrunt of b-type propositions, and hence p-type propo- sitions, ean be increased in ways that cannot be explained by the finitist Further, were the finitist to concede that warrant can be augmented for “basic” ‘propositions by further teasoning, then on what basis can the fiitist deny that reasoning can produce warrant in the first place? “The finitist will probably demur here for two reasons, First, it will be clatmed that for ‘any proposition, p, there will always be another proposition such that if S Tailed to 150] Chapter Five easonable vg fin AA} tbe more fat p and in believ- he regress The fiitist te surface, of it being nn front of ance is not beliefs by ld arise in account of | o correctly Why is p ose B were is required Ud respond syee or that 5 would be a further likely to be lef with b> for beliew- 4 will point >. tnfiisism type propo- the finitst for “basie™ st deny that ‘ned that for 7 Tailed t0 believe it and S* did believe it, S* would be better warranted than Sin believing that p (Ginet, pp. 145-6). Thus, it is too easy to increase the warrant of a belief. Second, there comes a poirt fv our reasoning where we cannot imagine what the next rene In the chain of beliefs could be (Ginet, p. 147) ‘There is some tersion between these va claims for if one car give e general recipe for constructing a further reason in every case, then iti easily imaginable how the chain could continue. Nevertheless, the inintist should reject both claims, The first claim rests on providing a general recipe for constructing a furthee season for any proposition, say p. Ihave discussed similar objections elsewhere and poisted out tht it isnot sutficient that there be such a proposition that ean serve as @ reason for pit must also be “avaable" to S {see Klein, 1999, p. 311-12) But Ginet’ objec. {on isnot so easily handled. He asks us to consider any proposition, p, and conety points out that tere will be another propasition avetabl (inte sence that its appee, Priately hooked up with S's beliefs) chat is such that if § were not to believe le would not be as well justified as 5* would be were S* to believe it ‘That proposition is [p v (q & ~q)}. But it should be recalled that according to infinitism there are at Jeast two necessary conditions of justification: () the Principle of Avotding Arbi. trariness (PAA), which generates an infinite series of propositions; and {i) Ihe Prins ciple of Avoiding Cliculrity (PAC), which blocés circular reasoning, PAC wos not tne Primary concern of Gine!s response, because he grants that coherentisa is rot the correct view of warrant. Nevertheless, it is that second principle which is of use here, PAC is forall propositions, x, if x 3 warranted for a person, 5. att then for al , ify i in the reason-ancesty of x for Salt then x is notin the reaon-ancestey of y for $ att. Now, since Ip v (q ~ql is equivalent to p,a chain wih inched the former as an ancestor of the latter would violate PAC. Hence, § fs not better justified in believing p were S also to believe that fp v {q & ~ql}; but were § not to believe Ib v {q & ~g)], then $ would not be as well justified in believing that p. In other words, not believing an equivalent proposition can lower the degree of jutineation, but believing it cannot increase the justtieation Now to the second claim. (inet suggests that there is @ process such that no further reasons could be given point in the reason giving With regard to many people who acquires basic perceptual beet when they have app10- late perceptual experience, it may be plausible ca suppose that, if they entertained the Several proposition to the effect that when one has such experience the perceptual beliet is likely to be true, taey would not only believe it but also take this tact general belie? {0 be part of their reason for their perceptual belief. Buti it equally plausible ta suppose that dhey have available in that same strong sense still another belief which Is their tact reason for holding that tact general belie?” What would it be? And what would be their tacit reason for that tacit reason? (Gite, 9. 147) Recall the types of tact reasons that have been adduced for holding, the tacit general belief. Descartes was faced with just this problem in the Meditations, namely: Do we have any reasons for thinking that our perceptual equipment typically yields the truth? We know his tyne of answer: there are a priori reasons available that show that the cquipment is reliable, The currently more fashionable type of answer is based upon |s Infinitism the Solution to the Regress Problem? —_[15: 4 posteriori reasoning involving mechanisms posited by evolutionary biology: Ths. 1 suggest itis easy to Imagine how the reasoning cou! continue because we have oot exaraples of such reasoning, Will reasoning in support of fat tlt reason lti= ately beg the question? I don’t believe it need do so and have argued for tha else- where (see Klein, forthcoming. Basic Difference: Reasoning Can Originate Warrant For Ginet, and many cpistemologists, the primary reason for sejecting infinitism Js thet itis committed to the view that all warrant originates by inference (see Klein, 1999, pp. 310-11), ‘A more important, deeper problem for infintism i tls: inference cannot originate jus Hleation, it ean only transfer i ftom premises to cotcusion. And so it cannot be thet, if there actually occurs jastifcation, 1 is ail inferential (Ginet, p. 46) “This objection would be conctusive if inferential justification were correctly construed fas Ginet suggests) as analogous to instrumental value. Just as there must be non- instrumentally valued objects, there must be non-ierentially justified belies ut nvfnitism rejeeis (or ought to reject) this analogy’? Infiitisn, like the plus ble versions of coherentism, depicts justification as emerging when the set of propo- Sitions that are appropriately adduced ss reasons expands. Of course, were the Foundationafit to insist on thinking of warrant as originating, in some propositions dd then being transferred by inference to other prepositions, he of she would be degging the question at hand. For i that very concept of warrant that infiniti js challenging.” Notes All references to Ginet refer to his *lairitism Is not the Solution tthe Regress Problem” this volume. 2. Ginet rightly criticizes my response to Dancy’s objection on this point. ¥éld not see Cel at that stage In the development of infinitismt that it must ject the analogy. have ted to correc that it Klein (fortncomaing). 4 twish to thane Anne Ashbaugh, Alvin Goldman, and Emest Sosa for their discussions thot the issues in this essay References icin, P, (1999) Human knowledge and the infinite egress of reasons, Philosophical Perspee- tives, 13, 299-332, icin P forthcoming) Skepticism: ascent and assent, In J. Greco (ed), Philosophers and Thee Critics, Oxford: Blackwell Chapter Five i \ >ey. Thus, swe have ason ulti- ‘that else- finitism is see Klein, ste jus be that, construed tbe non iefs, he plau of propo: were the positions would be infinitism + Prablen see clearly have teed sions about a} Perspee- ond Thetr Reply to Klein Carl Ginet 1 Fred and Doris te Kleins dialogue between Fred and Doris, foundationalist Fred doesnt do as well 4 | think he should, Let me revisit the scene and try to give him some help. Let the proposition that Fred has asserted be Lite Benny has been in the living room with blue paint on his hands Poris asks Fred why he thinks this is so and Fred answers: There's a blue smear on the wall Aud Doris asks Fred why he thinks that is so and Fred replies by asserting, among other things (uch as that he has just come into the living room), the flowing, (©) J sce a blve smear on a white surface right in front of me If Doris has the temerity to ask Fred wy he thinks tha is so, Fred could with some ste reply, “What do you mean? Didn't you hear me? I said see it right in front Stare” But Fre isa parent as wel! as an epstemologist, and has leaned to be pation with insatisble askers of "Why?" So he instead says, “1 have no reason for thinking {hat T see a blue smear on a white suefae, in the sense of a premise from whiches infer t but itis eminently reasonable of me, as it would be of anyone, to think "see such a thing when, as is the case, 1am prompted to do so by the fact thet {C) My visual experience is as il see such a thing and 1am aware of no reason to think that my visual experience might in this case be misleading me, Boris row asks Fred whether, if he is indeed being reasonable in believing P in ci. eens G. Hsn't he also obliged to believe both of the fatlowing two propositions (Should he entertain ther)? IRD) When € obtains, iis likely to be true that I see @ blue smear on a vite surface (2) C does ebtain ai isu i only because these beliefs are available to him as (good) reasons for believe ing P that he is justified in believing P? | would advise Fred to reply as follows. 1 do believe Ri and R2 {now that t con- Sicer thet) and { see that their truth provides reason to believe P. And it would be “nasonable of me not to do this, wile still believing P and thinking my doing so Inia me Sluion othe Rares eben? [1s] ee to be justified. An equally good reason for believing P would be constituted by R? togettier with {R1") When € obtains, it is resonable for me €0 believe that | see 8 lve smear om 8 white surface. {am not persuaded, however, thatthe availability of either of these easos for believ- i ing P constitutes my actual reason for believing P, But let that pass. Let us supposs, | for the sake of this discussion, that the availability of justified belief in, say, RI” and R2 was my reason for believing P and hence constituted (at least part of) my Just | fication for believing it. I Doris now asks Fred whether, if he is justified in believing RI* and R2, he mus! I rnot have available further beliefS as reasons for those beliefs. If he were to Aisten to I ime, Fred would respond as Follows. No. L need a0 premise from which (o infer RI*, This is because RI is @ basic « \ prior’ prinlple constitutive of the concept of justinication fr belief in @ perceptual { ropasiton like: ti a peinciple such that understanding it regutes accpting it Nor do | need a premise from which to infer R2. This is because the folowing is : a busie« prior! principle constitutive of the consspt of justification for @ conscious: state proposition like R2: (83) When C obtains and one is prompted by that Fact ro believe that C obtains, then that beie is justified | i Te follows ftom this principe that, given that my belie that € obtains is prompted by the fat that € obtains. Lam justified in that belie, whether oF not T have available | enter belets that support it. Ic is clear that R3 could aot serve as a premise in an i dierence justifying belie in R2 (hat C obtains), because the other premise would | have to be R2! R3 is not part of an inferential justification { have for believing that | Cabtsing but rather the basic principle of justification that entails that fam non iaferentaily justified in believing that C obtains by the fact that my belief is prompted by Cs obtaining, So the lesson | draw from my version of the dialogue is that inferential jusifica- tion of perceptual beliefs need not regress further than non-fnferentally justified bel {or available belief] in conscious-state propositions like R2 and self-evident principles Of justification like RI". 2 Inferentialism Drives Out Infinitisrn? | bo he at pat of Kins say hing ke a ring wm. On p37 Kins “The lnfinitist holds that finding 2 reason forthe questioned proposition, and then another ' for that reason, ete. places It at the beginning of a series of propositions each of which fins warrant and rational eebiity by being part of tv ses, Wasant creases wot eeause we are geting closer to a Basie proposition bat rather because we are getting 764] Chapter Five stituted by R2 os for beliew- et us suppose, 1, say, RIT and of) my justi 4 R2, he must sre to listen t0 1" is a basie @ 1g perceptual accepting it xe following Is ora conscious obtain, then is prompted by have available premise in an premise would believing that hat (2m noo- ief is prompted ential justifica “justified belief ident principles 7 Klein says: {then another ach of which Increases not ve are getting further from the questioned proposition Wasrant, and with it rational credibility, Increases asthe series lengthens ‘And in hs last paragraph, in response to Audi's remark that even If there were an infinite series of propositions each of which is available, itis not “clear how infinite

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