1

Cabansag vs. Fernandez [GR L-8974, 18 October 1957]

First Division, Bautista Angelo (J): 9 concur

Facts:
Apolonio Cabansag filed on 13 January 1947 in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint seeking the ejectment of
Germiniana Fernandez, et al. from a parcel of land. The case was set for hearing on 30 July 1947. The hearing was postponed to 8
August 1947. On that day only one witness testified and the case was postponed to 25 August 1947. Thereafter, three incidents
developed, namely: (1) a claim for damages, (2) issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which was set for hearing on 23 March
1948, and (3) alleged contempt for violation of an agreement of the parties approved by the court. Pleadings were filed by the parties on
these incidents. Partial hearings were held on various dates. On 9 December 1952 when the court, Judge Pasicolan presiding, issued
an order suggesting to the parties to arrange with the stenographers who took down the notes to transcribe their respective notes and
stating that the case would be set for hearing after the submission of the transcript. From 9 December 1952 to 12 August 1954, no
further step was taken either by the court or by any of the contending parties in the case. On 30 December 1953, when President
Magsaysay assumed office, he issued Executive Order 1 creating the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), which
was later superseded by Executive Order 19 promulgated on 17 March 1954. And on 12 August 1954, Apolonio Cabansag, apparently
irked and disappointed by the delay in the disposition of his case, wrote the PCAC a letter copy of which he furnished the Secretary of
Justice and the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Upon receipt of the letter, the Secretary of Justice
indorsed it to the Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, instructing him to require the stenographers concerned to
transcribe their notes in Civil Case 9564. The clerk of court, upon receipt of this instruction on 27 August 1954, referred the matter to
Judge Jesus P. Morfe before whom the case was then pending informing him that the two stenographers concerned, Miss Illuminada
Abelo and Juan Gaspar, have already been assigned elsewhere. On the same date, Judge Morfe wrote the Secretary of Justice
informing him that under the provisions of Act 2383 and Section 12 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, said stenographers are not obliged
to transcribe their notes except in cases of appeal and that since the parties are not poor litigants, they are not entitled to transcription
free of charge, aside from the fact that said stenographers were no longer under his jurisdiction. Meanwhile, on 1 September 1954,
Atty. Manuel Fernandez filed a motion before Judge Morfe praying that Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for an alleged
scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the PCAC to the effect that he, Cabansag, has long been deprived of his land "thru the careful
maneuvers of a tactical lawyer", to which counsel for Cabansag replied with a counter-charge praying that Atty. Fernandez be in turn
declared in contempt because of certain contemptuous remarks made by him in his pleading. Acting on these charges and counter-
charges, on 14 September 1954, Judge Morfe dismissed both charges but ordered Cabansag to show cause in writing within 10 days
why he should not be held liable for contempt for sending the above letter to the PCAC which tended to degrade the court in the eyes of
the President and the people. Cabansag filed his answer stating that he did not have the slightest idea to besmirch the dignity or belittle
the respect due the court nor was he actuated with malice when he addressed the letter to the PCAC; that there is not a single
contemptuous word in said letter nor was it intended to give the Chief Executive a wrong impression or opinion of the court; and that if
there was any inefficiency in the disposal of his case, the same was committed by the judges who previously intervened in the case.
Appearing that the lawyers of Cabansag, Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V. Merrera, had a hand in the writing and remittance of the
letter to the PCAC, Judge Morfe, on 29 September 1954, issued another order requiring also said attorneys to show cause why they
should not likewise be held for contempt for having committed acts which tend to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice. After due hearing, the court rendered decision finding Cabansag and the Merreras guilty of contempt and sentencing them to
pay a fine as stated in the early part of this decision. Cabansag, et. al. appealed.

Issue: Whether Cabansag should be cited for contempt due to the letter he sent to the Office of the President, the language of which
may undermine the reputation and independence of the Courts.

Held: Courts have the power to preserve their integrity and maintain their dignity without which their administration of justice is bound to
falter or fail. This is the preservative power to punish for contempt. This power is inherent in all courts and essential to their right of self-
preservation. In order that it may conduct its business unhampered by publications which tend to impair the impartiality of its decisions
or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, the court will not hesitate to exercise it regardless of who is affected. For, "as
important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the
independence of the judiciary." The reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. However, the freedom of speech and press should not be
impaired through the exercise of the power to punish for contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question are
a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. A judge may not hold in contempt one who ventures to publish anything
that tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him. The vehemence of the language concerning a judge's decision is not alone the
measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the
administration of justice. Even if we make a careful analysis of the letter sent by Cabansag to the PCAC which has given rise to the
present contempt proceedings, it was far from his mind to put the court in ridicule and much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of
those to whom the letter was addressed for, undoubtedly, he was compelled to act the way he did simply because he saw no other way
of obtaining the early termination of his case. This is clearly inferable from its context wherein, in respectful and courteous language,
Cabansag gave vent to his feeling when he said that he "has long since been deprived of his land thru the careful maneuvers of a
tactical lawyer"; that the case which had long been pending "could not be decided due to the fact that the transcript of the records has
not, as yet, been transcribed by the stenographers who took the stenographic notes"; and that the "new Judges could not proceed to
hear the case before the transcription of the said notes." Analyzing said utterances, one would see that if they ever criticize, the
criticism refers, not to the court, but to opposing counsel whose "tactical maneuvers" has allegedly caused the undue delay of the case.
The grievance or complaint, if any, is addressed to the stenographers for their apparent indifference in transcribing their notes. The only
disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating factor of the lodging of the contempt charge by the trial judge is the
fact that the letter was sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While the
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course of action he had taken may not be a wise one for it would have been proper had he addressed his letter to the Secretary of
Justice or to the Supreme Court, such act alone would not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must cause a serious imminent
threat to the administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such act has "a dangerous tendency" to belittle the court or undermine the
administration of justice for the writer merely exercised his constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate
grievance. On the other hand, while the conduct of Cabansag may be justified considering that, being a layman, he is unaware of the
technical rules of law and procedure which may place him under the protective mantle of our constitution, such does not obtain with
regard to his co-appellants. Being learned in the law and officers of the court, they should have acted with more care and
circumspection in advising their client to avoid undue embarrassment to the court or unnecessary interference with the normal course of
its proceedings. Their duty as lawyers is always to observe utmost respect to the court and defend it against unjust criticism and
clamor. Had they observed a more judicious behavior, they would have avoided the unpleasant incident that had arisen. However, the
record is bereft of any proof showing improper motive on their part, much less bad faith in their actuation. But they should be warned
that a commission of a similar misstep in the future would render them amenable to a more severe disciplinary action.
__________________________________________________________________________________

People vs. PerezFACTS:

Isaac Perez while holding a discussion with several persons on political matters uttered the following words "Andthe Filipinos, like
myself, must use
bolos
f o r c u t t i n g o f f W o o d ' s h e a d f o r h a v i n g r e c o m m e n d e d a b a d t h i n g f o r t h e Philippines. Because of such
utterances, he was charged in the CFI of Sorsogon with viola tion of Art. 256 of the RPC which has something to do
with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority. He was convicted.Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
WON Perezs remarks is protected by the constitutional protection on freedom of speech.Or WON the provisions of Act No. 292 should
be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people to peacebly assemble and petition the Government for
redress of grievances.

HELD:
No , it is not. Agreed with the lower court in its findings of facts but convicted the accused for violation of Act No.292 (Section 8).
1
RATIO DECIDENDI:
It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the f r e e d o m o f
speech and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress
o f grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government.
Criticism, no matter how s e v e r e , o n t h e E x e c u t i v e , t h e L e g i s l a t u r e , a n d t h e J u d i c i a r y , i s
w i t h i n t h e r a n g e o f l i b e r t y o f speech,
unless the intention and effect be seditious
.
But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly
and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy o f
the constitution and the laws, and the e x i s t e n c e o f t h e S t a t e .
In this instance, the attack on the Governor -General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There
is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible
with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.In the words of the law, Perez has uttered
seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended toinst igate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious
conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the peoplea g a i n s t t h e l a w f u l a u t h o r i t i e s .
H e h a s m a d e a s t a t e m e n t a n d d o n e a n a c t w h i c h t e n d e d t o d i s t u r b t h e p e a c e o f t h e community and
the safety or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and
may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.

Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels
against theGovernment of the United States or against the Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish
utter or makeany statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in
performinghis duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites
rebelliousconspiracies or which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the
communityor the safety or order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities,
shallbe punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years,
orboth, in the discretion of the court.
___________________________________________________________________________________________

Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,

G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 2006

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as organizations
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and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing
Batas Pambansa No. 880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a
permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the
choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the
message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are
being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered
to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of
the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880
and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and
14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.

Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The
right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is
a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.

However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.

B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the
assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference
to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and
is independent of the content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880
through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country.
After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to
exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied
with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of
maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the
requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa
No. 880 is SUSTAINED.

_____________________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO
VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991

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AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE:
DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE
TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
respondents.

G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A.
OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,

vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO
MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.

PER CURIAM:p

Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking reconsideration of the Court's
decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond
for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.

The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision did not rule as many
misunderstood it to do that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his
arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in the several
petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing
membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of
the people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people not the Court that should repeal, change or modify them.

In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:

1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without warrant, and in relying
on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such
arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested;

2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;

3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions
and subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not
comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
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4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of
Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the
function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the
detainee may be ordered forthwit released.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July
1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in
accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in accordance with law.

There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant
of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which read:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrest has committed it; and

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that,
within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for
being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like
rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes
and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart
from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude. . . .

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized
government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the
time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without
warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen
in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity,
would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this sense
that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e.
adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base
which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized
government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His
arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts that will be shown hereafter.

Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural falls under
Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that
the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be
noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.
 6

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means an
actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11

These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had
been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said
hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988
at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same
information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block
10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian, Laguna. 12

Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for
a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by
circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by
circumstances are: first the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario,
Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon"
was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie
Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.

In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was
found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting
officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor and
hospital management in compliance with the directives of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers who make the arrest, the
Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law
enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have
been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the
requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an information charging double murder
with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case
No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August
1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before
this Court in G.R. No. 84921.

As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and
Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants issued
by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught
in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it
should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court against said petitioners,
thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by
announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of the
authorities.

More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:

1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about the operations of the
CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz
Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view of
this information, the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search
warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted; that when Renato Constantine was then
confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications
equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16
 7

2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August
1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other
members of the rebel group.

3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his
possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found
subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18

4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when
they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them,
subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess
them. 19

5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises
ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject
of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-
Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military
agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied
by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to
their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and
Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received was true and the persons to be
arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the
Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking
member of the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their
arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof
as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former
comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding informations were filed in court
against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military
agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly
performed.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra,
Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted
at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against
the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities
upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the
punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without
limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace
and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this
Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not
evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in
the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. 23

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting
officers are not liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime
of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.

In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses:
that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa,
Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)

 8

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988
where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without
warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the
arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the
Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his
right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the
arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and
freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for
purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.

Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For Espiritu had before arraignment
asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court
a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been provisionally
dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of
men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the
suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II;
that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28
December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police
authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made
promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.

As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and
events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno,
Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an
order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was
granted by the same trial court.

On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13
January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve
the petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bian,
Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in
the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said
Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).

This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them were filed in
court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied
with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.

Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R.
No. still undocketed).

Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
 9

In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the case of Amelia
Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest,
belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their
ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the
records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without warrant,
are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in
compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons
arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or
innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the
merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this Court finds no compelling
reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still
directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant be
tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into and all other appropriate courts are enjoined
to do the same the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as
elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the
detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or
convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not
a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in
these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of
Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the
basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or
palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

___________________________________________________________________________

Schenck v. United States

Brief Fact Summary. The distribution of leaflets using impassioned language claiming that the draft was a violation of the Thirteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) and encouraging people to assert your opposition to the draft was held
not to be protected speech.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The character of every act depends on the circumstances in which it is done. The question in every case is
whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to protect.

Facts. This case is based on a three count indictment. The first charge was a conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917. The
second alleges a conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States. The third count alleges an unlawful use of the mails for the
transmission of unlawful matter. The document in question claims that the draft is a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment of the
Constitution and encourages people to assert your opposition to the draft. The Defendants, Schenck and other publishers of the
leaflets (Defendants), were found guilty on all of the counts.

Issue. Whether the words used in the leaflets are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to protect?

Held. Yes. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. In many places and in ordinary times, the Defendants in saying all that was said in the
leaflets would have been within their constitutional rights. However, the character of every act depends on the circumstances in which it
is done. The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to protect. When a nation is at war, many
things that might be said in a time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men
fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. Therefore, the words used in the leaflets are used in
 10

such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to protect.

Discussion. This case gave birth to the clear and present danger test.

________________________________________________________________________________

GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-27833; 18 APR 1969]
Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of
election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free
speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the
time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-
Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private
individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegation that the
nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only
political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that
the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state,
would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear
as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and
press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being
the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning,
excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The
Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give
their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on
freedom of speech. These are the clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil
consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance
can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing
according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly
established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness
be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably
calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the
constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly explained,
such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merel y to a
clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and
corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect
to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much
less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party
or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the
solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any
candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.

_____________________________________________________________________________

Primicias v Fugoso 80 PHIL 71 (1948)

Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in
Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit
is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part
of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of
 11

the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of
public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927
prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession,
tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or
disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of
Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade,
or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use
of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court
favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our
democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in
cases of national emergency.
_____________________________________________________________________________________

Nelson Navarro, Petitioner vs. Mayor Antonio Villegas, respondent.

FACTS:On February 24, 1970, the petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement of a DemocraticPhilippines, wrote a letter to the
respondent, the Mayor of the city of Manila, applying tohold a rally at Plaza Miranda February 26, 1970, from 4-11pm.On the same day,
the respondent wrote a reply, denying his request on the grounds that,the have temporarily adopted the policy of not issuing any permit
for the used of PlazaMiranda for rallies or demonstration during weekdays due to the events that happenedfrom the past week.On the
same letter, the respondent gave the petitioner an option to use the Sunken Gardennear Intamuros for its rally, and for it to be held
earlier for it to end before dark.The petitioner filed suit contesting the Mayors action on the ground that it violates the petitioners right to
peaceable assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances (ART. 3, sec 1(8)) and of the petitioners right to the equal
protection of thelaw (art. 3, sec. 1).

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents act on denying the request of the petitioner violates the petitioners Right to peaceable
assembly and right to the equal protection of the law.

Held: The right of peaceable assemble is subject to regulation under the police power of the state. The right to freedom of speech and
peaceful assembly, though granted by the Constitution, is not absolute for it may be regulated in order that it may not be in jurious to
the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right of community and society, This power may be exercised under the police power of
the state, which is the power of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,education,
and good order, safety and general welfare of the people.While the privilege of the citizen to use streets and parks for communication
may beregulated in the interest of all, said privilege is not absolute. It must be exercised insubordination to the general comfort and
convenience and in consonance with peace and good order, but it must not guise of regulation be abridged or denied.

_________________________________________________________________________________

Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 ( Nov. 9, 1983),

125 SCRA 553 Political Law Freedom of Speech Primacy of the Constitution over International Law

Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front
gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The
mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also
issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out
that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we adhere to generally accepted principles of international law.

ISSUE: Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution. Whether or not the rallyists should be granted the
permit.

HELD:

I. No. Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed the Vienna
Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the
primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same
time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally
guaranteed rights.
 12

II. Yes. The denial of their rally does not pass the clear and present danger test. The mere assertion that subversives may infiltrate the
ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice. In this case, no less than the police chief assured that they have taken all the necessary
steps to ensure a peaceful rally. Further, the ordinance cannot be applied yet because there was no showing that indeed the rallyists
are within the 500 feet radius (besides, theres also the question of whether or not the mayor can prohibit such rally but, as noted by
the SC, that has not been raised an an issue in this case).

___________________________________________________________________________

Ruiz v Gordon G.R. No. L-65695 December 19, 1983

C. J. Fernando

Facts:

Hector S. Ruiz, Coordinator of Olongapo Citizen's Alliance for National Reconciliation, filed a petition for mandamus against Richard
Gordon to be allowed to hold a parade/march from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle starting at 1:00 P.M.

The Court required the respondents to answer. Respondents replied by stating the request for a prayer rally was received in the Office
of the Mayor and that respondent had repeatedly announced in his regular program on Sunday over the radio (DWGO) and at the
Monday morning flag ceremony before hundreds of government employees that he would grant the request of any group that would like
to exercise their freedom of speech and assembly.

When interviewed on the matter by the Editor-in Chief of the 'Guardian', he mentioned the fact that he had granted the permit of the
petitioner, which interview appeared in the November 22-28, 1983 issue of the said newspaper.

Given these, the respondent prayed for the dismissal of the petition. This was complied with.

Issue: Can the petition be granted?

Held No. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

The Reyes case was given some discussion in the course of this petition as to the role of the judiciary in petitions for permits to hold
peaceable assembles.

"The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time
when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required.
Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.

Thereafter, his decision must be transmmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. They can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of
constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, even more so than on the other departments rests
the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights.

As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus could have been obviated if only petitioner took the
trouble of verifying on November 23 whether or not a permit had been issued. A party desirous of exercising the right to peaceable
assembly should be the one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable
time or, if the day and time was designated for the decision on the request, such party or his representative should be at the office of
the public official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or favorable, should be sent to the
address of petitioner.

Teehankee concurring:

The burden to show the existence of such grave and imminent danger that would justify an adverse action lies on the mayor as the
licensing authority. There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and
 13

present danger. As the Court stated in its Resolution of October 25, 1983 in the J. B. L. Reyes case, "It is essential for the validity of a
denial of a permit which amounts to a previous restraint or censorship that the licensing authority does not rely solely on his own
appraisal of what public welfare, peace or safety may require. To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and
sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test. The possibility that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is
not enough."

As likewise underscored in the J. B. L. Reyes case, the exercise of the right of peaceable assembly is not to be 4 abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place" (at paragraph 6) and "It is the duty of the city authorities to provide the proper police
protection to those exercising their right to peaceable assembly and freedom of expression" (at paragraph 7).

J. Conception concurring opinion

9 In order that public officials may not be charged, rightly or wrongly, with dereliction of duty or abuse of powers in the granting
or denying of such permits, the following guidelines are deemed necessary:

(a) When a peaceful assembly is to be held in a private lot, house, or edifice, only the consent of the owner of the place is necessary.
No permit from the government or any public officer is required.

(b) When an application to hold a rally, parade, or peaceful assembly has to make use of public places like parks, plazas, and streets,
the public authority charged with the duty of granting or denying the permit should also consider the convenience and the right of the
rest of the public to use and enjoy these same facilities.

(c) Conditions of peace and order in the locality should be carefully considered and precautionary steps taken to prevent vandals,
hooligans, provocateurs, and other criminals from turning into a violent one what otherwise should be a peaceful demonstration.

__________________________________________________________________________________

American Communications Assoc. vs. Douds, 339 US 282)

Background

The American Communications Association (ACA) was founded in 1931 as the American Radio Telegraphists Association (ARTA) by
Mervyn Rathbone.[1][2] The union represented telegraphists and radio operators (on land and at sea) in the United States. The union
had previously been involved in a Supreme Court case regarding the use of strikebreakers in strikes (NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938)), which it had lost. In 1937, the union changed its name to the American Communications
Association and affiliated with the newly formed Congress of Industrial Organizations.[3] A majority of the union's members were
strongly left-wing, and most the union's leaders were members of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA)with the union effectively under
the control of the CPUSA.[4]

The United States Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) on June 27, 1935, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt
signed it into law on July 5.[5] In 1947, Congress amended the NLRA by enacting the LaborManagement Relations Act (better known
as the Taft-Hartley Act) on June 23, 1947, overriding President Harry S. Truman's veto.[6] Section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act required
leaders of labor unions to file an affidavit with the National Labor Relations Board affirming that they were not members of the
Communist Party USA and did not advocate the violent overthrow of the United States federal government. [7] If a union had an elected
leader who did not file such an affidavit, that union would lose the protection of the NLRA. [7]

ACA leaders categorically refused to sign the anti-communist affidavits on the grounds that the oaths violated their First Amendment
rights. On October 29, 1947, Charles T. Douds, regional director of the National Labor Relations Board in New York City, barred the
American Communications Association from appearing on an NLRB-supervised union organizing election (its very first action under the
new Taft-Hartley anti-communist oath provisions).[8][9] The ACA sued to have the provision declared unconstitutional as a violation of its
leaders' First Amendment rights.[10]

On June 29, 1948, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held, in a 2-to-1 decision written by Judge Thomas Walter
Swan, that Section 9(h) did not impermissibly impose on union members' First Amendment rights. [11] Attorney Victor Rabinowitz
appealed the case to the Supreme Court.[11] The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 8, 1949.[9] Although the Court
was due to hear oral argument on January 13, 1949, it delayed this in order to take on another case (United Steelworkers of America v.
National Labor Relations Board) with almost identical issues.[10] Argument was rescheduled for February 28, 1949, [10] but did not occur
until October 11 so that both cases could be heard together.

Three of the Court's most liberal justices did not participate in the decision. [12][13] Justice William O. Douglas did not participate because
he had nearly been killed in a horseback-riding accident earlier in the year, and was still convalescing at his home in Arizona.[14]
Associate Justice Tom Clark had been President Truman's Attorney General, and had overseen the prosecution of the ACA.[15]
Although he joined the Court on August 24, 1949, [16] Clark had recused himself to his prior involvement in the case. Associate Justice
Wiley Blount Rutledge, a staunch liberal and strong advocate for civil rights,[17] had died unexpectedly of a stroke on September 10,
1949, at the age of 55.[18] His successor, 59-year-old Sherman Minton, a former Democratic Senator from Indiana and a judge on the
 14

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, was nominated as his replacement on September 16, 1949, but was not sworn
in until October 12.[19] His arrival on the Court came two days after oral argument, and he was not able to participate in the decision. [20]

Decision

Majority ruling

Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson wrote the plurality decision for the majority, joined by Associate Justices Stanley Forman Reed and Harold
Hitz Burton. Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter joined in all but Part VII of the majority opinion.

In Part I of the decision, Vinson first reviewed the relevant language in the Taft-Hartley Act, as well as that language which provided for
processing of affidavits and imposition of penalties in the event no affidavits were filed in the time permitted. [21] He also reviewed the
justification for upholding the constitutionality of the NLRA, which was to remove obstructions to interstate commerce. [22] He also
reviewed Congress' justification for passing the Taft-Hartley Act, which also attempted to remove impediments to interstate
commerceincluding the so-called "political strike," in which "legitimate trade union objectives" were subordinated by the Communist
Party to political objectives.[23]

In Part II, Vinson posed what a plurality of the court believed was the key question: [24]

We are, therefore, neither free to treat 9(h) as if it merely withdraws a privilege gratuitously granted by the Government, nor
able to consider it a licensing statute prohibiting those persons who do not sign the affidavit from holding union office. The
practicalities of the situation place the proscriptions of 9(h) somewhere between those two extremes. The difficult question
that emerges is whether, consistently with the First Amendment, Congress, by statute, may exert these pressures upon labor
unions to deny positions of leadership to certain persons who are identified by particular beliefs and political affiliations.

Part III of the decision addressed Congress' power to prevent political strikes through the Commerce Clause, whether the remedy
designed was reasonable, and whether the threat posed by the Communist Party was so unique in its use of political strikes and in
advocacy of violence that Congress could single it out. Vinson answered all questions affirmatively. [25] Citing In re Summers, 325 U.S.
561 (1945); Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), among others, Vinson
noted that the Constitution often permitted otherwise irrelevant beliefs, personal traits, or employment status to be infringed upon in
certain, limited circumstances.[26]

The question addressed in Part IV of the decision was whether the Communist Party presented such circumstances. The unions had
argued that a "clear and present danger" test be applied to the legislation, as this was a First Amendment issue, but could not agree on
how to do so.[27] Vinson rejected this test as mechanical.[28] But Congress had not concluded in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act that
expressing communist beliefs was a danger; rather, Congress had wished to eliminate impediments to interstate commerce. [29] The
problem with political strikes, Vinson asserted, was that rather than allowing speech to combat speech in the "marketplace of ideas",
strikes constitute force and coercion which Congress has every authority to regulate. [29] One of the unions had argued that political
strikes did not constitute such an imminent danger as to pass constitutional scrutiny, but Vinson rejected this once more as a
mechanical application of an inapt test.[30] Rather, Vinson argued, the Constitution permits infringement of constitutionally protected
rights when a sound truck invades the privacy of the home (Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)), unauthorized parades disrupt traffic
(Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, (1941)), the health of children is at stake (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)), or the
provision of public services is affected (United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947)).[31] Advocating a balancing of interests
and citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878) (an individual's religious beliefs cannot be accepted as proof of a felony act
without evidence of commission of the crime), Vinson instead proposed a balancing test.[32]

Part V of the decision discussed whether political strikes posed such a significant issue as to permissibly infringe on freedom of speech.
Vinson refused to substitute the Court's judgment for the congressional determination that this was the case. [33] In accepting the
authority of government to promote strong unions, Vinson observed, the Court had repeatedly also accepted the authority of
government to infringe in sometimes substantial ways upon individual liberties. [34] The Taft-Hartley Act's penalties, Vinson held, were
not direct infringements on the freedom to speak and thus not as onerous as infringements the Court had approved in the past. [35]
Vinson rejected the suggestion that the statute had not been narrowly drawn. Although legislation could have been enacted which
made political strikes themselves unlawful (rather than require anti-communist affidavits), Vinson asserted that:[36]

...the legislative judgment that interstate commerce must be protected from a continuing threat of such strikes is a permissible
one in this case. The fact that the injury to interstate commerce would be an accomplished fact before any sanctions could be
applied, the possibility that a large number of such strikes might be called at a time of external or internal crisis, and the
practical difficulties which would be encountered in detecting illegal activities of this kind are factors which are persuasive that
Congress should not be powerless to remove the threat, not limited to punishing the act.

Part VI of the decision discussed whether the statute impermissibly targeted the Communist Party as the sole political party seeking the
violent overthrow of the United States government. If the statute had penalized anyone who advocated violent overthrow of the
government, Vinson held, there would be new constitutional doubts raised.[37] But it was the Court's long-held tenet that statutes should
 15

be construed constitutionally wherever possible. [38] Subsequently, Vinson interpreted Section 9(h) narrowly as barring from union office
those who actually advocated overthrow of the government and not those who (for example) believed it would happen without their
assistance.[39] Vinson reiterated that the balancing of interests in Part V had found the infringement on free speech pemissible.[40] But
how did this reconcile with Reynolds v. United States? Because, Vinson said, "Insofar as a distinction between beliefs and political
affiliations is based upon absence of any 'overt act' ... the act of joining the Party is crucial. ... courts and juries every day pass upon
knowledge, belief and intentthe state of men's mindshaving before them no more than evidence of their words and conduct, from
which, in ordinary human experience, mental condition may be inferred." [41]

In Part VII, Vinson address whether Section 9(h) was unconstitutionally vague and/or was a bill of attainder or ex post facto law. Vinson
admitted that, hypothetically, the language of the Act might be construed as vague. But in accordance with the Court's long-held rule,
he construed the Act narrowly and asserted that there was no vagueness. [42] Although the unions had held the Act was a bill of
attainder under United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1867); and Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S.
277 (1867), Vinson observed that these cases punished past actions whereas Section 9(h) punished only future conduct. [42] Nor did the
Act run afoul of Article VI of the Constitution: "...the mere fact that 9(h) is in oath form hardly rises to the stature of a constitutional
objection. All that was forbidden was a 'religious Test.' We do not think that the oath here involved can rightly be taken as falling within
that category."[43]

The judgment of the district court was affirmed.[44]

Concurrence

Associate Justice Felix Frankfurter concurred with the majority opinion except as to Part VII.[44]

Frankfurter argued that constitutional questions should be decided as narrowly as possible.[45] He asserted that "it would make undue
inroads upon the policymaking power of Congress" to deny the government the right to prevent political strikes and disruptions to
interstate commerce so long as it does not do so in an arbitrary way or infringes on unrelated rights. [46]

However, despite his agreement with nearly all of the majority's reasoning in Parts I-VI, Frankfurter held that portions of Section 9(h)
over impermissibly overbroad.[47] Section 9(h) "ask[s] assurances from men regarding matters that open the door too wide to mere
speculation or uncertainty. It is asking more than rightfully may be asked of ordinary men to take oath that a method is not
'unconstitutional' or 'illegal' when constitutionality or legality is frequently determined by this Court by the chance of a single vote." [48]
The safeguards of the judicial system, Frankfurter asserted, were "too tenuous to neutralize the danger" to First Amendment
freedoms.[48]

Section 9(h) simply goes too far, he said, in demanding that an oath taken todayeven if well-considered, sincere, and seriously
undertakenis predictive of all future behavior and belief. [49] "I cannot deem it within the rightful authority of Congress to probe into
opinions that involve only an argumentative demonstration of some coincidental parallelism of belief with some of the beliefs of those
who direct the policy of the Communist Party, though without any allegiance to it. To require oaths as to matters that open up such
possibilities invades the inner life of men..."[50]

Frankfurter acknowledged, however, that only these parts of Section 9(h) were invalid, and he would have remanded the case back to
the district court with instructions for the union officers to obey only those constitutionally sound provisions. [50]

_______________________________________________________________________

United States v. OBrien

Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, OBrien (Defendant), burned his selective service registration certificate and was convicted of
violating a federal statute making it a crime to mutilate the certificate. The Defendant appealed, noting that his act was symbolic
speech and should fall under the protection of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution).

Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case is the basis for the OBrien test: When speech and nonspeech elements are combined in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify the limitations on First
Amendment speech. A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified (1) if it is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) if
it furthers governmental interest, which is (3) unrelated to the suppression of free expression and (4) if the governments interest
outweighs the suppression of speech.

Facts. The District Court convicted the Defendant for violating the statute, and the Court of Appeals Reversed. The Supreme Court of
the United States (Supreme Court) granted certiorari.
 16

Issue. This case considers whether symbolic speech may be suppressed when the actions done in furtherance of the speech are
contrary to governmental interest.

Held. Reversed.
The Supreme Court found that the governmental interest in preserving selective service registration cards outweighed Defendants
interest in making his symbolic speech and that Congress had a legitimate and substantial interest in preventing the destruction of
these cards. Further the court notes that unrestrained destruction of the cards would disrupt the functioning of the selective service
system, which was a greater problem than the abridgment of Defendants rights.

Dissent. Judge William Douglas (J. Douglass) found that the Defendants conviction was not consistent with the First Amendment, if his
speech did not significantly disrupt the rights of others or the interest of the government in regulating selective service.

Discussion. When considering suppression of symbolic speech, the interest of the government may be taken into consideration, if it
outweighs the protection afforded by the First Amendment of the Constitution.

___________________________________________________________________________________

CASE DIGEST : SWS vs Comelec

G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001 SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING
CORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts : Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys
in various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly
reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation, which features news- worthy items of information including election surveys Petitioners brought this
action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates
shall not be published seven (7) days be- fore an election. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout
the period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish
them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results
up to the last day of the elections on May 14,2001

Issue : WON 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press.

HELD : What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of 5.4? The United States Supreme Court, through
Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: [A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of
speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. This is so far the most influential test for
distinguishing content-based from content neutral regulations and is said to have "become canonical in the review of such laws." is
noteworthy that the O 'Brien test has been applied by this Court in at least two cases First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O
'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the
suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication
might undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of
opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other
opinion takers Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting
restriction of free expression is only incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O'Brien test, namely, that the restriction
be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute
pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election
cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the
fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speechbecause
of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils To summarize then, we hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it
imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other
than suppression of freedom of expression.

____________________________________________________________________________

Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110088, 241 SCRA 51 , February 01, 1995

G.R. No. 110088 February 1, 1995

DR. MERLE A. ALONZO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JUDGE DAN VELASCO, and DR. ANGELES VELASCO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
 17

This petition for review on certiorari challenges the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 10504 and its resolution 2
denying the motion for the reconsideration of the decision. The decision affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 11, Davao City, in Criminal Case No. 13698 convicting the petitioner of libel.
The antecedent facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:
From 1984 to 1986, accused Dra. Merle A. Alonzo was the Field Operations Officer of the Philippine Medical Care Commission
(PMCC) for Region XI. On June 13, 1985, accused was directed by Executive Officer of the PMCC, Rossi Castro, to conduct
inspections of Medicare-accredited clinics and hospitals (Exhibit 1). The directive was approved by the Chairman of PMCC, Dr. Pacifico
Marcos; as Special Order No. 73. Among the Medicare-accredited clinics inspected by accused were the Sto. Nio Medical Clinic in
Astorga, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, and Our Lady of Fatima Medical Clinic in Guihing,Hagonoy, Davao del Sur (ExhibitsE,E-1,andF).
The clinics were owned and managed by complainant Dra. Angeles Velasco, married to Judge Dan Velasco of the MTC-Hagonoy,
Davao del Sur. After the inspection, accused submitted her report on her findings to Dr. Jesus Tamesis, PMCC Vice-Chairman. The
report reads as follows:
Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis
Vice Chairman PMCC
Sir:
The folder of the Sto. Nio Medical Clinic and that of Our Lady of Fatima both owned and managed by Dra. Angeles Fe [sic] Velasco is
not accompanied by the standard SIR because of time pressure since I inspected it at past four in the afternoon. My purpose was to
invite the physicians in the area to the forthcoming July 7 medical meeting. However, after checking the physical plant, I discovered that
it was too small for a 50 bed hospital. I therefore proceed[ed] to the actual inspection which revealed the following:
GSIS 0
SSS 14
Non Medicare 1

Total 15
Again almost all of the charts with IVF and parenterals were not noted in the nurses' progress notes as either inserted, refused,
deferred or consumed.
1. Marcial, Emma # 699 admitted June 25, 1985.
2. Gelvero, Anita # 690 admitted June 21, 1995.
I therefore attach the written statement of the above 2 female patients. See attached brown paper in Bisaya[n]. There were five other
patients who had similar findings but they refused perhaps out of fear. This is the third time I found Dra. Velasco to be practicing this
kind of giving Doctors' order and should be stopped thru the following:
1. Demand all purchase receipts of IVF and drugs.
2. Require that she keep an inventory of all medicines use for medicare patients.
3. To modify her charting of meditation sheet.
4. More intensive inspection especially after 6:00 p.m.
5. Monitor all filed claims whether IVF refused or not [sic] inserted were later on claimed.
The couple is treatening [sic] me with libel according to the Davao del Sur PHA grapevine and it puzzles me how and why?
The other folder that of the Sto. Nio has the following violations:
1. Classified as Secondary by the MOH which should not be.
2. 7 charts are those who were not physically present on inspection.
3. The clinic is not manned by a physician at night.
In all, this particular clinic should be closely monitored because, aside from the above mentioned violations, the husband is a judge and
it gives them a certain amount of "untouchability". In fact, they make court suits their pasttime.
(SGD.) MERLE A .ALONZO, M.D.
FOO, Region XI
(Annex C, Exhibit B, Emphasis ours)
On the basis of said report and other documents, Executive Director Rossi Castro, on October 15, 1985, filed a complaint with the
PMCC against the Sto. Nio Medical Clinic for "Misrepresentation by Extending Confinement of Patients, Misrepresentation by Claiming
for Non-Existing Patients, Breach of Warranty of Accreditation" (Exhibit B).
On January 6, 1986, complainant Dra. Angeles Velasco received summons from the PMCC, together with attached complaint and
annexes, which included the report of accused (Exhibit A). Thereupon, after reading the papers, she went to see her husband, Judge
Dan Velasco, at the latter's office at Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, and showed him the same. Finding that the last portions of the report to
be libelous, complainant Judge Velasco and complainant Dra. Angeles Velasco went to see their lawyer Atty. David Montaa at the
latter's office in Quimpo Building, Rizal St., Davao City. Since Atty. David Montaa was out, the complainants entrusted the summons
and the complaint with annexes, contained in a folder with Atty. Paquito Balasabas whose office was adjacent to that of Atty. Montaa,
with the request that Atty. Balasabas deliver the folder to Atty. Montaa. Atty. Balasabas examined the documents and read them. 3
Dr. Velasco and her husband, Judge Dan Velasco, then filed a complaint for libel against the petitioner with the Office of the City Fiscal
of Davao City and, after preliminary investigation, Assistant City Fiscal Raul Bendigo filed the corresponding information for libel against
the petitioner with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City; which docketed it as Criminal Case No. 13698.
After due trial, the trial court promulgated on 19 November 1990 its decision finding the petitioner "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) crimes of libel, penalized under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged," and sentenced her "to pay a fine of
P1,000.00; for each crime; pay Dr. Angeles Te-Velasco and Judge Dan U. Velasco P5,000.00 each for moral damages; and to pay the
costs." 4
The trial court found defamatory the statement in the last paragraph which read: "the husband is a judge and it gives them certain
amount of 'untouchability.' In fact, they make court suits their pasttime." The trial court said that this statement "conveys the meaning
that Judge Velasco abuses his powers and authority as a judge thus enabling him and his wife to violate the law with impunity and even
 18

'make court suits their pasttime [sic].'" Regarding the requirement of publication, it held that there was sufficient publication of the
petitioner's subject report when she sent it to Dr. Tamesis. Thus:
In the instant case, although the letter was contained in a closed envelope, the accused sent it to Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis, a person other
than the complainants (Dr. Angeles Te Velasco and Judge Dan U. Velasco), thus parting with its possession with the intention that it be
read, as it was read, by Dr. Tamesis. There was, therefore, sufficient publication.
The trial court rejected the petitioner's defense that her report was a privileged communication and that she could not be held liable for
libel because "[t]here is evidence on record that she begrudged and bore the complainant's ill-will for not extending to her a loan of
P1,500.00 and for refusing to bear the vacation expenses of her children at the Davao Insular Hotel, the most expensive hostelry in
Davao City."
Unable to accept the judgment and insisting upon her innocence, the petitioner appealed from the judgment to the Court of Appeals
which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No. 10504.
In its decision of 29 January 1993 affirming the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeals conceded that the subject report of the
petitioner was a "qualified privileged communication" under the first paragraph of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code but held that
the privilege was lost because of proof of actual malice.
In the report, when appellant made the derogatory imputations, the same conveyed the clear meaning that Judge Velasco, husband of
Dra. Angeles Velasco, abuses his power and authority as judge, thus enabling him and his wife to violate the law with impunity and
even make court suits their pasttime. The derogatory remarks were obviously made out of ill-will or revenge, in view of the rumored
threat of libel from the complainants according to the Davao del Sur PHA grapevine. Thus, malice in fact is present, as there is intent to
injure the good name of persons without justifiable motive, making the communication actionable.
The petitioner's claim that her report was necessary as she was required to submit the same after inspection and that "her intention was
to convey the possible consequences she may suffer due to the said investigation as well as any difficulties the Commissioner may
encounter in pursuing legal action against the erring clinics and its owners" was rejected by the trial court.
There could be no question that the reporting of the irregularities was in pursuance to a legal duty, for which appellant could not be held
liable. But the report was not confined to such reporting called for by
duty; it included derogatory, imputations against complainants which are absolutely without relevancy and pertinency to the subject
matter of the investigation and report as directed in Special Order 73. The report even went to the extent of maligning the judge who
had nothing to do with the operation of the clinic.
xxx xxx xxx
Any alleged difficulty that the Commission may encounter in the pursuit of its legal action against the erring clinic, is purely conjectural
and speculative; and if at all there be such difficulty, it is not appellant's business to deal with but the Commission's exclusive affair.
Her motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioner filed the instant petition and in seeking a reversal of the challenged
decision, she claims that the Court of Appeals:
I. . . . ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ON THE BASIS OF ITS FINDING, THERE WAS PUBLICATION OF THE SUPPOSED
DEROGATORY REMARKS.
II. . . . ERRED IN DEEMING THE MARKS IN QUESTION TO BE DEROGATORY.
III. . . . MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN JUDGING THAT THE PRIVILEGED NATURE OF THE REPORT HAS BEEN LOST BY PROOF OF
ACTUAL MALICE; THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT'S FINDING OF ACTUAL MALICE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Put more simply, the primordial issue raised in this petition is whether the questioned report of the petitioner to Dr. Tamesis is libelous.
Libel is defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code as follows:
Art. 333. Definition of libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act
or omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation then to be libelous, the following requisites must concur:
(a) it must be defamatory;
(b) it must be malicious;
(c) it must be given publicity; and
(d) the victim must be identifiable. 5
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory and, under the general rule laid down in Article 354, every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true; if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is
malice when the author of the imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure
the reputation of the person who claims to have been defamed. 6 Truth then is not a defense, unless it is shown that the matter charged
as libelous was made with good motives and for justifiable ends. Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code provides, in part, as follows:
Art. 361. Proof of truth. In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it appears that the
matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendant shall
be acquitted.
However, malice is not presumed and must, therefore, be proved, under the following exceptions provided for in Article 354, viz.:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks; of any judicial legislative or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
The privileged character of these communications is not absolute, but merely qualified since they could still be shown to be malicious
by proof of actual malice or malice in fact. 7 The burden of proof in this regard is on the plaintiff or the prosecution. 8
Publication means "to make public; to make known to people in general; to bring before the public." 9 Specifically put, publication in the
law of libel means the making known of the defamatory matter, after it has been written, to some person other than the person of whom
it is written. If the statement is sent straight to a person whom it is written there is no publication of it. 10 The reason for this is that [a]
 19

communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem. A
man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others hold him. 11
It is undisputed that the petitioner, as Field Operations Officer for Region XI of the PMCC, is a public officer and that she submitted the
questioned report after she had conducted the inspection of the two clinics of Dr. Velasco pursuant to and by virtue of the directive of
the Executive Officer, Atty. Rossi Castro, which was duly approved by the Chairman of the PMCC, Dr. Pacifico Marcos, as Special
Order No. 73 12 under which she was to submit a report. Her authority to conduct the inspection and to submit the corresponding report
were not questioned by the private respondents. In her direct examination, Dr. Velasco categorically admitted this official authority and
duty of the petitioner. Thus:
ATTY. MONTANA:
xxx xxx xxx
Q You mentioned that at the time she was one of the inspectors, inspector of what?
A Philippine Medical Care Commission.
Q As such, therefore, she has the right and duty to inspect medical clinics?
A She was assigned to inspect my clinic and as a matter of fact all clinics in Davao del Sur and Region XI.
COURT:
Q And also in Region 10?
A Yes, Sir.
ATTY. MONTANA:
Q When you were referring to Dra. Merle Alonzo, the accused in this case, having authority to inspect all medical clinics in Davao del
Sur, you are referring to medical clinics accredited with the Philippine Medical Care Commission?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, will you please tell the Honorable Court the procedure of the Philippine Medical Care Commission regarding matters over which
it exercises its jurisdiction on inspections? In other words, why it be inspected by the Philippine Medical Care Commission?
A These field inspectors are assigned to inspect clinics in order to see to it that clinics are properly following rules and regulations of the
Philippine Medical Care Commission. 13
It is precisely because of such authority that the Court of Appeals conceded that her questioned report was a qualified privileged
communication under the first paragraph of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code. There can then be no doubt that the petitioner made
her report in the exercise of her official duty or function. She rendered it in due course to her superior who had a duty to perform with
respect to its subject matter and which the latter faithfully did by filing the appropriate complaint against Dr. Velasco after an evaluation
of the report.
In Deao vs. Godinez, 14 we held:
Indeed, the communication now denounced by plaintiff as defamatory is one sent by defendant to his immediate superior in the
performance of a legal duty, or in the nature of a report submitted in the exercise of an official function. He sent it as an explanation of a
matter contained in an indorsement sent to him by his superior officer. It is a report submitted in obedience to a lawful duty, though in
doing so defendant employed a language somewhat harsh and uncalled for. But such is excusable in the interest of public policy.
In the said case, we affirmed the dismissal by the trial court of a complaint for damages arising from an allegedly libelous indorsement
sent by Godinez, a district supervisor, to the Division Superintendent of Schools, his immediate superior, by way of an explanation of an
alleged confusion concerning a dental-medical report wherein Godinez stated that Deao, the school dentist, "is a carping critic, a fault-
finder and suspects every teacher or school official to be potential grafters and swindlers of the medical-dental funds, and that "she did
more harm than good to the teeth of the patients she treated."
We thus fully agree with the Court of Appeals that the report falls within the first paragraph of Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code.
Consequently, the presumption of malice or malice in law was negated by the privileged character of the report. The privilege may only
be lost by proof of malice in fact. It is, nevertheless, settled that "[a] privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over
privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides." 15
Tested under these principle, we disagree with the conclusion of the trial court that malice in fact was duly proved in this case since the
petitioner "was moved by ill-will" because Dr. Velasco did not grant her "a loan of P1,500.00" and refused "to bear the vacation
expenses of her children at the Davao Insular Hotel, the most expensive hostelry in Davao City." This conclusion is purely conjectural
for, as a matter of fact, Dr. Velasco herself was uncertain if these incidents indeed incited the petitioner. Thus, in answer to her
counsel's question as to the possible motive why the petitioner submitted an "untruthful" report to the PMCC, Dr. Velasco candidly
declared:
Perhaps Dra. Alonzo was angry because I was not able to give what she demanded first, when she wanted her children to be taken to
Davao for a vacation and secondly, when she asked P1,500.00 and I was only able to produce P500.00. So maybe that was the cause
why she was mad at me and she made that report. 16
Dr. Velasco's deliberate use of the words perhaps and maybe clearly conveyed her incertitude. It must also be stressed that her
aforesaid testimony regarding the petitioner's motive was not directed on the portions of the report which the trial court considered
derogatory as earlier adverted to, but an the "untruthful" report of violations. The specific question to which the above answer of Dr.
Velasco was made reads as follows:
ATTY. MONTANA:
Q You claimed before this Honorable Court that the facts contained in the charges against your medical clinic, the Sto. Nio Medical
Clinic, contained in Exhibit "B" which was duly served to you by way of summons also identified as Exhibit A are not true, th e basis
precisely, after reading this complaint, seems to hinge on the report of the accused to the Medical Care Commission for certain
violations, enumerated in Exhibit C. Will you please tell the Honorable Court, since these are not true, what motivated, to your way of
understanding, what motivated the accused to make this, according to you, untruthful report to the Commission? 17
Moreover, the petitioner denied the factual basis for the speculation of Dr. Velasco. Thus:
ATTY. ALDEVERA:
 20

Q Dr. Alonzo, the complainant Dr. Te-Velasco also testified that you borrowed P500.00 from her, is that true?
A That is not true.
ATTY. ALDEVERA:
We reform.
Q According to complainant you borrowed the amount of P1,000.00 and you received only P500.00 is that true?
A Not true.
Q What does this amount represent?
A For the payment of the dress she got from me.
Q When Dr. Te-Velasco testified here in Court she said that you requested her that your children Stay at the Davao Insular Hotel, what
do you say to this testimony of Dr. Velasco?
A Not true. 18
She also denied that she purposely accompanied the private respondents to Manila to help them secure the accreditation of their clinic
in Guihing, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur, and that she stayed with them at the Camelot Hotel in Quezon City. According to her, she has her
own rented house in Quezon City. 19
Nor can we agree with the differing conclusion of the Court of Appeals that "the derogatory remarks were obviously made out of ill-will
or revenge, in view of the rumored threat of libel from the complainants according to the Davao del Sur PHA grapevine." For one, this
only shows that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not agree on what the basis for the motive of the petitioner should
be. For another, as indicated above, the private respondents themselves focused their minds and hearts on the untruthfulness of the
violations indicated in the petitioner's report. Finally, the statement on the threat of a libel charge was evidently based on a rumor (from
the grapevine) which we, nevertheless, find to be relevant to the report since it serves to forewarn the petitioner's superiors of the risks
she and they might meet as a consequence of her report on the violations and to emphasize the need for PMCC's firmness and
courage to pursue the appropriate charges as may be warranted in the premises.
All told then, the prosecution in this case was unable to prove malice in fact.
Finally there was, in law, no publication of the questioned report. The rule is settled that a communication made by a public officer in the
discharge of his official duties to another or to a body of officers having a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the
communication does not amount to a publication within the meaning of the law on defamation. 20
There was also no publication when Atty. Balasabas, a third person, read the complaint against Dr. Velasco and the report of the
petitioner attached thereto. The private respondents entrusted these documents to Atty. Balasabas with the request that he give them
to their counsel, Atty. David Montaa. Where the plaintiff himself communicated or by his acts caused the communication of the libelous
matter to a third person, there was no actionable publication. 21
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 10504 is hereby
REVERSED and petitioner DR. MERLE A. ALONZO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
_____________________________________________________________________________

CASE DIGEST : Ledesma Vs Ca

G.R. No. 113216 September 5, 1997 RHODORA M. LEDESMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. MAXIMIANO C.
ASUNCION, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Quezon City, respondents

Facts : Sometime in April 1992, a complaint for libel was filed by Dr. Juan F. Torres, Jr. against Dr. Rhodora M. Ledesma, petitioner
herein, before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office, docketed as I.S. No. 92-5433A. Petitioner filed her counter-affidavit to the
complaint. Finding "sufficient legal and factual basis," the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed on July 6, 1992 an Information for libel
against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104. A petition for review of the resolution of Assistant City
Prosecutor Vestil was filed by petitioner before the Department of Justice pursuant to P.D. No. 77 as amended by P.D. No. 911. The
Department of Justice gave due course to the petition and directed the Quezon City prosecutor to move for deferment of further
proceedings and to elevate the entire records of the case. 5 Accordingly, a "Motion to Defer, Arraignment" dated September 7, 1992
was filed by Prosecutor Tirso M. Gavero before the court a quo. 6 On September 9, 1992, the trial court granted the motion and
deferred petitioner's arraignment until the final termination of the petition for review. 7 Without the consent or approval of the trial
prosecutor, private complainant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Lift the Order dated September 9, 1992 and to Set the Case for
Arraignment/Trial

Issue : WON the letter is libelous

Held : In every case for libel, the following requisites must concur: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be
given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable Petitioner's letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance against the
inaccurate distribution and payment of professional fees and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the
Philippine Heart Center Petitioner's letter was written to seek redress of proper grievance against the inaccurate distribution and
payment of professional fees and against unfair treatment in the Nuclear Medicine Department of the Philippine Heart Center. It is a
qualified privileged communication under Article 354(1) of the Revised Penal Code Petitioner's letter was a private communication
made in the performance of a moral duty on her part. Her intention was not to inflict an unjustifiable harm on the private complainant,
but to present her grievance to her superior. The privileged nature of her letter overcomes the presumption of malice. There is no
malice when justifiable motive exists; and in the absence of malice, there is no libel. We note that the information itself failed to allege
the existence of malice Further, we note that the information against petitioner was filed only on July 27, 1992 or one year after June
27, 1991, the date the letter was sent. It is obviously nothing more than a countercharge to give Complainant Torres a leverage against
petitioner's administrative action against him.
 21

___________________________________________________________________________________

Newsweek v. IAC
6:52 AM No comments

Facts:

"An Island of Fear" was published by Newsweek in its Feb 23, 1981. It allegedly portrayed the island province of Negros
Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the impoverished workers, but
also brutalized and killed them with impunity. #peachesdiaries
Newsweek filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that

o the printed article sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law;
o the complaint is bereft of allegations that state, much less support a cause of action.
Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Complaint on its face states a valid cause of action; and the question as to whether
the printed article sued upon its actionable or not is a matter of evidence.
Petitioner: Complaint failed to state a cause of action because:

o Complaint made no allegation the article referred specifically to any one of the private respondents;
o Libel can be committed only against individual reputation;
o in cases where libel is claimed to have been directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach
beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation.
Issue: WON the complaint must be dismissed? YES.

Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr.:

o "in order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R.
116)."
Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen:
o Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language only, are not actionable by individuals composing the
class or group unless the statements are sweeping.
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all
We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a
common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
_________________________________________________________________________________

U.S. v Bustos G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918

J. Malcolm

Facts:

In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding charges against Roman Punsalan, the justice of
the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust him from his office.

Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.

The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge still found him guilty.

Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary justice, instigated the charges against
him for personal reasons. He was acquitted.

The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasnt acted upon.

Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.

The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The trial court denied the motion. All except 2 of the
defendants appealed. Making assignments of error.

1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.

2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
 22

3. Error in not acquitting defendants

4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.

5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.

6. Error in sustaining the prosecutions objection to the introduction in evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which the petition
forming the basis of the libelous charge was based.

7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed by their counsel to the admission in
evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which the accusation in this case arose.

Issue:

Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace in Pampanga.

Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.

Ratio:

Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were small efforts at reform made by the La Solidaridad. The
Malolos Constitution, on the other hand, guaranteed freedom of speech.

During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty when he wrote, that no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.

In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy. It
also said the guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is
a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people
cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled.
Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.

It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty
of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the
notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free
speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means
that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a
redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.

Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the result of this. Privilged communications
may in some instances afford an immunity to the slanderer. Public policy is the unfettered administration of justice.

Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof of malice. This is apparent in
complaints made in good faith against a public officials conduct having a duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be
false, the protection of privilege may cover the individual given that it was in good faith. There must be a sense of duty and not a self-
seeking motive.

A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which
has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which
without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice
then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct.
Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.

It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The
charges might also under certain conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing
to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as
 23

suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of
charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the
petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is
apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were
justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on
instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance
to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the
justice of the peace was proper.

_______________________________________________________________________________

New York Times v. Sullivan

Brief Fact Summary. The Plaintiff, Sullivan (Plaintiff) sued the Defendant, the New York Times Co. (Defendant), for printing an
advertisement about the civil rights movement in the south that defamed the Plaintiff.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

Facts. The Plaintiff was one of three Commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed that he was defamed in a full-page ad taken
out in the New York Times. The advertisement was entitled, Heed Their Rising Voices and it charged in part that an unprecedented
wave of terror had been directed against those who participated in the civil rights movement in the South. Some of the particulars of the
advertisement were false. Although the advertisement did not mention the Plaintiff by name, he claimed that it referred to him indirectly
because he had oversight responsibility of the police. The Defendant claimed that it authorized publication of the advertisement
because it did not have any reason to believe that its contents were false. There was no independent effort to check its accuracy. The
Plaintiff demanded that the Defendant retract the advertisement. The Defendant was puzzled as to why the Plaintiff thought the
advertisement reflected adversely on him. The jury found the ad libe
lous per se and actionable without proof of malice. The jury awarded the Plaintiff $500,000 in damages. The Alabama Supreme Court
affirmed. The Defendant appealed.

Issue. Is the Defendant liable for defamation for printing an advertisement, which criticized a public officials official conduct?

Held. No. Reversed and remanded.

* Safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution (Constitution) in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.
* Under Alabama law, a publication is libelous per se if the words tend to injure a person in his reputation or to bring him into public
contempt. The jury must find that the words were published of and concerning the plaintiff. Once libel per se has been established, the
defendant has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their particulars.
* Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate and it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the breathing
space that the need to survive.
* The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
* The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) holds that the Constitution delimits a States power to award damages for
libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. In this case, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is
applicable.
* The Defendants failure to retract the advertisement upon the Plaintiffs demand is not adequate evidence of malice for constitutional
purposes. Likewise, it is not adequate evidence of malice that the Defendant failed to check the advertisements accuracy against the
news stories in the Defendants own files. Also, the evidence was constitutionally defective in another respect: it was incapable of
supporting the jurys finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made of and concerning the Plaintiff.
Concurrence. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) argued that the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution do not merely
delimit a States power to award damages, but completely prohibit a State from exercising such a power. The Defendant had an
absolute, unconditional right to publish criticisms of the Montgomery agencies and officials.

Discussion. In order for a public official to recover in a defamation action involving his official conduct, malice must be proved. Without the
showing of malice, the Supreme Court felt that a defamation action in this case would severely cripple the safeguards of freedom
speech and expression that are guaranteed in the First Amendment of the Constitution and applicable to the States via the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.

_________________________________________________________________________________

Hustler Magazine v. Falwell

Brief Fact Summary. After Hustler Magazine and Larry Flynt (Petitioners) published an advertisement, depicting Jerry Falwell (Respondent)
as having his first time in an outhouse with his month, the reverend brought suit based on invasion of privacy, libel and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
 24

Synopsis of Rule of Law. When an advertisement parodying a public figure depicts facts which no reasonable person could take as
true, that figure cannot prevail under a theory of emotional distress.

Facts. The November 1983 issue of Hustler Magazine featured a parody of an advertisement for Campari Liqueur that had the name and
picture of Respondent, and was entitled Jerry Falwell talks about his first time. The parody was designed to mimic other Campari ads,
which pointed to the idea of the first time someone tasted Campari Liqueur. The parody depicted Respondents first time as a
drunken, incestuous encounter with his mother in an outhouse. Respondent brought suit against Petitioners, alleging invasion of
privacy, libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit found for Petitioner on the defamation and invasion of privacy claims, on the basis that no reasonable person would consider the
parody as true. The same courts held for Respondent on the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Supreme Court of
the United States granted certiorari.

Issue. This case considers whether an award of damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress to the victim of a parody is
consistent with the First Amendment freedom of the press.

Held. Reversed.
* The Court found that to uphold the judgment of the lower courts would affect all political satire. Public officials and public figures were
held unable to recover in emotional distress, when they could not prove that the publication was made knowingly, with actual malice. A
parody, while admittedly in bad taste, is not considered malicious.

Discussion. The important rule to understand here is how the courts decision turned on Respondents status. If Respondent had been a
private individual, arguably, his right of privacy would have allowed him to recover for emotional distress. Because Respondent was a
public figure, he could not prevail in defamation, nor could he claim emotional dist.

________________________________________________________________________________

CASE DIGEST : Ayer Vs Capulong

G.R. No. 82380 April 29, 1988 AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM PRODUCTIONS, petitioners, vs.
HON.IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents. G.R. No. 82398 April 29, 1988 HAL MCELROY petitioner,
vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 and JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, respondents.

Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for
commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed
motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos
also signified his approval of the intended film production. It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented
in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as
background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American
historian have developed a script. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his
name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or
commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners
proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for
the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in
lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated

HELD : The Court would once more stress that this freedom includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit
such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television The respondent Judge should have stayed his hand, instead of
issuing an ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order one day after filing of a complaint by the private respondent and issuing a Preliminary
Injunction twenty (20) days later; for the projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience.
Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other
words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert. The subject
matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to
the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile The extent of that intrusion, as this Court understands the synopsis of the proposed
film, may be generally described as such intrusion as is reasonably necessary to keep that film a truthful historical account. Private
respondent does not claim that petitioners threatened to depict in "The Four Day Revolution" any part of the private life of private
respondent or that of any member of his family. His participation therein was major in character, a film reenactment of the peaceful
revolution that fails to make reference to the role played by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of privacy of a
"public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of simple
private citizenship. he continues to be a "public figure." After a successful political campaign during which his participation in the EDSA
Revolution was directly or indirectly referred to in the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public place, the Senate of the
Philippines. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of
expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful
and historical in its presentation of events
 25

______________________________________________________________________________

Espuelas vs People
Espuelas vs People
G.R. No. L-2990
December 17, 1951

Facts:

On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken,
making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in
fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the
Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the
Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious
suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and
administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to
President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

Issue:

Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the Government of the Philippines?

Held:

Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on
him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written bybthe accused, cannot fail to impress thinking persons that
it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's
simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on
persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed
from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is
that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities
thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to
whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people against the constituted
authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense
under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is
to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which
press upon their minds.

______________________________________________________________________________

Fermin versus Court of Appeals GR 157643

Here is the digest I made of the recent libel conviction handed down by the Supreme Court in Fermin versus Court of Appeals (March
28, 2008):
If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of
public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability
Fermin versus CA
Facts:
On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez, two (2) criminal informations for libel were filed
against Cristinelli Salazar Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. Fermin was charged being
the publisher of Gossip Tabloid while Tugas was editor-in-chief.
The Informations quoted the portion of the article complained against which was published on June 14, 1995, which read:
"MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE"
"IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG ASUNTO NILA DU'N, BUKOD PA SA
NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA
STATES DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA, NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA
STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA
 26

KANYA"
Fermin raised the defense of press freedom. She admitted to having a close association with congressman Roilo Golez and Paranaque
Mayor Joey Marquez, and that she used her skills as writer to campaign for them during the 1995 elections where Eddie Gutierrez, was
also a candidate for congress running against Golez.
Fermin also argued that to sustain a conviction for libel it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly participated in or consented to the
preparation and publication of the libelous article.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Fermin can validly raise trhe defense of press freedom.
2. Whether or not as publisher she is liable for libel.

Held:
1. Fermin cannot validly raise the defense of press freedom.
If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest
involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. While complainants are considered public figures for being
personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators such as Fermin, do
not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether
in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives.
Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is
given to critical utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of
public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech.
2. Fermin, as publisher is guilty of libel, whether or not she had actual knowledge and participation, having furnished the means of
carrying on the publication of the article purportedly prepared by the members of the Gossip Reportorial Team, who were employees
under her control and supervision. It is worthy to note that Fermin was not only the "publisher", as shown by the editorial box of Gossip
Tabloid, but also its "president" and "chairperson" as she herself admitted on the witness stand. She also testified that she handled the
business aspect of the publication, and assigns editors to take charge of everything. Obviously, Fermin had full control over the
publication of articles in the said tabloid. Her excuse of lack of knowledge, consent, or participation in the release of the libelous article
fails to persuade TEAcCD

Note:
Instead of the penalty of imprisonment of 3 months 11 days to one year 8 months and 21 days, the Supreme removed the penalty of
imprisonment (pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 08-2008) and imposed a fine of P6,000 each. But the Supreme Court slapped
Fermin with moral damages of P500,000 each private complainant.

___________________________________________________________________________________

Bridges v. California

Brief Fact Summary. The president of a union was found guilty of contempt of court for publishing a copy of a telegram saying his union
would strike if an adverse decision, subject to a motion to a new trial, was enforced. The publisher of the Los Angeles Times was found
guilty of contempt for publishing editorials on the pending sentencings of two members of a labor union. The propriety of the convictions
was brought into question.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished.

Facts. While a motion for a new trial was pending, Bridges, president of a union against whom a trial judge ruled, published a copy of a
telegram saying his union would strike if the adverse decision was enforced. As a result, Bridges was found guilty of contempt of court.
In a companion case, Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior, the publisher of the Los Angeles Times was found guilty of contempt for publishing
editorials on the pending sentencings of two members of a labor union. Bridges and Times-Mirror claimed that the contempt convictions
violated their First Amendment constitutional rights.

Issue. Did the contempt convictions of Bridges and Times-Mirror violate their rights of free speech and free press?

Held. Yes. The lower court if reversed.

Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) The convictions at issue punished utterances made during the pendency of a case, thereby restricting
speech at the precise time when public interest in the matter was at its peek. Therefore, the convictions cannot be dismissed as
insignificant. The substantive evils the convictions were designed to avert were (1) disrespect for the judiciary and (2) disorderly and
unfair administration of justice. As such, the means (the convictions) do not fit the ends (the substantive evils). First, an enforced
silence would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt for the bench, not the respect it seeks. Second, as to the Times-
Mirror indictment, to regard the published statements concerning pending sentencing as having an influence on the course of justice, is
to impute to judges a lack of firmness, wisdom or honor. Third, as to the Bridges situation, we cannot assume that the judge wasnt
already unaware of the possibility of a strike, which the laws o
f California do not prohibit anyway.
 27

Dissent. Justice Felix Frankfurter (J. Frankfurter) While freedom of speech and the press applies to the work of the courts, freedom of
expression cannot be allowed to nullify our constitutional guarantees of an impartial trial.

Discussion. This case draws into conflict two of our most cherished rights: the right to free speech and the right to a fair trial. To balance
these competing interests the court takes into account several factors in this case, such as (1) whether the litigation is still pending; (2)
the courage and fortitude a judge can be expected to have; (3) whether judges should be able to anticipate certain consequences,
without regard for whether particular information is published, etc.

________________________________________________________________________________

People vs. Alarcon [GR 46551, 12 December 1939]

En Banc, Laurel (J): 5 concur

Facts: As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in criminal case 5733 (People s vs.
Salvador Alarcon, et al.), convicting the accused therein except one of the crime of robbery committed in band, a denunciatory letter,
signed by one Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to
Federico Mangahas who, as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an
article published by him in the issue of that paper of 23 September 1937. The article provides, in part, that "Fifty-two (52) tenants in
Floridablanca, Pampanga, have been charged and convicted on a trumped up charge of robbery in band because they took each a few
cavans of palay for which they issued the corresponding receipts, from the bodega in the hacienda where they are working. These
tenants contend that they have the right to take the palay for their food as the hacienda owner has the obligation to give them rations of
palay for their main tenance and their families to be paid later with their share of their crop. But this is not all. When the convicted
tenants appealed the case and were released on bail pending their appeal, court and public officials exerted pressure upon one of their
bondsmen, as this bondsman informed the tenants, to withdraw his bail for them, and the fifty two tenants were arrested again and put
in jail." On 29 September 1937, the provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed with the Court of First Instance of that province to cite Federico
Mangahas for contempt. On the same date, the lower court ordered Mangahas to appear and show cause. Mangahas appeared and
filed an answer,alleging, among others, that the publication of the letter in question is in line with the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the press. On 29 November 1937, the lower court entered an order, imposing upon Mangahas the nominal fine of P25, or in
case of insolvency, 5 days in prison; this without prejudice to the action for libel that the public prosecutor believes to be advisable to file
against Luis M. Taruc. Magahas appealed from this order to the Court of Appeals which later certified the case to the Supreme
Court as involving only a question of law.

Issue: Whether the trial court properly cited Mangahas for contempt inasmuch as the robbery-in-band case is still pending appeal.

Held: Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit
or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is
ended. It must, however, clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the administration of justice
before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of
newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. There is no pending
case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. That is the
present case, for here the letter complained of was published after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga had decided the criminal
case for robbery in band, and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider its
order confiscating the bond of the accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it
was then without power to reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and could not have been
influenced by the questioned publication. If it be contended, however, that the publication of the questioned letter constitutes contempt
of the Court of Appeals where the appeal in the criminal case was then pending, the interrelation of the different courts forming our
integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in
vindication of the authority and de corum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this
last court be comes thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal.
____________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANNY GODOY
JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR vs. MAURICIO REYNOSO, JR. and EVA P. PONCE DE LEON

Facts: A complaint was filed by judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch
47, to cite for indirect contempt Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P. Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial
board, respectively, of the Palawan Times. His Honor's plaint is based on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his column,
"On the Beat," and published in the July 20, 1994 issue of said newspaper which is of general circulation in Puerto Princesa City. The
complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct, belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice; that the article
contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous, insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast aspersions on
the integrity and honesty of complainant as a judge and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but is an
imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed before him; and that the article is sub judice because it is still pending
automatic review.

Issue: Who has jurisdiction in contempt proceedings where the alleged contumely is committed against a lower court while the case is
pending in the Appellate or Higher Court
 28

Held: In whatever context it may arise, contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to
create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. As a matter of practical judicial administration,
jurisdiction has been felt properly to rest in only one tribunal at a time with respect to a given controversy. Partly because of
administrative considerations, and partly to visit the full personal effect of the punishment on a contemnor, the rule has been that no
other court than the one contemned will punish a given contempt.

The rationale that is usually advanced for the general rule that the power to punish for contempt rests with the court contemned is that
contempt proceedings are sui generis and are triable only by the court against whose authority the contempt are charged; the power to
punish for contempt exists for the purpose of enabling a court to compel due decorum and respect in its presence and due obedience to
its judgments, orders and processes: and in order that a court may compel obedience to its orders, it must have the right to inquire
whether there has been any disobedience thereof, for to submit the question of disobedience to another tribunal would operate to
deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.

There are, however, several jurisprudentially and statutorily recognized exceptions to the general rule, both under Philippine and
American jurisprudence, viz.:

1. Indirect contempt committed against inferior court may also be tried by the proper regional trial court, regardless of the imposable
penalty.
2. Indirect contempt against the Supreme Court may be caused to be investigated by a prosecuting officer and the charge may be filed
in and tried by the regional trial court, or the case may be referred to it for hearing and recommendation where the charge involves
questions of fact.
3. In People vs. Alarcon, et al., supra, this Court ruled that "in the interrelation of the different courts forming our integrated judicial
system, one court is not an agent or representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the
authority and decorum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court , and this last court becomes
thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal." The apparent reason is that
both the moral and legal effect of a punishment for contempt would be missed if it were regarded as the resentment of personal affronts
offered to judges. Contempts are punished as offenses against the administration of justice, and the offense of violating a judicial order
is punishable by the court which is charged with its enforcement, regardless of the court which may have made the order. However, the
rule presupposes a complete transfer of jurisdiction to the appellate court, and there is authority that where the contempt does not
relate to the subject matter of the appeal, jurisdiction to punish remains in the trial court.
4. A court may punish contempts committed against a court or judge constituting one of its parts or agencies, as in the case of a court
composed of several coordinate branches or divisions.
5. The biggest factor accounting for the exceptions is where the singular jurisdiction of a given matter has been transferred from the
contemned court to another court. One of the most common reasons for a transfer of jurisdiction among courts is improper venue. The
cases involving venue deal primarily with the question whether a change of venue is available after a contempt proceeding has been
begun. While generally a change of venue is not available in a contempt proceeding, some jurisdictions allow such a change in proper
circumstances.
6. A new court wholly replacing a prior court has jurisdiction to punish for violations of orders entered by its predecessor, although
where the successor court is created by a statute which does not extinguish jurisdiction in the predecessor, an affirmative transfer of
jurisdiction before the contempt occurs is necessary to empower the successor court to act.
7. Transfers of jurisdiction by appellate review have produced numerous instances where contempt against the trial court has been
punished in the appellate court, and vice versa. Some appellate courts have taken the view that a contempt committed after an appeal
is taken is particularly contemptuous of the appellate court because of the tendency of such contempts to upset the status quo or
otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of such court.
8. A judge may disqualify himself, or be disqualified, on a contempt hearing or in the main case, which circumstance may require a
transfer of jurisdiction, but where a judge is disqualified only in the main case, because of matters which do not disqualify him in a
contempt proceeding, the regular judge should sit in the contempt proceeding. Likewise, where the regular judge, is absent or otherwise
unavailable and an order is entered by another judge and made returnable to the proper court, the regular judge may punish fo r
violations of orders so entered.
9. Where the same act is a contempt against two or more courts, it is no bar to contempt proceedings in one of them that there is also a
contempt against the other.
10. While professional disciplinary proceedings have been resorted to as a punishment for contempt, the more recent view is that
punishment is of secondary importance to the need to protect the courts and the people from improper professional practice. To the
substantial extent that disciplinary action remains a punishment, disciplinary measures imposed by another court than the one
contemned furnish an exception to the rule against punishing for contempt of another court.
11. Some contemptuous acts are also crime, usually misdemeanors, which are often punishable in other courts than those against
which the contemptuous act was done.
12. Finally, a conviction for contempt against another court has been allowed to stand on the basis that the failure of the defendant to
make timely objection operated as a waiver of the right to be
tried before the court actually contemned.

The rule, as now accepted and deemed applicable to the present incident, is that where the entire case has already been appealed,
jurisdiction to punish for contempt rests with the appellate court where the appeal completely transfers the proceedings thereto or
where there is a tendency to affect the status quo or otherwise interfere with the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Accordingly, this
 29

Court having acquired jurisdiction over the complaint for indirect contempt against herein respondents, it has taken judicial cognizance
thereof and has accordingly resolved the same.
____________________________________________________

IN RE SOTTO

Facts: Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement2in connection with the decision of this

Court in In re Angel Parazo the statement was published in the Manila Times and other daily newspapers of the locality. The court
required Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should not be charged with contempt of court.

Atty. Sotto does not deny having published the statement but he contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
confers upon this Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has no power
to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a
law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the
exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press with the utmost
good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion,
erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.' The other
arguments set forth by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.

Issue: WON Atty. Sotto can be punished for contempt of court? Yes

Ratio:Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court an act which was not punishable as such
under the law and the inherent powers of the court to punish for contempt .

That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and
applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice
are patterned after those of that country.

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case
made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if
committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its
decision.

Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending reconsideration
by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in
the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided
the Parazo case, who according to

2 As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel

Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that
it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the wake of
so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put
an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, a constant
peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court
very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano,
Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.

his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus
embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice.

As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. An attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.

Decision: Atty. Sotto guilty of contempt. Fine of 1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in

case of insolvency. He is also required to show cause why he should not be disbarred.
 30

_____________________________________________________

In Re: Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Wenceslao Laureta and Contempt Preoceedings Against Eva Maravilla Illustre GR No
68635 12 March 1987

Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P.
Feliciano, all members of the First Division. Ilustre using contemptuous language claimed that members of the court rendered unjust
decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly
when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey
Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and found no reason to take action, stating that
Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case and was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution
of dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of
exposing the case to another forum of justice, to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on
16 Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the press. Tanodbayan dismissed
petitioners Complaint

Issue:

Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave professional
misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further Orders.

Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith
and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The
supremacy of the Supreme Courts judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks and
balances under a republican form of government such that the three co-equal branches of government are each supreme and
independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.

_________________________________________________

In Re: Column of Ramon Tulfo

Column of Ramon Tulfo

Facts:In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target' stating that the Supreme Court rendered an idiotic
decision in legalizing checkpoints, and again on Oct. 16, 1989, where he called the Supreme Court stupid and "sangkatutak na mga
bobo justices of the Philippine Supreme Court". Tulfo was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Tulfo
said that he was just reacting emotionally because he had been a victim of harassmen in the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant illogical
and unwise, and "bobo" was just quoted from other attorneys, and since the case had been decided and terminated, there was not
contempts. Lastly, the article does not pose any clear and present danger to the Supreme court.

Issue:Wheter or not Tulfo is in contempt

Held:Yes.

1. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet been decided upon, and the Supreme Court was still acting on
an MR filed from the CA.

2. Power to punish is inherent as it is essential for self-preservation. Contempt of ocurt is defiance of the authority, justice and dignity of
the courts. It brings disrepute to the court. There are two kinds of publications which can be punished for contempt:
a. those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case.
b. those whose object is to bring courts to discredit.
Tulfo's article constituted both.

3. It should have been okay to criticize if respectful language was used, but if its object is only to degrade and ridicule, then it is clearly
an obstruction of justice. Nothing constructive can be gained from them. Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting. Quoting is not
an excuse also, because at the end of his article, Tulfo said, "So you bobo justices, watch out!" Also, he said he was not sorry for
having written the articles.

Tulfo is found in contempt of court and is gravely censured.

 31

____________________________________________________

IN RE Emil (Emiliano) P. JURADO Ex Rel.: Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
Posted on June 20, 2013 by winnieclaire

Standard

Facts: Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation, the Manila Standard. He describes himself as a columnist,
who incidentally happens to be a lawyer,, had been writing about alleged improperties and irregularities in the judiciary over several
months (from about October, 1992 to March, 1993). Other journalists had also been making reports or comments on the same subject.
At the same time, anonymous communications were being extensively circulated, by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality
and corruption in the courts. And all these were being repeatedly and insistently adverted to by certain sectors of society. Events
Directly Giving Rise to the Proceeding at Bar.

The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court on August 27, 1992, in the so-called
controversial case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), G.R. No, 94374.
In that decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.,
wrote the opinion for the majority.
In connection with this case, G.R. No. 94374, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and one or two other newspapers published, on January 28,
1993, a report of the purported affidavit of a Mr. David Miles Yerkes, an alleged expert in linguistics. This gentleman, it appears, had
been commissioned by one of the parties in the case, Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), to examine and analyze the decision
of Justice Gutierrez in relation to a few of his prior ponencias and the writings of one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay, to
ascertain if the decision had been written, in whole or in part, by the latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion that the Gutierrez decision
looks, reads and sounds like the writing of the PLDTs counsel, Thus, he speaks of the Magnificent Seven, by merely referring to
undisclosed regional trial court judges in Makati; the Magnificent Seven in the Supreme Court, as some undesignated justices who
supposedly vote as one; the Dirty Dozen, as unidentified trial judges in Makati and three other cities. He adverts to an anonymous
group of justices and judges for whom a bank allegedly hosted a party; and six unnamed justices of this Court who reportedly spent a
prepaid vacation in Hong Kong with their families.

The Chief Justice issued an administrative order Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports of Corruption in the Judiciary,
to investigate the said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the public utility, denying the
allegations in Jurados column. The Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit
of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the
allegations made by Jurado are true.

HELD: Jurados actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual
accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote. They constitute contempt of court,
directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing them, he
has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible journalists who live by their Code or the Golden Rule and
who strive at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.

Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie,
knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false
statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.

The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: ARTICLE 19.
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. The provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of abuse of rights, one of the most
dominant principles which must be deemed always implied in any system of law.

Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements when publishing statements which are clearly
defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials.
Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent
standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or
accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to private honor and reputation. For to
so rule will be to discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from becoming judges. The public interest
involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of
private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these
two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which
are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements
they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit
the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain
the truth thereof.
 32

____________________________________________________
Miller v. California
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Millers (Defendant) conviction for mailing advertisements for adult books to unwilling recipients
was vacated and remanded in an effort to shift the burden of obscenity determinations to the state and local courts.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. In determining whether speech is obscene, the basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the
average person, applying contemporary community standards would find the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest of sex, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literacy, artistic, political, or scientific value.

Facts. The Defendant was convicted under the California Penal Code for mailing advertisements for adult material to non-soliciting
recipients.

Issue. Whether state statutes may regulate obscene material without limits?

Held. No. Judgment of the lower court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. In determining whether speech is obscene, the
basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find
the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of sex, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literacy,
artistic, political, or scientific value. The Supreme Court of the Untied States (Supreme Court) does not adopt as a constitutional
standard the utterly without redeeming social value test. If a state law that regulates obscene material is thus limited, as written or
construed, First Amendment constitutional values are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an
independent review of constitutional claims when necessary.

Dissent. To send men to jail for violating standards that they cannot understand due to vagueness, denies them of due process. The
statute in question is overbroad and thus, unconstitutional.

Discussion. This case attempts a new definition and clarification of obscenity while also trying to shift the burden of obscenity
determinations to the state and local courts.

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