Al-Shabaab: A Case Study of an Organizational Vision in the Political Frame

By Oleg Nekrassovski

Al-Shabaab is a Somalia-based militant group linked to al-Qaeda. Its official vision is the
establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic State in Somalia (Masters, n.d.). This vision is
obviously vague; since a good organizational vision is supposed to be a concise statement that
defines the mid- to long-term (three- to ten-year) goals of the organization (Kaplan, Norton, &
Barrows, 2008, p. 2). Moreover, only visions that state a measurable outcome and a targeted
value provide a clear guide for developing organizational strategy (Kaplan, Norton, & Barrows,
2008). While al-Shabaabs official vision says absolutely nothing about what exactly would
constitute the establishment of fundamentalist Islamic State in Somalia.
Al-Shabaabs leadership is divided between nationalist, clan-based militia leaders and
transnational jihadi radicals (Bruton & Pham, 2012). The nationalist, clan-based militia leaders
form the larger group. They enjoy considerable support from the civilian population; and their
subordinates form the bulk of al-Shabaabs troops. And, while being divided among themselves,
they mainly want to overthrow Somalia's weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and
replace it with their own clans (Bruton & Pham, 2012). The transnational jihadi radicals, on the
other hand, have foreign supporters in the Persian Gulf; have a transnational jihadist agenda;
and are interested in targeting U.S. assets, especially anywhere close to Somalia (Bruton &
Pham, 2012).
Thus, al-Shabaab is a great example of the fact that Organizations are coalitions of
different individuals and interest groups (Bolman & Deal, 2013, p. 189). In addition, al-
Shabaabs example also illustrates that organizational Coalition members have enduring
differences in values, beliefs, information, interests, and perceptions of reality (Bolman & Deal,
2013, p. 189). And the fact that every large organization is a coalition, also means that such a
coalition forms because its members need each other, even though their interests may only
partly overlap (Bolman & Deal, 2013, p. 190). And this is certainly true about al-Shabaab.
In fact, al-Shabaabs nationalists and jihadi radicals have banded together precisely
because each side had a lot to gain from the coalition. The jihadi radicals, despite being
outsiders, have gained fairly firm positions within Somalias slippery clan system. And in return,
they arranged for the nationalists to start receiving funds and technical training from abroad,
including from the Middle East and South Asia (Bruton & Pham, 2012). This observation also
illustrates that in organizations Most important decisions involve allocating scarce resources
deciding who gets what (Bolman & Deal, 2013, p. 188).
However, it should not be forgotten that within organizations, Scarce resources and
enduring differences put conflict at the center of day-to-day dynamics and make power the
most important asset (Bolman & Deal, 2013, p. 189). And this is clearly true for al-Shabaab; in
which the larger, more powerful, nationalist faction has mostly prevented the faction of jihadi
radicals from striking outside of Somalia. After all, it is against the interests of the nationalists,
who enjoy considerable support among the locals, to jeopardize the flow of foreign
humanitarian aid, to the Somali public, by permitting attacks on foreign targets (Bruton &
Pham, 2012). All of this illustrates that within organizations, Goals and decisions emerge from
bargaining and negotiation among competing stakeholders jockeying for their own interests
(Bolman & Deal, 2013, p. 189).
So, how does all of the above relate to the vagueness/weakness of al-Shabaabs vision?
The development of a good vision requires consensus building, listening, and provoking. And
the level at which these interactions occur carries considerable importance (Lipton, 1996). A
vision which is developed in isolation at the top, and pushed from the top down, is destined to
be a failure. By contrast, a good unifying vision must build on diverse and possibly conflicting
visions from multiple levels of the organization (Lipton, 1996). While it appears, that in al-
Shabaab, the dominant nationalist faction largely imposed its vision on the less powerful
faction of jihadi radicals. Moreover, militant organizations, especially those with Islamic
fundamentalist ideology, have a rigid command structure, with all decisions being made at the
top and being passed down the hierarchy, without any input from lower levels.
To make the problem worse, there are limits to the extent to which all organizational
levels can be made to participate in vision development (Lipton, 1996). Competing agendas and
preferences inevitably undermine all broadly collaborative efforts within organizations; while
the strongly held, motivating beliefs, which every good vision should contain, may be
eliminated by the struggle for consensus. After all, vision development through broad
organizational consensus is a time consuming process, and the more people are added to it, the
more costly it becomes (Lipton, 1996). And all of this is likely true for al-Shabaab, within which
the various agendas and preferences are in strong conflict with each other; none of the strongly
held beliefs of its members appear to be present in its vision; and for a rebel organization
struggling with other political factions for dominance over Somalia, spending the required time
and resources to build a vision by consensus, instead of engaging in immediate operations, may
prove to be a suicidal move.
 References

Bolman, L. G., & Deal, T.E. (2013). Reframing organizations: Artistry, choice, and leadership (5th
ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Bruton, B., and Pham, J. P. (2012). The splintering of al Shabaab: A rough road from war to
peace. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137068/bronwyn-bruton-and-j-peter-
pham/the-splintering-of-al-shabaab?page=show

Kaplan, R. S., Norton, D. P., Barrows, E. A. Jr. (2008). Developing the strategy: Vision, value gaps,
and analysis. Balanced Scorecard Report, 10(1), 1-5.

Lipton, M. (1996). Demystifying the development of an organizational vision. Sloan

Management Review, 37(4), 83-92.

Masters, J. (n.d.). Al-Shabab. CFR Backgrounders. Retrieved from

http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650