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Prior to World War I, writes Michael Howard, historians were in- terested in the canses of specific wars but devoted litle attention to the quest for the causes of war in general. War as a recurring phettomenon was taken for granted. Iu Howard's view, the causes of war have not changed fundamen: tally throughout the centuries. Just as Thucydides had written that the causes of the Peloponnesian War were “the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparsa,” some of the princspal causes of World War | were the growth of Germany's power and the fear this aroused in Britain. War, accord ing to Howard, does not happen by accident; nor doss it arise out of subcon- scious, emorional forces, but rather from a “superabundanece of analytic ratio~ ality”? The fears of those who make the decision for war may be rational or ircational, or both in combination. If Fear is a basic cause of war, then we aze forced to conclude that war is the product of both ircational and rational {ac- tors and that an understanding of its causes —and of ways to prevent, contcol, ‘+ limit, regulate, and terminate it—would requize a comprehensive approach to the problem. Whether war as an institutionalized form of state behavior ca exer be totally abolished from the international system is a larger question that cannot be answered until we understand the causes of wat Among the rocent efforts to understand at a general level te origins of was, Donald Kagan, surveying conflieis irom the Peloponnesian Wat {431-404 8.c.} to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, reaches several conch sions. He sees war not as an aberration, but instead as a recurring phenome non. It is @ uniquely modern Western characteristic, not substantiated by his toric experience, to believe dat humans can so tiansform themselves as #© make war obsolete or impossible, According 1o Kagan, basing his conclusions. on comparative historical analysis, war is the resull of competition for pO%e™ 188| PREREQUISITES OF A GENERAL THEORY OF CONFLICT AND WAR 189 In a world of sovereign states, such competition is @ normal condition that Sometimes leads to war. He also finds that states seek power not ‘only for preater security or economic gain, but also for “greater prestige, respect, def trence, in short, honor,” Kagen ‘also concludes that “fear, often unclear and intangible, not always of immediate threars but also of more distant ones, against which reassurance may not be possible, scco.nts for the persistence of var as a part of the human condition not likely €0 change." Unfortunately, we still do not know what are the causes of war, or if we do fenow them, we are far feora being, in agreement sbout the. ‘No single general theory of conflict and wat exists that is acceptable to social scientists in their re- cpetahe dvepines, of fo aires in other ies fom which soit scientists racer ait Ifa comprehensive theory sever to be developed, it wll probs diy sequiee inputs from biology, psychology and social peychologys anthropol- cay history, political science, economics, geogzaphy, #eories of com anes, Sons, organization, games, decision malcing, military steatesys functional integration, systems, philosophy, theology, and ‘eligion. Such a vast synthesis of human knowledge may be impossible o achieve, givea the increasing complexity Of the epistemological problem in the continuing jneeilectual debate about what aoa armand how we know it. Mera co contemplate the need for it, howeres ae ew rea ws agains that Alted North Whitehead calle “the fallacy of the sage factor" We cannot identify ony single cause of conic or wary ths Rae caukes are not only svultipie but zhey have kept multiplying throughout history. “The term conflict usually refers to a condition in which one identifiable group of human beings {whether tribal, ethic, linguistic, cultural, religious, Speloeconomic, political, or other) is engaged in conscious opposition 1 one se more other identifiable human groups because these groups are PUSSLEN that are or appear 29 be incompatible goals. Lewis A. Coser defines conflict doa “struggle over values and claims 10 scarce stats, power and resources in ‘which the aime of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, of eliminare their ri= vale? Conflict is an interaction involving humans; it does nor include che Truggle of individuals against their physical environment, Conflict implies see an mere competition. People may compete with each othec for some thing that is in shortage without being fully aware of theic competitors’ exis- tence, of without seeking to prevent the compesizors from ‘achieving their ob- jectives. Competition shades off into conflict when the parties ty {9 enhance this own position by reducing that of others, try t0 thwart ‘others from gain- ing their own ends, and cry to put their competitors out ‘of business or even to earn em Confice may be vilent or nonviolent (ie. in tein of physical Fone) dpentnane of revessive, controllable of uncontrollable, and resolvable or insoluble under various sets of circumstances. ‘Conflict is distinct from ten- sions, insofar as tensions usually imply latent hostility, feas, guspicion, the per- rived divergence of interests, and perhaps the desire to dominate oF gain re) ‘verge; however, tensions da not necessarily extend beyond astitudes and perceptions to encompass actual overt opposition and mutual efforts to thwart one another. They often precede and always accompany’ che ousbreakei 190 THe OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR \ of conflict, but they are nor the same 2 conficr, and they are not always ite Seanpatble with cooperation, Morcove comipsions fpeconae powerful enOuBy hey themselves may become eonuribucory or preliminary causes ‘of the occur rae conic nsofar as they affect the decision-making process. “What Coser has provided is @ ‘sociological definition. He is incerested in conflce benween groups Other analyte serge that the tesm conflict must ete once not only intergroup bet 280 1 eepersona) ard Fateapersonal PREPOTS braeigociery would not need r0 DE 2 seemed about conflict within che indivi: tual if it were not for the plausible assumption that there 3s a significant | vafgrionship between conics with een serseare of the individah and oaeyeas inthe excernal social oF¥e ‘Mo theory of conflict can ignore eis rela Gonship. The imernal and the cer cenal ean never be compleiely separated. wrtper ean the ane ever be reduced commplerely ro te other and derived solely eee, Beychologicl states alone conn ein social behsvies, ad soctal ‘Conditions alone cannot explain ‘individual behavior ‘Tes Luxerbacher moved that BV Matfeeent theoretical perspeedives and = methodological approaches are pealiy taken sn studying problems of peace vind war, conflict and cooperation “These ean be conceived of the one pandas esulng eth om aasional seh These arson processes win govesnineT esrance, be couception wna WARS se ecauae rues a= 2 easonab Shaner to win them « » ~ lOOES 1° a es enerafagrework, On the OHNE oa grge body of eras ies 4 this orf gwernational polit action, ar een parent 28 broad SOC a cast nest ges tht ae Bern SF cn a oy nawcult | aaa This distinction becween ero ud ssooioical exlarstiOn® 4 core jays 40 clearcut fOr pastiche futhors. However, 3 aoe Baws one o& the oder conceDsOn JF the end? tn his significance work Mars the State vind War, Keameth N Water distias guished cheee images of He vrnational relations, oF Levels of ‘analysis, 19 67, ae ihich we usally sey to salve pe causes of war, According 10 HE first im sae, war is waceable fo Kumar MANUS aad bebavion® Partisans of the second: ae oe geek the explanation of wat See peonnad stegevart of ths states 2 reaengronp inciudes both eras (Gino befieve chat demooraciss more peaceful can dictatersbips} oath MazsaseLeninists twho Belicve hac capitalist aj image postales rei foment war, while socisisen Teads co peace). The thir nate goes of war in the conto KNOY ns ehossical political theorists toding Kant, Spino7e, Rausses, ands in enodern cimes, Wale? frimsel® 2% Fae intertacional na suner realists and neorealists Giscussed in Chapter 2 Shyemthar iy the absence of S088 wrepuments of fave ard oFganizsy that PY Ta be efficacious for peneckee ns Tr ather words, accorains t© wales i far each Hl Thied image, a deficiency an the State ystem makes if areessa Snaerests and amabiions aad to act 3 judge 19 5 spn it Becomes iovolved im disPuie® one amor sate, enereby OKIE vrercence. of coniet inci Pre onal wae, ineviabie and BPE spent pectation of wae a5 HOFMAL Percave of te staue syste to pursue its own mee asit PREREQUISITES OF A GENERAL YHEORY OF CONFLICT AND WAR ater besos is cheory on the chied image. Whereas the bistoring is us interested in the spacifc and unique factors that lead co the outbreak of a par ae eee ris eheatist such as Walz seeks to penetrate beyond specific wavs ae tg explain the mare general phenomenon of war itsel-—thas is large aie Spine or other acts of violence and destenction of organized military Fanees of eo or more states. The causality of international war is probably te total in pare to the causality of other forms of political and social conflict seach ge citil war, revolution, and guesrilla insurgency, DUC international wat is ii pecife phenomena requiring, specific explanation of is own. In his treat eee seimage theories, Walz noted that both wropians 2nd realists often mee in diggosing te basic cause of war as human mamuee and behavior, bus Grecgice sharply over whether thar nature and behavior cot be made to un dergo a sufficient change to resolve the problem of war® Thus, Waltz prefers Get80 f qyar oa function of che balance of power ja an anaschi stats sY0Te Conflict ig universally and permanently recurring phenomenon seithin and between societies. It is not necessarily continuous @F aniformly intense. ‘Many societies experience long periods of rlacive pease, both internal and ex~ Many sOpite probably, hesreves, 2 certain amount of [ow level ured, almost for the group, the nation, or the international system. VARIETIES OF CONFLICT Several salient questions occur at the outset of our inqiny: Should we study the phenomenon of confit in rerms of conscious motivations? Do ‘people 7 tals fg about wharchey say they are igbung about? Inssetl, mk Tt go be yond stated reasons, regard them with suspicion 2s rene selferatiomalizations, < jad try to penetrate to the seal—zhat is, unconscious, murky, and sordid io} pulses hat drive prople to agrressive ehavior? Is this a false dichoromy? JF ere look carefully, we see that micro-scientists are more inclined to probe BE heath the surface into the unconscious, the nate, the instinctive (t0 USE ao ‘Gbsolete term), whereas macro-scientists are somewhat more willing ro lend! credence to conscious motivations, for these motivations PEt 0 thowsh |dy are 1 be vos, Line yet ede se.a0 end ugh, ‘THEORIES OF WAR AND ITS CAUSES IN ANTIQUITY £95) language, and communications patterns, which, in contrast to internal psychic forces, ate products of sociery. Given that the fruman being is a symbolic ani: mal, words are crucial links berween the unconscious and the conscious, be- ‘ween micro and macro, International war is one form of social eonilict—undoubredly the most impozeant single form in terms of its potential consequences for the individual and nations, However, there are many other forms of social conflict civil was, revolution, coup, guerrilla insurgency, political assassination, sabotage, terror- ism, seizure of hostages, prison riots, strikes and strike-breaking, sit-ins, threats, displays of force, sconomic sanctions and reprisals, psychological warlare, propaganda, tavern brawls, labor-management disputes, flare-ups #1 collegiate or professional sports events, divorce contests and legal wrangling ver the custody of children, imrafamily fights, and felonious crimes. ‘A ciucial question that arises frequently in the social sciences, regardiess of the phenomenon under invescigation, is whether we are dealing with the cane of the many. Can we understand war as a separate conflict phenomenon, in isolation, or must we study it as one highly organized manifestation, at @ specific social-structaral [evel, of a general phenomenon? Social scientisis are far from agreement as to whether human conflict can be satisfactaily ¢x- pizined as a continuum in which violent outbursts differ only by suck acci- dents as the nature of the parties, the size, the duration, the intessity, the na- ture of the issues and the objectives sought, the processes and modes of conflict, and the weapons employed. Other approaches would emphasize the uundeclying causes of view human conflict as an indefinite series of discvete phenomena, each of which, despite a superficial external resemblance to the others, cequixes is own unique theoretical explanation. THEORIES OF WAR AND ITS CAUSES IN ANTIQUITY Most of the older thearies of war and its causes we would now call “prescien- tific,” even though some of them were based on empirical evidence, drawn from history and human experience. Several of the earlier theories contain perceptive insights that continue to merit our attention as part of our cultural heritage. They enable us to see how the problem of war was looked upon in otter historical epochs and why it was nor always regarded as the greatest o! ceils. They reflect conscions motivations for and rationalizacions of wax, which at the level of human decision making can be causal. They provide philosophical, religions, political, and psychological arguments fr and against war, both in genezal and in specific circumstances. China In virnsally all the ancient religious and ethical civilizations, the prob- lea of war was approached nor only as one of political and military strategy, bbut also as one of spiricual and moral dimensions. Ancient China produced a broad range of theories from pacifism, or peace, to bellicism, or wat, Mo-Ti Breached doctrine of universal love, with which the waging of war was webbie AML196 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR deemed utteely incompatible; he called war large-scale rmurder and attacked ix ‘on grounds that it profits nobody (as Norman Angell subsequently asserted! in the early cwentieth century). Confucius and his disciple Mencius taught chat states, in dealing with one another, should observe good faith and moderation; they should also avoid imperialism, intervention in the affairs of other states, and aggressive wars of conquest. Like many modern idealists, they believed that diplomats should rely oa the reasonableness and justice of their positions, rather than on the threat of force, to win their case. However, the Confucians were not pacifstss chey did nor counsel nonresiscance to atzack. Confucius, al- though he looked en war as an evil, insisted chat when ic comes, it must be ‘waged vigorously. As a prerequisite of success, the army must have a clear idea of why it fy Sghting and a strong convierion that its cause is just. Mencius played down the value of alliances and warned rulers not co depend oa them; the real strength of a state lies less in strong forts than in the morale of its peo- ple and the moral stamina of its defenders. (In the twentieth century, Mao Zhedong stressed shat in war, the power of humans counts for more than the power of weapons.) To the right of the Confucians were the legatiss, includ ing the real or legendary Lord Shang, the Macliavelli of ancieat China, who advised rulers to make the peasants work long and hard and co ll peasants’ lives with drudgery; so thas when war comes, they will ree it a8 2 elcome relief India Whereas China extolled the scholar, Indian Hindu (buc not Buddhist] culture assigned a higher place to the warriot class. War was accepted as part of the eternal scheme of things and was more highly institutionalized in India than in China, Raies calculated! to mitigate the severity of war had che sanction of Indian religious auchorisies. Unfair, unchivalrous, and inhumane practices in war wer condemed; noc even in war was there an unqualified right to kill; certainly 2 king must nor kill those enemies who throw down cheis asms and beg for mercy, Nonetheless, even those Hinds and Buddhist zeachers who protested against war took is for granted that war was a naturally recurring phenomenon. The ancieat Buddhise doctrine of ahimsa (“harmlessness toward all living things”), farnous as one of the sources from which Gandhi derived his doctrine of nonviolence, was not understood to forbid the waging, of war; accu ally, it promoted vegetarianism long before it contributed to pacifism ® Greece The Greeks in general had a similarly fatal attitude toward war. The philosopher Heraclitus postulated recurring strife as one of the endless under lying processes of reality, along with the attracting force of love; the nwo altex~ rate with each otlier in gaining the ascendancy and then being driven out but never eliminated. Ln his view if war should perish, che universe would be de- stcoyed, for strife is justice, through which all things come into being and pass away!” The Greeks did not produce much in the way of pacifist thought. The Avhenians especially always seemed ready to fight for their freedom and iade- pendence, and sometimes for imperialistic ends.‘THEORIES OF WAR AND {15 CALSES IN ANTIQUITY 197 Even in his most utopian work, The Republic, Plato was unable 10 cis- pense with the role of military guardians, He suggested thar there would be vanced for a warrior group t0 defend the state if people could be contented with s timple, frugal existence—having neither che desire to plunder foreign Ses, nor wealth to tempt them to aggression, However, people want “courte- se and cakes,” imposing public temples and theaters, fine fabrics, elegant hellings, and exoric spices—all the fruits and comforts of civilization. Wan, said Plazo, results fom the unwillingness of harman beings to live withia the Times of pecessity2> Aristotle accepted war as a legitimare instrument for set dling tnteretae disputes, but he never praised i, Rathes, he insisted chae, just aeiziimane must engage in economic activity 1 enjoy life of leisure and cul fre, so they must occasionally carry on waz ro have peace. He strongly exit cued Sparta for gearing its educational an legal system fo war as the altt mate enc of polities ericles, 2 peerless propagandist, used his famous Funeral Oration 0 slo: vify not wae bur the heroism of chose Athenians who died defending the open, Jeotweraric society against the closed society ofthe garrison state of Sparta, The Hintanan Thucydides lamenced the destructiveness of war, accepted it prudgy ingly as a mater of defense rather than conquest or annihilation, and perhaps sre as close as any Greek writer to a skeptical view of rhe utility of war when fe peagiaatieally warned state leaders to take time over their decision to opt for yak He recorcied for composed} the words of one diplomatic envoy urging, & ting to ponder the unpredictability of war before making the fatal commit om «The longee a war lasts," he wrote, “the more things texd to depend on wedents. . .. tand) we have to abide their outcome in the datk."77 ‘Recently Alan Beyerchen, an bistoriaa at Ohio State University, concladed tne sullcngly similar vein chat Clausewits’s Ont War “is suffused with the un ‘erotanding thac every wat is inherently a nonlinear phenomenon, the conduct of which changes its character in ways that cannot be analytically pre- Jieeed. "Ie ie saluary to remember this caveat in ehe “age of science” and advanced military technology. Because the Greeks prized limit or measure as the key to human perfec: sion and to moderation 1n all things, and because they regarded themselves «5 tupesior to al nan-Greeks (barbaroi), they sought co assuage the damaging ef- fens of war ainang their own city-states, which shared culearal values, Thus, the treaty of the Amphieeyonic League of Delphi probibited war among mem- bets excepe for good cause, and it forbade taking Grecks as slaves, ling civilians, buraing member cities, oF cutting olf their water supplz”* Rome ‘The Greeks never worked out carefully she idea of the just war, This task was taken up by the Romans who, in che early Roman republic, were chuck more unabashedly moral and legalistic than che Greeks had been in thsic approach to sas. The Romans were meticulous in observing the rules of wwar—ules of their own devising under the Js feriale, that part of the sacred law that regutated the soiemz swearing of treaties, the setrlemene of disputes198 THE OLDER THECRIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR berween states, and she declaration of war. I was the function of the fetial judges, a seligiopolitical college of priest officials, to dezermine whether 8 neighboring community had so wronged Rome as to justify a resort to mili: tary force, The Romans apparently felt obliged co convince themselves, before em: barking on wax that their cause vas just and pious Yastinn ef piu). The most commonly recognized causes were (1) the violation of Rome's territorial Gorminions; (2) violation of ambassadors’ diplomatic immunity by inflicting physical hartns (3} violation of a treaty obligations (#) rendering aid to an en emy of Rome; {5} desecration of sacred places; and (6) cefusing to surrender those who had commitced serious offenses against Rome.” ‘Romans were inclined to look on « military defeat as a sign that the gods did not find their cause just; this was a powerful incentive to bravery on the battlefield. The Romans usually demanded satisfaction from the offending party within a specified period. If this was not forthcoming, a herald would read the formal declaration and hurl a spear into the soil of the enemy state, indicating the precise momene when war broke out. War and peace were si- multaneously incompatible, Two states were either at war or at peace with cach other. There was no room for chat ambiguity or uncertainty often found 1n Oriental history and during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, when limited conflict and uncasy cooperation were commingled. The Romans, even more than the Grecks, believed at least in theory that no greater force should be wsed in wer than required by “legitimate ouilitary necessity” and chat deliberate effores should be made to regulacize belligerent proceedings.2* Practice, however, sometimes overcame theory, as it often does in the passions of war, “Rome” seated Spain with harsh brutality, caliously enslaved more intelligent Gr and other civilized peoples, and finally succumbed ro Cato's oft-repeated ad monition, “Carthage must be destroyed” (Carthago delenda est)” Islam The prophet Muhammad preached the holy war (jlad} as @ sacred duty and a guarentee of salvation, and for several centuries, Muslim theorists assumed that the world was divided into the dar al-Islam (the peaceful abode ff the true believers and those who submitted to theit tolerant cule) and che day al-barh (the territory of war). Inasmuch as Islam wae a universalist system of belief, the two territories were always theozetically at war with each other because war was the ultimate device for incorporating recalcitrant peoples jnto the peaceful territory of Islami. The jihad, cherefore, was more a crusade than the belfuon justuon (just war"), familiar to mecieval Christian writers. ‘The concent of the jihad as a permanent state of war againse the non-Muslim sworld had become slmast obsolete in modern tines, at least prior to the emer gence of Muammar Qhaddhaf in Libya, Ayatollah Khomeini in tran, and var ious radical fundamentalist groups (e.g., the Muslim Brothechood) and mili: tant terrorists (e.g, Jihad) who call for 2 holy war against enemies of Islas Several modern writers have stressed char the cert jibad refers less to military Cconflic: than to the spiritual stragale for perfection within the heart of individ= ITHEORIES OF WAR AND ITS CAUSES IN ANTIQUITY 198 uals.2# Mahatma Gandhi declared that ke was able to perceive the origins of the doctrine of nonviolence and love forall living things not oaly in the sacred Hindu and Bucidhise writings and the Bible, but also in the Koran?? Judaism The predominanc historical attitudes towaed war that are found in ‘Western culture are a product of several different sources, including the Judec- Christian religious tradition, Greek philosophy, Roman legalism, European feudalism, Eslightenment pacigam, and modern scientism, humanitarianism, and other ideologies. The ancient Jewish scripcures reflect the paradox of hu ‘man yearaing for a peaceful existence amidst the constant recurrence of wat Sarrounded by hostile peoples, the Israciites relied heavily on a combine of religious prophetism and milicary organization for nation building, defense, and territerial expansion. In the eastier history of the Jews, Yahweh often ap- peared as 2 warriergod. Joshua, Gideon, Saul, and David foughe wars for Nahweb’s honar and glory, to demonsteate Yahweh's power and Yaliweh's spe- cial relarionship to the chosen people, Once the promised land had been won from the Canaanites and kings took over from judges, the wers of Israet and Judah became less ferocious, and themes of love, justice, and peace became ‘more prominent in the Jewish sctipeures.3° War and Christianity The early Christians were divided in their articade toward the use of military force by the state. During the frst three cencuries of the early Catholic Church's history, when Christianity was regarded an alien and subversive creed within the Roman Empire, there was a strong tendency roward pacifism, especially among the intellectuals, many of whom believed that the Christian both as private person and as a citizen should respond to in- juty by wuraing the other cheek, regardless of the consequences for the state. Pecifism, however, did not become the orthodox Christian doctrine. The dom inane view among, the leaders of the church was that political authority was divinely instituted for the benefit of the individuat, When force was used justly, they believed, it was good and not a moral evil. People are cnjoined co turn the other cheek when their own rights are violated, because they seek 3 salvation beyond history, but the stere, which mast safegnacd the temporal so- cial good here and now, may have t0 resort to force at times as an instrument of justice for the common good. Saint Ambrose and Saint Augustine, writing after Christians in the West had begun to assume zespansibility for the social order, baptized the ancient Roman doctrine of the just war as a “sad necessity in the eyes of men of ptinciple.”3! ‘Scholastic philosophers in the Middle Ages considerably cefined the juste war doctrine. The decision to initiate violent hostilities could not be taken by a private individual, bur only by public authority. Rulers were enjoined against resorting to war unless they were morally certain that their cause was just (jus ad bellwme}—that is, that their juridical rights had been violated by a neighboring rule Even then, they were extiorted to exhaust ali peaceful means of settling the dispute before initiating the use of force, and these means200 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR uually jnciaded sebitcotion. Furthermore, there had vo be a reasonable rospeet thatthe resort to foree would be Wor productive of good than of Peo erei yould eestore te order of justice, The Wat kad to be waged through- ae tt a cghe moral inkention, and i had co Be conducted by means that oe ere intially smesoral (us i bello), for what begins as a just war woth become unjust in its prosecusion, Thess Wess the common: teachings of coe anedieval weiters as Antonines of Florent ‘and St. Thomas Aquinas Prnphasia wag placed on what would late be called the “principles of propor ears and cisrumination.” Under the Bes be suffering and destruction sorted by the war should not be disproportions® 7 the canse justifying the caus PY ary onder she secon intocent papaledons Were considered imm- reams ae targets of miisary action. “Throughout the Middle Ages, the Catholig Church attempted to impose chon! controls on the conduct of wat by SPECIE HT ‘wher fighting could ot be carried on, sites where battle was prohibited, types of weapons that 10 sor tegismacely be emplayed, and classes of ure’ char were either ex empted froin te obligation of salisary Tervice of prorected against military ee ree fort to soften. he rut, of watfars Wot ‘by no means new in Sawer cuitare, The ancient Greeks and Romayit hhad been familiar with such yreed rules of war as chose forbidding WOM! desteuction of populations, sees arning, of cities, and the severance of a0et Supplies, Many circumstances we medieval Buropean culture, including the come? values of Christendom, She nauuze of fexdatism, prevailing cconore conditions, the Teutonic tredi- whe de chivalric warsion, and the crude 6 ‘of the milicary sciences, att sly reinforced the moral efkarts ofthe Tearholic Church co mitigace the harsh- ai i wartace Guring the medieval period: ene peried of transcion from medieval <@ modern Burope, three out sanding exceptions to the dominans theory ‘and practice of morally Limiced ae be identi These were ievariabhy expressions of ideoiogicet Wether that ran counter re 3 less despite the potenticl horrors of modern warfare and fee~ quent distortion of the jasz-war nocion throughout history as mere political Fropmganda, modern proponents of che theory insist that the traditional mode argent echieal ansiyse—oe that seeks to chart 2 middle cows between ae raeerenes of pacifiers and bellicism—cannot be discarded ‘Weapons web: mology exnnt be alowed to exploit all ssientific possibilities and develop 2° wording to ies own dialectic but must be eubjected 9 moral analysis of power and is limits, Writers in shis vein, hav included Paul Ramsey, joht Peumtney Moeray, Robert W, Tucker, Richard A. Fale ‘William ¥. O'Bries James Turner Johason, Michael Walzes, and others 76 The general consenses hasvswnr waiters (apart from Wize, discussed ‘separately later in this cP ter} can be suraried up ia the following propositions 1 the absence of effective intecaational peacekeeping institoteths we. | rr alright of sates to eegozt to War under cervain ceenastancts caneon) eat THE NORMATIVE THEORY OF JUST WARIN THE NUCLEAR AGE 215 not be denied. Within the self-help international system, it is probable that states will continuc to fecl constrained ac times to resort to zhe wee of military foree. An ethical doctrine to govern and limit was, there- fore, remains essential, 2, Although aggressive war (which was permitted ander the traditional doctrine vo punish offenses and to restore justice) is no longer consid ered a lawful means available to states for che vindication of violated rights, there siill exists the right to wage defensive war against aggres- sion and to give military aid to another party who is a victim of ag- gression.” 3. Modern military sechnology cannot be allowed to reader entirely ‘meaningless the readitional distinesion beeween combatant forces and innecents even in strategic war Even when che state has the mozal right to wage war (ius ad beliumt), there is an obligation to adhere to the law governing the means used in war (ius in bello). In two ait wars against Saddam Hussein's Iraq (1991 and 1998-1999) and in the NATO air war against Slobodan Milosevic's Secbia in 1999, the United Seates and its allies made strenuous, though nor always success- ful, efforts to target only military forces and installations while mini- ‘mizing collaceral damage to civilian lives and structures,” According to some NATO military planners, this effort prolonged the air war, Alter six weeks of air strikes against Yugoslavia, however, NATO did begin to make life more inconvenient for che civilian population by targeting power plants ‘The debate over war and morabity will go on indefinitely, Pacifists of vazi ‘ous persuasions, absolutist or celativist, will argue that itis either logically ab- surd ot ethically monstrous to analyze warfare in teems of rationality or jus: tice, Ocher theorists will contend that in a global system that lacks an eficetive slobal peacekeeping or peace-enforcement authority—that is, an international) force organized in support of international justice—independent governments and other political entities are likely to be disposed from time to ime to resort to the use of force. They will insist that the world will be better off if thase who advise governments—cegardless of whether they are pacifsts oz justewar theorists—ean have recourse to an intellectually credible code of rational, ‘Maral, civilized behavior that enjoins decision makers to observe humane lim. iss in their seraregizing, Despite frequent assertions that the just-war doctrine has become obsolete in a nuclear era of ualimited destructive eapabilicy. there fave been numerous instances of limised conventional and unconventional warfare, and of effores to develop new systems of advanced weapons technol- 08; to which the traditional analysis of the conditions required for the moral Justifcation of deterrence and force remains quite relevant. What is more, this fealysis is still applied with remarkable frequency in the public political de- buce.”” Moreover vtiters on the religious left who sought during the 1970s to develop theologies of fiderarion and eevolution appropriated some of the ele- ‘Rents of the just-war doctrine, ever while shifting the presumprion of justice216 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR away from incumbent governments (artempsing to sineain internal peace a0 er to inaurgent cevolutlonary groups (attempaing ro averterow incu bent governments they deemed oppressive)? Pechaps no student of the just war has deslt more intricately with the paradox conironted by strategists and mocalists in the nuclear age than Stchaal Welzer, ‘The humn mind seems unable to devise a cobszenr conser sai naefnenork=~polical policy strategie doctrine, and opesasionel miitary Dlamcthar neady combines effecive derenrence with workable that is widely acceptable on grounds of rationality, cxedibility, Walzer reminds us chat superpower governments are deterred even conventional wan, 0t 10 ‘timate hocror—-the danger that it might escel defense, and and morality. from risking Tnention limited nuclear war, by the specter of Jate to an uncontrollable mu- jer exchange. in an era of plentiful nuclear stockpiles he 2ays, any HAE able strategy is likely to deter ‘a central svar berween the giants. setood erat the strategists of deterrence were saying it becarn to adopt any particular strategy for fightin ‘Once we un- ye unnecessary ig 2 uuclear was.) (Many strategie do aaes of course, would deny this.) Te was deemed sufficient messy f Pose ceo ee quclear chreat. Deveson js fightening in psnciple when We stop to ponder the itimate, but in actuality, deverrence is © cece i has een a bloodless serategy. Tt causes wo pain 0 Think it through, which not many people do. Rfktnes pute distance Berween himself and most justwar theonsi shen he hostages, unless they stop to propornds the view chat all nacleze war is mmorth Toweyield, ractical battlefield weapons. Tidy ae, Wataee reiterated bis view thar any theory of war is inher. cenely imperfeet-A theory is no more shan a framework for deeisiou *6 such it cae at provide definitive answers. Moral decisions, he hold ace particularly Gfleale in wae, which often requires & choice be aeerceory claims concezaing justice—the common. good of the whole commu sy to live with be injury to its ‘even one waged with ween equally valid but con vay vezsus (he night of noncombarant civilians to aman. Walzer’s advice is To make 2 practical decision in each ease, taking, ‘Cguences and prevailing normative principles" Joseph Boyle ‘Walzer’s use of casuistey (a PE apmatic rather into. account both likely con demurs from than a genuinely moral method bY hedging concrete situations) and of consequential (basing moral deci ane ee the probability thatthe estimated beneficial effects of actin will out stgh the estimated harmfal ones). Fer Boy, this approach ‘weakens the 2u: “haat of aoral principles by allowing for exceptions in time of eneraSTY Tn the Cold War era, the debate among ethicist involving the morality or snumoralicy of war any nuclear war might occur and gians and philosophers have pitted the immorality of large-scale maciear war agin the pr robabilicy thar Spin out of contro}. Victally all morai theal?; Teng agtecd that, if clear deterrence show Parc down, cavrying out the stcaregy of assured destruction scribed in Chapter 8) would constiture sreeed magnituse, Concerning chat seraregy itself, writers who sacs of atrateny were ia serious disagreerpent on fowt points (which is d&- ‘moral evil of historically wnprece” deal with ti fs shifred subcly from one « id strategic policy to one hak:ald ce the “THE NORMATIVE THEORY OF JUST WARIN THE NUCLEAR AGE 217 1. What was the intention underlying the strategy of assured destruc- tion? Was it the good intention of preventing nuclear war or the rep- rchensible intention to wreak catastrophic death and destruction in retaliation? [F the two intentions are combined in one, how is it to be judged? 2, Was it possible to distinguish the public chreat embodied in a strategic deterrenc policy, designed to prevent war, from the plan that would ac- tually be executed if the deterrent failed? (This question also caused problems for strategic analysts, government policymakers, and mili- tary leaders who were concerned with keeping the threat credible.) 3. For purposes of moral evaluation, could we predicate the intention of government, just as we would of an individual in a legal case? in matrers Of governmental policy, expecially ia a pluralist constitutional democra- tic system, who could be held responsible for intending, vo do what? 4, as it morally petmissible, for the sake of preserving peace, to con front the adversary with a strategic threat chat would be immoral to execute? A.compelling argument can be made thar the more frightful the theeat, she more effective it should be as a deterrent, provided that itis credible, That is why the strategy of assured descruction was consideted so poiitically suceess- ful and also why it was so roundly condemned by many church leaders and ‘other moralists who fixed their attention on the implicit, conditional inzention embodied in it to destroy urban population and industrial complexes. Some argued thar it was justifable to hold nuclear weapons for purposes of deter- rence, but that these weapons could never be used in war. This argument con- travened the requirement of decerzent credibility, because it deprived deter- rence of an operational doctrine, (Whether it is possible for a democratic goverament to have one doctrine for deterrence aud a more limited ane in case af deterrence failure is debatable.) Presumably, any effort to render the threat less immoral and more limited might also sects, at least logically, ess effective as a deterrent {even though some would argue that this could enhance its credibility-—ie., its certainty of being applied). When U.S. defense officials appeared to be considering re sponses to aggression more tmeasured. than all-out massive retaliation with strategie nuclear missiles—for example, limited nuclear options, selective tar- geting, counterforce rather than countercity strategies, bautefield or tactical nuclear weapons, horizontal escalation, or conventional deterrence-—they svete often criticized by moralists for making muclear war less unthinkable or more likely co occur as a zesult of escalation. Thus, indirectly, the moralists, vwkether wittingly or not, have been indicating their concen with regard not only to the morality of deterrence hut also to its effectiveness. They might not condemn every conceivable use of nuclear weapons and might reluctantly ap- rove the possibility that cetaliatory use in 4 limited and discriminating mac- ‘ter against military targess could be theoretically justified. Nevertheless, the ‘moralises exhibited a great deal of skepticism that a nuclear war conid be kept218 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR limited, regardless of efforts to control it. Fearing the excatarory process, they generally opposed any rst use of nuclear weapons.* “The prolonged debate about the morality of nuclens war, which has passed through several phases, has served amply to demonstrate that the con Cept of deverrence, which constisuted an important theoretical development in the international relations of the twentieth cencury, repzesents something quite new in history. It seems to defy adequate evaluation in terms of the two tradi- tional Western categories of thought on the subject of war and peace—just war and pacifism—and requires a anique, rather paradoxical mode of ethical analysis. Recest years have witnessed an interesting but somewhat esoteric and fruitless debaze among philosophers as to whether pacifism and the just-war theory can be reconciled. James Sterba of Notre Dame Universicy sakes an af firmative position. He defines antiwar pacifisn as a view thac would never js- tify any war ona large scale but which would justify violence in a carefully ce- stricted manner when direcred in defense of one’s own life or the lives of other Innocents against 2n unjust aggcessoc® Erie Reisan of Pacific Lutheran “University regards this as an incoherent position because it lends warrant to at Jeast some wars and thus shiits from a perspective of moral pacifism to one of just war. According to Reitan, antiwar pacifism can be coherent omly if it re~ fuses to countenance all effective, organized defense, Reiran, however grans coherence to an antiwar pacifisin thar gives moral legitimacy to unorganized tnd inefiective private violence by citizens defending their homes and lives against an unjust aggressor.” Philosophers and theologians draw subile dis- Gnctions berween intentional killing of innocent civilians and killing that is foreseen as unavoidable but not intended, and modern democratic govers~ ments engaged in military operations have begun vo pay much greater atten tion co such distinctions than they did in Wozld War U “The Cold War ended, of course, without nuclear weapons having been used and with the only instances of their employment having been against Jopan in che closing days of World War i. In place of the deterrence relation: ship that evolved ducing the Cold War, the prospect loomed that weapons of mass desteuction—nuclear, biological, and chemical—-would be proliferared to larger numbers of states, and possibly to nonstare actors as well. Theories that were focused on bipolar deterrence needed to be adapced to take account of Such changes, as we shall discuss in Chapter 8. At the same tmae, the prolifer~ ation of weapons of mass destruction gives rise to ethical questions, including the appropriate basis for decerring the employment of suck systenw by a re wonal actor such 35 Irag. Whar would have been the appropriate U.S. 6 Sponse in the event that Saddax: Hussein had used chemical or biclugical weapons of mass destruction against Israel or Saudi Arabia ducing the 1996-1991 Gulf War? Having given up its own biological and chemical seeapons programs, the United States retasnet! a nuclear rexalistory opts n and & sophisticated conventional response capability, At the same time, she post-Cold War era hokds increasing potential for armed conflict by actors Biker than seaces, with such nonstate entities possibly in possession ofTE EE noves 219 weapons of unprecedented lethality. Such changing parameters for the con- duct of warfare raise numerous questions about why armed conflict occurs and the means by which it can be deterced or otherwise prevented. In the global-conflice setting of the twenty-first century, these questions encompass not only how was come about but also how, or even wherbes, normative the ries stich as those set forth in this chapter, developed in the Western world, will be applicable or acceptable in a world of unprecedented paradigmatic di- versity and complexity NOTES 1. Noteworthy samples published since 1980 include Francis A. Baca Peace Agovsst War: The Ecology of International Violence (San Francisco: Freeman, 1981); eave Buena de Mesquica, The War Trap (Mew Haven, CT. Yale Uawersty ress 1981); Robert G. Gilpin, War ond Change or World Politxs ‘Cambadee, Jand: Cambridge Unicersny Press, 1981} Seyom Brown, The Causes ard Prevention of ar (New Yorks Se, Masta’, 19874 Geoffrey Blaney, The Cases : cof Woz td ed, (ew York: Free Press, 19883 Melvin Small and J. David Singer tei, fnlemational Wir an smhology (Chicago: Dosey Press, 1989 Greg - Cashman, What Causes War? Au Introduction to Theories of International 8 Conflict (New York: Lexingron Books. 1993}; John 4. Vasquez, The War Puzzle a (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993}; Lawrence Freedman, = cd. War (New Yorke Onford University Press, 1994); Robert A. Doughty and Ira * D. Grube, eds, Warfare m the Western Worl, 2 vol. (Lexington, MA: D, is Heath, 1396), Claudio. Cioff-Revila, “Origins and Evolution of War acd | Politics," Imcrnationn! Studies Qnertery; 40(1) {March 1996), 1-22: and severah > avis in International Studies Quarter, World Politics, Americm Political Science Reeve, Journal of Conic Resolution, and International Security, which fre cited fer in this text an 2. Michael Howard, The Canses of War and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: vse Harvard University Brest, 1983] pp. 7-22, quoted at p. 14. J. David Singer hes m noted that, with the possible exception of Jean de Bloch’s Future of War {1895}, of sshich predicted swith surprising accuracy what the next Enropean war would ca look like, and Pitcizn Sorokin, whose 1937 work Social and Crdtaral Dynamites uat correlaced wat with eycles in cuisural patrerns, Quincy Wright's A Study of Ter of Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) and Lewis Richacdsou's studies of ee the searistics of arms races, published it 1960 on the basis of ealiexreseaccl (and ing discussed in Chapcer 7) mark the frst traccable effaris to bring scientti method te to bear on internationat conflict. He adds, while physical phenomena bad been i studied in an essentially scietife fashion for several cenmuries, and biological ale a ‘tomena Zor nearly a century, social phenomena had remained largely the domain he ‘of theoiogical speculation, moral umperative, and conventional folklore. : “Accounting for Internacional War: The State of the Discipline," Joxreal of Peace sical Research, NNT) {1981}, 1. Singer's judgment may be a bit unfaie wo the and philosophers and social, politica}, and legal theorists who reflected prior so the the ‘wentiedh ceatuty on the problem of wae withomr employing quantitative method: ost ologies and whose views can hatdly be dismissed as conventional folklore. I is Z correct, cevertheles, to say that the sustained effort to srady wars i a syseimatic,1a, ichae Haas, lersationat honfet (New Yose: Bobb Merrill, 1974) de OLDER THEORIES OF CONFUCT ANP WAR sciensific way, emloving che metiads of the behavioral disciplines di nor BEE is, seta yay oc afer te Fast Wore We nde agan, On the Origins of SF doe Preservation of Peace (ex Yor Doubleday, 1995), pe 1-11, 369, 1s po roe, The Fitions of Sei cone New Yoo Free est 12560 P > * Ces Laresbaches, “Last Words Abow eee wena of Conict Resobution *8 (ree 1994), 166. Faden Some, Yar quod ageinsteffores 1 exp Ay etecring to suc general causes has acer the sone nates fs by tet system, essing hat the Aavge are rnltip ond varied and a iteritge omige £0205 porte CU ‘Gu the Geuses of War (New afte fond Uniresty Pres 3996) Ore Spall see, would gece Fork ON. Wale, Mia, dhe Stare and NOT “A oreatal Analysis (New Yorks repre niversity Fess 1259) SHES, and 4 Toad chap. 6. The anarcine chance) 2 a emesional syacen is sensed #9 pape 3, pp. 60-62, See ato Wales 1 ot xperraion of Wan” chap. 7 ane ia Dye Ineretional Pome, an) cd ew Yorks Appleton, 1966): Herta We Alipors “The Role of Ppetaney x Haley Corel 8 Ti Corte oe War Cithana: Uatesiy eh pees, 1950 and Weer Le Tie eC auses of War and the Conse Pepeace,” Journal of Conflee on ney TW December 1950) 431-370 one lots thar wa should be raced ree any specific factor Butte # sae allation of factor Ibid BATS se ee ast ad Was pes 1S 20. eee Mest Lapse has oe a, 72 Tocqueville and Masx emabasaed he Sevmeity for conflict aznong soci 3 ogetgpeet defines the existeres OF & meee state of confics os another, re Gening a legiimace democrach rota May: The Soca! Bases of PONE Y Guten Ciry, NY: Dowbleday-Aneo® roa pp. 7 and 72. Conblct is 8h Mat aspect of greet, ane tal 6 2ghes lly contra} nor preven BSS Sean we ash to do 20, Hs Le Nica mei Yolence eNew Yorks Se Marin Joa), pp. 26-37, Human ecstenee Roca fe entinkable, Conte’ 220 96) ps mneacing 20 aC OF viowtgo, even if arainable, WOH! EY ibe desirable 4 Frome D, Fran *FHoman Nae i J ntonvioene Resiszance,” in QUE weight sera es Preventing Word Way few York: Simon & Sehustes WED 193. Reanesh Boukding has sponte chara given simabon He bbe 10 0 ee ou Fite confit oF a8 PN Fa Tends xo ie 2 certain 2 soe terest, Conic ond Defense ‘new vorks Harper & Rows 162k 8 ppp. 305-307, 3 Becoxed in Abraen Kendinee ane edward Pecble They Stadied Man. SN yok J eee mca torary Mentor BOOK Heap pr 102. Elsewhere, Ere Dyck . New pegocial facts do nok differ Bom ayenologeal Frcs #0 gual only: she sete ferent lsat BEY CE ween ley and the? GepsO8 3 tac condiions. «The mentally HS peoupa ie nt che save a8 Ht c aaa [ee group mene ASS yo aoe inroducvion 10S. A SOE S Te Mueller, The Rees iy Soctloga! Methods 2 0S G. 8. 6, Cah 1 JS Root Yoo: Free Bess 1938) 9. 2 iemphasis in ovginall : Beep example the collesion of ON irae ypons ociak cine NCIS See ioe eRe, ed The Nature of TNE re ceagiewood Cis NE Peet ce Hall, 1962 aso 3 Davie SUE ra ot ld Polite: the P75 Preaeanceatace,” journal of Soca SOV uly 1968), 127-156as, 16. Ww. ores 221 Seephen Withey and Daniel Katz, “The Social Psychology of Haraan Confles.” in Elton B. McNeil, ed., The Nature of Hinman Conflice (Englewood Clifs, NJ Prentice Hall, 1965), 3. €5. Herbert ©. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches to the Snidy of Intemational Relations,” in Herbert C. Kelman, ed., International Behavior: & Social Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 5-6, See also the references to the work of Werner Levi in chap. 6 on the mi- crocosniie theories of war Seo M. Jane Stroup, “Problems of Research on Sucial Conflict in she Area of International Relations,” jowmal of Conflict Resolution, IX (September 1965), 413-417, See also Coste, Fretions of Social Conflict, pp. 15-38; Jessie Bernard, “Parties and Issues in Confit,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, + (ene 1957), 4141-121; and Raymand W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder, “The Analysis of Social Conflict: Toward an Overview and Synthesis,” ibid, T (une 1957), 212-248. For the argument that Talcott Parsons's structurel-functional approach, zelegasing confi 10 the realm ofthe abnoreal, deviaer, and pathological, zendersisel in capable of explaining social change and conflict, se Ralf Dalcendort, “Toward a Theory of Social Conlicr,” journal of Covfict Resolution, 1 (June 1958), 170-183, According to Dalrendorf, Parsonians focused attention on problems of adjnsrmenc rather than of change. Far them, social conflict was essensally disrup- tive and dysfenetional. Dahrendor in his soriology, stressed change zather than persisting configurations, conflicr ether chan consensus. He presented his postu- {hues not to overtumn the Parsonien view, hr rather co complement it with an or ganic model of different emphases. He believed that neither model alone, but osly the two taken synthetically, can exhaust social reality and supply us with & com- plete theory of society in both its changing and enduring aspects. See Georg Simmel “Conic,” ans. Kust H. Wolff, in Conflict and the Web of Group “Affiliations [New York: Free Press, 1955). Simmel wrote: “Just as the universe nneeds fove and Aate—that is, atractive and repulsive forces—in order co have any form at all, s0 society, 100, in order #0 attain a dererminate shape, aseds some ‘quantiarive ration of harmony and disharmony, of assacration and competition, of favorable and unfavorable rendencics.” tid... 15. Even in relauvely hopeless Situauens, the oppartunicy 10 offer opposinon can help te reneler che unbearable bearable: “Opposition gives us inner satisfaction, distraction and relief, yest as de tummy and parence ander different psychological conditions” 4p. 49). See Le Coser, ed., Georg Simtel {Englewood Clifs, NFe The Fiee Press, 1955}, pp. 1~ See also R. G. Noch et al. "The friegrative Functions of Conflict,” Journal or Conflict Resclution, IV (September 1960), 355-374; Lewis A. Cores, “Some Social Functions of Violence,” Anwats of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLXIV (March 966}, 8-18; and Charles Lockhart, “Problems in the Management and Resolution of iaternational Confless,” World Politics, XOX (April 1977), 370 Seo the execllent chapter on “Ancient China,” in Frank M. Russell, Theories of International Relations (New Yorks Appleron, 1936}; Mousheng Lin, Men and ease Asx informal History of Chinese Political Thought (New Yorks [ohn Dey, 1942}; Atthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient Chita (London: Allen and Unwin, 1939 Anchor edition, 19561; H. G. Creel, Chinese Thought from Confucius £0 Mao Tse-tig (New York: New American Library, 1960), esp. pp. 51-53, 113-121, and 126-130; and Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, eds., The Humanist Way ir Arscient Chino: Essential Works of Covsfucianioon (New York:oe 222 18. 19. at 2. B. 24. 25. 26. vw. 28. qe ouneR THEORIES OF CORFUCT AND was shaman, 19651, poses GENE POI nat Mo-Tis followers sought 1° vt “avoid wars but were ‘willing to defend ‘py fores of axims ‘cities subject co wajust 4 30. ad een) of nese Colinton aN Pin ose (Cambedee, Enel week peidge University Pees, 183) Ps 88. Cae disasson of nto 19 apdnades ewe sua see D. MaRS Fer Phe White Umbrellas Ini STolineal Thougit from Mam fe Gand erty, aiversty of Cadoetig BI liga openly Pat U.N: Gosh 8 eyory of Hinds Potial Tne ies London: Orford University Pry 1923);.A- Le Bie agome Tundamentas of da seavcrate” in, Joo! Lane ob Basteanatve World Polis: Reais Sesteen and Dre-modern Now Wane Cortana Relations (Belmont, CS or et, 6), ep PP- AT SHE aN the Mpapter on wpscient Tale” oy Theos of Inzroatonel Relationss eae Palme, nian and West se Tht: coalescence ot lath rermea Political Scenes Review rene Sepreber 1958), 7477618 Coons Models, "Kavala: Forsign Pobey ar frcereationa System inthe ANGST Hinde | Mode enc Political Silene AE Spal (Geprember 1964, 49-560, Q 3 Jorn Surmer, Greek Prlosehnas here Pato Dew Yorks Maca as: 1361), tp. 72-74 Bercand Ruse tory of Wesiers Piosaphy (NE ‘York: Simon PR Schuster, 1245) P12 a9, Bato, The Republi, tans: F Me comaford (New York: Oxford Uniseticy PS 1945}, 800k Tl Rail, Potties, Baoks NT sed ‘ist rans, Esnest Barker (Oxford, nglanst Biford University Peesss 1946) Onerties, Tae Peopoomeson rans, Rex Warner (larmondsworths roland Pongait, 19549. 56. Fo" Pericles, see ids 9B. T1E-72}- a Jeane, oCinwscwlth NOW ene wapreditabiity of Wan” ee avronal Securit, 47 (Wistes 1992193), 6 ‘Coleman Phillipson, THe ines ya Late aed Castor of APT Grevce and Grote, Vol TL {Londons Macinslans 941), pp: 192-495. oid, Vol By pp. 322-343 hid Vol. hp: 223- seg Gwe, Cera aid the Romer epubie Rareondaworth Ener ebicam Books, 1956 pp. 4143 2 Bonk a A Be Gibb, Mohormneden an Historical Survey (New Yo NES, Fa Gr bibrary 3958198. S7-SE ee dunes has wee 69 AE expose amen de subject, War ond De oe na of Ita (Bator MO: Jobe Topline Press, 29531 and The ee rheoey of interanional RESET and 18 optimorany Relevance” im fe See eo eee slam and Inara ‘Relations (New Yoo: Praeaes 1565), pp. 24-394 “Holy Sab piinary Power and | etgion,” Report of 2 SemunE ay Ete Royal Usiteg Seis ET 9 MAY Mob, Rear Admnal EF Gass Sein soe Chait (London: RUS’ ‘snategion uales, 1980}, 47625 a8 Themnard Lewisy “Toe Rees, oe easy” in Mistael a Seat, Tae Mele Eat Reale {iene Brunswick, NP Teenssctoh ‘Books CY cop pp. 79-82: Absa Gechemda has poimned ont HS wihad 3 bet reseed a5 eanencal swegele” Of ppl efor” ater then oly was” BEE wargpa lar sppronee 1 oreety detesive and offing arposes “EF ae ure kind oF wold UB quiran envisions” James TOE johns0 pee Fonn Kelsay edb C798 Croseant ond Sword: The ustifictio” at ar suaion of War m the Wester amie Tradition (New Yous ‘Grea 19901, p39,28, 30, ee 2, 33, Nowes 223 Brown, White Umbrella, p. M3, For the beliefs and practices of the Israelites in the ages of the prophets and judges. before the rise of political kings, see Exodus 15:1-2i; Deuteronomy 20:1-20 and 23x15; josbus 1:19, 2:23, 3510, and 6:119; Judges 7:2-22 and 2 Samuel 5:24. See also Everew F, Gendler, “War and the Jewish Tradition,” ia James Finn, ed Conflict of Loyalties (New Yorks Pegasus, 1968}s George Foor Moors, Juans, Vol. 2 :Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1966}, po. 105-107; Roland de Vaux, anciont Isiael: Is Life ond fustitutions (New York: MeGraw-Elill, 1961), pp. 215-267: “Was,” asicle in the Jewish Encyclopaedia, Vol. 12 (London: Funk and Wagnalts, 1505), pp. 463-465; ¥. Yarden, “Warfare in the Second Millenium 2.0." in Benjamin Manzas,ed., The History of the Jewish People (New Brunswick, Nj: Ruegers University Pvess, 1970}; and “Peace (Sholom),” aniele in The Encyclopaedis Judaica, Vol. 13 (jerusaler Keter Publishing Company, anc New York: Macnullan, 171}, pp. 275-282, For the later themes of love, justice, and peace, see the books of Isaiah Jeremiah, Hosea, and Amos. in the New Testamens seriprures, see Macthew 26:7 and 52; Luke 1431-33 and 22:38, See also john Cadonx, The Early Church and the World (Edinburgh: T & T Clerk, 1925}, pp. 36 and 51-57; Roland 1. Bainton, Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace (Nashville, FN: Abingdon Press, 1960), chaps. 4, 5, and 6; Peter Brock, Pacifisns in Europe to 1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University ress, 19723, pp. 3-24s Edward A. Ryan, Sociery of Jesus (5,).). “The Rejection of Military Service by the Early Chrstiaas,” Theological Sedies, 13 (March 1952}; Knut Willem Ruyter, “Pacifism and Miltary Service in the Early Church,” Cross Currents, 32 [Spring 1982}; Joan D. Tooke, “The Development of the Christian Actitude Toward Was Before Aquinas,” Chaprer 1 in The Just War it Aquinas and Grotius ‘London: SPCK, 1365} G. 1. A. D. Drapes, “The Origins of the Juse War Tradition,” Now Blackriars [November 1964 F. Homes Dudden, The Life and Tintes of Saint Ainbrose, Vol. 2 (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1945), pp. 538-53% Saint Augustine, Ths City of God, tans, Demetrius B. Zema, 8, J and Gerald G. Walsh, (New Yorks Fathers of the Chuseh, 1950}, Book 4, chap. 15, and Book 19, chap. 12; James E, Doughersy, The Bishops ad Nuclear Weapons: The Catholic Pastonid Leiter ox War and Peace (Plasnden, CP: Agchon Books, 1984), pp. 18-82 St. Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologica,” 220e, Question 40, Acticle 1 in Aquinas, Selected Political Writings, trans. J. G. Dawson (Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1248}, p. 159; Tooke, “Cheistian Acioude Toward Was," 21-25; James E, Dougherty, Bishops and Nuclear Waxpors, pp. 42-7. James Turner Johnson, The just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historieal Inquiry (Princeton, Nj: Princeton University Press, 1981), Frederick Russell, The just War in the Middie Ages (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1975) E. B. R Midgley, The Nateral Law Tradition and the Theory of international Relarions (New York: Bacnes aad Noble, 1975), pp. 62-93; James R. Childress, “Just War Theories,” Theologicat Studies, 39 (Seprember 1978). Becsuse medieval society éxalzed cavalry aver infantey, only 2 limited number of full-fledged warriors was available, Given the lovr level of the aumor-making arts, the fulp equipped mounted knight represented a considerable investment. Monarchs lacked the financial and organizational resources to raise and cvaintain large professional acmics. Europe, with population sparse and agsi- calural methods poos was usually preoccupied with basic problems of survival. Furthermore, the inticate feudal network of laad-loyalty relationships gave rise224 35, 36. 37. 38. 40. aL sug OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND wa, so many conics of feley amon vassals ar Jords, ia 2 sociesy of delicately bal to ma ening wivonships, ass wee FTO ‘put they were waged 2° 9 aoe ale for sey Timited objectives. $55 PAE irene, Econortic nd Socal Fa vof Medieval Europe (New Yorks ‘Harcoust Brace Jovanovich, 1937 osenhs Stayer and Rushton, Cawley Fendafiom in History Peineetons NF dosent Universe Press 3956) FL. Gann TFaudatism (London: Longmans Pe orad Richard A. Preston, Sydney B ON and Herman ©. Were, Mer it ‘pro! A Pistory of Warfare an Its ay casts uth Westerns Soci frre Prange, 1952), chaps. 6 aa 7, Fos a8 So tf the rules of warfare laid yee Ae aie Catholic Church daring che n asih century wader eae “Eevee of dor BY ihe "Peace of God,” se Artur NustDS vA Concise History of the cody Nations (Neve York: Macs 12) 18. Crayne Dyes, War (New Yorks Crow 1985}, p69. ee Fronciseo de Vitoria, De Dndis et DE Tne Dal Relectiones, ans, oln F Bate Tevashingcon, DC: Casnerie Endowment ee nrernational Peace, $917) Francisee Haare be Trplie Virsa Theologist, DP: NA, "De Bello," im Selection from set gs (onford, England: Cacendan, 12° Tatthazar Ayala, Three Books Toe tae of Wan te Duvies Corea vain, Wier and. Malitary Dsscplive etatngton, DC: Casaege Intitares 1307. ‘Goamericn Wate), Le Droit des Gens (Sachngton, DC: Carnes Intre 17001 Ee Albericus Gents, De lire Bell vere jobe &. Rolle Oxiord, England ‘Clarendon, 1933). Joan U. Net, War and Han Progr cambridge, MA: Harvard Universi Jere. 1350), pp. 250-259: Richard & BO ree Mien ie Arras, chap. 9s Dyes ‘Wen ps 67 Broce Portes, War and he Rie Sirahe Nation Seats (New York: Free Pee 1 pan Trg he Hagieenh ones 4. Lewis May (New York: World, 1963), p- 18. Pree et Natny Drench Liberal Thoth ighisonth Conciry, 2nd Koray Re ork Usiveriy Bet 19SAH CN xt. row Mpovee Nicolas €=_ Catia, Mang Ripert, Ontlines of Joan ose rogae f the ama apa, Excerpts Krom English translation of 1802 in Hans ‘Kobi, Making of the ‘Moderit French Mind Eat apg Van Nosrand Al Books 0°01 97-98 eceion Sein anand Fallen ey Vere: diaurel Reader (New York: Del, 1959), 13-14 aes Toscan the Present ad For Peace of Europe opciones it Frederick Tofles ‘and E. Gordon “Alderfes, ds, The Witness ‘of Wallicrm Pens (New Yorks Macmillan, 1957% BP wT4d-159; Abe de Sr. Pierse, A Project for Maki Yori Mead bare, repented 6 C:E VSSEIO Si, Poieal Writings Of Jenmejactts Rousceas Volume T (Cambridge, England: University ‘press, 1915), oe, Tenis Rowse 4 (2 TA Sprough ti Federation OF Europe and the State of War, tans. C. E Vawehan (London: Constable Publishers, 19171 Jmmanuel Kent, Perpetssal Peace (New York: ‘Liberal xt8, Paty ane jreny Benda, Plan (6 et eeat and Perpeinel POs, reprinced in Charles WO Eyesest, Jeremy Benthane (London: Weidenielé and t Wicolson, 1966), PP 195-223. ee Froor War, ap, 68-72, The ‘death toll in che Revolutionary and ‘Napoleonic wats, 4 Nero e illd was ols ML8B. 44 45 46. 47, 48. 48. 50, SL. 2, 3. NOTES 225 See Hency A. Kissinger, A World Restored—Europs after Nopoleon: The Palisies of Consents in a Rewolitionary Age (New York: Grosset and Dunlap Universal Library, 1984). See also Charles Brenig, The Age of Revolution and Reaction (New York: WW. Norton, 1970), chaps. 3-5. David W. Zeigles, "The Wars for German Reunification,” chap. tin War, Peace and Intemational Politics, 4th ed. (Boston: Little, Browa, 1987} Gordon A. Craig, Germany 1865-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), chap. 1. In the American Civil War, 622,000 soldiers dicd, That total was greater han the ‘combined total for US. military personnel in the two world wars, plus Korea and Vietaam, although the population of the country was much larger in the 19898 than in the 18603. Dyes, War, v.77. QUA, Preston ex ly "Approach to Total Warfare,” chap. 15 in Mon in Arms: A History of Warfare end Its Inserrelastanships with Western Society 4th ed. (New ‘York: Hale, Rinehart and Winston, 1979) Dyes, War pp. 7-8, 150; Preston ee al, Men in Arms pp. 244-245, 250-2535, Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August {New Yorks Dell, 1962), pp. 91-95. Jonathan Dymond, An hiquiry into the Accordancy of War with the Principles of Christianity and an Examination of the Philosophical Reasoning by Which It Is Defended, 3d ed. (Philadelphia: Brown, 1834} Norman Angell, The Great [usion: A Stedy of the Relation of Milizary Power to National Advantage (New York: Putsam’s, 1910), p. 73. One of the arguments employed by Angell to prove that evonomic prosperity can be separated from mi ftary capability was thar the caconal bonds of small nonmiirary states were ough after by investors as more secuze than bonds of che larger military powers, In ceburtal to Angell, j H. fones of the University of Glasgow pointed ou that the iiltary expenditures of the Jarger powers crested the conditions of international Sabllity and security on which smaller nations depended, in The Economics of War and Conquest {Londoa: King and Sen, 1915), p. 25. For a skepscal cotqic ff the view that calways, steamships, and inemational commerce promote friendship among nations and were responsible for long periods of peace in nine: teenth-century Europe, sce Geoflrey Bjsiney, The Causes of War, drd ed. (New York: Macmillan-Free Press, 1988), esp. chap. 2 ‘Angell, ibid, p. 335, For Herbert Spencer's view that wat is too costly and descruc- tive for industrial societies, see his Principles of Sociology, Vol. 11 (New York ‘Appleton, 1898), pp. 568-642. George Liske's views are discussed in chap. 4. Kail von Clausewitz, On War, cans. ©. J. Mathhias Jolies (New York: Modern Librecy-Random House, 1343), pp. 5, 30, 34s cf. also Sit Basil H. Liddell Far, “The Objective in Wag” in B. Mitchell Simpson, ed, War, Strategy and Marizise Power (New Bronswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 197) p. 33; Hans ‘Rothfels, “Clavsewite,” in Edward Mead Encl, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy Princeton, Nj Peincevon University Press, 1943}, pp. 93-945 and Peter Parer, “Clausewitz,” in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, Ni Princeton University Press, 2986), pp. 201-202. Claasewite, On War, p. 2, held that the abstraes object of disssming the encons “by mo means universally ocewrs in. practice, aor is sta necessary condition « peace.” See also San Tr, The Art of War, rans, and with Introduction by Samutct B. Griffith (Cambridge, England Clacendon Press, 1963), pp. 40-48. GW. F Hegel, "Philosophy of Right and Law,” paragraph 324, ta Carl J Friedrich, ed, The Phulosonby of Hegel (New York: Random House-Modern Library, 1953}, p. 322.226 THE OLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR 54. Cheis Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (New York: Colubia University Press, 1992), pp. 59-69, Brown discusses owo Binglish idealists, T, H. Green and Bernard Bosenquet, who were influenced by Hegel but reached different eonchisions fram bis tpp. 68-69) 55. “What is good? All that enbances the feeling of power, the Will-o-Powe ard power iself in man, What is bad? Alf that proceeds from weakness, What is hap- finest? The feling that power is increasing—that resistance kas been overcome Not contentment, but more powers not peace at amy prie, bue war; not virtue, but cflicieney. The weak and the botelied shalk perishs frst prineiple of oue bumentsy. ‘And they ovght even to be helped ro perish, What is moze harmed than any vice? Peacteal sympathy with al the borched and the week-—Christianity.” From “The Tulighe of the Idols (1888},” in Groffrey Clive ed., The Philosophy of Nistesche [New York: New American Library, 1965), p. 42? 56. Human, Ail Too Human, Vol. } (1878), pp. 372-373. La sharp contrast 10 Nietasche’s exaltation of war, William James hoped that peaceful activities involy- ing a challenge co streaubus exertion and sacrifice could serve as a substirate oz wwac in providing the “social vitamins” genecated by war. The philosopher-p53- chologist recognized that war and zhe military life met cercain deep-cooted needs of societies and summoned forth human efforts of heroie proportions, He did aot think it possible ro attenuate the proclivity 0 wae until these same energies could be redirected-—for axample, by taining young men to fight not other hurnan ings but such naveaai forces as diseases, oods, poverty, and ignorance. If she na~ tion is nor to evolve into a sociery of moliycoddles, youth raust be conscripted to hrardship tasks to "gee the childishness knocked out of them.” See William Jarnes, “The Moral Equivalent of Wan” Memories and Soudies (London: Longmans, 1512); and A Moral Equiuslent for War (New York: Cacnepie Endowment for International Peace, 1926), Later, Aldous Huxley was to popularize che hypodie- tus that mony people find an exhilaration in war because their peacetime pursuits tre humiliating, boring, and frustcating, War brings wih ita state of chronic em hustosm, and “life during warcime takes on significance and purpesefulness. 30 thot even the riost intrinsically boring job is enabled as ‘was work'.” Prosperits is artificially induced; newspapers are filled with inceresting news; and the rules of Sexual morality are relaxed in wartime. However, Huxley, vecting just before World War fl, conceded thar she conditions of modern war have become 80 ap- ‘palling that not only the eivlians en the hoane front, buc “even the most nararsliy Raventaroue and combative human beings will scon come 10 hace and feas dhe process of fighting." Ende and Means (New York: Harper Row. 1937) Eacerpted in Roberr A. Goldwin et al, eds., Readings in World Politics (New ‘Yorks: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 13-14, Friedcich Meineeke, Machiavellian: The Doctrine of Raison d‘Eist and iss Plsce jn Modera History (New York: Prneger, 1957), ¢. 371 and fin cap. 14 58, Heinrich von Teeitschke, Politics, I (New York: Macmillan, 1916}, p. 525. 39) “We have learned ro perceive dhe moral majesty af war shrough the very processes which to the superficial observer seem brutal and inhuman. The greatness of wat ig jase what or fst sight seems 10 be its horror—that for the sake of their country tmen will evercome the natural feelings of urmaaity, that they will slaugheer their fellowmen who have done them no injury, nay whom they pechaps respect A hivaltous fees, Man will not only sacrifice his life, but ehe natural nl jastiie Spotty of his soul; , - here we have the sublimity of wax” Ibid., pp. 995-396 ‘Guoted in Frank M. Russel, Theozies of International Relotions,p. 245.notes 227 shred Thayer Maban, Armaments and Arbitration (3812), p31, Quored i ae oe tacion, «The Sésls of American Tatemational Thought, Main, Sarak and Tippmenn,” Word Pobis, XVIL July 1968}, $90. The foregoing Cursmary of Maban is based largely on Tariton’s analysis. sa vietor The Mind and Socity, Val. TV ttans, A. Bongioxas 40° agen (New Yorks Harcourt Brace, 1935), Bp, 2370-2175 and 12179-2220; eae nce, The Kalng Class rans H, D. Kab (New York: Motiow il, aca ar inteening and valuable assetrments of beth Parero and Mosca se rae UL of faces Burnham, The Mcbimultans: Deforders of freedom (New York: Jobn Day, 1943). 1 ntet ociied war as « zomantic advencure and aa 3 nacessay cormens for aro rile and sybase tendencies of odem south, See Edwatd MeNail Tena, Eas i Confit: The Politica! Taeorias of the Contemporary ‘World (New ‘York: Norton, 1960}, p. 94 se Conia Songlee The Decline of the West, rans. Charles F.Askinson ( York: Kenge, 1926-1928), 2 vols. and The How of Decision, ens, Charles F. Retoa ibvew Yorks Knoph, 12%4% Benedetto Groce, Theory and Historiography, cans. D Ainelee (London: 192). 65. Hak fumes Gregor, The Fascist Persuasion Radiea! Pobtics Peieeseh NI Sea eee Dees, 1974), Anthony Jares forts Fascom ine Cans cary World: daology, Eeoltion, Resurgence (Houlden CO- We Or, [Seon leap. 3 ML. §. Faers, The Social Philosophy of Cicvan Gentle Tents Uaiversiey of linois Pres, 1960), Set alo Noel OvSulvasy Pats sore 5 Ke. Dent, 1983} Ernest Nels, Threw Faces of Fasc New York treet ahr 8 Wison, 1965 Zece Stecnkell ct al, The Birth of Cont tMeningy wane David Matsel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univeriy Pei 1993); nee aoe Boscia Pas, Prevent, Fare (New York: Oxford Univesity Press, 1996). Go, Wang Lous Horowitt ed, The Anarene (New Yorks Dell 1968) Gor the edie tor’s introduction, p- 22 eee trons Thomas G. Masaryk, in Hosowtts ibid pp. $6472 Sr Hocewien, narckst, pp. 4455. See also Alun Ries, Anarchy (Carobsidge: por eige University Prose, 1280}; Paul Thoman, Katt Marx ard he “Anarchists ade alndg tnd Regan Pe, 1990 David Millet, Anarshion (London) M. Dent, 1984). 68, George Sol, Reflections on Vilonce (New Yaris Maciillats 969) Pe 77-9, Georges Sor ap 2, sVidlence andthe Decadence of che Middle Clssess See Tas ee sone A Note on Myth ang Vilence,” in Bran Macias: 2 ra gec lio, The Pragmate Revolt Pols: Sodan, Fascism and are nttutional State [New York: Howard Ferg, 1968), 9p. 911-141 3 seater iat, pp. 52-54 Francs W. Cokes, Recon Poin! Thou’ SS" Sess Aebiron, 19541, chap. Vd esp pp 222-225. Set souses el 0s »s, Ti. Quowd at Davie Bell, The Cultural Gontradicnons of Capitals “ork Saat asyeshn 6. Contemporary eeorstsofen selec a zandom, fr ade eankipe or imarden appeal members of the group ot cass they sek f9 AOE seein int personnsl, diplomats, air wavelers of restau Gee) See Cee sents and Terrovion (New York: St. Masts 1974) fal Raed Ha er Towra (New Yorks Wiley 1974 and J, Bowyer Bek Fon eens The Aralsis of Political Violence,” World Politic KAT (april 197), 476~488.WAR, ape THE OLDER THEORIES OF cONFLICT AND gp, Sue J: Bowyer Bell, “Explatind Inernational Tertorisms: The Bluse Quest” in Shies Wt, Kegkey. J eds Tn" senator: Caracas, oN Cts New Yorks Marin ee soy pp 178-184, Haig Khaschadonre Cte Morality of Terrains” orceragh (New York: Lang, 1998) aul johaso" ae Mt searor ise eM a iy enh an a tay Sins of econ” 8 HeBE See. Terris, Pokal Violence and Deadly Ser (New Yor Universi Bee of America, 1984), p. 5. 3, Chis Brown, ntemauoral RICE, ye New Normative Aparasehes iNew ce otuabia Univessy Pees, UNE 132, orig Foe epee sale Of as lceranare Fetecing Ose awirodes, Por Recland H. Bainron, Christo” "araades Toward Wa avd Ponce (Nashville, eM tingdon Brest 1960) 158 Ce Menmest, ed, Nvelear Weapons rad the Conflict of Conscience CEN Tori Serine’, 1962) Gordon “Zabn, 4” comtpative 40 Wor (New Yor, Gouri on Religion and nvernational Affaics, Apeay tance Finn ey Peace 0 oa pes and tos Bom OSes YOR Coune’l 196 gion and Ircenational MGS, re Donald A, Wells, The War Myth Gee York: Pegasts 19678, Fa eagles, THe Nos Violent Croke (New ORT, Macmillan, 2968); Jone He seep telics of Jens (Grand Rept ME ote ne, 1972 Grae Stash, Ts sei ees of Non-Violent Action (USC Ccrgene, 1975 Josegh Faber mt vert pence tMearyknoll, NY! O-PS Books. Sipayy Thomas Mecton, The i olen aleynatioe (Sew Yor Me Stems sed Gizoun, 1980) ane The prcvb ard Yoo Borat: Necleoy OPT and the a vam Conscience, 2 rep0T OS oe prey under the chaienantiP of the Shop of Salbury Coadens ares Teg outs, 98H, TE 1 shel, eda, Just War No Lara Bos poue Dare, INE: Nowe PAE Uaiversity Press, 1988) 45, See Erich Fromm, “ThE OSE for Unilaseral Disarmament? Donald G- SRenpan, eds Arnis Comal, “ pormament and National See (lew York: Title, }96t}, pp. 187-197 Pfaiford ©, Sibley, “Unules ‘Disarraarncaty 8 aes A. Goldens dy AMI Beer Chicago: Baad McNally 1361) oanziad, Zab Alenia Wer so. Beat Ranney, War aml the Cor acence (Dusan NC: Duke UNE Baul Rag and The Lara of SeCE ew Work Counc 8 Religion and Bees ol fait, 19638 f6hH CoO Te ae Mavaliey and Moder {New York: Core Peace Fe ey 1959}; Rika’ A Fall La Morality avd War ie comemporny Worl Remese? Meio in ford Pobics No» § Fe agen, 3963}; Revert WE ‘Foe Juce or tBalsmsre: OS Hopkins Tetpecsiy Pees, 1960) and Te tet ican BTA Crtgue (1 York ‘Connell on Religion 20d eae Mal Affies, 12668 WING vy, OvBrien Suetegr Wn, Datersence ad Tonal (Wesrminstes, MD: Newn Prose, 1967 we te Conduct of Just at Tinted War (ew York! Tearess ‘omy; Micka aa se and Unnst Wars ea casks Books, 197775 ees F Johaso Jae Wer Train nd 68 i eet of War Princeton NI Pe ‘Gnivesst dats Richaed J Rega sot incised Cases (Sieg D et pey Bran Kanes Jus! Or land the Coro OO" (pethesds, MD: Internationa Senotans Publications; 1997) 77, OiBuien, Nucleat War, Deterrent ‘ed Morality, pp: 349 b> Tee Te Gulk War of 1991 wa Mecasion for a considerable cevival of ater. Te oe ae so Jars net aco Gaye tane ae ad we the Bear nthe Gull” Christa ca a (Febery 13. BPTI et a86, 81 22, 83, 84, as, Notes 229 Alan E Geyer, “Just War, had and Abuse of Tradition,” Christianity and Criss, 51 (Mareh 4, 1981), $1-53; Joho Howard Yoder, “just War Tradition: fs ft Credible?” Christians Coniwry, 108 (March 13, £994), 295-298; Stanley Hauerwas and Richard Jobn Neuhaus, “Pacifiam, Jost War and the Gulf." First Things, 13 (May 1991], 39-45; Jean B, Elsain, ed just War Theory (New Yorks New York University Press, 1991h James T. Jobson and George Weigel, Just War avd the ‘Gulf War, Center for Ethics and Public Policy (Lanham, Mi; University Press of America, 1991}; Michael K, Daffey, “The Just Wae Teaching: From. Tonkin Galf to Persian Gull,” America, 168 (Febuary 2, 1991), 83 ff John P. Langen, “The Just Waz Theory after she Gull War” Theologica! Studies, 53 (March 1992}, 95-11 Brian j. Hekin,“Jusc War Theory in 2 Post-Cold War World,” The Journal of Religious Ethics, 20 Fall 1992), 237-265. See Ralph B. Poites, War and Moret Diseaurse (Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1969); Robert Ginsberg, e., The Critique of War (Chicago: Regnery, 19693, Richard A. Wasserstcom, Wir and Morality (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1970 Motion A. Kaplan, td. Strategic Thinking and its Moral tmphwatians (Chicago: University of Chicago Cencer for Policy Seady, 1973)s [ames T. Johnson, “The ‘Crsise Missile and the Neutron Bomb: Some Moral Reflections,” Worldonew, 20 (December 1977}; Robert L Phillips, Wer and justice {Oklahoma City: Griversity ‘of Oklahoma Press, 1984); John D. jones and Mate F Griesbach, eds, fst War ‘Theory w the Nuclear Age (Lanhate, MD: University Press of America, 1985), Willian V. O'Brien and Johe Langan, S.J, eds., The Nuclear Dilemma and the Just War Tradition (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1986}, For the debate over the theology of liberation and the morality of revolutionary violence, see the October 1968 issue of Worldview, devoted to “Revolution and Violence”; Gustavo Gutticrez, “Liberation and Development,” Crass Currents, 21 (1971); Philip E, Berryman, “Latin American Liberation Theology,” Theological Studies, 34 (December 1973}; Guenter Lewy, Religion anid Revalition {New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), esp. chap. 20; Francis P Forenza, “Political Theology and Liberation Theology,” in Thomas M. McFadden, ed., Liberation, Revolution and Freedom: Theological Perspectives iNew York: Scabury Press, 1975} Gustavo Guttierez, A Theology of Liberation, trans, Caridad inda and John Eagleson (Maryknoll, NY; Orbis Books, 1978), Dennis & McCann, Christian Realisor and Liberation Theology (Maryknoll, NY. Orbis Books, 1981), and Quentin 1, Quade, ed,, The Pope and Revolution: Jobn Pan! B Confronts Liberation Theology (Washington, DC: Ethics and. Public Policy Center, 1982) ‘Walzes, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 278. Tid, 9,274, Chris Brown defends Walzer against what he regarded as patroniz- ing British crities of Walzer’s hook, sho ealled his philosophical grasp of che is- sues shallow and his notion of morality platitudinous. In Brown's view, Walze's baok isthe best current work on the subject. international Relasions Theory: New Normative Approaches, p. 136. Michel Walzes,"A Response,” Eahics ard International Affans, 11 |3997), 99-104. Joseph Boyle, “Just and Unjust Wars: Casnistry and the Boundaries of the Moral World,” ibid., 83-98, For other defenses and critiques of Welzey, see the arscles by Theodore J. Koontz, David C. Hendrickson, and Michael joseph Smith in the Concerning the ethics of the strategy of nuclear deterrence, see (in addition to the works cited in Notes 74, 76, and 73): Geoffrey Goodwin, ed, Ethies and Nuclear86. 97. jeg CLDER THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND WAR etervonce (Sew Yorks St. Martin's Pess, 19821, FETT Grisec, “The Moral Implications of cron journal 2 (Winter 498235 Francis X- Winters, Society SNaclesr Deterrence Morality: Atlaurie Winey Bishops in Tension,” Theolosial Sete, "43 (September 1982); Jobn. Carr, (S),) "The American Ferarchy a8 ‘Nuclear Weapons,” ibid David Sana (0) J htacear Weapons and Nuclear 0 “phe Shape of the Catholic ce Eid Wecersber 1982}; The Cong of Poms, God's Promise and Oct Rerpume, US. Cathole Bishops’ Paso) fey ‘War and Peace, Text in cite KC Docamentary Serie 13 (May 1% opsieL. Bruce vac Vaorst, “The Or od Maeae Deteconce,” Foran AV, G1 (Spring 1983), Albert aac eBishops, Staten and, Over Se the Bombing of Innocents,” TL, Davidson, Nuclear War ard the ‘American Churces Modern Warfare (Bovides, CO Aone can Sg jis Castell The Bihoos ad the “Bomb: Waging Peace in the Mates lige (Garden ity, NY: Doubleday. tne. {983} Michael Novak, Movat Clorty in the Nuclear Age was Nelson, 1983)5 Philip t Lantos 04, Justice ane War in the Nu ‘am, MD: University Press of Taleo eigeay Toth &. Does S: Jo cde THE Catholic Bishops and Nuclear fave ishing, DC: Georgetown Universi) Mc “1984); James E. Dougherey ae papi and Nuclear Weapens (Hamden £P Aachon Books, 1994), e8P sree, Sand 6 Seace ME. Russert, EDS) ‘Dilemmas of Nuclear Deterrence,” cha onal Sec, 8 (Spring, BAD; Michae, Fox and Leo Grosrks, Nuclear Fer ophal Perspectives (ew Yor: Pett ‘Land, 1985): George Weigch Fronpatiaas Ordos: The Peesent Falhrs end Fatwre. Prowse of Americar Fe pong om War ond Peace (Nese YOR ‘Onord University Press, 19878 cara Jean Dike, Sacement fhe COMMAS ‘Peace, Bpiseopal Diocese Th Meatington, 1987. Ths more tecnial ques) ‘of deterrence stracegys the ot eeiebaey of avclear was, « NATO BOL ro Best use, ete possibilty OF substituting comventio c Me tang related issues are discussed Ba Chapter 8. See a0 , nr Debates Deterrence ad 6 Lapse of Faith (Ne James Scezba, “Reconeli .° Social Theory ard. Practice, 18 (all 2292), Crate asthe ieeconcxbiey of Paci jst War Theory A Response er ibid 20 {Sumner 1994), 117-238 See James Sterba, “Reconelling sya ost War Theoriss Rested” RASPETS Reitan, ibid, 135-142, See Racism, "beyond Jost War aad Paci Nonviolent Strugel® Towel jJostice, Freedom and Peace.” The TBasonenicat Review, 48 (psi! 1996). Jost Aspro, jus Peace: A Review Faas ‘Chistian Pecifism a2 aan Ratton Sues Review, 22 (ptt 1990) 129-4 Serceperasions of Confit Ethic, Pacfsme ‘aad the Just Wan” Rossa, 39 Cluly August 1952) 30-3h-