Crim Reviewer

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO ENACT PENAL
LAWS
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general condemnation
of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our criminal justice
system. No act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege.
Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be
considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect
then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing
punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment). The absence of malicious intent does not
automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal
liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa).
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 151258, February 1,
2012, CJ. Sereno

The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this case on 10 February 1991
led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.[1] Due in large part to the brave efforts of his
mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death.
This widespread condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in
1995, that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of the law was to discourage members from making
hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.[3] Moreover, the
law was meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of consent and initial innocent act in the
conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[4]

Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.[5] Within a year of
his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the
University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng
Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga of
the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in
Baguio City.[6]

Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our
criminal justice system [N]o act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by law.[7] Nullum crimen,
nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or
injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of
the law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments,
and to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.

Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v.
People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R.
Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).

FACTS
 The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and the trial court,[9] are as
follows:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of
Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were
Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert
Navera, Geronimo Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).

On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to
have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their briefing, they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from
the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of
the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were
then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites included the Indian Run,
which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their
backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their
legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the
Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the
latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans;
and the Auxies Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical
pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity
principles. They survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to present comic
plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or
legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment
them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that
they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members[10] Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites,
Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he
reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the
neophytes to paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows,
one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining
of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no
longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was
officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering and incoherent
mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans
started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him
warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced
dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
 Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.[11] On
the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in
abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.[12]

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91),
holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized
with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial
court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the
remaining nine accused commenced anew.[14]

On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding of conspiracy by the
trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the
accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the
following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi,

Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza,
Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted, as
their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio

Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime
of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also
ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of 30,000 as indemnity.

3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced
them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion
temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny
Villa in the sum of 50,000 and to pay the additional amount of 1,000,000 by way of
moral damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against
accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.[16]Meanwhile, on different
dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of
accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.[17]On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
89060 & 90153[18] reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.[19]

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually
brought before this Court.
G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10
January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof
beyond reasonable doubt.[20]

While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a Notice
of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March
2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not
survive the death of the accused.

G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People

Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CAs Decision
dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520.[21] Petitioner sets
forth two main issues first, that he was denied due process when the CA sustained the trial courts
forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the
CA did not apply to him the same ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused.
[22]

As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizons right to present
evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an earlier date since a co-
accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his
right should not have been considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement.
He argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was
ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.

Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been acquitted,
like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation rites and were not tainted
by evil motives.[23] He claims that the additional paddling session was part of the official activity of
the fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation
rites decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the
paddling.[24]Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that the individual blows
inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in Lennys death.[25] The Solicitor General
purportedly averred that, on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could
not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of
the victim.[26]

Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims that
Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons father, since the latter did not have a
car, and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space
was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking
space were only part of the psychological initiation. He then cites the testimony of Lennys co-neophyte
witness Marquez who admitted knowing it was not true and that he was just making it up.[27]
 Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of
concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the neophytes, who
mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny
to prevent the latters chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny
through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is
contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and concern for the victims well-being.

G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 10 January
2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it acquitted 19
(Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight
physical injuries.[28] According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have
been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at
the time Lenny died.

In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld,
inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries
led to the victims death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the
resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] The said article
provides: Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the Solicitor
General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
setting aside the trial courts finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of the crime.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona

Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of
the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos.
89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused Escalona,
Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case
No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the nine
other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For various reasons, the initial trial of the case
did not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.

Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused,
namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to assert their right
to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that the prosecution cannot be
faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were
still in the appellate court.
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.

ISSUES

1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes denial of due
process;

2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for violation of the right
of the accused to speedy trial;

3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the liability of each
accused according to individual participation;

4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and

5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.

DISCUSSION

Resolution on Preliminary Matters

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this Court
took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.

According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties is
totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is
extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term personal penalties refers to the
service of personal or imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias)
refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense complained of
(i.e., civil liabilityex delicto).[33] However, civil liability based on a source of obligation other than
the delict survives the death of the accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.[34]

Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both
personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict complained
of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed
and terminated.

G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)

In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for
accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5thand 12 of October 1993.
[35] The Order likewise stated that it will not entertain any postponement and that all the accused who
have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their
evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required shall therefore be
construed as waiver to present evidence.[36]

However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that his
client Antonio General would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the counsel would adopt the
testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already testified.[37] Because of this development
and pursuant to the trial courts Order that the parties should be ready at all times down the line, the trial
court expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date 25 August 1993 instead of his originally
assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993.
[38] Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To address
the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a
previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates originally
assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the Manifestation on the same date and treated
the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of the three-day-notice rule under the Rules
of Court.[40] Consequently, the trial court ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted
to a waiver of that right.[41]

Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the trial
court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the 25 August 1993
hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not
supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he
was ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask for a
resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to present evidence
on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the
schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.

The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution
itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel This constitutional right includes
the right to present evidence in ones defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and defend oneself
in person at every stage of the proceedings.[44]

In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defenses

presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was cancelled due to
lack of quorum in the regular membership of the Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the
agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his
counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing the
issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order
further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence because of his nonappearance at
yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings. In ruling against the Order, we held thus:

Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of
Court, Crisostomos non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a
waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only and not for the
succeeding trial dates

xxxxxxxxx
 Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have
been deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights
may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual
intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or
even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the
waiver due to the agreement of the prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present
case, the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware
of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not
enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to
attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally
in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even
forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to
present evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22
June 1995 hearing.

Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case

involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the
accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could personally conduct a
searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.[46] (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25
August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have considered the
excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused General had made a last-
minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was
not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates
for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have
done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused
of all his pre-assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
due process.

Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to
present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the criminal case or
to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that
where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or
irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the
rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable
doubt by the evidence on record.[48]

We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case at bar.
Neither can we see any procedural unfairness or irregularity that would substantially prejudice either
the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by
accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what
he is really contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the
CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition
that all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional rites, and that the alleged extension of the
initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity.[49] He even argues that Dizon did
not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned.[50]
 For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or justice to
another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding the case for the
reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This
case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts
necessary to decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)

Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should not have
been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time.
She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against
them, and that they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case against their co-
accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions to
Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that the prosecution could not
be faulted for the delay in the movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may
require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals.[51]

The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there be a trial free from vexatious, capricious
or oppressive delays.[53] The right is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended with unjustified
postponements of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried
and for no cause or justifiable motive.[54] In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts
should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case.[55] The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.
[56] Also to be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the
right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.[57]

We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the
right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.[58] As a consequence, an appeal or a
reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double jeopardy.
[59] As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is
capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges
the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of
discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy from
attaching.[62]

We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case against accused
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy trial. The
court held thus:

An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the
following factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below:

xxxxxxxxx

5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and
the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring
them to secure certified true copies of the same.
 xxxxxxxxx

While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that
contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold
that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x.

xxxxxxxxx

[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of
the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to
comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies
of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September 21,
1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the
Department of Justice, to secure the complete records of the case from the Court of
Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the said Order as in fact, the same
directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still,
there was no compliance on the part of the prosecution. It is not stated when such order
was complied with. It appears, however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said
records were still not at the disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made
the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused
Concepcion x x x.

xxxxxxxxx

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002,
or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the
court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the
petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas
motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act upon, the
case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This prolonged inactivity
whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution frowns upon x x x.
[63] (Emphasis supplied)

This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On
29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not
commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]

As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity of the
Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts to an unreasonable
delay in the disposition of cases a clear violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
cases.[67] Thus, we held:

The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the
disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found
the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be
violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases;
similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay of
almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints
 before him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not quashing the information which
was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was filed and thereby depriving
petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant
case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade
already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that
accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the records that
would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De
Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)

The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates that when a
person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any
other manner without the consent of the accused the accused cannot again be charged with the same or
an identical offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience.
[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and
undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.[71] It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the
Constitution of the United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the
citizen,[72] viz:

Article III Bill of Rights

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right,
provides as follows:[73]

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to
reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the
same Rules.[74] The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid
complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the
charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the defendants express consent.[75]

As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a] verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will
put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed
purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the
defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction,
from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty.[76] We further stressed that
an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal.[77]

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower courts acquittal of
the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions:
(1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount
to a deprivation of due process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3) where there has
been a grave abuse of discretion.[80]

The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review must show
the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so
grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.[83] In such an event,
the accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.[84]

The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1) the
acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of slight physical
injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant and
petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent completely ignored the a)
Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioners Comment x x
x.[85] Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set
aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code.[86] The Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by
Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to hazing.[87]

In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties.[88] In People v. Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of
discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the
evidence.[89] Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.[90] Therefore, pursuant to
the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19
acquitted fraternity members.
 We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug the
four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.

Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies when
the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.[91]We have also recognized,
however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that
the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.[92] The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.

In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the CA
reasoned thus:

Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the
fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by
the victim as a result of the physical punishment heaped on him were serious in
nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means
to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical attendance required. To
do so, at this stage would be merely speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where
the category of the offense and the severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness
or incapacity for labor, the length of this period must likewise be proved beyond
reasonable doubt in much the same manner as the same act charged [People v. Codilla,
CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when proof of the said period is absent,
the crime committed should be deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De
los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this Court
is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda
and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.[93] (Emphasis supplied and
citations included)

The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding that the four accused
should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because of the death of the
victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance
required.[95] The reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that the
accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victims injuries neither
caused incapacity for labor nor required medical attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His
injuries were not even serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered
physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.

On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were
liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. According to the
court, the four accused were found to have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken
during such initiation rites on the person of Villa.[99] It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers
findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the multiple traumatic injuries he suffered
from the initiation rites.[100]Considering that the CA found that the physical punishment heaped
on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,[101] it was patently erroneous for the court to limit the
criminal liability to slight physical injuries, which is a light felony.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a person is found to
have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results
in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the
destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.

The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries punished under Articles
262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies is therefore tantamount to a
whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According
to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies should
be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a person, punished under Articles
246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the
aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally
inconsistent with each other, in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries
when actual death occurs.[102]

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts, in and of
themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own findings. From proof that the
death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he suffered,[103] the only logical
conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have
directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his
body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
criminally liable for slight physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy,
we therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.

Resolution on Ultimate Findings

According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the intentional
infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article
4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it was the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted.[104]

The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have been
no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to the conduct of
hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the
consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4
of them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2 Dizon and
Villareal were found guilty of homicide.

The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly
commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm maliciously, or to get
even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his own
desire to join a society of men pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous
admission rituals, just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal
laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief
exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical
and psychological initiations widely known as hazing.

Intentional Felony and Conspiracy

 Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.[105] The classical theory
posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to choose between
good and evil.[106] It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so
long as free will appears unimpaired.[107]The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that
humans are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of
pleasure and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to
cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing the crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is
thus based on the free will and moral blame of the actor.[110] The identity of mens rea defined as a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the predominant consideration.
[111] Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits.[112] In order for an intentional felony to
exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or malice.[113]

The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence,
and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation and with power to
choose between two things.[115] The second element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine
the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.
[116] The last element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act.[117]

The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the purpose of the mind and the
resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the
act, while intent concerns the result of the act.[120] While motive is the moving power that impels one
to action for a definite result, intent is the purpose of using a particular means to produce the result.
[121] On the other hand, the term felonious means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding
from an evil heart or purpose.[122] With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in
intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus
malus that the act or omission be done willfully, maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with
malice aforethought.[123] The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.[124] As is required
of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt.[125]

In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. Article 8
of the Revised Penal Code which provides that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it is to be interpreted to
refer only to felonies committed by means of doloor malice. The phrase coming to an agreement
connotes the existence of a prefaced intent to cause injury to another, an element present only in
intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is
unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal
design.[126] Here, a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence,
lack of foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.[127] Verily, a deliberate intent to
do an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony
committed by means of culpa.[128]

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.[129] Beingmala in se, the felony of
homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries.[131] Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred, unless
there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[132] Furthermore, the victims death must not
have been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed
without malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be
qualified as reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.[134]

Hazing and other forms of initiation rites

The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.[135] It is said that, throughout
history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging from military
groups to indigenous tribes.[136] Some say that elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle
Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for
upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,[138] where
young menrecruited into the military were tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of
their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for battle.[139] Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some
connection to these values of ancient Greek civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept
lends historical legitimacy to a tradition or ritual whereby prospective members are asked to prove their
worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain membership through hazing.
[141]

Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join an
organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.[142] The
neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long.[143] During the program, neophytes are required
to interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to
understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to participate
in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes, the
organization, and its active and alumni members.[144] Some chapters require the initiation activities
for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the entire neophyte stage.[145]

Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as prerequisite
for admission to an organization.[146] In hazing, the recruit, pledge, neophyte, initiate, applicant or any
other term by which the organization may refer to such a person is generally placed in embarrassing or
humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.
[147] It encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger
those who desire membership in the organization.[148] These acts usually involve physical or
psychological suffering or injury.[149]

The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago,
our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society namedKataastaasan
Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable Association
of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).[150] TheKatipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity
believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities approved
by the Catholic Church.[151] The Katipunans ideology was brought home to each member through the
societys initiation ritual.[152] It is said that initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point
of illumination, and were asked a series of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve.[153] They were made to go through
vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or [pagtalon] sa balon.[154] It would seem that they
were also made to withstand the blow of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to endure a matalas na
punyal.[155] As a final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership
papers with the his own blood.[156]

It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the
Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner of hazing in
the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.

Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do
exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to eat or drink
unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.[157] In 1901, General Douglas
MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second
year at West Point.[158]

In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured
during the shriners hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz membership.
[159] The ritual involved what was known as the mattress-rotating barrel trick.[160] It required each
candidate to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metalboard onto connected mattresses leading to a
barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb.[161] Members of Hejaz would stand on each
side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the barrel.[162]

In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Carolina,
were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings directly onto the
neophyte paratroopers chests.[163] The victims were shown writhing and crying out in pain as others
pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the chests of the victims.[164]

In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa
Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.[165] The fraternity members
subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the
chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of
a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and
punches to the body; and body slamming, an activity in which active members of the fraternity lifted
pledges up in the air and dropped them to the ground.[166] The fraternity members then put the pledges
through a seven-station circle of physical abuse.[167]

In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity
members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.[168]The hazing included the
following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces,
dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often
onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and yerks (a
mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity
and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and
running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2 a.m. meetings, during which the pledges would be hazed
for a couple of hours; and (7) running the gauntlet, during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and
hit as they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs.[169]

In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim Sylvester Lloyd was
accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.[170] He
participated in initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and torture,
psychological coercion and embarrassment.[171]

In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries
from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation rites.[172] Kenner and the other initiates went
through psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200
times.[173]

In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought initiation into the
campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.[174] The pledges
efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones,
together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks.
[175] In these rituals described as preliminaries, which lasted for two evenings, he received
approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.[176] During the last two days of the hazing, the rituals
intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the four-night initiation.
[178] Jones and several other candidates passed out.[179]

The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial birth by fire, through which
the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.[180] Some organizations
even believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the
organization to establish unity among the pledgesand, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of
the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities; improved academic
performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking opportunities; and the esprit
dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship and common cause.[182]

Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.

The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military.
[183] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress prohibited
all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.[184] It was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state
anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person
therefrom.[185]

However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the Committee
to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states increasingly began to enact
legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted
criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.[187]Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a
misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe situations.[188] Only a
few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs.
[189]

Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in death
or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.[190] In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of imprisonment
shall be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three years.[191] Indiana criminal law
provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal recklessness, a Class
D felony.[192]
 The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.[193] As an
element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in serious bodily injury, death falls under
the category of serious bodily injury.[194] A person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a
fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years.
[195] Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial
risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C felony.[196] A
Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.[197]

In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.[198] An individual
adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of not more
than two years or not less than 180 days.[199] Under Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily
injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.[200] A person who has been convicted of a third-
degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.[201] West
Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may be
found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor.[202] In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of
a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of another.[203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, or both.
[204]

In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was no
hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, wherein
Barry Ballous family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing
statute in South Carolina until 1994.[206]

The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not

proven beyond reasonable doubt

The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does not automatically
amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that
the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is a contextual background or
factual premise they are still criminally liable for intentional felony.

The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with the exception of
Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or
intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.

As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found that
the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical
injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently
been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking space
had been stolen by the victims father.[207] As to Villareal, the court said that the accused suspected the
family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareals
brother.[208] The CA then ruled as follows:

The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear
that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted
and so for the death of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the
consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime of homicide.
[209] (Emphasis supplied)
 We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.

The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the
existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed utterances
were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquezs
testimony:

Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were briefed as to
what to expect during the next three days and we were told the
members of the fraternity and their batch and we were also told about
the fraternity song, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were made to ride a
van and we were brought to another place in Kalookan City which I
later found to be the place of Mariano Almeda, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms
and then the driver of the van and other members of the Aquilans who
were inside left us inside the van, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, Villa akin ka,
Asuncion Patay ka and the people outside pound the van, rock
the van, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these
remarks uttered upon your arrival?

Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their
voices, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through,
what were the voices or utterances that you heard?

Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay ka sa amin, etc., sir.

Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the
rocking of the van which lasted for 5 minutes?

xxxxxxxxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted,
was there any utterances by anybody?

Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were
encouraging others who were pounding and beating us, it was
just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them enjoyed looking
us being pounded, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?

Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether matigas pa
yan, kayang-kaya pa niyan.

Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you
quote?

Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I

could not really pin point who uttered those words, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol
Express?

Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that
you remember?

Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he
would say that and I quote ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay
yung kapatid ko, so that would in turn sort of justifying him in
inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead of just walking, he
would jump on my thighs and then after on was Lenny Villa. He
was saying to the effect that this guy, his father stole the parking
space of my father, sir. So, thats why he inflicted more pain on Villa
and that went on, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?

Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.

Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your
family have his brother killed, what was your response?
Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up
sir. So he said that I knew nothing of that incident. However, he just
in fact after the Bicol Express, he kept on uttering those
words/statements so that it would in turn justify him and to give me
harder blows, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villas
father stole the parking space allotted for his father, do you recall
who were within hearing distance when that utterance was
made?

Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different people
who heard from time to time, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against
Lenny Villas father was made?

Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and
when Lenny Villas turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir.

Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas father?

Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.

Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?

Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and sometime he stand up
and he kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also
that accusations made by Dizon you or your family had his
brother killed, can you inform this Honorable Court what exactly
were the accusations that were charged against you while
inflicting blows upon you in particular?

Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that
his family who had his brother killed, and he said that his brother was
an NPA, sir so I knew that it was just a story that he made up and
I said that I knew nothing about it and he continued inflicting
 blows on me, sir. And another incident was when a talk was being
given, Dizon was on another part of the pelota court and I was sort of
looking and we saw that he was drinking beer, and he said and I
quote: Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan,
ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka
sa akin, sir.

Atty. Tadiar What else?

Witness Thats all, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician
came around as promised to you earlier?

Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:

Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated
that there was a briefing that was conducted immediately before your
initiation as regards to what to expect during the initiation, did I hear
you right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?

Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.

Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect
during the initiation?

Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would
be mocked at, sir.

Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the
likes?

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?

Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school.
All the bruises would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we
wear the regular school uniforms like long sleeves, it would be
 covered actually so we have no thinking that our face would be
slapped, sir.

Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on
your body but that will be covered?

Witness Yes, sir.

JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that
would create bruises to your body?

Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or
paddle, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation
procedures is psychological in nature?

Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied)

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical
initiation, meaning body contact, is that correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation,
correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to
terrify you, scare you, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to,
I repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting
the initiation, is this correct?

Witness Sometimes sir, yes.

Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he
was supposed to have said according to you that your family were
responsible for the killing of his brother who was an NPA, do you
remember saying that?
 Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon
that you did not believe him because that is not true, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose
as I have mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring you or
frightening you into quitting the initiation, this is correct?

Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying
those things was because he wanted to inflict injury.

Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?

Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was
hitting me.

Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of
initiation by all the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said
something similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?

Witness No, sir.

Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters
would run on your thighs, right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters
not only on you but also on the other neophytes?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was
administered by one master, was also administered by one master
on a neophyte, was also administered by another master on the
other neophyte, this is correct?

Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)

According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and
Villareal were baseless,[213] since the statements of the accused were just part of the psychological
initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes; that [t]here is no element of truth in it as
testified by Bienvenido Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part
of tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation rites.[214]

We agree with the Solicitor General.

The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial proportion
on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot
be tolerated, especially because it was the CAs primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to
kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat,
according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both
accusations against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific threats
referred to by the CA. It was Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness
Marquez, [I]to, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on
Villas thighs while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father. With the
testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to kill based
solely thereon.

As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual
milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the testimony of
witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to
psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and
intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, Patay ka, Recinto, Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka,
Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin, or some other
words to that effect.[215] While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the
formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villas father for stealing the parking space of
Dizons father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused
Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity.[216]

Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological pressure was
through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious stories, so that he
could justify giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role
playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.

The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact, during
the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:

Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of
interpellations on why we included the phrase or psychological pain and suffering.

xxxxxxxxx

So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but
the recruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already described
yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette extensively to test the readiness and the
willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his desire to be a member of the
fraternity, sorority or similar organizationor playing and putting a noose on the neck
of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the
 fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking him to jump outside after making him
turn around several times but the reality is that he will be made to jump towards the
inside portion of the building these are the mental or psychological tests that are
resorted to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The doctors who
appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some mental
aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we
want to prevent.[217] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be automatically
viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the
context of the fraternitys psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even established
whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend
credence to the veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only
confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just making
it up.[218] Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to
kill: [T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict
physical harm as part of the fraternity initiation rites x x x.[219] The Solicitor General shares the same
view.

Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill.Animus interficendi cannot
and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.
[220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that
none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.[221]

The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to

injure not proven beyond reasonable doubt

The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that since all of
the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued,
all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal
Code.

In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised
Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that
is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state
of the wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot
be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal
Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the
physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain
bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt
act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions
are.[223]
 Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[224] that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.
In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of her students
behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the
corporal punishment. In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability for slight physical
injuries, this Court stated thus: Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility [w]e are
persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent the means she actually used was
moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent. Considering the
applicable laws, we then ruled that as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for
her act of whipping her pupil. In People v. Carmen,[226] the accused members of the religious group
known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima under the guise of a ritual or treatment plunged the
head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, pounded his chest with fists,
and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to cure him of nervous breakdown by
expelling through those means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused
the death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial courts finding of
liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should
be held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.

Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of inflicting physical pain on
the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled
that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused.
[227] What persons do is the best index of their intention.[228] We have also ruled that the method
employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted may be
determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual
background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.

Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of the
rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings, that
the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they
were subjected to traditional initiation rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol Express, Rounds, and the
Auxies Privilege Round. The beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes arms and legs.

In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and to
play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys
principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to traditional initiation rituals. When
the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were
subjected to another traditional ritual paddling by the fraternity.

During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries
protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those who were
designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.[230] It was their regular duty to
stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to pump their legs in order that their blood
would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or round; to serve food and
water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they needed.

These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.[231] A few days before the rites, he asked
both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.[232] His father knew that Lenny would go
through an initiation process and would be gone for three days.[233] The CA found as follows:
 It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to
undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts,
they voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila
Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given briefings on what to expect. It
is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity, the neophytes will
undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that traditional methods such
as mocking, psychological tests and physical punishment would take place.
They knew that the initiation would involve beatings and other forms of hazing.
They were also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any time they wanted
to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that after a
week, you can already play basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for his part,
admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit in the arms and legs, that a
wooden paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms
and legs. Indeed,there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes.
[234] (Emphasis supplied)

Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny
continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.

Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear malicious
intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even
if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were
done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements
of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of
criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that
the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional rounds on the second night were held
upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of
the head of the initiation rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals,
including the paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other
weapon was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly the legs and
the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were assigned for the
specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes during the initiation rites,
further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through
the same process of traditional initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or
given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely different
from common crimes.[235] The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken into
consideration.

The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may
also be determined by Lennys continued participation in the initiation and consent to the method used
even after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is
enlightening:

SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished
under the Revised Penal Code.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

 SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the
charge would be murder or homicide.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated

homicide or serious physical injuries.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it
can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense
under this definition of the crime of hazing?

SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a

sorority, fraternity or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has
already resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.

That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that
no group or association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can
become a member without being held criminally liable.

xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that
imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere
organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or
organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et cetera
as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.

The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing,

abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or
offenses, because these very same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal
Code.

That is my difficulty, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. x x x

Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a
person or group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into
an organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr.
President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or
there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong
has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the
result from the act of hazing.

To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the
sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called
hazing. Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even consider having
a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even committed
initially, Mr. President.

So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why
there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o
ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko
na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong
nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung
maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay
after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: Huwag ninyong
gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa
inyo.

xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the

distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution
does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the death, that resulted in the
serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of lasciviousness or deranged
mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving or
establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create
the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic
elements of any crime.

If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate,

then there is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the
organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society or a new club
is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts that lead to the
result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because
there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised
Penal Code, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being

criminalized because in the context of what is happening in the sororities and
fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their intention is to
maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr.
President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.

If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters
intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the
act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily
escape responsibility and say, We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of
our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any intention to kill or maim.
 This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged
therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the
prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they are separate offenses.

xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that

initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it
becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution
have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or
not?

SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that

occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.

SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.

SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be
hazing, Mr. President. [236] (Emphasis supplied)

During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to
include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further clarified thus:

SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the

inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be
punished. However, the act of sodomy can be committed by two persons with or without
consent.

To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy

forced into another individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy
be modified by the phrase without consent for purposes of this section.

SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the
concept that it is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without
consent will change a lot of concepts here. Because the results from hazing aggravate
the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity,
sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or without the consent of
the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a sorority or fraternity with his
consent does not negate the crime of hazing.

This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that
attend initiation which may have been announced with or without physical infliction of
pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is announcement that
there will be physical hazing or whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte
is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment. What is important is that there
is an infliction of physical pain.

The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from
himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the
individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the perpetrators of the
crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of the victim.

xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the

distinguished Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society
sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and practices.

In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some
individuals when they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private
rooms of couples. They can do their thing if they want to make love in ways that are not
considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is not something that the State
should prohibit.

But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the
act may even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain
may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not
make the act of hazing not punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction of
pain upon himself.

If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said,
Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it. So, if we allow that reasoning
that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then we would not have
passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass this bill, because it
will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or
suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.

But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to
prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting
physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the
act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates the act with higher
penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the criminal nature of the
act.

So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it
is committed without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this
proposed law will collapse.

SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.

 SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment?

(Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)

Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the
principal author of the Senate Bill, said:

I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of
intent or whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical
amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.

If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law
on hazing. We will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is
a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr. President.[238](Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle
of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an amendment
thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This
dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of hazing unique as against typical
crimes cast a cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct
or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys parents would not have consented[239] to
his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the practice of hazing were considered by them
asmala in se.

Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired
Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the people have spoken, through
Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal.[240] Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement
nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or
psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law,
there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony.
And when there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused. In dubio pro reo.

For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against the
trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof
beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus
iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the
unique nature of hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.

The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless

imprudence resulting in homicide

The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes
felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which
an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.[241] In this case, the danger is visible
and consciously appreciated by the actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises
an act done without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere
lack of foresight or skill.[243] Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly
visible. [244]

The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows:
Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes
on the doer the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so
constitutes negligence.[246]

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree
of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.[247] If, on account
of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who
chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or
avoid damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required.[249] It is
thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an
individual, from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort.[250] The duty of the person to
employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.[251]

There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.

According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to multiple
traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of the heart to
work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253] In the present case,
the victims heart could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite
blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the channeling of the blood supply from the entire
circulatory system including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm
areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple
hematomas were wide, thick, and deep,[256] indicating that these could have resulted mainly from
injuries sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.[257] Repeated blows
to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating blood
became so markedly diminished as to produce death. [258] The officer also found that the brain, liver,
kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ
in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.
[259] It was concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim suffered
from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.[260]

The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs, resulting from
repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his eventual
death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities performed on him by the
Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched,
kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.
[261] They were also paddled at the back of their thighs or legs;[262] and slapped on their faces.
[263] They were made to play rough basketball.[264] Witness Marquez testified on Lenny,
saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.[265] The NBI medico-legal officer explained that the death of
the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries suffered by the latter.[266] The relevant
portion of the testimony is as follows:

Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross
examinations of defense counsels that the injuries that you have
enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny Villa previously
marked as Exhibit G-1 to G-14 individually by themselves would not
cause the death of the victim. The question I am going to propound to
you is what is the cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked
from Exhibit G-1 to G-14?

Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not
fair for us to isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the
whole body. At the same manner that as a car would not run minus
one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human approach is to
interpret all those injuries in whole and not in part.[267]

There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking
during the initiation rites.[268]

Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to recklessness,
which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations
owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process.[269] With the foregoing
facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI
medico-legal officer found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered,
criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and contributed to the
infliction of physical injuries.

It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at least
mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon and Villareal restrained themselves from
insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened initiation rites
having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities the implication of the presence of alumni should
be seen as a point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members
were intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for
legislative consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and
the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances
that would increase the applicable penalties.

It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the misery of hazing and
employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to establish kinship. A
neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits
it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give up, because he
feared being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice.[271] Thus,
for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By
giving consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members.
Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.

Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in
effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing
punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there was no law prohibiting the act
of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing laws at the time of his
death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.[273] As
to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.

Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of the
Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability from slight
physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to
accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.

The accused liable to pay damages

The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of 50,000 as
civil indemnity ex delicto and 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally paid by
accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of 30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and
severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.

Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim.
[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we sustain the CAs award of indemnity in the
amount of 50,000.

The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses
incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by tangible
documents.[276] Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is prevented from
granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred
or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim
for actual damages.[277]

The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of the
victims death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which provides that
the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.[279] Thus, we hereby we
affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner

Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed
Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug,
Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is also MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato
Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months ofprision correccional,
as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa
civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000,
plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this
Decision until satisfaction.[280]Costs de oficio.

The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED.
The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the
fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.

SO ORDERED.

FELONIES
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime itself. Conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.
Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct
of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit
agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to
be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of
them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim. There is no clear evidence that
accused-appellants had a common design to kill Maximillian. To recall, Maximillian's group and
accused-appellants' group completely met by chance that fateful early morning of April 29, 2006 near
Gaisano Mall. They did not know each other before this meeting. The events swiftly happened, in a
matter of minutes, from the meeting of the two groups, to Maximillian's insulting remark to Jenny, to
the scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel, and to accused-appellant Arnel's
stabbing of Maximillian. The scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel broke out
because the former tried to grab the latter's arm. It was at this point that prosecution witnesses saw
accused-appellant Randy block Maximillian's way and hold Maximillian's hand/s. Josephine testified
that accused-appellant Randy held only Maximillian's left hand, and Frederick narrated that accused-
appellant Randy held both of Maximillian's hands; but neither of these witnesses was able to describe
the extent that Maximillian's ability to defend himself or flee was impaired by accused-appellant
Randy's hold on his hand/s. Given the circumstances, the Court has serious doubts that accused-
appellant Randy so acted to ensure that accused-appellant Arnel would be able to stab and kill
Maximillian. It is completely reasonable and plausible that accused-appellant Randy was merely
stepping in to stop Maximillian from further attacking his cousin accused-appellant Arnel. There was
no proof that accused-appellant Randy had prior knowledge that accused-appellant Arnel carried a
sharp weapon with him or that accused-appellant Arnel intended to stab Maximillian. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL VILLALBA AND RANDY VILLALBA, G.R. No. 207629,
October 22, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Before the Court is the Decision1 dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 00844-MIN, which affirmed, with modifications as to the amount of damages imposed, the
Judgment[2 dated February 18, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Butuan City, Branch 33, in
Criminal Case No. 11736, finding accused-appellants Arnel Villalba y Duran (Arnel) and Randy
Villalbay Sarco (Randy) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of Maximillian
Casona y Lacroix (Maximillian).

In the Information dated May 1, 2006 filed with the RTC, accused-appellants were charged as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 29th day of April 2006 at 2:30 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Capitol
Avenue, near Gaisano Mall, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, attack and stab one MAXIMILLIAN CASONA Y
LACROIX, with the use of an ice pick, hitting the latter at his left breast and left portion of his
stomach, which directly caused his death incurring damages which maybe proven in
Court.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty during their arraignment on August 8,

2006.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

At the pre-trial conference held on July 19, 2007,5 the parties stipulated only as to the time and place of
the stabbing incident, i.e., at around 2:00 in the early morning of April 29, 2006 near the Gaisano Mall
in Butuan City. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of three persons who witnessed the stabbing incident:
Maximillian's widow Josephine B. Casona (Josephine),6 Homer Ferdinand B. Hermosura
(Homer),7and Frederick L. Apolinario (Frederick).8 The prosecution also called to the witness stand
the physicians who attended to Maximillian before his death, namely, cardiologist Dr. Annalisa A.
Gonzalez (Gonzalez)9 and surgeon Dr. Edesio C. Urag (Urag).10 Last to testify for the prosecution was
Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Inocencio T. Amora (P/Insp. Amora),11 the investigator assigned to the case
and the apprehending officer of accused-appellants.

The documentary exhibits of the prosecution consisted of the respective Sworn Statements, all dated
May 1, 2006, of Josephine, Homer, and Frederick;12 the police blotter entry dated April 29, 2006
which reported Maximillian's stabbing and death;13 the police blotter entry dated April 30, 2006 which
reported the subsequent arrests of accused-appellants for illegal gambling and concealment of deadly
weapon;14 the Affidavit of Apprehension dated April 30, 2006 jointly executed by P/Insp. Amora,
Senior Police Officer (SPO) 3 Antonio A. Claros, Police Officer (PO) 3 Rey Gabrielle B. Maderal, and
PO2 Judan Q. Alvizo;15 three photographs depicting Frederick's identification of accused-appellants as
Maximillian's assailants;16 a sketch and description of the puncture wounds found on Maximillian's
body prepared by Dr. Urag;17 Maximillian's Certificate of Death;18 and the hospital and burial
expenses in the total amount of P55,225.60 incurred by Josephine.19 These exhibits were all admitted
in evidence by the RTC in its Order dated February 29, 2008.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The prosecution's evidence established the following version of events:cralawlawlibrary

Maximillian, a college instructor, attended a farewell party for his students at Moff s Restaurant and
Cocktail Lounge along JC Aquino Avenue in Butuan City on the night of April 28, 2006. Maximillian
was accompanied by his wife Josephine and their friends Frederick, Homer, and Homer's wife Marilou.

Around 2:30 in the morning of April 29, 2006, Josephine begged Maximillian that they already go
home. Josephine reminded Maximillian of the lateness of the hour and of the great amount of liquor
that he had already consumed. Maximillian still did not want to leave, but Josephine insisted. Angry,
Maximillian rushed out of the restaurant and headed towards the direction of the Gaisano Mall in
Butuan City. Josephine asked Frederick to catch up with Maximillian. Josephine, Homer, and Marilou
then trailed about 10 meters behind Maximillian and Frederick.

When they turned the corner of JC Avenue and Capitol Drive, Maximillian and Frederick chanced upon
accused-appellants and their girlfriends, Maximillian's group and accused-appellants' group did not
know each other prior to the early morning of April 29, 2006. Maximillian suddenly ordered accused-
appellants to wear their shirts, and then asked accused-appellant Arnel, "How much is that?" referring
to accused-appellant Arnel's girlfriend. Frederick intervened and told accused-appellant Arnel, "Brod,
don't mind him. He is a little bit drunk." Accused-appellant Arnel replied, "That was nothing, Kuya."
However, Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel continued to stare at each other. Moments later,
Maximillian tried to get hold of accused-appellant Arnel's left arm but the latter was able to wave away
Maximillian's hand. Accused-appellant Randy blocked Maximillian's way and held Maximillian's
hand/s as accused-appellant Arnel hit Maximillian on the chest and abdomen. At this point, it appeared
to eyewitnesses Frederick, Josephine, and Homer that Maximillian was just being boxed by accused-
appellant Arnel. Frederick tried to break the scuffle, as Josephine and Flomer, who were only five
meters away, came running to help. Accused-appellants stepped back and then ran away. Despite telling
Josephine that he was stabbed, Maximillian still chased accused-appellants, with Frederick and Homer
at his heels. Stones were thrown their way but none of them were hit. All of a sudden, Maximillian fell
to the ground. Josephine checked Maximillian's body yet found no blood or wound. Assuming that
Maximillian was simply drunk and in pain because of the fist fight, Josephine, with the help of
Frederick and Homer, brought Maximillian home on board a motorized "trisikad." During the ride
home, Maximillian was unconscious but snoring heavily. However, when they were already at their
house, Josephine felt that Maximillian had no more pulse and his eyes had turned white. Josephine,
again with Frederick and Homer, rushed Maximillian to Manuel J. Santos Hospital.

Maximillian arrived at the hospital at around 3:00 in the morning of April 29, 2006. Dr. Gonzalez, the
attending physician at the emergency room, noticed that Maximillian was already unresponsive and had
no more heartbeat. Dr. Gonzalez performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation and was able to revive
Maximillian. Dr. Gonzalez conducted close physical examination of Maximillian's body and discovered
two hardly visible stab wounds located at the latter's left chest and abdomen. Dr. Gonzalez immediately
referred Maximillian to Dr. Urag, a surgeon.

As a result of his own examination, Dr. Urag reported that Maximillian's stab wounds both had a lateral
width of about 3-5 mm, and that the stab wound on Maximillian's chest penetrated the pericardium of
his heart, which caused the entry of fluid into the said organ. The delay in the discovery of the fatal
chest wound and the lack of hospital facilities rendered it too late to save Maximillian. Resultantly,
Maximillian died of "Cardio Pulmonary Arrest secondary to Pericardial Tamponade secondary to
penetrating stab wound left chest." Dr. Urag called Maximillian's wounds as puncture wounds, which
could be caused by any sharp instrument or bladed weapon, or even nails.

Josephine reported Maximillian's stabbing and death to the police on April 29, 2006. P/Insp. Amora,
then the Chief of the General Investigation Section of the Butuan City Police Office, took charge of the
investigation of Maximillian's case. P/Insp. Amora conducted an ocular inspection of the scene of the
crime and was able to identify accused-appellants as the suspects. The following day, April 30, 2006,
P/Insp. Amora came upon information that accused-appellants were in P-l Barangay Imadejas
Subdivision, Butuan City. P/Insp. Amora proceeded to the given location and there found accused-
appellants playing and betting on a game of cards. The police immediately arrested accused-appellants
for illegal gambling and brought them to the police station. Upon being informed of accused-appellants'
arrest, Josephine and Frederick arrived at the police station and identified accused-appellants as
Maximillian's assailants.

Accused-appellants testified in their own defense.

Accused-appellant Arnel21 while admitting his presence at the time and scene of the crime, narrated a
different version of the events surrounding Maximillian's stabbing.

According to accused-appellant Arnel, at around 2:30 in the morning of April 29, 2006, he was with his
girlfriend Jenny and friends Johndale and Tata in the vicinity of Gaisano Mall, waiting for a tricycle.
When Jenny was about to board a tricycle, four persons, who all looked drunk, came out of a store. One
of these four persons, who turned out to be Maximillian, approached and asked accused-appellant Arnel
how much was the girl he was with. Maximillian's crude remark angered Jenny, who immediately left
with Tata, on board the tricycle. A companion of Maximillian approached accused-appellant Arnel and
requested him to bear with Maximillian who was already drunk. Accused-appellant Arnel expressed
that he understood the situation. However, Maximillian suddenly blocked the way of accused-appellant
Arnel and Johndale. Maximillian punched accused-appellant Arnel, hitting the latter on the neck, just
below his left ear. Johndale was able to run away. Accused-appellant Arnel asked Maximillian why the
latter hit him. Instead of answering the question, Maximillian threw back another question, asking if
accused-appellant Amel was brave. Accused-appellant Arnel looked for a stone to throw at Maximillian
to fend off the latter, but saw none. What accused-appellant found and grabbed as a weapon to defend
himself was a barbeque stick, about six inches long. Accused-appellant Arnel stabbed Maximillian once
with the barbecue stick on the left side of the body, after which, the barbecue stick broke. When
stabbed, Maximillian did not show any reaction but just walked away from accused-appellant. At that
point, Maximillian's three companions also began to attack accused-appellant Arnel. After their attack,
Maximillian's three companions left. Accused-appellant Arnel sat down for a while near Gaisano Mall,
then went home. The following day, accused-appellant Arnel was apprehended by the police. Accused-
appellant Arnel was surprised to learn from the police that Maximillian had died. Accused-appellant
Arnel insisted that he had no intention of killing Maximillian and denied any knowledge of how
Maximillian sustained the second stab wound. Accused-appellant Arnel further clarified that it was his
friend Johndale, not his cousin accused-appellant Randy, who was with him when he encountered
Maximillian the early morning of April 29, 2006.

Accused-appellant Randy22 narrated on the witness stand that he was at his house in Barangay
Doongan with his wife and children in the early morning of April 29, 2006. Accused-appellant Randy
knew nothing about Maximillian's stabbing and death. Accused-appellant Randy was with his wife at
the house of a traffic aide called Puspus in Lower Doongan when he was accosted by the police. The
police asked accused-appellant Randy for the whereabouts of his cousin accused-appellant Arnel. When
accused-appellant Randy answered that he did not know, the police immediately arrested him and
brought him to the police station. At the police station, the police promised that they would drop the
charges against accused-appellant Randy if the latter would reveal where accused-appellant Arnel was.
Accused-appellant Randy thus told the police that accused-appellant Arnel was in Pareja Subdivision.
Accused-appellant Arnel was indeed found and arrested in Pareja Subdivision and was also brought to
the police station. Accused-appellants were then presented before a witness to Maximillian's stabbing.
The witness was wearing a cap and a cover on his face. The witness first pointed only at accused-
appellant Arnel, but after some coaching from the police, the witness also pointed at accused-appellant
Randy.

On February 18, 2010, the RTC promulgated its Judgment convicting accused-appellants as charged.
The trial court found that the prosecution had duly established the essential elements of murder, and
rejected the uncorroborated claim of self-defense of accused-appellant Arnel and defenses of denial and
alibi of accused-appellant Randy. The trial court held that Maximillian's killing was murder given the
presence of the qualifying circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery, but not evident
premeditation. The RTC sentenced accused-appellants thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds accused Arnel Villalba and Randy Villalba
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery and abuse of superior strength, with no mitigating
circumstance. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, banning the imposition of the death penalty, said
accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without possibility of parole.
The accused are further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Maximillian Casona the amounts of
SEVENTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND (P75,000.00) PESOS as civil indemnity, TWENTY[-]FIVE
THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS as exemplary damages, FIFTY[-]FIVE THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY[-]FIVE PESOS AND SIXTY CENTAVOS (P55,225.60) as actual damages,
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages, and TWENTY THOUSAND
(P20,000.00) PESOS as attorney's fees.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Accused-appellants appealed their conviction before the Court of Appeals, based on the following
grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[I] THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREM[E]DITATION

[II] THE COURT A QUO LIKEWISE ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE TFIE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

[III] THE COURT A QUO ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE EXISTENCE OF
SELF-DEFENSE ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARNEL VILLALBA. 24

On September 25, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision affirming the conviction of
accused-appellants for murder. Like the RTC, the appellate court gave scant consideration to accused-
appellants' unsubstantiated defenses. The appellate court likewise agreed with the finding of the RTC
that treachery attended Maximillian's killing, reasoning thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The court a quo for its part, had this to say about its finding of treachery:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
 The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.
Frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the
victim is unarmed. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate (People v. De
Guzman, G.R. No. 173197, April 24, 2007).

Thus, there was treachery when accused Randy Villalba held the hand of the
victim who was drunk while his co-accused Arnel Villalba simultaneously
boxed and stabbed the deceased, thereby insuring its execution to kill the victim
without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. Treachery qualifies the killing to murder (Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code).

We agree with the court a quo.

Jurisprudence abounds in holding that an altercation between the victim and the accused
immediately before the attack upon the victim does not necessarily negate the presence of
treachery. This was reiterated in People v. Jabian [G.R. No. 132913-14, April 4,
2001], viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Accused-appellant Jabian's suggestion that an argument between the parties

preceded the slaying as testified to by Ruel Lipalam, coupled with the fact that
the attack was frontal, as shown by location of the wound, and that therefore the
killing of Jose Sammy was not sudden or unexpected as to negate a finding of
treachery, cannot be sustained. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend to directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. Thus, it has been held that the fact that the attack was preceded by a
fight, or even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person does not
negate treachery. In this case, accused-appellant Jimmy Magaro held both arms
of the victim behind his back, effectively rendering the latter incapable of
defending himself while the other accused stabbed him in the chest. As
correctly pointed out by the trial court, the victim was "a virtual
sitting duck when stabbed by Jabian because he was hand clasped by Magaro in
order to be so stabbed, without any risk whatsoever to the two accused arising
from any useful defense which Jose Sammy might make."

In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled in a number of cases that treachery attends the
killing of a person who is drunk, unarmed, has no opportunity to defend himself and the
attack is sudden.

In the case at hand, it was established by the prosecution witnesses that appellant Randy
held an intoxicated Maximillian while appellant Arnel stabbed him. Consequently, at the
time of the attack, the victim was not in the position to defend himself. Clearly then, the
court a quo's finding of treachery is justified. At the same time, this collaborative manner of
the attack supports the finding of conspiracy.25cralawredChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court of Appeals though modified the amount of damages awarded. The dispositive portion of the
Court of Appeals' decision reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
FOR THE REASONS STATED, the appeal is DENIED. The RTC Decision in Criminal Case No.
11736 finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS;

1. Moral damages are awarded in the increased amount of

Php75,000;chanrobleslaw

2. Exemplary damages are awarded in the increased amount of Php30,000;

and

3. Interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all damages from April 29, 2006
up to the finality of this Decision, and interest at 12%per annum on
these damages from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid shall
likewise be paid by accused- appellants to the heirs of Maximillian
Casona.26

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Court gave the parties the opportunity to file their respective supplemental briefs[27 but the parties
manifested that they had already exhausted their arguments before the Court of
Appeals.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accused-appellant Arnel asserts that he cannot be adjudged criminally liable for the resulting death of
Maximillian as he only stabbed Maximillian in self-defense. Accused-appellant also argues that
treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing of Maximillian to murder, as even the prosecution
admits that provocation and aggression came from Maximillian and that an altercation between
accused-appellant Arnel and Maximillian preceded the stabbing.

Accused-appellant Randy insists on his alibi, i.e., that he was at home with his family and not in the
company of accused-appellant Arnel on April 29, 2006 near the Gaisano Mall.

The Court finds partial merit in the instant appeal.

At the outset, the Court bears in mind the following pronouncement in People v.
Gerolaga29:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In this Decision, this Court emphasizes the need to review the facts and details of appealed cases with
meticulous, laser-like precision. While, as a rule, the findings of fact of trial courts are accorded great
respect by appellate tribunals, still, the latter must wade through the mass of evidence in order to ensure
that the trial court did not overlook or misapprehend little details that could spell the innocence of the
accused, or at least mitigate their guilt. This is but consistent with the doctrine that all doubts must be
resolved in their favor. Indeed, it is far better to set free a thousand guilty persons than to unjustly
punish an innocent one.
The Court, after a meticulous review of the records of the case, finds bases to downgrade accused-
appellant Arnel's crime from murder to homicide and to absolve accused-appellant Randy of any
criminal liability for Maximillian's death.

The Court begins with the undisputed facts: Maximillian and Frederick, followed by Josephine, Homer,
and Marilou, chanced upon accused-appellant Arnel, his girlfriend Jenny, and two other companions,
somewhere along Capitol Drive, near the vicinity of Gaisano Mall in Butuan City, at around 2:30 in the
morning of April 29, 2006. These two groups did not know each other prior to April 29, 2006.
Maximillian addressed an insulting remark towards Jenny causing tension between Maximillian and
accused-appellant Arnel. A scuffle ensued between the two men and accused-appellant Arnel eventually
stabbed Maximillian on the chest with a sharp instrument, causing a puncture wound that penetrated
Maximillian's heart and ultimately caused Maximillian's death.

Prosecution witnesses Josephine and Frederick had positively identified both accused-appellants at the
police station soon after accused-appellants' arrest. The same prosecution witnesses, together with
Homer, would again positively identify both accused-appellants in open court during trial. Hence,
accused-appellant Randy's presence at the time and place of Maximillian's stabbing was duly
established. Accused-appellant Randy was not able to attribute any ill motive on the part of the three
prosecution witnesses that could have impelled them to testify against him. Where there is nothing to
show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their positive and
categorical declarations on the witness stand, under the solemnity of an oath, deserve full faith and
credence. It necessarily prevails over alibi and denial, especially when neither alibi nor denial is
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.[30 Nonetheless, accused-appellant Randy's presence at
the time and place of Maximillian's stabbing does not necessarily mean that the former should bear
criminal liability for the latter's death, as the Court will subsequently discuss herein.

The Information charged accused-appellants with Maximillian's murder, alleging that accused-
appellants, acting in conspiracy with each other, and with abuse of superior strength, treachery, and/or
evident premeditation, stabbed Maximillian with an icepick.

On conspiracy

Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime itself. Conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.
Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct
of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit
agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to
be carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each of
them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There is no clear evidence that accused-appellants had a common design to kill Maximillian. To recall,
Maximillian's group and accused-appellants' group completely met by chance that fateful early
morning of April 29, 2006 near Gaisano Mall. They did not know each other before this meeting. The
events swiftly happened, in a matter of minutes, from the meeting of the two groups, to Maximillian's
insulting remark to Jenny, to the scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel, and to
accused-appellant Arnel's stabbing of Maximillian.
The scuffle between Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel broke out because the former tried to
grab the latter's arm. It was at this point that prosecution witnesses saw accused-appellant Randy block
Maximillian's way and hold Maximillian's hand/s. Josephine testified that accused-appellant Randy
held only Maximillian's left hand, and Frederick narrated that accused-appellant Randy held both of
Maximillian's hands; but neither of these witnesses was able to describe the extent that Maximillian's
ability to defend himself or flee was impaired by accused-appellant Randy's hold on his hand/s. Given
the circumstances, the Court has serious doubts that accused-appellant Randy so acted to ensure that
accused-appellant Arnel would be able to stab and kill Maximillian. It is completely reasonable and
plausible that accused-appellant Randy was merely stepping in to stop Maximillian from further
attacking his cousin accused-appellant Arnel. There was no proof that accused-appellant Randy had
prior knowledge that accused-appellant Arnel carried a sharp weapon with him or that accused-
appellant Arnel intended to stab Maximillian.

In fact, there is no strong evidence of the weapon accused-appellant Arnel used in stabbing
Maximillian. None of the prosecution witnesses actually saw accused-appellant use an ice pick or any
other weapon. Josephine, Homer, and Frederick did not even know that Maximillian was stabbed,
believing that he was just punched by accused-appellant Arnel.

For his part, accused-appellant Arnel admitted stabbing Maximillian but asserted that he used only a
barbecue stick which he found in the area. A barbecue stick, with a sharp end, could cause a puncture
wound consistent with that which killed Maximillian. That accused-appellant Arnel used a barbecue
stick he found in the area as weapon shows that he acted instantaneously and spontaneously in stabbing
Maximillian, thus, further negating the possibility that he conspired with accused-appellant Randy to
commit the stabbing.

On the qualifying circumstances for murder

The prosecution likewise failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any of the alleged circumstances
which would qualify the killing of Maximillian to murder.

The RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, already found that there was no evident premeditation. The
essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.32 As the Court
already discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the events leading to the stabbing of Maximillian by
accused-appellant Arnel happened swiftly and unexpectedly, with accused-appellant Arnel
instantaneously and spontaneously stabbing Maximillian with a barbecue stick he found in the area.
Accused-appellant Arnel clearly had no opportunity for cool thought and reflection prior to stabbing
Maximillian.

Unlike the RTC and the Court of Appeals, however, the Court finds no treachery in accused-appellant
Arnel's stabbing of Maximillian. That accused-appellant Randy was present or that Maximillian was
unarmed and drunk at the time of the stabbing are not sufficient to constitute treachery. Neither do said
circumstances constitute abuse of superior strength.

Treachery is defined under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing the
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Based on the above definition, two conditions must be present in order to constitute treachery: (1) the
employment of such means of execution that gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate, and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Jurisprudence,
however, has qualified that the suddenness of the attack, the vulnerability of the position of the victim
at the time of the attack, or even the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not by themselves render the
attack as treacherous, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the wound from behind the
victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the time the attack was made, or the fact that the victim
was unarmed, do not by themselves render the attack as treacherous. This is of particular significance
in a case of an instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he gained an advantageous position
over the victim when the latter accidentally fell and was rendered defenseless.The means employed for
the commission of the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have been consciously or
deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the consummation of the crime and at the same time
eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from the intended victim. For the rules on treachery to apply,
the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim, and without
provocation on the part of the latter. Treachery is never presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy, it is
required that the manner of attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as conclusively as
the crime itself.33 (Emphasis supplied.)

The elements of treachery are wanting in this case. At the risk of sounding repetitive, the Court once
more emphasizes the swiftness of the events that took place on April 29, 2006 when Maximillian's
group unexpectedly came upon accused-appellants' group. The tension and physical violence between
Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel quickly escalated from a verbal exchange, to a physical
scuffle, and then to the stabbing of Maximillian by accused-appellant Arnel. Accused-appellant Arnel
merely found a barbecue stick in the area which he used to stab Maximillian. The barbecue stick could
hardly be a weapon of choice and accused-appellant Arnel obviously used it only in desperation.
Moreover, it cannot be said that Maximillian did not expect at all some form of attack from accused-
appellant Arnel. Maximillian provoked accused-appellant Arnel by making a crude remark about the
latter's girlfriend, then grabbing accused-appellant Arnel's arm, and taunting accused-appellant Arnel if
he was brave. It would appear that Maximillian was, in fact, spoiling for a fight. In addition, as the
Court previously observed herein, it cannot simply assume in the absence of proof that accused-
appellant Randy held Maximillian's hand/s to prevent the latter from retaliating as accused-appellant
Arnel stabbed Maximillian. Accused-appellant Randy could just as well be holding Maximillian's
hand/s to stop Maximillian from further attacking accused-appellant Arnel during the scuffle. Lastly,
the Court is unconvinced that accused-appellant Arnel took advantage of Maximillian's drunken state.
No clear and convincing evidence has been presented to show the degree of Maximillian's intoxication
or if it had even affected his strength and intelligence.

As for abuse of superior strength, it is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.
The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime
was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the
aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the
advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the case at bar, Maximillian was with Frederick when they first chanced upon accused-appellants, an
even match of two against two, therefore disputing any allegation of inequality of forces between the
two sides. Moreover, given the doubts as to accused-appellant Randy's actual participation in the
stabbing, it cannot be said that the two accused-appellants had used their combined strength against
Maximillian to ensure the latter's death.

Without any qualifying circumstance, the stabbing and death of Maximillian is a homicide rather than a
murder.

The respective criminal liabilities of accused-appellants

In the absence of conspiracy, the respective criminal liability of accused-appellants would depend on
the precise participation of each in the crime.

Accused-appellant Arnel had already admitted to stabbing Maximillian with a barbecue stick, which
eventually caused the latter's death. Unless he is able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court his claim
of self-defense as a justifying circumstance, accused-appellant Arnel's conviction for the crime of
homicide becomes inevitable.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It is a hornbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the
appellant to prove the elements of that claim, i.e., (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accused-appellant Arnel failed to establish the unlawful aggression of Maximillian at the time he
stabbed the latter.

Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense, for if no unlawful aggression

attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing as there is nothing to repel. The
unlawful aggression of the victim must put the life and personal safety of the person defending himself
in actual peril. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude does not constitute unlawful
aggression.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In this case, accused-appellant Arnel's contemplated threat to his life or limb when he stabbed
Maximillian was not real or imminent. Maximillian merely uttered insulting remarks to accused-
appellant Arnel and the latter's girlfriend, Jenny. Accused-appellant Arnel even admitted that Frederick,
Maximillian's companion, immediately intervened and apologized for Maximillian's unruly conduct.
Granting that Maximillian did punch accused-appellant Arnel and hit the latter below his left ear,
accused-appellant Arnel could have simply hit Maximillian back. Instead, accused-appellant Arnel used
a barbeque stick to stab Maximillian on the chest, which was evidently not commensurate, and well
overboard, as compared to the aggression exhibited by Maximillian to him.

The penalty prescribed by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of homicide isreclusion
temporal. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence shall be that which
could be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence should be
within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium term which has a duration of fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months, and one (1) day, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months; and that the minimum
should be within the range of prision mayor which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years. In the instant case, the Court sentences accused-appellant Arnel to imprisonment of
eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

As to the civil indemnity and damages, based on current jurisprudence, the Court orders accused-
appellant Arnel to pay Maximillian's heirs the amount of Fifty-Five Thousand Two Hundred Twenty-
Five Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P55,225.60) as actual damages, Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00) as moral damages, and another Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil
indemnity.

Absent any evidence that accused-appellant Randy acted with criminal intent in holding Maximillian's
hand/s at about the same time that accused-appellant Arnel stabbed Maximillian, the Court absolves
accused-appellant Randy of any criminal and civil liability for Maximillian's death.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal of accused-appellants is PARTIALLY

GRANTED.

The Court finds accused-appellant ARNEL VILLALBA y DURAN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide, for which he is SENTENCED to imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERED to pay
the heirs of Maximillian Casona the amounts of P55,225.60 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and another P75,000.00 as civil indemnity plus interest on all damages awarded at the rate of
6% per annum from date of finality of this decision until fully satisfied.

The Court ACQUITS accused-appellant RANDY VILLALBA y SARCO on the crime charged for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Conspiracy must be proven with evidence that can convince a trial court of its existence beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, when the co-accused stated in open court that her fellow co-accused had no
participation in the crime of estafa, such statement was an admission against her interest. The statement
negated the alleged common design or purposeof conspiracy between her and Benito. It alsomeans
that she admitted that her companions acts can never be attributed to her. ANGELITA CRUZ
BENITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR. No. 204644, February 11, 2015, J. Leonen

Conspiracy must be proven with evidence that can convince a trial court of its existence beyond
reasonable doubt. Moreover, there can be no conspiracy to commit a crime that has already been
consummated.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 of the Court of Appeals' Decision,2 affirming in toto the November 17,
20093 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Quezon City. The trial court convicted Angelita Cruz Benito
of estafa, finding that she conspired with Rebecca Agbulos in misappropriating the pieces of jewelry the latter
received in trust from Dorie Cruz-Abadilla.4
In the Information dated October 28, 1994, Rebecca Agbulos (Agbulos) and Angelita Cruz Benito 5 (Benito) were
charged with estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)of the Revised Penal Code. The accusatory portion of
the Information reads:
That in or about the period comprised from June 8, 1994 up to August 3, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping with each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud DORIE CRUZ-ABADILLA in the following manner, to wit:
Assorted pieces of jewelry in the amount of P2,070,300.00, Philippine Currency, for the purpose of selling the same
on commission basis, under the express obligation on the part of said accused of turning over the proceeds of the sale
to said DORIS CRUZ-ABADILLA if sold, or of returning the same if unsold to said complainant, but the said
accused, once in possession of the said items, far from complying with their obligation as aforesaid, with intent to
defraud, unfaithfulness and grave abuse of confidence, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to fulfill their
aforesaid obligation despite repeated demands made upon them to do so and instead misapplied, misappropriated and
converted the same or the value thereof, to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said
DORIE CRUZ-ABADILLA in the aforesaid amount of P2,070,300.00, Philippine Currency.6
Agbulos and Benito were arraigned on July 10, 1995, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued. 7
The prosecution presented as witnesses complainant, Dorie Cruz-Abadilla (Abadilla); her friend, Concepcion
Quionez Pamintuan (Pamintuan);8 and Estela Diloria (Diloria),9 a pawnshop appraiser of E. Ochoa Pawnshop.
The prosecutions version of the facts
Abadilla knew Agbulos and Benito through Abadillas friend, Pamintuan. Pamintuan introduced Agbulos to Abadilla
as a jeweler.10
Abadilla and Agbulos entered into several transactions for the sale of jewelry, with Agbulos going to Abadillas
residence at 174 Maginhawa Street, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City. In all these transactions, Benito accompanied
Agbulos.11
On June 9, 1994, Agbulos received pieces of jewelry from Abadilla. They agreed that Agbulos would return the pieces
of jewelry in the afternoon should Agbulos fail to sell them. Agbulos then issued Abadilla a check for the value of the
jewelry received.12
Agbulos received another batch of jewelry from Abadilla on June 14, 1994. She again issued Abadilla a check, this
time for P828,000.00. They likewise agreed that Agbulos would return the jewelry in the afternoon should she fail to
sell them.13
On June 16, 1994, Agbulos received the last batch of jewelry from Abadilla, issuing a check in the amount
ofP453,000.00.14
On June 21, 1994, Abadilla called Agbulos on the phone, asking for security for the pieces of jewelry she gave
Agbulos. Agbulos then gave as security the owners copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 438259. 15
However, upon verification with the Land Registration Authority, the certificate of title turned out to be spurious. 16
Abadilla deposited the checks Agbulosissued to her, and all were dishonored by reason of "closed account." Abadilla
then tried to locate Agbulos, but Agbulos could no longer be found. 17
After several months, Abadilla learned from Agbulos sister-in-law that the latter received pawn tickets from a friend.
Abadilla, through her friend Pamintuan, obtained from Agbulos sister-in-law pawn tickets numbered 45227 and
45306 issued by E. Ochoa Pawnshop. Appearing on the pawn tickets was the name "Linda Chua." 18
Abadilla went to E. Ochoa Pawnshop to verify the items described in the pawn tickets. She learned that the items
pawned were among the pieces of jewelry she turned over to Agbulos, specifically, a mens diamond ring and a set of
diamond ring and earrings. She also learned from Diloria, the pawnshop appraiser, that the "Linda Chua" who pawned
her jewelry was Benito.19
The defenses version of the facts
For the defense, Agbulos and Benito testified. Benito denied that she was the "Linda Chua" who pawned Abadillas
jewelry. According to her, on June 8, 1994, she was at the house of Agbulos mother, working as a cook and taking
care of Agbulos children. She denied being with Agbulos when the latter transacted with Abadilla and that she only
knew of Abadilla when the latter looked for Agbulos.20
Agbulos supported the testimony of her co-accused Benito, stating that the latter "had no participation [in her
transactions with Abadilla]."21 Agbulos likewise denied that Benito accompanied her to Abadillas residence whenever
she received jewelry from Abadilla.22
The Regional Trial Courts findings
The Regional Trial Court found that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Agbulos and Benito
conspired to commit estafa. According to the trial court, Agbulos and Benito received the pieces of jewelry in trust for
Abadilla. They undertook to sell the jewelry for Abadilla or return them in the afternoon should they fail to sell them.
However, in violation of that trust, they failed to return the unsold jewelry. Worse, they had the jewelry pawned under
a different name.23
Thus, in the Decision24 dated November 17, 2009, the trial court sentenced Agbulos and Benito to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum. It also ordered Agbulos and Benito to pay Abadilla P2,070,300.00 byway of civil
indemnity plus 12% interest from the filing of the Information until full payment.25
Disposition of the Court of Appeals
Benito appealed before the Court of Appeals, maintaining that she had nothing to do with Agbulos transaction with
Abadilla.26
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals sustained the finding that Benito was the "Linda Chua" who pawned Abadillas
jewelry as testified to by the pawnshop appraiser, Diloria. Thus, even assuming that Agbulos alone transacted with
Abadilla, "it was the action of [Benito] that paved the way [to the misappropriation or conversion of the jewelry, to the
prejudice of Abadilla]."27 The Court of Appeals upheld the finding that Agbulos and Benito conspired to commit
estafa. Affirming in toto the trial courts Decision, the Court of Appeals denied Benitos appeal in the Decision 28 dated
June 30, 2011.
Benito filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution 29 dated November 13,
2012.
Proceedings in this court
Benito filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. On behalf of the People of the Philippines, the
Office of the Solicitor General commented on Benitos Petition,30 after which, Benito replied to the Comment.31
In her Petition for Review on Certiorari and Reply, Benito insists that the prosecution failed to prove her alleged
conspiracy with Agbulos to commit estafa. She maintains that Agbulos alone transacted with Abadilla, denying that
she received any of the pieces of jewelry. That she allegedly accompanied Agbulos to Abadillas residence does not
prove that she likewise received some of the pieces of jewelry. Thus, the element of estafa consisting of the receipt in
trust of personal property does not apply to her.32
Moreover, Benito vehemently denies that she was the "Linda Chua" who pawned Abadillas jewelry. She points out
that prosecution witness Diloria did not personally transact with "Linda Chua." Diloria allegedly testified that her co-
worker entertained "Linda Chua" and appraised the jewelry being pawned. With "no extraordinary reason why [the
Linda Chua transaction] stuck to [Dilorias] mind," 33 Benito argues that Diloria was incompetent to testify as to the
identity of "Linda Chua."34
Maintaining that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, Benito prays for her acquittal.
In the Comment, the People of the Philippines argues that Benito raises questions of fact that is not allowed in a
Petition for Review on Certiorari. In addition, the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals agreed in their
findings of fact. Thus, the findings that Benito received jewelry from Abadilla and that she was the "Linda Chua" who
pawned some of the jewelry are entitled to great respect, if not finality, by this court.35
Considering that the arguments of Benito are a mere rehash of those she raised in her appeal before the Court of
Appeals, the People of the Philippines prays that this court deny Benitos Petition for Review on Certiorari.
The Issue for this courts resolution is whether Angelita Cruz Benito conspired with Rebecca Agbulos in committing
estafa punished under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
We grant this Petition.
I
The judgments of the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals are based
on a misapprehension of facts
Under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review on
Certiorari:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or
other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall
raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies
by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis supplied)
As an exception to the rule, questions of fact may be raised in a Rule 45 Petition if any of the following is present:
(1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on speculations; (3) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked
undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed
by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record.36
A question of fact exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts." 37On the
other hand, a question of law exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts."38
Benito raises questions of fact in her Petition for Review on Certiorari. Specifically, she prays that this court examine
the truth of the following findings: that she received jewelry from Abadilla and that she posed as "Linda Chua" and
pawned the jewelry she received from Abadilla.
Despite Benito raising questions off act in her Petition for Review on Certiorari, we nevertheless take cognizance of
her Petition. The trial court and Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts of this case.
II
The prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt Benitos conspiracy
with Agbulos to commit estafa
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Proof of conspiracy may be direct or
circumstantial.39 So long as the evidence presented show a "common design or purpose" 40 to commit the crime, all of
the accused shall be held equally liable as co-principals even if one or more of them did not participate in all the
details of the execution of the crime.41
For this reason, the fact of conspiracy "must be proven on the same quantum of evidence as the felony subject of the
agreement of the parties,"42 that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. 43 Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code punishes estafa through misappropriation: Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount
of the fraud is over P12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional P10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
 ....
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
....
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
To prove estafa through misappropriation, the prosecution must establish the following elements:
(1) the offenders receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same;
(2) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of
the money or property;
(3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received. 44 (Citation omitted)
We find that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the conspiracy between Benito and Agbulos.
As testified to by Abadilla, only Agbulos received the pieces of jewelry from her, and Benito was merely "present
during the negotiation":
Q[:] Do you have an agreement regarding the business of jewelry?
A[:] Our agreement is that they will get the items on the same day and if they could not sell [the] items, they will
return it in the afternoon of the same day.
Q[:] Who took the pieces of jewelry you mentioned awhile ago?
A[:] Rebecca Agbulos.
Q[:] Where was accused Angelita C. Benito?
A[:] She was present during the negotiation.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Even assuming that Benito accompanied Agbulos in going to Abadillas residence, this does not prove that Benito
received any jewelry from Abadilla. As the helper of Agbulos brother, 46 Benito may have accompanied Agbulos on
her employers order. "Mere presence [at the scene of the crime] is not by itself indicative of conspiracy between [the
accused]."47
Interestingly, Agbulos testified that the transaction was only between her and Abadilla. She alone issued security for
the jewelry, namely, the dishonored checks and the spurious certificate of title. 48 Agbulos even declared in open court
that "[Benito] ha[d] no participation in the case at bench":49
Q: Can you tell us the participation of your co-accused Angelita Benito in this case?
A: Angelita Benito is just a maid of my brother and assigned to fetch my kids in school.
Q: The prosecution witness testified that you were with your co-accused at that time you went to the place of the
complainant to receive the pieces of jewelry?
A: That is not true, sir.
Q: You said you were the only one who went to the house of the complainant?
A: Yes, sir.50 (Emphasis supplied)
Agbulos statement was an admission against her interest. 51 The statement negated the alleged "common design or
purpose" between her and Benito and would lead to her being solely liable for the crime. 52 It also means that she
admitted that her companions acts can never be attributed to her. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
should have considered this statement in assessing the guilt of Benito.53
In Gomez v. IAC,54 Dolores Gomez (Dolores), together with her husband Rodrigo Gomez (Rodrigo), was charged
with estafa for allegedly conspiring with Rodrigo in misappropriating pieces of jewelry they received from Rodrigos
sister. The trial court convicted her and Rodrigo of the crime charged.55
On appeal, this court acquitted Dolores. It considered a letter Rodrigo wrote his sister, stating that he alone
misappropriated the pieces of jewelry. According to the court, this letter was a declaration against Rodrigos interest
that the trial court should have given weight.56
In Ong v. Court of Appeals,57 Santiago Ong (Ong), together with a Tony Chua (Chua), was charged with estafa for
allegedly conspiring with Chua in misappropriating pieces of jewelry they received from a Florentina Buyco (Buyco).
The trial court convicted them of the crime charged. On appeal, this court acquitted Ong. It considered an affidavit
Chua executed, "absolving [Ong] from any participation in his jewelry transaction with [Buyco and her
sister]."58 According to this court, Chuas statement in his affidavit was a declaration against his interest that should
have been given weight by the trial court.59
The strongest evidence against Benito is the testimony of Diloria, the pawnshop appraiser who positively identified
Benito as the "Linda Chua" who pawned Abadillas jewelry. According to the Court of Appeals, Benitos posing as
"Linda Chua" and pawning the jewelry "paved the way for the presence of the second and third elements of
[estafa],"60 i.e., the misappropriation of the property to the prejudice of another.
However, the identification of Benito as the "Linda Chua" who pawned the jewelry is "open to serious doubt." 61 As
testified to by Diloria, she saw Benito in E. Ochoa Pawnshop only on two occasions: on June 6 and 17,
1994.62Moreover, there is evidence that Diloria was not the pawnshop appraiser who entertained "Linda Chua" 63 but a
co-worker named Mary
Ann:
Q[:] Who prepared the pawn ticket?
A[:] Anybody who is available.
....
Q[:] Anybody who is available?
A[:] Yes, sir.
Q[:] In this case, you appraised [pawn tickets numbered 45227 and 45306]?
A[:] One of our appraisers.
....
Q[:] Who filled up this pawnshop ticket?
A[:] Mary Ann.
Q[:] Your co-employee?
A[:] Yes[,] sir.64
Therefore, as Benito argues, "[t]hereis . . . no special reason why the [Linda Chua transaction] stuck to D[e]lorias
mind, such that she was able to remember the face of a complete stranger and positively identify her more than three
(3) months after the alleged transaction."65
Further, based on Dilorias testimony,"Linda Chua" first went to E. Ochoa Pawnshop on June 6, 1994.66 This date
was prior to the first time Agbulos received pieces of jewelry from Abadilla on June 9, 1994. There is thus some
reasonable doubt as to whether the jewelry "Linda Chua" pawned on June 6, 1994 belonged to Abadilla.
With respect to the second time "Linda Chua" went to the pawnshop on June 17, 1994, Benito cannot be held liable
for it as well.
Generally, demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust is necessary before an accused is convicted of estafa.
However, if there is an agreed period for the accused to return the thing received in trust and the accused fails to return
it within the agreed period, demand is unnecessary. Failure to return the thing within the agreed period consummates
the crime of estafa, i.e, the misappropriation of the thing received in trust. 67
In United States v. Sotelo,68 Manuel Araneta (Araneta) delivered to Vicente Sotelo (Sotelo) pieces of jewelry for the
latter to sell for a price not less than P180.00 or to return the jewelry within one hour from delivery if unsold. Sotelo
failed to return the pieces of jewelry within one hour from their delivery. Without demanding for the return of the
jewelry, Araneta filed against Sotelo a complaint for estafa within the hour after Sotelo failed to return the jewelry.
The court convicted Sotelo of estafa because "[he] did not return [the pieces of jewelry] within the [agreed period] nor
at any other time."69
When Agbulos failed to return in the afternoon the jewelry she received on June 9, 14, and 16, 1994, she was already
presumed to have misappropriated the jewelry. There would be no more need to present any act to prove the
misappropriation.
Consequently, the estafa had already been consummated when "Linda Chua" allegedly pawned the jewelry on June
17, 1994. Benito, who was allegedly "Linda Chua," cannot be held criminally liable with Agbulos. "There can be no
ex post facto conspiracy to do that which has already been done and consummated." 70
In Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 71 Preferred Home Specialties, Inc., through its president,
Edwin Yu (Yu), entered into an agreement with Specialty Oils, Inc. for the toll manufacturing of high quality
margarine. Yu, however, had second thoughts in continuing the agreement with Specialty Oils, Inc. 72
Through the intervention of Harley Sy (Sy), Yu continued the agreement with Specialty Oils, Inc. 73 However, the
margarine delivered by Specialty Oils, Inc. discolored and "turned white." 74 Yu also learned that Specialty Oils, Inc.
claimed in an affidavit filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission that it was already non-operational when
it entered into the agreement with Preferred Home Specialties, Inc.75
Claiming that Specialty Oils, Inc. defrauded it, Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. filed a complaint for estafa against
the officers of Specialty Oils, Inc. It impleaded Sy as respondent for allegedly conspiring with the officers of Specialty
Oils, Inc. indefrauding Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. In a certiorari proceeding against the Department of Justices
Resolution, the Court of Appeals ordered the criminal Complaint against Sy dismissed. 76
This court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision, ruling that the crime of estafa had already been consummated by
the time Sy intervened between Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. and Specialty Oils, Inc. According to this court, Sy
intervened after Specialty Oils, Inc. had delivered the substandard margarine. Therefore, Sy could not be held
criminally liable with the officers of Specialty Oils, Inc.77
In People v. Furugganan,78 Anacleto Furugganan (Furugganan), together with other co-accused, was charged with
murder for allegedly shooting to death several men and wounding a Joseph Ferrer (Ferrer). According to Ferrer, he,
together with other fishermen, was sleeping in a nipa hut when he heard gunshots. He was shot on the leg but
pretended to be dead.79
After the shooting had stopped, Ferrer saw Furugganan and other men climbing up the hut. One of the men hit
Ferrers head to confirm that he was dead. After the men had left, Ferrer went home to have his wound treated and
report the incident.80
In his defense, Furugganan denied that he shot Ferrers companions and alleged that he was merely threatened by one
of the shooters to go up the hut or he himself would be shot. Furugganan emphasized that he was unarmed when he
went up the hut. Ferrer would eventually testify that Furugganan was indeed unarmed.81
This court found Furugganan credible and acquitted him on the ground of reasonable doubt. According to this court,
1wphi1

Furugganans act of going up the hut "cannot . . . be said to have lent in any way even a whit of material or moral aid
in the actual commission of the [crime] charged as, by then, [the crime] had already been consummated." 82
All told, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Benito conspired with Agbulos in
misappropriating the jewelry belonging to Abadilla. Benito, therefore, cannot be convicted of estafa.
There is no proof of Benito's direct participation in the commission of the crime charged. Neither is there proof
beyond reasonable doubt of her conspiracy with Agbulos.
The presumption of innocence holds in favor of Benito. 83 She should be acquitted on the ground that her guilt has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 80, Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59259 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE with respect to Angelita
Cruz Benito. Petitioner Angelita Cruz Benito is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
To avail of self-defense as a justifying circumstance so as not to incur any criminal liability, it must be
proved with certainty by satisfactory and convincing evidence which excludes any vestige of criminal
aggression on the part of the person invoking it. It cannot be entertained where it is not only
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is also doubtful. Thus, the claim of an accused
that he stabbed the victim at the back portion of the latters body (Lumbar area) while the former was
lying down is not only uncorroborated by any other evidence but it is improbable and contrary to the
physical evidence especially when the vicitm was lying on the ground while the accused was on top
and at the same time choking him, making the plea of self-defense dubious. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. ERWIN LALOG, ROOSEVELT CONCEPCION, EDWIN RAMIREZ, and
RICKY LITADA, G.R. No. 196753, April 21, 2014, J. Del Castillo

The facts of this case as summarized by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
On September 29, 1999 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Ryan Gain [Gain], Roswel Mercado [Mercado], Rex
Rey [Rey] and Jayson Manzo [Manzo] were strolling at the Municipal Park of Poblacion, Municipality of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, when they were blocked by four (4) persons, namely Erwin Lalog [Lalog], Roosevelt
Concepcion [Concepcion], Edwin Ramirez [Ramirez] and Ricky Litada [Litada]. xx x Lalog angrily talked to x x x
Gain, but x x x Mercado intervened and apologized to the group of xx x Lalog x x x.
Later, x x x Gain and x x x Mercado went down the stairs of the park locally known as the "RAINBOW[.]" x x x
Mercado [was] walking ahead ofx x x Gain by six (6) arms length[;] when he looked back, he saw xx x Gain being
ganged upon by the group of the accused-appellants x xx [held] both the hands of x x x Gain, while x x x Lalog
stabbed x x x Gain. x x x [Fearing for his life,] Roswel x x x immediately fled the scene.
Sensing that the assailants had left the scene, x xx Mercado approached x x x Gain and brought him to the hospital x x
x but it was already too late for he was declared x x x [d]ead on [a]rrival x x x.
On the other hand, x x x Lalog admitted stabbing x x x Gain in self-defense, while the other three appellants, x x x
Concepcion, x x x Ramirez, and x x x Litada denied their participation in the stabbing incident, claiming that the three
of them were in a drinking session, in the house of [Ramirezs aunt] in Quezon Street, Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro.1
Thus, on October 28, 1999, an Information 2 was filed charging appellants Lalog, Concepcion, Ramirez, and Litada
with the crime of murder. During their arraignment on February 21, 2000, appellants pleaded not guilty. 3The case was
set for pre-trial on April 27, 2000.4 However, upon agreement by both parties, the pre-trial was terminated. Trial on
the merits ensued.
In a Decision5 dated October 17, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, found
appellants guilty as charged, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Erwin Lalog, Roosevelt Concepcion, Edwin Ramirez
and Ricky Litada guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal[s] of the crime of MURDER for having conspired in
killing Ryan Gain, qualified by treachery, which is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
by RECLUSION PERPETUA to DEATH. Considering that there is neither a mitigating nor aggravating circumstance
in the commission of the crime, all accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
with all the accessory penalties and to jointly and severally pay the heirs of Ryan Gain the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, the sum of P29,510 as expenses incurred during the wake of deceased Ryan Gain including the funeral
expenses, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.6
The trial court lent credence to the testimony of Mercado who never wavered in his narration that he saw appellants
gang up on the victim and that appellant Lalog stabbed the victim at the back. It was not persuaded by Lalogs claim
of self-defense as it was quite improbable for Lalog to have stabbed the victim on the back while he was lying on the
ground and the victim on top of him. The number of wounds sustained by the victim negated Lalogs claim of self-
defense; rather, it was indicative of appellants intent to kill. The trial court disregarded Concepcions, Ramirez, and
Litadas defense of alibi considering that the place where they claim to be was only about a hundred meters away from
the scene of the crime. Thus, it was not physically impossible for them to be present at the crime scene. The trial court
found that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation did not attend the commission of the crime. It noted
that appellants and the victim met only by chance at Pinamalayan Park; there was no showing that appellants planned
the killing. However, it found that the killing was done in a treacherous manner. The prosecution established that
appellants first held the hands of the victim to render him immobile and to foreclose any defense from the latter.
Thereafter, appellant Lalog stabbed him at the back. As regards the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, the same was absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Nocturnity was not considered to have
qualified the crime because there was no showing that appellants took advantage of the same to perpetrate the crime
or to conceal their identity.
Aggrieved, appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, in its November 11, 2010 Decision, 7 the appellate
court affirmed in full the Decision of the trial court, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro, in Criminal Case No. P-6043 convicting the accused-appellants of the crime of Murder and sentencing them
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the accessory penalties, and to jointly and severally pay the heirs
of Ryan Gain the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the sum of P29,510.00 as expenses incurred during the wake
of deceased Ryan Gain including the funeral expenses, the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay costs of
suit, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, this appeal.
Appellants claim that Mercados testimony should not have been given credence by the trial court and the appellate
court as there were inconsistencies. They allege that Mercado initially testified that appellants attacked the victim at
the place known in the locality as the "rainbow" but later recanted and stated that the stabbing occurred on the ground
near the "rainbow".
This contention deserves no consideration. Whether the victim was stabbed at the "rainbow" or near the "rainbow" is
inconsequential. What is important is the fact that Mercado unwaveringly testified that he saw appellants gang up on
the victim, render him immobile, and then stab him at the back several times.
Appellants next argue that the trial court and the appellate court erred in disregarding Lalogs claim of self-defense.
We are not persuaded. As correctly held by the trial court:
To avail of self-defense as a justifying circumstance so as not to incur any criminal liability, it must be proved with
certainty by satisfactory and convincing evidence which excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the
person invoking it. It cannot be entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence
but is also doubtful. If the accused fails to discharge the burden of proof, his conviction, shall of necessity follow on
the basis of his admission of the killing (People v. Suyum et. al. G.R. No. 137518, March 6, 2002).
The claim of x x x Lalog that he stabbed x x x Gain at the back portion of the latters body (Lumbar area) while the
former was lying down is not only uncorroborated by any other evidence but it is improbable and contrary to the
physical evidence because how could x x x Lalog [stab] x x x Gains back when the former was lying on the ground
while the latter was on top and at the same time choking him. The testimony of prosecution witness x x x Mercado
that x x x Gain was stabbed at his back by x x x Lalog while x x x [both his hands were being held by the other
appellants] is more logical, believable and [in] consonance with the physical evidence. x x x Gain could not have been
easily stabbed at his back if his x x x hands were not being held x x x considering that x x x Gain is much taller and
bigger in built than the accused particularly x x x Lalog unless x x x Gain just simply let his back (lumbar area) [be]
stabbed without any resistance or struggle on his part which is impossible under any state of circumstances.
Furthermore, the number of wounds [sustained by Gain] (Exh. "A") [is] indicative of x x x Lalogs desire to kill the
former and not really defend himself because not a single moment of the incident was his life and limb being
endangered which is the essence of self-defense. The fact that the deceased x x x Gain was not armed all the more
negates self-defense.9
Finally, we are not persuaded by appellants argument that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proved.
We agree with the trial courts observation that appellants attacked Gain in a treacherous manner. They held Gains
arms, rendered him immobile and then thrust the knife into his body several times.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals properly sentenced appellants to reclusion perpetua there being no
aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery. However, appellants are not eligible for
parole.10
As regards damages, the award of civil indemnity must be increased to P75,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.11 The awards of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and actual damages in the amount
of P29,510.00 are proper. In addition, the heirs of the victim are entitled to an award of exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00.12 Finally, interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until the
awards of damages are fully paid is imposed.13
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The November 11, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R CR-
HC No. 00325 which affirmed the October 17, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro, Branch 42, finding appellants Erwin Lalog, Roosevelt Concepcion, Edwin Ramirez and Ricky Litada guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellants are without eligibility for parole; the award of civil indemnity is
increased to P75,000.00; appellants are ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
interest on all damages awarded is imposed at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

Self-defense, to be successfully invoked, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence that
excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. Bosito failed to
present adequate evidence to prove otherwise. Thus, his claim of self-defense cannot stand. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNALDO BOSITO Y CHAVENIA, G.R. No. 209346, January 12,
2015, J. Carpio

Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 19 April 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05289. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated 29 September 2011 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabaco City, Al bay, Branch 15 in Criminal Case No. T-4696, convicting
appellant Arnaldo Bosito y Chavenia (Bosito) of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Facts
Bosito was charged in an Information for murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 3 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Information states:
That [on or] about 1:00 in the afternoon of June 11, 2007 at P-1, Barangay Hacienda, San Miguel Island, City of
Tabaco, Philippines, and within the jurisdictionof this Honorable Court, the [above-named accused], with intent to kill
and with treachery, and while armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously attack, assault,
and hack WILLY BERBA BONAOBRA, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal wounds which directly
caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment, Bosito pleaded not guilty and invoked selfdefense.
On 14 January 2008, at the pre-trial conference, the following facts offered for stipulation by the prosecution were
admitted by the defense: (1) the identity of Bosito; (2) that Bosito and the victim, Willy Berba Bonaobra (Bonaobra)
knew each other; (3) that Bosito was in Hacienda, San Miguel, Tabaco City on 11 June 2007; (4) that Bosito saw
Bonaobra in Hacienda in the afternoon of 11 June2007; (5) that Bonaobra is already dead; (6) that Bosito hacked
Bonaobra several times at the house of Rosemarie Bongon in Hacienda, San Miguel, in the afternoon of 11 June 2007;
and (7) that Bonaobra did not die immediately at the scene of the incident but expired at the hospital. The prosecution
presented the following witnesses: (1) Adonis Bosito (Adonis), Bositos nephew and the eyewitness to the crime; (2)
Vicente Bonaobra, father of the victim; (3) Dr. Nicanor Manzano III, the attending physician of Bonaobra at the Bicol
Regional Training and Teaching Hospital where the victim was brought after the hacking incident; (4) Atty. William
Balayo, the lawyer who assisted Bosito when he gave his extrajudicial confession; and (5) SPO1 Dennis Biron, the
Investigator and Blotter Custodian of Tabaco City Police Force.
The prosecution summed up its version of the facts from the testimony of Adonis, the eyewitness tothe crime:
Bonaobra arrived at the house of his sister Rosemarie Bongon (Rosemarie) at around noon of 11 June 2007. After 30
minutes, Bosito arrived at Rosemaries house. Bosito stood beside Bonaobra and watched a card game being played
by other guests. Bonaobra offered Bosito some peanuts which Bosito accepted.
At around 1:00 in the afternoon, without warning, Bosito hacked Bonaobra with a boloas the victim was trying to sit.
The blow to his head caused Bonaobra to slump to the ground. He tried to crawl away but Bosito hacked him again
and hit him in the leg. Despite his injuries, Bonaobra was still conscious and continued crawling. Bosito then
positioned himself behind Bonaobra and hacked him in the head two more times. Although already mortally wounded,
Bonaobra still managed to stand up and run away.
After Bonaobras escape, Adonis picked up a wooden post from the ground and told Bosito to stop.However, Bosito
waved his boloand told Adonis not to come near him. Bositothen walked toward the direction of his house and
threatened Adonis and his companions that they would be next should they follow him.
Later, Adonis saw Bonaobra being boarded on a boat and found out that Bonaobra was taken to a hospital. On 14 June
2007, Bonaobra died of aspiration pneumonia due to sustained multiple hack wounds.
Adonis testified that Bonaobra did not provoke Bosito. Adonis suspected that Bosito thought that Bonaobra came to
Tabaco City to avenge Edgar Binas, who was also hackedby Bosito three years earlier.
Dr. Nicanor Manzano III, the attending physician of Bonaobra when he was brought to the hospital issued two
medico-legal certificates showing that Bonaobra sustained: (1) a skull fracture which caused brain evisceration; (2)
severe neck trauma; (3) thoracic area posterior trauma; and (4) left gluteal area trauma. Dr. Manzano testified that all
of Bonaobras wounds were to the back of his head and the back side of his torso. Among all his wounds, the most
fatal was the first head trauma which caused Bonaobras brain tissues to come out from his skull.
Atty. William Balayo testified that upon the request of PO2 Joel Zubeldia, he assisted Bosito in executing his
extrajudicial confession. Atty. Balayo ensured that Bosito understood his constitutional rights and Bosito, having
understood the implication of his act, voluntarily gave his confession. Atty. Balayo stated that Bosito admitted striking
the victim only once. However, upon learning that Bonaobra died in the hospital several days after due to multiple
hack wounds, Atty. Balayo decided not to assist anymore because of Bositos misrepresentation.
SPO1 Dennis Biron brought to court and read into the records Police Blotter Entries 062156, 062158 and 062189 and
attested to the correctness of the certification submitted in court as documentary exhibits.
The defense, on the other hand, presented (1) appellant Bosito; (2) Analisa Balderama (Analisa), appellants sister;
and (3) Walter Dumaguin, appellants friend.
Bosito testified that while on their way to the rice field, he and his sister Analisa passed by the house of Rosemarie
Bongon where Adonis was having a drinking spree with his brothers, Juan and Arnold, and Bonaobra. The group
called on Bosito to join them and when he approached them, Adonis struck him with a piece of wood, hitting his wrist
as he parried the blow. While still holding the piece of wood, Bonaobra, together with Juan and Arnold, who were all
drunk and holding bladed weapons surrounded Bosito. Just as Bonaobra was about tostab him, Bosito immediately
pulled out his bolo and hacked the victim. Bonaobra ran away and fell to the ground about a kilometer away from the
crime scene. The others scampered away. Bosito went home, left his bolothere and surrendered himself to the
barangay captain.
Analisa testified that she and her brother Bosito were on their way to the rice field when they passed by Bonaobra,
Adonis, Juan and Arnold on a drinking spree at Rosemaries house. Adonis invited Bosito for a drink which the latter
refused. Bonaobra then pushed Bositoand struck Bosito with a bolo four times but Bosito evaded these thrusts. They
grappled for possession of the bolo which Bosito eventually wrestled out of Bonaobras hand and hacked Bonaobra
maybe four times. She tried to pacify them but to no avail. Analisa stated that prior to this incident, Bonaobra had
been threatening Bosito for about seven months already whenever Bonaobra was drunk. Walter Dumaguin, a fishpond
operator in Hacienda, San Miguel, testified that he was a friend of Bositoand visited him in jail for about 10 minutes
the day after the incident. Dumaguin did not give any other relevant information.
In its Decision dated 29 September 2011, the RTC found Bosito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder. The RTC accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of Adonis and disregarded Bositos claim of self-
defense. The RTC stated that Adonis testified in a straight forward and candid manner thatBosito mercilessly hacked
Bonaobra four times, with his bolo. The RTC stated further that Bositos version of self-defense was incredulous and
unbelievable since Bosito was unharmed and unwounded compared to the number of hacked wounds sustained by the
victim. The RTC declared Bosito guilty of the crime of murder attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery
and abuse of superior strength due to the sudden and unexpected attack made by Bosito which afforded no opportunity
for Bonaobra to defend himself. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Arnaldo Bosito y
Chavenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua.
Accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Willy BerbaBonaobra the following:
a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
c) P15,505.45 as actual damages;
d) P1,392,120.00 representing the loss of earning capacity.
SO ORDERED.5
Bosito filed an appeal with the CA and raised a lone error by the RTC:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
SELF-DEFENSE [THEORY].6
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 19 April 2013, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC. The CA found no
cogent reason to deviate from the trial courts factual findings and conclusion. The CA stated that Bositos plea of self-
defense has been rebutted by the positive and categorical testimony of prosecution witness Adonis who had
convincingly established that the unlawful aggression emanated from Bosito and not from the victim. The CA added
that the trial court correctly accorded credence to Adonis whose testimony it found spontaneous, straightforward,
candid and evincing credence and belief. Further, the CA ruled out the presence of illmotive on the part of Adonis to
falsely implicate his uncle.
The CA deleted the award of (1) actual damages of P15,505.45 since jurisprudence holds that when actualdamages
proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000, the award of temperate damages of P25,000 is
justified in lieu of actual damages in a lesser amount; and (2) damages for loss of earning capacity since no
documentary evidence was presented by the prosecution to substantiate the claim and the victim does not fall under
any of the recognized exceptions. Nevertheless, the CA granted the amount of P25,000 as temperate damages in lieu
of actual damages of P15,505.45 supported by receipts and P30,000 as exemplary damages pursuant to Article
22307 of the Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS:
1. Ordering Appellant Arnaldo Bosito yChavenia to pay the heirs of the victim temperate damages of Twenty-
Five Thousand Pesos (Php25,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(Php30,000.00);
2. Deleting the award of actual damages and damages for loss of earning capacity; and
 3. Ordering the payment of interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum computed from the date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid on the total amount of damages adjudged in favor of the heirs of the victim,
the appealed 29 September 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Branch 15, in Criminal Case
No. T-4696 is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.8
Appellant Bosito now comes before the Court, submitting for resolution the same issue argued before the CA. In a
Manifestation9 dated 28 February 2014, Bosito stated that in lieu of supplemental brief, he is adopting the Appellants
Brief10 dated 21 June 2012 submitted before the CA. Likewise, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it
no longer desires to file a supplemental brief and instead adopts the Appellees Brief 11 dated 12 November 2012 which
it filed before the CA.12
Appellant assails the decisions of the RTC and CA for not giving credence to his contention of self-defense.
The Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
We agree with the RTC and the CA in ruling that the prosecution fully established Bositos guilt for the crime of
murder beyond reasonable doubt. Adonis positively identified Bosito as the person who hacked Bonaobra and caused
his death. Considering that Adonis and Bosito were blood relatives, Adonis was candid, straightforward, spontaneous
and firm in his narration of the events.
In the present case, Bosito would like us to believe that he acted in self-defense. In his Appellants Brief, Bosito
admitted hacking Bosito although in self-defense. By invokingself-defense, appellant admits killing the victim and the
constitutional presumption of innocence is effectively waived. The burden of evidence then shifts to the appellant that
the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability. 13 Thus, it is incumbent upon appellant to prove the
elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-
defense.14
Bosito claims that the unlawful aggression consisted of Bonaobras group ganging up on him and attempting to stab
him with a knife. However, aside from Bositos self-serving testimony, the defense did not present any witness to
corroborate his testimony that Bonaobra pulled a knife and tried to stab him. Likewise, Bosito failed to present the
knife which he said he grabbed during the tussle and kept in his possession. In People v. Satonero, 15we held that the
failure to account for the non-presentation of the weapon allegedly wielded by the victim is fatal to the plea of self-
defense.
Next, the means employed by Bosito to prevent or repel the supposed unlawful aggression was beyond reasonably
necessary. As correctly found by the trial and appellate courts, the number, nature, and gravity of the wounds
sustained by Bonaobra reveal a determined effort to kill and contradict Bositos claim of self-defense. The
prosecutions evidence shows that Bonaobra sustained and died from multiple hack wounds. The records show that
after Bonaobra received the first blow to his head, which proved to be the most fatal, Bosito still continued to thrust
his boloto the victim three more times. Even Analisa, Bositos sister, who gave her testimony for the defense,
confirmed that Bosito hacked Bonaobra four times. Clearly, the means utilized was not reasonable under the
circumstances.
In People v. Obordo,16 we held that self-defense, to be successfully invoked, must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. Bosito failed to present
adequate evidence to prove otherwise. Thus, his claim of self-defense cannot stand.
Further, we agree with the lower courts in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The essence of
1wphi1

treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the victim of any chance to defend
himself. Here, the sudden attack of Bosito with a bolo against Bonaobra while they were watching a card game caught
the victim by surprise. Bonaobra was unprepared and had no means to put up a defense. Such aggression insured the
commission of the crime without risk on Bosito. Also, we agree with the trial court when it held that abuse of superior
strength is deemed absorbed in treachery. Since treachery qualifies the crime of murder, the generic aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the former. 17
In sum, we find no cogent reason to depart from the decision of the trial and appellate courts. Bosito is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole, in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 9346; 18 and with all the accessory penalties
provided by law. As for damages, the CA awarded these amounts: (1) P50,000 as civil indemnity; (2) P50,000 as
moral damages; (3) P25,000 as temperate damages; and (4) P30,000 as exemplary damages. To conform with recent
jurisprudence,19 the amount of civil indemnity awarded by the CA is hereby increased to P75,000. Moreover, the
amounts of damages awarded are subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 19 April 2013 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05289 WITH THE MODIFICATIONS that:
(1) appellant Arnaldo Bosito y Chavenia is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
(2) the amount of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000; and
(3) appellant is ordered to pay interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

The accused failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel or Eligio, which is a
condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to obtain. As case law puts it,
there can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who
resorted to self-defense. As shown by the records, it was Casas who was actually the aggressor, as he
was the one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay prostrate, and
again on Eligio as he was fleeing. Being the party initiating the attack, and overbearing with a deadly
weapon, Casas cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for unlawful
aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude,as against the one claiming self-
defense. Evidently, the contrary happened in this case.
However, the Court disagrees that the accused should be convicted of the crime of Murder with respect
to the death of Joel, considering the prosecutions failure to prove the existence of treachery. In order to
appreciate treachery, the victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the
attack. Should it appear, however, that the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in, and, instead
of fleeing from it he met it and was killed as a result, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery
cannot be appreciated.
In this case, Joel knew that Casas was armed with a knife and had just used the same on Eligio. Joel
elected to intervene, and even armed himself with a bamboo pole. Accordingly, it is rather obvious that
Joel was aware of the danger to his life. Further, acting in the heat of the moment, and there being no
showing that no appreciable interval of time had elapsed from Joels mishap to his stabbing so as to
allow for the assailants careful reflection, it does not equally appear that Casas deliberately adopted
means in order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. Evidently, this lack
of deliberation on the part of Casas, as well as Joels obvious awareness of the danger to his life,
prompts this Court to discount treachery as a qualifying circumstance. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN CASAS Y VINTULAN, G.R. No. 212565, February 25, 2015, J.
Perlas-Bernabe

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Benjamin Casas y Vintulan (Casas)
assailing the Decision2 dated November 20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No.
05313 which affirmed the Decision3 dated November 4, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 160 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 136842 and 136843, finding Casas guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide under Articles 248 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), respectively.
The Facts
Two (2) criminal Informations were filed before the RTC charging Casas of the Murder of Joel Tabile y Gulla 4(Joel)
and the Frustrated Murder of Eligio5 Ruiz y Ricardo6 (Eligio), the pertinent portions of which respectively read:
Crim. Case No. 136842
That, on or about the 24th day of December, 2007, in the City of San Juan, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with another person, whose true identity and present
whereabouts are unknown, with the use of a bladed weapon, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and by means of the
qualifying circumstance treachery (sic), evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Joel Tabile y Gulla, thereby inflicting upon the latter
several stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Crim. Case No. 136843
That, on or about the 24th day of December, 2007, in the City of San Juan, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with another person, whose true identity and present
whereabouts are unknown, with intent to kill and by means of the qualifying circumstance treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, which qualifies the crime to frustrated murder, with the use of a bladed
weapon, a deadly weapon, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Elegio
Ruiz y Ricardo, thereby inflicting upon the latter several stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which
ordinarily would have caused his death, thus, performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
murder as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused, that is, due to the timely medical assistance rendered unto said Elegio Ruiz y Ricardo, which prevented his
death. CONTRARY TO LAW.8
During arraignment, Casas entered a plea of not guilty. After which, joint trial on the merits ensued. 9
The prosecutions version of the facts is as follows:
On December 24, 2007, between 1 to 2 o clock in the afternoon, Casas, accompanied by a certain "Ron-Ron" (Ron-
Ron), went to a certain taho factory located at 313 F. Roman Street, San Juan City, looking for a certain Jesus. Failing
to find the person he was looking for, Casas brandished a knife and stuck it into a pail used for making taho.
Consequently, Eligio, an employee of the tahofactory, confronted Casas, saying to the latter, "Benjie[(referring to
Casas)], bakit ang yabang mo? Kung hindi mo makita ang kalaban mo, dapat hanapin mo na lang." Casas replied
"Gusto mo ito? (referring to his knife)." Eligio told Casas to get rid of the knife, which the latter gave to Ron-Ron.
Eligio and Casas then had a fistfight. During the ensuing melee, Casas took the knife from Ron-Ron and stabbed
Eligio twice while the latter was fleeing. Casas, during his continued pursuit of Eligio, then ran into Joel, who, for his
part, tried to help Eligio with the use of a bamboo pole. However, Joel slipped, fell face first on the floor, and was
prostrate. There and then, Casas stabbed him twice, the first blow entering his back and exiting at the front of his
torso, and the second blow hitting the left side of his abdomen. Casas managed to overtake Eligio, and stabbed him
again on the stomach. Fearing that Casas would kill him, Eligio grabbed a plastic stool and hit Casas on the head with
it, forcing the latter to drop the knife and cease the attack. PO1 Silverio R. Fuentes (PO1 Fuentes) claimed that he was
riding his motorcycle on the date of the incident when he met PO3 Eduardo Fronda (PO3 Fronda) who asked for
assistance as the latter saw a bloodied male. The two immediately proceeded towards the victim, who turned out to be
Casas, and asked him what happened. The latter replied that he had just stabbed someone. After confirming that there
was indeed a stabbing incident nearby, PO1 Fuentes and PO3 Fronda arrested Casas. 10
After the prosecution rested its case, Casas filed a demurrer to Evidence 11 on the basis of the alleged inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which the RTC denied in an Order 12 dated December 30, 2010.13 With
the demurrers denial, the defense changed its theory as Casas admitted that he stabbed both Joel and Eligio but
interposed self-defense to justify his actions. 14 In particular, Casas claimed that he was a former employee of the taho
factory and that on December 24, 2007, the date of the incident, his former employer asked him to get the remainder
of his salary. While at the factory, Joel challenged him to a fight. Casas averred that he refused to accept Joels
challenge, but the latter took a knife and attacked him. During the alleged attack, Casas posited that he suffered minor
injuries when he disarmed and stabbed Joel. Eligio and one Rolando Jaronel witnessed the fight, and when they saw
that Casas stabbed Joel they began to attack him also. In order to protect himself, Casas repeatedly stabbed Eligio. He
maintained that he did not intend to kill Joel.15
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision16 dated November 4, 2011, the RTC convicted Casas of the following:
(a) in Crim. Case No. 136842, Murder (of Joel), thereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with all the concomitant accessory penalties, and ordering him to pay the amounts of P50,000.00 in
civil indemnity, P12,500.00 in actual damages, P37,200.00 in loss of earning capacity, P30,000.00 in moral
damages, P30,000.00 in exemplary damages, and costs; and
(b) in Crim. Case No. 136843,Attempted Homicide (of Eligio), thereby sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years and
six (6) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering him to pay the amount of P14,000.00 as
temperate damages, and costs.17
It declared that the evidence on record did not support Casass theory of self-defense, observing that the victims
showed no unlawful aggression towards Casas. On the other hand, the prosecutions witnesses invariably testified that
it was Casas who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay prostrate, and again on Eligio as
he was fleeing, establishing that Casas was the aggressor. Further, it was pointed out that Casas suffered only nine (9)
injuries, consisting of three (3) abrasions, one (1) contusion, and five (5) incised wounds, which did not, collectively
or individually, threaten his life at any time. 18 Conversely, Joel was killed because of the stab wounds that Casas
inflicted, while Eligio was stabbed multiple times. As such, the second requirement under Article 11 (1) of the RPC,
i.e., the reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the unlawful aggression, was non-existent. 19
Meanwhile, the RTC found that Casas stabbed Joel twice when the latter slipped, fell, and lay prostrate, and in that
position Joel could not defend himself. Accordingly, it ruled that Casas employed treachery in killing Joel, and thus
should be convicted for Murder.20
As for Eligio, the RTC opined that though Casass intent to kill the former was present (as shown by the weapon he
used, the number of wounds he inflicted, his resolution to chase and harm Eligio after the latter fled, and the parts of
Eligios body that Casas injured), the circumstances that would qualify the case to Murder were not attendant;
therefore, Casas should be convicted only of Homicide in such respect. The RTC also ruled that the said crime was
only in its attempted stage given that the prosecution was not able to prove that he performed all the acts of execution
which would consummate the Homicide,21 nor show the nature of Eligios wounds.22
Dissatisfied, Casas appealed23 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision24 dated November 20, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTCs conviction of Casas but modified the amounts
awarded to P75,000.00 in civil indemnity, P12,500.00 in actual damages, P37,200.00 in loss of earning
capacity, P30,000.00 in moral damages, and P30,000.00 in exemplary damages for the Murder of Joel. As for the
Attempted Homicide of Eligio, it awarded P25,000.00 in temperate damages, and P10,000.00 in moral damages, in
order to conform with recent jurisprudence.
Aggrieved, Casas filed the instant appeal.25
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not Casass conviction for the crimes of Murder and Attempted
Homicide should be upheld.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
The Court first rules on the existence of criminal liability.
Essentially, Casas, in a sudden change of theory from the denial of his demurrer, banks on the justifying circumstance
of self-defense in order to overturn his conviction for the crimes of Murder and Attempted Homicide. The statutory
basis therefor is Article 11 (1) of the RPC which reads:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
After a careful review of the records, the Court is satisfied that the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, correctly pronounced
that the above-mentioned requirements were not present in this case. It is significant to point out that upon invoking
the justifying circumstance of self-defense, Casas assumed the burden of proving the justification of his act with clear
and convincing evidence. This is because his having admitted the killing required him to rely on the strength of his
own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence, which, even if it were weak, could not be
disbelieved in view of his admission.26
Preliminarily, Casas failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel or Eligio, which is a condition
sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to obtain. As case law puts it, there can be no self-defense
unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. 27 As shown by the
records, it was Casas who was actually the aggressor, as he was the one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on
Eligio, then on Joel as he lay prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing. 28 Being the party initiating the attack,
and overbearing with a deadly weapon, Casas cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for
unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, 29 as against the one claiming self-defense. Evidently, the
contrary happened in this case.
It bears clarification that the initial fistfight between Eligio and Casas does not indicate that unlawful aggression was
employed by the former against the latter considering that Eligio had already yielded from the brawl and, in fact,
proceeded to flee. It is well-settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away if and so such was the case with
respect to Eligio unlawful aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression
ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation, and not self-
defense, is committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the
injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression was still existing
when the aggressor was injured by the accused.30
Thus, given that the core element of unlawful aggression was not proven, Casass claim of self-defense falters and his
criminal liability stands.
This notwithstanding, the Court, however, disagrees that Casas should be convicted of the crime of Murder with
respect to the incidents in Crim. Case No. 136842, i.e., the death of Joel, considering the prosecutions failure to prove
the existence of treachery. The Court expounds. The elements of Murder that the prosecution must establish are: (a)
that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Among the qualifying circumstances thus enumerated in Article 248 is treachery. Under Article 14 of the RPC,
1wphi1

"[t]here is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make." In other words, to appreciate treachery, it must be shown
that: (a) the means of execution employed gives the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (b) the
methods of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted; 31 indeed, treachery cannot be presumed, it must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.32
In People v. Se,33 the Court explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack
on the victim, without the slightest provocation on the latters part. The victim must not have known the peril he was
exposed to at the moment of the attack. Should it appear, however, that the victim was forewarned of the danger he
was in, and, instead of fleeing from it he met it and was killed as a result, then the qualifying circumstance of
treachery cannot be appreciated.34
In People v. Discalsota,35 the Court held that treachery cannot be appreciated in instances when the victim had the
opportunity to flee or defend himself.36
In this case, the records show that a fistfight ensued between Eligio and Casas. 37 Joel, seeing that Casas had stabbed
Eligio, wanted to help the latter by using a bamboo pole but slipped and fell. 38 As he was lying prostrate on the floor,
Casas delivered the blows that ended Joels life. Under these circumstances, it is the Courts observation that Joel was
fully aware of the danger posed in assisting Eligio. He knew that Casas was armed with a knife and had just used the
same on Eligio. Joel elected to intervene, and even armed himself with a bamboo pole. Accordingly, it is rather
obvious that Joel was aware of the danger to his life. Further, acting in the heat of the moment, and there being no
showing that no appreciable interval of time had elapsed from Joels mishap to his stabbing so as to allow for the
assailants careful reflection, it does not equally appear that Casas deliberately adopted means in order to ensure that
Joel had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. Palpably, Casas just happened to stab Joel as the latter had just
slipped on the floor when the former caught up with him (Joel). Evidently, this lack of deliberation on the part of
Casas, as well as Joels obvious awareness of the danger to his life, prompts this Court to discount treachery as a
qualifying circumstance. Thus, insofar as the incidents in Crim. Case No. 136842 go, the Court downgrades the
conviction to the crime of Homicide. In consequence, Casas is instead meted with the penalty of imprisonment with
an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all the concomitant accessory penalties, for the Homicide of Joel.
The downgrading of Casass conviction in Crim. Case No. 136842 results in the deletion of the award ofP30,000.00 in
exemplary damages.39 Further, keeping with recent jurisprudence, the Court is impelled to increase the award of moral
damages from P30,000.00 to P75,000.00,40 as well as delete the award of P12,500.00 in actual damages and, in lieu
thereof, award temperate damages in the higher amount of P25,000.00.41 The Court also perceives error in the award
of P37,200.00 in loss of earning capacity since the established formula thereof was incorrectly applied.
The formula for the computation of loss of earning capacity is as follows:42
Net earning capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income - Living Expenses (50% of gross annual income)],
where life expectancy = 2/3 (80 - the age of the deceased).
Thus, operating under the established facts as found by the RTC that Joel was 22 when he was killed by Casas, and
that he had monthly salary of 1,000.00 to 1,500.00 as a utility man,43 the loss of earning capacity is computed as such:
Net earning capacity = [2/3(80-22)] x [(1500 x 12) - ((1,500 x 12) x 50%)]
= [2/3(58)] x [P18,000.00 - P9,000.00]
= P348,000.00
Accordingly, the award of loss of earning capacity is increased from P37,200.00 to P348,000.00 as above-computed.
Meanwhile, the civil indemnity award of P75,000.00 stands.44
In similar light, the Court modifies the award of moral damages in Crim. Case No. 136843from P10,000.00
toP20,000.00 to conform with recent jurisprudence.45
Finally, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded, in both Crim.
Case Nos. 136842 and 136843, from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.46
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Decision dated November 20,
2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 05313 with MODIFICATION in that, in Crim. Case No.
136842, considering that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven, accused-appellant Benjamin Casas
y Vintulan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt only of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code and is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with an indeterminate period of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with
all the concomitant accessory penalties.
Further, in order to conform with existing jurisprudence, the following monetary awards are MODIFIED: in Crim.
Case No. 136842, (a) the award of P12,500.00 in actual damages is deleted and, in lieu thereof, P25,000.00 in
temperate damages is awarded; (b) the award of loss of earning capacity is increased from P37,200.00 toP348,000.00;
(c) the award of P30,000.00 in moral damages is increased to P75,000.00; and (d) the award ofP30,000.00 in
exemplary damages is deleted; and in Crim. Case No. 136843, the award of P10,000.00 in moral damages is increased
to P20,000.00. In addition, all awards for damages, in Crim. Case Nos. 136842 and 136843, shall bear legal interest at
the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
The rest of the CA Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Other than Dela Cruzs
testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to Dela
Cruzs questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun
from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed an assault which may have caused Dela Cruz to
fear for his life. Even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially came from the victim,
the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is
settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the
former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed .A person making a defense
has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased. SHERWIN DELA
CRUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., G.R. No. 189405, November 19, 2014, J.
Peralta

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside
the May 7, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin
Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and its August 19, 2009
Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information3 dated March 2, 2005, which alleged:
That on or about the 1st day of January 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and with the use of an unlicensed firearm, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one JEFFREY WERNHER GONZALES Y LIM
on the head, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and moral gunshot wound which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, petitioner went to the office of
Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of Robinsons Summit Center,Ayala Avenue, Makati City. When petitioner
was already inside the building, he went to the work station of the deceased victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales
(Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the eye witness Antonette Managbanags sketch, was seated fronting his
computer terminal, with his back towards the aisle. As petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner was
already holding a gun pointed at the back of Jeffreys head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of
petitioner holding the gun, and a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter. Petitioner won the
struggle and remained in possession of the said gun. Petitioner then pointed the gun at Jeffreys face, pulled the trigger
four (4) times, the fourth shot finally discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead, eventually killing him.
Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the office.
The defense recounted a different version of the facts.
Petitioner claimed that on January1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, more or less, petitioner, together with his
children, went to Sykes Asia, the workplace of his wife, Darlene Dela Cruz (Darlene), located at the 25th Floor of
Robinsons Summit Building in Makati City, to fetch the latter so that their family could spend time and celebrate
together the New Years Day. Before entering the Robinsons Summit Building, petitioner underwent the regular
security check-up/procedures. He was frisked by the guards-on-duty manning the main entrance of said building and
no firearm was found in his possession. He registered his name at the security logbook and surrendered a valid I.D.
Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same building, a security guard manning the entrance once again frisked
petitioner and, likewise, found no gun in his possession; hence, he was allowed to enter the premises of Sykes Asia.
The security guard also pointed to him the direction towards his wifes table.
However, as Darlene was then not on her table, petitioner approached a certain man and asked the latter as to the
possible whereabouts of Darlene. The person whom petitioner had talked towas the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. After
casually introducing himself as the husband of Darlene, Jeffrey curtly told him, "Bakit mo hinahanap si Darlene?"to
which he answered, "Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin."The response given by Jeffrey shocked and appalled petitioner:
"Ayaw na nga ng asawa mo sayo sinusundo mo pa!"
Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey, petitioner tried to inquire from Jeffrey who he was. But Jeffrey
suddenly cursed petitioner. Then, Jeffrey suddenly picked up something in his chair which happened to be a gun and
pointed the same at petitioners face followed by a clicking sound. The gun, however, did not fire.
Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner grappled with Jeffrey for the possession of the gun.While grappling, the
gunclicked for two (2) to three (3) more times. Again, the gun did not fire.
Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away to avoid any further confrontation with
the latter.However, Jeffrey immediately blocked petitioners path and shouted, "Guard! Guard!" Immediately then,
Jeffrey took hold ofa big fire extinguisher, aimed and was about to smash the same on petitioners head.
Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack while still holding the gun. While in the act of parrying, the gun
accidentally fired due to the reasonable force and contact that his parrying hand had made with the fire extinguisher
and the single bullet discharged hit the forehead of Jeffrey, which caused the latter to fall on the floor and die.
Petitioner left the gun and went out ofthe premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded towards the elevator. On his way to
the elevator, he heard Darlene shout, "Sherwin anong nangyari?", but he was not able to answer.
After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two (2) young children. Petitioner later
learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit relationship when he received a copy of the blog of Darlene, dated
January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.
During his arraignment, on August 22, 2005, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the
charge. Thereafter, pretrial conference was conducted on even date and trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of Marie Antonette Managbanag
(Managbanag), Maria Angelina Pelaez (Pelaez) and Carlos Alberto Lim Gonzales (Gonzales), respectively. The
prosecution likewise formally offered several pieces of documentary evidence to support its claim.
For its part, the defense presented aswitnesses, petitioner himself; his brother, Simeon Sander Dela Cruz III (Cruz),
Greg Lasmarias Elbanvuena (Elbanvuena) and Managbanag, who was recalled to the witness stand as witness for the
defense.
On February 26, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Makati City, Branch 147, rendered a Decision 5 finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), the fallo thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered finding herein accused Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria Guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor medium as Minimum to
Fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as Maximum; to indemnify the
Heirs of Jeffrey Wernher Gonzales y Lim in the amount of P50,000.00 plus moral damages in the amount of P1
Million, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.6
On March 28, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, while private respondent, through the private prosecutor, filed
a Notice of Appeal on April 11, 2007 insofar as the sentence rendered against petitioner is concerned and the civil
damages awarded.
After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA).
However, the latter denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with modification on the civil liability of
petitioner. The decretal portion of the Decision 7 reads: WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147 dated 26 February 2007 finding accused-appellant Sherwin Dela Cruz y
Gloria GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofHomicide with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;
 (3) the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages;
(4) the amount of P3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity.
(5) to pay the costs of the litigation.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.
Raised are the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER ALL THE REQUISITES OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE,
AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.
2. WHETHER THE FIRING OF THE GUN WHEREIN ONLY A SINGLE BULLET WAS DISCHARGED
THEREFROM WAS MERELY ACCIDENTAL WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE TIME THAT THE
PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS STILL IN THE ACT OF DEFENDING HIMSELF FROM THE
CONTINUOUS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION OF THE DECEASED VICTIM.
3. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
4. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE IS
APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
5. WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT MAY BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
THE VICTIM ARISING FROM THE ACCIDENT THAT TRANSPIRED.9
There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. What is leftfor determination by
this Court is whether the elements of self-defenseexist to exculpate petitioner from the criminal liability for Homicide.
The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lackof sufficient provocation
on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. 10 In other words, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked
attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by
employing reasonable means to resist the attack.11
Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it is well settled thatwhen he
invokes the same, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in
defense of himself.12 The burden of proving that the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability
therefor shifts upon him.13 As such, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution for, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has
admitted the killing.14
Measured against this criteria, wefind that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his petition must be denied.
First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression was employed by the
deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent danger not merely threatening and intimidating action. 15 There is aggression, only when the one attacked
faces real and immediate threat to his life. 16 The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
speculative.17 In the case at bar, other than petitioners testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that
Jeffrey condescendingly responded to petitioners questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident;
that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed an assault which may have caused
petitioner to fear for his life.
Even assuming arguendothat the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired, and therefore, danger may
have in fact existed, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by
wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful
aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner
had every opportunity to run away from the scene and seek help but refused to do so, thus:
In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. Accused admitted that he wrested the gun
1avvphi1

from the victim. From that point in time until the victim shouted "guard, guard", then took the fire extinguisher, there
was no unlawful aggression coming from the victim. Accused had the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even
assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially came from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when
the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the
defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is
committed (Peo Vs. Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor
when the unlawful aggression has ceased (PeoVs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609).
Accused alleged that the victimwas about to smash the fire extinguisher on his (accuseds) headbut he parried it with
his hand holding the gun. This is doubtful as nothing in the records is or would be corroborative of it.In contrast, the
two (2) Prosecution witnesses whose credibility was not impeached, both gave the impression that the victim got the
fire extinguisher to shieldhimself from the accused who was then already in possession of the gun. 18
Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to
kill or even wound the former aggressor. 19 To be sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or
action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that
would warrant legal self-defense on the part of the offender. 20 Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of self-
preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly
unlawful aggression had already ceased.
More, a review of the testimony of the prosecution witness, Pelaez, will show that if there was unlawful aggression in
the instant case, the same rather emanated from petitioner, thus: DIRECT EXAMINATION
Atty. Mariano:
Q: Can you relate to the Court, Ms. Witness, how did this incident happen?
A: We were still at work, we were expecting calls but there were no calls at the moment and I was standing at my
work station and then Sherwin approached Jeff and he pointed a gun at the back of the head of Jeff.
Q: And then what happened?
A: And then Jeff parried the gun and they started struggling for the possession of the gun.
Q: How far were you from this struggle when you witnessed it?
A: Probably 10 to 12 feet.
Q: Going back to your story, Ms. Witness, you mentioned that after Jeffrey warded off the gun, they started to
struggle, what happened after that, if any?
A: After they struggled, the gun clicked three times and then after that Jeff tried to get hold of the fire extinguisher and
the fourth shot went off and then Jeffrey fell down.
Q: And who was holding the gun?
A: Sherwin was holding the gun. (TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 12-14) CROSS-EXAMINATION: Atty. Agoot:
Q: So you did not see when Sherwin approached Jeffrey because he came from the other side? Atty. Mariano:
Objection, your Honor, witness already answered that.
Atty. Agoot:
I am on cross examination, your Honor.
COURT
You didnt not see when he approached Jeffrey? A: No, as I said, I saw him point the gun at the back of Jeff and he did
not come from my side so that means
COURT
No, the question is, You did not actually see Sherwin approached Jeffrey?
A: I saw him already at the back of Jeffrey.
Atty. Agoot
He was already at the back of Jeffrey when you saw him?
A: Yes, Sir.
(TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 26-27)21
Clearly, petitioner's allegation that when he approached Jeffrey, the latter pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot
him, is not corroborated by separate competent evidence. Pitted against the testimony of prosecution witnesses,
Managbanag and Pelaez, it pales incomparison and loses probative value. We have, on more thanone occasion, ruled
that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate
competent evidence but also extremely doubtful in itself.22
In addition, other than petitioners testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing that the alleged unlawful aggression
on the part of Jeffrey continued when he blocked the path of petitioner while the latter tried to run away to avoid
further confrontation with Jeffrey. We also agree with the findings of the RTC that there was no proof evincing that
Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big fire extinguisher on petitioners head. Alternatively, the prosecution
witnesses maintained an impression that Jeffrey used the same to shield himself from petitioner who was then in
possession of the gun, a deadly weapon. An excerpt of the testimony of Managbanag bares just that, to wit:
Atty. Agoot
Q: And then after pulling the fire extinguisher from the wall Jeffrey again faced the person who was holding the gun
already?
Witness:
A: He was holding the fire extinguisher like this.
COURT
For the record.
Atty. Mariano:
Witness demonstrating how the victim Jeffrey Gonzales was holding the fire extinguisher upright with his right hand
above the fire extinguisher and his left hand below the fire extinguisher.
Witness:
The left hand would support the weight basically.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And then he used that fire extinguisher to protect himself from the slapping of that person who was in possession
of the gun?
Witness
A: Yes, sir.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And then after that there was again a grappling?
Witness
A: No more grappling for possession. Because Jeffrey was still holding the fire extinguisher at thattime. And then he
fell holding on to the fire extinguisher.
Atty. Agoot
Q: You said here which I quote "binaril siya ng lalaki ng sunod-sunod pero hindi pumutok" Do you affirmand confirm
this statement?
Witness
A: Yes, sir. They were pushing each other. The other person was trying to point the gun at Jeffrey and Jeffrey was
trying to cover himself with the fire extinguisher so nagkakatulakan sila at the same time.
Atty. Agoot
Q: You said that the gun clicked, how many times did the gun click without firing?
Witness
A: Three (3) times, sir.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And what did the late Jeffrey do when the gun clicked but did not fire?
Witness
A: They were still pushing each other at that time.
Atty. Agoot
Q: Using the fire extinguisher, heused that to push against the person
Witness
A: Basically trying to cover himself and trying to push away the person who was pointing the gun at him.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And why do you know that Jeffrey was trying hard to push the fire extinguisher?
Witness
A: Because I was seated roughly about 5 to 6 feet away from them. So I clearly saw what was going on at that time.
(Direct Examination of Marie Antonette Managbanag for the Defense, TSN dated 04 September 2006, pp. 12-17,
emphasis supplied)23
Petitioners contention that Jeffreys unlawful aggression was continuous and imminent is, therefore, devoid of merit.
Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant case, the severe wounds inflicted by
petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and, therefore, cannot be considered a justifying circumstance under
pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim, Jeffrey, the means employed
by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to
avert. As held by the Court in People v. Obordo:24
Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, accused-appellant likewise
failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's punch was reasonable. The means employed by the
person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense.
Accused appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was trying to get something from his waist, so he
(accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a
wound on a vital part ofthe victim's body was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-
appellant himself, the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.25
Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an
unlawful aggression. The opposite was, however, employed by petitioner, as correctly pointed out by the RTC, thus:
The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The gun and the discharge thereof
was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression with the use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that
the means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of
attack and the defense (Peo vs. Obordo, 382 SCRA 98).
It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun, as against the victim who was armed,
so to speak, with a fire extinguisher, which is not a deadly weapon. Under the circumstances, accuseds alleged fear
was unfounded. The Supreme Court has ruled that neither an imagined impending attack nor an impending or
threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression (Catalina Security Agency Vs. Gonzales-Decano,
429 SCRA 628). It is a settled rule that to constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real
threat on his lifeand limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary (Senoja v.
Peo., 440 SCRA 695).26
If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have just run, despite any obstruction,
considering that he was already in possession of the gun. He could have also immediately sought help from the people
around him, specifically the guard stationed at the floor where the shooting incident happened. In fact, he could have
reported the incident to the authorities as soon as he had opportunity to do so, if it was indeed an accident or a cry of
self-preservation. Yet, petitioner never did any of that.
We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and hassling with Jeffrey, and inthe end,
shooting the latter on the forehead, not only once, but four times, the last shot finally killing him, if he had no
intention to hurt Jeffrey. Thus:
Moreover, the Prosecutions eyewitnesses were consistent in declaring that while there was prior struggle for the
possession of the gun, it was nevertheless accused who was holding the gun at the time of the actual firing thereof
(TSN, p. 30, October 10, 2005; TSN, p. 14, October 17, 2005). Witness Managbanag even alleged that while the
victim (Jeffrey), who was in possession of the fire extinguisher, and the accused were pushing each other, accused
pointed the gun at the victim. She heard three (3) clicks and on the 4th , the gun fired (TSN, p. 12, October 10, 2005).
Under the circumstances, it cannot be safely said that the gun was or could have been fired accidentally. The discharge
of the gun which led to the victims death was no longer made in the course of the grapple and/or struggle for the
possession of the gun.27
The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may have been shot accidentally to the detriment of Jeffrey.
The fire was neither a disaster nor a misfortune of sorts. While petitioner may nothave intended to kill Jeffrey at the
onset, at the time he clicked the trigger thrice consecutively, his intent to hurt (or even kill) Jeffrey was too plain to be
disregarded. We have held in the pastthat the nature and number of wounds are constantly and unremittingly
considered important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense. 28 Thus, petitioners contention that an accident
simultaneously occurred while hewas in the act of self-defense is simply absurd and preposterous at best. There could
nothave been an accident because the victim herein suffered a gunshot wound on his head, a vital part of the body and,
thus, demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.
Besides, petitioners failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey and to surrender the
gun that he used to kill the victim militates against his claim of self-defense. 29
In view of the foregoing, we find it illogical to discuss further the third element of self-defense since it is recognized
that unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua nonfor upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense. 30 If there
is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis. 31 Hence, there is no basis to
entertain petitioners argument that a privileged mitigating circumstance of selfdefense is applicable in this case,
because unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete
or incomplete, on the part of the latter.32
Anent petitioners argument thatthe RTC erred when it failed to consider as suppression of evidence the prosecutions
alleged deliberate omission to present the testimonies of the security guards-on-duty at the time of the shooting
incident, the same fails to persuade. We concur with the decision of the CA on this point, to wit:
Having admitted the killing of the victim, the burden of evidence that he acted in self-defense, shifted to accused-
appellant Dela Cruz. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions
evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the
killing.
The security guards on duty at the time of the subject incident were at the disposal of both the prosecution and the
defense. The defense did not proffer proof that the prosecution prevented the security guards from testifying. There is
therefore no basis for it to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence.
The defense could have easily presented the security guards if it is of the opinion that their [the security guards]
testimonies were vital and material to the case of the defense. It could have compelled the security guards on duty to
appear before the court. xxx.33
It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. 34 It is
the peculiar province of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses and related questions of fact because of
its superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of witnesses while testifying. 35 This being so and in the
absence of a showing that the CA and the RTC failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of such weight and
substance that would have merited petitioner's acquittal, this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the ruling of
the CA that petitioner did not act in self-defense.36
In this regard, we do not subscribe to petitioners contention that since the incident transpired in Jeffreys office, and
the witnesses presented by the prosecution are known officemates of Jeffrey, the witnesses are expected to testify in
favor of Jeffrey and against petitioner. Ascorrectly pointed out by respondent, there appears no motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against petitioner. 37 The fact that they are officemates of Jeffrey does not
justify a conclusion that Managbanag and Pelaez would concoct or fabricate stories in favorof Jeffrey for the mere
purpose of implicating petitioner with such a serious crime, especially since they are testifying under oath.
All told, we find no basis to doubt ordispute, much less overturn, the findings of the RTC and the CA that the elements
of homicide are present in the instant case as amply shown by the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, and
they constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of petitioner beyond cavil or doubt.
Nevertheless, with regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm, we
deviate from the findings of the CA. A perusal of the Information will show that the use of unlicensed firearm was
expressly alleged in the killing of Jeffrey. This allegation was further proved during trial by the presentation of the
Certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division, dated November 11, 2005, certifying that petitioner is
not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre, per verification from the records of the said Division.
Accordingly, under Paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, amending Section 1 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance, to wit:
xxxx
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
x x x x.
Under Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being an aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, the penalty imposable on petitioner should be in its maximum
period.38Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty.
As to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and damages for loss of earning capacity in favor ofprivate
respondent, we sustain the findings of the CA in so far as they are in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. In
addition, we find the grant of exemplary damages in the present case in order, since the presence of special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm has been established. 39 Based on current jurisprudence, the
award of exemplary damages for homicide is P30,000.00.40
Finally, pursuant to this Courts ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 41 an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the
aggregate amount awarded for civil indemnity and damages for loss of earning capacity shall be imposed, computed
from the time of finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 7, 2009 Decision and August 19, 2009 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1) Petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
maximum, as the maximum penalty;

(2) Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim the following:

a. the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b. the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages;

 c. the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages;

d. the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

e. the amount of P3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity;

f. for the civil indemnity and the damages for loss of earning capacity, an interest of six percent
(6%) per annum, computed from the time of finality of this Decision until full payment thereof;
and

g. the costs of the litigation.

SO ORDERED.

QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
The special qualifying circumstance such as the minority of the victim and relationship with the
offender must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information and must be proved conclusively and
indubitably as the crime itself. Although it was shown during the trial that Barcela was the common law
spouse or live-in partner of the mother of victims AAA and BBB, this fact would not alter the crimes in
their qualified form inasmuch as the two separate informations did not specifically allege such
relationship as aqualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he would be deprived of his right to be informed
of the charge lodged against him. The relationship alleged in the information is different from that
actually proven. PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. FLORO BUBAN BARCELA, G.R. No.
208760, April 23, 2014, J. Mendoza

This is an appeal from the March 19, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
04961, which affirmed with modifications the January 6, 2011 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
93, San Pedro, Laguna (RTC), in Criminal Case Nos. 5517-SPL, 5526-SPL and 5527-SPL, finding
accused-appellant Floro B. Barcela (Barcela) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Rape committed
against AAA,3 and of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault and Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 and
Acts of Lasciviousness, committed against BBB.4
The Facts
Barcela was charged with the following crimes: 1] Qualified Rape, docketed as Crim. Case No. 5517-SPL; 2]
Violation of Article 266-A(2) in relation to R.A. No. 7610, docketed as Crim. Case No. 5526-SPL; and 3] Violation of
R.A. No. 7610 (Acts of Lasciviousness), docketed as Crim.
Case No. 5527-SPL, in three (3) separate Informations which read:
Crim. Case No. 5517-SPL
That sometime in the year 2002, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused being the stepfather of AAA by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with AAA, a minor, nine (9) years of age,
against her will and to her damage and prejudice.
The crime is qualified by minority and relationship between the offender and offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case No. 5526-SPL
That on or about November 12, 2004, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused being then the stepfather of BBB, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual assault and/or subject to sexual abuse the latter by inserting his finger into
the genital or private part of the said BBB, a minor, fourteen (14) years of age, against her will and consent, which act
being detrimental to her normal growth and development.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case No. 5527-SPL
That sometime on 2003 and subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon his stepdaughter BBB, a minor, fourteen (14) years of age, by
touching the private part of the said minor, against the latters will and consent, which act is detrimental to the normal
growth and development of the said minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecutions version of the events was succinctly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its
Brief5 as follows:
Private complainants BBB and AAA were living, along with the appellant, their mother, grandmother and sister in a
two-storey house where all of the family members sleep together in one room in San Pedro, Laguna, because the other
rooms [were] being rented to other people. AAA was seven (7) years old when her stepfather, appellant Barcela,
committed the despicable by sexually abusing her. She was lying on the floor sleeping one early morning in 2002,
when she was awakened and noticed that her stepfather lifted her clothes and removed her shorts. Appellant then
placed his hand on his organ as AAA lay still with her hands on the floor shocked by what was happening. Appellant
successfully inserted his penis inside complainant AAAs vagina. While committing the bestial act, appellant
threatened her not to tell anyone what he was doing to her, otherwise he would kill her.
Her elder sister BBB also suffered the same horrible fate. On 12 November 2004 at around 3:00 oclock in the
morning, appellant Barcela made a similar sexual assault upon BBB who was only fourteen (14) years at that time. It
happened while BBB was sleeping in one room with her stepfather, mother and other sister. Appellant was lying at her
right side. Suddenly, appellant lifted her skirt, removed her underwear and inserted his finger inside her vagina. After
accomplishing the atrocious act, appellant threatened to kill her if she [would] disclose to anyone what happened to
her. BBB was very afraid because of the threat that she pretended to be asleep after being raped. On that same night,
BBB also saw her stepfather molesting her sister AAA. BBB also testified that prior to being raped in 2004, appellant
had been regularly touching her private organ.
AAA informed her mother, grandmother and her sister BBB of what happened to her. Sadly, her mother did not
believe her but her grandmother and sister BBB (who also suffered the same fate) believed her. BBB then informed
her classmate, teacher and school principal of the grim experience she and her sister underwent in the hands of her
stepfather. Her grandmother was summoned by the principal and, together, they reported to the police the rape
incidents. In order to protect herself, AAA stayed at the "Kanlungan" shelter. As a result of the loathsome episode in
their lives, AAA and BBB both felt afraid, ashamed and aggrieved.
Private complainants were eventually examined by Dr. Roy Camarillo, a medico-legal officer of the Philippine
National Police. In his medico-legal report, he concluded that BBB sustained a shallow healing laceration in her
hymen caused by the insertion of a hard object which may be a penis, finger or a flat hard object. As regards the
examination conducted on AAA, he concluded that there was no evident injury at the time of the examination but
testified that the injury that AAA incurred may have totally healed as the rape occurred two (2) years from the time of
the examination.6
Version of the Defense
Barcela denied the accusations and alleged the following in his Brief7 to substantiate his claim of innocence:
Accused Floro B. Barcela is the common law husband of the private complainants mother, CCC. They all resided at
the two-storey house of CCCs mother in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna.
On November 12, 2004, the private complainants were sleeping beside their mother CCC and their half-sister DDD,
herein accused-appellants daughter with CCC. He did not rape AAA. Neither did he insert his finger inside BBBs
vagina, nor threatened either of the two (2) private complainants. He knew of no reason why the private complainants
would accuse him of such crimes charged against him.8
Ruling of the RTC
In its January 6, 2011 Decision, the RTC found Barcela guilty as charged. In its assessment, the testimonies of AAA
and BBB have successfully met the test of credibility and were found to have been solely motivated by the desire to
obtain justice for the wrong done against them.
The denial proffered by Barcela must then yield to the positive testimonies of the offended parties. The RTC
explained:
The culpability of accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA was clearly established by private complainants AAA and
BBB. In this regard, there is nothing in the records to show that their testimony was motivated by any other reason
other than to bring to justice the perpetrator of the crimes against them. Indeed, the Court finds that there is no
evidence to show that AAA and BBB were prejudiced against accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA that they would
impute to him the commission of the crimes charged if he was not guilty thereof. It must be noted that not only were
the testimony of AAA and BBB convincing and unequivocal, the same were also backedup by the physical evidence,
which is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth.9
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment:
1) Finding accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Rape in Criminal
Case No. 5517-SPL and hereby sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. In addition,
accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA is ORDERED to pay the victim the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity,P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2) Finding accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
Article 266-A (2) in relation to R.A. 7610 in Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL and hereby sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) Months and One (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum and to pay
the victim the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages
3) Finding accused FLORO BUBAN BARCELA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of
R.A. No. 7610 (Acts of Lasciviousness) in Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL and hereby sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the victim the amounts ofP30,000.00
as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.10
Feeling aggrieved, Barcela appealed the RTC judgments of conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts finding of Barcelas guilt of the crimes charged. The appellate court lent
credence to the testimonies of AAA and BBB, declaring the same to be credible and sufficient to sustain the
conviction. It ruled that the crime of penile rape committed against AAA and that of rape by sexual assault committed
against BBB were qualified by the special qualifying circumstances of minority and the relationship between the
offender and the offended party because Barcela was the common-law husband of the victims mother. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed RTC
Decision dated January 06, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS:
 1. In Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL (Qualified Rape), Floro Barcela y Buban is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility of parole. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay
AAAP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL (Qualified Sexual Assault in relation to RA 7610), accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay
BBBP30,000 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL (Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to RA 7610), accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence, he is ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and to pay BBB of the
amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages and P15,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.11
The Issue
Insisting on his innocence, Barcela filed the present appeal and raised this lone assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSES
CHARGED ALTHOUGH HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Barcela faults the courts a quo for giving undue faith and credence to the testimonies of AAA and BBB, contending
that the same were laced with inconsistencies and improbabilities that tainted the veracity of their charges. He avers
that the lack of concrete prosecution evidence showing any unusual behavior exhibited by AAA and BBB after the
alleged commission of the crimes, rendered said victims complaints dubious. Barcela points out that it is incredible
that AAA and BBB would still sleep with him in the same room despite the fact that they had been previously sexually
assaulted by him. He argues that the absence of hymenal lacerations, healed or otherwise, in the vagina of AAA and
the presence of a mere shallow laceration in the vagina of BBB, together with the inconsistencies in their testimonies,
effectively belied their charges against him.
The Court, however, is not at all swayed by the contentions of Barcela. His arguments boil down to the credibility of
the victims testimonies and the weight and sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases where the Court ruled that questions on the credibility of witnesses should best be
addressed to the trial court because of its unique position to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying which is denied to the appellate courts. 12 The trial judge has the
advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses. Hence,
the judges assessment of the witnesses testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the
absence of any substantial reason to justify the reversal of the trial courts assessment and conclusion, as when no
significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is
generally bound by the formers findings. 13 The rule is even more stringently applied if the appellate court has
concurred with the trial court.
After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the
RTC and the CA, together with their respective calibration of the credibility of the private complainants. AAA and
BBB, guileless and innocent in the ways of the flesh, categorically narrated in detail their ghastly ordeal in the hands
of Barcela. Their respective stories bear the stamp of truth and candor. There is neither cause nor reason to withhold
credence from their testimonies.
Moreover, Barcela did not establish any ill motive that could have compelled the private complainants to falsely
accuse him of committing the crimes charged. The failure of Barcela to effectively cite any plausible reason for the
private complainants accusations, all the more strengthens the latters credibility and the validity of their charges.
Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she was not, in truth, a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice
for the wrong done to her. 14 The Court finds it hard to believe that AAA and BBB would fabricate a tale of defilement
and make public knowledge that Barcela robbed them of their virtue and chastity, dragging themselves and their
family to a lifetime of agony and shame, unless motivated by a genuine desire to obtain redress for the foul deed
forced upon them.
Barcela claims that it is incredible that: 1] AAA did not cry out loud when he allegedly inserted his penis into her tight
vagina; 2] BBB just went back to sleep after he allegedly inserted his finger into her vagina; and 3] private
complainants still opted to sleep next to him despite the incidents. To him, these are contrary to human nature and
could not be the actuations of abused young girls.
The Court is not convinced. Behavioral psychology teaches us that, even among adults, people react to similar
situations differently, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a
startling or frightful experience.15 Let it be underscored that these cases involve victims of tender years, and with their
simple, unsophisticated minds, they must not have fully understood and realized at first the repercussions of the
contemptible nature of the acts committed against them. This Court has repeatedly stated that no standard form of
behavior could be anticipated of a rape victim following her defilement, particularly a child who could not be
expected to fully comprehend the ways of an adult.16 At any rate, it is not inconceivable that the victims continuously
slept with Barcela despite the sexual molestations as it was undisputed that everybody in the victims family slept in
one room.
The absence of hymenal laceration on AAA and the finding of a shallow vaginal laceration on BBB are not fatal to the
cause of the prosecution. The Court has repeatedly held that the presence of hymenal rapture, vaginal laceration or any
genital injury is not indispensable because the same is not an element of the crime of rape. 17 In the same breath, an
intact hymen does not negate the finding that the victim was raped. 18 The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of
AAA and BBB cannot exculpate him either. Obviously, the inconsistencies referred to are trivial and only pertained to
inconsequential matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape. What is decisive in a rape charge
is that the commission of rape has been sufficiently proven. Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters
which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered grounds for acquittal. 19
In stark contrast to the convincing narration of facts by AAA and BBB are the bare-faced and shaky defenses of denial
and alibi proffered by Barcela. Jurisprudence has decreed that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and
categorical testimony of the complainant and her identification of the accused. 20 Alibi is an inherently weak defense,
which is viewed with suspicion because it can easily be fabricated. 21 Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which
must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. 22 Here, not a shred of competent proof
was adduced by Barcela to corroborate his denial and alibi as they are only supported by his self-serving testimony.
Hence, they do not merit any evidentiary value.
The Court will now determine the specific crimes committed by Barcela with the corresponding penalties to be
imposed and the appropriate damages to be awarded.
Criminal Case Nos. 5517-SPL and 5526-SPL
The statutory provisions relevant to the present review are Article 266-A and Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), which state:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation; xxx
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act
of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
ART. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxxx
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the
victim.
xxxx
Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.
xxxx
Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten aggravating/qualifying
circumstances mentioned in this article. (Emphases supplied)
To sustain a conviction for qualified rape, the following elements must concur: a) the victim is a female over 12 years
but under 18 years of age; b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and c) the offender has
carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or intimidation; or when she was deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority. 23
In Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL, the prosecution proved that AAA was only 7 years old when the penile rape was
committed in 2002. Her birth certificate showed that she was born on September 24, 1994. The prosecution was also
able to establish the fact of sexual intercourse between Barcela and AAA. The Court notes that AAA told her story by
words and demonstrations using male and female dolls. AAA recounted that while she was lying on the floor of their
house, Barcela lifted her clothes and removed her shorts; that he inserted his penis into her vagina; that she felt pain;
and that he warned her not to tell the incident to anyone, otherwise, he would kill her. The straightforward narration of
AAA of what transpired, and her categorical identification of Barcela as the malefactor, sealed the case for the
prosecution.
In the crime of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender is a special
qualifying circumstance and raises the penalty to the supreme penalty of death. It is essential that this circumstance
must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information and must be proved conclusively and indubitably as the
crime itself; otherwise, the crime shall be considered simple rape warranting the imposition of the lower penalty of
reclusion perpetua.24
The aforesaid qualifying circumstance, however, could not be appreciated in Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL. To begin
with, AAA was under 12 years old (only 7 years old) when she was raped in 2002. More importantly, the prosecution
failed to prove the allegation in the information that Barcela was the step-father of AAA at the time of the commission
of the crime. It bears stressing that a stepfather-stepdaughter relationship presupposes a legitimate relationship, which
in this case is the valid marriage between Barcela and the natural mother of AAA (also of BBB), and the best evidence
to prove the same is the marriage contract. 25 Nowhere in the record, though, does it show that such certificate of
marriage was submitted in evidence by the prosecution. In People v. Manggasin, 26 the Court held that the qualifying
circumstance was not proved because there was no proof of the allegation that the accused-appellant was the
stepfather of the complainant as the evidence showed that he was not married to the complainants mother.
Being regarded as the "tatay," Barcela had gained such moral ascendancy over AAA and BBB that any resistance
normally expected from girls their age could not have been put up by them. His moral ascendancy and influence over
them substituted for actual physical violence and intimidation as an element of rape. This made them easy prey for his
sexual advances. Barcelas moral and physical dominion of AAA and BBB are sufficient to cow them into submission
to his beastly desires. No further proof is needed to show lack of consent of the victims to their own defilement.
Further, record shows that threat and intimidation were indeed employed by Barcela to consummate the purpose
which he had in mind. The threat of death he communicated to AAA and BBB produced fear in their minds which
made them yield to his bestial demands. In any event, the prosecution need not prove that Barcela employed force,
threat or intimidation against AAA because rape is committed when the offender had carnal knowledge of the
offended party who is under 12 years of age.
The Court likewise finds convincing the testimony of BBB, which clearly established that at around 3:00 A.M. of
November 12, 2004, she was awakened when Barcela, who was then sleeping next to her, lifted her skirt, removed her
panty and, thereafter, inserted his finger into her vagina; and that she suffered pain during the insertion but could not
shout for fear that Barcela would kill her. The Court notes that she consistently and without hesitation pointed to
Barcela as the person who sexually molested her. The prosecution also established that she was only 14 years old
when she was sexually molested as evidenced by her birth certificate.
Taken in this light, the Court affirms Barcelas conviction in Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL of rape by sexual assault
under Art. 266- A, par. 2 of the RPC, but not in its qualified form. The special qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship were likewise not present. While the minority of BBB was duly proven, the allegation of stepfather-
stepdaughter relationship was not established.
Although it was shown during the trial that Barcela was the common-law spouse or live-in partner of the mother of
victims AAA and BBB, this fact would not alter the crimes in their qualified form inasmuch as the two separate
informations did not specifically allege such relationship as a qualifying circumstance. Otherwise, he would be
deprived of his right to be informed of the charge lodged against him. 27 The relationship alleged in the informations is
different from that actually proven. Verily, the CA erred in convicting Barcela of qualified rape in Criminal Case No.
5517-SPL and qualified rape by sexual assault in Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL.
There being no qualifying circumstance attendant to the commission of rape in Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL, Barcela
should be convicted of simple statutory rape and should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of
damages should also be modified in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 28 AAA is thus awarded the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL, Barcela should be convicted with simple rape by sexual assault, instead with the
penalty of prision mayor as provided in Art. 266-B par. 7 of the RPC. Considering that there was neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period pursuant to Article 64(l) 29 of the
RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Barcela should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the
minimum of which is prision correccional (6 months and 1 to 6 years) and the maximum of which is within the range
of prision mayor, in its medium period (8 years and 1 day to 10 years). More specifically, the Court imposes the
penalty ranging from five (5) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum. The Court sustains the CA in awarding P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages;
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages being consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. 30
Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL
The Court also upholds Barcelas conviction in Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL of Acts of Lasciviousness committed
against a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse: x x x. (Italics supplied)
The elements of sexual abuse under the above provision are as follows:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.31
Here, it was proven with certitude that Barcela had repeatedly molested BBB by regularly touching her vagina since
2003 when she was still in Grade III. This act is covered by the definition of "lascivious conduct" under Section 2 (h)
of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to implement
R.A. No. 7610:
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or private area of a person.
The circumstance of relationship, Barcela being the common-law husband of BBBs mother, cannot be considered as
an ordinary aggravating circumstance to increase the imposable penalty. While it is true that the alternative
circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in crimes against chastity 32 (such as Acts of Lasciviousness),
regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended party, it is only taken into
consideration under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code "when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender."
The relationship between Barcela and BBB is not covered by any of the relationships mentioned. 1wphi1

Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance is present, the penalty should be imposed in its medium
period.33 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Barcela should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the
minimum of which is prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period (8 years and 1
day to 14 years and 8 months) and the maximum of which is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua, in its medium period (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years). Thus, the CA is correct
in imposing the penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Likewise, the award of P20,000 as civil indemnity;P15,000.00 as moral
1wphi1

damages; P15,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the fine of P15,000.00, are proper.34
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the March 19, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04961, which should read:
1. In Criminal Case No. 5517-SPL, finding accused-appellant Floro Buban Barcela GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Statutory Rape under subparagraph ( d) of Article 266-A, paragraph
1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and to pay AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.0 ) as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. 5526-SPL, finding accused-appellant Floro Buban Barcela GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Rape by Sexual Assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of five (5) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay AAA in the amount of
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as civil indemnity; Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral
damages; and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. 5527-SPL, finding the accused-appellant Floro Buban Barcela GUILTY of the crime
of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation to R.A. No. 7610, the Court 1 sentences him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and !one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and to pay the amount of Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (Pl5,000.00) as fine; and to pay BBB the amounts of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as civil
indemnity; Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as moral damages; and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages,
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.
SO ORDERED.

Without any evidence to appreciate the aggravating circumstance of treachery in the killing of Calim,
respondent can only be held liable as principal for the crime of homicide. For treachery to be
considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where no
particulars are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration of an attack with treachery cannot be
presumed. Furthermore, Watamamas theory of mistaken identity is not persuasive; witnesses need not
know the names of the assailants, as long as they recognize the latters faces. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. MATIMANAY WATAMAMA a.k.a. AKMAD SALIPADA, TENG
MIDTIMBANG, G.R. No. 188710, June 2, 2014, CJ. Sereno
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated 30 January 2009 in CA-G.R. CRHC No.
00133, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated 9 June 2005 issued by the Regional Trial Court
(R TC) of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch 22, finding accused-appellant Matimanay Watamama a.k.a. Akmad
Salipada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the killing of Aoubakar Calim (Calim).
FACTS
Appellant and his co-accused Teng Midtimbang were charged under an Information 3 for murder docketed as Criminal
Case No. 99-06. Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Based on the records, Midtimbang remained at large
as of the date of promulgation of the RTC Decision.4
The evidence for the prosecution established the following: Around eight in the morning on 26 October 1998,
Francisco Arobo, Jr. (Arobo), Calim, and five other farmers were at the farm of Ali Samad (Samad) located in Sitio
Matingao, Malapag, Carmen, Cotabato. They were ploughing the unplanted area, while Samad was tending his corn
plants. Arobo was five meters ahead of Calimwhen the former heard gunfire coming from behind. Arobo immediately
looked to the rear and saw Midtimbang and appellant firing gar and rifles at Calim, who was then slumped near his
plow. Midtimbang and appellant were positioned ten (10) meters apart and five meters obliquely behind Calim.
Because of the successive gunshots, Arobo and the rest of their group scampered to take cover in the shrubbery, while
Samad ran towards the nipa hut at the other side of the farm where his children were staying. 5 Appellant and
Midtimbang also fired at Samad, but he was not hit. Thereafter, the two fled. Samad then reported the incident to a
barangay kagawad.6
The postmortem examination by the local municipal health officer showed that Calim sustained multiple gunshot
wounds in the head, chest, right and left thighs, and right elbow.7
The version of the defense was that appellant was simply mistaken for Teng Midtimbang because of their physical and
facial resemblances. Appellant claimed that his real namewas Akmad Salipada, not Matimanay Watamama. 8Allegedly,
on that fateful morning of 26 October 1998, he was at their house in Sitio Maitum, Malapag, Carmen, Cotabato. He
had just eaten breakfast with his wife, GuianilaSalipada (Guianila), when they heard seven gunshots. Guianila peeped
through their window and, after a while, Teng Midtimbang and Ali Sampo Midtimbang passed by their house. The
two were carrying rifles. Guianila asked them where they had come from, and they supposedly told her that they came
from the house of Calim and that they shot him because he had stolen a carabao. After appellant was criminally
charged with the killing of Calim, Guianila allegedly saw a letter from the wife of Teng Midtimbang addressed to
Atty. Tabosares, appellants counsel.9
Zaid Tayuan (Tayuan), a detention prisoner, also testified for the defense. The gist of his testimony was that he had
witnessed the Midtimbang brothers kill Calim, and that appellant was nowhere in the vicinity of the crime. Tayuan
claimed that he easily recognized them because they were comrades in the Moro National Liberation Front. Tayuan
further said that when the incident happened, he was resting at his farm in Sitio Maitum, which was just adjacent to
Samads farm in Sitio Matingao. He claimed that he was about six meters from the Midtimbang brothers when they
shot Calim to death.10 On cross-examination, however, Tayuan admitted that Sitio Maitum was about fivekilometers
away from Sitio Matingao, and that their common boundary was a mountain.11
RULING OF THE RTC
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and ordered him to indemnify the
heirs of Calim in the amount of P50,000.
The RTC noted that if indeed appellant was not acquainted with his co-accused, he would not have known that they
looked alike. Thus, his defense of mistaken identity was belied by his own testimony and, more important by the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses positively identifying him as one of Calims assailants. Moreover, the trial
court ruled that evident premeditation and treachery attended the commission of the crime, as the evidence showed
that the assailants had planned to kill Calim, a known cattle rustler, and that their attack was so sudden that it
foreclosed any defense by the victim.12
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds and so holds that [the] prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Accused Matimanay Watamama (Akmad Salipada) is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder as defined and penalize[d] under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Without mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attending to the commission of the crime accused Matimanay Watamama (Akmad Salipada) is directed
to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessories [sic] penalties. The detention of Matimanay Watamama
from May 17, 1999 is counted in full in his favor.
Accused Matimanay Watamama is directed to indemnify the heirs of Abubakar Kalim the amount of P50,000.00. Let
Warrant of Arrest be issued against Teng Midtimbang with no amount of bail fixed.
SO ORDERED.13
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Appellant filed an appeal14 raising the following errors: (1) he was convicted even if the prosecution had failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial court erroneously disregarded his and Tayuans testimonies
and, thus, it wrongly concluded that appellant was Matimanay Watamama. 15
The CA affirmed appellants conviction for the crime of murder in view of the presence of treachery but ruled that
evident premeditation was not sufficiently proven by the prosecution. It modified the damages awarded by the RTC
and ruled that appellant should also be made to pay P50,000 as moral damages in addition to the civil indemnity that
the trial court had awarded to the heirs of Calim.16
The CA sustained the RTCs appreciation of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in relation to appellants
denial and Tayuans assertions. It held that appellants defense of mistaken identity was lame compared to the positive
and categorical testimonies of the two eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution. Moreover, it ruled that the
prosecutions failure to prove that the real name of appellant was Matimanay Watamama was not crucial, since he was
positively identified by eyewitnesses. On the other hand, it found the version of Tayuan incredible, given that his farm
was five kilometers away from the farm of Samad, and that the common boundary of their farms was a mountainous
area. It also ruled that the letter from the wife of Teng Midtimbang, in which Ali Sampo Midtimbang allegedly owned
up to the killing of Calim, was hearsay and self-serving and, hence, inadmissible. 17
The CA, however, overturned the trial courts finding that there was evident premeditation. It found no evidence
showing when the accused decided to commit the crime; whether they clung to their determination to commit the
crime; and whether a sufficient period of time had lapsed from the time they decided to commit the crime until they
carried it out, thus giving them enough opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of their intended act. 18
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision convicting appellant for Murder and imposing on him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua,
is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 the accused is ordered
to pay the heirs of Abubakar Calim as Civil Indemnity, he is ordered to pay them the amount of P50,000.00 as Moral
Damages.
SO ORDERED.19
Without filing a motion for reconsideration with the CA, appellant filed the instant appeal. 20 The Court directed the
parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. 21 Both manifested that they were dispensing with the filing thereof,
since they had exhaustively discussed their arguments in their respective briefs filed with the CA. 22
ISSUE
The ultimate issue presented for the resolution of this Court is whether respondent was correctly convicted of the
crime of murder.
In his Brief,23 appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt his participation in the
killing of Calim. He maintained that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses placing him at the scene of crime
were mere conjectures, which did not amount to positive identification. He pointed out that both witnesses admitted
that they ran to take cover after seeing the shooting incident. Therefore, their testimonies were unreliable, since they
were based on perceptions that were tainted with fear and tension. He also argued that the fallibility of the witnesses
supposed positive identification of him was heightened by the defense evidence proving that he and Midtimbang
looked alike, but that the trial court erroneously disregarded that evidence. Moreover, he maintained that the
prosecution failed to establish treachery and evident premeditation, since none of its witnesses testified on how the
attack on Calim commenced and in what mode.24
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Brief, 25 maintained that the fact that the prosecution witnesses did
not see the precise moment when Calim was shot to death did not create any doubt as to the appellants identity as one
of the assailants. The OSG also maintained that the prosecution sufficiently established treachery, since the witnesses
testimonies clearly showed that Calim was engrossed in farm work when appellant and Midtimbang attacked him. 26
OUR RULING
We find appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, rather than murder, as the prosecution failed to
sufficiently establish treachery in the killing of Calim.
The factual findings of the trial court, as well as its calibration of the witnesses testimonies and its conclusions, are
accorded by this Court with high respect especially so if the same are affirmed by the CA. 27 An exception to this
rule is when, as in this case, there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that has been ignored or
misconstrued by the court.28
For the charge of murder to prosper, the prosecution must prove the following: (1) the offender killed the victim, and
(2) the killing was done through treachery, or by any of the five other qualifying circumstances, duly alleged in the
Information.29 There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means,
methods or forms that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the
defense that the offended party might make. The mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery. The
essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning and is done in a swift and unexpected way,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim with no chance to resist or escape. Thus, even frontal attack
can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the victim is unarmed. 30
Appellant argues that treachery cannot be appreciated in this case, because no evidence was presented showing how
the attack commenced. The OSG, on the other hand, claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses showed
that appellant and Midtimbang managed to sneak up on Calim and position themselves behind him to avoid risk of
any retaliation. In fact, according to the OSG, the attack was so sudden and fast that neither Calim nor the others
present even noticed the arrival of the assailants.31
We agree with appellant.
For treachery to be considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where
no particulars are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration of an attack with treachery cannot be
presumed.32 A case in point is People v. Rapanut, 33 in which this Court ruled out treachery as the eyewitness saw the
accused only after the initial sound of gunshots, as obtained in this case. Circumstances that qualify criminal
responsibility cannot rest on mere conjecture, no matter how reasonable or probable, but must be based on facts of
unquestionable existence. These circumstances must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself. 34
We cannot simply assume that at its inception, Calim was unable to parry the attack, as he was caught unaware. Both
Arobo and Samad admitted that they did not see how the attack commenced, and that it was the initial gunfire that
caught their attention. Thus, it cannot be said with certainty that the victim was engrossed in his farm work when he
was initially attacked.
Neither can we conclusively say that there was no chance or opportunity for Calim to defend himself from aggression.
However, we are not persuaded by appellants theory of mistaken identity. Notably, he did not object to the
1wphi1

Information, which identified him as "Matimanay Watamama" when he entered his plea.35
Witnesses need not know the names of the assailants, as long as they recognize the latters faces. What is imperative is
that, on the basis of their personal knowledge, the witnesses are positive as to the physical identification of the
perpetrators, as obtained in this case.36
Thus, it was sufficient that Arobo and Samad were able to identify respondent in the crime scene and when they took
the witness stand.37
Indeed, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses varied on few points. The inconsistencies in their accounts were
minor, and did not make their identification of appellant any less credible. Arobo stated that Midtimbang was
obliquely behind Calim,38 whereas Samad claimed that
Midtimbang shot the victim from the front.39 Still, both Arobo and Samad categorically stated that appellant was
positioned behind Calim. Moreover, the location of Calims wounds, as found by the examining physician,
corroborated their description of appellants position in relation to the victim.
In the light of the positive identification by both witnesses, the alibi of appellant must fail. 40
Besides, he was not able to prove that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime
when it happened. It appears, rather, that he lived near Samads farm, and that he was at his house when the crime was
committed. Thus, we are constrained to reject his alibi.
Without evident premeditation, and without any evidence to appreciate the aggravating circumstance of treachery in
the killing of Calim, respondent can only be held liable as principal for the crime of homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the 30 January 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00133 is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant Matimanay Watamama a.k.a. Akmad Salipada is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of
prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

Jenny stabbed the victim out of the blue during town festivities. A sudden attack which is not
preconceived by the accused belies the holding of treachery. When the victim is merely a bystander in
an altercation, when suddenly the accused stabs him, absent any other qualifying circumstance, the
accused is only liable for homicide. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNY LIKIRAN alias
Loloy, G.R. No. 201858, June 4, 2014, J. Reyes

Jenny Likiran (accused-appellant) was convicted of the crime of Murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malaybalay City, Branch 8, for the death of Rolando Sareno, Sr. (Sareno ). In its Decision 1 dated July 17,
2006, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Loloy Likiran guilty of the crime of Murder and imposes upon him the
penalty of Reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of [P]50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
[P]50,000.00 moral damages; [P]30,000.00 actual damages, and [P]10,000.00 attorney's fee and to pay the costs. This
court has no jurisdiction over Jerome alias Caro Likiran as he is not impleaded in the information.
SO ORDERED.2
The incident that led to the death of Sareno happened on the wee hour of March 19, 2000 in BarangayBugca-on,
Lantapon, Bukidnon. It was the eve of the town fiesta and a dance was being held at the basketball court. Prosecution
witnesses Celso Dagangon (Dagangon), Prescado Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio Goloceno (Goloceno) testified
that on said night, they were at the dance together with Sareno at around 8:00 p.m. After a few hours, while Mercado
and Goloceno were inside the dance area, Jerome Likiran 3 (Jerome), the accused-appellants brother, punched
Mercado on the mouth. Goloceno was about to assist Mercado when he saw that Jerome was armed with a short
firearm while the accused-appellant was holding a hunting knife, so he backed off. Dagangon and Sareno, who were
outside the dance area, heard the commotion. Afterwards, Jerome approached Sareno and shot him several times. With
Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant stabbed him on the back. It was Dagangon who saw the incident first-hand as he
was only three meters from where Sareno was. Dagangon was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome
and the accused-appellant left, but Sareno was already dead at that point. Sareno suffered multiple gunshot wounds
and a stab wound at the left scapular area.4
The accused-appellant, however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he admitted that he was at the dance, he
did not go outside when the commotion happened. Heand Jerome stayed within the area where the sound machine was
located and they only heard the gunshots outside. Other witnesses testified in the accused-appellants defense, with
Edgar Indanon testifying that he saw the stabbing incident and that it was some other unknown person, and not the
accused-appellant, who was the culprit; and Eleuterio Quiopa stating that he was with the accused-appellant and
Jerome inside the dance hall at the time the commotion occurred.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellants culpability. 5 Prosecution witness
Dagangons positive identification of the accused-appellant was held sufficient by the RTC to convict the latter of the
crime of murder.6 The RTC also rejected the accused-appellants defense of denial as it was not supported by
evidence. It also ruled that alibi cannot favor the accused-appellant since he failed to prove that it was impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime on the night of March 19, 2000.7
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision in toto per assailed Decision 8 dated July 27, 2011, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated July 17, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8
of Malaybalay City, in Criminal Case No. 10439-00 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.9
The CA sustained the findings of the RTC as regards the identity of the accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of
the crime. The CA, nevertheless, deviated from the RTCs conclusion that there was conspiracy between Jerome and
the accused-appellant, and that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime. According to the CA,
the information failed to contain the allegation of conspiracy, and the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish
that Jerome and the accused-appellant ganged up on the victim.10
The CA, however, sustained the RTCs finding of treachery.11
The accused-appellant protested his conviction. 12 According to him, the prosecution failed to establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the accused-appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of
the assailant and his culpability.13
Upon review, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, including their assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Factual findings of the trial court are, except for
compelling or exceptional reasons, conclusive to the Court especially when fully supported by evidence and affirmed
by the CA.14
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. 15In this case, the
identity of the accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime has been adequately established by the
prosecution, more particularly by the testimony of Dagangon. The Court cannot sustain the accused-appellants
argument that it was impossible for Dagangon to see the assailant considering that there was no evidence to show that
the place where the crime occurred was lighted. As found by the CA, Dagangon was only three meters away from the
accused-appellant and Jerome and had a good view of them. Moreover, there was no distraction that could have
disrupted Dagangons attention. He even immediately identified the accused-appellant and Jerome during police
investigation, and there is no showing that Dagangon was informed by the police beforehand that the accused-
appellant was one of the suspects.16 Positive identification by a prosecution witness of the accused as one of the
perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight than alibi and denial. 17 Such positive identification gains further
ground in the absence of any ill motive on the part of a witness to falsely testify against an accused. 18
The accused-appellant also asserted that the information charged him of murder committed by attacking, assaulting,
stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby causing his instantaneous death. 19 The accused-appellant argued that the
evidence on record established that Sareno was in fact shot by some other person. 20 At this juncture, the Court notes
that the testimony of Dagangon, indeed, identified two assailants the accused-appellant and his brother, Jerome;
however, it was only the accused-appellant who was charged with the death of Sareno. Defense witnesses also
testified that Jerome died on March 12, 2005.21
The CA disregarded the accused-appellants contention and ruled that "the cause of death was not made an issue in the
court a quo" and the Certificate of Death was admitted during the pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and cause of
death.22 And even assuming that the cause of death was an issue, the CA still held the accused-appellant liable for the
death of Sareno on the basis of the Courts ruling in People v. Pilola.23
The Court reviewed the records of this case and finds sufficient basis for the CAs disregard of the accused-appellants
argument.
The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated upon and admitted by the
prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Cidric Dael (Dr. Dael) of the Bukidnon
Provincial Hospital and reviewed by the Rural Health Physician of Malaybalay City "is admitted as proof of fact and
cause of death due to multiple stab wound scapular area." 24 Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118, meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and
counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. 25 In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement
was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may nevertheless be admitted given that the
defense failed to object to its admission. 26 Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the
regular performance of his duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the victim. 27 Note that the certificate
of death issued by Dr. Dael provides the following:
CAUSES OF DEATH

Immediate cause : DOA

Antecedent cause : Multiple GSW
Underlying cause : Stab wound scapular area (L)28
The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sarenos cause of death. 29
More importantly, the accused-appellant is criminally liable for the natural and logical consequence resulting from his
act of stabbing Sareno. It may be that he was not the shooter, it is nevertheless true that the stab wound he inflicted on
Sareno contributed to the latters death. In Quinto v. Andres,30 the Court stated that:
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a
consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes
cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual
act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to
crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. x x x[.] 31 (Citations omitted and emphasis
ours)
The Court, however, cannot agree with the RTC and CAs conclusion that the killing of Sareno was attended by
treachery, qualifying the crime to murder.
Treachery is appreciated as a qualifying circumstance when the following elements are shown: a) the malefactor
employed means, method, or manner of execution affording the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and b) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the
offender.32 Treachery is not present when the killing is not premeditated, or where the sudden attack is not
preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the accused as a
result of a provocative act of the victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of the moment. 33
In this case, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses all point to the fact that the shooting and stabbing of Sareno
was actually a spur of the moment incident, a result of the brawl that happened during the barrio dance. The
prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant and his brother Jerome deliberately planned the means by which
they would harm Sareno. In fact, what was revealed by the prosecution evidence was that Sareno was an innocent
bystander who unfortunately became a target of the accused-appellant and Jeromes rampage. Consequently, the
accused-appellant should be liable only for the lesser crime of Homicide.
In convictions for homicide, Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) prescribes the penalty of reclusion
temporal, which ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. 34 In the absence of any
modifying circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, 35 or from fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 36 the
maximum of the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant shall be within the range of reclusion temporal
medium,37 and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the
offense,38 or prision mayor in any of its periods, which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years.39 There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the Court thereby sentences the accused-appellant to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
With regard to the damages awarded, the Court affirms the award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) civil
indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) moral damages, as these are in accord with the Court's judicial
policy on the matter.40 These, on top of the Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) actual damages and Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) attorney's fees awarded by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Further, the monetary awards shall
earn interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid. 41
The Court, moreover, deletes the attorney's fees awarded by the RTC as there is nothing on record proving that the
heirs of Sareno actually incurred such expense. Attorney's fees are in the concept of actual or compensatory damages
allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, 42 and absent any evidence supporting
its grant, the same must be deleted for lack of factual basis.
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00484 is
MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Jenny Likiran alias "Loloy" is hereby found guilty of the lesser crime of
HOMICIDE, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.
Further, the award of attorney's fees is hereby DELETED.
Interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages awarded, to earn from the date
of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.
In all other respects, the Court of Appeals decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be deliberately sought to ensure the safety of the accused
from the defensive acts of the victim. The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a
finding of treachery even if the attack was intended to kill another as long as the victims position was
merely accidental. A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on clear and convincing
evidence. Such evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. In this case, no evidence
was presented to show that petitioner consciously adopted or reflected on the means, method, or form
of attack to secure his unfair advantage. MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014, J. Leonen

Treachery as a qualifying circumstance must be deliberately sought to ensure the safety of the
accused from the defensive acts of the victim. Unexpectedness of the attack does not always
equate to treachery.
We are asked to decide on a petition for review on certiorari 1 of the Court of Appeals' decision2 dated November 20,
2007 and the Court of Appeals resolution 3 dated February 18, 2008. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial
Courts decision4 dated July 2, 2004 that found petitioner guilty of two (2) counts of frustrated murder and sentenced
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum
to 17 years and four (4) months of reclusion temporalas maximum for each count.5
This case arose out of two (2) informations for frustrated murder filed against petitioner:
Criminal Case No. Q-00-91821
That on or about the 20th day of April 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attackand
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one GERARDO NAVAL by then and there stabbing the latter
with a sharp bladed weapon hitting him at the left back portion of his body, thereby inflicting upon said offended party
physical injuries which are necessarily fatal and mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said
GERARDO NAVAL which save his life, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party. 6
Criminal Case No. Q-00-91842
That on or about the 20 th day of April 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attackand
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one ROMEO AUSTRIA by then and there stabbing the latter
with a sharp bladed weapon hitting him at the left back portion of his body, thereby inflicting upon said offended party
physical injuries which are necessarily fatal and mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance rendered to said ROMEO
AUSTRIA which save his life, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party. 7
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleadednot guilty to the offenses charged against him. 8
The prosecution presented private complainants Gerardo Naval and Romeo Austria as witnesses. 9 It also presented Dr.
Raisa D. Francisco, Carlos Angeles, and Arnold Angeles as witnesses. 10 Petitioner testified for the defense.11
Facts according to the prosecution
Romeo Austria testified that at around 8:30 a.m. on April 20, 2000, he was playing a lucky nine game ata wake on
Araneta Avenue, Quezon City.12 Miguel arrived, asking money from Austria so he could buy liquor. 13 In response,
Austria asked Miguel "to keep quiet." 14 Gerardo Naval "arrived and asked [Austria] to go home." 15 There was an
exchange of words between Naval and Miguel. 16 Austria "stood up [and] felt that he was stabbed." 17 As he ran home,
he noticedMiguel "armed with a knife," 18 this time chasing Naval.19 Austria was "hospitalized . . . and was . . .
confined for more than a month."20 He spent around P110,000.00 for his hospitalization.21 On cross-examination,
Austria testified that he saw Miguel attempt to stab him again. 22
Gerardo Naval testified that Miguel was irked when he asked Austria to go home. 23 After he and Miguel had an
exchange of words, he "felt a hard blow on his back." 24 Naval retaliated.25 However, he ran away when he saw Miguel
holding a knife.26 Miguel chased Naval who fell on the ground. 27 When Naval saw that Miguel was "about to stab him
again, he hit [Miguel] with a bench" 28 and left him lying on the ground, unable to stand. 29 According to Naval, "he did
not see the [knife] land on his back."30 Naval was also confined at the hospital but only for six (6) days.31
Dr. Carlos Angeles testified that "he treated [Austria] for [the] stab wound at [his] back." 32 He declared that Austria
could have died without an emergency operation. 33 According to him, "a long and sharp instrument, probably a
knife,"34 could have been used to stab the victim. 35 Dr. Arnold Angeles, Navals doctor, testified that "continuous
blood loss"36 could have caused Navals death.37
Facts according to the defense
Miguel testified that he saw private complainants at a wake. 38 Naval tapped his back and asked, "Anong problema
mo?" to which he answered, "Wala naman."39 Thereafter, Naval punched Miguel.40 As he was about to stand up, he
was hit by a hard objecton his head, causing him to lose consciousness. 41 He was brought to UERM Memorial
Hospital where Naval identified him.42 He was then brought to Station 11 in Galas, Quezon City. 43 Miguel also
testified that only Naval identified him at the hospital.44
The parties stipulated that Dr. Renan Acosta, supposedly the second defense witness, conducted Miguels
examination.45 He issued a temporary medical certificate and a separate permanent medical certificate. 46
Regional Trial Court
In its decision, the Regional Trial Court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
frustrated murder.47 He was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayoras minimum, to 17 years and four (4) months of reclusion temporalas maximum for each
count.48 Petitioner was ordered to indemnify Austria P25,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as actual
damages; and Naval P25,000.00 asmoral damages and P10,000.00 as temperate or moderate damages.49
Petitioner was also ordered to pay the costs of suit.50 The dispositive portion of the Regional
Trial Court decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Re: Criminal Case No. 00-91841-finding accused MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder hereby sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of Six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as MINIMUM to Seventeen (17)Years and
Four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal as MAXIMUM and to indemnify private complainant Gerardo Naval
in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos as and by way of morals [sic] damages and in the
 absence of evidence, the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as and by way [of] Temperate or
moderate damages;
2. Re: Criminal Case NO. 00-91841-finding accused MIGUEL CIRERA y USTELO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, hereby sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
[of] Six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as MINIMUM to Seventeen (17)years and four (4)
months of Reclusion Temporal as MAXIMUM and to indemnify private complainant Romeo Austria in the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos as and by way of moral damages and the amount of
One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as actual damages.
3. To pay the cost of suit.51 (Emphasis in the original)
The Regional Trial Court found thatpetitioner caused the stab wounds of private complainants. 52 Naval and Austria
were able to positively identify him and describe how they obtained their injuries. 53
Petitioners acts were not attended by evident premeditation as ruled by the trial court. 54 However, there was treachery
on petitioners end, considering the length of time it took private complainants to realize that they were
stabbed.55 This, according to the Regional Trial Court, was a method or form that tended to insure the execution of an
act without risk from the offended partys defense.56
Petitioner appealed57 the Regional Trial Courts July 2, 2004 decision to the Court of Appeals, raising as issue the
credibility of the prosecutions witnesses and, hence, the correctness of his conviction. 58
Court of Appeals
In a decision59 promulgated on November 20, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals was not persuaded by petitioners arguments pointing to alleged inconsistencies inthe
prosecution witnesses narratives. It found that the inconsistency between Navals testimony and his sworn affidavit
on the number of times petitioner was hit might be attributed to the fact that "the statement was taken . . . while he was
[still at] the hospital [unable] to fully understand its contents". 60 The Court of Appeals was not persuaded either by
petitioners argument that Austria and Naval failed to testify that they saw him stab them. 61The Court of Appeals held
that "no other person could have committed the crime" 62 as "all the circumstances point to [petitioner] as the author of
the crime."63
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the trial court that there was treachery in this case because"the attack
was so sudden and unexpected"64 that "self-defense was not possible."65
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in the Court of Appeals resolution 66 promulgated on February 18,
2008.
Petitioner, in this case, raises the following issue:
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL WHICH IN
EFFECT, AFFIRMS THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION RENDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT, DESPITE THE
PATENT LACK OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE PETITIONER AND FOR THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE PETITIONERS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 67
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the inconsistencies in Austrias and Navals
statements.68 Austrias statement that only Naval and petitioner were standing behind him was inconsistent with
Austrias other statement that "petitioner was on his left side, while [Naval] was on his right side." 69
Petitioner also stresses that Austrias claim that Naval and petitioner "were still having an altercation when he
suddenly felt a stab blow at his back" 70 was inconsistent with Navals alleged failure to mention "that he had an
altercation with the petitioner before the stabbing incident." 71 Petitioner claims that it was not possible for him to have
stabbed Austria without Naval noticing since he was having a heatedexchange of words with Naval. 72
Petitioner insists that the claim that "petitioner was armed with a knife" 73 was not proven since "the knife was not
recovered."74 Petitioner was left immobile, yet "nobody bothered to retrieve the knife" 75 he supposedly used in
committing the crimes charged against him.76 Petitioner also points out that other players in the lucky nine game
might have gotten mad at private complainants when Naval allegedly asked Austria to go home for a drinking spree. 77
Petitioner also argues that there was no treachery. 78 Even assuming that an assault was sudden and unexpected, there
must be "evidence that [the] mode of assault was consciously and deliberately adopted to [e]nsure the execution of the
crime without risk to the [petitioner.]"79 Given "private complainants superiority in number"80 and considering that
petitioner "was left behind unconscious,"81 private complainants were not left without "opportunity to retaliate." 82
Respondent counters that the "trial courts observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded
finality, unless there appears in the recordsome fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which . . . would alter the result of the case." 83
Private complainants point out that the circumstances of the case show treachery since they were attacked from
behind.84 Further, they claim that there was no warning that they were in danger when they were stabbed. 85
The petition should be partly granted. Treachery did not exist and, hence, petitioner may only be convicted of two
counts of frustrated homicide.
I
Nonetheless, we affirm the findingthat the prosecutions witnesses were credible.
Petitioner points to alleged inconsistencies that pertain only to collateral and inconsequential matters. He directs this
courts attention to inconsistent statements regarding the positions of private complainants at the time of the
incident.86 He also points to the alleged impossibility of him committing the offense without being noticed by
Naval87 and to the alleged failure to recover the knife used in stabbing private complainants. 88
These alleged inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, specially
with respect to the "principal occurrence and positive identification" 89 of petitioner. Slight inconsistencies in the
testimony even strengthen credibility as they show that the "testimony [was] not rehearsed." 90 What is important is
that there is consistency as to the occurrence and identity of the perpetrator.91
Further, the alleged failure to retrieve the knife supposed to have been used in perpetrating the offense does not
destroy the credibility of the testimonies. 92 The crime is proved not by presenting the object but by establishing the
existence of the elements of the crime as written in law.93
II
Petitioner was charged and convicted by the trial court and the Court of Appeals with two counts of frustrated murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that murder is committed by a person who kills, under certain
circumstances, another person that is not his or her father, mother, child, ascendant, descendant, or spouse. It provides:
ARTICLE 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusin temporalin its maximum period to death, if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage ofsuperior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other
means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption
of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other public calamity. 5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.
If these qualifying circumstances are not present or cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the accused may only
be convicted with homicide, defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another withoutthe
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide
and be punished by reclusin temporal.
In murder or homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill. If there is no intent to kill on the part ofthe offender,
he or she is liable only for physical injuries.94
"[I]ntent to kill . . . must beproved by clear and convincing evidence." 95 "[It] should not be drawn inthe absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt." 96
In Escamilla v. People,97 we said that "[t]he evidence to prove intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the means used;
the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and the conduct of the malefactors before, at the
time of, orimmediately after the killing of the victim."98
The act of killing becomes frustrated when an offender "perform[s] all the acts of execution which [c]ould produce the
[crime]"99 but did not produce it for reasons independent of his or her will.
In convicting petitioner offrustrated murder, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner intentionally
tried to kill private complainants. He was the author ofthe stab wounds obtained by private complainants. However,
for reasons independent of his will, he was unable to fully execute the crime.
This court held that "findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial
court,"100 which is in the best position to observe the witnesses demeanor while being examined in court. 101 This
court gives more weight tosuch findings if affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 102 The exception to the ruleis when the
trial court misconstrued facts which if properly appreciated could alter the outcome of the case. 103
We find that there is nothing in the circumstances of this case that warrants the application of the exception, with
respect to the findings that: 1) there was intent to kill; 2) petitioner was the willful author of the stab wounds, which
almost killed private complainants; and that 3) petitioners failure to kill private complainants was a result of
circumstances independent of his will. Circumstantial evidence was used to identify the perpetrator in this case. 104
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules ofCourt provides that a person may be convicted based on circumstantial evidence if
the requisites are present. It provides:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
This court iterated this rule in Trinidad v. People:105
The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstance es is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.106
In this case, the following facts were considered:
1) Petitioner was identified by private complainants to be at the scene of the crime; 107
2) Private complainants were able todescribe how they obtained their injuries; 108
3) Petitioner was seen holding the knife at the scene of the crime;109
4) Only three persons were involved in the incident private complainants and petitioner; 110
5) Petitioner "was standing very close to the private complainants";111
6) Petitioner was the only one who had an altercation with private complainants, 112 and petitioner was seen
chasing and about to stab at least one of the private complainants; 113
7) Private complainants sustained stab wounds;114
8) The stab wounds sustained by private complainants would have been fatal had it not been given
appropriate medical attention.115
The combination of these circumstances "constitute[s] an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the [petitioner], to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person." 116
The version offered by petitioner that it was he who was punched and hit with a hard object 117 is not inconsistent with
the facts as stated by private complainants. It may even be true. However, it does not remove such reasonable
conclusion that he was the author of the acts complained about in this case.
Petitioners intent to kill is evident from his attempt to stab private complainants more than once. 118 Petitioner chased
private complainants after they had tried to flee from him. 119 The wounds inflicted by petitioner were also shown to
have been fatal if no medical attention had been given to private complainants immediately after the incident. 120
Petitioners acts did not result in private complainants deaths despite petitioner having already performed all acts of
execution of the crime. However, this was not due to his desistance but due to the timely medical attention given to
private complainants.121
Meanwhile, Dr. Carlos Angeles and Dr. Arnold Angeles testimonies that private complainants would have died had
no immediate medical attention been given to them,122 showed that petitioners failure to kill private complainants
was due toacts independent of his will.
Based on the foregoing, we do not find reason to disturb the trial courts and the Court of Appeals findings.
III
However, treachery, as a qualifying circumstance to sustain a conviction of frustrated murder rather than frustrated
homicide, was not proven by the prosecution.
Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery:
ARTICLE 14. Aggravating Circumstances. The following are aggravating circumstances:
....
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.123
The requisites of treachery are:
(1) [T]he employment of means,method, or manner of execution which will ensure the safety of the
malefactor from defensive or retaliating acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter
to defend himself or to retaliate;124 and
(2) [D]eliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner of execution. 125
A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on "clear and convincing evidence." 126 Such evidence must be
as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. 127 Its existence "cannot be presumed."128 As with the finding of guilt of the
accused, "[a]ny doubt as to [its] existence . . . [should] be resolved in favor of the accused." 129
The unexpectedness of an attack cannotbe the sole basis of a finding of treachery 130 even if the attack was intended to
kill another as long as the victims position was merely accidental. 131 The means adopted must have been a result of a
determination to ensure success in committing the crime.
In this case, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner consciously adopted or reflected on the means, method,
or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage.
The attack might "have been done on impulse [or] as a reaction to an actual or imagined provocation offered by the
victim."132 In this case, petitioner was not only dismissed by Austria when he approached him for money. There was
also an altercation between him and Naval. The provocation might have been enough to entice petitioner to action and
attack private complainants.
Therefore, the manner of attack might not have been motivated by a determination to ensure success in committing
the crime. What was more likely the case, based on private complainants testimonies, was that petitioners action
1wphi1

was an impulsive reaction to being dismissed by Austria, his altercation with Naval, and Navals attempt to summon
Austria home.
Generally, this type of provocation negates the existence of treachery. 133 This is the type of provocation that does not
lend itself to premeditation. The provocation in thiscase is of the kind which triggers impulsive reactions left
unchecked by the accused and caused him to commit the crime. There was no evidence of a modicum ofpremeditation
indicating the possibility of choice and planning fundamental to achieve the elements of treachery.
The ability of the offended parties toretaliate and protect themselves may not by itself negate the existence of
treachery. The efforts of the accused to employ means and method to ensure his safety and freedom from retaliation
may not have succeeded. However, in this case, the ability of the offended parties to have avoided greater harm by
running away or by being able to subdue the accused is a strongindicator that no treachery exists.
It is, therefore, an error for both the trial and appellate courts not to have considered the evidence that the offended
parties were able to flee and retaliate. Upon proof of evasion and retaliation, courts must evaluate the evidence further
to ensure whether there can be reasonable doubt for this qualifying circumstance to exist. This is only in keeping with
the presumption of innocence of the accused.
Thus, in the absence of clear proof of the existence of treachery, the crime proven beyond reasonable doubt isonly
frustrated homicide and, correspondingly, the penalty should be reduced. 134
IV
Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a penalty lower by one degree than that which should be imposed
for homicide may be imposed upon a person guilty of frustrated homicide.
The imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime shall be the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for the consummated crimes. The penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed must have a maximum term which canbe
properly imposed under the rules considering the attending circumstances. 135 Since there is no attending circumstance
in this case, the penalty of prision mayor in its medium term or eight (8) years and one (1) day asmaximum should
beimposed. The minimum sentence should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code.136 A penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day as minimum, prision correccional should, therefore,
be proper.
Furthermore, petitioners civil liabilitymust be modified. The award of actual damages to Romeo Austria should be
88,028.77 since this is the only amount supported by receipts on record. This is in line with Article 2199 137 of the
Civil Code, which limits the entitlement for pecuniary loss to such amount duly proved.
We see no reason to modify the trial courts award of moral damages, being in line with Article 2219 138 and
jurisprudence.139 The trial courts award of temperate damages to Naval isalso justified in recognition of the injuries
he sustained, which from their very nature imply damages and do not need to be proved inaccordance with Article
2216140 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals decision is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is found guilty of two (2) counts of
frustrated homicide. He is sentenced to a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as maximum, for every count. Furthermore, he
is ordered to indemnify a) Romeo Austria P25,000.00 as moral damages and P88,028.77 as actual damages and b)
Gerardo Naval P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as temperate ormoderate damages.
Petitioner is also ordered to pay the c.osts of suit.
SO ORDERED.

The accused who was charged and convicted with the crime of murder contends that the trial court and
the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The SC ruled that the appellants
sudden attack on the victim amply demonstrates that treachery was employed in the commission of the
crime. It further held that It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of the victim when he
thrust the knife to his torso for even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an
unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGILIO AMORA y VISCARRA, G.R. No. 190322, November 26, 2014, J.
Del Castillo

The qualifying circumstance of treachery does not require that the perpetrator attack his victim from behind.
"Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when une)(pected and on an unarmed victim who would be in
no position to repel the attack or avoid it."1
On appeal is the August 28, 2009 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03294, which
affirmed with modification the February 21, 2008 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 84, Malolos
City, Bulacan. The RTC convicted Virgilio Amora y Viscarra (appellant) of the crime of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim Romeo Gibaga (Romeo) P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P35,000.00 for funerale) (penses, and P16,770.69 for medical expense.
Factual Antecedents
On November 30, 2004, appellant was charged with murder defined and penalized under Article248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). Pertinent portions of the Information4 filed against him read:
That on or about the 12th day of September 2004, in San Jose Del Monte City, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a deadly weapon and with
intent to kill one Romeo Gibaga, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said deadly weapon the said Romeo Gibaga, hitting him on the trunk,
thereby inflicting upon him mortal wound[s] which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.5
Upon arraignment on January 18, 2006, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, pre-
trial and trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of eyewitnesses Maricris Alidon (Maricris), Anselmo Benito (Anselmo),
and Aurelio Amora (Aurelio). Linda Gibaga (Linda), the wife of the victim Romeo, and Dr. Felimon C. Porciuncula,
Jr. (Dr. Porciuncula), the Medico-Legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim, also testified for
the prosecution. Their testimonies are summarized below.
On September 12, 2004 at around 5:45 p.m., Anselmo, Aurelio, and the victim Romeo were walking on their way to
Sampol Market in San Jose Del Monte City. Maricris and her son were tailing them about four meters behind. As they
were making their way to the market, they saw appellant in his store located on the right side of the street. Suddenly,
appellant rushed towards them and stabbed Romeo twice - one on the chest and another on the abdomen. They were
all caught by surprise due to the suddenness of the attack. Romeo fell to the ground while appellant quickly ran away
from the scene. Aurelio chased appellant but failed to catch up with him. Maricriswent to Romeos house to inform his
wife Linda about what had just happened.
Upon hearing the news from Maricris, Linda rushedto the scene of the crime but did not find her husband there as
Romeo was already brought by Anselmo to the Sapang Palay District Hospital. Later on, he was transferred to East
Avenue Medical Center where he died after three days. Linda testified that before Romeo passed away, he told her that
appellant was his assailant.6
Due to Romeos injuries and eventualdeath, Linda spent P16,770.69 for hospital expenses, P35,000.00 for funeral
expenses, and P50,000.00 as expenses for the wake.
Dr. Porciuncula testified that Romeo died due to two fatal stab wounds. The first stab wound penetrated his chest and
pierced his heart while the wound on his abdomen pierced the pancreas and his small intestines. Both stab wounds
appeared to have been caused by a single-bladed weapon.7
Version of the Defense
The appellant was the lone witness presented by the defense.He declared on the witness stand that on September 12,
2004, at around 5:45 p.m., he was working as a construction worker in a site 8 to 9 kilometers away from his
residence. On his way home, Nestor Basco, his neighbor, informed him about a stabbing incident that had just taken
place near his home. Upon arriving at his house, his wife and his parents told him that the stabbing incident took place
in front of their store and that the alleged assailant passed through their yard to the street at the back. The alleged
assailant managed to escape, and the stabbing was wrongly imputed against appellant. On December 9, 2004,
appellant was arrested. He claimed that he does not know Romeo, whom henever met before the stabbing incident.
The only reason he could think of why he is being falsely accused was that he turned down Anselmos request
for P200.00 to buy shabu. This happened when they were having a drinking spree with Aurelio the day before the
stabbing incident. According to appellant, Anselmo got infuriated by his refusal and threw a bottle of gin at him.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 21, 2008, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting appellant of the crime of murder. Itfound that the
stabbing of Romeo was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery as it was "sudden and unexpected such
that [Romeo] was unable to react or defend himself from the assault of [appellant]" 8
The dispositive part of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetuaand to
indemnify the family of the deceased Romeo Gibaga the following amounts:
1. Php16,770.69 for medical expenses;
2. Php35,000.00 for funeral services; and
3. Php50,000.00 for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.9
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC. It held in its August 28,2009 Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 21, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Malolos City is hereby
AFFIRMED with modification in that the heirs of the victim are additionally awarded Php25,000.00 as temperate
damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.10
Faulting the Decision of the CA, appellant now appeals to this Court advancing the same issues he raised before the
CA.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant asserts that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER
DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILTBEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
GRANTING ARGUENDOTHAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE, THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.11
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Appellant argues that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing the
testimony12 of prosecution witness Aurelio, appellant posits that the eye witnesses could not have possibly identified
the true assailant because it was already 5:45 p.m. and the place where the stabbing incident occurred was almost
shrouded in darkness. Appellant also stresses that witness Aurelio, by his own statement, was drunk at the time of the
incident, thereby impairing his perception and making his judgment in identifying the assailant unreliable. Because
there is uncertainty as to the identity of the true malefactor, appellant asserts that he is entitled toan acquittal.
We are not persuaded.
The RTC is correct in giving weight and credence tothe testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, viz:
x x x the Court finds the testimonies of the former ([Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio]) straightforward and credible,
hence, [deserving] recognition and respect as truthful account of what actually transpired during the incident in
question. The Court likewise noted the assertions of [Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio] that they are familiar with or
know the accused and the victim well since they are neighbors in Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan.
The Court therefore does not doubt [Maricris, Anselmo, and Aurelio] in identifying the accused as the attacker and
assailant of [Romeo]. Besides, no evidence was offered to show ulterior motive on the part of [Maricris, Anselmo, and
Aurelio] to testify falsely against the accused.13
It bears stressing that the RTC Decision finding appellant guilty of the charge was not based solely on the testimony of
Aurelio. Two other eyewitnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who stabbed Romeo. Anselmo and
Maricris were consistent in their testimonies identifying appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Excerpts of their
testimonies are reproduced below:
[FISCAL ROQUE:]
Q: You said that you were walking together with Aurelio Amora and Romeo Gibaga. [W]hile you were
walking, what happened if any?
[ANSELMO BENITO:]
A: Romeo Gibaga was suddenly stabbed, sir.
Q: In relation to you, where was this Romeo Gibaga before he was stabbed?
A: He was at myleft side, sir.
Q: How about this Aurelio Amora, where was he?
A: Aurelio was at my right side, sir.
Q: While this Aurelio Amora was on your right and this Romeo Gibaga on your left, you mentioned that
somebody came and stabbed this Romeo Gibaga[. W]ere you able to see or notice where this assailant came
from before he stabbed Romeo Gibaga?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: He came from behind, sir.
xxxx
Q: Considering your position, are you in a position to tell us whether this Romeo Gibaga actually saw the
assailant before he was stabbed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he do?
A: None, sir.
Q: Why was he not able to react before he was stabbed?
A: Because he was not aware, sir.
Q: Mr. Witness[,] you mentioned that you were able to see this person who stabbed Romeo Gibaga[. I]f he is
now present, can you identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly look around and point him out?
THE INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to a person x x x wearing a detainees t-shirt who identified himself as Virgilio Amora.
Q: And you mentioned that Romeo Gibaga was stabbed by this accused whom you [have just] identified[.
W]ere you able to see the weapon that was used in stabbing Romeo Gibaga?
 A: No, sir.14
xxxx
[FISCAL ROQUE :]
Q: And while you were there going toSampol Market, do you still recall x x x any unusual incident that
transpired?
[MARICRIS ALIDON:]
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what was this unusual incident, Madam witness?
A: The stabbing incident thathappened to Romeo Gibaga, sir.
Q: And were you able to see who stabbed him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was he?
A: Virgilio Amora, sir.
Q: If he is present today, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly look around and point him out?
THE INTERPRETER:
The witness pointed to a person who identified himself as Virgilio Amora. 15
It is clear that the witnesses have properly identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Astestified to by the
witnesses and correctly ruled by the RTC and the CA, he was the person who attacked, stabbed and killed Romeo.
Appellant tried to impeach the testimonies of Anselmo and Aurelio claiming that their motive for falsely testifying
against him was because of his refusal to give them money for shabu.
The Court finds that appellants assertion is a mere speculation that deserves scant consideration. His explanation is
neither supported by evidentiary proof nor buttressed by established facts. We have consistently ruled that positive
identification by credible witnesses prevails over self-serving statements of the accused. Such statements cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight over affirmative declarations of eyewitnesses.
Finally, appellant claims that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was working at a construction site 8 to 9
kilometers away from the scene of the crime. He argues that it was thus impossible for him to be the person who
stabbed and killed Romeo.
Appellants defenses of denial and alibi must likewise fail.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, "the accused must prove(a) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him tobe at the scene of the crime" 16during its
commission. "Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminisand the
location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not
have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed." 17
In this case, the appellant failed to satisfy these requirements. While a distance of 8 to 9 kilometersis quite far,
appellant was not able to satisfactorily substantiate his claims regarding his whereabouts. Aside from his own
testimony, appellant did not bother to present the testimony of other witnesses or any other proof to support his
defense. Since he claimed that his parents and wife saw the stabbing incident and that the assailant allegedly even
entered their yard, it is puzzling why he did not present them as witnesses to bolster his denial.
In any case, eyewitnesses positively identified the appellant to be present at the scene of the crime. "Time and again,
this Court has consistently ruled that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated
and is inherently unreliable."18
The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the RTC. The rule is well-settled that factual findings of
the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and utmost respect given that trial
courts have firsthand observation of the witnesses demeanor while testifying in court. We shall not supplant our own
interpretation of the witnesses testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to determine the
issue of credibility of witnesses. Moreover, in the absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion,
and especially when the CA, asin this case, has affirmed the findings of the trial judge, the assessments and
conclusions of the trial court shall not be overturned.
Treachery
Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC provides that"[t]here is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." Thus in
order for the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following requisites must be shown: (1) the
employment of means, method, or manner of execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive
or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) the
means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. "The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift,deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape." 19
In this case, the appellants suddenattack on Romeo amply demonstrates that treachery was employed in the
commission of the crime. The eyewitnesses were all consistent in declaring that the appellant in such a swift motion
1wphi1

stabbed Romeo such that the latter had no opportunityto defend himself or to fight back. 20 The deliberate swiftness of
the attack significantly diminished the risk to himself that may be caused by the retaliation of the victim.
It is of no consequence that appellant was in front of Romeo when he thrust the knife to his torso. Records show that
appellant initially came from behind and then attacked Romeo from the front. In any event, "[e]ven a frontal attack
could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or
avoid it,"21 as in this case. Undoubtedly, the RTC and CA correctly held that the crime committed was murder under
Article 248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Penalties and Awards of Damages
The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetuato death. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, is correct in
holding that the appellant must suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties, by
reason of the absence of any aggravating circumstance. "It mustbe emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not
eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that persons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended."22
With regard to the award of civil indemnity ex delicto, the same must be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 in
line with prevailing jurisprudence.23 Civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than
the commission of the crime.24 We uphold the CA in awarding moral damages to the heirs of Romeo in the amount
of P50,000.00. "As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family." 25 We likewise award exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00 since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven by the prosecution. When a crime is
committed with an aggravating circumstance, whether qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary damages is
justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. 26 The CA however erred in awarding temperate damages in lieu of
actual damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Records show that the RTC already awarded the heirs of the victim
actualdamages consisting of P16,770.69 as medical expenses andP35,000.00 as funeral expenses. These expenses
were fully supported by receipts.27
Lastly, all damages awarded shall be subject to 6% per annuminterest from the finality of this Resolution until fully
paid, also in line with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The August 28, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 03294, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Malolos,
Bulacan, finding appellant Virgilio Amora y Viscarra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuais AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
 (1) the appellant is not eligible for parole;
(2) the award of civil liability ex delictois increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00;
(3) the appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Romeo Gibaga the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
(4) the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages is DELETED; and
(5) the appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Romeo Gibaga interest at the legal rate of 6% per annumon
all the amounts ofdamages awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the
victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for
the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The fact that there
were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was committed with
abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim.
The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the
deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. The
appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.
GARY FANTASTICO AND ROLANDO VILLANUEVA vs. ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR. AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 190912, January 12, 2015, J. Peralta

For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, dated January 20, 2010, of petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva assailing
the Decision2dated August 31, 2007 and Resolution3 dated January 7, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G. R. CR. No. 31719, affirming the Decision4 dated March 31, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
11, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 93-127049, finding petitioners guilty of attempted murder.
The following are the antecedents:
On the afternoon of June 27, 1993, Elpidio Malicse, Sr. (Elpidio) was outside the house of his sister Isabelita Iguiron
(Isabelita) in Pandacan, Manila when all of a sudden, he heard Isabelita's son, Winston, throwing invectives at him.
Thus, Elpidio confronted Isabelita but she also cursed him, which prompted the former to slapthe latter. On that
occasion, Elpidio was under the influence of alcohol.
The Barangay Chairman heard what transpired and went to the place where the commotion was taking place inorder
to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio was eventually persuaded to go home where he drank some coffee.
Thereafter, Elpidio went back to the house of Isabelita to offer reconciliation. On his way there, he passed by the
house of Kagawad Andy Antonio and requested the latter to accompany him, but was instead told to go back home,
leaving Elpidio to proceed alone.
Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron (Titus) and her son-in-law Gary
Fantastico (Gary) and asked the two where he can find their parents. Titus and Gary responded, "putang ina mo, and
kulit mo, lumayas ka, punyeta ka."
In his anger with the response of Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open and saw Isabelita's elder son, Salvador
Iguiron (Salvador) behind the door holding a rattan stick or arnis. Salvador hit Elpidio on the right side of his head
that forced the latter tobow his head but Salvador delivered a second blow that hit Elpidio on the right eyebrow.
Salvador attempted to hit Elpidio for the third time but the latter got hold of the rattan stick and the two wrestled on
the floor and grappled for the possession of the same rattan stick. Then Titus ran towards the two and sprayed
something on Elpidio's face. Not being able to free himself from the clutches of Salvador and to extricate himself,
Elpidio bit Salvador's head.
Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head with a tomahawk axe when the latter was about to go out of the house.
Elpidio tried to defend himself but was unable to take the tomahawk axe from Gary. Elpidio walked away from Titus
but Gary, still armed with the tomahawk axe and Salvador, with hisarnis, including Titus, chased him.
Roland (Rolly) Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of his head with a lead pipe which caused the
latter to fall on the ground. Elpidio begged his assailants tostop, but to no avail. Salvador hit him countless times on
his thighs, legsand knees using the rattan stick.
While he was simultaneously being beaten up by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly, Nestor, Eugene and Tommy, he tried to
cover his face with his arm. Gary hit him with the tomahawk axe on his right leg, between the knees and the ankle of
his leg, which caused the fracture on his legs and knees. Rolly hit Elpidio's head with a lead pipe, while Tommy hit
him with a piece of wood on the back of his shoulder.
Thereafter, a certain "Mang Gil" tried to break them off but Titus and Gary shouted at him: "Huwag makialam, away
ng mag-anak ito" and the two continued to maul Elpidio. The people who witnessed the incident shouted "maawa na
kayo" but they only stopped battering him when a bystander fainted because of the incident. Elpidio then pretended to
be dead. It was then that concerned neighbors approached him and rushed him to the emergency room of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
Thus, a case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, was filed
against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse Iguiron, Saligan Malicse Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros,
Eugene Surigao and petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva. The Information reads:
That on or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating
together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with
treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, commence the commission of the crime ofmurder directly by
overt acts, to wit: by then and there hitting the head of Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon with a piece of rattan, axe, pipe
and a piece of wood and mauling him, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous
desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal.
They all pleaded "not guilty." The defense, during trial, presented the following version of the events that transpired:
Around 4:30 p.m. of June 27, 1993, Salvador was at the second floor of their house when he heard his tenth son
Winston crying while the latter was being castigated by Elpidio. He went down and told Elpidio to come back the next
day to settle. His wife Isabelita called the Barangay Chairman two blocks away. Barangay Chairman Joseph Ramos
and Elpidio's wife and daughter went to the house and Elpidio was given warm water, but he showered his daughter
and Winston withit. Elpidio was brought to his house and the former told the Barangay Chairman that it was a family
problem. Elpidio went back to the house of Salvador where Titus was sitting on the sofa. Elpidio asked Titus to open
the door until the former kicked the door open. Titus escaped through the open door and Salvador went out of the
house because another child was on the roof, afraid that the said child might fall. Thereafter, Elpidio went to the street.
According to petitioner Gary Fantastico, he was inside their house with his wife and Titus when the incident occurred.
He and his wife ran upstairs, while Titus went out when Elpidio hit the door. Elpidio had a reputation for hurting
people when drunk and Gary learned that Elpidio was brought to the hospital because he was mauled by the people.
During trial, one of the accused, Salvador Iguiron died. Eventually, the trial court, in a Decision dated March 31,
2008, acquitted Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros but found Gary Fantastico and Rolando
Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Attempted Murder. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva GUILTY
of the crime of attempted murder and sentences them to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years
and one(1) day as minimum, to ten (10) years as maximum. They are also ordered to pay the actual damages
of P17,300.00 and moral damages of P10,000.00.
Accused Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners appealed the case to the CA, but the latter court affirmed
the decision of the RTC and disposed the case as follows: WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, we hereby AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant appeal.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied by the same court.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners stated the following arguments:
THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT FROM THE FACTS
OF THE CASE ARE INCORRECT.

THE INFORMATION ITSELF IN THIS CASE DOES NOT ALLEGE ALL THE ELEMENTS AND
THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS OF THE SPECIFIC CRIME OF ATTEMPTED MURDER. NOT
ALL OF THE ELEMENTSOF ATTEMPTED MURDER ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE. THERE IS
NO TREACHERY OR ANY OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE TO SPEAK OF IN THIS
CASE.

THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PRESENCE
OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

THERE ARE MANIFEST MISTAKES IN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE COURT OF

APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT.

THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS WAS BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE

DEFENSE EVIDENCE, NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.

THE TESTIMONY OF THE RESPONDENT THAT IT WAS THE PETITIONERS WHO ATTACKED
HIM IS INDEED UNCORROBORATED AND THUS SELF-SERVING.

CLEARLY, THERE ARE SO MUCH REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN THE DECISION OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER COURT THAT INJURIOUSLY AFFECTED THE SUBSTANTIAL
RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS AND THESE SHOULD BE CORRECTED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT.

At the outset, it bears stressing that under the Rules of Court, an appeal by certiorari to this Court should only raise
questions of law distinctly set forth in the petition.5
In the present case, the issuesand arguments presented by the petitioners involve questions of facts. Therefore, the
present petition is at once dismissible for its failure to comply with the requirement of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
that the petition should only raise questions of law. The distinction between a "question of law" and a "question of
fact" is settled. There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state
offacts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-
litigants. On the other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion
drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.6
At any rate, the arguments of herein petitioners deserve scant consideration.
It is the contention of the petitionersthat the Information filed against them was defective because it did not state all
the elements of the crime charged. However, a close reading of the Information would show the contrary. The
Information partly reads:
x x x but the said accused did not perform all the acts of the execution which should have produced the crime of
murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries
inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal.
From the above-quoted portion of the Information, it is clear that all the elements of the crime of attempted murder
has been included.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a felony, thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance.7
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
The non-performance of all acts ofexecution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance. 8
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two (2) elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be committed.9
The Court in People v. Lizada10 elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act, thus:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular
crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor bythe spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that,
in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality ofbeing equivocal that must
be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or
an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as
the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the
overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first
or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made."
The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must
have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense.11
Petitioners question the inclusion of the phrase "not necessarily mortal" in the allegations in the Information.
According to them, the inclusion of that phrase means that there is an absence of an intent to kill on their part. Intent
to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through external manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the
accused at the time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People, 12 this Court considered the
following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature,
location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the
motives of the accused. This Court also considers motive and the words uttered by the offender at the time he inflicted
injuries on the victim as additional determinative factors. 13 All of these, were proven during the trial. Needless to say,
with or without the phrase, what is important is that all the elements of attempted murder are still alleged in the
Information. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the
offense was committed.
In any case, it is now too late for petitioners to assail the sufficiency of the Information on the ground that the
elements of the crime of attempted murder are lacking. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.- The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a
motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
Anent the probative value and weight given to the testimony of Elpidio by the CA and the RTC, the same is not ridden
with any error. In People v. Alvarado, 14 we held that greater weight is given to the positive identification of the
accused by the prosecution witness than the accused's denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime.
This is so inasmuch as mere denials are self-serving evidence that cannot obtain evidentiary weight greater than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.15
It is clear from the records that Elpidio was able to make a positive identification of the petitionersas the assailants,
thus:
Q. Then what happened next Mr. Witness?
A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador Iguiron, I got out of the door of the house, then, I saw Gary
was hiding in the kitchen door holding an axe. Tonahawk with blade of ax was dull and had a handle of one
foot, with the diameter of one inch.
Q. Why did you know that the ax blade of the tom was dull? (sic)
A. I also used that.
Q. Where do you usually keep that in the house of Iguiron?
A. In the kitchen.
Q. How far is that kitchen from where Gary emerged from?
A. He is right in the kitchen.
Q. Then what happened?
A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador, Gary Iguiron was hiding in the kitchen door and holding a
tomhack(sic) whose edge is dull and he hit me on my right side and my headand I got injury (sic) and blood
profusely oozing, I want to get hold of the tomhawk (sic).
Q. Were you able to get of the tomhawk (sic) from Gary?
A. No sir.16
xxxx
Q. You said while on that street somebody hit you from behind, who was that?
A. Rolly Villanueva.
Q. Why do you say that it was Rolly Villanueva, considering that it was hit from behind?
A. Because they were about 5 of them at the main gate of the compound.
Q. Who are they?
A. Rolando Villanueva, Nestor Ballesteros, Tommy Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao, Saligan Iguiron.
Q. You said you were hit by Rolando from behind, do you have occasion to see first before you were hit?
A. When I was hit I fell down and I was able to see who hit (sic), I saw him.
Q. When you fell down, you were able to realize it was Rolando Villanueva who hit you, you mean you
realized what he used in hitting you from behind?
A. It was a pipe. 1/2 inch thick, 24 inches in length.
Q. You said you fell down because of the blow of Rolando Villanueva and you saw him holding that pipe,
how was he holding the pipe when you saw him?
A. When I fell down he was about trying to hit me again.17
In connection therewith, one must not forget the well entrenched rule that findings of facts of the trial court,
its calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties as well as its conclusion on its findings, are accorded
 high respect if not conclusive effect. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe, at
close range, the conduct, demeanor and deportment of the witness as they testify. 18 The rule finds an even
more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. 19
It is also of utmost significance that the testimony of Elpidio is corroborated by the medico-legal findings as
testified by Dr. Edgar Michael Eufemio, PGH Chief Resident Doctor of the Department of Orthopedics. He
testified as to the following:
Q. And as head of that office, Mr. Witness, why are you here today?
A. Actually, I was called upon by the complainant to rectify regarding, the findings supposedly seen when he
was admitted and when I saw him in one of the sessions of our Out Patient Department.
Q. When was this follow-up session at your department did you see this complainant?
A. Based on the chart, I think it was four (4) months post injury when I first saw the patient.
Q. Why does he has (sic) to makea follow up in your department?
A. Based on this chart, he sustained bilateral leg fractures which necessitated casting. Normally, casting
would take around three (3) months only but since the nature of his fracture was relatively unstable, I think it
necessitated prolong immobilization in a case.
PROSECUTOR TEVES:
Q. Did you personally attend on his needs on that date when you saw him?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And what could have been the cause of these injuries he sustained? A. I think one of his leg has close
fracture, meaning, probably it was caused by a blunt injury rather than a hacking injury, one on the left side,
with an open wound which was very much compatible with a hack at the leg area.20
Petitioners also claim that the prosecution was not able to prove the presence of treachery or any other qualifying
circumstance.
In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and ina swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the
hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. For treachery tobe considered, two elements
must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend
themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. 21 From the facts
proven by the prosecution, the incident was spontaneous, thus, the second element of treachery is wanting. The
incident, which happened at the spur of the moment, negates the possibility that the petitioners consciously adopted
means to execute the crime committed. There is no treachery where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately
adopted but was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the partof the accused because of the provocative act of the
victim.22
The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, thus:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that Salvador Iguiron hit Elpidio Malicsi, Sr. twice on the head
as he was entered (sic) the house of the former. Gary Fantastico hit the victim on the right side of the head with an axe
or tomahawk. The evidence also show that Rolando "Rolly" Villanueva hit the victim on the head with a lead pipe.
And outside while the victim was lying down, Gary hit the legs of the victim with the tomahawk. lvador also hit the
victim with the rattan stick on the thighs, legs and knees. And Titus Iguiron hit the victim's private organ with a piece
of wood. The Provisional Medical Slip (Exh. "D"), Medico Legal Certificate and Leg Sketch (Exh. "D-2") and the
fracture sheet (Exh. "D-4") all prove that the victim suffered injuries to both legs and multiple lacerations on his head.
The injury on one leg which was a close fracture was caused by a blunt instrument like a piece of wood. This injury
was caused by Salvador Iguiron. The other leg suffered an open fracture caused by a sharp object like a large knife or
axe. This was caused by Gary Fantastico who used the tomahawk or axe on the victim. The multiple lacerations on the
head were caused by Gary, Rolly and Salvador as it was proven that they hit Elpidio on the head. There is no
sufficient evidence that the other, accused, namely Saligan Iguiron Y Malicsi, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros
and Eugene Surigao harmed or injured the victim. Titus having sprayed Elpidio with the tear gas is not sufficiently
proven. Neither was the alleged blow by Titus, using a piece of wood, on the victim's private organ sufficiently
established as the medical certificate did not show any injury on that part of the body of the victim.
The said injuries inflicted on the complainant after he went back to his sister Isabelita's house. Whenhe kicked the
1wphi1

door, the melee began. And the sequence of the injuries is proven by victim's testimony. But it was a lopsided attack as
the victim was unarmed, while his attackers were all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim
was also drunk. This establishes the element of abuse of superior strength. The suddenness of the blow inflicted by
Salvador on Elpidio when he entered the premises show that the former was ready to hit the victim and was waiting
for him to enter. It afforded Elpidio no means to defend himself. And Salvador consciously adopted the said actuation.
He hit Elpidio twice on the head. Treachery is present in this case and must be considered an aggravating
circumstance against Salvador Iguiron. Rolly Villanueva, Gary Fantastico and Salvador Iguiron were all armed while
Elpidio, inebriated, had nothing to defend himself with. There is clearly present here the circumstance of abuse of
superior strength.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime." 24 "The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim
does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the
relative strength of the aggressors and the victim." 25 The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought
the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. 26 "To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked."27 The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. 28
Anent the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, which is an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years
and one (1) day as minimum, to ten (10) years as maximum and ordered them to pay actual damages of P17,300.00
and moral damages of P10,000.00, this Court finds an obvious error.
For the crime of attempted murder, the penalty shall be prision mayor, since Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code
states that a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed
upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony. 29 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the
sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Absent any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence should be within the range of
prision mayor in its medium term, which has a duration of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years; and that
the minimum should be within the range of prision correccional, which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years. Therefore, the penalty imposed should have been imprisonment from six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. WHEREFORE, the
Petition for Review on Certiorari dated January 20, 2010 of petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva is
hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated August 31, 2007 and Resolution dated January 7, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the petitioners are sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six ( 6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioners are also ORDERED to pay Pl 7,300.00 as actual damages, as
well as Pl 0,000.00 moral damages as originally ordered by the RTC. In addition, interest is imposed on all damages
awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

In convicted the accused of the crime of murder, the RTC appreciated the use of firearm as an special
aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court affirmed such ruling by citing Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294, which treats the unauthorized use of a
licensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special aggravating
circumstance. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANIEL VILLA MATIBAG y DE @
"DANI" "DANILO," G.R. No. 206381, March 25, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe

G.R. No. 206381, March 25, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL
MATIBAG Y DE VILLA @ DANI OR DANILO, Accused-Appellant.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 206381, March 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANIEL MATIBAG Y DE VILLA @

DANI OR DANILO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Daniel Matibag y De Villa @
Dani or Danilo (Matibag) assailing the Decision2 dated September 13, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03759 which affirmed in toto the Decision3 dated August 1,
2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Pallocan West, Batangas City, Branch 3 (RTC) in Criminal Case
No. 13941, finding Matibag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

In an Amended Information4 dated May 5, 2005, Matibag was charged with the crime of Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,5 the
accusatory portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about March 27, 2005 at around 8:40 oclock [sic] in the evening at Iron Street,
Twin Villa Subdivision, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a Beretta
Caliber .9MM Pistol with Serial No. 3191M9, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with
the qualifying circumstance of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said pistol one Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan, while
the latter was completely defenseless, thereby hitting him and causing gunshot wounds at
his head and chest, which directly resulted to the victims death.

That the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm is attendant in
the commission of the offense.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.6cralawred
cralawlawlibrary

Matibag entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment. After the termination of the pre-trial, trial
on the merits ensued.7cralawred

The prosecution asserted that at around 8:40 in the evening of March 27, 2005, Enrico Clar de Jesus
Duhan (Duhan), who just came from a meeting with the other officers of the homeowners association
of Twin Villa Subdivision, was walking along Iron Street in Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City
when Matibag confronted Duhan, and asked, ano bang pinagsasasabi mo? Duhan replied wala,
and without warning, Matibag delivered a fist blow hitting Duhan on the left cheek and causing him to
teeter backwards. Matibag then pulled out his gun and shot Duhan, who fell face-first on the pavement.
While Duhan remained in that position, Matibag shot him several more times. PO2 Tom Falejo, a
member of the Philippine National Police, positively identified Matibag and stated on record that he
arrested the latter on the night of March 27, 2005. Dr. Antonio S. Vertido who conducted an autopsy on
Duhan confirmed that the latter suffered gunshot wounds in the head and chest which led to his
death. 8cralawred

In his defense, Matibag alleged that on said date, he was at the despedida party of his neighbor when
Duhan arrived together with the other officers of the homeowners association. Wanting to settle a
previous misunderstanding, Matibag approached Duhan and extended his hand as a gesture of
reconciliation. However, Duhan pushed it away and said, putang ina mo, ang yabang mo, thereby
provoking Matibag to punch him in the face. Matibag saw Duhan pull something from his waist and
fearing that it was a gun and Duhan was about to retaliate, Matibag immediately drew his own gun,
shot Duhan, and hurriedly left the place. Matibag went to see his police friend, Sgt. Narciso Amante, to
turn himself in, but the latter was unavailable at the time. As Matibag headed back home, he was
stopped by police officers who asked if he was involved in the shooting incident. He then readily
admitted his involvement.9cralawred

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision10 dated August 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Matibag as charged, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of Duhan the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, ?59,000.00 as actual damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.11cralawred

The RTC refused to give credence to Matibags claim of self-defense as he failed to prove the presence
of unlawful aggression on Duhans part, finding that: (a) Duhans words and actions prior to Matibags
attack could not be considered as a real threat against him; (b) no firearm was recovered from the
victim; (c) Matibags account that Duhan was about to pull something from his waist, which thus led
him to believe that he was about to be shot, remained uncorroborated; and (d) the number of gunshot
wounds Duhan sustained contradicts the plea of self-defense.12cralawred

Separately, the RTC appreciated the existence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery since the
attack was sudden, unprovoked, and without any warning on the victim who was unarmed and in a
defenseless position.13 Likewise, the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm
was appreciated since a firearm was used in the commission of a crime and, hence, considered
unlicensed.14cralawred

Dissatisfied, Matibag appealed15 to the CA.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The CA Ruling

In a Decision16 dated September 13, 2012, the CA affirmed Matibags conviction in toto.17cralawred

The CA agreed with the RTCs findings that: (a) treachery attended the killing of Duhan as the attack
on him was sudden;18 and (b) an unlicensed firearm was used in committing the crime, which is
considered as a special aggravating circumstance.19cralawred

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Courts resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld the conviction of
Matibag for Murder.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

In the review of a case, the Court is guided by the long-standing principle that factual findings of the
trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and respect. These factual
findings should not be disturbed on appeal, unless there are facts of weight and substance that were
overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially affect the disposition of the case. The Court has
carefully scrutinized the records and finds no reason to deviate from the RTC and CAs factual findings.
There is no indication that the trial court, whose findings the CA affirmed, overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, the Court defers to the trial
court on this score, considering too that it was in the best position to assess and determine the
credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.20cralawred

On this score, the Court now proceeds to resolve this case on points of law.

Matibag is charged with the crime of Murder, which is defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
RPC, as amended. In order to warrant a conviction, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the
killing is not Parricide or Infanticide.21cralawred

Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. In People v. Tan,22 the Court explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden
and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person
attacked.23 In People v. Perez,24 it was explained that a frontal attack does not necessarily rule out
treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so
unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his or her defense.25cralawred

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Matibag, who was armed with a gun, confronted
Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and shot him on the chest.26 Although the attack was
frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it was made rendered it impossible for Duhan to
defend himself, adding too that he was unarmed.27 Matibag also failed to prove that a heated exchange
of words preceded the incident so as to forewarn Duhan against any impending attack from his
assailant.28 The deliberateness of Matibags act is further evinced from his disposition preceding the
moment of execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out, Matibag was ready and destined to effect such
dastardly act, considering that he had an axe to grind when he confronted Duhan, coupled with the fact
that he did so, armed with a loaded handgun.29 Based on these findings, the Court concludes that
treachery was correctly appreciated.

This finding of treachery further correlates to Matibags plea of self-defense. Note that by invoking
self-defense, Matibag, in effect, admitted to the commission of the act for which he was charged, albeit
under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated him. With this admission, the burden of
proof shifted to Matibag to show that the killing of Duhan was attended by the following
circumstances: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person resorting to self-defense.30cralawred

Among the foregoing elements, the most important is unlawful aggression. It is well-settled that there
can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.31 Jurisprudence states that not every form
or degree of aggression justifies a claim of self-defense.32 For unlawful aggression to be appreciated,
there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude,33 as against the one claiming self-defense.

Evidently, the treacherous manner by which Matibag assaulted Duhan negates unlawful aggression in
the sense above-discussed. As mentioned, the prosecution was able to prove that the attack was so
sudden and unexpected, and the victim was completely defenseless. On the other hand, Matibags
version that he saw Duhan pull something from his waist (which thereby impelled his reaction),
remained uncorroborated. In fact, no firearm was recovered from the victim.34 Hence, by these
accounts, Matibags allegation of unlawful aggression and, consequently, his plea of self-defense
cannot be sustained. The foregoing considered, the Court upholds Matibags conviction for the crime of
Murder, qualified by treachery, as charged.

Moreover, as the RTC and CA held, the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm,
which was duly alleged in the Information, should be appreciated in the imposition of penalty.
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866,35 as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294,36 treats the
unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a
special aggravating circumstance:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession

of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. x x x.chanrobleslaw

xxxx

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,

such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

cralawlawlibrary

Further, under Section 5 of RA 8294, the scope of the term unlicensed firearm has already been
expanded as follows:37cralawred

Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. The term unlicensed firearm shall
include:

1. firearms with expired license; or

2. unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime. (Emphasis
supplied)
cralawlawlibrary

Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use thereof was unauthorized under the
purview of RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance. As a result, the
imposition of the maximum penalty of death, which is reduced to reclusion perpetua in light of RA
9346,38 stands proper. To this, the Court adds that Matibag is not eligible for parole.39cralawred

Finally, case law provides that for death resulting from the crime of Murder, the heirs of the victim are
entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim without need
of evidence other than the commission of the crime;40 (b) actual or compensatory damages to the
extent proved,41 or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot be provided with certainty;42 (c) moral damages;43 and (d) exemplary damages when the crime
was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.44cralawred

In line with recent jurisprudence, civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 and moral damages in
the amount of P100,000.00 are awarded to Duhans heirs without need of evidence other than the
commission of the crime and Duhans death. Considering further that the crime was committed with
treachery, exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00 is also granted.45cralawred

The award of P59,000.00 as actual damages should, however, be deleted as the records do not show
that the prosecution was able to prove the amount actually expended. In lieu thereof, P25,000.00 as
temperate damages is awarded to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.46 In addition, interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid is
imposed on all monetary awards.47cralawred

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated September 13, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03759 finding accused-appellant Daniel Matibag y De Villa @
Dani or Danilo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONsentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ordering him to pay the Heirs of Enrico Clar de Jesus
Duhan the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, all with legal
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until full payment.

SO ORDERED.