Argument of Rep IV 1976 Wilson

Scots Philosophical Association
University of St. Andrews
The Argument of Republic IV

Author(s): J. R. S. Wilson
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), Vol. 26, No. 103 (Apr., 1976), pp. 111-124
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the
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THE
PHILOSOPHICAL
QUARTERLY
VOL. 26 No. 103 APRIL 1976
THE ARGUMENT OF R E P UBLIC IV

BY J. R. S. WILsoN
I
Plato tells us in the Republicthat a polis, like a person,may have the
virtuesof wisdom,courage,temperanceand justice, or the corresponding
vices. How shouldwe understandthis claim? It is not unusualto attribute
personal qualities to a group or collectivity,but there are a numberof
different ways in whichthismay be legitimate,and it is importantto deter-
minewhichof thesePlato has in mind.
To attributea qualityto a groupmay be merelyto generalizeabout its
members.Thus we may referto a groupof people as English,or elderly,or
seated, because its membersare English,or elderly,or seated. Now it is
obvious, both fromPlato's generalremarks,1and fromhis discussionof
some,at least,of the individualvirtues,that he has morein mindthan this.
He regardsthepolis not just as the sum ofits members,but as a groupwith
corporatepropertiesof its own. It possessesthe virtuesin its own right,
even if some or all of its membersalso possess themas individuals.
Anygroupis a whole,not just a collectionof its members,and possesses
qualitiesin its own right. Our concernhere is with personalqualities. A
commonway fora groupto possess a personalqualityis in its capacityas
a collectiveagent. For insofaras a groupis a collectiveagent,manyof the
qualitieswhichpertainto agentsmayproperlybe ascribedto it. If a govern-
ment,for example, can be said to act, it can be said to act foolishlyor
courageously,and the persistentdisplay of such characteristics entitlesus
to call it, i.e., the government
as a whole,foolishor courageous.In attribut-
ing follyor courage to a government,we are not generalizingabout its
1Seo especially 435A-B.
112 J. R. S. WILSON
members,but characterizing it on thebasis ofits collectiveactionas a whole.

It is not only as an agent that a groupmay possess in its own righta
qualitywhicha personcan also possess. To say that a groupis large,or of
mixedrace, or famous,is not to say that each of its membersis large,or of
mixed race, or famous,but nor is it throughits corporatebehaviourthat
the grouppossessessuch properties.It can sometimes,of course,be unclear
whethera quality is being attributedto a groupin this way, or only as a
generalizationabout its members.Thus if I say that a groupis wealthy,I
mightmean that it is composedof wealthypeople, or that it possesses
corporatewealth.
A quality possessedby a group corporatelymay be possessedby none
ofits membersindividually.A groupmaybe ofmixedrace orfamousthough
no one in it is of mixed race or famous. Similarlya governmentmay be
collectivelyfoolishthoughno memberof it is individuallyso. To appreciate
thisrequiresa certainlevel of sociologicalsophistication, and I am not sure
that it holds forall qualities. Thus it is doubtfulif a government could be
collectively wise, unless some at least of its members were individuallyso.2
The limitingfactorsseemto be sociologicalratherthanlogical-a wisegroup
composedof foolishmembersis not a logicalbut a sociologicalimpossibility.
Plato wouldprobablyhave deniedthat a groupcould everpossessa quality
whichnone of its memberspossessed,forof the polis at least he assumes
that it must acquire its characterfromthe characterof some or all of the
people in it.3 This is a sociologicalassumption,in fact mistaken,though
widelybelievedeven today,and I shall returnto it in sectionV.
Plato, I suggested,wants to attributepersonalqualitiesto the polis in
its ownright. This is fairlyclearin the case ofwisdom,courageand temper-
ance. The polis is a collectiveagent,and as such it is wise and brave. Its
temperanceis not manifestedprimarilyin its collectiveaction,but is none-
thelessa qualityof the polis as a whole,and not just of its members.The
case of justice is moredifficult.GregoryVlastos,in the courseof his very
ingeniousreconstruction of the argumentof Book IV, claimsthat the polis
is just only in that derivativesense in which "'just' . . . functionsas a
one-placegroup-predicate, predicableof groupsas such, on conditionthat
theirmembers,or sub-groupscomposedof theirmembers,are just in the
primarysense",4or in otherwordsthat to attributejustice to the polis is
merelyto generalizeabout its members.It followsthat thepolis is not just
in the way that a personis just, and that the equivocationhere,undetected
by Plato, constitutesa flawin his argument.
Vlastos' reasonfordenyingjusticeto thepolis in its own rightseemsto
be that Plato makes no referenceto the actions of the polis in regardto
2Though perhaps it could if civil servants took the effectivedecisions.
3See 435E and 544D-E.
4G. Vlastos, "Justice and Happiness in the Republic", in Platonic Studies (Princeton,
1973), p. 130. This article was also published in a slightlydifferentformin G. Vlastos
(ed.), Plato, II (New York, 1971).
THE ARGUMENT OF REPUBLIC IV 113
otherpoleis. Indeed, he says, to thinkof a just polis as one that behaves

towardsotherpoleis as a just man behaves towardsothermen would have
been only an embarrassment to Plato.5 I shall argue that Plato has other
for
grounds attributing justiceto the polis in its own right. I shall offeran
interpretation of the argumentof Book IV to which,I believe, the text
lends itselfas readilyas it does to that of Vlastos, and whichclears Plato
of the chargeof equivocation.
II
When Plato says that fora man to be just is forhim to be such that
each of the threeelementsin him does its own,6Vlastos,like many philo-
sophers,takes himto be offering a definition of 'justice'. If Plato is offering
a definition of 'justice',thenits remotenessfromordinaryusage presentsa
primafacie puzzle.7 I believe,however,that it is a mistaketo interpret
Plato in this way.8 His centralquestionis not the analyticalphilosopher's
question"What does 'justice' mean?", but the substantialquestion"What
is justice?". It is illuminating to comparePlato inquiringintothe natureof
a virtue to a scientistinquiringinto the natureof a disease such as polio.9
Schematically,what happensis this. Doctorsfirstbecomeconvincedthat a
varietyof symptomsare caused by a singleunderlyingcondition,as yet
unidentified, and can hence be regardedas symptomsof the same disease.
They call this disease "polio". In time a scientistdiscoversthe underlying
condition,retrospectively justifyingmedical practice,and identifiespolio
with that condition. He has not made his discoveryby analysingthe
meaningof 'polio', but his identification is answerableto ordinaryusage in
the followingway. For it to be polio whichhe has identified, the condition
in question must be the cause of most, at least, of the symptomswhich
doctorshave previouslyattributedto thatdisease. Somerevisionofaccepted
ideas as to the symptomsof polio may perhapsresultfromthe new under-
standingofits nature,and a fewsickpeoplemaybe rediagnosedaccordingly.
It may even happen that what was thoughtbeforeto be a separatedisease
is now seen to be in fact polio. But formost,at least, of thosepreviously
thoughtto be polio-sufferers, the diagnosismuststand.
Now take the case of a virtue. We ordinarilyattributea virtueto a
personon the basis of certainsortsof behaviour. When Plato tellsus what
the virtueis, he identifiesthe underlyingconditionof soul whichnormally
gives rise to this behaviour. If the analogy with the scientistwere exact,
5Vlastos, op. cit., pp. 130-in.; see also n. 21 below.
6I adopt Vlastos' renderingof r6 t&aaocuo57pateLv.
7Cf.Vlastos, op. cit., pp. 115-7.
8Here I follow Terry Penner's superb article, "The Unity of Virtue", PR, 82 (1973).
Penner's discussion primarily concerns the Protagoras, Laches and Charmides, but is
equally applicable to the Republic. I was reading the Republic in a Quinean way before
I encountered Penner's paper, but it helped me greatly to clarifymy thoughts. I shall
not attempt to reproduce the general argument which he has stated so admirably.
9The example is taken from H. Putnam, "Brains and Behaviour", in R. J. Butler
(od.), Analytical Philosophy,II (Oxford, 1965), to which my discussion is much indebted.
114 J. R. S. WILSON
this identification need answerto ordinaryusage only as the identification

ofa diseasedoes,in thatthe conditionofsoul mustcause mostofthe "symp-
toms" whichlead us to attributethe virtueto a person. But Plato, I think,
sometimesattemptsto linkhis accountof a virtuemorecloselyto the vulgar
conception.10The identification of a virtue,as of a disease,frequentlyleads
to a revisedaccount of its "symptoms",whichmay be seen to embracea
much wider range of behaviourthan is commonlythought. When, for
example, we see what courage is, we see that the behaviourto which it
gives rise extendsfar beyondthe traditionalunderstanding.l'
If I am right,then,whenPlato sets out to identifya virtue,his task is
to isolate the state of the soul whichgives rise to behaviourof the kind
whichordinarilyleads us to attributethat virtueto a person. The state of
the soul is the virtue,and to discoverit is a matterof substantiveinquiry,
not just of conceptualanalysis. If a polis can also possessthe virtue,then
some state of the polis must be equivalentto that state of the soul. But
how can this be? One way in whichit can be, is if a soul, like a polis, is
what I shall call a "complex". I shall explain this notionin crude,but I
hope comprehensible, terms.
I shall say
(1) that any thingis a complexif it belongsto a kind such that
(i) any memberof that kind containsthe same sort of com-
ponentpartsor elements;
(ii) membersof that kind may differin theirconstitution, by
whichI mean that the characterof the componentparts,
therelationbetweenthem,and the contribution each makes
to the workingof the whole,may varybetweenmembersof
that kind;
(iii) the characterand behaviourof a memberof that kind is
determinedby its constitution;
(2) that a structuralfeatureof a complexis a featureof its consti-
tution.
If souls and poleis are complexessuch that the parts of a soul can in
some way be equated withthe partsof a polis, and if a virtuein the soul is
a structuralfeatureof the soul, then will Plato not be entitledto say that
if a polis has that same structuralfeature,it has that same virtue? Only,
perhaps,if he can showthat the structuralfeaturein the polis givesrise to
the same "symptoms"as its counterpart in the soul. In fact,of course,his
argument in Book IV proceedsin the reverse direction. Taking the ideal
'0Hence it may be an over-simplificationto say that Plato in the Republic does not
engage in conceptual analysis, or that for him a virtue is just a theoretical entity (cf.
Penner, op. cit., p. 41). If (1) the vulgar conception of a virtue explains it in terms of
outer behaviour, (2) for Plato the virtue is not that behaviour but the innerstate which
gives rise to that behaviour, but nevertheless(3) he feels some compulsion to show that
his account is at least implicit in the vulgar conception, this helps to explain why in
the case of each virtue the outer behaviour seems to mirrorthe inner state. I shall
returnto this point later.
"lThis perhaps goes back to Socrates. Cf. G. Vlastos, Introduction to Plato's Pro-
agoras (New York, 1956), pp. 1-li.
polis whichSocrateshas described,his typicalstrategyis to showthat there

are good groundsforascribinga virtueto it, to identifythat virtuein the
polis with a structuralfeatureof the polis, and then to look forthe same
structuralfeaturein the soul, and to show that theretoo it gives rise to
the "symptoms"of the virtuein question.12
III
Before I considerPlato's text in detail, I shall set out schematically
what I take to be the centralunderlyingargument.What I say shouldbe
regardedas a hypothesis,to be testedagainstthe text. I believethat my
interpretation accountsforat least as muchof what Plato says as does that
of Vlastos, and that it has the additionaladvantage of rescuinghim from
the charge of equivocation. It leaves unexplained,however,some out-
standingfeaturesof the text, to deal with whichI shall have to add two
epicycles. Perhaps some will feel that the resultis too complex,and that
I read too muchinto Plato's words,especiallyin my treatmentof what he
says about justice. I believethat Plato hidesmuchofhis argumentbeneath
the surfaceof the dialogue,and that any satisfactoryaccount of what is
going on requiresa certainuse of imagination. Two commentatorswho
take offfromthe same passage,however,may leap imaginatively in different
directions.The text alone will not settle the issue. How then to decide
betweenthem? If an interpretation is compatiblewiththe text, and does
not conflictwithPlato's moregeneralargument,simplicityis certainlyone
further criterionforassessingit. But it is to somedegreea matterof judge-
mentwhenan interpretation becomestoo Ptolemaicto be plausible,and I
thinkthat in Plato's case anotherfactormustbe bornein mind,that that
interpretation whichis mostinteresting and least erroneousas philosophyis
mostlikelyto be right.
The main thrustof Plato's argumentcan be summarized,in my view,
as follows:
(1) A soul is a complexof threeelements-reason,Oupi6oand appetite.
One constitution of the soul is natural,but most,if not all, souls departto
a greateror lesserextentfromthe naturalconstitution.
(2) In the case of each of the fourvirtuesof the soul-wisdom, courage,
temperanceand justice-one mustdistinguish betweenthe structuralfeature
of the soul whichis that virtue,and the behaviouralcharacteristics or traits
or "symptoms"to whichit gives rise. It is the possessionby a personof
these characteristics whichleads us to attributethe virtueto him,but the
virtue is not identical with the characteristics.It is identical with the
structuralfeaturewhichunderliesthemand explainstheirpresence.
(3) A polis is also a complexof threeelements,whichcorrespondto the
elementsof the soul in such a way that Plato feelsentitledto say that they
are the same elements. These elementsshould be thoughtof as sorts of
"'The last step is spelt out only in the case of justice.
116 J. R. S. WILSON
people, ratherthan as classes in our sense, for they are presentin every
polis, even if all hierarchicorderis lacking. If the elementsof the polis are
identified withthe corresponding elementsof the soul,thenthe constitution
whichis naturalto the soul is also naturalto the polis, thoughno existing
polis exemplifies it.
(4) The same fourvirtuescan be foundin a polis as in a soul, and they
are identical with the same four structuralfeatures. That a polis may
exemplifythe same virtueas a soul is in some cases obvious,but in others
it has to be demonstrated.The evidenceforthe presenceof a virtuein a
polis is that it displays characteristicsor "symptoms"analogous to those
associatedwiththat virtuein the soul.
(5) Each virtueis tentatively in thepolis,and theidentification
identified
is confirmed whenit is shownto workforthe soul also.
IV
I mustnow showthat Plato's textpermitsmyreadingofit by examining
his discussionofeach virtuein turn. If I am right,thatin no case does Plato
ascribea virtueto a polis in a merelyderivativeway,i.e., as a generalization
aboutitsmembers, we shouldexpecthimto be awarethatit maybe necessary
to show that polis can have a virtuejust as a persondoes. The natural
a
way to do this would be to show that those characteristics whichindicate
the presence of the virtue in a person can also be found in the ideal polis
which Socrates has described. The underlyingpatternof argumentwith
regardto any virtue V would therefore be as follows:
(1) The presenceof V in a person indicatedby characteristics
is C.
(2) If we examine our ideal polis we also findin it characteristicsC.
(3) We may therefore assume that our polis possesses V.
(4) That structuralfeatureof our polis whichgives rise to C is S.
(5) We may therefore tentativelyidentifyV withS.
(6) Testing thishypothesisagainstthe person,we findthat theretoo it
is S whichgivesriseto C.
(7) We may therefore concludewithcertaintythat V is S.
I shall attemptto showthat thispatternof argument,oftencondensed,
to be sure,underliesPlato's discussionof each of the fourvirtues. In the
case of wisdom and courage,no argumentis really needed to show that
these can correctlybe ascribedto the polis. In the case of temperance,an
argumentis needed, and is provided. In the case of justice, Vlastos has
claimedthat thepolis is onlyjust in the sensethat its membersare just. If
he is correct,the above patternof argumentwill be lacking. I shall tryto
show,however,that heretoo the text can be squeezed into shape without,
I hope,too muchdistortion.
WISDOM.That our polis may fairlybe called wise is obvious. It has, as

of wisdom,forits collectivedecision-making
a whole,the characteristics is
prudent,informedby good judgement(eupouoCi).The structuralfeature

whichgivesriseto this,and withwhichtherefore its wisdomcan be identified,
is the presenceof a formof knowledge,specificallythe knowledgeof the
rulers. This is not the only formof knowledgepresentin the polis, but it
is this knowledgein particularwhichgives rise to the good judgementof
thepolis as a whole. The craftsmen have the knowledgepertainingto their
craft,but the rulersknowwhatis good forthepolis as a wholein its internal
and externalrelations,and it is this that makes the polis wise. Note that
strictlyspeakingthe presenceof thisknowledgein the rulersis not the only
structuralconditionforwisdom. It is also necessarythat each of the three
elementsshouldplay its properrole,i.e., as we shallsee, thatthepolis should
be just. Theremightbe a polis in whichthoseby naturefittedto rulehad
the appropriateknowledge,but in which they were not allowed to rule.
Such a polis wouldnot be wise. However,that each elementshouldplay its
properrole is a conditionforthe presenceof all the virtues,and giventhat
it is satisfied,the structuralfeatureto whichthe good judgementofthepolis
can specificallybe attributed,and withwhichtherefore its wisdomcan be
identified, is the knowledgeof its rulers.
This identification of wisdomremainstentativeuntilit is testedon the
soul. Plato must firstshow that the polis and the soul are similarlycon-
structed. Let us accept his argumentthat the soul, like the polis, is com-
posed of threeelements,such that each elementin the soul can be equated
withthe corresponding elementin thepolis. If the identificationof wisdom
in the polis is correct,then wisdomin the soul, that quality of the soul
whichgivesriseto thosecharacteristics whichlead us to call a personwise,
should be the same structuralfeature. And indeed it is. Wisdom in the
soul is the knowledge,located in the reason,of what is good foreach part
of the soul and the soul as a whole. We can see once again that it is a
structuralconditionforwisdomthat each part of the soul play its proper
role, forif reason did not rule, its knowledgewould not be manifestedin
the person'sbehaviour.
COURAGE. The courageof the polis is evidentlyshownin its prowessin
war. It is locatedin thesecondclass ofauxiliaries,foralthoughthemembers
of otherclasses may be brave,it is not theircouragethat constitutescivic
courage.13The structuralfeatureof the polis whichgivesriseto prowessin
war,and withwhich,therefore, civic couragecan be identified,
is the power
of the auxiliariesto preservethe conviction,instilledby education,about
what should and what should not be feared. This convictionhas been
instilledinto the auxiliariesso effectivelythat neitherpleasure nor pain
can dislodgeit. It shouldbe noted that this is the courageof a polis-the
courageof an individualauxiliary,as of any man, is the equivalentstruc-
turalfeatureof his soul. Once again,thispowerin the auxiliariestranslates
18Thisinvolves my firstepicycle.
118 J. R. S. WILSON
itselfinto prowessin war only because everyelementin the polls plays its
properrole.
As withwisdom,the structuralfeaturewhichis couragecan be foundin
the soul of the brave man. The Ou[6oqis the naturalsubordinateand ally of
reason,as the auxiliariesare thenaturalsubordinatesand allies ofthe rulers.
Couragein theindividualis thepowerofthe Outo6g to preservetheinjunctions
of reason as to what should or shouldnot be feared,in the face of test by
pleasureor pain. It is this whichgives rise to those featuresof behaviour
whichlead us to call a man brave.
TEMPERANCE.What I have claimed to be Plato's general patternof
argumentis perhapsmostapparentin his discussionoftemperance.Whereas
it is easy to see that our polis is wise and brave,it is less obviousthat it is
temperate.Plato therefore producesreasonsforcallingit so. From a con-
siderationof the characteristics commonlyassociated with temperancein
the individual,he extractstwo criteriawhichcan be applied to the polis.
Temperancein the individualinvolvesthe controlof certainpleasuresand
desires. Furthermore, people associate temperancewith the idea of being
"master of oneself". By this they must surelymean that the naturally
betterpart of a personcontrolsthe naturallyworsepart. Now if we apply
these criteriato our polis, we see that in it too the naturallybetterpart
controlsthe naturallyworse. Moreover,withinthe polis as a wholedesires
are controlledby reason,just as theyare in the temperateman. For these
reasons,therefore, anyone would surelygrantthat our polis is temperate.
In what,then,does its temperanceconsist? Temperancein the polis is
the structuralfeaturewhichgives rise to the characteristics just described,
and that in turnis the harmonythat existsamongits variouselements,the
unanimityas to who should rule and who be ruled. That all agree as to
who should rule explains why the mass of the populationwillinglytake
ordersfromthe rulers,and hence also why theirdesiresare subordinated
to reason. Having identifiedtemperancein the polis with this unanimity
amongits componentelements,Plato immediatelyassertsthat the identity
holdsforthe individualtoo,14merelyreiterating laterthatagreementamong
thethreeelementsin thesoul thatreasonshouldruleconstitutes temperance.
But theretoo we mustbe carefulto distinguish the structuralfeaturewhich
is temperance,namely the unanimityamong the parts of the soul that
reasonshouldrule,fromthe two characteristics to whichit givesrise,l5that
the naturallybetterpart rulesthe naturallyworse,and that certaindesires
are undercontrol.
Thus we can see Plato describingthe commonlyaccepted signsof tem-
perancein the individual,showingthat theseare presentin thepolis,identi-
fyingtemperancein the polis with the structuralfeaturewhichgives rise
to them,and locatingthe same structuralfeaturein the individual. Notice
1At 432A.
150r perhaps one characteristicwhich can be described in two ways.
that althoughthe fact that the naturallybetterpart rules the naturally

worsecould be called a structuralfeatureofpolis or soul, temperanceitself
is not identifiedwith this, but with the agreementas to who should rule
whichunderliesit.16 Temperanceis the latter,and givesrise to the former.
In sectionV I shall offeran explanationforwhy this should be so.
JUSTICE. At the beginningof the section on the virtuesin the polis,

Plato seems to assume that because our polis is perfect,it will have the
virtuesof wisdom,courage,temperanceand justice.l7 Some criticshave
accused him of beggingthe questionhere.18In fact,however,as we have
seen,thereare non-question-begging reasonsforattributing wisdom,courage
and temperanceto the polis. We shouldexpect Plato, therefore, to adduce
similarreasonsforcallingit just. We shouldexpecthim,moreover,to point
to characteristics of thepolis itselfwhichentitleus to call it just. If, as
Vlastos suggests,it is only throughbeing composedof just membersthat
the polis can be called just, then Plato will have gone astray,forthe polis
willnot be just in the same way that an individualis just.
As Vlastos pointsout, the characteristics of a personwhichlead us to
call him just are above all characteristics whichhe possessesas an agent.
If Plato is to showthat ourpolis may similarlybe called just, shouldhe not
point to similarcharacteristics whichit possessesas an agent? We call a
personjust because of the way he relatesto otherpeople. Should we not
call a polis just because of the way it relatesto otherpoleis? But thereis
no sign in the sectionunder considerationthat Plato has this in mind. I
shall argue,nevertheless, that Plato's reasonforcallingthe polis just is not
simplythat its membersare just, and that the characteristics of justice in
the polis can even be equated withouttoo much distortionwith those of
justicein the individual.
To understandPlato's argumentin this sectionI believe that we must
distinguishtwo different characteristicsof justice in the polis fromthe
structuralfeatureof the polis whichgivesriseto them,and whichforPlato
is identicalwith justice. The similarityof these threemay easily lead to
confusion.The firstcharacteristic of the polis is that it is such that every
personin it does his own,i.e., performs the functionsin the polis forwhich
his nature best fitshim. The second is that throughthe operationof its
legal institutions the polis is characterizedby "justice" in the legal sense-
law-suitsare so adjudicatedthat no one has what belongsto anotheror is
deprivedofwhatis his own. These characteristics providereasonsforcalling
the polis just in its own right. And the structuralfeaturewhichgives rise
to them,and withwhichthe justice of the polis can therefore be identified,
1This is clear from432A, 433C and 442C.
17427E.
18See for example P. Shorey, Republic, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1930), ad
loc.; A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility(Oxford, 1960), p. 286; and R. C. Cross
and A. D. Woozley, Plato's Republic (London, 1964), pp. 104-5.
120 J. R. S. WILSON
is that each of its threeelements,each class of personin it, does its own.
To say that our polis is such that everyonein it does his own is not
simplyto generalizeabout the membersof the polis. What Plato is saying
is not just that everyonein the polis as a matterof fact does his own, but
that the polis is so constitutedas to ensurethat everyonein it will do his
own. This is a factabout thepolis as a whole. Lee's translationmakesthe
point clear: the justice of thepolis is "the qualitywhichmakes each indiv-
idual-child or woman,slave, freeman or artisan,ruleror subject-get on
xwith his own job and not interfere with otherpeople",19and the quality
referred to hereis a qualityof thepolis. It is, as we shall shortlylearn,the
factthat each class does its own,and in particularthat it is thosenaturally
fittedto ruleand onlytheywho rule,whichunderliesand explainsthe more
generalspecializationof functionwhichcharacterizesthe polis. Plato gives
what he seems to regardas a furtherreasonforthinkingthat this quality
is the one we are lookingfor,and hence that it oughtto be justice,for,as
we have alreadynoted,it is this qualitywhichproducesand preservesthe
othervirtuesin thepolis. The qualitythat makeseveryonedo his own also
ensuresthatthepolis is wise,braveand temperate,and thusit seemsreason-
able to say thatthisqualityat leastrivalstheothervirtuesin its contribution
to the excellenceof thepolis, and is itselfa virtue.20
It is characteristicof a just personthat he does his own. The character-
istic of the polis to whichPlato has drawnour attentionis that it ensures
that its membersare just, i.e., do their own, and this providesthe first
reason for callingthe polis itselfjust. Plato now refersas a furthercon-
siderationto the legal processesof the polis, forsurelythe way that these
operateprovidesa reason that would be generallyaccepted forcallingthe
polis just. It is the rulersin ourpolis who willadjudicatelaw-suits,not the
citizensas a whole,and the principlethey will followis that no one shall
have what belongsto anotheror be deprivedof what is his own. This, all
would agree, is legal justice, and a polis whose legal institutionsenforce
thisprinciplemay reasonablyitselfbe called just. This characteristic of the
polis arises because the rulersalone adjudicate law-suits. To performthis
is
duty part of what is involved in theirdoing their own. That the polis is
characterizedby legal justice is a consequence,therefore, of the structural
featurewhichPlato willidentifywithjusticein thepolis-that each element
in it does its own.
Before consideringhis identification of justice, I want to returnto a
question raised earlier. The ofa just polis seemon thesurface
characteristics
to differ fromthoseof a just man. I believe,however,that thisis a merely
superficialdifference. The characteristicsof justicein a personare encapsu-
lated by Plato in the formula'doingone's own'. This approximatesat least
19433D.This is fromtherevisedPenguintranslation
of 1974.
20Insofaras the argument is taken to show that the quality in question is a virtue
in the polis, it is valid. But if Plato thinks that this in turn provides an independent
reason for identifyingthe quality with justice, he is indeed begging the question.
to the commonunderstandingof what it is for a man to be just, but it

incorporatesalso the distinctivelyPlatonic idea of performing that social
functionfor which one's nature best fits one. By analogy,then, a just
polis should be one that does its own,i.e., that functionsas a polis should.
Is thereany reasonto supposethat what it is fora polis to do its own must
be speltout in termsofits actionsin regardto otherpoleis?21 On thecontrary,
Socrates has set out preciselywith the object of describinga polis which
does what a polis shoulddo. For a polis to do its own is in the firstinstance
not a matterof how it relatesto otherpoleis, but of how it relatesto its
own members. The polis constructedaccordingto natural principleswill
providethe social contextnecessaryformen to become good, and that is
the properfunctionof a polis. Plato would be quite justified,therefore, in
equating the characteristicsof a just polis withthose of a just man,though
he appearsneverto use the formula'doingits own' of the polis.
The structuralfeatureofthepolis whichgivesriseto thosecharacteristics
we mightsum up as doingits own is that each of the threeelementsin it
does its own. Plato showsthis by askingfirstthe conversequestion:what
would lead to the polis not doing its own? The interchangeof most forms
of workwould not greatlydamage the community.Interchangebetween
the classes,however,would be disastrous. This, therefore, is the lynch-pin
of the whole,that each class should do its own, and it is withthis feature
of thepolis that its justiceis identical. So long,in particular,as onlythose
menand womenrule who are fittedby natureto do so, and so longas they
carryout assiduouslythe duties of rulers,the polis and all its educational,
legal, and othersocial institutionswill functionas they should. It is this
featurewhichensuresthat everyman does his own. It is thisfeaturewhich
producesand preservesthe virtuesofwisdom,courageand temperancein the
polis. And it is thisfeaturewhichleads to thejust adjudicationof law-suits.
As withthe othervirtues,this accountof justice mustbe testedagainst
the individual. The resultthat this yieldsis that fora personto be just is
foreach part of his soul to fulfilits own properfunction.If this condition
is satisfied,then,as withthe polis, the personwill possess the otherthree
virtues.Furthermore, he willmanifestall the commonlyacceptedcharacter-
istics of justice-he will not embezzle money,commitsacrilegeor theft,
betrayhis friendsor his country,and so on. Thus we have identifiedthe
structuralfeaturewhichis justice both in polis and man.
V
I mentionedin sectionIII that to explain everythingthat Plato says,
two epicyclesmustbe added. They are as follows:
(1) We have alreadynotedPlato's beliefthat a polis acquiresits charac-
terfromthe characterofthepeonlewhomakeun one or moreoftheelements
21Though351B-C and 442E imply, contra Vlastos, that justice in the polis would
manifest itself in external relations. Injustice certainly does, for a tyranny will bo
constantly at war-see 566E-567A.
122 J. R. S. WILSON
in it. This means that if a polis is to have virtue V, not only must it be
similarlyconstitutedto a soul with virtue V (a philosophicalassumption),
but it mustin some sense deriveits V-nessfromthe V-nessof one or more
ofits elements(a sociologicalassumption).Thus the rulerswhoseknowledge
makes the polis wise are themselveswise. The auxiliarieswhose powerto
preservethe convictionabout what should or should not be fearedmakes
thepolis courageousare themselvescourageous.The membersofeveryclass
are temperate,and I thinkthat forPlato this is a necessaryconditionfor
temperancein thepolis. That he believesthat the temperanceof the whole
mustarise fromtemperancein the partshelpsto explain whyhe choosesto
equate that virtuenot withthe betterpart's ruling,but withthe agreement
by everypart that it should. Such agreementin the polis is possibleonly
if each citizenis himselftemperate,fora memberof the subordinateclasses
will rebelagainstrule by the naturalrulersif his own subordinatepartsare
out of control.22Finally,it is because the membersof everyclass are just
that thepolis as a wholeis just.23
In an understandable echo ofthis,Plato is also inclinedto talk as though
the V-nessof a soul derivedfromthe V-nessof one or moreof the elements
in it, thoughif this were taken literally,an infiniteseries would result.
Thus he calls wise the reasonwhichmakes a personwise (441E), and talks
of the courageof the Ou[i6oof a braveman (442B). He does not referto the
parts of the soul as temperate,but he calls the desiresof a temperateman
"simpleand moderate"(431C). Later, in Book IX, he describesas just the
partsof a just man's soul (586E).
(2) When a scientistidentifiesa disease with a certainunderlyingcon-
dition,thereis no reason why that specificidentityshould be implicitin
the previousconceptionof the disease. The conditionin questionneed have
had no moreintuitiveplausibilitythan any otherpossiblecandidate. Plato
identifieseach virtuewiththe innerstate whichgives rise to and explains
the outersignsby means of whichwe ordinarilydetectits presence. If the
analogy were exact, there would be no more onus on him than on the
scientistto showthat his identification is implicitin ordinaryusage. Never-
theless,as I suggestedearlier,he does sometimesseem to want to link his
account of a virtue to the vulgar conception. Thus in his discussionof
temperancein the polis, Socratesbeginsby remarkingthat "at firstsight,
temperanceseemsmorelike somesortof concordor harmonythanthe other
22At432A, Plato says that temperance extends across the whole polis. This could
mean two things. It could mean that temperance is a structuralfeature of the whole
polis, not just of part of it. Or it could mean that temperance is a quality of every part
of the polis. These are differentclaims, though each is true forPlato. I am not certain
that he saw the difference.
23Conversely,it is because the polis as a whole is just that the members of every
class are just. The apparent conflictdisappears when the temporal dimension is taken
into account. Each man's justice helps to sustain the social institutions which keep
him just, and ensure that his children resemble him. The polis is the means by which
men, once just, remain so, and transmit their justice through the generations.
qualitiesdid",24and he refersback to thisafterhe has identified temperance,

pointingout that it is indeed a sort of harmony,and thus that his initial
guesshas provedcorrect.Plato hereseemsto wantto showthathis account
is intuitivelyplausible. I believe that Socrates' referenceat 433B to the
commonsaying about justice, that it is "to do one's own and not to be
meddlesome",is to be understoodsimilarly,thoughin fact forPlato fora
polis or a soul to be just is forits threepartsto do theirown and not to be
meddlesome.
Plato's identificationsare obviouslynot on a par withthoseofa scientist.
When he picks out a structuralfeatureof polis or soul as the cause of the
characteristics commonlyassociated with a virtue,and thus as the virtue
itself,he is relying,not on esotericinformation, but on factsand arguments
whichshouldin principlebe available to anyone. At the sociologicallevel,
he claimsthat a polis constructedto Socrates' specifications would workin
a certainway, and explains why it would workin that way. He thereby
assumes a great deal both about human nature and about the social out-
come of weaving that nature into a particularinstitutionalfabric. His
argumentis only as good as these assumptions,forno such polis has ever
existed. The assumptionsare not purelya priori,fortheyare rootedin the
knowledgewhichall ofus have to a greateror lesserextentabout how people
are and how societieswork. What Plato sees,any ofus could see ifwe knew
how to look. This is equallytrueofhis analysisofthe soul intoparts,whose
innerworkings,naturalor unnatural,are reflectedin the behaviourof the
whole. Conversely,because what he says is rootedultimatelyin common
experience,and because he has no privilegedroad to knowledge,he must
be able to makeus see whathe pointsto,ifhisclaimsare to carryconviction.25
Thus he does need, unlikethe scientist,to invokeeveryconsiderationthat
mightadd plausibilityto whathe says.
These two epicyclesare clearlyconnected,and explainthe tendencyfor
outer appearanceto reflectinnerstructure.Thus an innerharmonygives
riseto the outwardharmonycharacteristic of temperance.An inner"doing
theirown" gives rise to the outward "doing one's own" characteristicof
justice. This reflectionof innerin outerrecursin the discussionin Books
VIII and IX of imperfect poleis and souls-to give only one example,the
tyrannicalindividualbehaves towardsothersas the masterpassion within
him behaves towardsotherdesires. It also, I believe,providesthe clue to
understanding the Cave.26
I hope I have shownthat Plato's argumentin RepublicIV can be con-
struedin a way whichclears him of the chargeof equivocation. If I am
correct,the ideal polis is just in its own right,and not merelythroughthe
24430E, Cornford'stranslation (Oxford, 1941).

26I do not think that the Theory of Forms, properly understood, requires me to
qualify this in any significantway.
26See my article "The Contents of the Cave", forthcomingin Can. J. Phil.
124 J. . s. WILSON
justiceof its citizens. It is a polis whichin everysense "does its own", i.e.,
does what a polis by natureshould do. I have of coursenot proved that
the text mustbe read in this way, and some may feelthat the complexity
of my interpretation calls fora Copernicus.My positionwill be secureonly
whenembeddedin a readingof the Republicas a whole.
of Edinburgh
University

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The Argument of Republic IV

THE ARGUMENT OF R E P UBLIC IV

members,but characterizing it on thebasis ofits collectiveactionas a whole.

otherpoleis. Indeed, he says, to thinkof a just polis as one that behaves

this identification need answerto ordinaryusage only as the identification

polis whichSocrateshas described,his typicalstrategyis to showthat there

WISDOM.That our polis may fairlybe called wise is obvious. It has, as

prudent,informedby good judgement(eupouoCi).The structuralfeature

that althoughthe fact that the naturallybetterpart rules the naturally

JUSTICE. At the beginningof the section on the virtuesin the polis,

to the commonunderstandingof what it is for a man to be just, but it

qualitiesdid",24and he refersback to thisafterhe has identified temperance,

24430E, Cornford'stranslation (Oxford, 1941).

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