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Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 6, Number 1, January

1968, pp. 1-14 (Article)

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 just Men and Just Acts
in Plato's Republic
JEROME SCHILLER

I. Introduction
Too MUCHhas already been written about Plato's Republic. But this, strangely
enough, is why a little more needs to be written. For the book has been worked
over so often that an obvious sign of fatigue has set in: critics are beginning to
find such elementary flaws in the Republic that one wonders why he should
waste time on such a philosophically embarrassing work at all.
I t is to counter one of these recent criticisms and thus, hopefully, to help
offset the fatigue, that this study is written. I t purports not only to show the
criticism mistaken, but also to sketch a way of looking at the Republic which
should send the reader back for a further look at this incredibly rich work.
The richness of the Republic is, indeed, a source of embarrassment for any-
one writing on it. For because of its structure it is at least misleading to isolate
one topic from the myriad others treated there, and because of its complexity,
impossible to document interpretations of more than a few topics. I shall follow
the time-honored practices here of merely expressing my bias on some topics
(such as my non-political interpretation) and leaving it up to the reader to fol-
low up hints of my interpretations of other topics (such as that of the Sun, Line,
and Cave).

II. Plato's Alleged Fallacy in the Republic

David Sachs and A. W. H. Adkins have recently claimed that Plato commits
the fallacy of equivocation in the Republic, not in the course of some minor
argument, but in answering what is probably the central problem posed by the
work: Why be just? 1 Simply put, their objection goes like this: In the first book
of the Republic, Socrates attempts to prove to Thrasymachus why justice is
preferable to injustice. But even Socrates is dissatisfied with this answer and
early in the second book, after a brilliantly fashioned defense of the Thrasy-
machean position by Glaucon and Adeimantus, the brothers ask for a more con-
vincing demonstration from "You, [who have] passed your entire life in the
consideration of this very matter." e Socrates seems to accept the challenge and
proceeds to a search for the concept of justice writ large in the state.
Now, claim Adkins and Sachs, Plato never does answer Glaucon's and Adei-
David Sachs, A Fallacy in Plato s Republic, Philosophical Review, LX(XII (1963), 141-
158; A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, A Study in Greek Values (Oxford, 1960), p. 289.
Adkins, in developing a political interpretation of the Republic, does not elaborate the criticism
as does Sachs; hence I refer in this study primarily to the latter's article.
s Plato, Republic 376e 2-3, trans. P. Shorey (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical
Library, 1937-42). All subsequent quotations are from this translation.

[1]
 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

mantus' request. For though he does eventually purport to show that justice is
preferable to injustice, the justice he attempts to prove this of is not at all the
same justice that Glaucon and Adeimantus have in mind. Plato has simply
equivocated on the term "iustice," meaning at one time the set of acts gen-
erally considered just, s but at another time a certain order in the individual's
soul. He has purported to show that an individual with a well-ordered soul reaps
advantages, but unless he can show a clear relation between this "Platonic"
notion of justice and the "vulgar" notion of justice, the notion which Cephalus,
Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus have in mind, he will
not have answered the brothers' question, and will thus have avoided the central
problem of the Republic. The relation he has to establish is, Sachs claims, that
Platonic justice is a necessary and a sufficient condition for vulgar justice. Then
he could argue that since he has shown that a man reaps advantages just to
the extent that he is Platonically just, (1) a vulgarly unjust individual will not
reap more advantages than a vulgarly just one (on the grounds that Platonic
justice entails vulgar justice), and (2) a vulgarly just man will reap more ad-
vantages than a vulgarly unjust one (on the grounds that vulgar justice en-
tails Platonic justice). Sachs contends that Plato never proves that Platonic
justice entails vulgar justice--though he frequently claims that the relation
holds, and that he never even attempts to prove that vulgar justice entails
Platonic justice3
Sachs and Adkins support their argument well, making a good case for the
existence of these two unrelated sorts of justice in the Republic. How m a y their
damaging criticism he answered?
III. Possible Answers to Sachs' and Adkins' Claims
An obvious tack in answering this imputation of fallacy is to argue that ac-
tually no fallacy is committed because Plato either explicitly or implicitly
draws the relationships required between the two senses of "justice." This is the
approach adopted by Professor Demos in his recent discussion of Sachs' article. 5
He confines his attention to the question of Platonic justice being a sufficient
condition for vulgar justice (that is, to the proof that if a man has an ordered
soul, he will be vulgarly just). Identifying the common feature of vulgarly just
acts as "rendering to every man his due," 6 Demos purports to show how a
man's being Platonically just will entail his being vulgarly just by showing (1)
that Platonic justice involves an individual's reason being in control of his
spirit and appetite; (2) that reason both apprehends and aspires to the ideal
good; (3) that grasping this good involves grasping the form of justice; (4)
that this form is universal justice, not my private good; (5) that grasping this
form involves producing instantiations of it, that is, everywhere rendering to
a Sachs describes the vulgar conception of justice as consisting in the nonperformance of
certain acts; vulgar injustice as consisting in theperformance of these acts, such as embez-
zlement, thievery, adultery, neglect of parents, tie cites key passages (442d 10-443b 2, 344a
3-b 5, 360b 5-360c 2) for these lists of acts (Sachs, pp. 142-144).
4 Sachs, pp. 152-156.
Raphael Demos, "A Fallacy in Plato's Republic?" Philosophical Review, LXXIII (1964),
395-398.
6 D e m o s , p. 395.
 JUSTICE I N T H E REPUBLIC 3

each his due. In supplying the stops that Plato might have used to show that
Platonic iustice entails vulgar justice, Demos claims to have shown that, at
most, we can accuse Plato of a lacuna in his proof, but not a ]allacy.
A second obvious way of answering the critics is to claim that no fallacy has
been committed because it was not Plato's intention to answer the problem
posed by Sachs and Adkins. 7 These critics clearly believe that Plato's proofs in
the Republic are designed to show that vulgarly just men are happy, s If Plato
is not particularly interested in this problem, we are being rather unfair to der-
ogate his work as one based on a fallacy.
There is a good deal in the Republic which may be cited in support of this
second line of reply. Plato's opinion of the abilities of the ordinary man in
recognizing true worth--as evidenced in his depiction of the reaction of the
men in the Cave to true enlightenment or society's sophistical influence over
potential philosophers---seems at times as low as that expressed in the Phaedo.
And it should be no news that the Republic is a revisionary book. Why should
we expect him to offer his stamp of approval to vulgar justice, to prove that
acting in a vulgarly just way is tantamount to individual happiness? We might
perhaps expect to discover him arguing t h a t vulgar injustice will lead to un-
happiness, but why should he not hold out a new, revised standard of be-
havior as the road to success? On this ground, if Plato were to take steps to
avoid the "fallacy" attributed to him by Sachs and Adkins, he would be de-
feating his own major purpose in writing the book.
The criticism gains force when we look closely at the course of argument in
Book I. Although much energy is devoted here to attacking the Thrasymachean
position that injustice is superior to justice, we cannot forget the earlier discus-
sions with Cephalus and Polemarchus. Joseph has cogently argued that the
purpose of these discussions is to show that justice should not be construed as
a list of duties. 9 But this attack on treating justice as a list of duties surely can
be construed as an attack on the notion of vulgar justice. And although these
earlier attacks are not nearly so sharp as those directed against Thrasymachus,
Plato manages to remind us of them even in the midst of the latter. Thus the
perfectly unjust man is one who "benefits his friends and harms his enemies," lo
a maxim we must suppose to be an important part of the equipment of the
vulgarly just man, and a maxim which Socrates shows, albeit lamely, to be in-
adequate early in Book I. 11 Further evidence that Plato is fighting on two flanks
7 Sachs, incidentally, remarks that Plato probably would not have thought that vulgar
justice does entail Platonic justice since he would not have wanted to attribute an ordered soul
to such vulgarly just individuals as Cephalus or the timocratic man (Sachs, pp. 156,157). But
Sachs, of course, thinks that Plato must establish entailment to answer the problem the broth-
ers have posed. This would seem to indicate an irremediable conflict in his thought.
8 Sachs,pp. 152, 156, 157.
0 H. W. I~. Joseph, Essays in Ancient and Modern Philosophy (Oxford, 1935), p. 2 and chap.
II passim.
io Republic 362c 1.
u This maxim also turns up as an implicit premise in Socrates' argument against Thrasy-
machus' claim that the unjust are more powerful than the just, the "honor among thieves"
argument. Success in an evil undertaking--we have no reason to think that Socrates favors it
but it is used here in an ad h ~ i n e m vein--relies on the unjust helping one another in order to
harm their enemies, the just.
 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

in Book I is his use of the notion of techne, or skill, in his attacks. Against
Polemarchus, techne emerges as an inadequate model for justice. Against
Thrasymachus, viewing justice as a techne is useful not only in establishing a
ruler's proper interest, but in the proof that the just are more intelligent than the
unjust in that they do not overreach. TM

IV. Problems with These Replies to Sachs and Adkins

Undoubtedly there are other ways of responding to Sachs' and Adkins' crit-
icisms, but we might note at this point some problems which seem to arise in
developing these two sorts of reply.
Demos' suggestion that we construe the "fallacy" as a "lacuna" seems to
fail because of incompleteness. Even if we were to grant that we can view the
metaphysical framework of the Republic as implicit in Plato's discussion of the
advantageousness of justice and that Demos' depiction of the entailment is cor-
rect, he cannot free Plato from the charge of equivocation unless he can also
establish the entailment of Platonic justice by vulgar justice. Demos explicitly
limits his attention to the entailment of vulgar by Platonic justice in remark-
ing that he is not sure that Plato needs to establish the other entailment.13
But his amplification of this sentiment seems to indicate that he finds some
such entailment. He replies to Sachs' suggestion that Plato would probably not
want to admit that Cephalus was Platonically just although he was vulgarly
just by claiming that Cephalus undoubtedly had right opinion and thus, pre-
sumably, could be considered happy. But Sachs could well ask whether (1)
Plato ever shows that being vulgarly just entails having right opinion (which is
improbable); and whether (2), even if he did show this, he would have proven
that a vulgarly unjust man could not reap more advantages than the vulgarly
just man. (The former might, for instance, be Platonically just.) Thus Demos,
or any critic who takes this line, unless he can characterize the lack of even any
mention of an entailment of Platonic by vulgar justice as a lacuna and can
supply the needed steps by reference to Platonic doctrines implicit in the Re-
public, will not have answered Sachs' and Adkins' claim. Undoubtedly some
implicit entailment between Platonic and vulgar justice can be found--even if
Demos' picture is not acceptable--and his approach is thus useful in curbing
such Sachsian exuberance as, "It is tempting to assert that the most t h a t can be
said on behalf of Plato's argument is that crimes and evils could not be done by a
Platonically just man in a foolish, unintelligent, cowardly, or uncontrolled
way." 14 But it will not do as a final answer.
There is no such easy way to express our discomfort with the second reply,
that Plato has no intention of giving his approval to vulgar justice. But it
undoubtedly stems from our feeling that even if Plato was not concerned with
the problem posed by Sachs and Adkins, he ought to have been. Certainly the
12Certainly this ambivalent attitude toward justice as a technepoints forward to the revision
of the activity of reason which Plato is to develop in his discussion of the tri-partite soul, but
it seems just as clearly to indicate the complexity of Plato's attack.
is Demos, p. 396.
14Sachs, p. 155.
 J U S T I C E I N T H E REPUBLIC 5

criticism seems hollow without any further suggestion as to what the re-
visionist scheme is which Plato affords us instead of answering Sachs' obviously
important question.
Unfortunately most suggestions along this line seem to distort the text. Typi-
cal of these alternatives to proving that vulgar justice is worthwhile are these
four views: (1) Plato thinks that it is inappropriate to ask for a justification of
justice in terms of advantage; (2) Plato is urging the individual to turn away
from ordinary affairs and discover that the good life exists within; (3) Plato is
primarily concerned in the Republic not with benefits for individuals, but with
benefits for states; (4) Plato really despairs of discovering any happiness for the
ordinary man in this work, but pessimistically concludes that only a few--the
philosophers---can ever achieve true happiness.
Sachs nicely disposes of the first suggestion, which makes sort of a Kantian
out of Plato. 1~ Glaucon does, indeed, ask Socrates to show why justice is valua-
ble in-itself as opposed to being valued for-its-consequences. But it becomes
clear both in the discussion with Glaucon, in Book IV and in Book IX, that by
"value-in-itself" Plato has in mind certain consequences to which justice, by
itself, leads, and that he wants merely to exclude the class of consequences which
depend upon others' recognizing that the individual is just. The continuing rele-
vance of the question, "Is justice profitable?" or "Does it pay?" seems to un-
dercut this first suggestion. TM
The second suggestion, that Plato is urging the reader to eschew things of the
world and find comfort in things of the soul, seems indicated in Glaucon's
comment at 367d 2: "This is what I would have you praise about justico the
benefit which i t . . . inherently works upon its possessor." We will show below
that there may be some truth in this second suggestion, but it is at most a par-
tial one. As an account of Plato's sole aim in the Republic, it is certainly a
perversion. Asceticism is largely absent from the Republic. Even if the individual
is to seek value in his soul, the soul of the Republic is not pictured as an
entity imprisoned in the body, but rather as the seat of all the activities of the
body. It is "that whereby we live." 17 Hence, care of the soul does not lead away
from action.
The third suggestion, that Plato, though professing an interest in individual
justice, is really concerned in the Republic with developing the nature and
value of a certain sort of society, seems to disregard the analogical status of the
political doctrine of the Republic. Perhaps Plato's concern with justice in the
Laws is primarily a concern for the justice of a society, with individual justice
t~ Sachs, pp. 145-148. I cannot agree with all of Sachs' interpretation here, especially his
viewing "justice" in Adeimantus' speech as referring to a state of the soul and not to an ac-
tion (see below, note 23). But in an:F event, Plato's characterization of ~r appear to be both
actions and states of the soul practically in the same breath as "),u~r~)~etp" where the word--
in this context--clearly means "advantageous" when applied to actions, supports a consequen-
tialist interpretation (445a 1-2: "whether it is profitable DwaLre~et] to do justice 8lKa~&re
~p&~re~v] and practice honorable pursuits and be just [eIva~ $/Kamv];" see also 588e 4-589a 2.)
I shall develop below the two sorts of consequences he has in mind: just action securing the
iust soul; the iust soul insuring man's happiness.
~6 Republic 445a 2, 589c 1.
17 Republic 445a 10-b 1.
6 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

derivatively depending on this justice. But not only the insistence on the analo-
gous status of the ideal state, TM but also the distinction drawn between the civic
and private activities of the individual, 1~ and, more importantly, the explicit
return in Book I X to the consideration of the justice of the individual seem to
argue against this suggestion.
John Gould has forcefully presented the final suggestion--~that Plato has de-
spaired of discovering any happiness for the ordinary man, but has limited it to
a few fortunate individuals. 2~ Gould pictures the structure of the Republic as a
progressive approach to a more satisfactory definition of justice: The discussions
of the first book obviously unsatisfactory even to Socrates; those culminating
in Book IV more satisfactory, but still in need of a "longer and harder way" 21
to be conclusive; the "longer way" culminating in the Sun, Line, and Cave pas-
sages, which picture true justice as attainable by only the philosophic rulers.
Books V I I I - X he views as a discussion of the disintegration of the soul and the
introduction of the concept of necessity, each underscoring the difficulty of at-
taining true virtue. Gould's picture is appealing and well documented, but like
the second suggestion, can at best be partially true. For it glosses over the cru-
cial return in Book IX to an elaboration of the definitions of Book IV. As we
shall see below, Book IX presents serious problems for any simple interpretation
of the Republic, but, together with the possibility of the metaphoric interpreta-
tion of the Sun, Line, and Cave passages, it seems to make some other account
more plausible.
V. An Interpretation of the Relationship Between Just Men
and Just Acts in the Republic
I shall now attempt to sketch a more plausible account of Plato's revisionist
scheme in the Republic, which will commit us to neither an overly Kantian,
ascetic, political, nor pessimistic interpretation of the work. To anticipate the
conclusion I shall reach: The value of just action is that it alone can insure the
most advantageous life for the individual because it alone can guarantee the con-
tinuance of his balanced soul. B u d - a n d this is the crucial point~--just action
will accomplish this end only if it is action done by an individual who (1) has a
harmonious soul and (2) determines that the action in question is just through
exercise of this soul. In short, action is needed to prevent the atrophy of an or-
gan designed for action, but it must be action of the right sort, that is, action in
which that organ is properly used. Let us work toward this conclusion by noting
some features of Plato's discussions of just acts and just men.
First we should look closely at the problem posed by Glaucon and Adeimantus
at the beginning of Book II. Why, they ask, is justice worthwhile, independent of
any rewards that accrue to the just person through reputation? As noted
above, Sachs suggests that this is really a request that Socrates show that
justice by itself that is, independent of other factors such as the opinion of
~8Republic 358d 8, 434e 1-2, and Book V I I I passim.
1, Republic 443e 5, 592a 2.
~o John Gould, The Development of Plato's Ethice (Cambridge, 1955), chaps, x-x~H.
21Republic 435d 2-3.
 JUSTICE IN THE REPUBLIC 7

o t h e r s - - y i e l d s i m p o r t a n t advantages. Although there are some difficulties in this

interpretation of Plato's distinction between v a l u e in-itself and value for-its-
consequences, it is a helpful one. ~ Nevertheless, we m u s t n o t t a k e it too strictly,
for if we do, we ignore an i m p o r t a n t feature of the brothers' question. T h e
context clearly indicates t h a t t h e y w a n t to k n o w w h y j u s t action is a d v a n -
tageous33 B u t t h e y certainly cannot be interested in finding justification for
completely independent action. I n earlier dialogues and in this section of the
Republic, P l a t o does envisage a person's acting v i r t u o u s l y independent of any
reason for so acting. 24 Such a person is often pictured as acting b y divine lot or
b y practice. B u t Glaucon and Adeimantus cannot be interested in such virtuous
action, because ,they p r e s u m a b l y would not be interested in the question of jus-
tification at all if the individual had no control over his actions but did t h e m un-
consciously.
This restriction on Sachs' interpretation is important because it emphasizes
the limitations imposed by the brothers' problem. That they want a justifica-
tion indicates t h a t their concern is with reasoned j u s t behavior. B u t the ex-
t r e m i t y of their examples indicates t h a t t h e y will not accept as good reasons for
just action, r e a s o n s - - s u c h as the gaining of future pleasures or the avoidance of
future pains or death which P l a t o has frequently offered in other contexts as the
reasons w h y o r d i n a r y people generally are just. e5 W e are forced to expect a
justification in t e r m s of just actions pursued for r a d i c a l l y di#erent reasons.
T h u s in the v e r y terms of their question our expectation of some sort of revision
is aroused. I t is for this reason t h a t I cannot agree with Sachs' suggestion t h a t
Glaucon and A d e i m a n t u s are simply interested in justifying vulgar justice. I t is
true t h a t their interest lies in justifying a sort of action and not a s t a t e of
soul, but it is a v e r y unusual sort of action.
Between the beginning of Book I I and the end of B o o k I V P l a t o carefully
outlines a plan b y which the souls and bodies of the guardians of the state m a y be
" F o r instance, the art of healing, in and of itself, produces certain consequences. Y e t
Socrates clearly states that it has value only for its effects. Sachs would presumabl~ ar~me t h a t
it produces these effects only ~ven a certain prior state of the body. But (1) it is difficult to be
sure that this is true, and (2) m a sense every cause depends upon some prior condition to be
efficacious. See also note 23 below.
ss This is obvious from the parallel drawn between the values just in-itself and just for-its-
consequences. The latter value, the reputation and rewards of justice, refers clearly to just
actions; so, therefore, must the former. My interpretation clearly diverges from Sachs' here
(see Sachs, pp. 147-148). He finds, especially in Adeimantus' speech, anticipations of theses to
be propounded in Books IV, VIII, and IX. But although the passages he cites, e.g. 358b 4-7,
366e 5--9, 367b 3-5, 367e 1-5, are ambiguous, his interpretation seems implausible. Sachs thinks
that the "justice" referred to in thesepassages is Plator,ic justice, whichis to be valued by the
effect it has on the individual's soul. But (1) if he is correct~ he seems to be undercutting his
own argument--that Glaucon and Adeimantus want a justification of vulgar justice; (2) this
seems an unduly abrupt introduction of such an unusual concept; (3) Platonic justice never is,
I think, justified by its effect on the individual's soul. Some of the passages he cites speak of
the effect of ~ustice on the possessor (367b 3-5, 367e 1-5), others of the effect of justice when it is
in an individual's soul (358b 4-7, 366e 5-9). I would suggest that in such passages Plato is
simply stressing the privacy of the just action. It is solely the individual's property, escaping
the eyes of both gods and men (366e 8). I should perhaps add that this divergence of interpreta-
tion might make Sachs unwilling to admit that I am following his interpretation of the dis-
tinction between just in-itself and just for-its-consequences.
24For instance, Men 100a 1-2; Republic 366d 1.
25 For instance, Phaedo 68d 1-69a 3.
 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

made as harmonious as possible through education. Toward the end of Book IV,
having characterized the just soul as one in which the three parts of the soul are
properly ordered, he claims, "Having first attained to self mastery and beau-
tiful order within himself, and having harmonized these three principles.., and
having linked and bound all three together and made of himself a unit, one man
instead of m a n y . . , he should then and only then turn to practice if he find
aught to do either in the getting of wealth or the tendence of the body or it
may be in political action or private business, in all such doings believing and
naming the just and honorable action to be that which preserves and helps
produce this condition of soul, and wisdom the science t h a t presides over such
conduct; and believing and naming unjust action to be that which ever tends to
overthrow this spiritual constitution, and brutish ignorance, to be the opinion that,
in turn presides over this." ~6 Several lines later he notes, "to act unjustly
and be unjust and in turn to act justly--the meaning of all these terms be-
comes at once plain and clear, since injustice and justice are so." 2~ He con-
tinues: "These are in the soul what the healthful and the diseaseful are in the
body; there is no difference. . . . Healthful things surely engender health and
diseasefut disease . . . . Then does not doin~ just acts engender iustice and unjust
injustice?" And, "Then beautiful and honorable pursuits tend to the winning of
virtue and the ugly to vice." ~s He then concludes that just acts are worthwhile
because of the worth of the just soul.
This relationship between just acts and the just soul is re-echoed in Book IX,
when he notes the relationship between his discussion of justice and the vulgar
canons of justice: "The things which law and custom deem fair have been ac-
counted so for a like reason--the fair and honorable things being those t h a t
subject the brutish part of our nature to what is human in us . . . . Can it profit
anyone in the light of this thought to accept gold unjustly if the result is to be
that by the acceptance he enslaves the best part of himself to the w o r s t ? . . .
The reason for the old objection to licentiousness i s . . . because that sort of thing
emancipates that dread beast overmuch . . . . Do we not censure self-will...
when [it] foster[s].., the element of the lion and the snake in us? And flattery
. .. when [it] reduces[s] this same high spirited element?" e9 In all matters the just
man will "keep his eyes fixed on the constitution in his soul" and "shun those
[things] that may overthrow the established habit of his soul." so
Plato is arguing that accepting his account of iustice will not overturn ac-
cepted practices. But even here he is unwilling to give his blanket approval to
these practices. We object to licentiousness because it emancipates the beast,
but we censure self-will w h e n it flatters the lion and flattery w h e n it reduces
this element.
26 Republic 443d 6-444a 2. The translation of 443e 4--o~rr ~} ~rp&rr~ ~ ~ ~ ~p&r~
seems a little misleading here. Cornford's rendering--"wiU he be ready to go about whatever
he may have to d o . . . "--seems more adequate. F. M. Cornford, Republic o] Plato (Oxford,
!941), p. 142.
~ Republic 444c 1-3.
2s Republic 444c 5-444e 4.
~9 Republic 589c 7-590b 9.
8o Republic 591e 1-592a 4.
 JUSTICE I N T H E R E P U B L I C 9

Plato's view of the relationship between just acts and just men emerges rather
clearly, I think, from these passages. A harmonious soul is a precondition for
just acts' being worthwhile, because only with such a soul can we identify
which acts are just so that, acting upon this knowledge, we can secure the har-
monious state. The account gains depth when we realize that the growth from a
less secure to a more secure harmony is mirrored in Plato's account of the de-
velopment of the guardian and the philosopher. The gaining of harmony through
inculcation is the burden of that whole section of the Republic devoted to the
education of the guardian. He is to be dyed with balanced harmony, balanced
stories, and balanced food so that his soul will become harmonious. 31 The philoso-
pher's education is, on the other hand, one which leads the individual who ac-
tually has the ability to determine which actions his reason will approve of and
to carry them out. That is, it leads him to determine the good " b y reference to
which just t h i n g s . . , become useful" 82 and without which no one really under-
stands just things adequately. Acting on this vision secures his truly just role
as reason guiding the state.
Two problems arise in using the education of the guardian and of the philoso-
pher to fill out the account of the relationship between just acts and just men. The
first is the general objection that the guardian and the philosopher are to be taken
as analogues to parts of the soul, and not as individuals in their own right. But
this seems an unduly narrow view of these rich passages. The philosopher kings
are, after all, to be chosen from those who have reached the guardian stage; a
"longer way" 3S--depicting the education of the philosopher--is needed to secure
the earlier definition of justice. And perhaps most important, at crucial points in
the discussion of each education, Plato explicitly refers to "us," the interlocu-
tors, and relates the educational processes to them. Thus at the culmination of
his discussion of the need for the guardians to live among symbols of harmony
to develop souls that can recognize harmonious things when they see them,
Plato writes, " W e shall never be true musicians, either--neither we nor the
guardians we have undertaken to educate--until we are able to recognize the
forms of soberness, courage, liberality, and high-mindedness.., in all the com-
binations that contain and convey them . . . . ,, s4 And near the end of the Cave
passage, Plato argues that "each of us" who has reason has an eye (reason) in our
soul that must be turned toward the light (good) to be "useful or beneficient." 8~
A second problem in using these passages metaphorically is that even if the
education of the guardians can properly be viewed as stressing inculcation of
harmony, we may wonder whether we can argue that the discussion of the educa-
tion of the philosopher stresses action, as opposed, perhaps, to vision. As we
31 Republic 430a 3, Bks. II-III passim.
33Republic 505a 2-3.
33Republic 504b 4.
34Republic 402c 1-5.
35Republic 518c 6-519a 1. This passage, incidentally, seems itself to support the passages
cited from Books IV and IX. "True knowledge cannot be put into a soul that does not possess
it" (518b8-9) Rather, the reason which is there must be turned toward the light by turning the
entire soul until it grasps the good, when its reason will become a useful ~mplement.Th~s turn-
ing, I suggest, is the practical use of the soul made harmonious through prior education.
10 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

shall see below, the correct view is probably that both vision and action are
stressed here. The latter theme, in any event, is clear. Seeing the good is useless
unless it is carried out in the establishment of moral rules. The philosopher may
want to remain in the ethereal realm, but he will not be truly just unless he re-
turns to the Cave. Those who will not "voluntarily engage in action, believing
that they have been transported to the Islands of the Blessed" 86 are not suit-
able as leaders of state. But if the philosopher does return, he will fulfill his
task, leading the state, even more certainly than the guardian will fulfill his
task, defending the state.
Plato's view of the relationship between just action and the just individual
thus emerges as a mildly revisionistic one which proposes to call actions just in
terms of their tendency to secure the soul's more stable harmony through use of
that very harmony. It values just actions in terms of their consequences, it
stresses the importance of continued action, it is concerned with individual
justice, and it does not seem applicable only to a few. But it is a theory with
further important implications. It seems to throw light on Plato's acceptance of
the Socratic paradox that knowing the good implies doing it, for it closely re-
lates the agent's knowing that an action is just and his knowledge that it will be
to his benefit by citing as the criterion of a "just" action the agent's knowledge
that it will strengthen his own advantage by insuring the harmony of his soul. a7
I t further seems to illuminate Aristotle's discussion of the attaining of virtue
through virtuous action.

VI. Problems in This View

We have omitted a discussion of the advantages that accrue to the Platoni-
cally just man because we agree with Sachs that the problem of whether Plato
convincingly establishes the connection between Platonic justice and advantage
has little to do with whether or not he commits the fallacy attributed to him. a8
We must now, however, touch on this question of advantage since only in so
doing can we understand why Book I X presents problems for our interpretation
of Plato's view on the relationship between iust men and lust acts.
At the end of Book IV Plato concludes that the question of the profit of justice
is an absurd one: lust acts lead to a just soul; a just soul is that by which we
live and, as such, is obviously preferable to an unjust soul. This conclusion has
been interpreted in widely different ways, including, for instance, the absurdity
being seen as resting on the fallacy of asking for any justification of justice and
as resting on the irreducibility of the aesthetic harmony of the soul. Plato's
theory of the tri-partite soul would seem, however, to underlie a more accept-
able interpretation of the passage. It is absurd to ask why a just soul is more
worthwhile than an unjust one because, by definition, a just soul is one in which
a6 Republic 519c 5-6.
sTThus we reach a conclusion opposed to that reached in a recent article by Gerashnos
Santas ("The Socratic Paradoxes,"~Philosophival Review, L X X I I I [1964], pp. 147-165), who
explicity holds that knowing an action to be lust and knowing justice to be worthwhile are
logically independent for Plato. (Santas, p. 161.)
u Sachs, p. 153.
 J U S T I C E I N T H E REPUBLIC 11

the rational element is in control of the other elements and thus is able to ful-
fill all its functions adequately. This rational element, in addition to attempt-
ing to satisfy its own desires for knowledge and advising the other parts of the
soul how to fulfill their desires, has the third task of determining how each of
the other parts (as well as itself) can maximize its own advantages while not
interfering with the satisfaction of the other parts. Through this third activity of
reason the individual is made into a unity and realizes his highest possible ad-
vantage. I t is possible that he does not realize as much sensual or intellectual
pleasure as another, but, since man is neither purely a beast nor purely an in-
tellect, but a man, we should not measure his advantages alongside these ab-
stractions. 8~
In some ways we find the most adequate statement of these views in Book IX.
There is, for example, the contrast of the soul of the perfectly unjust man,
split up by fears which make it impossible for him to realize any of his aims,
with the unified soul of the just man; or the picture of the just composite beast~-
man, lion, and s n a k e - w h i c h has the appearance of a man but in which the
growth of all elements is fostered. The just man is a man, not a congeries of dis-
soeiated desires. As such he realizes the advantages of a man, because this is
precisely what it means to be just.
But the familiar second and third proofs of the advantageousness of justice
of Book I X seem to present a divergent picture. In these arguments, Plato at-
tempts to show that the perfectly lust man realizes more pleasure than any other
man. He argues in the first that the pleasures of the highest part of the soul a r e
superior to those of the other parts of the soul, and their satisfactions are
thus superior. In the second he argues that these pleasures are more real than
other pleasures. The discordant note here is an ascetic one. The philosopher
eschews lower pleasures for higher; he prefers real pleasures of the mind--
those directed toward more real and unchanging objects--to the pleasures of the
body, illusory because of the constant change of the objects from which they a r e
derived. Plato seems to suggest that for the just man, the mind "from pleasure
less/Withdraws into its happiness." Reason, in so doing, seems to forget about
unifying and satisfying the man as a whole, and is concerned solely with satis-
faction of its own desires.
It is difficult to account for this puzzling shift, and perhaps even more difficult
to account for the quick transition from the ascetic to the non-ascetic emphasis
at 586d, where Plato shifts from contrasting the true pleasures of the reason with
the spurious pleasures of the body, to discussing the truth of those pleasures of
each part of the just man which are approved by his reason.
There does seem to be a clue at 589b where Socrates, in the midst of the just
beast passage remarks, "For whether we consider pleasure, reputation, or profit,
he who commends justice speaks the truth, while there is no soundness or real
knowledge of what he censures in him who disparages it." 40 But although he
3g I have followed Murphy's interpretation here. See N. R. Murphy, The In~erprvtation of
Plato's Republic (Oxford, 1951), chaps. II, 1II, v.
4o Republic 589b 10-c 3.
12 H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

clearly separates profit from pleasure here, we may well ask why he should do
so, or more importantly, whether he can claim that the same individual can
reap these different advantages.
But perhaps Plato is envisaging rewards for different individuals in this
panegyric of justice. After all, he includes in his statement the reputation of
justice. Such a plea for justice was, we might have thought, effectively elim-
inated by Glaucon's and Adeimantus' picture of the totally unjust man who has
a reputation for justice. But suppose that Plato is anxious to prove that justice
is preferable to injustice no matter what the condition of the society in which the
claim is made. Adeimantus has shown that reputation is a powerful ally of jus-
tice in contemporary society. On this line might we suggest that in "pleasure" and
"profit" Plato is envisaging the claims that can be made for iustice in two other
societies? Profit may be the advantage of iustice in a society where all or
most men have been educated to act in a harmonious way, where, because
reason is in control, men are "akin and friendly." 41 Such a society would be an
ideal society, but certainly not an unimaginable one. But Gould is certainly cor-
rect in claiming that one cannot read the Republic without feeling the highly
pessimistic strain which runs through the work. Not only does Plato become in-
creasingly hesitant in the course of the work about the possibility of achieving
the ideal state, 42 but he even more bitterly pictures---in the Cave passag~ the
fate that may overtake an individual who even tries to educate the people. 48
Perhaps, then, his picture of the ascetic pleasure$ afforded by justice is meant to
apply to iustice in a society worse than the contemporary one, a completely
topsy-turvy society such as that pictured by Glaucon where the just are pun-
ished and the unjust rewarded.
I make this suggestion only tentatively. Obviously it needs exhaustive con-
firmation in the text. But it does seem to account for the peculiar curve of
Plato's thought in two central passages of the work. Thus in the Sun, Line and
Cave passage, what starts as an investigation of what is needed for anyone to
become truly just becomes an essay on the nature and method of pure idea-
tion, and then reverts to an examination of what every man needs to become
just. So, similarly, in Book I X what starts as a restatement of the rewards of the
justice of the balanced soul becomes a disquisition on the rewards of ratio-
cination, and abruptly returns to the rewards of harmony again.
If this picture of multiple aims is acceptable, the problem with the inter-
pretation we offered above of the relationship Plato draws in the Republic
between just men and just acts should be clear. For it looks as though we have
generated multiple senses of "justice" of our own. Plato has been able to dis-
cover these different defenses for justice only by understanding "justice" in dif-
ferent senses. It is true that we might accommodate the ascetic sense to the har-
monious sense of justice. Thus, in a society in which individuals have a chance to
realize themselves fully, the rational element serves the whole individual. Where
41Republic 590d 6-7.
42Republic 473e 2-3, 592a 10-b 5.
43Republic 517a 7-9.
 JUSTICE IN THE REPUBLIC 13

they are thwarted and seem doomed to only partial fulfillment, reason, recog-
nizing the situation, determines to fulfill only its own recognizable goals, thereby
achieving as much harmonious fulfillment as possible. But this uneasy solution
seems wholly inapplicable to that third society, Plato's own, where reputa-
tion is the defense. Here there is no premium on reasoned harmony or reasoned
withdrawal, but rather on unreason. For reputation is a defense only for those
unable to separate appearance from reality.
VII. Summary and Conclusion
In this study I have been primarily concerned with accomplishing two ob-
jectives: rejecting a serious criticism of Plato's Republic and offering some sug-
gestions on the interpretation of an important topic discussed in that work: the
relationship between just men and just acts. First I outlined the criticism that
Plato equivocates on "justice" in the Republic, thus never affording an answer to
the central problem of the work, why it is preferable to be just. Two sorts of
replies to this criticism--(1) that Plato did not commit a fallacy because he
actually did relate the two concepts, and (2) that Plato committed no fallacy
for he never intended to relate the two concepts--were developed, but neither
seemed entirely acceptable. An example of the first sort of reply failed be-
cause of incompleteness and, in light of Sachs' excellent documentation, it seemed
that any similar attempt would fail. The second sort of reply needed to be
supplemented with a positive account of what Plato is attempting to do in the
Republic to be convincing. But four suggested alternative accounts seemed to
fail under scrutiny. A fifth alternative did seem more plausible, however, in that
it was supported not only by those passages in which Plato explicitly discusses
the relationship of just men and just acts, but also by a metaphorical inter-
pretation of the education of the guardian and the philosopher. This account,
with its distinction between two ways of achieving a balanced soul and its
stress on the importance of action under the aegis of the harmonious soul, seems
interesting not only in its own right, but for its illumination of other Platonic
and ethical doctrines. But, finally, I discovered a difficulty with this interpreta-
t i o n - n a m e l y , that although it certainly does characterize one phase of Plato's
thought in the Republic, it does not deal adequately with all discussions of justice
in the work. Though well designed for depicting the relationship between just
men and just acts in an idealized society, it does not seem suitable as a de-
scription of the relationship in a contemporary or a worse society.
Two final comments are, perhaps, in order. First, on our interpretation of the
relationship between just men and just acts: One may wonder whether our dis-
tinction between inculcation and practice is very helpful in developing an ac-
count of Plato's ethical theory. What could he mean by inculcation or correct
practice? To this criticism I can reply only that the framework seems to me to
be a promising one, and that a further study of the Republic with this frame-
work in mind will hopefully yield fruit. If my reader agrees, my aim of refocus-
ing attention on the Republic will have been accomplished.
Finally, how damaging is the criticism I have raised against this interpreta-
14 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

tion? Is the Republic discovered to be of little worth because Plato has pos-
sibly attempted to deal with several different senses of "justice" in it? Certainly
this makes the work more difficult, and any interpretation more tentative. But
I think we might agree with a recent comment of J. B. Skemp's on this point: "If
Plato had not been concerned primarily to establish dikaiosune ameinon adikias
[justice is better than injustice] as a rule for man as man in all possible worlds,
many latent contradictions would disappearmand the Republic would then
cease to be the profound work which its fiercest critics concede t h a t it is." 44

Washington University, St. Louis

44j. B. Skemp, "Comment on communal and individual justice in the Republic," Phronesis
V (1960), 38.