Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15,
Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas, in an Information3 dated 14 February
2006, which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having been duly appointed and
qualified to such public position as Police Officer 2 of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) assigned in the Security Service Group of the Cebu City Police
Office, after having beenarrested by agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was found positive for use
of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDEcommonly known as "Shabu", the
dangerous drug after a confirmatory test conducted on said accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The defense presented petitioner as the lone witness. He denied the charges
and testified that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he was arrested
allegedly for extortion by NBI agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was
required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused saying he
wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was, however, denied. He also
requested to be allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of his urine
sample, to no avail.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision4 dated
6 June 2007, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months at the
Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at
Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City.5
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTCs validation of the result
of the urine test despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of
the lack of legal basis for itsadmission. First, he alleges that the forensic
laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact that he was not
assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional right. Secondly, he
was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack
of sufficient basis to convict him.
Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for Review on certiorari. He assigns
as errors the use of hearsay evidence as basis for his conviction and the
questionable circumstances surrounding his arrest and drug test.
THE ISSUE
OUR RULING
We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent
affirmation by the CA, erroneous on three counts.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover persons apprehended or arrested
for any unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A.
9165.
First, "[a] person apprehended orarrested" cannot literally mean any person
apprehended or arrested for any crime.The phrase must be read in context
and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed under Article II of
the law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or
arrested for, among others, the "importation,"9 "sale, trading,
administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation",10"manufacture"11 and "possession"12 of dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession thereof
"during parties, social gatherings or meetings"13 ; being "employees and
visitors of a den, dive or resort";14 "maintenance of a den, dive or
resort";15 "illegal chemical diversion of controlled precursors and essential
chemicals"16 ; "manufacture or delivery"17 or "possession"18 of equipment,
instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or
controlled precursors and essential chemicals; possession of dangerous
drugs "during parties, social gatherings or meetings"19 ; "unnecessary"20 or
"unlawful"21 prescription thereof; "cultivation or culture of plantsclassified
as dangerous drugs or are sources thereof";22 and "maintenance and
keeping of original records of transactions on dangerous drugs
and/orcontrolled precursors and essential chemicals."23 To make the
provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any crime
not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its meaning.
Note thataccused appellant here was arrested in the alleged act of
extortion.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form
of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive
for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence
obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers
should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of
dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been
charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and
Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings
or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec.
12(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who
shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is
imprisonment of four years and a fine of P50,000.00. In fact, under the same
section, the possession of such equipment, apparatus or other
paraphernalia is prima facieevidence that the possessor has used a
dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Sec. 15.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users,
this Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs
cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of
dangerous drugs isonly and solely in the form of residue and the
confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous
drugs.In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the
filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should only
be done when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than
mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as provided for in
Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine sample could be material to
the charge of extortion.1wphi1 The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred
when they held that the extraction of petitioners urine for purposes of drug
testing was "merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a
custodial investigation."
We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible. In
Gutang v. People,29 the petitioner therein and his companions were arrested
in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his residence. A
PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu materials and
paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that case were also
asked to give urine samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the
petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use
of prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the latters urine sample was
inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled
extrajudicial confession.
In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that "what the Constitution
prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material." The situation in Gutangwas categorized
as falling among the exemptions under the freedom from testimonial
compulsion since what was sought tobe examined came from the body of
the accused. The Court said:
This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not
meant to unearth undisclosedfacts but to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that
petitioner and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their
urine but they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested
to undergo a drug test.
Assuming arguendothat the urine samples taken from the petitioner are
inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is
replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner
for the crimes charged.
The drug test was a violation of petitioners right to privacy and right against
self-incrimination.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 20-30; Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L.
Hernando and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo L. delos
Santos and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes.
2
Id. at 32.
3
Rollo, p. 41.
4
Rollo, pp. 33-40; Penned by former RTC Judge (now CA Justice)
Gabriel T. Ingles.
5
Id. at 40.
6
Id. at 69-86.
7
Id. at 64.
8
R.A. 9165.
9
Section 4.
10
Section 5.
11
Section 8.
12
Section 11.
13
Section 13.
14
Section 7.
15
Section 6.
16
Section 9.
17
Section 10.
18
Section 12.
19
Section 14.
20
Section 18.
21
Section 19.
22
Section 16.
23
Section 17.
24
G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010, 637 SCRA 791.
25
591 Phil. 393 (2008).
26
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, 3 August 2010, 626 SCRA 633.
27
People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 731 (2003).
28
People v. Gallarde, 382 Phil. 718 (2000).
29
390 Phil. 805 (2000).
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
Promulgated:
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision[1] dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 28846, which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 120, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66765
convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In an Information[2] dated November 11, 2002, petitioner Abraham C.
Miclat, Jr. was charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole
witness. The testimonies of Abraham Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat,
the father and sister, respectively, of the petitioner was dispensed with after
the prosecution agreed that their testimonies were corroborative in nature.
Evidence for the Prosecution
On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has
established all the elements of the offense charged, rendered a
Decision[6] convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No.
9165, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Simply stated, petitioner is assailing the legality of his arrest and the
subsequent seizure of the arresting officer of the suspected sachets of
dangerous drugs from him. Petitioner insists that he was just watching
television with his father and sister when police operatives suddenly barged
into their home and arrested him for illegal possession of shabu.
Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several
plastic sachets inside their house by one of the arresting officers who was
peeping through a window is not sufficient reason for the police authorities
to enter his house without a valid search warrant and/or warrant of
arrest. Arguing that the act of arranging several plastic sachets by and in itself
is not a crime per se, petitioner maintains that the entry of the police
surveillance team into his house was illegal, and no amount of incriminating
evidence will take the place of a validly issued search warrant. Moreover,
peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot be contemplated as within
the meaning of the plain view doctrine, rendering the warrantless arrest
unlawful.
Petitioner also contends that the chain of custody of the alleged illegal
drugs was highly questionable, considering that the plastic sachets were not
marked at the place of the arrest and no acknowledgment receipt was issued
for the said evidence.
Finally, petitioner claims that the arresting officer did not inform him of
his constitutional rights at any time during or after his arrest and even during
his detention. Hence, for this infraction, the arresting officer should be
punished accordingly.
True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:
For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has
ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[15]
Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and
consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it
becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[17] The right against
warrantless searches and seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial
exceptions, namely:
x x x x.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to
comply strictly with the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioners arrest
illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible.[22] What is essential
is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.[23]
Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and
the integrity of the drugs seized from the petitioner was preserved. More
importantly, an unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited drugs taken from
the petitioner was sufficiently established. The factual antecedents of the
case reveal that the petitioner voluntarily surrendered the plastic sachets to
PO3 Antonio when he was arrested. Together with petitioner, the evidence
seized from him were immediately brought to the police station and upon
arriving thereat, were turned over to PO3 Moran, the investigating
officer. There the evidence was marked. The turn-over of the subject sachets
and the person of the petitioner were then entered in the official
blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of the SDEU, Police Senior Inspector Jose
Ramirez Valencia, endorsed the evidence for laboratory examination to the
National Police District PNP Crime Laboratory. The evidence was delivered by
PO3 Moran and received by Police Inspector Jessie Dela Rosa. [24] After a
qualitative examination of the contents of the four (4) plastic sachets by the
latter, the same tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.[25]
x x x x.
x x x x.
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one
(1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5)
grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or
cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana
resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not
limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB,
and those similarly designed or newly-introduced
drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far
beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three
hundred (300) grams of marijuana.[31]
From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P400,000.00).The evidence adduced by the prosecution established
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had in his possession 0.24 gram
of shabu, or less than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug, without any legal
authority.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
*
Designated additional member, per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21,
2011.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate
Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp.
140-51.
[2]
Id. at 40.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Id. at 76-77.
[5]
Id. at. 78.
[6]
Id. at 75-82.
[7]
Id. at 81-82.
[8]
Supra note 1.
[9]
Id. at 151.
[10]
Id. at 209-210.
[11]
Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 611,
622.
[12]
Rebellion v. People, G.R. No. 175700, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 343, 348.
[13]
People v. Santos, G.R. No. 176735, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 578, 601.
[14]
Emphasis supplied.
[15]
People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 775 (2003).
[16]
TSN, (PO3 Rodrigo Antonio), April 21, 2003, p. 5; rollo, p. 60.
[17]
1987 Constitution, Article III, Sections 2 and 3 (2).
[18]
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 633, 641.
[19]
People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007, 516 SCRA 463,
476.
[20]
People v. Lagman, G.R. No. 168695, December 8, 2008, 573 SCRA 224,
236, citing People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 633-634 (1999).
[21]
Emphasis supplied.
[22]
People v. Pagkalinawan, G.R. No. 184805, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 202,
218, citing People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 430,
448.
[23]
Id.
[24]
Rollo, p. 37.
[25]
Id. at 38.
[26]
People v. Teddy Batoon and Melchor Batoon, G.R. No. 184599, November
24, 2010.
[27]
People v. Sembrano, G.R. No. 185848, August 16, 2010, 628 SCRA 328,
343.
[28]
People v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 187070, February 24, 2010, 613 SCRA 556,
564.
[29]
People v. Willie Midenilla, et al., G.R. No. 186470, September 27, 2010.
[30]
People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 184804, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 625, 642.
[31]
Emphasis supplied.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
praying that the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Sogod, Southern Leyte
(RTC), dated January 16, 2009, dismissing the criminal case for rape against
PO1 Rudyard Paloma y Torres (private respondent), and the
Resolution[2] dated March 16, 2009, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, be annulled and set aside.
The records reveal the following antecedent facts.
On November 20, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion for Bail. Hearings
on the motion commenced on December 7, 2004, but petitioner failed to
appear. Only private respondent presented evidence. Thus, on March 16,
2005, the MCTC of Sogod issued an Order allowing private respondent to post
bail set at P200,000.00.After posting a surety bond, private respondent was
released from confinement.
On June 27, 2008, private respondent was committed to detention [4] and, on
June 30, 2008, the RTC issued an Order[5] stating that accused had voluntarily
surrendered to the Office of the Clerk of Court and arraignment was set for
July 31, 2008. In the meantime, on July 3, 2008, private respondent filed a
Motion to Admit Cash Bond in Lieu of Surety Bond; thus, in an Order dated
July 10, 2008, the RTC cancelled the July 31, 2008 schedule for arraignment
and reset the arraignment and hearing on said motion for August 20, 2008. At
said scheduled date for arraignment and hearing on the motion, nobody
appeared for the prosecution.Hence, the RTC issued the Order[6] dated August
20, 2008 resetting the arraignment for October 31, 2008 and stating that:
The said Order also scheduled the initial hearing for trial on the merits for
December 12, 2008. On December 12, 2008, no one appeared for the
prosecution, prompting counsel for accused private respondent to move for
dismissal of the case on the ground of failure to prosecute. Private
respondent's motion to dismiss was denied per Order[12] dated December 12,
2008, and hearing was reset to January 16, 2009.
Again, on the very day of the January 16, 2009 hearing, the private prosecutor
filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Hearing, stating that it
was only on January 14, 2009 that he was furnished a copy of the notice of
the January 16, 2009 hearing and he had to attend a previously scheduled
hearing for another case he was handling, set for the very same date. Thus, in
the Order dated January 16, 2009, the RTC disposed, thus:
x x x Again notably absent are the private prosecutor, the two
public prosecutors designated by the Department of Justice to
prosecute this case as well as the private complainant herself.
A last minute urgent motion to reset was filed by the private
prosecutor, but the same is denied being in violation of the three
(3) day rule in filing written postponements. After hearing the
arguments coming from both the public prosecutor assigned to
this Court and counsel for the defense, the Court deems it proper
to act on the urgency of the matter prayed for by the said
counsel. Considering that the accused has been languishing in jail
since June, 2008 up to the present and to allow him to stay in jail
for a single minute, it is quite unreasonable and would violate his
right to speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, finding the motion of the counsel for the accused to
be based on grounds that are meritorious, this Court pursuant
to x x x the rule on speedy trial (RA 8433) [should be 8493] hereby
orders this case dismissed for failure of the prosecution to
prosecute or nolle prosequi.[13]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same
per Resolution dated March 16, 2009.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, alleging that public respondent
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in rashly and precipitately dismissing the rape case against private
respondent. Respondents counter that there was no grave abuse committed
by the trial court and setting aside the dismissal of the rape case would put
private respondent in double jeopardy.
Petitioners insist that the RTC dismissed the criminal case against private
respondent too hurriedly, despite the provision in Section 10 of the Speedy
Trial Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8493), now incorporated in Section 3, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 3. Exclusions. - The following periods of delay shall be
excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other
proceedings concerning the accused, including but
not limited to the following:
xxxx
x x x x[18]
A careful reading of the above rule would show that the only delays that may
be excluded from the time limit within which trial must commence are those
resulting from proceedings concerning the accused. The time involved in the
proceedings in a petition for transfer of venue can only be excluded from said
time limit if it was the accused who instituted the same. Hence, in this case,
the time during which the petition for transfer of venue filed by the private
complainant is pending, cannot be excluded from the time limit of thirty (30)
days from receipt of the pre-trial order imposed in Section 1, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court.
The records reveal that the 30-day time limit set by Section 1, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court had, in fact, already been breached. The private prosecutor
received the Pre-trial Order[19] dated November 24, 2008 on December 3,
2008, while the Provincial Prosecutor received the same on December 2,
2008.[20] This means that at the latest, trial should have commenced by
January 2, 2009, or if said date was a Sunday or holiday, then on the very next
business day. Yet, because of the prosecution's failure to appear at the
December 12, 2008 hearing for the initial presentation of the prosecution's
evidence, the RTC was constrained to reset the hearing to January 16, 2009,
which is already beyond the 30-day time limit. Nevertheless, the prosecution
again failed to appear at the January 16, 2009 hearing. Indeed, as aptly
observed by the RTC, petitioners showed recalcitrant behavior by obstinately
refusing to comply with the RTC's directives to commence presentation of
their evidence. Petitioners did not even show proper courtesy to the court,
by filing motions for cancellation of the hearings on the very day of the
hearing and not even bothering to appear on the date they set for hearing on
their motion. As set forth in the narration of facts above, the prosecution
appeared to be intentionally delaying and trifling with court processes.
The trial court cannot be faulted for refusing to countenance delays in the
prosecution of the case. The Court's ruling in Tan v. People[23] is quite
instructive, to wit:
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
*
Designated additional member per Special Order No. 1028 dated June 21,
2011.
[1]
Penned by Rolando L. Gonzales, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 39, Sogod,
Southern Leyte; rollo, pp. 80-81.
[2]
Id. at 88-93
[3]
MCTC records, pp. 378-379.
[4]
RTC records, p. 25.
[5]
Id. at 26.
[6]
Id. at 91-92.
[7]
Id. at 92.
[8]
Id. at 193-195.
[9]
Id. at 199-200.
[10]
Id. at 206.
[11]
Id. at 218.
[12]
Id. at 260-261.
[13]
Id. at 273-274.
[14]
G.R. No. 167409, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA 127.
[15]
G.R. No. L-74766, December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 753.
[16]
Garcia v. Miro, supra note 14, at 131-132.
[17]
G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 338.
[18]
Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
[19]
RTC records, pp. 223-225.
[20]
See Registry Receipts, RTC records, attached to the dorsal portion of p.
225.
[21]
G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA 688.
[22]
Id. at 713.
[23]
G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 139.
[24]
Id. at 151-155. (Emphasis supplied).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to evolve
their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to privacy. The
alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous drugs is more
apparent than real. Often, the compromise is there because law enforcers
neglect to perform what could have been done to uphold the Constitution
as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of society.
PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect."5 PSI
Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the
San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers
from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.6 A passenger jeepney from
Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatacs checkpoint.7 The jeepney
driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male
passengers who were carrying marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the
two male passengers who were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and
Santiago Sacpa Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while
Dayao was holding a yellow bag.10
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their
bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since
they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed
Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three
bricks of what looked like marijuana.13 Cogaed then muttered, "nagloko
daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti nagyanna,"which translates to
"Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac
arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police
station."15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their respective
bags"16inside the station.17
While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley
Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their
bags.18 Inside Cogaeds sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected
marijuana fruiting tops,"19 and inside Dayaos yellow bag was a brick of
suspected marijuana.20
PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.21 PSI
Bayan personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime
Laboratory.22 Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem
Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed
marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from Cogaeds blue bag had a total
weight of 8,091.5 grams.24 The marijuana from Cogaeds sack weighed
4,246.1 grams.25 The marijuana collected from Dayaos bag weighed 5,092
grams.26 A total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from Cogaeds and Dayaos
bags.27
At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the
head."38 The bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was
inside.39
It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and
Dayao were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
Republic Act No. 9165.40 The information against them states:
That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of San
Gabriel, Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA and
SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with discernment) and JOHN
DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly, without being
authorized by law, have in their control, custody and possession dried
marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of seventeen
thousand,four hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6) grams.
The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando City,
La Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty.43 The case was dismissed
against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time and was
exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006 or Republic Act No. 9344.44Trial against Cogaed ensued. In a
decision45 dated May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found Cogaed guilty.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaeds arrest illegal considering that
"Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was shown that hewas about to do so or that had just done so. He
just alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal, the
warrantless search should also be considered illegal.48 However, the trial
court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed
"waived his right to object to such irregularity"49 when "he did not protest
when SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his
bag."50
II
III
For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a valid
search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether the
evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and (3) whether
there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.
II
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determinedpersonally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence
whether searches and seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule, searches
conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this provision
are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that
can only be determined by a judge.56 The existence of probable cause must
be established by the judge after asking searching questions and
answers.57 Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an offense
alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches done by the
law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the place and the
things to be searched.58
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when
warrantless.59 In the Rules of Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are
allowed even without a separate warrant.60 This court has taken into
account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of
the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured."61 The known
jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures
are:
4. Consentedwarrantless search;
5. Customs search;
III
The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it
did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the
Constitution.
In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that led
to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying
manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person who uses
dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is probably
hiding something as well.
The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a bag
and traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover,
criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of
suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It
was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."
COURT:
Q So you dont know what was the content while it was still being carried by
him in the passenger jeep?
WITNESS:
COURT:
Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have
reason to believe that the accused were carrying marijuana?
WITNESS:
The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been
identified by the police officers otherwise.
It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a
reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not
adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify
that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched.85 Anything
less than this would be an infringementupon ones basic right to security of
ones person and effects.
IV
Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an
opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas
v. Court of Appeals,86 one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk"
doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious
circumstances as probable cause:
The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
police officers to inspect the same.87 (Emphasis supplied)
Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required
to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in
light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that police
officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance.95 There should be
"presence of more than oneseemingly innocent activity, which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."96 The
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."97 Certainly,
reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in
a reasonable search.98
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was
no approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless
arrest. The person searched was noteven the person mentioned by the
informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person
searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by
saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained
only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to
search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.
The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for
the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.100 As in
Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving
dangerous drugs.
In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was
illegal.109 There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Arutas
arrest and the subsequent search and seizure.110 It was only the informant
that prompted the police to apprehend her.111 The evidence obtained was
not admissible because of the illegal search.112 Consequently, Aruta was
acquitted.113
Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver,
not the polices informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was
"suspicious."
People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case,
the police had been receiving information that the accused was distributing
drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City."121 One night, the police
received information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing drugs at the
Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout.122 A car "arrived and
parked"123 at the hotel.124The informant told the police that the man parked
at the hotel was dealing drugs.125 The man alighted from his car.126 He was
carrying a juice box.127 The police immediately apprehended him and
discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the juice box he
was holding.128
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about
Chuas situation when the police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here
was no validstop-and-frisk."129
VI
Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a
lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a
warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court:
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not
have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
VII
The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can
be discerned again from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-
examination:
ATTY. BINWAG:
Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the
contents of their bags, is it not?
WITNESS:
A Yes, maam.
Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is
it not?
A Yes, maam.
Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?
A None, maam.
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were
the contents ofthe bag, you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright
from them, is it not?
A Yes, maam but when I went near them it seems that they were
surprised.133 (Emphasis supplied)
The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatacs
responses to Judge Florendos questions:
COURT:
....
A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that he
was somewhat frightened.1wphi1 He was a little apprehensive and when
he was already stepping down and he put down the bag I asked him, "whats
that," and he answered, "I dont know because Marvin only asked me to
carry."134
For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not
sufficient that the police officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as
a police officer.1wphi1 The police officer must also inform the person to be
searched that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of any
of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a
reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a
language known to the person who is about to waive his or her
constitutional rights. There must be anassurance given to the police officer
that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature
of a persons constitutional right to privacy requires no less.
VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.135
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v.
Diokno.136 This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that
encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is "the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures."137 It ensures that the fundamental
rights to ones person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed
upon and are upheld.
Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to
eradicate this menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the resources
to be able to perform their duties better. However, we cannot, in any way,
compromise our societys fundamental values enshrined in our Constitution.
Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the very foundations of the
society that we seek to protect.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San
Fernando City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR COGAED Y
ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement
unless he is being heldfor some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the oofnion of the
Court's Division.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
Footnotes
* Designated as Acting Member in view of the vacancy in the Third
Division per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014.
1
CA rollo, pp. 39-58.
2
Id. at 60.
3
Id.
4
Rollo, p. 5; CA rollo, p. 10.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Rollo, p. 5; CA rollo, p. 13.
12
Rollo, pp. 56, 13.
13
Id. at 6, 13.
14
Id. at 6.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Rollo, p. 7; CA rollo, p. 12.
24
Rollo, p. 7.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 78.
33
Id. at 8.
34
Id. at 5.
35
Id. at 8.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Rollo, pp. 8 and 34.
41
Id. at 34.
42
Id. at 23.
43
Id. at 4.
44
Id.
45
CA rollo, pp. 915.
46
Id. at 15.
47
Id. at 14.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 3958.
52
Rollo, pp. 222. Ninth Division, decision penned by Associate Justice
Ramon R. Garcia, with Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and
Samuel H. Gaerlan concurring.
53
Id. at 12.
54
CA rollo, pp. 4142.
55
Rep. Act No. 10640 (2014) amending sec. 21 of Rep. Act No. 9165.
56
CONST., art. III, sec. 2.
57
CONST., art. III, sec. 2.
58
CONST., art. III, sec. 2.
59
See Valmonte v. De Villa, 258 Phil. 838, 843 (1989) [Per J. Padilla, En
Banc]: "Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden."
60
RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, sec. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons
or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without search warrant.
61
Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 370,
383 [Per J. Carpio- Morales, Third Division], citing People v. Nuevas,
545 Phil. 356, 370371 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
62
People v. Aruta,351 Phil. 868, 879880 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third
Division].
63
Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 370,
393394 [Per J. CarpioMorales, Third Division] (Bersamin dissenting),
citing Malacat v. Court of Appeals,347 Phil. 462, 479480 (1997) [Per J.
Davide, Jr., En Banc].
64
See also Nolasco v. Judge Pao, 223 Phil. 363, 377378 (1985) [Per J.
Melencio-Herrera, En Banc].
65
G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990, 188 SCRA 288 [Per J. Gancayco, First
Division].
66
Id. at 294, citingthe Solicitor Generals arguments.
67
Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 632, 636 (1997) [Per J.
Panganiban, Third Division].
68
The term was derived from the American case of Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968). This case served as basis for allowing "stop and frisk"
searches in this jurisdiction.
69
345 Phil. 632 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
70
Id. at 638.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 647.
74
Id.
75
330 Phil. 811 (1996) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
76
Id. at 815.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 818819.
80
Id. at 815.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 819.
83
TSN, May 23, 2006, p. 6.
84
TSN, June 1, 2006, pp. 2122.
85
Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 462, 473474 (1997) [Per J.
Davide, Jr., En Banc].
86
G.R. No. 89139, August 2, 1990, 188 SCRA 288 [Per J. Gancayco, First
Division].
87
Id. at 293.
88
People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 880 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third
Division] (Emphasis supplied).
89
347 Phil. 462 (1997) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
90
Id. at 481.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Esquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 370
[Per J. Carpio Morales, Third Division].
95
Id. See dissenting opinion of J. Bersamin, p. 397.
96
Id.
97
CONST., art. III, sec. 2.
98
See dissenting opinion of J. Bersamin in Esquillo v. People, G.R. No.
182010, August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 370, 397 [Per J. Carpio Morales,
Third Division].
99
Malacat v. Court of Appeals,347 Phil. 462, 481-482 (1997) [Per J.
Davide, En Banc].
100
In J. Bersamins dissent inEsquillo v. People, G.R. No. 182010,
August 25, 2010, 629 SCRA 370, 396, he opined:
CARPIO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MENDOZA, JJ.
JULIET YANEZA, PABLO ABUNDA, JR., and
VICENTE AFULUGENCIA,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
June 1, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks
to annul the July 11, 2008 Decision[1] and the November 4, 2008
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 99088, which
reversed and set aside the October 24, 2006[3] and the February 26,
2007[4] Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 92.
The RTC Orders revived Criminal Case No. Q-03-115490, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., Oscar Mapalo and Vicente
Afulugencia, after the same was dismissed in an earlier Order.
The Facts
On September 12, 2002, petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for libel
against respondents Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda, Jr., and Vicente Afulugencia
(respondents), as well as Oscar Mapalo (Mapalo).[5]
In deference to the prosecutors last resolution, the RTC ordered the criminal
case dismissed in its Order dated March 17, 2004, viz.:
More so, the Court cannot interfere with the Public Prosecutors
discretion to determine probable cause or the propriety of
pursuing or not a criminal case when the case is not yet filed in
Court, as a general rule. However, if the same criminal case has
been filed in Court already, the Public Prosecutor can still
interfere with it subject to the approval of the Court. In the case
of Republic vs. Sunga, et al., the Supreme Court held that while it
has been settled in the case of Crespo vs. Mogul that the trial
court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be
dismissed after the complaint or information has been filed in
court, nonetheless any motion of the offended party for the
dismissal of the criminal case, even if without objection of the
accused, should first be referred to the prosecuting fiscal and only
after hearing should the court exercise its exclusive authority to
dismiss or continue with the prosecution of the case. The Court,
therefore, after hearing and conferring with the fiscal, can dismiss
the case if convinced that there is [no] reason to continue with
the prosecution [of] the same. As in this case, the Court finds
merit [in] the motion of the Public Prosecutor.[11]
SO ORDERED.[15]
The appellate court found the RTC to have gravely abused its discretion in
ordering the reinstatement of the case. The CA annulled the impugned
RTC Orders, ruling that all the elements of double jeopardy exist. There
was a valid Information sufficient in form and substance filed before a
court of competent jurisdiction to which respondents had pleaded, and
that the termination of the case was not expressly consented to by
respondents; hence, the same could not be revived or refiled without
transgressing respondents right against double jeopardy.
The CA further found that the DOJ Secretary improperly took cognizance of
the Petition for Review because DOJ Department Order No. 223
mandates that no appeal shall be entertained if the accused has already
been arraigned or, if the arraignment took place during the pendency
of the appeal, the same shall be dismissed.[17]
Petitioner interposed the instant appeal when his motion for reconsideration
of the CA Decision was denied.[18]
The Issues
Our Ruling
Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the court, any
disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a
motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial court should
not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the
Secretary of Justice.[20]It is the courts bounden duty to assess independently
the merits of the motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written
order disposing of the motion.[21]While the recommendation of the
prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is persuasive, it is not
binding on courts.
In this case, it is obvious from the March 17, 2004 Order of the RTC,
dismissing the criminal case, that the RTC judge failed to make his own
determination of whether or not there was a prima facie case to hold
respondents for trial. He failed to make an independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the case. The RTC judge blindly relied on the
manifestation and recommendation of the prosecutor when he should have
been more circumspect and judicious in resolving the Motion to Dismiss and
Withdraw Information especially so when the prosecution appeared to be
uncertain, undecided, and irresolute on whether to indict respondents.
The same holds true with respect to the October 24, 2006 Order, which
reinstated the case. The RTC judge failed to make a separate evaluation and
merely awaited the resolution of the DOJ Secretary. This is evident from the
general tenor of the Order and highlighted in the following portion thereof:
This Court must therefore remand the case to the RTC, so that the latter
can rule on the merits of the case to determine if a prima facie case exists and
consequently resolve the Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw
Information anew.
It is beyond cavil that double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy
exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3)
a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c)
after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.[24]
Since we have held that the March 17, 2004 Order granting the motion
to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion, then respondents
were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of
the case. Ergo, the fifth requisite which requires the conviction and acquittal
of the accused, or the dismissal of the case without the approval of the
accused, was not met. Thus, double jeopardy has not set in.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Arturo G. Tayag, with Associate Justices Martin
S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this Court) and Noel G. Tijam,
concurring; rollo, pp. 18-38.
[2]
Id. at 41-47.
[3]
Id. at 49-51.
[4]
Id. at 52.
[5]
Supra note 1, at 20.
[6]
Resolution dated February 18, 2003 in I.S. No. 02-12597; rollo, pp. 53-57.
[7]
Supra note 1, at 21.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 58-59.
[10]
Supra note 1, at 21-22.
[11]
Id. at 23-24.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 60-76.
[13]
Supra note 1, at 25.
[14]
As summarized in the October 24, 2006 Order of the RTC; supra note 3, at
50.
[15]
Id. at 50-51.
[16]
Supra note 4.
[17]
Supra note 1.
[18]
Supra note 2.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 6-7.
[20]
First Womens Credit Corporation v. Baybay, G.R. No. 166888, January 31,
2007, 513 SCRA 637, 646, citing Santos v. Orda, Jr., 481 Phil. 93, 106 (2004).
[21]
Lee v. KBC Bank N.V., G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 117,
132, citing Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil. 207, 235 (1997).
[22]
Supra note 3, at 50.
[23]
See Co v. Lim, G.R. Nos. 164669-70, October 30, 2009, 604 SCRA 702, 712,
citing Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc. v. Eugenio, Jr., G.R. No.
163741, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 274, 281-282.
[24]
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended provides:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information.