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Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
BERSAMIN,
- versus -
DEL CASTILLO, and
Respondents.
Promulgated:
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DECISION
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1[1] dated
November 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75773,
entitled Jose Fernando, Jr., et al. v. Heirs of Germogena Fernando, et al.,
Respondent Acuna likewise averred that the action for partition cannot
prosper since the heirs of the original owners of the subject property, namely
Rosario, Jose Jr., Norma, Tomas, Guillermo, Leopoldo, Hermogena,
Illuminada and Zoilo, all surnamed Fernando, and Lucila Tinio, purportedly
had already sold their respective one-tenth (1/10) share each in the subject
property to Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor for the amount of P35,000.00 on
January 25, 1978 as evidenced by a Kasulatan sa Bilihang Patuluyan. 12[12] He
added that he was in possession of the original copy of OCT No. RO-487
(997) and that he had not commenced the issuance of new titles to the
subdivided lots because he was waiting for the owners of the other portions of
the subject property to bear their respective shares in the cost of titling.
11[11] It would appear from the annotation of said July 30, 1980 Decision on the
back of OCT No. RO-
487 (997) that Lot 1302 was further subdivided into Lots 1302-A to 1302-J
with petitioners ascendant Jose Fernando allocated Lot 1302-D.
The plaintiffs and defendants jointly moved to have the case submitted
for judgment on the pleadings on May 7, 1999. 16[16] However, the trial court
denied said motion in a Resolution 17[17] dated August 23, 1999 primarily due
to the question regarding the ownership of the property to be partitioned, in
light of the intervention of respondents Acuna and Hermogenes who were
claiming legal right thereto.
14 [14] In the dispositive portion of said 1980 Decision, Lot 1302-G was
adjudicated to Antonia A. Fernando.
With respect to Lot 1303, the trial court found that the November 29,
1929 Decision of the Cadastral Court, adjudicating said lot to different persons
and limiting Jose Fernandos share to Lot 1303-C, was never implemented nor
executed despite the lapse of more than thirty years. Thus, the said decision
has already prescribed and can no longer be executed. The trial court ordered
the reversion of Lot 1303 to the ownership of spouses Jose A. Fernando and
Lucila Tinio and spouses Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez under OCT
No. RO-487 (997) and allowed the partition of Lot 1303 among petitioners as
successors-in-interest of said registered owners. Excluded from the partition,
however, were the portions of the property which petitioners admitted had
been sold or transferred to Ruperta Sto. Domingo Villasenor and respondent
Acuna.
As for the ownership of Sapang Bayan, the trial court found that the
same had not been alleged in the pleadings nor raised as an issue during the
pre-trial conference. Also, according to the trial court, the parties failed to
clearly show whether Sapang Bayan was previously a dry portion of either Lot
1302 or Lot 1303. Neither was there any proof that Sapang Bayan was a river
that just dried up or that it was an accretion which the adjoining lots gradually
received from the effects of the current of water. It was likewise not
established who were the owners of the lots adjoining Sapang Bayan. The
trial court concluded that none of the parties had clearly and sufficiently
established their claims over Sapang Bayan.
The dispositive portion of the May 16, 2002 Decision of the trial court
reads:
All the parties, with the exception of respondent Acuna, elevated this
case to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed November 24, 2003
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Hence, plaintiffs and defendants in the court a quo elevated the matter
for our review through the instant petition.
1. Whether or not the ownership of Lot 1303 and the Sapang Bayan
portion of the piece of land covered by O.C.T. No. RO-487 (997) or
Plan Psu-39080 should revert to the descendants and heirs of the
late spouses Jose Fernando and Lucila Tinio and Antonia
Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez;
ATTY. VENERACION:
Q The other lots in the name of the other persons. Did they
take possession of that?
ATTY. SANTIAGO:
ATTY. VENERACION:
ATTY. SANTIAGO:
COURT:
ATTY. VENERACION;
35[35] G.R. No. 150654, December 13, 2007, 540 SCRA 100, 107.
37[37] G.R. No. 168902, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 394, 409.
38 [38] Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Mingoa, Sr., G.R. No. 146548,
December 18, 2009, 608 SCRA 394, 415, citing Isabela Colleges, Inc. v. Heirs
of Nieves Tolentino-Rivera, 397 Phil. 955, 969 (2000).
39 [39] Olegario v. Mari, G.R. No. 147951, December 14, 2009, 608 SCRA 134,
147.
disturbed. The right of the registered owners as well as their successors-in-
interest to recover possession of the property is already a stale demand and,
thus, is barred by laches.
In the same vein, we uphold the finding of the Court of Appeals that the
title of petitioners ascendants wrongfully included lots belonging to third
persons.40[40] Indeed, petitioners ascendants appeared to have acknowledged
this fact as they were even the ones that prayed for the cadastral court to
subdivide Lot 1303 as evident in the November 29, 1929 Decision. We concur
with the Court of Appeals that petitioners ascendants held the property
erroneously titled in their names under an implied trust for the benefit of the
true owners. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:
As aptly observed by the appellate court, the party thus aggrieved has
the right to recover his or their title over the property by way of reconveyance
while the same has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value. 41[41] As
we held in Medizabel v. Apao,42[42] the essence of an action for reconveyance
is that the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is
the transfer of the property, in this case its title, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful owner or to
one with a better right. It is settled in jurisprudence that mere issuance of the
41 [41] Id., citing Huang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108525, September 13,
1994, 236 SCRA 420; Vda. De Esconde v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 81
(1996).
42[42] G.R. No. 143185, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 587, 608.
certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility
that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in
the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties
may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of
title.43[43]
In fact from the transcripts of the proceedings, the parties could not
agree how Sapang Bayan came about. Whether it was a gradual deposit
received from the river current or a dried-up creek bed connected to the main
river could not be ascertained.
Even assuming that Sapang Bayan was a dried-up creek bed, under
Article 420, paragraph 146[46] and Article 502, paragraph 1 47[47] of the Civil
Code, rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion. In the
absence of any provision of law vesting ownership of the dried-up river bed in
some other person, it must continue to belong to the State.
46[46] Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others
of similar character; x x x.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice