KARL MARX AND RELIGION: 1841-1846

KARL MARX AND RELIGION: 1841-1846

By

KATHLEEN CLARKSON

A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the degree

Master of Arts

McMaster University

November 1973
MASTER OF ARTS (1973) McMASTER UNIVERSITY
(Religion) Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: Karl Marx and Religion: 1841-1846

AUTHOR: Kathleen L. Clarkson

SUPERVISOR: Dr. L. I. Greenspan

NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 120

SCOPE AND CONTENT:

A recurrent theme throughout the writings of Karl Marx

from 1841 through 1846 is his attack on religion. This thesis

will first explicate the precise nature of his atheism. Then it

will detail his critique of religion by means of a chronological

.ana1ysis of his major early works. Finally, it will indicate some

implications of his attack on religion for the "Christian-Marxist"

dialogue.
 PREFACE

Throughout this thesis, I have used the standard trans-

lations of Karl Marx's works as are noted in the Bibliography.

Since many of the references do come from Marx's (and Engels')

various writings, for the sake of convenience, I have used

certain abbreviations for those cited most often. I also have

abbreviated one secondary source. They are as follows:

Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'

Dissertation The Difference between the Democritean and

Epicurean Philosophy of Nature

German Ideology The German Ideology

Holy Family The Holy Family or Critique of Critical

Critique Against Bruno Bauer and Company

"Introduction" "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's

'Philosophy of Right': Introduction"

"Jewish Question" "On the Jewish Question"

Manifesto Manifesto of the Communist Party

"Theses" "Theses on Feuerbach"

Young Hegelians The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx

Finally, I would like to thank the members of my supervisory

committee for their help during the various stages of writing. In

.particular, I am grateful to Dr. L. Greenspan. I would also like

iii
 to thank D. J. Hawkin and K. Temple for their support and for

their critical relationship to my work.

iv
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER I - THE INFLUENCE OF BRUNO BAUER AND LUDWIG FEUERBACH

ON KARL MARX'S ATHEISM 5

I Introduction 5

II Clarification of the Issue 7

III Marx's Concept of Religion Per Se 11

(a) Affinity to and Divergence from Bruno Bauer 11

(b) Place Reserved for Atheism Within Marx's System 19

IV Influence of Ludwig Feuerbach and Wider Implications

for Marx's Critique of Religion 21

(a) Outline of the Influence of Feuerbach 22

(b) Feuerbach on Religion - Positive and
Negative Critique 27
(c) What Marx did and did not take from
Feuerbach 31
(d) Summary of the Real Direction of
Feuerbach's Influence on the Marxian
Critique of Religion 39

V Conclusion 40

CHAPTER II - THE MARXIAN CRITIQUE OF RELIGION: 1841-1846 42

I Introduction 42

II The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean

Philosophy of Nature 44

III Marx's Journalism 50

(a) "Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship

Instruction" 50
(b) "The Leading Article in No. 179 of the K!Hnische
Zeitung: Religion, Free Press, and Philosophy" 56

v
 IV Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right' 63

V "On the Jewish Question" 72

VI "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy

of Right': Introduction" 83
VII "Paris Manuscripts" 92

(a) "Alienated Labour" 92

(b) "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and General
Philosophy" 97

VIII The Holy Family 100

IX The German Ideology 104

X Conclusion 113

CONCLUSION - IMPLICATIONS OF THIS WORK 115

BIBLIOGRAPHY 119

vi
 INTRODUCTION

. There is no doubt that the writings of Karl Marx have had

a major impact on the modern world. Because of the global signi-

ficance of Marx's ideas, numerous scholars have delved into

different aspects of his philosophy. Volumes have been written

on Marxian economics, Marxian socialism, and the Marxian dialectic.

Very little, however, has been written on Karl Marx and religion.

The delayed publication of the complete writings of Marx from

1841-1846 seems a main reason for this, since it was during these

years that Marx developed his critique of religion. It is the

purpose of the present study to determine the precise nature of

Karl Marx's attack on religion throughout the corpus of these

important writings from 1841-1846.

In Chapter I, I deal with the question of Karl Marx's

atheism in terms of the influence of Bruno Bauer and Ludwig

Feuerbach. This approach is not simply an antiquarian pursuit of

who influenced whom, but it sheds light on M~rx's specific view

of religion. From a comparison of Mar~ with Feuerback and Bauer,

I attempt to show both the intellectual debt to these two thinkers,

as well as the novelty of his own position. I argue that Marx

took the content of his critique of religion from Bauer, not

1
 2

Feuerbach. Part of that argument involves a refutation of a

commonly held misconception that Marx derived his critique of

religion from Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity. Rather,

I argue that Marx elaborated a theory of ideology from certain

features of Feuerbach's thought. To magnify the difference

between Marx and Feuerbach, I examine Marx's atheism in relation

to Bauer's atheism. Most significantly, I show that Marx assimilated

Bauer's macabre description of religion. As a result, his atheism,

unlike Feuerbach's, was of an extremely militant variety. After

analyzing the comparative influence of these tvJO formative thinkers

on Marx, I conclude this chapter by elucidating the distinctiveness

of his own attack on religion.

In Chap ter II, I de tail Marx's cri tiq U x 9 religion by

means of a chronological analysis of his major early works. I

concentrate mainly on his writings from 1841 through 1846, because

during that period, Marx articulated his attack on religion.

Occasional reference is made to Marx's later works in order to

illustrate the persistence of his critique as a theme in all of

his writings, but he made no significant innovations beyond 1846.

This detailed study is necessary to substantlate the general

argument presented in Chapter I.

Finally, in the Conclusion, I indicate some implications

of this study for the "Christian-Marxist" dialogue. Although it

 3

is beyond the scope of this thesis to enter into that debate

bet~veen "Christians" and "Marxists", I do point out some general

questions on which the dialogue should focus.

Since this thesis is limited to an historical study, it

will not be possible to examine other avenues to the complex

question of the relationship between Marx and religion. For

example, the work of Frederick Engels will be considered only in

those books which he wrote in collaboration with Marx, chiefly

The Holy Family and The German Ideology. It is not my concern

to ask whether Engels presents a different view elsewhere, nor

to allude to him to clarify Marx. Furthermore, I have been

careful to distinguish between an historical study and a

biographical approach grounded in psychology. In part, the

~"'!... .':; .... -

latter approach has been taken by Arend Th. van Leeuwen; e.g.,

in discussing the imagery of water in Marx 1 s poetry, he

suggests:

. investigation from a psycho-analytic viewpoint

is likely to discover a strong inclination towards
maternalistic symbols, arising out of a latent desire
to return to the pre-natal and pre-conscious bliss
of the womb. l

While this approach may be interesting in itself, it does not

speak to the point of this study. Thirdly, I do not deal with

the question of whether Marxism itself is a religion - a problem

1
Arend Th. van Leeuwen, Critique of Heaven (London, 1972),
p. 48.
 4

more suitable for sociological enquiry. Finally, with respect

to the "Christian-Marxist ll dialogue, I do not refer to the question

of the ultimate truth of Marx's critique of religion and society.

Fruther, within that debate, my thesis does not shed any light on

whether traditional Christianity is intrinsically incompatible

with Marxism. Nor does it touch on developments within Marxism

which only be labelled revisionism. My only concern in the body

of this thesis is looking at Marx himself--his own understanding

of atheism as it formed the structure of his early writings.

In the conclusion to this thesis, however, I do sketch briefly

some general areas of concern which this study presents to the

lIChristian-Marxistll dialogue.

'"" . .~"." .~.

 CHAPTER I

THE INFLUENCE OF BRUNO BAUER AND LUDWIG FEUERBACH ON KARL

MARX'S ATHEISM

I. Introduction

This chapter seeks to determine the precise nature of

Karl }furx's atheism by delineating the extent to which he draws

from Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach for his own quite dis-

tinctive critique of religion. It focuses on this large question

in a number of different ways. The crux of the discussion,

however, concerns the diametrically opposed descriptions of

religion found in the writings of Bauer and F~uerbach. While

both deny any supernatural content of religion, each still sees

Christianity as the height of religious development. Here, however,

the similarity ends. Feuerbach views Christianity as the apex of

religion, because the essence of man made up its content; Bauer

views Christianity as the apogee of religious alienation, because

man had no content. In other words, Bauer sees in religion an

expression of the worst in man, while Feuerbach finds an expression

of the best in man. One finds man's inhumanity and the other finds

the essence of humanity. Consequently, Bauer wants religion

abolished and Feuerbach wants it humanized. Marx, like Bauer,

5
 6

also finds hell in heaven. Likewise, both Marx and Bauer assail

heaven, loudly denouncing its inhumanity. Whereas the essential

humanity of religion results in Feuerbach's denial of atheism,

its essential inhumanity determines Bauer's and Marx's emphatic

repudiation of religion. Feuerbach's atheism earned the epithet

"pious", while Bauer and Marx could only be described as un-

compromising, militant atheists.

Feuerbach's impact on Marx comes after his break with

Bauer. It does not date from Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity,

his well-known critique of religion, but rather from Feuerbach's

later works, his lesser-known critique of Hegelian speculation.

His Essence was published in 1841, but not until 1843, after the

publication of Preliminary Theses for a Reform of Philosophy and

Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, does Marx assimilate

some of Feuerbach's ideas. In the main, Marx absorbs the idea of

Hegelian philosophy as the final transformation of theology. By

1846, Marx's critique of religion expands into a full-blown theory

of ideology which includes not simply theology but all forms of

religiosity, i.e., philosophy, ethics, political economy, etc.

This chapter goes on to elaborate these themes in some

detail. I will draw out the distinctiveness of Marx's own critique

of religion in the'conclusion to this chapter.

 7

II. Clarification of the Issue

While there is no doubt that Karl Marx was an atheist,

there is some question about the nature of Marx's atheism and

confusion concerning whether or not Marx's views on religion

underwent a considerable shift from his early to later works.

Was Marx actually a militant atheist and, if so, how does one

account for his brusque dismissal of religion at the writing

of the Manifesto of the Conmunist Party:

The charges against Communism made from a religious,

a philosophical, and generally, from an ideological
standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination. l

Nicholas Lobkowicz interprets this and other passages to mean

that Marx was not a militant atheist, that "[a]ny direct struggle
'if, :\ ~.' -,-

against religion . appeared to Marx as useless and mis-

2
placed. " As will be shown, however, this statement is

somewhat misleading, because Lobkowicz does not reckon with the

decisive influence of Bruno Bauer on the young Marx. David

McLellan correctly sees it was Bauer who proved formative for

Marx's essentially macabre understanding of religion and for his

3
militant atheism.

1
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist
Party, trans. Samuel Moore (Moscow, 1952), p. 72. Hereafter this
will be referred to as Manifesto.
2
Nicholas Lobkowicz, "Marx's Attitude toward Religion", in
Marx and the Western World, ed. Nicholas Lobkowicz (Notre Dame,
1967), p. 304.
3
See David McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx
(New York, 1969), p. 79. Hereafter this will be referred to as
Young Hegelians.
 8

It has been a common fault of not too recent Marxian

scholarship to see the Young Hegelians as second-rate thinkers

who wrote fuzzy polemics and not much else. In the particular

case of Bruno Bauer, these scholars have concentrated on the

4
so-called period of "pure criticism", seeing in this period

Bauer's primary work and neglecting his earlier writings which

5
had a profound influence on Marx's thinking about religion.

In addition, Ludwig Feuerbach has often tacitly been included

in the rank and file of Young Hegelians and LSwith says of

Feuerbach's works:

Measured by the standard of Hegel's history of

the "spirit", Feuerbach's massive sensualism must
seem as a step backward in comparison to Hegel's
conceptually organized idea, as a barbarization
of thought which replaces content by Rombast and
sentiment. 6

Finally, it has been claimed that from this assorted "bombast

and sentiment", Marx drew his critique of religion, but with

4
Between 1840-1843, Bauer designed his critiques to
effect immediate political change in Germany. However, after
the failures of radicalism, Bauer did shift in 1844 to a more
theoretical critique, "pure criticism", devoid of immediate
political impact.
5
See Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the
Intellectual Development of Karl Marx (2nd. ed.; Ann Arbor,
1962).
6
Karl LHwith; From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution
in Nineteenth-Century Thought, trans. David Green (3rd ed.; New
York, 1967), p. 80.
 9

this difference:

Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-

alienation, the duplication of the world into a
religious and secular world. His work consists in
resolving the religious world into its secular basis.
But the fact that the secular basis becomes separate
from itself and establishes an independent realm in
the clouds can only be explained by the cleavage and
self-contradictoriness of the secular basis. Thus
the latter must itself be both understood in its
contradiction and revolutionized in practice. 7

In short, according to this school of thought, Marx accepted

the basic features of Feuerbacht~ critique of religion, but moved

from it to the radical critique of society. Undeniably, Feuer-

bach exerted a direct influence on Marx, but this influence

actually w~s confined more to Marx's understanding of Hegel and

his later conception of ideology than to what Marx discerned as

the very content of religion. Thus, while Marx 'occasionally did

talk like a Feuerbachian about how religion functioned, it was

still from Bruno Bauer that Marx gathered the substance of his

critique of religion.

It may seem pedantic to haggle over Marx's intellectual

debts. Marx himself, however, was an extremely eclectic thinker

and it is of utmos~ importance to this discussion to locate the

primary sources of his atheism. To explicate: there is a

differentiation, frequently obscured by students of Marx, that

7
Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", in Writings of the
Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, trans. Lloyd Easton and
Kurt Guddat (New York, 1967), p. 401. Hereafter this will be
referred to as "Theses". I am going on to show this passage
should not be interpreted in this way.
 10

must be made between what Marx saw as the actual content of

religion and what he asserted about the historical demise of

8
Christianity. In the first case, Marx acknowledged that

Feuerbach discovered in religion an earthly kernel, but he

averred this earthly kernel was not what Feuerbach had designated

as the human essence. Rather, "[t]his state, this society, produce

religion which is an inverted world consciousness, because they

9
are an inverted world." Here, Marx sided with Bauer although

he substitu~ed the cleavages and self-contradictions in society

for those in Bauer's self-consciousness. According to Bauer,

religion was the illusory, distorted, and deformed creation of

man's consciousness divided against itself. For Marx, similarly,

religion idealized the contradictions in soci~ty __ .For both,

therefore, the content of religion was man's inhumanity. In the

second instance concerning the historical demise of Christianity,

let it suffice for now to note that Marx saw Christianity as an

ideology peculiar to feudalism, but not to capitalism. Seen

from the historical perspective taken by Marx, Christianity was

theoretically demolished by the Enlightenment and practically

by the French Revolution. The Marxian conception of ideology,

however, is too difficult a subject to take up en passant: it

8
According to Marx, Christianity was the apex of religious
development, the most extreme form of religious alienation. The
variety of Christianity which Marx was most familiar with was a
very other-worldly Lutheranism, predominant in Germany during the
1840's.
9
Karl Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's
'Philosophy of Right': Introduction", in Early Writings, trans.
T, B. Bottomore (New York, 1964), p. 43. Hereafter this will be
referred to as "Introduction" ..
 11

will require a detailed discussion of Marx's historicized version

10
of Feuerbach' s theory of projection.

III. Marx's Concept of Religion Per Se

(a) Affinity to and Divergence from Bruno Bauer

To return, then, to the question of the content and

militancy of Marx's atheism: as previously suggested, it is

necessary to make a close examination of the relationship of

Marx to Bruno Bauer to deal with this topic. Like the other

Young Hegelians, Bauer's studies of theology took place within

the Hegelian edifice. The Young Hegelians, Lobkowicz observes,

" . . were Christians insofar as, and becausKH they were

11
Hegelians." Bauer himself studied theology for three years

under Hegel and he commenced his academic career as an orthodox

Hegeliati: with a lectureship in theology at Berlin. By 1839,

however, Bauer began to have doubts about the Hegelian recon-

ciliation between philosophy and theology. At this time, he

wrote a pamphlet attacking Hengstenberg, head of the orthodox-

pietistic party at Berlin; Bauer claimed inthi q article there

was no ground for similarity between the Hegelian and orthodox

10
See ahead pp. 36-39, and pp. 104-113.
11
Lobkowicz, p. 322.
 12

party's approach to the Bible. This pamphlet precipitated Bauer's

removal to Bonn; the move was made by the Minister of Culture,

Altenstein, to protect Bauer from the wrath of the powerful

pietistic party. In his next works, Kritik des Johannes (1840)

and Kritik der Synoptiker (1841-1842), Bauer broke entirely

r
with Christianity, conceiving " his works as an expose of

the irrationality of Christianity when compared to the present

12
stage of self--consciousness. 1l In consequence, Bauer was dismissed

.from Bonn. He spent the next two years writing and from that

period came his article, Die Judenfrage, and an extremely vitriolic

attack on Christianity, Das entdeckte Christentum. Finally, in

1844, Bauer collaborated with his brother Edgar to produce the

Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung. It is only in this review that

~ ~:. ""-' -~~

Bauer resorted to "pure criticism", disregarding immediate

13
political goals.

Marx's acquaintance with Bruno Bauer dated from his student

days at Berlin and extended well into the latter part of 1842. It

is of special interest to this discussion that "Marx's period of

study of religion and philosophy corresponds precisely to the

14
period of his friendship with Bruno Bauer. ~ " Marx knew'

12
Joung Hegelians, pp. 49-50.
13
See ibid., pp. 48-50.
14 --
Ibid., pp. 69-70.
 13

Bauer through the Doctor's Club at Berlin and he attended Bauer's

lectures at the university. Later, when Bauer was removed to Bonn,

the two kept up a close correspondence. Marx, in fact, hoped to

obtain a university post at Bonn through Bauer's influence.

The major work of Marx which survived this period was his

doctoral dissertation, The Difference between the Democritean and

Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. Clearly, this work was inspired

by Bauer. In the foreword to the dissertation, Marx referred to

15
the Middle Ages as "the period of consummate unreason". In

this characterization, Marx remained true to Bauer: Christianity

was irrational; it was the very expression of irrationality. Hence,

any attempt to reconcile theology with philosophy demeaned philosophy,

insulted reason. Marx was quite vehement on A

this
' - .
point and made

not the slightest concession to theology:

Philosophy does not make a secret of it. The profession

of Prometheus: HIn simple words, I hate the pack of
gods," is its own profession, its own aphorism against
all divine and earthly gods who do not acknowledge human
self-consciousness as the highest divinity. It allows
no rivals. 16

This was hardly the profession of a passionless atheist.

Indeed, from Bauer's letters to Marx, it appears the

latter was spending a great deal of time studying religion. Marx

15
Karl Marx,
Epicurean Philosophy
Hague, 1967), p. 61.
Dissertation.
16
Dissertation, p. 62.
 14

was preparing a review of a book by K. P. Fischer entitled Die

Idee der Gottheit as well as a critique of Hegel's Religionsphilosophie.

But more important, he and Bauer actually planned to edit a journal

called Archiv des Atheismus. Finally, Marx probably collaborated

with Bauer to produce Die Posaune des jlingsten Gerichts liber Hegel

den Atheisten und Antichristen. This tract was written from the

standpoint of an archpietist and intended to show that Hegel was

a revolutionary and an atheist. In addition, Bauer and Marx

planned a sequel to the Posaune and for his part, Marx delved
17
into the study of Christian art.

This biographical information has been marshalled to

illustrate two points. First, while Marx's knowledge of religion

~'" ... _-~,

was couched in Hegelianism, he seems to have had a fairly wide

knowledge of the subject. Second, it should be evident by now

that Marx was not a "Sunday-atheist." One does not make open

proclamations of atheism, intend a journal called Archiv des

Atheismus, and defy any union of philosophy with theology unless

one is a passionate, that is, militant atheist. To argue, as

Lobkowicz does, that militant atheism is contingent upon a prior

religious experience, a Christian not a rationalistic father,

coupled with an abrupt throwing off of Christianity after great

17
See David McLellan, Marx Before Marxism (New York,
1971), pp. 68-70. Also, Young Hegelians, p. 71.
 15

inner turmoil, resulting, finally, in a life-long passion for

writing atheistic books, simply excludes the militancy of Marx~s

18
atheism through arbitrary definition.

A more serious objection to my thesis could be raised

by arguing that Marx began as a militant atheist, but made a

turnabout in his more mature works. Certainly, by 1848, religion

did not seem a pressing problem and even in November 1842 in a

letter to Arnold Ruge, referring to the contributions of the

Freien to the RheinischeZeitung, Marx did say:

I then asked that religion should be criticized more

within a critique of the political situation than
19
the political situation within a critique of religion.

Perhaps, then, it would be well to conceive Marx's attitude

toward religion on a continuum, spanning the "course of his works

from 1841-1846. At one end of the continuum, we find the militant

and at the other extreme, the mellowed atheist. Although con-

venient, this schema is also inadequate.

A more satisfactory explanation ofMarx's attitude toward

religion, however, can be found through an analysis of the

following well-known passage of 1843:

18
See Lobkowicz, pp. 303-335.
19
Karl Marx, Early Texts, trans. David McLellan (New York,
1971), p. 53.
 16

For Germany, the criticism of religion has been largely

completed; and the criticism of religion is the premise
of all criticism. 20

Briefly, what Marx meant here was this: the theoretical critique

of religion was necessary and crucial, since man cannot change

the world until he rids himself of his illusions about it. In

this sense, the religious critique was of vital importance both

in itself and as a model for secular illusions. It was the pro-

ject-of the Enlightenment to outline the theoretical critique

of religion and the achievement of the Young Hegelians, especially

Bruno Bauer, to complete that task. Under Bauer's tutorship,

Marx had studied religion, deemed it both inhuman and irrational,

and attacked it theoretically. By 1843, Marx considered there

was little left to say about religion per se~ therefore, he did

not write additional, exclusively atheistic reviews. However,

this did not lessen the intensity of his atheism, but rather it

directed his attack to the inverted world "whose spiritual aroma

21
is religion". In other words, religion had been attacked

directly and exposed as inhuman, now the task at hand was to expose

the contradictions in society and to revolutionize it. Unlike

Bauer, Marx thought only when society was revolutionized would

religion ultimately disappear.

20
"Introduction", p. 43.
21
Ibid.
 17

At first glance, this last statement seems to contradict

what was said earlier, namely, that Christianity expired on the

eve of the French Revolution with the arrival of the bourgeoisie.

This seeming contradiction can be resolved in two main ways.

First, Marx was in the habit of talking as if the future, or

better, what he saw the future to be, was the present. For

example, Marx talked as if there was a full-grown proletariat

in Germany during the 1840's when, in fact, the first rumblings

of the proletariat barely could be heard._ Likewise with religion:

as Marx saw it, the very existence of the bourgeoisie would

eliminate Christianity, since the bourgeoisie would leave

" . remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked
.22, .
~In short, the
A
self-interes t, than callous 'cash payment' .li .<

bourgeoisie were in the process of replacing religious alienation,

Christianity, with the final and most complete alienation of man,

man as merely Kapital. Second, in his article on the question

of the Jews, Marx claimed that religion was now the spirit of

civil society:

It has become what it was at the beginning, an expression

of the fact that man is separated from the community,
from himself and from other men. 23

22
Manifesto, p. 44.
23
Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question", in Early Writings,
p. 15. Hereafter this will be referred to as "Jewish Question".
 18

According to Marx, the real essence of Christi.anity was nothing

other than egoism and selfish need and this was precisely the

spirit of civil society, the sphere of self-interest. In this

sense, it could be said that the bourgeoisie inaugurated practical

Christianity. Thus, Marx could argue that the spirit of religion

would persist in its various guises until society was finally

revolutionized.

In sum: the militancy of Marx's atheism has often been

played down, overlooked, or misinterpreted. Some Marxist

scholars, for example Roger Garaudy, have played down Marx's

atheism in order to make Marxism more palatable to those Christians

2t~
involved in the "Christian-Marxist" dialogue. Another reason

for this tendency has been the paucity of reljaplepcholarship

on the Young Hegelian movement, particularly on the most prominent

member, Bruno Bauer. On this account, until recently it was easy

to overlook Bauer's influence on Marx, especially if one took

Marx at his word and evaluated Bauer's works from what Marx and

Engels said about them in The Holy Family and The German Ideology.

The following passage from The Holy Family is indicative:

And despite all its invectives against dogmatism, it

condemns itself to dogmatism and even to feminine
dogmatism. It is and remains an old woman, faded,
widowed Hegelian philosophy, which paints and adorns
her wrinkled and repugnant abstraction of a body and

"24
See Roger Garaudy, From Anathema to Dialogue:" A"Marxist
Challenge to the Christian Churches, trans. Luke O'Neill (New York,
1966).
 19

ogles allover Germany in search of a wooer. 25

Lastly, and strangely enough, Marx's famou~ line in The German

Ideology, "[l]ife is not determined by consciousness, but

26
consciousness by life ll , has been taken to mean man's con-

sciousness is of little importance. Here, Marx has been grossly

misinterpreted by his mechanistic followers. For the author of

Das Kapital, it was very important that men saw the world for

what it was and religious consciousness was a false way of looking

at the world.

(b) Place Reserved for Atheism Within Marx's System

This last topic, that is, Marx's designation of religion

as an important form of false consciousness brings us to a con-

-~ .1; "'.' '"

sideration of Ludwig Feuerbach's influence on Marx. Before

turning directly to Feuerbach, however, a final word should be

said about the place of atheism within the Marxian system.

While it is beyond the scope of the present work to evaluate in

what sense Marx's philosophy must be perforce atheistic, we can

25
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Holy Family, trans.
R. Dixon (Moscow, 1956), p. 30. Hereafter this will be referred
to as Holy Family.
26
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology,
trans. S. Ryazanskaya (Moscow, 1964), p. 38. Hereafter this will
be referred to as German Ideology.
 20

ask where Marx himself placed atheism within his system. In The

Holy Family, Marx lauded Pierre Bayle for seeing an atheistic

society is both possible and on one level, desirable: it is possible,

because atheists can be respectable men and desirable, since not

27
atheism, but religion debases man. This is not to imply, how-

ever, that Marx sympathasized with the attempt to make atheism

into an end in itself. Atheism, rather, is just a step in the

right direction; it is both a prerequisite for communism and later

an essential element of con~unist society. To quote Marx:

"Communism begins where atheism begins . . , but atheism is at

28
the outset still far from being communism. Put in another

way and this exemplifies Marx's dialectical understanding of

.A .:.- .......~

history: communism is the negation of capitalism and atheism,

the negation of religion. Both complement each other and represent,

for Marx, the next stage of history, that is, communist society.

Neither, however, witness the final stage of human development,

the classless society. In.the Third of the "Paris Manuscripts",

Marx made this point quite explicitly:

Once the essence of man and of nature, man as a natural

being and nature as a human reality~ has become evident
in the practical life, in sense experience, the quest for
an alien being, a being above man and nature (a quest

27
Holy Family, p. 171.
28
Karl Marx, "Paris Manuscripts", in Early Writings, p. 156.
 21

which is an avowal of the unreality of man and

nature) becomes impossible in practice. Atheism, as
a denial of this unreality, is no longer meaningful,
for atheism is a negation6f God and seeks to assert
by this negation the existence of man. Socialism
no longer requires such a roundabout method; it begins
from the theoretical and practical sense perception
of man and nature as essential beings. It is positive
human self-consciousness, no longer a self-consciousness
attained through the negation of religion; just as the
real life of man is positive and no longer attained
. through the negation of private property, through
communism. 29

In other words, atheism, which asserts the existence of man

through the negation of God, becomes an impossibility in the

classless society, because that society is the realization of

30
man as a social being. In sum (following Marx's dictum in The

German Ideology that repetitio est mater studiorum), we have seen

A J ... _. ,",
that Marx was a militant atheist and that he consciously reserved

a place for atheism within his system, that is, communism and

atheism go hand in hand:

IV. Influence of Ludwig Feuerbach and Wider Implications for

Marx's Critique of Religion

29
"Paris Manuscripts", pp. 166-167; This passage has been
quoted at length, because Nicholas Lobkowicz cites this same
passage out of context and implies that atheism is not a consciously
integral part of the Marxian system. See Lobkowicz, p. 304.
30
See "Excerpt-Notes of 1844", in Writings of the Young
Marx on Philosophy and Society, pp. 271-272, where Marx elaborates
on the term "communal being", das Gemeinwesen.
 22

(a) Outline of the Influence of Feuerbach

To turn, then, to Marxts debt to Ludwig Feuerbach: Marx

had read The Essence of Christianity as early as 1841, but

apparently he was not taken by it. Certainly, one does not detect

a strong Feuerbachian influence on Marxts dissertation. Not until

January 1842 in a short piece, "Luther as Arbiter between Strauss

and Feuerbach", do we find an explicit statement of Marxts

attachment to Feuerbach. There, Marx agreed with him that "

miracle is the realization of a natural or human wish in a

31
supranaturalistic way". Citing Luther's commentary on Luke 7,

Marx maintained that that commentary could be interpreted as an

apology for Feuerbach's Essence. On another level, though, Marxts

essay was nleant less as a panegyric for Feuerbachts book than as

a lunge at the speculative theologian, D. F. Strauss. In other

words, Marx could not theoretically accept Feuerbachts complex

reduction of the "divine" to the human essence, but he could and

did use Feuerbach polemically to refute Strauss. This refutation

was based on Marx's acceptance of Feuerbach's characterization of

Hegel as a speculative theologian. To explicate further:

Feuerbach distinguished between religion ana theology, and between

ordinary theology and speculative theology or philosophy. For

Feuerbach, religion represented the highest aspirations of man;

31
Karl Marx, "Luther as Arbiter between Strauss and
Feuerbach", in Writings of the Young MarxonPhilosophy and
Society, p. 94.
 23

consequently, theology, which confounded the fact that religion

was man-made, must be considered an aberration of religion which

reached the height of its deviancy in what Feuerbach termed the

speculative theology of Hegel's idealism. While Marx never could

Inake this distinction, he did herald Feuerbach's seeing that

speculative philosophy was nothing other than the last cover for

theology. van Leeuwen perceptively remarks that Marx took ".

32
religion, in its philosophical guise, in deadly earnest."

Nevertheless, there is a major reason why Marx could

never totally accept Feuerbach's distinction: obviously for

Marx, religion could never represent the highest aspirations

of mankind. This point is crucial to my argument. For Marx,

. ~ ~ - ~

like Bauer, religion represented the worst fn mankind. Feuer-

bach's primary concern, on the contrary and in contrast to Marx,

was always with religion. He did not, however attempt to prove

that there was no God, because this was the task and the accom-

plishment of the Enlightenment. Besides, Feuerbach stated,

practically speaking, the existence of GDd had been denied since

the Reformation, that is to say, Luther's God was a God for man.

Yet, Feuerbach did react vehemently against those critics (whether

Hegelian or Christian) of his Essence of Christianity who labelled

him an atheist. Those who have read him as an atheist, he

32
van Leeuwen, p. 185.
 24

asserted in the preface of the second edition of his Essence,

have entirely misunderstood the intention of his book. Those

who negated religion also negated man. In fact, Feuerbach first

33
selected the title "Know Thyself" for The Essence of Christianity.

This kind of self-understanding, doubtless, was not found congenial

by the maker of Promethean declarations of atheism.

Thus, Feuerbachts influence on Marx came not so much from

The Essence of Christianity, but really from Feuerbach's later

works, Preliminary Theses for a Reform of Philosophy and Principles

of the Philosophy of the Future. It was only after Marx broke

with Bauer that he grabbed hold of Feuerbach, but this was the
34
Feuerbach of the Thesen and GrundsYtze. In short, what Marx
'A .~ .... -. ....'

admired in Feuerbach was not his critique of religion, but his

method of getting at Hegel. As Marx saw it, the other Young

Hegelians had attacked Hegel from the outside, but only Feuerbach,
35
via what Shlomo Avineri terms his "transformative method",

has dealt with Hegel in terms of his own system. Feuerbach

33
Hook, p. 234.
34
See "Paris Manuscripts", p. 196.
35
Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of
Karl Marx (Cambridge, 1968), p. 13.
 25

observed that the concrete in Hegel was always alienated; from

this observation, Feuerbach specified alienation as the epistemo-

36
logical inversion of the subject-object relationship. Put

differently: according to Feuerbach, ijegel abstracted thought

out of time and space and made it into a subject, and then made

being into a predicate of thought. Hegel, in a word, ignored

37
the real human subject. One result of this inversion was the

mystification of the actual subject-object relation and this very

mystification expressed,both for Feuerbach and Marx, the aliena-

tion of the human subject.

In the Third of the tlparis Manuscripts", Marx, paraphrasing

Feuerbach, said much the same thing of Hegel's Phenomenology:

. this process must have a bearer, a subject;

but the subject first emerges as a fesuit~ This result,
the subject knowing itself as absolute self-consciousness,
is therefore God, absolute spirit, the self-knowing and
self-manifesting idea. Real man and real nature become
mere predicates, symbols of this concealed unreal man
and unreal nature. Subject and predicate have, therefore,
an inverted relation to each other . . 38

In simple language, here, Marx agreed with Feuerbach in three

important respects. First, Marx concurred that being precedes

36
Ibid., p. 103.
37
It will be seen later that Marx disagreed with Feuer-
bach's definition of this real human subject.
38
"Paris Manuscripts", p. 214.
 26

thought; it is man who thinks, not man the thinker. Against

Hegel, Marx asserted, secondly, that nature and man are not

two distinct entities. Rather, following Feuerbach, Marx saw

man as a part of nature. Third (and this is the main reason

for the preceding digression on Hegel), when Marx talked about

real man and nature as mere predicates within the Hegelian

system, this statement is equivalent to saying that the actual

alienation of man and nature is expressed ideally within the

Hegelian edifice.

Both Feuerbach and Marx, to repeat, thought speculative

idealism was merely a thinly disguised theology. Indeed,

speculative idealism as set forth by Hegel and his followers

was the final transformation of theology, t.e" i~st theoretical

bastion of religion. Both, moreover, saw a distinct relationship

between theology and the alienation of man. Feuerbach, in fact,

saw the alienation of man exclusively, and here he differed

radically from Marx, in terms of religion and theology.

According to Feuerbach, religion is a human product,

the result of human activity, or to use his own terminology, the

result of human projections. The true essence of religion, he

reasoned in his later writings, is grounded in human experience,

specifically in man's feelings of helplessness, and dependence

on other men and nature, as well as in man's fear of death.

 27

Given the tenuous state of his existence, man projects his God,

which Feuerbach referred to as the "divinel l , in order to cope

with the human situation. Seen from this perspective, "[r]eligion

39
is the dream of the human mind", or again, it is "the childlike
40
condition of humanity". Hence, religion is a dream, a fantasy

of the imagination - a fantasy, however, in a very practical rather

than a theoretical sense. Religion is the creation of man in

emotional response to real human needs. It is wish-fulfillment.

(b) Feuerbach on Religion - Positive and Negative Critique

In The Essence of Christianity, Feuerbach's critique of

religion took place on two levels: the first was "The True or

Anthropological Essence of Religion", and the,s_ecqnd,

A .
"The False

or Theological Essence of Religionll We will summarize his

argument and discuss what Feuerbach meant by religion as aliena-

tion in order to demonstrate to what extent Marx could have

borrowed from Feuerbach for his own understanding of religious

alienation. For Feuerbach, the true, anthropological essence

of religion is the human essence stripped of all limitations. He

deduced this anthropological source of religion through an

analysis of the content of the divine being, the Christian God.

39
Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans.
George Eliot (New York, 1957), p. xxxix.
40
lbid., p. 13.
 28

His argument was simply this: the predicates of the divine nature

are identical to the predicates of human nature. The only differ-

ence is that the divine predicates are stripped of all human

limitations; consequently, religion is nothing else than the

"antithesis between human nature in general and the human

41
individual". The difference between the subject and predicates,

moreover, is solely the distinction between existence and essence.

The predicates, however, are the truth of the subject. From this,

Feuerbach concluded:

Now, when it is shown that what the subject is lies

entirely in the attributes of the subject; that is,
the predicate is the true subject; it is also proved
that if the divine predicates are attributes of the
human nature, the subject of those predicates is also
the human nature. But the divine pr~di~ates are
partly general, partly personal. The general predicates
are the metaphysical but these serve only as external
points of support to religion; they are not the
characteristic definitions of religion. It is the
personal predicates alone which constitute the essence
of religion - in which the Divine Being is the object
of religion. 42

In his treatment of the metaphysical and personal predicates of

the divine, Feuerbach recognized two roots of religion. Nearly

in the same breath, however, he dismissed the metaphysical predi-

cates and affirmed the personal predicates; Feuerbach identified

41
Ibid. , p. 14.
42--
Ibid. , p. 25.
 29

the subjective essence of religion with feeling. Yet, the

ontological attributes, such as omnipotence, omniscience, infinity,

and perfection of the divine remained problematic throughout

his works. One way he attempted to resolve the problem was to

attribute the personal predicates of the divine to individual

man and the ontological predicates of the divine nature to generic

man.

At other times, and this takes us to Feuerbach's negative

critique of religion, he identified the ontological predicates

of the divine with man's reason, stripped of all human limitations.

It is ordinary theology and speculative philosophy which posit

the ontological attributes of the divine. While religion is the

projection of man's will and emotions, theolog:9' is-the projection

43
of man's reason. It is theology (used in Feuerbach's sense to

include speculative philosophy), whose primary concern_is with the

existence of the divine, that obscures the true, anthropological

essence of religion.

Given this outline of Feuerbach's critique of religion, we

can now summarize the salient features of his conception of religion

as alienation. First, Feuerbach characterized religion as false

consciousness:

43
Feuerbach viewed man traditionally. Thus, the three
faculties of man are cognition, conation, and affection.
 30

But when religion - consciousness of God - is designated

as the self-consciousness of man, this is not to be under-
stood as affirming that the religious man is directly
aware of this identity; for on the contrary, ignorance
of it is fundamental to the peculiar nature of religion. 44

Second, since the predicates of the divine and human natures are

identical, "[t]o enrich God, man must become poor; that God may be
45
all, man must be nothing." For example,

[t]he Virgin represents the love the monk denies himself

in this world. The nun becomes the bride of Christ, i.e.,
substitutes an unearthly love for real earthly love. God
is given the personality and dignity that man denies to
himself. 46

Third, not only is religion a form of false consciousness which

functions to. impoverish man, even the divine predicates are

47
distorted in God. Just as in the Incarnation "love conquers God",

Feuerbach stated so also should man reject Godt

As God has renounced himself out of love, so we, out

of love should renounce God; for if we do not sacrifice
God to love, we sacrifice love to God, and, in spite
of the predicate of love we have the God, the evil being
of religious fanaticism ..l 8

Lastly, because theology seeks to acquire a theoretical basis for

the distinction between God and man, alienation increases propor-

tionately with. theological development. By setting God over and

44
Feuerbach, p. 13.
45
Ibid., p. 26.
46--
Eugene Kamenka, The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach (New
York, 1970), pp. 51-52.
47
Feuerbach, p. 53.
48
Ibid.
 31

against man, however, theology contradicts itself in that it sets

itself up over and against the spirit of religion.

(c) What Marx did and did not Take from Feuerbach

It should be evident by now that Marx, following his

former teacher Bruno Bauer, could not accept the last two features

of Feuerbach's notion of alienation. What Marx could not accept

in Feuerbach was his distinction between religion and theology. He

could not accept this distinction because he rejected the very

idea of a true, anthropological essence of religion. He could

never say with Feuerbach that those who negate religion also negate

man." Rather, for Marx, the negation of religion, atheism, was

preliminary to the affirmation of man, cOllununiJm~ ~.' Or the other

hand, what Marx could accept and did amplify were the first two

elements of Feuerbach's concept of alienation. For Marx, religion

was an important form of false consciousness, an ideology; it

was also a human product which functioned to impoverish and debase

man.

This last statement, however, deserves some qualification.

According to Marx, religion both impoverishea and debased man. At

times, even Feuerbach was willing to admit that religion debased

man, but for the most part, he concentrated on its positive aspects.

In the main, Feuerbach wanted not to abolish, but only to purify

religion. Feuerbach simply wanted man to reclaim his alienated

 32

attributes and to return to himself. Marx t on the. contrarYt

never granted any dignity to religion and rarely admitted that

religion had any positive function at all. Concerning the latter

point, with the exception of one line in the "Introduction" to

his Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right': "[r]eligiou~

suffering is at the same time an eXpression of real suffering

49
and a protest against real suffering", Marx never again

mentioned any other positive role religion might.play in history.

Thus, in the context of Marx's system, it made no sense whatsoever

to talk about the purification of religion.

What,did make sense to Marx was the central place Feuer-

bach reserved for man t for anthropology, in his writings. Through

A ~ .... ~. t

his transformative method t Feuerbach had reinstated the human

subject. With regard to his life-long interest, Feuerbach repeatedly

stressed it was man who was the beginning, centre, and end of

religion. Louis Dupr~ correctly sees Marx and Feuerbach agreed,

that the real alienation is not the alienation of consciousness

It

50
but the alienation of man". Feuerbach never tired of insisting

that religion was a hu~an product t the result of human creativity.

Both Feuerbach and Marx t however t observed that religion appeared to

49
"Introduction", p. 43.
50
Louis Dupre, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism
(New York, 1966), p. 108.
 33

man as independent of his own productivity. Man's own product,

his god, confronted him as an alien and hostile being. The more man

attributed to this alien being, furthermore, the less he had to

51
himself. It is this description of Feuerbach's which Marx took

over and employed in the well-known section on "Alienated Labour"

in the "Paris Manuscripts".

Yet, the question arises, then, as to how Marx could reject

the thrust of Feuerbach's critique of religion and still retain

52
this particular description of religious alienation. In the

sixth, seventh, and ninth of his "Theses on Feuerbach", Marx

implicitly justified his usage of this interpretation. In the

sixth thesis, Marx contended that because Feuerbach did not grasp
:1 ~_. " 53
the human essence as "the ensemble of social relationships", he

was compelled "to abstract from the historical process and to

establish religious feeling as something self-contained, and to

54
presuppose an abstract-isolated-individual". Marx reasoned in

51
See "Paris Manuscripts", p. 122.
52
It is perhaps worth noting that Marx employed this
description in his discussion of the worker's alienation from
nature. It was Feuerbach who emphasized that'- man was a part of
nature. However, Feuerbach saw man's relation to nature as
passive, while Marx saw it as active.
53
"Theses", p. 402.
54
Ibid.
 34

the seventh and ninth theses that this isolated individual belonged

to a definite form of society, that is, civil society. From this,

Marx appears to conclude that Feuerbach~s discussion of this

aspect of religious alienation was applicable insofar as it did

approximate a description of the worker's alienation from nature.

That is, his idea of man's impoverishment by an alien being was an

adequate conceptualization of the worker's situation in civil

society. This alien being, however, was not God, claimed Marx,

but the commodity.

Nevertheless, by drawing the analogy between religious and

secular alienation, Marx parted company with Feuerbach. By using

religious alienation as a paradigm to analyze secular alienation,

Marx made a marked return to Bruno Bauer. The extent to which

Bauer permanently influenced the structure of Marx's thought can

be seen by the frequency which Marx discussed secular alienation

in terms of religious alienation. Bauer's influence on Marx

in this regard cannot be over-estimated.

The very fact that Marx
55
could call the spirit of bureaucracy "theological" or the members
56
of the political state "religious" derived . ~rom Bauer, not

Feuerbach. Similar examples of Marx's paradigmatic use of religious

alienation, moreover, abound in his writings. In The Poverty of

55
Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right',
trans. Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge, 1970), p.
46. Hereafter this will be referred to as Critique.
56
"Jewish Question", p. 20.
 35

Philosophy, to use a third illustration, Marx compared economists

to theologians: the economist sees bourgeois institutions as

natural and feudal ones as artificial just as the theologian sees

57
his religion as true and any other religion as false. Thus,

while Feuerbach made an illuminating suggestion about the functioning

of an alien being, it was Bauer who taught Marx how to make practical

use of this description:

Thus the criticism of heaven is transformed into the

criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the
criticism of -law., and the criticism of theology into
the criticism of po1itics. S8

This is not meant to belittle ,the impact of some of

Feuerbach's insights on Marx. As previously mentioned, Marx

.A ~ ~.' ~.

adopted Feuerbach's trans formative method and took up the theme

of the impoverishment of man by an alien being. But more important

and in our view, to conclude this section, the most important

borrowing by Marx from Feuerbach was this: Marx took up and

elaborated a theory of ideology to a large extent from Feuerbach's

theory of projection and evasion. Feuerbach, it should not be

forgotten, thought religion was a human product, the result of

human projections. After man projected the divine, however, the

latter, he observed, confronted man as if it existed from time

57
Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, eds. C. P. Dutt
and V. Chattopadhyaya (London, n.d.), p. 102.
58
"Introduction", p. 44.
 36

immemorial. It is this view of the divine as independent of

human productivity that Feuerbach termed "false consciousness ll

Marx absorbed Feuerbach's theory of projection and his

notion of false consciousness with two qualifications. First,

not man in pristine nature, not man in isolation, but man in

society produces religion so that it is a social product. Second,

Marx historicized Feuerbach's theory of projection and turned it

into a full-blown, if imprecise, theory of ideology. Concerning

the second point, Marx frequently equated ideology with false

consciousness, but did not limit false consciousness to strictly

religious consciousness. According to Marx, every epoch had its

own ideologies, representing the ideas of the dominant class:

A!< ~.

For instance, in an age and in a country where royal

power, aristocracy and bourgeoisie are contending for
mastery and where, therefore, mastery is shared, the
doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the
dominant idea and is expressed as an "eternal law".59

Here, he implied that only societies with classes could have

ideologies. Yet, Marx called religion an "ideology" " . . and

did not deny that there are religions in primitive and classless
60
societies." Thus, for Marx, it would seem religion is an

ideology no matter whether it emerges in a primitive or class

society, because religion is the classic form of false consciousness.

59
German Ideology, pp. 60-61.
60
John P1amenatz, Ideology (London, 1971), p. 26.
 37

More specifically, in the "Introduction" to hisCritique ofHegel's

'PhilosophyofRight', Marx characterized religious consciousness

61
as "false ll , because it is an lIinverted world consciousness ll

In The German Ideology, moreover, he applied this same

description to ideology in general and discussed its genesis:

If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear

upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon
arises just as much from their historical life-process
as the inversion of the objects on the retina does from
their physical life-process. 62

While it is clear from this passage that ideology arises because

society itself is in some sense inverted, it is not so clear

exactly what Marx meant by an ideological lIinversion ll Is an

ideology merely an ideal reflection of a topsy-turvey world?

'" .: >.

Although he did not take up this question per se, it would appear

from his writings that Marx considered the reflectional theory

of ideology too simple. It is too simple because the prime function

of an ideology is to legitimate the status quo and it does this

basically by presenting the status quo as natural and in most epochs,

preordained. Hence, ideologies function to conceal the. true state

of affairs, namely, that world history is the creation of man

through human labour, that all mature societies have been dominated

by class interests, and that all class societies are transitory.

Feudal society, for example, gave way to civil society; the

feudal nobility and clergy lost their priviledged position to the

61
"Introduction", p. 43.
62
German Ideology, P' 37.
 38

bourgeoisie. When the medieval period came to an end, it follows

from what just has been said, its ideologies also ceased to exist.

Using this reasoning, Marx could say that the bourgeoisie did

away with Christianity. According to Marx, if the proletariat

II
ever had any theoretical notions, e.g., religion, etc.,
63
these have now long been dissolved by circumstances." These

circumstances are the bourgeois conditions of production. The

bourgeoisie have substituted naked and brutal exploitation

" for exploitation, veiled by religious and political

64
II
illusions However, Marx implied elsewhere in The German

Ideology and the Manifesto that the bourgeoisie have not been

entirely successful in getting rid of religion. Marx stated,

~ Ji_....-_. -.

for instance, that II [the bourgeoisie] destroyed as far as possible

ideology, religion, morality, etc., and where it could not do

65
this, made them into a palpable lie. II If pressed, Marx would

most likely account for this inconsistency by arguing that

Christianity still persisted, because the bourgeoisie had not

developed to their full potential. Anyway, Marx suggested there

was a qualitative difference between feudal and bourgeois

Christianity. For the bourgeoisie, religion is a "palpable lie",

63
Ibid., p. 52.
64--
Manifesto, pp. 44-45.
65
German Ideology, p. 75.
 39

66
a "brougeois prejudicel l , and the priest is its "paid ~vage
67
labourer". Thus, where the bourgeoisie have not yet destroyed

religion, they use religion to suit their o~~ purposes and .ignore

it when it does not.

(d) Summary of the Real Direction of Feuerbach's Influence on the

Marxian Critique of Religion

In sum: a great deal of attention has been devoted to

Ludwig Feuerbach in order to clear up two misconceptions about his

influence on Marx. First, it is incorrect to say that Marx took

Feuerbach's critique of religion and applied it to politics. What

Marx took from Feuerbach and this was taken from his later works,
~ 5!";'-' '"
was his transformative method; he applied this method to Hegel's

political philosophy. Second, as emphasized in my discussion of

The Essence of Christianity, Marx did not accept the thrust of

Feuerbach's analysis of religion, namely, Feuerbach's effort to

humanize religion. Marx's intellectual debt to Feuerbach, rather,

lies more in the descriptive features of Feuerbach's specification

of religion as alienation. Feuerbach described the workings of

an alien being and presented Marx with the outline for a theory of

ideology.

66
Manifesto, p. 58.
67
Ibid., p. 45.
 40

v. Conclusion

Essentially, what sets Marx's critique of religion apart

from those of both Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach is his novel

understanding of religion as ideology. Although he did not use

the actual term 'ideology' until 1845-46, the concept was seminal

in --articles written as early as 1842. By 1846, Marx pulled to-

gether all the strands of his theory in the work entitled The

German Ideology.

Because Marx understood religion as ideology, he thought

both Bauer and Feuerbach overestimated the impact that their

critiques of religion would have on effecting radical change in

.~ .1: .... ~ .. ":

society. If religion was simply a symptom of man's alienation

in society, Marx reasoned that the theoretical critique of religion

could not eradicate man's real alienation--his socio-economic

alienation. Fruthermore, since Christianity was the distorted

reflection of the feudal relations of production, Marx saw that

it would soon be out-moded anyway, when the bourgeoisie wrested

complete control from the feudal nobility. ~he bourgeoisie

would eliminate Christianity by substituting bourgeois in its

place; that is, by replacing theology with political economy.

Unlike both Bauer and Feuerbach, Marx reasoned that ideologies

would persist as long as classes persisted. Just as theology

 41

legitimated the domination of the feudal nobility and clergy,

political economy would legitimate the domination of the

bourgeoisie. In the end, Marx argued that only the radical

critique of society could complete the critique of ideology

which includes not only religion, but also all forms of secular

illusion.
 CHAPTER II

THE MARXIAN CRITIQUE OF RELIGION: 1841-1846

I. Introduction

In this chapter, I will closely follow Karl Marx's

critique of religion through his writings from 1841-1846. The

following works are considered in some detail: Marx's doctoral

dissertation, The Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean

Philosophy of Nature (1841); two articles written during 1842,

"Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction" and "The

Leading Article in No. 179 of the KHlnische Zeitung: Religion,

Free Press, and Philosophyll; Critique of HegeL's..' Philosophy of

Right' (1843); "On the Jewish Question" (1843); "Contribution to

the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right': Introduction"

(1843); "Paris Manuscripts", especially the sections on "Alienated

Labour" and "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and General Philosophy"

(1844); The Holy Family (1844); and finally, The German Ideology

(1845-1846). I have not included Marx's essay, "Luther as Arbiter

Between Strauss and Feuerbach" and his "Theses on Feuerbach", be-

cause the importance of these writings for Marx's critique of

religion has been discussed sufficiently in Chapter I.

The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate a number of

42
 43

major themes of Marx's critique of religion. Very briefly, they

can be summarized as follows. Beginning with his doctoral

dissertation, Marx dismisses religion and sees theology and

philosophy as utterly incompatible. This rejection of theology

eventually results in his repudiation of Hegelian speculation as

is shown most clearly in the "Introduction" and the Critique of

'Hegel's Philosophy of Right' and also the concluding section of

the "Paris Manuscripts". A second major theme in Marx's early

writings c~nters on his view of the Christian state. This polemic

against the Christian state originates in his two articles and

culminates in the "Jewish Question". Another strand in his

critique of religion revolves around the perverse effects it has

-;., .;" ,h._' ."

on man. Although he never has a good word to say for religion,

The Holy Family is the most striking illustration of Marx's

invective. The "Paris Manuscripts" and The German Ideology,

finally, are the best examples of Marx's use of religious alienation

as a paradigm to attack secular alienation.

I would underline that these themes are not isolated, but

rather run throughout his early works. Because Marx does not

consider religion at great length in any of his works, it will be

necessary in dealing with these sources to move constantly among

them while trying to analyze each one in turn. This procedure also

allows me to show both the development as well as the continuity

 44

of Marx's critique of religion. Furthermore, i.n light of what

was said in Chapter I, I will be careful to point out the specific

influence of Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach on Marx's thinking

in this area.

II. Marx's Doctoral Dissertation - The Difference between the

Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature

Marx's doctoral dissertation, submitted in April 1841,

is the only extant work which remains from his earliest studies.

This dissertation and the notes prepared for it are the best

source for information about Marx's ideas from late 1838 to 1841.

Appended to the dissertation was a critical analysis of Plutarch's

--=A, :1 .... _. .".

attack on Epicurus' theology; only the first paragraph of the

appendix survives. The dissertation itself, as its title suggests,

is a detailed consideration of the differences between the philoso-

phies of nature of Democritus and Epicurus. The dissertation is

important for our study on two counts. First, this work clearly

shows the influence of Bruno Bauer on Marx, especially on his

thought about the origins of Christianity. Second, through his

discussion of Epicurus' philosophy, Marx tackles the perennial

question of the relationship between philosophy and theology. The

result is his decisive rejection of theology, but more importantly,

he questions speculative philosophy and this anticipates his later

 45

rejection of Hegelian speculation.

In the foreword to the dissertation, Marx explains his

reasons for choosing this particular topic. Hegel, Marx thinks,

sketched correctly the general aspects of Greek speculation, but

failed to go into the necessary detail. Hegel failed to supply

this information, in part, because of the immensity of his

philosophical task, but also, Marx argues, because Hegel under-

estimated the importance of the Epicurean, Stoic, and Sceptical

systems for the whole of Greek philosophy. Marx intends his

thesis to fill partially this gap in Hegel's system by examining

the essential difference between Democritean and Epicurean physics,

and thereby to clear up the commonly held prejudice that Epicurus

borrowed his philosophy of nature from DemocrJt,:!s. -_,He relegates

to a later work

a more exhaustive discussion . . of Epicurean,

Stoic and Sceptical philosophy in their totality and
in their total relationship to earlier and later Greek
philosophy. 1

Marx's choice of topic, it seems certain, was motivated

by Bruno Bauer. The Epicurean, Stoic, and Sceptical systems

which Marx planned to consider in their ent~!ety fell under the

heading of "self-consciousness" in Hegel's Phenomenology. At

this time, B. Bauer was elaborating a philosophy of self-consciousness

and, doubtless, suggested this period of Greek philosophy to Marx

1
Dissertation, p., 61.
 46

for that reason. Bauer's philosophical position at this time

can be summarized roughly as follows: man's self-consciousness

develops dialectically in history by negating those forces

initially thought of as separate and distinct from human self-

consciousness; presently the progress of self-consciousness is

aided by philosophical criticism (not to be confused with Bauer's

"pure criticism" of 1844) whose task is to transform objects

2
into self-consciousness. Thus, to use an example, after

religion is shown through criticism to be a human product, self-

consciousness is no longer subject to its own creation and,

therefore, no longer restrained by the religious sphere from its

free, human development. In his dissertation, Marx, following

Bauer, argues that post-Aristotelian philosophy formed the complete

~ .~ .... -.-.
structure of self-consciousness and states that these systems were
3
actually "the key to the true history of Greek philosophy" a key,

it is worth noting, which Hegel missed. This statement closely

ties Marx to the philosophy of self-consciousness which increasing-'

ly was becoming the philosophy which united the Young Hegelian

movement and also indicates the intimate collaboration between

Marx and Bauer during this period.

There is a second reason why Bauer directed Marx to this

2
See Young Hegelians, pp. 59-61.
3
Dissertation, p. 62.
 47

particular period of Greek philosophy: Bauer traced the origins of

Christianity to post-Aristotelian philosophy. His Biblical studies

led him to deny the historicity of the Gospel accounts and to locate

the real roots of Christianity in the philosophies of sel.f-consciousness.

With the breakdown of the Greek world, Bauer claimed the philosophies

of self-consciousness' did manage to retain individual freedom. Later,

Christianity absorbed this idea of individual freedom, but as Marx

in agreement with Bauer, observes, it transmuted freedom into "the

4
blue mist of heaven". Christian freedom was really slavery to the

divine Sovereign, the heavenly counterpart to the emperor in Rome.

Only after Christianity became the religion of the exploiters rather

than the exploited, Bauer argued, did it turn ba.c~to'. the philosophies
5
of Plato and Aristotle.

To return to the work itself: in the conclusion of his

dissertation, Marx calls Epicurus the "greatest Greek representative

6
of the Enlightenment" and cites a laudatory passage from Lucretius

about Epicurus' practical atheism. Marx's admiration for Epicllrus

seems to stem from his practical atheism, that is, Epicurus' denial

of the eternity of the celestial bodies, "[b]ecciLUse the eternity of

7
II
the heavenly bodies would disturb the ataraxia of self-consciousness.
4
Karl Marx, "Letter to Arnold Ruge", in Writings of the Young
Marx on Philosophy and Society, p. 206.
5
See van Leeuwen, pp. 72-73.
6
Dissertation, p. 109.
7
Ibid., p. 106.
 48

While Aristotle did reproach the ancients for the belief that the

heavens require the support of Atlas, Epicurus goes much further

and

. . criticizes those who believe that man needs the

heavens, and Atlas himself, upon whom the heavens are
supported, [Epicurus] finds to possess human stupidity
and superstition. 8
9
Epicurus attributes "all the fear and confusion of human beings"

to the eternity of the heavenly bodies. For this reason, he

rejects Aristotle's idea that the heavenly bodies are immortal and

eternal. Rather Epicurus contends

. that everything happens in [the heavenly bodies]

multitudinously and ungoverned, that everything in them
is to be explained b numerous and inexact, large
numbers of reasons. l O
In this way the ataraxia of individual self-consciQusness
A .-:
is

preserved, " . everything collapses which behaves transcendentally

over and against human consciousness, i.e. belongs to the imaginative

11
intellect."

Marx sees Epicurus' assertion that the heavenly bodies are

not eternal as a radical departure from the whole history of Greek

speculation. Epicurus, in other words, rejected the religious

tradition of previous Greek philosophy; he endeavoured to free

8
Ibid. , p. 102.
9
Ibid. , p. 107.
10
Ibid. , p. 105.
11
Ibid. , p. 108.
 49

philosophy from theology. This, according to Marx, was his great

achievement. Epicurus' advance over previous Greek speculation

has been overlooked by the entire philosophical tradition;

culminating in Hegel, Marx says, because that tradition concentrated

exclusively on the metaphysical pronouncements of post-Aristotelian

philosophy, rather than its subjective basis. The metaphysical

character of western philosophy obscured Epicurus' importance.

Because of the speculative trend of Hegel's philosophy, Marx

concludes, he missed the key to Greek philosophy.

In a note appended to the dissertation, Marx adds an

explicit condemnation of Hegel's presentation of the ontological

proofs for the existence of God. Marx says Hegel inverted the
'", ,~"., .~.

ontological argument so that he could refute it in order to

reaffirm it. Marx queries: "[w]hat kind of clients have to be

killed by their own attorney so that he can spare them from

12
sentence?" For Marx, the ontological proofs, including Hegel's,

reduce to "empty tautologies". They are an example of the essential

irrationality of religion, the utter incompatibility of theology

and philosophy. ........

In the next two articles, Marx launches a full-scale

attack against the Christian state. Building on the argument

from this dissertation, the young Marx contrasts the irrationality

12
Karl Marx, "Reason and the Proof of God", in Writings of
the Young Marx on Philosophy 'and Society, pp. 64-65.
 50

of religion with the rationality of the state.

III. Marx's Journalism

(a) "Comments on the ,Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction"

This article, completed in February of 1842, originally

was meant for the Deutsche JahrbUcher, but it was suppressed,

~~tting1y enough, by the censorship. It first appeared in February

of the next year in Arnold Ruge's Anekdota. The subject of Marx's

article concerns the Dec~mber, 1841 censorship instruction enacted

by Frederick ,William IV. With the accession of Frederick William

IV, there were renewed hopes, shared alike by the Young Hege1ians

and the ascendent bourgeoisie, for a looseninguf~the;press from

the Prussian censorship. Since 1819, a censorship edict, initially

designed to expire in five years, had been in effect. The outcome

was a press restrained on all sides by the censors and, in conse-

quence, newspapers merely reflected the political and religious

sentiments of the Prussian government. The instruction was meant

to liberalize the 1819 edict. It is Marx's contention, however,

the instruction intensified rather than relaxed the repression of

the old edict. Increased repression, Marx argues, was due to the

self-contradictory nature of the purported Christian state.

Marx claims that one merit of the old edict in contrast to

 51

the new instruction was its rationalism. Because Marx in 1842

thinks the state should be based on "free reason", he finds the

shallow rationalism of the edict infinitely preferable to the

pseudo-liberalism of the instruction. According to the 1819 edict,

since religion was reasonable, its fundamental principles could not

be attacked; however, particular religions in the state could be

criticized. While Marx does appreciate the overall rationalistic

viewpoint of the edict, he points out, nevertheless, it was:

. . so illogical as to take an irreligious point of

view while it aims to protect religion. It is contra-
dictory to the fundamental principles of religion to
separate those principles from its positive content
and specific quality, for every religion believes it
is different from other illusory religions by virtue
of, its particular nature, and i the tre, religion by
virtue of its specific quality.13

Marx proceeds to maintain the new censorship instruction not only

did not clear up the contradictions in the edict, but by proposing

a Christian state, it compounded them. While the 1819 edict did

not even mention the Christian religion, the implicit purpose of the

instruction was to protect the Christian state through arbitrary

censorship. Thus, the instruction specifical~y forbade the

critique of the Christian religion as well as the critique of

13
Karl Marx, "Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship
Instruction", in Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and
Society, p. 75.
 52

particular doctrine if it was done in a frivolous or hostile manner.

In effect, Marx says, the actual purpose of the instruction was to

shield the Christian state from the press by eliminating any type

of religious critique: "[r]eligion is not to be attacked at all,

neither in a hostile nor frivolous manner, not in general or in

11+
particular."

A second stated purpose of .the censorship instruction was

"
Incredulous

at the naivete of the instruction, Marx points to the existence of

more than one denomination in the state. Once it is admitted, Marx

argues, there are both Catholics and Protestants in the state, how

is the censor to prevent one denomination from'te~oming the norm of

the state. That is, according to the instruction, since particular

doctrines are exempt from examination, how is the censor to decide

what is and what is not a "fanatical injection of religious convic-

tions into politics". Furthermore, if the state is founded upon

Protestant Christian principles,

it becomes for the Catholic a church to which he

does not belong, which he must reject~s heretical, and
whose essence he finds obnoxious The reverse would be
true if the state were Catholic. 16

14
Ibid., p. 76.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid., p. 77.
 53

If the state is founded- only on general Christian principles,

moreover, who is to decide those principles and how can those

principles be abstra~ted from the positive content of the specific

denominations?

Having said this, Marx suggests either religion be kept

out of politics or rather facetiously, religion be allowed to

operate in its o\Vll way in the political sphere:

You should forbid that religion be drawn into politics-

but you do not want to do that-because you wish to base
the state on faith rather than on free reason, with religion
constituting for you the general sanction of the positive.
Or you should permit the fanatical injection of religion
into politics. Religion might be politically active in
its own way, but you do not want that either. For religion
is to~;pport secular matters without the latter's being
subject to religion. Once religion is drawn into politics,
it becomes an insufferable, indeed an irreligious presumption
to want to determine on secular groundsxhow religion has to
operate within politics. If one allies himself with religion
from religiosity, one must give religion the decisive voice
in all matters. Or do you perhaps understand by religion
the cult of your O\Vll sovereignty and governmental wisdom?17

At this point, three conclusions can be drawn concerning Marx's views

on the Christian state. First, for the young Marx, the state should

be the embodiment of "free reason" and as such, the state is utterly

- incompatible with religion. Here he reiterates what he said earlier

in his doctoral dissertation, namely, that religion is irrational.

Religion is just as diametrically opposed to the state as it is to

philosophy. Second, the basic and false assumption underlying both

17
Ibid., pp. 77-78.
 54

the edict and the instruction is that fundamental Christian

principles can be abstracted from the different denominations. But

how can this be so, Marx asks, when Catholics and Protestants

themselves do not view each other as Christians, but as heretics.

In other words, there is no general form of Christianity. For

these two reasons, then, Marx sees the Christian state as a contradic-

tion in terms and throughout his career he views with apprehension

any attempt to establish such a hybrid. Third, in his discussion

of the censorship instruction, he suggests what is wanted is not

so much a Christian state, but religious sanctions for the status quo.

This is Marx's earliest recorded statement of the fact that religion

can be politically exploited, a theme recurrent in his early

.", .~ ~. "

writings. In his first contribution to the Rheinische Zeitung,

published in May of 1842 and entitled "The Proceedings of the Sixth

Rhenish Parliament", Marx takes up this issue again:

. [I]n their hands [the parliament] religion requires

a polemical bitterness impregnated with political tendencies
and becomes, in a more or less conscious manner, simply a
sacred cloak to hide desires that are both very secular and
at the same time very imaginary.18

In this review and his sub~equent works, it should be noted that

Marx shifts his emphasis from criticizing the irrationality of

religion to concentrating more on its capacity for political

exploitation. What here is called a "sacred cloak" will later

18
Karl Marx, "The Proceedings of the Sixth Rhenish Parliament",
in Early Texts, p. 35.
 55

become an "ideology", and religion will be used as the paradigm

for all other ideologies.

Thus far in his discussion of the censorship instruction,

Marx has argued against the compatibility of religion and the

state; now he proceeds to vindicate the autonomy of morality from

religion. Once again, Marx begins his analysis by admiring the'

rationalism of the old edict which, he claims, rightly separated

morality from religion. Following the philosophers of the Enlighten-

ment, the young Marx also sees morality as an autonomous and rational

sphere with its own universal laws and p~inciples. Contrary to the

rationalist spirit of the old edict, the new instruction, Marx

maintains does not admit morality per se, but only allows an official

morality, the morality of the Prussian government~'An official

morality is the inevitable outcome in a so-called Christian state,

Marx argues, because specifically Christian legislators cannot allow

morality in its own right, but must see it as an outgrowth of religion:

Independent mOLality offends the basic principles of

religion, and particular concepts of religion are opposed
to morality. Morality recognizes only its own universal
and rational religion, and religion only its own particular
and positive morality.19

In The German Ideology, however, Marx will lump morality with the

rest of ideology.

19
Marx, "Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship
Instruction", p. 78.
 56

(b) liThe Leading Article in No. 179 of the KBlnische Zeitung:

Religion, Free Press, and Philosophy"

This article, published in July of 1842 in the Rheinische

Zeitung, was written in reply to Karl Hermes, editor of the KBlnische

Zeitung. In his lead editorial, Hermes objected to the use of

newspapers as a forum to air philosophical and religious views,

criticized the atheism of the Rheinische Zeitung, and advocated

stricter censorship to control the offending members of the press.

Harx's reply, to be sure, was highly critical of Hermes' "ailing"

editorial. In his own article, Marx once again discusses his

positions regarding. religion, philosophy, and the relation of

church to state.

Marx begins with Hermes' assertion that r<eligion is the

foundation of the state and that even fetishism, admittedly the

crudest form of religion, elevates man above the beast by freeing

him from the domination of his sensuous appetites. Yet Marx

replies, according to scientific research, fetishism ranks below

animal worship as a form of religion. And animal worship itself

degrades man below the beast by making an animal man's god. Thus,

n[f]etishism is so far from raising man above the appetites that

20
it is on the contrary 'the religion of sensuous appetites'''.

20
Karl Marx, "The Leading Article in No. 179 of the KBlnische
Zeitu~: Religion, Free Press, and Philosophy", in Writings of the
Young Harx on Philosophy and Society, p. 115.
 57

Hermes further maintained that, on one hand, all his tori-

cally important nations at their zenith had highly developed and

sophisticated forms of religion, and that, on the other hand, the

decline of these nations coincided with the decline of their

religious culture. In this matter, Marx accuses Hermes not only

21
of "turning history upside down", but also of confusing cause

and effect. The historical zeniths of Greece and Rome, to illustrate,

came after the supersession of religion by philosophy and coincided

with their philosophical achievements:

Greece's highest internal development came at the time

of Pericles, its highest external peak, with Alexander.
In Pericles' time the sophists and Socrates, who may be
called philosophy incarnate, had supplanted religion with
art and rhetoric. Alexander i s time was, tP.e t.ime of
Aristotle who rejected the eternity of "the "individual"
spirit and the God of positive religions. And then Rome!
Read Cicero! Epicurean, stoic, or sceptical philosophy
was the religion of cultured Romans when Rome reached
the zenith of its history.22

The decline of the ancient religions with their states, moreover,

can be explained quite simply since

. the "true religion" of the ancients was the cult of

"their nationality", of their "state". It was not the
decline of the ancient religions that brought the downfall
of the ancient states but the decline -'of the an~~ent states
that brought the downfall of the old religions.

21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid., p. 116.
 58

Hermes, in contrast, accounted for the decadence of the ancient

religions by declaring the ancient religions had come into conflict

with scientific inquiry; scientific research by the ancients had

demonstrated the errors of the old religions. Following Hermes'

argumentation to the extent of subjecting it to a reductio ad

absurdum, Marx concludes " . the whole ancient world perished

[according to Hermes' logic] because scientific inquiry revealed

24
the errors of the old religions", and conversely, if Lucretius

and Lucian had not written or had not been read by the Roman

authorities, the ancient world would not have declined.

Hermes also claimed the best of scientific research justified

the truths of the Christian religion. If this were the case, Marx
:", -: ~-'- ~,

asks, why has every philosophy been accused of heresy by theology; were

not Malebranche, Jakob BHhme, and Leibniz philosophers and were

they not accused of apostasy by the theologians. Moreover, the best

Protestant theologians consistently have maintained Christianity"

cannot be consonant with reason because 'secular' and 'spiritual'

25
reason contradict each other . . " Or perhaps do you mean by

scientific research, Marx questions Hermes, only research which before-

hand concurs with dogma,

but then what advantage does your assertion have over

that of the Indian Brahmin who proves the holiness of the
.Ved~sby.reservtng for himself alone the right to read them!26
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid., p. 117.
26
Ibid.
 59

Even accepting for the moment that Christianity is consonant with

scientific research and, therefore, the possibility of its decline

is precluded, why is it then, Marx inquires finally, that " . . the

police must keep watch that philosophizing newspaper writers do not

27
bring on a decline . 11

The difference between philosophical and theological inquiry,

Marx continues, is that the former searches for truth whereas the

latter rejects a priori as error whatever contradicts its faith.

Philosophy, moreover, relies on reason for its justification while

theology relies on the police to enforce its judgments. Marx

proceeds to raise the thorny question of

what is there to distinguish your claims [for truth]

from those -of the Mohammedans, from the claims of any
other religion? . Must [philosophy] believe that in
one country 3 X 1 = 1, in another that wo~en have no souls,
in a third that beer is drunk in heaven?2

Philosophy's concern, on the contrary, is with universal truths, not

with variable cultural specifications of truth and it does not

II

Genuine

philosophy has become worldly and has entered the arena of the press,

Marx explains further, because" for six years German papers

have been drumming against the religious party [D. F. Strauss and

27
. Ibid.
28
Ibid., p. 118.
29
Ibid.
 60

followers] in philosophy, calumniating, distorting, and bowdlerizing

30
it". For six years, a theologizing press has been noteworthy only

for its ignorant polemics against Hegel and Schelling, Feuerbach

and Bauer, Deutsche JahrbUcher, etc. Now a philosophizing press,

Marx proclaims, will bring forth truth and its appeal is exclusively

to reason.

Hermes saw the philosophizing press as an additional threat

to the state since publically to attack Christianity was also to

attack the very foundation of the state. He chided the censorship

for its slackness in allowing the press to philosophize on religious

matters, and reminded the censors that Christianity is not only the

foundation of all the European states, but also A i~ ~is .. the basis of

the states' laws and public institutions. Marx finds a double-fault

in Hermes' argument. In the first place, the French Constitution

and the Prussian Civil Code do not even mention the Christian

religion: "[The Prussian Civil Code] does not say that the primary

duty of the state is the suppression of heretical error for salvation

31
in another world". In the second place, Marx declares there is

no evidence in the Prussian Civil Code to indicate its laws and

public institutions are based on the Christian religion. The

Prussian Civil Code, for example, does not state that a marriage

30
Ibid. , p. 123.
31
Ibid. , p. 119.
 61

is invalid unless it takes place before the ministrations of a

pastor. Nor does it mention that Prussian educational institutions

rest solely on Christianity; surely, Marx says, education is based

more on the classics and science than on the catechism.

It is appropriate, Marx goes on, that this whole subject of

the Christian state be aired in the papers, because it is the

business of the press to discuss political affairs. Since religion

has become political, it falls within the domain of the press. As

for the Christian state itself, Marx admonishes Hermes to

[r]ead St. Augustine's De civiate'Dei, study the church

fathers and the spirit of Christianity, and then tell us 32
whether the church or the state is the IIChristian State"!

Indeed the Christian state is not only contrary ,...t'~! .th~. opinions of

the church fathers, but more importantly, it is contrary to the

spirit of the Gospels. The Gospels draw a sharp distinction between

state and church, between the realm of Caesar and the realm of God:

Does not every Inoment of your practical life give the lie
to your theory? Do you consider it wrong to go to court
if you are cheated? But the apostle writes that this is
wrong. 33

Even the pope, Marx declares, rightly refused ~~ join the Holy

Alliance because the Church and not diplomacy must be the bond among

nations. The pope realized a truly Christian Europe or Christian

state must be theocratic:

32
Ibid., p. 126.
33
Ibid.
 62

The prince of such states must be either the God of

religion, Jehovah himself as in the Jewish states,
the representative of God, the Dalai Lama as in Tibet,
or finally, as GUrres rightly demands of Christian
states in his most recent work, they must be completely
submitted to a church which is "infa11ib1e ll For if
there is no supreme head of the church as in Protestantism,
the domination of religion is nothing but the religion of
domination, the cult of the government's wil1. 34

Furthermore, Marx maintains that theocratic states, like the

Byzantine state, are, in fact, the worst states. Later, in the

"Jewish Question", Marx will measure the political maturity of a

particular state by the extent to which it has politically emancipated

itself from religion.

Marx finishes this discussion by posing the following

dilemma for the spokesman of the Christian state:

-it. _~ .A~- ....'

Either the Christian state corresponds to the concept

of the state as the actualization of rational freedom,
and then nothing else can be demanded for it to be Christian
than that it be rational; then it suffices to develop the
state from reason in human relations, a task philosophy
accomplishes. Or, the state of rational freedom cannot
be developed out of Christiani.ty; then you will yourselves
concede that this development does not lie in the tendency
of Christianity, since Christianity does not want a bad
state and any state is a bad state which is not the
actualization of rational freedom. 35

In other words, the state as the "actualization of rational freedom"

cannot be developed out of re1i.gion because religion is irrational.

A year later, Marx finishes his attack on the Christian

state in his essay, "On the Jewish Question ll

34
Ibid. , p. 127.
35
Ibid. , p. 128.
 63

IV. Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'

This manuscript, written during the summer of 1843, is the

first of numerous works which Marx entitled "Critique" and it is

typical of the way which Marx will develop, clarify, and formulate
36
his own ideas in opposition to those of his opponents. In his

first critique, Marx felt obliged to come to terms with Hegel in

general and his political philosophy in particular. The Young

Hegelian attack on the master centered on his treatment of religion

and the Prussian state and it is not unexpected, therefore, to find

Marx dealing with both subjects in his earliest critique of Hegel.

The work itself is a painstaking analysis of paragraphs 261-313 of

37
Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie. 'l. ~"/~.

If for no other reason than Hegel's proclamations about the

end of Sophia and the perfection of reality, his left-wing disciples

saw an imperative need to come to terms with his all-encompassing

and monumental edifice. For his part, Marx was less than satisfied

with the Hegelian claim concerning the perfection of reality, that

is, the Hegelians integration of man's private and public existence

in the state. Then too, Marx realized that to~call into question the

36
This work was not published until 1927.
37
The first four pages of Marx's manuscript no longer survive,
but probably dealt with paragraphs 257-260 of Hegel's work.
 64

Hegelian state was not only to jeopardize the entire Hegelian

system, but also to call into question the whole project of

speculative philosophy, since Hegel himself had proclaimed the

end of Sophia.

Considering the scope of his aims, it comes as no surprise

the Kritik is probably the most complex of Marx's earliest writings.

On one level, Marx judged Hegel by the standards of his own system,

pointing out the contradictions and the historical inconsistencies

in Hegel1s justification of the state. On still another level,

Marx attacked the contemporary Prussian state. Here Marx accepted

Hegel's postulate that philosophy comprehends reality in thought,

and concluded that any discussion of Hegel's philosophy implies

~ ~ ._~ .~.

a simultaneous critique of reality, in this case the Prussian state.

On a third and most significant level, Marx was confident he could

deal a fatal blow to Hegel's speculation by utilizing Feuerbach's

transformatj~e method which he applied throughout the Kritik to

Hegel's political philosophy.

In early 1843, Ludwig Feuerbach published his Preliminary

Theses f~r a Reform of Philoso~. Feuerbach viewed his Thesen as

a final chapter to The Essence of Christianity. In his magnum opus,

to repeat, Feuerbach argued man's essence was alienated in a God he

himself created. Feuerbach viewed man's alienation in religion as

primary, reasoning since there was only one reality, there could
 65

be only one alienation from reality. Alienation would be done

away with when man realized the predicates of God~ an illusory being~

were actually those of man. Through this realization~ man would

reclaim his alienated attributes and thereby restore the proper

relationship of the subject to its predicates. In his Thesen,

Feuerbach continued his attack on theology and indicted the Hegelia~

system for being the last rational support of religion. Had not

Hegel himself said that philosophy comprehends in thought what

religion represents in symbol, that the content of philosophy and

religion were identical? Like theology, Hegelian speculation,

Feuerbach declared, was a systematic reversal of the proper relation-

ship between subject and predicates. Thus, just as in theology~

;~ ,.~ ........ 0. ... ~

what properly belonged to real, corporeal man in relation to nature

was attributed to God, in Hegel's speculation~

it was ascribed to
38
the Absolute Spirit, a figment of Hegel's imagination.

Marx was quite enthusiastic about Feuerbach's Thesen which

he read prior to the composition of his Kritik. The Kritik itself

bears witness to Marx's whole-hearted adoption of Feuerbach's method.

38
Later, in a characteristically Feuerbachian manner, Marx
maintained the only difference between Christian theology and
speculative philosophy was while the former had only one incarnation,
the latter had as many incarnations as there were "things". See Holy
Family, p. 80.
 66

What Feuerbach outlined. generally in his -

Thesen
- - here is applied
specifically in Marx's careful analysis of Hegel's political philosophy.

From 1843 until 1845, it is certain Feuerbach had a pronounced

influence on Marx's thinking. It seems necessary, however, to stress

once again where this influence lies.

On one hand, as just mentioned, what excited Marx was

Feuerbach's method of internally analyzing Hegel, clearly set forth

in the Thesen of 1843. Both Feuerbach and Marx, in his turn, labelled

Hegel a "speculative theologian" whose system could be summed up best

in the word, "Mysticism". Harx used this term constantly in the

Kriti~ and later he applied it to Bruno Bauer's philosophy in Th~

Holy Family, Max Stirner's in The German Ideology, and P. J. Proudhon's

.5i .... ". ,.,.,
political economics in The Poverty of Philosophy.'''' According to Marx,

mysticism was " the mystery of Hegelian philosophy, especially

39
the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of Religion". Hegel's

system was mystifying because he ascribed to the Absolute Spirit what

properly belonged to the human subject and, then, made the latter into

an emanation of an imaginary entity. When Marx subjected Hegel's

political philosophy to Feuerbach's transformative method, however,

he discovered it was possible to rid the Philosophy of Right of its

mystical form and still retain its empirical content; he considered

this empirical data to be an accurate description of the contradictions

39
Critique, p. 84.
 67

involved in the existing political order. Therefore, it was possible

for Marx to criticize simultaneously the contradictions in Hegel's

justification of the state as well as the irrationality of the Prussian

state itself. Marx, to be sure, was pleased with the results of his

Kritik, so pleased in fact, his subsequent works of 1843-1845 were

40
written as a direct outgrowth of this Feuerbachian analysis of Hegel:

Feuerbach was the first to complete and criticize Hegel

from Hegel'? point of view, by resolving the Metaphysical
Absolute Spirit into "real man on the basis of nature" and
to complete the Criticism of religion by drafting in a
masterly manner the ~neral basic features of the Criticism 41
of Hegel's speculation and hence of every kind of metaphysics.

On the other hand, it was not Feuerbach's early work on

religion, per s~, which invoked Marx's enthusiasm. If this were the

case, one would expect to see a strong Feuerbach1a~influence on Marx's

ideas prior to 1843. Also one would not expect to find Marx fre-

quently using religious analogies to describe the separation of man

from his public existence in the. Hegelian state. To explicate: for

Feuerbach, religion is presently the sale cause of man's alienation

and the only barrier to realizing a truly human community, consistent

. 42
with man's species-being, Gattungswesen. For Marx, religion is

40
See "Paris Manuscripts", pp. 63-64.
41
Holy Family, pp. 186-187.
42
The term "species-being" originated in the writings of
Ludwig Feuerbach. He used the term to designate what was specifically
human in man, that is, an individual's consciousness of being a
member of a species.
 68

simply a symptom of a more primary alienation, socio-economic in

character, and, as such, religion is basically unassailable through

a theoretical critique alone; however, religion can be dealt with

indirectly through a radical critique of the political order which

engendered it and on which it depends. Ultimately, ideologies will

persist until a social complex is created which is a truly human

43
expression of all. the individuals that compose it, das Gemeinwesen.

There is, in sum, a fundamental difference between Feuerbach and

Marx's understanding of religion: for Feuerbach, religion is the

cause of man's present alienation and the final obstacle in the way

of man's humanization; for Marx, religion is a symptom of man's

alienation and dehumanization under the existing political order.

'", .!l.~ .... ~,
Thus Marx, following Bruno Bauer, does what Feuerbach would

not consider to do; he uses religion as an apt analogy to describe

man's alienation in the Hegelian state and consequently, he is able

to criticize ~ri passu religion and the Prussian state. In the

Kritik, to illustrate, Marx draws an analogy between the political

constitution and heaven:

The political constitution was until now the religious

sphere, the religion of popular life, the heaven of its
universality in opposition to the earthly existence of
its actuality.44

43
See footnote 30, p. 21.
44
Critique, pp. 31-32.
 69

Just as all men are equal in heaven but unequal on earth, so too

all men are equal before the constitution but unequal in civil society,

the sphere of self-interest. In both cases, Marx is pointing out

there is an illusion of equality, one religious and the other

political, but in actual fa~t there is only gross social inequality.

Marx finds in the Prussian bureaucracy, moreover, a second instance

of this practical illusion of equality and once again he draws a

comparison with religion. In this instance, he argues that just

because every citizen has the opportunity to become a civil servant

does not do away with the separation between bureaucrat and ordinary

citizen any more than just because every Catholic (male) has the

opportunity of becoming a priest does away with the distinction

45 !t ...... _...
~~ "'i."

between cleric and layman. Marx further calls the bureaucrats "the
46
Jesuits and t.heologians of the state", describes the civil service

examination as "the bureaucratic baptism of knowledge, the official

47
recognition of the transubstantiation of profane into holy knowledge",

and concludes his treatment of the bureaucracy by saying:

The monarch distributes and entrusts the particular state

activities as functions to the officials, i.e., he dis-
tributes the state among the bureaucrats, entrusts it like
the holy Roman Church entrusts consecrations. 48

45
Ibid. , p. 50.
46--
Ibid. , p. 46.
47--
Ibid. , p. 51.
48
Ibid. , pp. 51-52.
 70

While it is superfluous to this discussion to multiply illustrations,

two final examples of Marx's paradigmatic use of religious alienation

need detain us in the Kritik.

In an oft quoted passage, Marx compares "true democracy" to

Christianity:

Just as it is not religion that creates man but man who

creates religion, so it is not the constitution that
creates the people but the people which creates the
constitution. In a certain respect democracy is to all
other forms of the state what Christianity is to all
other religions. Christianity is the religion par
excellence, the essence of religion, deified man under
the form of a particular religion.
In the same way democracy is the essence of every political
constitution, socialized man under the form of a particular
constitution of the state. 49

Frequently, this passage has been cited to demonstrate an early and

unqualified acceptance by Marx of Feuerbach's crttfque~of religion.

And one certainly does find l1arx following Feuerbach to the extent

-of insisting on the primacy of the human subject as the source of

religion. Against this school of thought, however, it should be

pointed out that the notion of Christianity as the apex of religion

was a current one in Hegelian circles and hardly peculiar to

Feuerbach. Hegel, Bruno Bauer, and Marx, for example were all of

this view. B. Bauer, Feuerbach, and Marx all held that Christianity

was the apex of religion because man in some sense made up its

content. Thus, the essence of religion ~ religion was realized in

49
Ibid., p. 30.
 71

Christianity and consequently, for B. Bauer, Feuerbach and Marx,

religious alienation vlaS complete. A second notion common to all

three thinkers was that religion could not be abolished until it

was realized, until it had reached its final form and in this

sense, Christianity could be seen as self-destroying. In the Kritik,

Marx compares II true democracy" to Christianity because in the political

sphere, democracy is the final form, the essence of the political

constitution. As such, and herein lies the crucial importance of

the comparison with Christianity, it is self-destroying. Thus, through

an analogy with Christianity, Marx formulates one of the basic tenets

of his system, the disappearance of the state.

The last subject in the Kritik deserving our attention

... -~ <.- ":

concerns Marx's discussion of primogeniture which is considered an

early formulation of "the fetishism of commodities ll , fully elaborated

.
in the first volume of Das Kaoital. Since the eldest son is accorded

the exclusive right of inheriting landed-property under a system of

primogeniture, the land, therefore cannot be equally distributed

among the children by the landowner. Hence, Marx describes primo-

geniture as II private property which has become a religion for

itself, which has become absorbed in itself, enchanted with its

50
autonomy and nobilityll. In other words, since entailed property

50
Ibid., p. 102.
 72

is inalienable even by its owner, "[i]t ceases actually to be

property at a11:its'6~mersarethemse1vestransf6rmed'int6the
51
property'of property". Just as in religion man is degraded to

the status of being an object of his own creation, in primogeniture,

man is degraded to being an object of his own property. Property

ceases to be an object and becomes a virtual slIDject. In the

Paris }funuscripts, Marx pursues this line of reasoning by comparing

the alien character of the commodity-form of human labour to

religion.

V. "On the Jewish Question"

Marx's discussion of the question of the Jews is one of

"A .~ .... _- b.

the better known of his early works. Until recently, however, the

reason for its notoriety chiefly was due to critics of Marxism who

used this review to present Marx as thoroughly anti-semitic. While

it is fallacious to label "Zur Judenfrage" an anti-semitic work, it

is certainly a forceful statement of Marx's appraisal of both

Judaism and Christianity. In addition~ this article contains Marx's

most sustained and lengthy consideration of religion in general.

Together with his essay entitled "Contribution to the Critique of

Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction", it is, moreover, the

best source for information about Marx's seminal ideas on religion.

51
Avineri, p. 30.
 73

Both articles were written during the latter part of 1843 and

published in February of 1844 in the peutsch~Fran~8sische JahrbUcher.

"Zur Judenfrage" itself was wri.tten in two parts and reviews

two artic~es by Bruno Bauer on the same topic. Marx begins by

smnmarizing the results of BauerTs argument which, he says with

rare praise, was done with dash, clarity, wit and profundity,
It

52
in a style which is as precise as it is pithy and vigorous".

Nevertheless, Marx declares that BauerTs analysis of the question of

the Jews in itself is insufficient: Bauer halted his analysis with

the Christian state aIld did not subject the state as such to

examination. In other words, Bauer framed the question of the Jews

in theological form: the focus of his examination was the relation-

ship between church and state. Consequently, Ba~eraidnot perceive

the fundamental question, namely, the relation bettveen political and

53
human emancipation. BauerTs critique remained theological and

stumbled into contradictions at the very point it should have become

a political critique.

To illustrate his point, Marx examines the question of

Jewish emancipation as it varied from Germany to France, and finally,

to the North American states. In the Christian state of Germany, Marx

says that Bauer is perfectly correct; the question of the Jews is a

52
"Jewish Question", p. 4.
53
MarxTs style here is polemical. Thus, the position he
imputes to Bauer should not be taken as a correct representation of
BauerTs own views.
 74

theological question. The Jew, in fact, does stand in religious

opposition to the state since he is denied political rights because

of his religion. In France, however, the state, although it

~ecognizes the religion of the majority, is not Christian but

constitutional; there the question of the Jews is not theological,

then, but a question of incomplete political emancipation. The Jew

stands in religious opposition to the state only insofar as the

state still recognizes the religion of the majority. While in the

North American states, finally, the question of Jewish emancipation

no longer retains even a theological semblance. It is at this stage

where Bauer's critique falters. In most of North America, the

state adopts a political attitude toward religion, this is, it

'.... >~ ~

banishes religion from the state. Yet, contrary to Bauer's

,
conclusion, religion not only persists, but flourishes in North

America.

Given the political reality of North American society, Marx

insists that Bauer's formulation of the question of the Jews must be

rejected and the problem restated to read: ". what is the

54
relation between complete political emancipation and religion"? In

answer to his own question, Marx declares that

since the existence of religion is the existence of

a defect, the source of this defect must be sought in the
nature of the state itself. Religion no longer appears a~5
the basis but as the manifestation of secular narrowness.

54
"Jewish Question", p. 9.
55
Ibid., pp. 9-10.
 75

Without fail, Marx holds to this position throughout his career:

religion is not the cause, but simply one manifestation, primarily

56
pre-bourgeois in character, of man's alienation in society. In

this, as I have shown, he differs from both Bruno Bauer and Ludwig

Feuerbach. A few years later, to use another example, Marx writes

in The German Ideology:

Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology

and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no
longer retain the semblance of independence. They have
no history, no development; but men, developing their
material production and their material intercourse, alter~
along with this their real existence, their thinking and
the products of their thinking. 57

Since religion itself has no real history~ Marx's approach to it,

therefore~ always consists in locating its profane basis in society:

'.... .~"-" ~,
"History has for long enough been resolved into superstition; but
58
now we resolve superstition into history". Thus, Marx looks to

the political state in its secular form to discover the source of

religion.

Returning, then, to the example of the states in North

America, Marx discusses at greater length the actual relation between

political and human emancipation. In essence, ,"-Marx's

.
argument is

this: the state can emancipate itself only from state religion; it

cannot emancipate men from religion. While the state emancipates

56
See pp. 37-39.
57
German Ideology, p. 38.
58
"Jewish Question", p. 10.
 76

itself from religion when it no longer recognizes any religion,

political emancipation is not complete human emancipation. As

discussed earlier, Marx's position should not be misconstrued at

this juncture. Marx does not oppose political emancipation from

religion: he measures the political maturity of a state by the

degree to which it has emancipated itself from religion. Avineri

rightly sees that Marx

conceives the emergence of the modern state as

a corollary of secularization, expressed by 'political
emancipation', i.e. the separation of politics from
religious and theological considerations and the
relegation of institutional religion to a separate and
limited sphere. 59

Viewed from Marx's perspective, to illustrate concretely, Germany

could not even be considered a state, and France would be less

politically mature than the North American states.

Yet, there are severe limitations to all political measures.

Even though the state declares itself atheistic, as in North America,

this declaration virtually has no impact on the members of the state

itself. The atheism of the state, in other words, does not preclude

the religiosity of the private individual. Indeed, it presupposes it

just as the state presupposes property when it abolishes the property

qualification for voting as in North America. Moreover, since the

state is an expression of the members which compose it, an additional

59
Avineri, p. 43.
 77

problem arises in that the state's atheism stands in direct contra-

diction to individual religiosity. Private practice of religion

contradicts the theoretical atheism of the state. The result is that

an indivi~ual stands in profound contradiction to himself. Marx

uses the terms bourgeois and'citoyen to express this radical division

between an individual's life in civil society and the political state.

The question of the Jews, Marx concludes, is but one manifestation of

the secular opposition between the private and general interest.

There is still another inherent limitation of political

freedom from religion. Because man frees himself from religion

through the state as an intermediary, Marx continues, man's freedom

perforce is abstract and partial:

even when he proclaims himself an atheist through

the intermediary of the state, that is, when he declares
the state to be an atheist, he is still engrossed in
religion, because he only recognizes himself as an
atheist in a roundabout way, through an intermediary.
Religion is simply the recognition of man in a roundabout
fashion; that is, through an intermediary. The state is
the intermediary between man and human liberty. Just as
Christ is the intermediary to whom man attributes all
his own divinity and all his religious bonds, so the
state is the intermediary to which man gsnfides all his
non-divinity and all his human freedom.

This comparison between Christ and the state as intermediaries be-

tween man and his real, social life deserves careful examination. A

hasty reading might suggest a pronounced Feuerbachian influence at

this point on Marx's thinking. Under closer scrutiny, however, this

60
"Jewish Question", p. 11.
 78

passage is reminiscent of Marx's comparison of Christianity to

61
"true democracy" in his .Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy 6fRig,ht'.

The point of the analogy, it should be remembered, was to show the

state as self-destroying. In this case, since the perfected political

state canIlot ensure human emancipation, the state must be abolished.

In other words, just as Christianity cannot be purified, the modern

state cannot be reformed. Both must disappear.

The perfected political state, furthermore, abolishes religion

after its own fashion, that is, it actually can do no more than

relegate it to the realm of private opinion:

Religion is no longer the spirit of the state . . It has

become the spirit of civil society, of the sphere of egoism
and of the bellum omnium contra omnes. It is no longer the
essence of differentiation. It has become what it was at
the be~inning, an expression of the fact that man is separated
from the community, from himself and from other men. It is
now only the abstract avowal of an individual folly, a private
whim or caprice. 62

From this excerpt, it is important to note that Marx locates the

origin of religious consciousness in the contradiction between the

individual and general interest. Thus, for Marx, the different forms

of religion are but ideal expressions of this conflict as it appeared

63
in divers societies. Since Christianity is the apex of religion,

it also follows that it is the most acute religious expression of the

clash between the private and public interest. Christianity postulates

61
This is not to imply that Marx equated "true democracy" with
the modern state.
62
"Jewish Question", p. 15.
63
See McLellan, Marx Before Marxism, p. 135.
 79

an illusory equality in heaven and legitimates gross social in-

equality on earth. As Marx writes in 1847, "[t]he social principles

of Christianity justified the slavery of Antiquity, glorified the

serfdom of the Middle Ages and equally know, when necessary, how to
64
defend the oppression of the proletariat. "
In the abstract political state, Marx goes on, the human

basis of Christianity has been realized:

Man, in his most intimate reality in civil society, is

a profane being. Here, where he appears both to himself
and to others as a real individual he is an illusory
phenomenon. In the state, on the contrary, where he is
regarded as a species-being, man is the imaginary member
of an imaginary sovereignty, divested of his real, individual
life"and infused with an unreal universality.65

The human core of Christianity has been realized, in other words, in

the dual and contradictory existence man leads in the perfected

political state. Alluding once again to North American society,

Marx points to the infinite variety of denominations and sects which

exist under the aegis of the democratic state:

Christianity here attains the practical expression of its

universal religious significance, because the most varied
views are brought together in the form of Christianity,
and still more because Christianity does not ask that
anyone should profess Christianity, but 5~mply that he
should have some kind of religion. .

The most conflicting beliefs and practices are classed as Christian

64
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Religion (New York,
1964), p. 83.
65
"Jewish Questionl!, pp. 13-14.
66
Ibid., p. 21.
 80

and "[t]he religious consciousness runs riot in a wealth of contra-

67
dictions and diversity."

From the preceding discussion, Marx reaches a conclusion

in line with Bauer's method: according to Marx, not the Christian

but the atheistic state is, in fact, the "religious state. For

Marx, the Christian state is a non-state, an imperfect state; it

needs religion for its political consummation. As such, the

Christian state is involved in a painful contradiction. Here Marx

repeats many of the arguments which he used to refute Hermes'

defense of the Christian-Germanic state. And again, Marx does

support Bauer's effort to force

the state, which supports itself upon the Bible,

into a total disorder of thought in which it no longer
knows whether it is illusion or reality.68

However, explains Marx, since the Christian state accepts the

imaginary form of Christianity which is incapable of development,

it cannot, for this reason, be the practical realization of

Christianity. In contrast, the atheistic state is the real state,

the perfected state; it does not need religion for its political

completion. Since the human basis of Christianity has been realized

in its profane form, the modern state can dispense with religion.

As Harx says later in The Holy Family,

67
Ibid.
68
Ibid., p. 19.
 81

[t]he state declares that religion, like the other

elements of civil life, only begins to exist in its
full scope when the state declares it to be non-political
and thus leaves it to itself. To the dissolution of
the political existence of these elements, for example,
the dissolution of property by the abolition of the
property qualification for electors, the dissolution of
religion by the abolition of the state church, to this
very proclamation of their civil death corresponds their
most vigorous life, which henceforth obeys ~9s own laws
undisturbed and develops to its full scope.

Thus, the modern state witnesses the practical realization of

Christianity. In civil society, every man is considered a sovereign,

albeit unsocial, being.

In the second half of IIZ ur Judenfrage", Marx examines Bruno

Bauer's article, "The Capacity of the Present-day Jews and Christians

to become free". Marx begins his review by saying Bauer had once

again incorrectly formulated the problem in a theological per-

spective. According to Marx, Bauer claimed that Christians had

to renounce their Christianity, but that Jews not only had to

renounce their Judaism, but also had to accept Christianity in

dissolution to become fully free. The emancipation of the Jew, in

other words, had to take place in two stages. Marx counters by

declaring Bauer had obscured the real issue by making it a religious,

rather than social question. For Marx, the real question is:

"what specific social element is it necessary to overcome in order

69
Holy Family, p. 158.
 82

70
to abolish Judaism?" The profane basis of Judaism, Harx answers,

is self-interest and practical'need, the Jew's cult is huckstering,

and God, money. To abolish Judaism, therefore, means to abolish

the material preconditions which make the Jew possible. Eliminate

huckstering and the Jew's" religious consciousness would

evaporate like some insipid vapour in the real, life-giving air of

71
society."

The Jew, Marx goes on, already has emancipated himself in a

Jewish manner. The Jew not only has acquired vast sums of money,

but also has been instrumental in making money the world power.

The practical Jewish spirit has made Christian nations into Jewish

converts. Historic.",-lly, howeve:t:, this situation could arise only

72
because of the perfection of civil society in the Christian world:

Only under the sway of Christianity, which objectifies

all national, natural, moral and theoretical relationships,
could civil society separate itself completely from the
life of the state, sever all the species-bonds of mall,
establish egoism and selfish need in their place, and
dissolve the human world ~~to a world of atomistic,
antagonistic individuals.

The theoretical life of Judaism, based. as it was on practical need

and self-interest, had a limited development; the practical life of

70
"Jewish Question", p. 34.
71
Ibid.
72
See Young Hegelians, p. 76. McLellan quotes a passage
from Das entdeckte Chris ten tum to show that Bauer also held Christianity
responsible for the egoism of civil society.
73
Ibid., p. 38.
 83

Judaism, commerce, had to await the perfection of civil society

in the Christian world before it could reabsorb Christianity into

itself. Marx concludes that "[f]rom the beginning, the Christian

was the theorizing Jew; consequently, the Jew is the practical

74
Christian. And the practical Christian has become a Jew again."

VI. "Contribution to the Cri t;:ique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right':

Introduction"

Marx composed this essay shortly after "Zur Judenfrage"

and it too was published in the Deutsch-FranzHsische Jahrblicher

in February of 1844. Marx intended it as an introduction to his

Critiqu~ of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right' which he planned to re-

write fol.' a more general audience. Like other of Marx's projects,

however, the popularized Kritik never materialized. Nevertheless,

for the purpose of this study, the first few pages of the Einleitung

comprise a succinct, if in some places, cryptic summary of the

essential features of the Marxian critique of religion. It is

from the Einleitung, moreover, that the famous and frequently

75
misunderstood phrase, "[religion] is the opium of the people",

derives - a phrase, it should be noted, which also can be found in

one form or another in the writings of Hegel, B. Bauer, and Feuerbach.

74
Ibid., p. 39.
75
"Introduction", p. 4L}.
 84

Marx begins the Einleitung with the proclamation: "[f]or

Germany, the criticism of religion has been largely completed; and

76
the criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism". The

first half of Marx's proclamation echoes statements made by both

B. Bauer and Feuerbach about the Enlightenment critique of religion.

Both thinkers, it should be remembered, agreed that the Enlightenment

had adumbrated the definitive critique of religion and each saw in

his own work the completion of the eighteenth-century critique.

Here }~rx acknowledges his ovm debt to both scholars: in the main,

to Bauer, Marx owed his understanding of the historical content of

reJigion, while to Feuerbach, he owed the notion of speculative

philosophy as theology and its consequent implications for Hegel's

system. The second naIf of the proclamation, "the criticism of

religion is the premise of all criticism", underlines the pivotal

place of the religious critique in the Marxian system. On one

hand, Marx is referring to his (and Bauer's) critique of the

Christian-Germanic state which occupied him during 1842-1843. This

critique of the Christian state, Marx claims, was the necessary

preliminary and a crucial element of the critique of the German

situation. On the other hand, Marx is saying the critique 6f

religion also has a wider significance which is not delimited by

national boundaries. Religious consciousness as the classic form

76
Ibid., p. 43.
 85

of false consciousness serves Marx as the paradigm for all other

forms of false consciousness. Seen from this broader perspective,

the religious critique is of immense importance to Marx because

man cannot change the world until he rids himself of all his

illusions about it.

Once religious consciousness has been unmasked, the Ein-

lei tung continues, man is forced to question the material preconditions

which engendered it:

The Rrofane existence of error is compromised once its

celestial 6ratio pro aris et focis has been refuted.
Man, who has found in the fantastic reality of heaven,
where he sought a supernatural being, only his own
reflection, will no longer be tempted to find only the
semblance of himself--a non-human being--where he
seeks and must seek his true "reality. 77

Following Bauer, here, Marx declares that what man found in heaven

was not a Divine Being nor even a human being; rather what man

discovered was a non-human being, his own reflection . . In the

fantastic reality of heaven, man unearthed the inhumanity of society.

Now, Marx proceeds to agree with Feuerbach that: "[t]he

basis" of irreligious criticism is this: man makes religion; religion

78
does not make man". With Feuerbach, Marx insists on the primacy

of the human subject as the source of religion. Unlike Feuerbach,

though, ~furx still maintains religious alienation is not man's

primary alienation. Marx goes on to clarify further his divergence

77
Ibid.
78
Ibid.
 86

from Feuerbach:

. man is not an abstract being squatting outside the

world. Man is .the human world, the state, society. This
state, this society, produce religion which is an inverted
world consciousness, because they are an inverted worl~.79

Even at this early date, before his own concept of man crystallized,

Marx repudiates the Feuerbachian man as "an abstract being squatting

outside the world". Two years later, in his sixth thesis on

Feuerbach, Marx explicitly contrasts his own position with

Feuerbach's:

Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human

essence. But the essence of man is no abstraction-in-
hering in each single individual. In its actuality it is
the ensemble of social relationships.
Feuerbach, who does not go into the criticism of thi.s
actual essence is hence compelled
1. to abstract from the historical process and to
establish religious feeling as somethi.ng self-contained,
and to presuppose an abst.ract-isolated-human individual'
2. to view the essence of man merely as "species", as
the inner, dumb generality Vlhich unites the many indivi-
. 80 .
duals naturally.

In 1843, Marx conceives man as lithe human world, the state, society",

and in 1845, as the Ilensemble of the social relations". At no time,

therefore, could Marx conceive of religion like Feuerbach, that is,

religion as the psychological projection of an isolated individual.

Not man's faculties, not man in isolation, not man in pristine nature,

but society, the inverted world, engenders religion, the inverted

world consciousness. In The German Ideology, Marx will term this

79
Ibid.
80
"Theses", p. 402.
 87

inverted world consciousness, an "ideology".

Having said this, Marx noW" describes religion as "the

general theory of this world, its encyclopedic compendium, its

81
logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur", etc. van

Leeuwen sees this first string of characteristics as a direct

reference to Hegel's system:

Hegel's philosophy claims to be the summary, the com-

prehension of the world. His Logic, far from being
merely an analysis of the laws of human reason, is the
logic of the world, just as his En~yclopaedia is the
encyclopaedic compendium of that wo~2

According to Marx, Hegelian speculation is the most extreme form

of religious alienation. The popular logic of religion is en-

Marx continues to enumerate a second list of characteristics:

religion is the perverted world's "enthusiasm, its moral sanction,

-its solemn complement, its general basis of consolation and justifi-

84
cation". This second list concentrates on the moral and emotional

aspects of religion. With reference to the former, Marx once again

recalls his critique of the Christian state where he pointed out

the unique capacity of religion for political exploitation. Earlier,

in his refutation of the Christian state, Marx frequently referred

81
"Introduction", p. 43.
82
van Leeuwen, p. 191.
83
Ibid., p. 194.
84--
"Introduction", p. 43.
 88

to religion as a "sacred cloak"; now he calls it a l'moral sanction,

a solemn complement". Religion, Marx repeats, has been used to

legitimate the statu~_~. Concerning the latter, it is of some

importa~ce to recognize this as Marxts first mention of the consoling

qualities of religion. In his previous writings, Marx has not dwelt

at all on this capacity of religion. While he does develop this

theme in the next few paragraphs, one should be careful not to fall

into the common prejudice that this is either the central or only

issue which Marx takes with religion. As Kamenka aptly observes:

in his theory of ideologies generally Marx seems

to vacillate between treating ideologies as expressions
of social interests on the one hand, and as compensations
fantasy-supplementations of social reality, on the other. 5 s
Marx proceeds to elaborate on how religion consoles man.

He says "[r]eligious suffering is at the same time an expression of

86
real suffering and a protest against real suffering\l. The perversion

of the world, in other words, entails very real suffering and

religion is one response to this suffering. It is the "sigh of

the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, and the

87
soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people".

Without a doubt, this last sentence is the best known of any of Marxts

sayings. Marx uses the word lI op ium" to describe the intoxicated,

85
Eugene Kamenka, Marxism and Ethics (London, 1969), p. 42.
86
"Introduction", p. 43.
87
Ibid., pp. 43-44.
 89

imaginary, and distorted consolation which religion provides for

man's insufferable social existence.

The critique of religion, the Einleitung goes on, disillu-

sions man and he is forced to face his real situation with sober

senses. The critique of religion, Marx expla.ins, is not meant to

exacerbate the harshness of man's condition. Rather

[c]riticism has plucked the imaginary flowers from

the chain, not in order that man shall bear the chain
without caprice or consolation but so that he shall cast
off the chain and pluck the living flower . . Religion
is only the illusory sun about which man revolves so
long as he does not revolve about himself. 88

Thus, the call to give up religious illusions is a call to throw

off'a condition which requires illusions. "The criticism of

religion is, therefore, the embryonic criticism of this vale of

89
te~.E~ of which religion is the halo."

~rx finishes this section by proclaiming:

The immediate task of philos~, which is in the service

of history, is to unmask human self-alienation in its
secular form now that it has been UIunasked in its sacred
form. Thus the criticism of heaven is transformed into
the criticism earth, the criticism of religion into the
criticism of law, and ~8e criticism of theology into the
~riticism of politics.

This passage explains why Marx would include a summary of his

88
Ibid., p. 44.
89
Ibid.
90
Ibid.
 90

critique of religion in the introduction to his ~I-itique ?f Hegel's

'Philosophy of Right'. LHwith correctly remarks that the traditional

meaning of a theism changes for .tarx: " it is no longer a

theological problem, i. e., a fight against heathen and Christian gods,

91
but a fight against earthly idols". In the Paris Hanuscripts,

the commodity-form of human labour will emerge as chief among these

earthly idols. Yet, by calling the commodity an idol - indeed a

fetish, the crudest form of religion - Harx's works evidence the

extent to which Bauer's method permanently influenced the structure

of his thought. It was on Bauer's suggestion that Marx made the

transition from theoretical to practical atheism, that he changed

theological qUestions into secular ones and crucially, that Harx

92
saw' religious alienation embodied in secular institutions.

Toward the middle of the Einleitun&~ Marx' resumes his

discussion of religion:

What proves beyond doubt the radicalism of [German]

theory, and thus its practical energy, is that it
begins from the resolute positive abolition of re-
ligion. The critici"sm of religion ends with the
doctrine that man is the supreme being for man.
It ends, therefore, with the categorical imperative

91
LHwith, Meaning in History (Chicago, 1949), p. 49.
92
See Young Hegelians, pp. 78-79. McLellan argues that
most of the ~etaphors which Marx used to describe religion in the
Einleitung actually were borrowed from B. Bauer's works.
 91

to overthrow all those conditions in v,7hich man is an

abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being. . 93

In the next few lines, Marx likens the revolutionary quality of

the theoretical critique of religion to the Reformation. Luther

emancipated man from external religiosity by making "religiosity

94
the innermost essence of manl l Thus, while Protestantism was not

the real liberation of man, at least Marx states, the question of

emancipation was presented in .its proper perspective, that is, as

the struggle against man's inner religiosity. It is worth quoting

from the Third of the ''paris l1anuscripts:' entitled "Private Property

and Labour ll , to show how Marx makes the transition from theology

to political ecqnomy by comparing the achievements of Luther to Adam

Smith:

Engels is right in calling Adam Smith the Luther

of political economy. Just as Luther recognized religion
and faith as the essence of the real world, and for that
reason took up a position against Catholic paganism; just
as he annulled external religiosity while making religiosity
the inner. essence of man; just as he riegated the distinction
between priest and layman because he transferred the priest
into the heart of the layman; so wealth external to man
and independent of him (and thus only to be acquired and
conserved from outside) is annulled. That is to say, its
external and mindless objectivity is annulled by the fact
that private property is incorporated in man himself, and
man himself is recognized as its essence. But as a result,
man himself is brought into the sphere of private property,
just as with Luther, he is brought into the sphere of
religion. 95

93
"Introduction", p. 52. LHwith comments: "Only the atheism
of man with faith in himself must also see to the creation of the
world". LHwith, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth-
Century Thought, p. 95.
94"Introduction", p. 53.
95"Paris Manuscripts", pp. 147-148.
 92

In this manner, Marx moves from theology to political economy and

from political economy to alienation, both in theory and in reality.

VII. "Paris Manuscripts"

The "Paris Manuscripts", commonly known as the "Economic

and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844", were first published under

that title in 1932. Since then, a diverse body of interpretive

literature has sprung up around them. For example, the "Paris

Manuscripts" have been used to demonstrate the "humanism" of the

young Marx and in addition, from Marx's analysis of alienation,

French existentialism drew inspiration. The work itself was

written between auturrm of 1843 and January of 1844 and it is

comprised of four manuscripts. For our study, however, only two

of the manuscripts, the last section of the First Manuscript entitled,

"Alienated Labour", and the final part of the Third Manuscript called

"Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and General Philosophy", warrant

detailed consideration.

(a) "Alienated Labour"

The best known part of the "Paris Manuscripts" is this

section which Marx devoted to alienated labour. In it, Marx

amplifies what he means by the alienation of the worker. Marx

claims to derive the concept of alienated labour from political

economy itself. Much like his approach to Hegel, Marx accepts

 93

the presuppositions and laws of political economy to show that

" the worker sinks to the level of a commodity, and to a most

96
miserable commodity".

It is, moreover, primarily this essay which has given rise

to the mistaken view that Marx applied Feuerbach's critique of

religion to politics. Actually, as previously discussed at some

97
length, what JvIarx does do is take one aspect of the Feuerbachian

critique of religion, namely, his description of an alien being,

and he then draws a comparison between it and the commodity-form

of human labour. Marx invokes a comparison with religion, in

other words, to describe the worker's alienation from nature.

Having said this, we can now return to the essay itself.

Political economy, Marx states, presupposes private property,

while it should explain it. It is the same way with theology

which " . . explains the origin of evil by the fall of man; that
98
is, it asserts as a histori.cal fact what it should explain".

Rather than resort to this kind of hypostasis, Marx asserts

[w]e shall begin from a contemporary economic fact.

The worker becomes poorer the more wealth he produces
and the more his production increases in power and
extent. . The devaluation of the human world
increases in direct relation with the increase in value

96
Ibid., p. 120.
97
See pp. 33-34 where I argue that JvIarx could reject the
thrust of Feuerbach's critique of religion while still retaining
Feuerbach's description of an alien being.
98
"paris Manuscripts", p. 121.
 of the world of things. Labour does not only create
goods; it also produces itself and the worker as a
commodity, and indeed in the same proportion as it
produces goods. 99

The object of production, in short, stands opposed to the worker

as an alien being, as an independent power distinct from the

producer. As the world of objects increases, the worker is

progressively impoverished. Now, Marx does make a comparison with

religion which is distinctively Feuerbachian:

It is just the same as in religion. The more of himself

man attributes to God the less he has left in himself.
The worker puts his life into the object, and his life
then belongs no longer to himself but to the object.
. . The alienation of the worker in his product means
not only that his labour becomes an object, assumes an
external existence, but that it exists independently,
-outside himself, and alien to him, and that it stands
opposed to him as an autonomous power. The life which
he has given to the object sets itself against him as
an alien and hostile force. 100

Marx summarizes the alien character of the commodity by saying the

worker is alienated from nature. Basically, Marx sees two aspects

of the worker's alienation from nature: first, the totality of

nature is diminished by the worker's production of objects, and

second, the worker's physical means of existence also diminishes

as his production increases.

Since the worker is alienated from the product of labour,

Marx deduces that the process of production itself must be active

99
Ibid.
100
Ibid., pp. 122-123.
 95

alienation. Marx sees three facets of alienated labour: Labour

is external, forced, and merely a means for satisfying other needs.

Marx writes: "[i]ts alien character is clearly shown by the fact

that as'soon as there is no physical or other compulsion it is

101
avoided like the plague". Marx once more draws a parallel

with religion:

Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of

human fantasy. of the human brain and heart, reacts
independently as an alien activity of gods or devils
upon the individual, so the activity of the worker
is not his OiVil spontaneous activity. It is another's
activity and a loss of his OiVil spontaneity.102

Like the gods, the commodity-form of human labour exacts servitude

from the worker. It stifles the worker's creative activity, his

very life.

Not only is the worker alienated from the product and

process of production, Marx continues, the worker also is alienated

from the species. Marx infers this characteristic of alienated

labour from his equation of productive life with species-life,

Gattungs1eben. Consequently, because the worker's productive life

is merely a means for subsistence, his real universal and free life,

his species-life, is degraded to a means. Following Feuerbach but

also going beyond him, Marx distinguishes man from the animals by

101
Ibid., p. 125.
102
Ibid.
 96

his consciousness of himself as a member of the species. As a

species-being, Gat tungswes en , man's productive life expresses

the freedom and creativity of the entire species. When productive

life i~ degraded to a means, conversely, it expresses the alienation

of the worker from the species: "Alienated labour reverses the

relationship, in that man because he is a self-conscious being

103
makes his life activity, his .being, only a means for his existence ll

The final result of the worker's alienation from the species

is his alienation from other men, both workers and non-workers.

Marx asks, if the product of labour does not belong to the worker,

to whom does it belong? "Not the gods, nor nature, [Marx answers]
104
but only man himself can be this alien power over men." The

worker creates the non-worker as the lord of production. Once

again, Marx illustrates his point through an analogy with religion:

Every self-alienation of man, from himself and from

nature, appears in the relation which he postulates
between other men and nature. Thus religious self-
alienation is necessarily exemplified in the relation
between laity and priest, or, since it is here a question
of the spiritual world, between the laity and a mediator. 105

Just as the laity creates the priest, the worker creates the capitalist

over and against himself.

Having analyzed the four characteristics of alienated labour,

namely the worker's alienation from nature, himself, the species,

and from other men, Marx concludes that private property is not the
103
Ibid., p. 127.
104
Ibid., p. 130.
105
Ibid.
 97

cause, but rather the result and means of alienated labour. While

political economy assumes private property as the cause of alienated

labour, Marx asserts the reverse is true:

But the analysis of this concept shows that although

private property appears to be the basis and cause of
alienated labour, it is rather a consequence of the
latter, just as the gods are fundamentally not the
cause but the product of confusions of human reason.
At a later stage, however, there is a reciprocal
influence. 106

Marx finishes this section, in other words, by saying it is alienated

man who creates both the gods and private property.

(b) IICritique of Hegel's Dialectic and General Philosophy"

The so-entitled HCritique of Hegel's Dialectic and General

Philosophyll forms the final section of the Third Manuscript. In

it, Marx attempts the difficult task of clarifying his ow~ relation-

ship to Hegel's dialectic as well as to speculative philosophy.

Perhaps because of the subject matter, Marx's ideas often seem

obscure in this work. Even so, this essay is significant because

it further develops the notion, broached in both the Kritik and the

Einleitun&, of Hegelian philosophy as the final transformation of

theology.

As usual, Marx starts by attacking the Young Hegelians,

especially Strauss and B. Bauer, for not having come to terms with

the Hegelian dialectic. Only Feuerbach's works are exempted and

106
Ibid., p. 131.
 98

he is praised for his II serious and critical relation to Hegel's

107 -
ll
dialectic Marx elucidates Feuerbach's advance in the following

three points:

1. to have shown that philosophy is nothing more than

religion brought into thought and developed by thought,
and that it is equally to be condemned as another form
and mode of existence of human alienation;
2. to have founded genuine materialism and positive
science by making the social relationship of II man to manll
the basic principle of theory;
3. to have opposed to the negation of the negation
which claims to be the absolute positive", a self-subsistent
principle positively founded on itself. lu8

When Harx says, llphilosophy is nothing more than religion brought

into thought ll , he is referring, on one hand, to the inverted point

of departure of both religion and Hegelian speculation: theology

begins with God and philosophy with the Spirit. Thus, both ignore

the real human subject, namely, real corporeal man in relation to

nature. Following Feuerbach, Marx does not see nature and history

as two distinct entities. Rather man is a part of nature. Marx

conceives of man's relation to nature, however, quite differently

than Feuerbach:

But man is not merely a natural being; he is a human

natural being. . . Consequently, human objects are
not natural objects as they present themselves directly,
nor is human sense, as it is immediately and objectively
given, human sensibility and human objectivity. Neither
objective nor subjective nature is directly presented in
a form adequate to the human being. l09
107
Ibid., p. 197.
108--
Ibid.
109
Ibid., p. 208.
 99

For Marx, there is only an historical nature, that is to say, a

nature subdued and recreated by man in his own image. To return

to Hegel: since Hegel began with an abstraction, the dialectic is

a divine process which ". . . man's abstract, pure, absolute

110
being, as distinguished from himself, traverses".

On the other hand, Marx declares with Feuerbach that the

root of Hegel's false positivism can be found in the negation of

negation:

Hegel's dialectic begins from the infinite, the

absolute and fixed abstraction, which is to say in
ordinary language, from religion and theology. Secondly,
he supersedes the infinite and posits the real, the
perceptible, the finite and the particular; in other
words, philosophy is posited as the supersession of'
religion and theology. Thirdly, he then supersedes
the positive and re-establishes the abstraction, the
infinite; in other words the re-establishment of
religion and theology.ll i

Thus, after recognizing religion as a product of self-alienation,

self-conscious man confirms himself in religion qua religion .

. Hegel, in short, reaffirms illusory being - reaffirms alienated

life as real human life. This pron~ts Marx to comment that the

philosopher of religion is the truly religious man, since following

Hegel, the philosophy of religion is the true existence of

religion.

Nevertheless, Marx says Hegel's concept of "supersession"

110
Ibid., p. 214.
III
van Leeuwen, p. 192.
 100

does contain an insight into man's appropriation of the objective

world through the supersession of its alien character. Marx

clarifies his statement through an illustration: atheism as

the abolition of God and communism as the abolition of private

property result in practical humanism. According to Marx, atheism

and communism are " . . . the first real emergence, the genuine
112
actualization, of man's nature as something real". Thus, Marx

concludes, Hegel did grasp, although in an alienated form, " . . .

man's self-estrangement, alienation of being, loss of objectivity

and reali.ty, as self-discovery, change of nature, objectification

113
a.nd realization". That is, Hegel saw man's self-creation

through labour.

VIII. The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique Against

Bruno Bauer and Company

Jhe Holy Family was the first fruit of Marx and Engels'

long collaboration. It was written during the latter part of

1844 and published in February of 1845. In the foreword, Marx

says the intent of Die heilige Familie is to enlighten the

general public on the illusions of speculative philosophy. Actually,

like The German Ideology, much of this book is an extended polemic

112
"Paris Manuscripts", p. 213.
113
Ibid.
 101

against the Young Hegelian School, represented in this work by

the authors of the journal,Allgemeine Literatur-Ze~tung. Marx

makes Bruno Bauer his chief antagonist in Die he:Llige Familie.

He accuses Bauer of twisting Hegelian speculation into a theo-

logical caricature and he, therefore, subject Bauer's Critical

II
Critique to Feuerbachts transformative method: Critical

Criticism makes out of ,criticism, as a predicate and activity of

man, a subject apart, criticism referring itself to itself and

114
therefore Critical Cri tid_sml! However, as mentioned earlier,

it is important not to forget that Marx is attacking the stance

Bauer took in 1844, the period of II pure criticismll , and not Bauer's

earlier position. Disenchanted by the failure of radicalism and

perhaps also by the permanen~ loss of his university post, Bauer

had increasingly lost hope for immediate political change in

Germany. Thus, in 1844 with the launching of the Allgemeine

Literatur Zeitung, Bauer did shift from a radical critique to a

critique without immediate political significance. m1ile many of

Marx's arguments are peripheral to my specific enquiry, Die heilige

Familie itself is an invaluable source for illustrating how Marx

pictures the effect of religion upon man.

For Marx, it should be kept in mind, religion is primarily

114
Holy Family, pp. 31-32.
 102

an alienation of man's consciousness. Religion is not the essen-

tial alienation of man, man's socio-economic alienation; it is a

manifestation of that basic alienation on the level of conscious-

ness. It is the idealisation of the divisi.ons of society: "Religious

alienation as such occurs only in the sphere of consciousness, in

the inner life of man, but economic alienation is that of real life
115
and its supersession, therefore, affects both aspects". While

religion is primarily false consciousness, religion also acts

back upon man. For Marx, the way religion, particularly Christianity,

acts back upon man is macabre.

In Die heilige Familie, Marx COIT@ents on Szeliga's review,

published in No. VII of Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, of Eugene

Sue's novel, Myst~res de Paris. Marx relates how a robust tavern

maid, Marie, comes under the fatal thrall of a priest. The priest,

Marx begins, initiates }illrie's conversion by distorting her naive

love of nature into "religious fascination":

For her, nature has already become a devout, christianized

nature, debased to creation. The transparent sea of
space is desecrated and turned into a dark symbol of
stagnant eternity.116
Holding out the promise of baptism, the priest now transforms Marie

into a sinner:

The priest must soil her in her own eyes, he must

trample underfoot her moral capacities and gifts to

115
"Paris Manuscripts", p. 156.
116
Holy Family, p. 230.
 103

make her receptive to the supernatural grace he

promises her, baptism. 117

Marie's awareness of sin, in turn, affects her relations with

other men. No longer does she see other, men in relation to

herself, but only in relation to God:

She is already caught in religious hypocrisy which

takes away from another man what he has deserved in
respect of me in order to give it to God and which
considers anything and everything human in man as
alien to God and everything inhuman in him as really
God's own. 118

This last line repeats Marx's statement in the Einleitung about

unearthing the inhumanity of society in the celestial realm of

heaven. God, far from being superhuman, is found out as subhuman.

Deluded by the priest, Marie enters a convent and gives herself

entirely to God. She relinquishes intercourse with man for

intercourse with God, changes worldly love into heavenly love,

and trades earthly happiness for eternal bliss. However,

[c]onvent life does not suit Marie1s individuality -

she dies. Christianity consoles her only in imagination,
or rather her Christian consolation is precisely the
annihilation of her real life and essence-her death. 119

So ends the story of Marie, a tale which recounts how a robust

'tavern maid was transformed into a nun and from nun to corpse.

Marie's story is rather instructive for grasping Marx's

views on the practical effects of religion. From this tale, it

117
Ibid.
118
Ibid. , p. 231.
119
Ibid. , p. 234.
 104

is obvious Marx wants religion abolished; it is not a matter of

compromise with religion or purification of it. He describes

faith as Ilcoarsell and "repulsive ll and argues religion debases

120
and dehumanizes man. Elsewhere in Die heiligeFamilie, to

use a few more examples, Marx links Christian consciousness of sin

121 122
with insanity and reduces Christian sexuality to mere propagation.

In sum, for Marx, like Bauer, religion further mutilates human

existence. Thus, his rejection of religion is absolute.

IX. The German Ideology

The German Ideology completes the project begun in Die

123
heilige Familie to "debunk and discredit ll Young Hegelian philosophy

and as such, it is the last of Marx's early works which directly

124
pertains to our specific enquiry. In Die Deutsche Ideologie, Marx

emphatically rejec~s the Feuerbachian critique of religion. His

rejection evolves out of his understanding of history, clearly developed

in his first chapter entitled IlFeuerbach ll . The bulk of the remainder

of the book deals with Max Stirner's critique of communism. Nearly

four hundred pages of bellicose prose are devoted to Stirner's book,

DerEinzige und sein Eigentum. This, of course, creates a problem

120
Ibid., p. 171.
121
Ibid., p. 245.
122
Ibid., p. 89.
123--
German Ideology, p. 23.
l2/f
The full text of Die Deutsche Ideologie was not printed
until 1932.
 105

in that much of this section is a closely reasoned critique of

Stirner, rather than a systematic exposition of Marx's own thought.

Moreover, references to religion are scattered throughout the book,

and, therefore, I must piece together Marx's theory of ideology

in the context of his discussion of history.

As early as March, 1843 in a letter to Arnold Ruge, Marx

had doubts about the historical validity of Feuerbach's approach:

"Feuerbach's aphorisms [Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy]

only seem to be amiss in one point in that he refers too much to

125
nature and not enough to politics". Later, as I traced this

theme through the Einleitung and his Thesen, I saw Marx repudiating

the Feuerbachian "Man" as an abstraction. In the 'Paris Manuscripts ll ,

furthermore, he went on to rej ect Feuerbachian lInaturell. Now, in

Die Deutsche Ideologie, we see Marx attempting to completely

disassociate himself from Feuerbach!s thought. He complains that

Feuerbach's materialism excludes history and, therefore, it is actually

abstract and not real materialism.

[Feuerbach] merely substituted an abstract earth

for an abstract heaven. The real critique of heaven had
not been completed by Feuerbach at all; it had still to
be accomplished, not by replacing heaven with earth, but
by criticizing heaven in its earthly manifestations or,

125
Karl Marx, lILetter to Arnold Ruge ll , in Early Texts, p. 60.
 106

to put it the other way around, by criticizing the earth

in its heavenly manifestations. 120

Marx concludes once and for all the essence of religion is to be

found in II neither the 'essence of Man', nor in the predicates

of God, but in the material world which any stage of religious

127
development finds already in existOence ll . For example, following

B. Bauer, Marx states the appearance of Christianity can be traced

to the decomposition of the ancient world which eventually resulted

in the vast concentration of wealth in the Roman world. Thus,

because the early Christians were for the most part slaves, the

ancient Christian was

. . satisfied with his imaginary heavenly property and

his divine right to ownership. Instead of making the
world the possession of the people, he proclaimed
himself and his ragged fraternity to be 'God's own
possessionll.1 28

Only when the secular authority appropriated Christianity, Marx

goes on, II could Christianity imagine itself to be the owner

129
of the world ll

Thus, Marx once more insists that religion, like the rest

of ideology, has no independent history. For Marx, the real basis of

126
van Leeuwen, p. 186.
127
German Ideology, p. 168.
128
Ibid., p. 201.
129
Ibid., p. 202.
 107 .

history is grounded in man's practical relation to nature in the

actual production of life. After satisfying his basic material

needs (food, clothing, and shelter) and acquiring the means or

instruments of this satisfaction, man's first historical act, claims

Marx in Die Ideologie, is the creation of new needs.

Because there is no limit to the needs he can create,

or to the means of satisfying them, man continually
transcends himself. Through this transcendence he
becomes more and more human. The production process thI~
is at once manls self-expression and his self-creation. 0

In other words, man creates himself through his own activity, that

is, through both material and cultural production in history.

At this point in his discussion of the real versus ideal

premises of history, Marx introduces the social factor into the

production process. He sees a definite mode of cooperation or social

stage (itself a productive force) that accompanies each particular

mode of production or industrial stage. Initially, this mode of

cooperation is the family; the family is the first social unit. In

the act of procreation and then in the family, Marx finds, moreover,

the beginnings of the division of labour. Real division of labour,

however, is not accomplished until physical labour is separated from

mental labour.

These then, according to Marx, are the four aspects of the

primary historical relationships: the production of means of

130
Dupre, p. 148.
 108

subsistence, the creation of new needs, the family as the first

social unit, and the division of labour stretching beyond the family

with increased production. Marx refers to these four aspects of

the real ground of history as "moments" to impress upon the Young

Hegelians that these aspects are not four different temporal stages.

These moments, on the contrary, " . . have existed simultaneously

since the dawn of history and the first men, and which still assert
131
themselves in history today".

Only now does Marx mention "consciousness". Consciousness,

however, is not an independent factor like the other four premises

of actual history. Language is practical consciousness and like

language, consciousness arises out of social relations, out of

the need for intercourse with other men. Consciousness is always

a social product and it remains so despite the efforts of the Young

Hegelians to make it the driving force of history. Consciousness,

finall~ is always consciousness of nature because man's relation

to nature determines his social relations. Conversely, man's

consciousness of himself as a social being confirms his active rather

than passive relation to nature.

With the bifurcation of labour into physical and mental

labour as exclusive spheres of activity, consciousness, Marx continues,

does appear to gain a kind of independence vis-~-vis the world. In

131
German Ideology, p. 41.
 109

other words, the division of labour engenders ideologists as

the conceptualizers of the ruling class[es]. Marx includes philoso-

phers, theologians, moralists, political theorists, and lawyers

among others in the category of ideologists. In reality, Marx says;

the task of the ideologist is to systematize the illusions of the

ruling class. However, because the ideologist divorces nature from

history, he falsely views his mvn work as both the motive force

and the culmination of previous history. Thus Hegel, the specula-

tive theologian, saw philosophy as the driving force of history

and saw his own philosophy as the culmination of all previous

philosophy. Marx concludes the ideologists invert reality and

" regard their ideology both as the creative force and as the

aim of all social relations, whereas it is only an expression and

132
symptom of these relations".

The practical effect of ideology, Marx explains, is to

legitimate the domination of the ruling class. Ideology accom-

plishes this end in two main ways. On one hand, the ideologists

present the ruling interest as the common interest, as the norm

of society. On the other hand, ideology serves as a supplement

of social reality, as a compensation for the inhumanity of society.

In the Middle Ages, to use one illustration, Christianity not only

justified the feudal hierarchy by proclaiming it ordained by God,

132
Ibid., p. lf61.
 110

but also consoled the serfs for their degraded position within that

hierarchy by promising them greater rewards in heaven.

It is true, Marx admits, that ideologies sometimes clash

with one another. This is so, he explains, because of the nature of

alienated labour, referred to in Die Ideologie as the division

of labour. Writing two years earlier in the "Paris Manuscripts",

Marx indicated the effect of alienated labour on the theoretical

life of man:

The nature of alienation implies that each sphere

applies a different and contradictory norm, that
morality does not apply the same norm as political
economy, etc., because each of them is a particular
alienation of man; each is concentrated upon a specific
area of alienated activity and is itself alienated
from the other. 133

On this account, it is to be expected that ideologies will con-

tradict one another. In the case of political economy versus

morality, though, the norm of political economy will ultimately

take preference over the norm of morality, because political

economy satisfies real needs, while morality only soothes the

conscience.

There is a second reason why ideologies come into conflict

and this brings us to a more general consideration of the movement

of histo~7 - a movement, according to Marx, which is both genetic

and dialectical. In 1844, Marx saw history as genesis:

133
"Paris Manuscripts", p. 173.
 III

And as everything natural must have its orlgln so man

has his process of genesis, history, which is for him,
however, a conscious process and thus one which is
consciously self-transcending. 134

Marx sees man owes his very physical existence, his individual

origin, to man and not to any superterrestial being, since the

coitus of two human beings has produced the human being. Just

so, world history is the creation of man through human labour.

Hence, for Marx, world history is the definitive proof of man's

135
self-creation, proof of his own origins.

History itself, Marx proceeds, is the process of the

emergence of nature for man. So apprehended, "[h]istory is a

real part of natural history, or the development of nature into

136
man" In other words, society, at any given industrial stage,

is the result of an intricate dialectic of human praxis: the

productive forces create social relations which, in turn, shape

the productive forces. At every stage in human history, there

exists a definite mode of production which corresponds to par-

ticular relations of production and also a particular state of

consciousness, particular ideologies. Simultaneously, demand, or

the creation of new needs, in society begins to outgrow the capacity

of the existing productive forces and results in the eventual

134
Ibid. , p. 208.
135
Ibid. , p. 166.
136
Ibid. , p. 164.
 112

137
creation of new means of production. When in the course of time,

however, the new productive forces outgrow the relations of

production, the old relations of production and with them the whale

relations' of society, including its ideologies, must break apart,

must dissolve. Marx asks:

[d]oes it require deep intuition to comprehend that

man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's
consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions
of his material existence, in his social relations and in
his social life?138

Accordingly, when the revolutionary bourgeoisie wrested power from

the feudal nobility and clergy " . . . Christian ideas succumbed

139
in the 18th century to rationalist ideas . " This argument

repeats what was said in Chapter I that Marx thinks the bourgeoisie

eliminated Christianity, a position explicable in the context of

his dialectical understanding of history.

To conclude: while Marx's theory of ideology never reaches

any great precision, certain things are clear. First, Marx con-

stantly stresses that ideology has no independent history and

is completely dependent upon the interests of the ruling class.

This allows Marx to make the somewhat startling statement that

the bourgeoisie did away with Christianity. Second, Marx equates

,
ideology with false consciousness in a two-fold sense: an ideology

is false consciousness because society is false, but also because

137
In the capitalist era, however, supply dominates demand, .
causing an anarchy of production.
138
Manifesto, p. 72.
139
Ibid., p. 73.
 113

ideology legitimates the perversion of society. Third, and this

follows from what just has been said, there will be no ideologies

in the classless society. There will be no religion in the classless

society.

x. Conclusion

From this detailed examination of Marxts somewhat

scattered conmlents on religion throughout his writings from 1841-1846,

it seems obvious his thought on the subject was neither systematic

nor self-contained. This observation, however, in no way implies

his position regarding religion was not well thought out and basically

consistent. Quite the contrary, it would appear that he fully

realized the import of his rejection of religion. These particular

works, moreover, evidence the extent to which his critique of

religion played an important part within t~e framework of his

whole thought. The question of religion was not merely the pastime

of a young man, but it structured the way in which he thought

through the most basic questions. Even though he thought the

theoretical critique of religion was finished, he did not think it

was irrelevant. In the first place, he saw parallels in the secular

sphere which could be explained by analogies with the religious

sphere. Secondly, but more important, while the theoretical critique

 114

was completed, ideology still persisted. Marx's final stance on

religion was that its critique would not be completely accomplished

until the world was righted.

 IMPLICATIONS OF THIS WORK

Apart from the academic exercise of tracing a single theme

through certain writings of a major thinker, this thesis is of

contemporary interest to the "Christian-Marxist" dialogue. It is

beyond the scope of the present study to enter into the debate

itself. Such an undertaking would require a second preliminary

study of how the modern Christians involved see themselves and

their faith. For example, how much traditional theology do they

see as wrong or open to reinterpretation? Or what is the proper

relationship'between faith and works in the technological society?

Only when these kinds of questions have been answered could the

debate proper begin. From my analysis of Marxrs critique of

religion, I can only point to some general questions on which the

debate should focus and indicate the areas in which there is a

danger of false accord.

Starting with his doctoral dissertation, there is no doubt

Marx was a thorough-going, militant atheist. The fact that Marx

did not recommend the extermination of Christians does not mitigate

agalnst the vehemence of his atheism. Unlike Feuerbach, Marx did

not think religion could be humanized, since it, by definition,

solely expressed the inhumanity of society. Therefore, if

Christians and Marxists find their theoretical affinity in

115
 116

Perhaps of even greater significance for this particular

discussion is the further point that Marx's atheism was not simply

an accident of his own personality. Since he himself stated

1
" . the criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism",

it is untenable to argue that he saw his critique of religion as

peripheral to the rest of his system. For him, that critique was

absolutely necessary and he drew heavily on Bruno Bauer for it.

Unlike. Bauer, though, Marx thought the critique of religion would

atrophy unless it resulted in a radical critique of society.

According to Marx, Bauer's error lay in over-estimating the impact

his critique of religion would have on transforming society. In

contrast, Marx thought only the transformation of society would

complete the critique of religion. Often in "Christian-Marxist"

dialogue, the question of Marx's atheism is bracketed in the expec-

tation of finding grounds for agreement in the shared belief that

society must be transformed. Christians, ironically, seem to take

a pDsition at this stage very similar to Bauer's. Of course, they

start from the opposite assumption that Christianity is good, but

they would assert with Bauer that Christianity properly understood

1
"Introduction", p. 43.
 117

would lead to the transformation of society. For Bauer, significant

change would result from the end of Christianity, while for the

Christians, it would come from the application of Christianity.

In spite of obvious differences, the Christians, like Bauer, do

not seem to have assimilated Marx's description of the movement of

history. Until they come to grips with the theory of ideology,

they are as far removed from him as was Bauer. While it is important

to look at Feuerbach's and Bauer's influence. on Marx's critique of

religion, for a proper understanding of Marx, it is equally crucial

to see why he diverged from them.

In short, if the "Christian-Marxist" dialogue wants to

maintain serious discussion, it must be willing to recognize grave

difficulties with the man himself. Marx certainly saw himself as

an atheist. He digested the theoretical critique of religion and

produced polemics against theology, the Christian state, and the

ot~er forms of ideology. His writings are literally riddled

witli his critique of religion in such a consistent way that there

is no doubt he reserved a definite place for atheism within his

system. Therefore, those who desire to find a common theoretical

basis for Christianity and Marxism must deflect Marx's own account.

In order to do this, they must make an explicit methodological

assumption, namely, that they are able to understand what Marx

said or should have said better than he did. Specifically, they

 118

must prove that Marx erred about the nature of religion and the

centrality of atheism. In doing so, they disregard the cornerstone

of Marx's entire theory of ideology. This approach raises the

question of how much one can tamper with Marx's integrated system

and still remain Marxist. It is possible Marx anticipated and

rejected this very discussion with Christians when he wrote in the

Hanifesto of the Communist Party:

Nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism

a Socialist tinge. Has not Christianity declaimed
against private property, against marriage, against
the State? Has it not preached in the place of these,
charity and poverty, celibacy and mortification of
the' flesh, monastic life and Mother Church? Christian
Socialism is but the holy water with which the priest
consecrates the heart-burnings of the aristocrat. 2

2
Manifesto, pp. 79-80.
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 120

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