DIZON, DAEZELLE FAITH SANCHEZ JD - 2 APRIL 26, 2016

EDROSOLANO, SHANE MARIE BELLOGA

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES DECIDED ON 2014

Gov. Luis Raymund F. Villaflurete, Jr. Vs Hon. Jesse M. Robredo, GR. No. 195390, December 10,
2014.

FACTS: In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination and audit on the
manner the local government units utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the
calendar years 1993-1994. The examination yielded an official report, showing that a
substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for
development projects but was diverted to expenses properly chargeable against the
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of R.A.
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). In 2010, Jesse
Robredo, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed Memorandum Circular (MC) No.
2010-83, entitled Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings,
which aims to promote good governance through enhanced transparency and accountability of
LGUs. The MC requires the posting within 30 days from the end of each fiscal year in at least
three (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the local government unit a summary of
all revenues collected and funds received including the appropriations and disbursements of
such funds during the preceding fiscal year. The foregoing circular also states that
noncompliance will be meted sanctions in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and
regulations. On December 2, 2010, the Robredo issued another MC, reiterating that 20%
component of the IRA shall be utilized for desirable social, economic and environmental
outcomes essential to the attainment of the constitutional objective of a quality of life for all. It
also enumerated a list for which the fund must not be utilized. Villafuerte, then Governor of
Camarines Sur, joined by the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur, filed the instant petition
for certiorari, seeking to nullify the assailed issuances of the respondent for being
unconstitutional and having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Hon. Secretary of DILG invalidly assume legislative power in
promulgating the assailed memorandum circulars which went beyond the clear and manifest
intent of the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.

RULING: There is no merit in the respondents claim that the petitioners failure to exhaust
administrative remedies warrants dismissal of the petition. It bears emphasizing that the
assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the rule-making body or quasi-legislative power of
the DILG. This pertains to the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of granting statute. Not to be confused with the quasi-
legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine question of facts to
which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down
by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In challenging the validity of an
administrative issuance carried out pursuant to the agencys rule-making power, the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not stand as a bar in promptly resorting to the filing
of a case in court.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises, G.R. No. 172551, January 15,
2014.

Private lands acquired for agrarian reform; primary jurisdiction. The Land Bank of the
Philippines is primarily charged with determining land valuation and compensation for all
private lands acquired for agrarian reform purposes. But this determination is only preliminary.
The landowner may still take the matter of just compensation to the court for final
adjudication. Thus, we clarify and reiterate: the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 rests with the RTC-
SAC. But, in its determination, the RTC-SAC must take into consideration the factors laid down
by law and the pertinent DAR regulations.

Republic of the Phlippines vs Drugmakers Laboratories, Inc and Terramedic, Inc., G.R. No.
190837,March5,2014.

FACTS: The FDA was created pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 3720, otherwise known as the
"Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act," primarily in order to establish safety or efficacy standards and
quality measures for foods, drugs and devices, and cosmetic products. On March 15, 1989, DOH
issued Administrative Order No. 67 entitled Revised Rules and Regulations of Pharmaceutical
Products. It required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine with the FDA
before they may be released to the market for sale. It also required a bioavailability/
bioequivalence (BA/BE) test for a manufacturer to secure a Certificate of Product Registration
(CPR) for its products. The implementation of the BA/BE test however was put on hold because
there was no facility capable of conducting the same. FDA then issued Circular 1 which resumed
the implementation of the BA/BE test. Thereafter, FDA issued Circular 8 which provided for
additional details concerning the test requirement.

Respondent is a drug manufacturer of a drug brand named Refam for the treatment of persons
suffering from pulmonary and extra- pulmonary tuberculosis. When Refam was subjected to
the required test, it resulted that the product was not a bioequivalent with the reference drug.
FDA warned respondent that is CPR will never be renewed unless it submit satisfactory results
of BA/BE test.

Instead of submitting satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam, respondents filed a petition for
prohibition and annulment of Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 before the RTC, alleging that it is
the DOH, and not the FDA, which was granted the authority to issue and implement rules
concerning RA 3720. As such, the issuance of the aforesaid circulars and the manner of their
promulgation contravened the law and the Constitution. They further averred that that the
non-renewal of the CPR due to failure to submit satisfactory BA/BE test results would not only
affect Refam, but their other products as well.

ISSUE: Whether or not the FDA may validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997

RULING: Yes. An administrative regulation that is merely an interpretative rule needs nothing
further than its issuance. An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an
interpretative rule, or a contingent rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate
legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof.
They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to
authority properly delegated by Congress and effect a change in existing law or policy which
affects individual rights and obligations. Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to
interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulations under which the administrative body
operates. Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the statute being administered and
purport to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute
means and refer to no single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the
same class which may be covered by the said rules. Finally, contingent rules are those issued by
an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the
enforcement of the law depends. In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with
the requirements laid down by Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987," on prior notice, hearing, and publication in order to be valid and
binding, except when the same is merely an interpretative rule. This is because when an
administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed.A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that AO 67, s.
1989 is actually the rule that originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a
component of applications for the issuance of CPRs covering certain pharmaceutical products.
As such, it is considered an administrative regulation a legislative rule to be exact issued by the
Secretary of Health in consonance with the express authority granted to him by RA 3720 to
implement the statutory mandate that all drugs and devices should first be registered with the
FDA prior to their manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the validity of
its issuance, the Court deems that AO 67, s. 1989 complied with the requirements of prior
hearing, notice, and publication pursuant to the presumption of regularity accorded to the
government in the exercise of its official duties. The FDA then issued Circular No. 8, s. 1997 to
supplement Circular No. 1, s. 1997 in that it reiterates the importance of the BA/BE testing
requirement originally provided for by AO 67, s. 1989. Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be
considered as administrative regulations because they do not: (a) implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory
regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain the existence of certain facts or
things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these
circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO
67, s. 1989, including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and
pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and
since they would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern as they
are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations in the first place no prior hearing,
consultation, and publication are needed for their validity.

Olivia Da Silva Cerafica vs Commission on Election, GR. No. 205136, December 2, 2014.

FACTS: In October 2012, Kimberly filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig for 2013 Elections.
Her COC stated that she was born on 29 October 1992 or that she will be twenty (20) years of
age on the day of Election, in contravention of the requirement that one must be atleast twenty
three (23) of age on the day of the election as set out in Sec. 9 (c) of the Republic Act No. 8487
(Charter of City of Taguig). As such, Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory hearing sue to
the age qualification. Instead of attending the hearing, she filed a sworn Statement of
Withdrawal of COC on December 17, 2012. Simultanuosly, Oliva filed her own COC as a
substitute of Kimberly.

In a Momorandum, Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra of the Comelec Law Department

recommended the cancellation of Kimberlys COC, and consequently, the denial of the
substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. In a Special En Banc Meeting of the Comelec, the Comelec
adopted the recommendation of Director Amora-Ladra, cancelled Kimberlys COC and denied
the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia as an effect of the cancellation of Kimberlys COC

ISSUE: Whether or not Comelecacted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and contrary to law and jurisprudence in issuing the assailed minute
resolution.
RULING: The Court finds that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion. In the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power, the Constitution, mandates to hear and decide cases first
by Division, and upon motion for reconsideration, by En Banc. Where a power vests in
judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve exercise
of functions of a judge is conferred upon an officer other that a judicial officer, it is deemed a
quasi-judicial. As cancellation proceedings involve the quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec,
the Comelec in division should be first decided this case.

Ralph P. Tua v. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, Presiding Judge, Branch 22, RTC, Imus, Cavite; and
Rossan Honrado-Tua, G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014.

Judicial power; issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of the Courts authority to settle
justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and demandable
before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The provision
in R.A. 9262 allowing the issuance of protection orders is not an invalid delegation of legislative
power to the court and to barangay officials to issue protection orders. Section 2 of Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe,
and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of
its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. Hence, the primary judge of the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law is primarily the
function of the legislature. The act of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection
orders is in pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving
rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
wrongs for violations of such rights.