Gomez vs.
CA, 168 SCRA 503 (1988) duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus
168 SCRA 503 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Judgment
Confirms Title Sec 30 & 32 PD 1529
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12 parcels of
land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion later died
and the 12 parcels of land were inherited by Jose Gomez et al her
heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the property among them.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the
application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On
August 5, 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the
subject lots in Gomez et als favor. The decision became final and
executory hence the court directed the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office (GLRO) to issue the corresponding decrees of
registration over the lots adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and petitioned
for its setting aside. He discovered that the 12 parcels of land were
formerly part of a titled land which was already granted by
homestead patent in 1929. Under the law, land already granted by
homestead patent can no longer be the subject of another
registration. The lower court granted Silverios recommendation.
Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land Registration
Act) which provides that after judgment has become final and
executory, the court shall forthwith issue an order to the
Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree
of registration and certificate of title. That once the judgment
becomes final and executory under Sec 30, the decree of
registration must issue as a matter of course.
ISSUE: Whether or not to set aside the lower courts initial ruling on
approving the adjudication even after it had became final and
executory.
HELD: Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in
a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in
the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1)
year after the entry of the final decree of registration. The Supreme
Court has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered
by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the
period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such
decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it.
LABURADA vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
[G.R. No. 101387, March 11, 1998]
FACTS:
Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A
which was approved by the trial court. Upon motion of
petitioners, the trial court issued an order requiring the LRA to
issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA
refused. Hence, petitioners filed an action for mandamus.
The LRA revealed that based on records, Lot 3-A which
sought to be registered by Sps. Laburada is part of Lot No. 3,
over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other
hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 is covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de
Buenaflor, which was issued as a transfer from TCT No. 6595. The
LRA contended that to issue the corresponding decree of
registration sought by the petitioners, it would result in the
contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration
system, and destroy the integrity of the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the LRA may be compelled by
mandamus to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that
the subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens
certificate of title?
HELD:
NO. It is settled that a land registration court has no
jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in
the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second
decree for the same land would be null and void, since the
principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land
only once. Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are
seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905,
the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run
counter to said principle. The issuance of a decree of registration
is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere
ministerial act which may be compelled through mandamus. It is
not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of
registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the
case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The LRA,
on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a
report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the
property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from
notice. After receipt of such report, the land registration court, in
turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to
settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of
registration, according to the facts and the law as herein
discussed.
Baranda vs. Gustilo
GR No. 81163 September 26, 1988
FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by original
certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute between
petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and
respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria Gotera and Susan Silao). Both
parties claimed ownership and possession over the said land.
However during the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate of
title held by respondents was fraudulently acquired. So the transfer
certificate of title was ordered to be put in the name of petitioners. In
compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds
Avito Saclauso annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and
void, cancelled the same and issued new certificate of titles in the
name of petitioners. However, by reason of a separate case pending
in the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in the
new certificate of title. This prompted the petitioners to move for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates.
Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register
of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration invoking Sec 77 of PD
1529.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to
annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a Torrens certificate of
title?
HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting
Register of Deeds stand that the notice of lis pendens cannot be
cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court of
Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds, encumbrances, instrument and the like is
ministerial in nature. The acting register of deeds did not have any
legal standing to file a motionfor reconsideration of the Judges
Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of
PD 1529 states that: It shall be the duty of the register of deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing
with real or
personal property which complies with all the requisites for registra
tion.
If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and in form the presentor or such denial in
writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him
of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this
decree. On the other hand, Sec 117 of PD 117 states that: When
the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to
be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage or other instrument presented to him for registration or
where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken by
the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument,
the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land
Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest
through the Register of Deeds.
CARMELITA FUDOT vs. CATTLEYA LAND, INC., VELASCO, JR.
533 SCRA 350
FACTS: Respondent asked someone to check, on its behalf, the titles
of nine (9) lots, the subject land included, which it intended to buy
from the spouses Troadio and Asuncion Tecson. Finding no defect
on the titles, respondent and the Tecsons executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the same properties . The Register of Deeds,
Atty. Narciso dela Serna, refused to actually annotate the deed of
sale on the titles because of the existing notice of attachment in
connection with Civil Case No. 3399 pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol. The attachment was eventually cancelled by
virtue of a compromise agreement between the Tecsons and their
attaching creditor which was brokered by respondent. Titles to six
(6) of the nine (9) lots were issued, but the Register of Deeds refused
to issue titles to the remaining three (3) lots , because the titles
covering the same were still unaccounted for. On 23 January 1995,
petitioner presented for registration before the Register of Deeds the
owners copy of the title of the subject property, together with the
deed of sale purportedly executed by the Tecsons in favor of
petitioner on 19 December 1986 On 5 May 1995, respondent filed its
Complaint6 for Quieting of Title &/Or Recovery Of Ownership,
Cancellation Of Title With Damages before the Regional Trial Court
of Tagbilaran City. On 26 June 1995, Asuncion filed a complaint-in-
intervention, claiming that she never signed any deed of sale
covering any part of their conjugal property in favor of petitioner.
She averred that her signature in petitioners deed of sale was
forged thus, said deed should be declared null and void. The trial
court rendered its decision: (i) quieting the title or ownership of the
subject land in favor of respondent; (ii) declaring the deed of sale
between petitioner and spouses Tecson invalid; (iii) ordering the
registration of the subject land in favor of respondent; (iv)
dismissing respondents claim for damages against the Register of
Deeds for insufficiency of evidence; (v) dismissing Asuncions claim
for damages against petitioner for lack of factual basis; and (vi)
dismissing petitioners counterclaim for lack of the required
preponderance of evidence. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the
decision but the Court of Appeals denied her motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
ISSUES:
1. BETWEEN 2 BUYERS OF REGISTERED LAND, WHO HAS THE
BETTER RIGHT-IS IT THE FIRST BUYER WHO WAS GIVEN THE
OWNERS DUPLICATE TCT TOGETHER WITH A DEED OF SALE
IN 1986, OR THE SECOND BUYER IN 1992 WITH ONLY A DEED
OF SALE.
2. IS A BUYER OF REGISTERED LAND WHO DID NOT DEMAND
OR REQUIRE THE DELIVERY OF THE OWNERS DUPLICATE
TCT A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH.
3. IN SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION OF REGISTERED LANDS,
AS BY SALE, WHICH LAW SHALL GOVERN, ARTICLE 1455 OF
CIVIL CODE OR P.D. 1529 OR TORRENS SYSTEM.
HELD:
1. First issue : The Civil Law provision on double sale is not
applicable where there is only one valid sale, the previous sale
having been found to be fraudulent. The Court held that despite the
fact that one deed of sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544
of the Civil Code will not apply where said deed is found to be a
forgery, the result of this being that the right of the other vendee
should prevail. Thus, under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the
husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. The act of
registration does not validate petitioners otherwise void contract.
Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or
instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of
the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of
title covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or instrument.
2. On the second issue: Art. 1544. Should it be immovable property,
the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. The Court declared
that the governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in
time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the
second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights, except where the
second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the
first as provided by the afore quoted provision of the Civil Code.
Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar him from availing of
his rights under the law, among them to register first his purchase
as against the second buyer. However, knowledge gained by the
second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to
register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior
registration with bad faith. That respondent was a buyer in good
faith, in its desire to finally have the title to the properties
transferred in its name, it persuaded the parties in the said case to
settle the same so that the notice of attachment could be cancelled.
3. Third issue: The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has
been held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration
Act (now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as the
operative act that binds the land. On lands covered by the Torrens
System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they
appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or
encumbrance not noted therein. Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. L-360 November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appelant, vs. THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
FACTS:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of
1941. The registration was interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to
accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deed on
ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land within the
jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire
residential land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot
that was already of private ownership prior to the approval of this
Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?
RULING:
1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at
the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. This means to say that, under the provisions of the
Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban
or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all
acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the
fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.
2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874
sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private
only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the pharase "no land"
used in this section refers to all private lands, whether strictly
agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private
land which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said
two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two
provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to
aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature,
to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease,
encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were
granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity.
Ong Cung Po vs CA 239 SCRA 341
DOCTRINE:The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon
the capacity to acquire or hold landa of the public domain. The 1935
constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition,
exploitation, development and utiization of all lands of the public
domain and other natural resoutces of the Philippines for Filipino citizens
or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned
by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals, corporatioon, have been
disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been
disqualified from acquiring private lands.
FACTS
On July 23, 1947, Ong Joi Jong sold a parcel of land to private respondent
Soledad Parian, wife of Ong Yee. Ong Yee is the brother of petitioner Ong
Ching Po.The sale was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Sale and
subsequently registered with the register of Deeds of Manila of which
transfer of certificate of Title was issued to the private respondent.
According to the private respondent, she entrusted the administration of
the lot and building to petitioner Ong Ching Po when she and her husband
settled in Iloilo. When her husband died, she demanded the lot be vacated
because she was going to sell it. Unfortunately, Ong Ching Po refuses to
vacate the land.
On March 19, 1981, the private respondent filed a case for unlawful
detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.The inferior court
dismissed the case. The dismissal was both affirmed by the Regional trial
court and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners ,on the other hand, claimed that on July 23, 1949, Ong Ching
Po bought the parcel of Land from Ong Joi Jong evidenced by a photo copy
of a Deed of Sale conveying therewith the he is acceding to the request of
Mr. Ong Ching Po to sign another document in favor of Soledad Parian
forthe purpose of facilitating the issuance of the new title by the Register
of Deeds and for the reason that he is not yet a Filipino.
On December 12, 1985, petitioners Ong Ching Po and his children filed an
action for re conveyance and damages against private respondent in the
RTC of Manila.
On July 26, 1986, private respondent filed an action for quieting of title
against Ong Ching Po. Upon the motion, the case was consolidated and
on May 30, 1990, the TC rendered a decision in favor of private
respondent. On appeal by the petitioners to the CA, the court affirmed
the decision of the RTC. Hence the petition to the SC.
ISSUE
1) Whether or not Ong Ching Po as a Chinese citizen can validly
acquire the land executed under the Deed of Sale.
2) Whether or not the private respondent took possession of the
property.
HELD/RATIO
1) No. An Alien is disqualified from acquiring lands in the
Philippines. The Supreme Court did not go along with the claim of the
petitioner that Ong Ching Po merely used the private respondent as a
Respondent spouses bought lots, they were then natural
dummy to have the title over the parcel of land registered in her name
because being an alien he was disqualified to own real property in the born Filipino Citizens: Eventually they filed application for
Philippines. To sustain such contention is a violation of the nationalization registration but they were no longer Filipino citizens and had opted
laws. Assuming that the Deed of sale is in existence and was duly
to embrace Canadian Citizenship. Opposition was filed by the
executed, still the petitioner cannot claim ownership of the land by virtue
of Section 5 Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that save republic on the ground of Foreign Nationality
in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualifies to acquire or hold lands of the public domain the Philippines,
this was further reiterated in the Section 14 Article XIV of the 1973 ISSUE:
Constitution and adopted in the 1987 Constitution, Section 7, Article XII
which further states that save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the public
Whether or not respondent can register there land which
domain of the Philippines.
they bought when tehy were Filipino citizen even if at the
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity
rgistration they are altready of another citizenship?
to acquire or hold lands of public domain. Private land maybe transferred
or conveyed to individuals or entities qualified to acquire lands of the
public domain.The 1935 constitution reserved the right to participate in
the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of all lands
of the public domain and other natural resources of the Philippines for RULING:
Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of
which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals, corporation,
have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also
been disqualified from acquiring private lands. Petitioner Ong Ching Po They can register it
was a Chinese citizen; therefore he was disqualified from acquiring and
owning real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due execution Private respondents were undoubtedly natural born citizens
of the Deed of sale has been established, the same is null and void, it being
at the time of the acquisition of the property and by virtue thereof
contrary to law.
acquired vested rights thereon tacking in the process, the
2) Yes. The private respondent took possession of the land. possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of
Under the law, possession is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the
notarized deed of conveyance. Under Art 1498 of the Civil Code of the time held by their predecessor in interest under Public Land Act
Philippines, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the A natural born citizen who has lost his Philippine Citizenship
contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly may be a tranferee of private lands upto a maximum of 5000 sq m
be inferred. If what the petitioners meant was that the private respondent
urban and 1 hectare -rural
never lived in the building constructed on said land, it was because her
family had settled in Iloilo. It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were
in the name of private respondent and her husband. The rental receipts It is not significant that whetehr private respondents are no
were also in the name of her husband. longer filipino citizens at the time they registered the land what is
important is that they were former natural-born citizens of the
Philippines

Public Land Act requires that applicant must prove that:

REPUBLIC VS CA AND LAPINA
1) The land is alienable public Land and

2) his possesion in the concept above stated must be

CASE NO: 235 SCRA 567 either since time immemorial or for period prescribed by Public
Land Act
CHAPTER: JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE,
P 100 Thus, when the conditions set by law are complied with, the
possessor of land by operation of law acquires a right to a grant, a
PONENTE:
government grant without the necessity of a certificate of title being
issued. As such the land ceases to be a part of public domain and
goes beyond the Dir. of Lands to dispose
FACTS:
Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Lui She 21 SCRA 52
Galicia, Monico King A.
FACTS:
Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property in Manila, as her
sister died. Then already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years
old, blind, crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other relative to
live with. She lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese,
lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a longtime lessee
of a portion of the property. Wong himself was the trusted man to whom
she delivered various amounts for safekeeping, including rentals from her
property.
In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the lessee to
her, Justina Santos executed a contract of lease in favor of Wong,
covering the entire property, including the portion on which the house of
Justina Santos stood.
She then executed another contract giving Wong the option to buy the
leased premises. The option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine
citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. It appears, however, that this application for
naturalization was withdrawn when it was discovered that he was not a
resident of Rizal. In 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children
on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine
citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings were
abandoned.
Later on, she executed two other contracts, one extending the term of the
lease to 99 years, and another fixing the term of the option of 50 years.
In two wills executed on, she bade her legatees to respect the contracts
she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a later date she
appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts
were made by her because of machinations and inducements practised
by him, she now directed her executor to secure the annulment of the
contracts. Action was filed, and the court was asked to direct the Register
of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of the contracts
Both parties died during the pendency of the action. Wong was
substituted by his wife, Lui She, while Justina Santos was substituted by
the Philippine Banking Corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether an alien may validly acquire lease right and an option to buy a
real property.
HELD/RATIO:
No.
A lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving
an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted
Philippine citizenship. As this Court said in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds:
[A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from
the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence
in the Philippines is temporary they may be granted temporary
rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and
share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not
impossible to acquire.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece
of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise
dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that
the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner
divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus
possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right
to dispose of it (jus disponendi)rights the sum total of which make up
ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow,
the use, the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the
rights of which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien. And yet
this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within the space of one
year, with the result that Justina Santos ownership of her property was
reduced to a hollow concept.
As this Court said in Krivenko:
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we
have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is and
not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our
construction is to preclude where they may build aliens
admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites their
homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution,
we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of
amity or equity, xxx
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution
aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,
including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is
affirmed, without costs.
Borromeo vs Descallar
G.R. No. 159310 February 24, 2009
CAMILLO F. BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. ANTONIETTA O DESCALLAR,
respondent.
FACTS:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met respondent Antonietta Opalla-
Descallar. They fell in love and live together. They bought a house and
lot and an Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their names. However,
when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration, it was
refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire
alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, his name was erased
but his signature remained and the property was issued on the name of
the Respondent alone. However their relationship did not last long and
they found new love.
Jambrich met the petitioner who was engaged in business. Jambrich
indebted the petitioner for a sum of money and to pay his debt, he sold
some of his properties to the petitioner and a Deed of Absolute
Sale/Assignment was issued in his favor. However, when the Petitioner
sought to register the deed of assignment it found out that said land was
registered in the name of Respondent. Petitioner filed a complaint
against respondent for recovery of real property.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Jambrich has no title to the properties in question and
may not transfer and assign any rights and interest in favor of the
petitioner?
2. Whether or not the registration of the properties in the name of
respondents make his the owner thereof.
RULINGS:
1. The evidence clearly shows that as between respondent and Jambrich,
it was Jambrich who possesses the financial capacity to acquire the
properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties,
Jamrich was the source of funds used to purchase the three parcels of
land, and to construct the house. Jambrich was the owner of the
properties in question, but his name was deleted in the Deed of
Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nevertheless, his signature
remained in the deed of sale where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich
has all authority to transfer all his rights, interest and participation over
the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed of Assignment.
Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during
the couples cohabitation does not help the respondent. The rule of co-
ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but
otherwise capacitated to marry each other does not apply. At the case at
bar, respondent was still legally married to another when she and
Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship and no co-
ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of
property in order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.
2. It is settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
It is only a means of confirming the existence with notice to the world at
large. The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner
of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the
disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
absolutely make her the owner.
Ting Ho vs Teng Gui
GR No. 130115 July 16, 2008
Facts:
Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho
and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo against their brother, respondent
Vicente Teng Gui. The controversy revolves around a parcel
of land, and the improvements which should form part of
the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and
should be partitioned equally among each of the siblings.
Petitioners alleged that their father Felix Ting Ho died
intestate on June 26, 1970, and left upon his death an
estate. According to petitioners, the said lot and properties
were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of
respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased
Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese citizen, was then
disqualified to own public lands in thePhilippines; and that
upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took
possession of the same for his own exclusive use and benefit
to their exclusion and prejudice.
Issue:
Whether or not the sale was void
Ruling:
No, the sale was not void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code has
provided that if the price is simulated, the sale is void, but
the act may be shown to have been in reality a donatin, or
some other act or contract. The sale in this case, was
however valid because the sale was in fact a donation. The
law requires positive proof of the simulation of the price of
the sale. But since the finding was based on a mere
assumption, the price has not been proven to be a
simulation.
MULLER v. MULLER
Supreme Court : First Division
Petitioners: ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER
Respondents: HELMUT MULLER
G.R No. 149615, Date: August 29, 2006
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FC 91
CASE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review on
certiorari assails the February 26, 2001 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with
modification the August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-
94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between petitioner and respondent,
as well as the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying
the motion for reconsideration.
FACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and
respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in
Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines
in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house
in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo,
Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a
house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property
was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses
eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent
filed a petition for separation of properties before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a
decision which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between the petitioner and
respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties
between them and ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding those
acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With
regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was
acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent.
However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds
because the property was purchased in violation of Section
7, Article XII of the Constitution.
Thus However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code,
properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse
during the marriage shall be excluded from the community
property. The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner
in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of
property of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of
the sale of said real property as well as the personal
properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the
petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the
petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country
cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a
violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which
provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain." The law will leave the
parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice
to a voluntary partition by the parties of the said real
property.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial courts
Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for
reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property,
and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also
considered petitioners ownership over the property in trust
for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of
Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution
which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.
ISSUE: Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the
amount used to purchase the land as well as the costs for
the construction of the house?
HELD: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2001
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering
petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse
respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the
acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for
the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the
Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration
thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12,
1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the
regime of absolute community between the petitioner and
respondent, decreeing a separation of property between
them and ordering the partition of the personal properties
located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.
DISCUSSION: Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are
also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary
purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of
the national patrimony.
In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court
held: Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution,
"natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public
agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving
agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may
easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who
may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is
partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in
Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining
avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into
aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the
alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all,
they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private
agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as
not including residential lots or lands not strictly
agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely
acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and
cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their
names lands of any area for building homes, factories,
industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and
vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds,
airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are
not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
Generals Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the
conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional
prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to
this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property
titled in the name of petitioner because of the said
prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or
claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an
implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law
in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for the
exception provided in cases of hereditary succession,
respondents disqualification from owning lands in the
Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is
allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of
an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision,
no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the
fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a
court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced.
It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and
will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity
must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands. Thus, in the instant case, respondent
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it
is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of
ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile
exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement
would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own.
Frenzel vs Catito
Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the
original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!
G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003
ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL, petitioner, vs. EDERLINA P.
CATITO, respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of
German descent. He is an electrical engineer by profession,
but worked as a pilot with the New Guinea Airlines. He
arrived in the Philippines in 1974, started engaging in
business in the country; two years thereafter, he married
Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen.
In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from bed and board
without obtaining a divorce.
In 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia for a vacation.
He went to Kings Cross, a night spot in Sydney, for a
massage where he met Ederlina Catito, a Filipina and a
native of Bajada, Davao City.
Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in Germany and
was married to Klaus Muller, a German national. She left
Germany and tried her luck in Sydney, Australia, where she
found employment as a masseuse in the Kings Cross
nightclub.
Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded
her to stop working at Kings Cross, return to the
Philippines, and engage in a wholesome business of her
own. He also proposed that they meet in Manila, to which
she assented. Alfred gave her money for her plane fare to
the Philippines. Within two weeks of Ederlinas arrival in
Manila, Alfred joined her. Alfred reiterated his proposal for
Ederlina to stay in the Philippines and engage in business,
even offering to finance her business venture. Ederlina was
delighted at the idea and proposed to put up a beauty
parlor. Alfred happily agreed.
Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but that he was
eager to divorce his wife in Australia. Alfred proposed
marriage to Ederlina, but she replied that they should wait a
little bit longer.
Alfred went back to Papua New Guinea to resume his work
as a pilot.
Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was disqualified from
owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only
Ederlinas name would appear in the deed of sale as the
buyer of the property, as well as in the title covering the
same. After all, he was planning to marry Ederlina and he
believed that after their marriage, the two of them would
jointly own the property.
When Ederlina left for Germany to visit Klaus, she had her
father Narciso Catito and her two sisters occupy the
property.
Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live
with Ederlina. He returned to Australia and sold his fiber
glass pleasure boat to John Reid in 1984. He also sold his
television and video business in Papua New Guinea. He had
his personal properties shipped to the Philippines and
stored at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
On July 28, 1984, while Alfred was in Papua New Guinea,
he received a Letter dated December 7, 1983 from Klaus
Muller who was then residing in Berlin, Germany. Klaus
informed Alfred that he and Ederlina had been married on
October 16, 1978 and had a blissful married life until Alfred
intruded therein.
Klaus stated that he knew of Alfred and Ederlinas amorous
relationship, and discovered the same sometime in
November 1983 when he arrived in Manila. He also begged
Alfred to leave Ederlina alone and to return her to him,
saying that Alfred could not possibly build his future on his
(Klaus) misfortune.
Alfred had occasion to talk to Sally MacCarron, a close
friend of Ederlina. He inquired if there was any truth to
Klaus statements and Sally confirmed that Klaus was
married to Ederlina.
When Alfred confronted Ederlina, she admitted that she and
Klaus were, indeed, married. But she assured Alfred that
she would divorce Klaus. Alfred was appeased. He agreed to
continue the amorous relationship and wait for the outcome
of Ederlinas petition for divorce. After all, he intended to
marry her. He retained the services of Rechtsanwltin
Banzhaf with offices in Berlin, as her counsel who informed
her of the progress of the proceedings. Alfred paid for the
services of the lawyer.
Ederlina often wrote letters to her family informing them of
her life with Alfred. In a Letter dated January 21, 1985, she
wrote about how Alfred had financed the purchases of some
real properties, the establishment of her beauty parlor
business, and her petition to divorce Klaus.
In the meantime, Ederlinas petition for divorce was denied
because Klaus opposed the same. A second petition filed by
her met the same fate. Klaus wanted half of all the
properties owned by Ederlina in the Philippines before he
would agree to a divorce. Worse, Klaus threatened to file a
bigamy case against Ederlina.
Alfred proposed the creation of a partnership to Ederlina, or
as an alternative, the establishment of a corporation, with
Ederlina owning 30% of the equity thereof. She initially
agreed to put up a corporation and contacted Atty. Armando
Dominguez to prepare the necessary documents. Ederlina
changed her mind at the last minute when she was advised
to insist on claiming ownership over the properties acquired
by them during their coverture.
Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating.
Ederlina had not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus.
The latter could charge her for bigamy and could even
involve Alfred, who himself was still married. To avoid
complications, Alfred decided to live separately from
Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her. In one of her
letters to Alfred, Ederlina complained that he had ruined
her life. She admitted that the money used for the purchase
of the properties in Davao were his. She offered to convey
the properties deeded to her by Atty. Mardoecheo
Camporedondo and Rodolfo Morelos, asking Alfred to
prepare her affidavit for the said purpose and send it to her
for her signature. The last straw for Alfred came on
September 2, 1985, when someone smashed the front and
rear windshields of Alfreds car and damaged the windows.
Alfred thereafter executed an affidavit-complaint charging
Ederlina and Sally MacCarron with malicious mischief.
On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlinas father,
complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life savings and
because of this, he was virtually penniless. He further
accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the
properties he had purchased with his own money. He
demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina and
her family had stolen and turn over all the properties
acquired by him and Ederlina during their coverture.
Alfred filed a Complaint dated October 28, 1985, against
Ederlina, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for
recovery of real and personal properties located in Quezon
City and Manila. In his complaint, Alfred alleged, inter alia,
that Ederlina, without his knowledge and consent, managed
to transfer funds from their joint account in HSBC Hong
Kong, to her own account with the same bank. Using the
said funds, Ederlina was able to purchase the properties
subject of the complaints. He also alleged that the beauty
parlor in Ermita was established with his own funds, and
that the Quezon City property was likewise acquired by him
with his personal funds.
Ederlina failed to file her answer and was declared in
default. Alfred adduced his evidence ex-parte.
Alfred prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered in
his favor.
Issues:
a) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in applying the rule of
In Pari Delicto since both parties are not equally guilty but
rather it was the respondent who employed fraud when she
did not inform petitioner that she was already married?
b) Whether the intention of the petitioner is not to own real
properties in the Philippines but to sell them as public
auction to be able to recover his money used in purchasing
them?
Ruling:
The trial court ruled that based on documentary evidence,
the purchaser of the three parcels of land subject of the
complaint was Ederlina. The court further stated that even
if Alfred was the buyer of the properties, he had no cause of
action against Ederlina for the recovery of the same because
as an alien, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning
lands in the Philippines.
The sale of the three parcels of land to the petitioner was
null and void ab initio. Applying the pari delicto doctrine,
the petitioner was precluded from recovering the properties
from the respondent.
Alfred appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals in
which the petitioner posited the view that although he
prayed in his complaint in the court a quo that he be
declared the owner of the three parcels of land, he had no
intention of owning the same permanently.
His principal intention therein was to be declared the
transient owner for the purpose of selling the properties at
public auction, ultimately enabling him to recover the
money he had spent for the purchase thereof.
On March 8, 2000, the CA rendered a decision affirming in
toto the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that
the petitioner knowingly violated the Constitution; hence,
was barred from recovering the money used in the purchase
of the three parcels of land. It held that to allow the
petitioner to recover the money used for the purchase of the
properties would embolden aliens to violate the
Constitution, and defeat, rather than enhance, the public
policy.
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question
were entered into by him as the real vendee, the said
transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are
null and void ab initio.
A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null
and void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It
produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party
to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and
ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses
his money or property by knowingly engaging in a contract
or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may
not maintain an action for his losses. To him who moves in
deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The
law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or
agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.
Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code, the petitioner
cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow
him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase
thereof. Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public
policy, cannot be done directly. Where the wrong of one
party equals that of the other, the defendant is in the
stronger position ... it signifies that in such a situation,
neither a court of equity nor a court of law will administer a
remedy. The rule is expressed in the maxims: EX DOLO
MALO NON ORITUR ACTIO and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR
EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS.
Futile, too, is petitioners reliance on Article 22 of the New
Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The provision is expressed in the maxim: MEMO CUM
ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST (No person
should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another).
An action for recovery of what has been paid without just
cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This
provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is
proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the
pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the
petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject
properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said
properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of
Holman vs. Johnson: The objection that a contract is
immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the
defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection
is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of
policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary
to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
CHEESMAN V IAC 193 SCRA 93
G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991
FACTS: This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen
(petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to annulfor lack of consent on his part
the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot and building to
Estelita Padilla
December 4, 1970 Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were
married but have been separated since February 15, 1981
June 4, 1974 a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights was
executed by Armando Altares, conveying a parcel of land in favor of
Criselda Cheesman, married to Thomas Cheesman. Thomas, although
aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his
wife. Tax declarations for the said property were issued in the name of
Criselda Cheesman alone and she assumed exclusive management and
administration of the property
July 1, 1981 Criselda sold the property to Estelita Padilla without
knowledge and consent of Thomas
July 31, 1981 Thomas filed a suit for the annulment of the sale on the
ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and
consent. Criselda filed an answer alleging that the property sold was
paraphernal, having purchased the property from her own money; that
Thomas, an American was disqualified to have any interest or right
of ownership in the land and; that Estelita was a buyer in good faith
During the trial, it was found out that the transfer of property took place
during the existence of their marriage as it was acquired on June 4, 1974
June 24, 1982 RTC declared the sale executed by Criselda void ab initio
and ordered the delivery of the property to Thomas as administrator of the
conjugal property
Thomas appealed to IAC where he assailed the granting of Estelitas
petition for relief and resolution of matters not subject of said petition; in
declaring valid the sale to Estelita without his knowledge and consent. On
January 7, 1986, IAC affirmed summary judgment decision
ISSUE: Whether or not the wife can dispose of the property in question;
Whether or not Cheesman, being an American citizen, can question the sale
HELD: Section 14, Art. XIV of 1973 Constitution provides that: save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to ISSUES:
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, assuming that it was his 1. W/N the land is already a private land - YES
intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he
acquired no right whatsoever over the property by virtue of that purchase; 2. W/N the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by
and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, he was knowingly
violating the Constitution. private corporations or associations applies- NO

HELD: IAC affirmed Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc

As such, the sale to him was null and void. At any rate, Cheesman had and
has NO CAPACITY TO QUESTION THE SUBSEQUENTSALE OF 1. YES
THE SAME PROPERTY BY HIS WIFE ON THE THEORY THAT IN
SO DOING HEIS MERELY EXERCISING THE PREROGATIVE OF A already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but
HUSBAND IN RESPECT OFCONJUGAL PROPERTY. To sustain such
a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate
a theory would permit indirect controversion of the Constitutional
prohibition. of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned
If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient
husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then
have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become
Constitution does not permit him to have. private property, at least by presumption
Even if the wife did use conjugal funds to make the acquisition, his The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of
recovering and holding the property cannot be warranted as it is against the
constitution. Consequently, Estelita is a purchaser in good faith since she which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be
knew that Thomas cannot intervene in the sale or disposition of the said
evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
property.
strength of said patent.
DECISION: The Court AFFIRMED the appealed decision.
The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but

simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by

earlier law
Director Of Lands V. IAC (1986) 2. NO

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
Lessons Applicable: Sec. 3 Art. XII, 1987 Constitution (Land Titles and
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
Deeds)
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such

acquisition
FACTS:
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr.
acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members
hectares
of the Dumagat tribe 5 parcels of land

possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the

Philippines was discovered by Magellan

land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872

granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian

Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether

with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public

domain

Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M

worth of improvements

ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was

duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of

Maconacon, Isabela

donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela

IAC affirmed CFI: in favor of