TITLE X.

EMANCIPATION (1)

G.R. No. 197174. September 10, 2014.*

FRANCLER P. ONDE, petitioner, vs. THE OFFICE OF
THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIAS CITY,

Correcting the entry on petitioners birth

certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in
Bicol to not married is a substantial correction requiring
adversarial proceedings

The remedy and the

proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial The law removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or
typographical errors.

FACTS:Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before
the RTC and named Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City as sole respondent.
Petitioner alleged that he is the illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde
He prayed that the following entries on hisbirth certificate be corrected as follows:

ENTRY FROM TO
Date and place of marriage of December 23, 1983-Bicol Not married
his parents
First name of his mother Tely Matilde
His first name Franc Ler Francler

RTC dismissed the petition for correction of entries on the ground that it is insufficient in form
and substance. It was further held that the correction in the first name of petitioner and his
mother can be done by the city civil registrar under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048, entitled An
Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical
or Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil
Registrar Without Need of a Judicial Order, Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. The RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, as it
found no proof that petitioners parents were not married on December 23, 1983. However
petitioner argues that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court allows a substantial correction of entries in
the civil registry He likewise adds that proof that his parents were not married will be presented
during the trial, not during the filing of the petition for correction of entries. The OSG in its
comment ,it points out that the first names of petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru
administrative proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. Such correction of the entry on petitioners
birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to not married is
a substantial correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with in adversarial
proceedings where all interested parties are impleaded.
Issue/s:Whether the RTC erred when it points out that the first names of petitioner and his
mother can be corrected thru administrative proceedings under R.A. No. 9048,and in
ruling that correcting the entry on petitioners birth certificate that his parents were
married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to not married is substantial in nature requiring
adversarial proceedings

HELD:On the first issue, we agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner and his mother
as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No.
9048 under Section 15 of R.A. No. 9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil
register can be corrected and changes of first name can be done by the concerned city civil
registrar without need of a judicial order. Aforesaid Section 1, as amended by R.A. No. 10172.
On the second issue, we also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting the entry on
petitioners birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to not
married is a substantial correction requiring adversarial proceedings. Said correction is
substantial as it will affect his legitimacy and convert him from a legitimate child to an ille
gitimate one. In Republic v. Uy,8 we held that corrections of entries in the civil register including
those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve
substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceedings. We clarify, however, that the RTCs dismissal is without prejudice. He
can also file a new petition before the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth
certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial
correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. It is true in the case at bar that the
changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial
ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as
well as the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Petition seeking a substantial correction of
an entry in a civil register must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil
registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed petition for correction of entries, but also all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the correction. This is required by
Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v. Uy, we have similarly ruled that when a
petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is
mandated. Thus, in his new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as
parties since the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them it is no longer
necessary to dwell on the last issue as petitioner will have his opportunity to prove his claim that
his parents were not married on December 23, 1983 when he files the new petition for the
purpose.
TITLE XI SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW. CHAPTER 4.
OTHER MATTERS (4)

G.R. No. 187512. June 13, 2012.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, respondent.

Declaration of Presumptive Death Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that
since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the
court therein shall be immediately final and executory.

FACTS: Respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada met Cyrus Granada at Sumida Electric Philippines, an
electronics company in Paraaque where both were then working. The two eventually got married and
their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada. Cyrus went to Taiwan to
seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication from her
husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of
Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. RTC
rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead (OSG) filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus
failed to prove her wellfounded belief that he was already dead.

The RTC denied the motion Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, Yolanda
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal.

She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death was a summary judicial proceeding, in
which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable. Appellate court granted
Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: 1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in
asummary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon
notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal.

2.Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent presented

HELD: The CA dismissed the Petition assailing the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v.
BermudezLorino, the appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision
therein is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247
of the same Code. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it
through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family
Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the
judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory. Under Article 41 of the Family
Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a
petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republics
Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death of respondents spouse was immediately final and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary
appeal

2The Family Code provision prescribes a wellfounded belief that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in
Article391, Civil Code

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry

3. That the present spouse has a wellfounded belief that the absentee is dead and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee.

Petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent
husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of
Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony.
In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she
were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other
government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end,
but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

The Republics arguments are welltaken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition. The RTC
ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her wellfounded belief that her absent
spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already
final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, ]nothing is more settled in law than that when a
judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law.
G.R. No. 161062. July 31, 2009.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

FERVENTINO U. TANGO, respondent.

The judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be

immediately final and executory No appeal can be had of the trial

courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of

presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the

Family Code.

FACTS: Ferventino and Maria were married in civil rites before then Mayor Ignacio Bunye of
Muntinlupa City. None of Marias relatives witnessed the ceremony as they were opposed to her
relationship with Ferventino. The two had only spent a night together and had been intimate once when
Maria told Ferventino that she and her family will soon be leaving for the United States of America
(USA). Maria and her family flew to Seattle, USA Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year
before she stopped responding to his letters. Out of resentment, he burned all the letters Maria wrote him.
He claims to have forgotten her address since. Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find Maria.
Upon inquiry from the latters uncle, Antonio Ledesma, in Las Pias, Ferventino learned that even
Marias relatives were unaware of her whereabouts. He also solicited the assistance of a friend in Texas,
Capt. Luis Aris of the U.S. Air Force, but to no avail. Finally, he sought the aid of his parents Antonio and
Eusebia in Los Angeles, and his aunt Anita Castro Mayor in Seattle. Like, Ledesma though, their attempts
to find Maria proved fruitless. The next 14 years went by without any news of Maria.

Ferventino filed a verified for the declaration of presumptive death of Maria within the contemplation of
Article 41 of the Family Code, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring MARIA JOSE V. VILLARBA,
wife of FERVENTINO U. TANGO, presumptively dead within the meaning of Article 41 of the Family
Code. (OSG), for the Republic, to file a Notice of Appeal Court of Appeals, treating the case as an
ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, affirmed the RTCs Order It held that Marias
absence for 14 years with out information about her location despite diligent search by Ferventino was
sufficient to support a wellfounded belief of her death. Court of Appeals denied the Republics appeal

ISSUE: Whether the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to
the parties and, hence, is not subject to appeal.

HELD: As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial courts judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for cer tiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court
of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. In the case before us, petitioner
committed a serious procedural lapse when it filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals instead of a
petition for certiorari. The RTC equally erred in giving due course to said appeal and ordering the
transmittal of the records of the case to the appellate court. By no means did the Court of Appeals acquire
jurisdiction to review the judgment of the RTC which, by express provision of law, was immediately final
and executory.Adding to the confusion, the Court of Appeals entertained the appeal and treated the same
as an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. As it were, the Court of Appeals committed
grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction because, by express provision of the law, the judgment was not appealable