PURIFICACION ALARCON and ROSAURO ALARCON vs.

HONORABLE
ABDULWAHID BIDIN

Facts:

In 1923, Roberto Alarcon leased Lot 3178 of the Zamboangas cadastre to

Esteban Sergas. On January 5, 1926, Roberto sold a portion of his undivided
share to Esteban. The date of the instrument of sale was entered on the title as
January 5, 1926, and the date of inscription as May 3, 1963. The name of the
vendor in the text of the "Escritura de Venta" was "Roberto Alarcon", but the
typewritten name at the bottom of the document, above which appears a
thumbmark, reads "Alberto Alarcon". On July 9, 1928, Roberto Alarcon sold
another portion of his share of the land to Adela Alvarez, who, in turn, sold it,
on November 29, 1954, to Domingo Rojas Francisco, one of the private
respondents. Petitioners filed suit for recovery of what they allege is their
portion of cadastral lot 3178 on October 23, 1978 denying the genuineness of
the Escritura de Venta as the thunmbmark is not Roberto Alarcon's nor is he
"Alberto" Alarcon. Private respondents, defendants below, moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that the action is barred by the statute of
limitations and that petitioners are guilty of laches. Petitioners opposed on
the ground that no prescription can lie against their father's recorded title.
The respondent Judge dismissed the complaint "for the reason that it is
barred by laches"

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint was dismissed for the reason that it is barred by
laches.

Whether or not the land registered under the Torrens System may not be
acquired by prescription.

Held:
Yes. As far as petitioners are concerned, more than 50 years had elapsed since
the execution of the deeds of sale in 1926 and 1928 and the date they
instituted suit for recovery of possession in 1978. Clearly, their passivity and
inaction and, before them, that of their father, constituted laches. As held by
respondent Judge, their cause of action must be considered barred for it has
been converted into a stale demand

True, land registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession, as petitioners correctly contend. The
protection given by law is in favor of registered owners. As it is, although title
to the disputed property is still in the name of Roberto Alarcon, it has been
subjected to the registration in 1963 of the sale made by him to Esteban
Sergas. Technically, therefore, the latter became the owner in 1963 of the
portion of the land sold to him. It may also be stated that if petitioners' cause
of action in seeking the nullification of the sales is predicated on fraud, the
same has prescribed for not having been brought within four years from the
inscription of the deed of sale in favor of Esteban Sergas in 1963.

BUENO vs. REYES, 27 SCRA 1179

Facts:

On January 7, 1936 Francisco H. Reyes filed an answer in Cadastral Case No. 47

of Ilocos Norte, claiming lot No. 2857 of the Laoag Cadastre as property
belonging to himself and to his two brothers, Juan and Mateo. The case was
heard without opposition, and the lot was adjudicated in favor of the
claimants on March 27, 1939. Twenty-three years thereafter, or on December
12, 1962 to be exact, the plaintiffs filed the action below for reconveyance of
lot No. 2357. They allege in their complaint that the said lot originally
belonged to Jorge Bueno, who died leaving three children, namely, Brigida
Bueno, Eugenia Bueno and Rufino Bueno, to whom the property descended by
intestate succession; that subsequently Brigida and Eugenia died, leaving their
respective children, who are now the plaintiffs-appellants together with
Rufino Bueno. The defendants Juan and Mateo Reyes 1 filed their answer, in
which, they raised a number of defenses, including laches, imprescriptibility
of title, and prescription of action.
That the fact that Francisco Reyes, Mateo Reyes and Juan Reyes are declared
owners of the has only been discovered during this year when Mateo Reyes
and Juan Reyes, the defendants herein, including Francisco Reyes who was
dead long ago, filed with this Court a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession against a wrong person by the name of Mateo R. Reyes, who now
admittedly (sic) not the possessor of the lot but plaintiffs herein, and the
plaintiffs have demanded from the defendants the reconveyance and/or the
quitclaiming of their undivided shares as appearing in said Certificate of Title
No. but then, they refused, and continue to refuge to do so. The plaintiffs
complaint was dismissed, upon motion of the defendants, alleging that there is
already prescription of action.

Issue:

Whether or not lower court erred in the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of prescription.

Held:

Both the appellees and the court below proceeded on the theory that the
action for reconveyance was predicated on the existence of an implied trust,
and that such an action prescribes in 10 years. The appellants counter, in this
appeal, that the trust was not implied but express, and that in any case even an
implied trust, according to some decisions of this Court, is imprescriptible.

If any trust can be deduced at all from the foregoing facts it was an implied
one, arising by operation of law not from any presumed intention of the
parties but to satisfy the demands of justice and equity and as a protection
against unfair dealing or downright fraud. Indeed, in this kind of implied trust,
commonly denominated constructive, as distinguished from resulting, trust,
there exists a certain antagonism between the cestui que trust and the trustee.
Thus, for instance, under Article 1456 of the Civil Code:
if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes. In a number of cases this Court has
held that registration of property by one person in his name, whether by
mistake or fraud, the real owner being another person, impresses upon the
title so acquired the character of a constructive trust for the real owner, which
would justify an action for reconveyance.
Varsity Hills Inc. vs. Navarro 43 SCRA 503

Facts:

A petition was filed by the respondents Mejia as heirs of Quintin Mejia and by
Elpidio Tiburcio as assignee of a portion of the estate
left by the latter as plaintiff against petitioners Tuason et. al. The complaint
alleged that Quintin Mejia had obtained a Spanish title to the land and that he
and his successors in interest had occupied the land without interruption until
they were forcibly rejected therefrom
and their houses demolished in1934 through a writ of execution. In 1914, the
defendants Tuason had obtained a decree of registration covering 35,403
hectares and that they had fraudulently and insidiously included plaintiffs
land in the area covered by the Certificate of Transfer by inserting fake and fa
lse technicaldescriptions. UP et al. as subsequent acquirerswhose titles are
derived from the original fraudulentcertificates should likewise be annulled.
Herein Petitioners contend that the decision in a
civilcase wherein the Respondents were declared aswithout title to the
land and ejected by a writ of execution was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
ThePetitioners contend in the present case that thecauses of action averred by
the Respondents werebarred by the LRA and the statute of limitations
over51 years having elapsed since the decree of registration was issued,
barred by laches as 32 yearshave elapsed since the ejectment and that the
courthad no jurisdiction to review and revise the decree
of registration. They also maintain as affirmativedefenses that they had in pos
session for over 30years of the land thus acquiring title by
acquisitiveprescription and that claims for ownership wereextinguished by th
e decree and that they arepurchasers for value and in good faith of the
landsstanding in their names. A motion to dismiss
wasfiled yet was denied by the lower court. ThePetitioners resorted to the SC f
or a specialproceeding for writs of certiorari and prohibition thusthe trial
court was enjoined from proceeding with thetrial until further orders.Mejia
and Tiburcio claim that appeal in due time wasthe proper remedy.

Issue:

Whether or not the present action prospers based on claims

of implied/constructive trust?
SC:

The court below gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion to
dismiss based on
theiraffirmative defenses. The action by Tiburcio andMejias was already barre
d by res judicata andextinctive prescription. A previous case was decided
wherein Quintin Mejia had been found without title and thus ejected. The
action in the court below was
definitely barred as while the present respondents were not parties to the
cause which Quintin Mejia was such a party, the final judgment against him
concludes and bars his predecessors and privies as well. Since the
respondents failed to file a petition for review of the decree within one year
after the entry thereof despite claims that there was fraud in the inclusion of
their land in the title, they are barred by the LRA. However if the fraud had
been committed after the issuance of the decree, they should have pleaded
when Quintin was made a defendant in Civil Case 4420.
Nevertheless, their cause of action is barred by resjudicata. With
or without judgment against Quintin,

their action had been extinguished by the lapse of 30 years from the time he
was ejected from the land in question. An action to recover is also foreclosed
by the statute of limitations. Actions on implied trusts are extinguished by
laches or prescription of 10 years.
Ecsay vs, Court of Appeals, 61 SCRA 369

Facts:

Emilio and Jose Escay, now both deceased, were brothers. In his lifetime,
Emilio mortgaged his properties now in question, to the Philippine National
Bank. He died in 1924 before he could pay his obligation with the bank which
had mounted. The bank then filed in 1930 a foreclosure suit against the estate
of Emilio represented by the administrator, Atty. Eduardo Arboleda. Pending
the said suit, on April 28, 1933, a contract hereafter referred to as original
contract was entered among the Philippine National Bank, Jose Escay, Sr., and
the administrator, Atty. Arboleda, under which Jose assumed the mortgage
indebtedness of his deceased brother Emilio. This was agreed to by Magdalena
Vda. de Escay, widow of Emilio, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem of
their children. When it was discovered that the original contract failed to state
the transfer of the ownership of the properties in question to Jose Escay, Sr., in
consideration of his assumption of the mortgage indebtedness of Emilio
(subject to the right of repurchase of the heirs of Emilio within five (5) years
after the mortgage indebtedness had been fully paid), a supplementary
contract was entered into among the Philippine National Bank, the
administrator, Atty. Arboleda and Jose Escay, Sr. This was approved by the
probate court taking cognizance of the estate of the deceased Emilio Escay in
its order of February 24, 1934.

In 1941, Magdalena Vda. de Escay, Roberto and the other children filed a
complaint against Jose Escay, Sr. and Atty. Arboleda (administrator of the
deceased Emilio), for the recovery of the ownership and possession of the
properties in question. This case was provisionally dismissed after defendants
have answered, upon motion of the parties on July 24, 1944.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court erred in holding of the properties in trust (implied)
for the heirs of Emilio Escay.

Held:
Petitioners contend that since the titles over the properties in question were
transferred to the name of respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Jose Escay,
Sr., by fraudulent means, an implied trust was created between the testate
estate of Emilio Escay and Jose Escay, Sr. under which, by operation of law,
Jose Escay, Sr. became a trustee of the properties in question in favor of the
heirs of Emilio Escay as the cestuique trust; consequently, the respondents are
duty bound to reconvey the properties in question to the petitioners whose
right to recover the properties does not prescribe.

Petitioners also argue that the original contract, Exhibit "F" and the
supplementary contract, Exhibit "I", created in their favor an express trust
because the true intention of the parties was that only the possession and
administration of the properties of petitioners in question should be
transferred to respondents, predecessor-in-interest Jose Escay, Sr., which
properties he was supposed to hold in trust for the petitioners until such time
as he shall have fully liquidated the obligations of the testate estate of Emilio
Escay, and since an action based on an express trust does not prescribe the
right of petitioners to recover the properties in question from the
respondents does not prescribe and therefore the respondents can be ordered
to reconvey the properties in question to petitioners. The prescriptibility of an
action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, is now a
settled question in this jurisdiction. It prescribes in ten years.