JUDGE MANUEL R. AQUINO, Complainant. v.
JOCELYN Jocelyn Fernandez is GUILTY of SIMPLE NEGLECT OF
FERNANDEZ Stenographer I, Respondent.
413 SCRA 597 October 17, 2003 | Austria-Martinez, J. |
Wenceslao
DOCTRINE
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice from the presiding judge to
the lowliest clerk, is circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility.
FACTS
Nov. 16, 1998Judge Manuel Aquino of MTC La Union
submitted to the OCA his report or findings recommending that
an appropriate disciplinary action be imposed upon Jocelyn
Fernandez who holds the position of Stenographer 1 in his
sala.
According to the judge, Fernendez committed the ff. acts
constituting NEGLECT OF DUTY:
1) She failed to type the draft order in criminal case entitled
People v. Jose Runes which was then pending in his
court despite his instructions given on Nov. 4, 1988.
o When asked to give a written explanation, Fernandez
admitted her failure and promised not to commit the
same offense explaining that she had to prepare 18
copies of her daily time record and leave of absences.
2) She did not file any prior leave of absences for Nov. 4-6
1998 as required by law.
3) Unauthorized absences on October 8-11 1996 and
October 18, 1996.
4) Her stenographic notes were always submitted late and
full-of errors
5) A memorandum by the Clerk of Court (Isable Marquez)
was submitted reprimanding Fernandez for playing
mahjong on Nov. 1993 a day she absented from work.
April 2, 2001 Judge Aquino referred this administrative
matter to the Executive judge of RTC La Union (Judge Molina-
Alim) for investigation, report and recommendation. After due
investigation, Judge Molina-Alim submitted to the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) her report and recommendations
with the ff. findings:
DUTY in failing to type the drafted order; gross dishonestly in
being absent without any application for leave; serious
misconduct in being absent just to play mahjong.
She is found guilty despite considering the prevailing
circumstances that:
a) Respondents absences, although unauthorized
were not habitual and frequent;
b) Her failure to type the drafterd order was only
committed once; and
c) Her abscnese just to play mahjong is an isolated
case
Recommended penalty: Suspension of 1 year without pay
Oct 8, 2002Deputy Coourt Administrator (DCA) Jose Perez
concurred in the report of Judge Molina-Alim and approved the
findings and recommendations of the latter. Now, this case.
ISSUE/S
W/N Respondent Fernandez should be liable for simple neglect
of duty in:
a) Failure to type and submit draft order YES
b) Unauthorized absences due to failure to file leave of
absences NO
RULING
The court does not entirely agree to the findings of DCA.
Judges have the authority to act upon disciplinary matter involving
light offenses, clerks of court only have the duty to initiate
invesitgaiton of erring personnel and to recommend appropriate action
to the Exec Judge. (Circular no. 30-91 and Sec. A Chapter VII of the
1991 Manual for Clerks of Court)
The court finds that only 2 charges are left for resolution:
a) FAILURE TO TYPE A DRAFT ORDER
o OCA and the investigating judge was correct in finding
that Fernandez committed a simple neglect of duty to
type a draft order which Judge Aquino had instructed
her to finish.
o This is considered as a less grave offense under Sec
23 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations
of EO 292. Penalty is of suspension for 1 month and
 1 day to 6 months for the 1st offense and dismissal from
service for the 2nd offense
o Considering Ferndendezs admission and plea for
companssion with a promise not to commit the same
acts in the future, the penalty was mitigated to a FINE
OF P2000
b) UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCES
o Rules governing unauthorized absences and leave of
absences are found in Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations
o Pertinent provisions in relation to the case:
Sec. 49. Period within which to act on leave
application.Whenever the application for leave of
absence, including terminal leave, is not acted upon by
the head of agency or his duly authorized representative
within five (5) working days after receipt thereof, the
application for leave of absence shall be deemed
approved.
Sec. 50. Effect of unauthorized leave.An
official/employee who is absent without approved
leave shall not be entitled to receive his salary
corresponding to the period of his unauthorized
leave of absence. It is understood, however, that his
absence shall no longer be deducted from his
accumulated leave credits, if there is any. (Emphasis
supplied).
Sec. 51. Application for vacation leave.All applications
for vacation leave of absence for one (1) full day or more
shall be submitted on the prescribed form for action by
the proper head of agency five (5) days in advance,
whenever possible, of the effective date of such leave.
(Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 52. Approval of vacation leave.Leave of absence
for any reason other than illness of an official or
employee or of any member of his immediate family
must be contigent upon the needs of the service. Hence
the grant of vacation leave shall be at the discretion
of the head of department/agency.
Sec. 53. Application for sick leave.All application for
sick leave of absence for one full day or more shall be
made on the prescribed form and shall be filed
immediately upon employees return from such leave.
Notice of absence, however should be sent to the
immediate supervisor and/or to the agency head.
Application for sick leave in excess of five (5)
successive days shall be accompanied by a proper
medical certificate.
Sick leave may be applied for in advance in cases where
the official or employee will undergo medical
examination or operation or advised to rest in view of ill
health duly supported by a medical certificate.
An ordinary application for sick leave already taken not
exceeding five days, the head of department or
agency concerned may duly determine whether or
not granting of sick leave is proper under the
circumstances. In case of doubt, a medical
certificate may be required.
Sec. 54. Approval of sick leave.Sick leave shall be
granted only on account of sickness or disability on the
part of the employee concerned or of any member of his
immediate family.
Here the judge has the discretion to disapprove or
approve the application
Reason behind this requirement is to enable head of
offices to make the necessary adjustments in the work
assignments among the staff.
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the mere failure
to file a LOA in advance does not ipso facto render an
employee administratively liable.
o The unauthorized leave of absences becomes
punishable only if the absences is:
a) frequent or habit;
b) detrimental to the service; or
c) official or employee falsified his daily time record
under Sec 23(a) or (f) of the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules
o Judge Aquino merely alleged that respondent did not
file any prior LOA this is insufficient to discipline
Fernandez. In fact, there is no evidence or claim on
such instances mention above. Her absences ooccured
2 years apart which can hardly be categorized as
frequent or habitual.
 o As a court employee, it is incumbent upon her to
dispose of her duties with utmost responsibility.
Public officers must be accountable to the people at
all times and serve them with the utmost degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency
Any act which falls short of the exacting standards for public office,
especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of the
judiciary, or which diminishes or tends to diminish the faith of the people
in the Judiciary, shall not be countenanced
PENALTY: Jocelyn Fernandez Stenographer I of MTC La Union
GUILTY OF SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY and FINED P2,000 with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same offense in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
CSC v CA (GR147009) (Yap)
Petitioner/s: CSC
Respondent/s: CA and NEOLITO DUMLAO
Topic: Procedure; Issue of regularity of the CSCs institution of
disciplinary administrative proceedings against an erring civil servant
on the basis of an anonymous letter-complaint
Doctrine: See #2 HELD
Facts:
(1) The CSC received an anonymous letter-complaint against
Neolito Dumlao (Dumlao), a Department of Education, Culture
and Sports Supervisor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
(2) The letter-complaint contained allegations that Dumlao:
a. Never received a college degree
b. Never received an MA English degree
c. Has many pending criminal cases
(3) By virtue of this, the CSC requested Director Madarang to look
into the allegations and, if necessary, conduct an investigation.
Madarang submitted his Report of Investigation, stating that
Dumlao failed to finish his 4 year liberal arts course. This was
also confirmed by the CHED upon verification.
(4) Thus, the CSC formally charged Dumlao with Dishonesty and
Falsification of Official Documents. CSC conducted formal
hearings wherein both parties presented testimonial and
documentary evidence. CSC then issued a Resolution finding
Dumlao guilty under the administrative charge and ordered his
dismissal form the service. Hence, Dumlao filed a petition for
review on certiorari in the CA.
(5) CA: GRANTED Dumlaos petition and set aside the resolution
dismissing him from service. Basis:1
a. Sec. 46 of EO 292 (Admin Code):
(c) Except when initiated by the disciplining authority,
no complaint against a civil service official or employee
shall be given due course, unless the same is in writing
and subscribed and sworn to by complainant.
1 PS. Important to read provisions and note difference in interpretation by CA and SC
b. Section 48(1) and (2) of EO 292 provides for the
Procedure in Administrative Cases against Non-
Presidential Employees
(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced
against a subordinate officer or employee by the
Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head
of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional
directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other
person.
(2) In the case of a complaint filed by any other person,
the complainant shall submit sworn statements
covering his testimony and those of his witnesses,
together with his documentary evidence. If on the basis
of such papers, a prima facie case exists, he shall
notify the respondent in writing, of the charges against
the latter, to which shall be attached copies of the
complaint, sworn statements, and other documents
submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not
less than 72 hours, after receipt of the complaint, to
answer the charges in writing under oath; together with
supporting sworn statements and documents, in which
he shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal
investigation if his answer is not considered
satisfactory. If the answer is found satisfactory, the
disciplining authority shall dismiss the case.
c. Section 8 of the Uniform Rules on Admin. Cases in the
Civil Service
A complaint against a civil service official or employee
shall not be given due course, unless it is in writing and
subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However,
in cases initiated by the proper disciplining authority,
the complainant need not be under oath
No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless
there is obvious truth or merit to the allegations therein
or supported by documentary or direct evidence, in
which the person complained of may be required to
comment
CA: Section 46 and 48 contemplates the initiation of a
complaint against a civil service official or employee by
 filing a complaint for preliminary investigation by the fiscal,
which vests the fiscal with QJ discretion to determine Note: The Court did not anymore rule on questions of facts with regard
whether to file a criminal case in court, similar to institution to the guilt of Dumlao. Not a trier of facts.
of criminal cases. The anonymous letter is a complaint
which must comply with the mandatory requirements FALLO: Case REMANDED to CA for further proceedings. Petition
under Section 48(2) and Section 8. Hence, the CSC was GRANTED.
without jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation
on the anonymous complaint as it did not comply with the
formal requirements aforementioned.

Issue:
(1) W/N CSC Regional Office had jurisdiction to conduct an
investigation on the anonymous complaint. (YES)
(2) W/N CSC Regional Office can file a formal complaint against
Dumlao on the basis of an anonymous complaint. (YES)

Held:
(1) CA gravely erred in considering the letter complaint as the
complaint referred to in EO 292 and the Uniform Rules on Admin.
Cases in the Civil Service.
- The complaint contemplated therein refer to an actual charge to
which the person complained of is required to answer and
indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation should
his answer be deemed not satisfactory
- In contrast, the anonymous letter-complaint herein was NOT a
complaint within the purview of the aforementioned rules and
sections under EO 292. It did not, by itself, commence
administrative proceedings, requiring an answer from Dumlao,
as described under Sec. 48(2) of EO 292, but merely triggered
an investigation by the CSC.
- The letter-complaint is a plain and simple letter. Hence, the
complaint was initiated by the CSC ITSEF. To say that the CSC
could not act upon the information is a restrictive interpretation
of EO 292 and deprived the Government of its disciplining
power over people who hold a public trust.

(2) Under Sec. 46 and 48(1) of EO 292 and Sec. 8 of the Uniform Rules
on Admin. Cases in the Civil Service, a complaint may be initiated
against a civil service officer or employee by the appropriate
disciplining authority, even without being subscribed and sworn to.
Considering that the CSC, as the disciplining authority for Dumlao,
filed the complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly acquired.
P/CAPT. ROMEO M. DE GUZMAN v. MARIPI APOLONIO
A.M. No. P-05-2069
October 13, 2005
FACTS: De Guzman, Chief of the PNP-CIDG alleged that Maripi
Apolonio violated R.A. No. 3019 by means of accepting a cash
amount of P60,000 in an entrapment operation. However, the
Prosecutor found no sufficient evidence of a violation of RA No. 3019,
and thus, downgraded the charge to estafa. Thus, an Information for
estafa was filed.
Maripi claimed that the alleged money received during the entrapment
operation was for the premium for the surety bond of her niece
Esperanzas brother Jomel, who was detained of drug charges.
Earlier, Lucia Samonte (Lucia), Esperanzas mother and Maripis
sister-in-law, allegedly approached Maripi for advice on what the
former can do to secure the release of Jomel. Maripi initially
approached the PNP investigator to ascertain the nature of the
charges against her nephew Jomel. Subsequently, she and Lucia
went to the Office of the City Prosecutor to inquire about the
possibility of posting bail for Jomel. Prosecutor Lucky M. Damasena
said that he would recommend P120,000.00 bail bond for each case
or a total of P360,000.00. Maripi then recommended that Lucia raise
the money needed for the premium of the surety bond.
Thereafter, Maripi and Lucia agreed to meet on a certain day to go to
the Office of the City Prosecutor and talk to an insurance agent who
will issue the surety bond. On the appointed day, Esperanza came to
know about the money because Lucia had asked her to deliver it to
respondent. Thinking that the money would be used for extortion,
Esperanza went to the CIDG of Santiago City and an entrapment
operation was arranged for the arrest of respondent.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its report, held that the
information at hand is sufficient to hold respondent liable for gross
misconduct. It found that there is strong and incontrovertible evidence
of Maripis active involvement in procuring the release of her nephew
who was detained on drug charges. The OCA thought it improper for
Maripi to make personal inquiries with the PNP and the Office of the
City Prosecutor regarding her nephews cases. The OCA also
observed it highly irregular for Maripi to make arrangements for
securing a surety bond in the city prosecutors office. Further, the
OCA recommended that Maripi be placed under preventive
suspension pending the final outcome of the resolution of the criminal
case. (N.B. Ito talaga main point dito)
ISSUE: Is the recommendation of preventive suspension pending the
resolution of the criminal case proper?
HELD: YES. Section 19, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service empowers the proper disciplining authority to
issue upon petition of the complainant or motu proprio, an order of
preventive suspension to any subordinate officer or employee pending
investigation if the charge involves, among others, grave misconduct.
Said provision reads in full, to wit:
SEC. 19. Preventive Suspension.- Upon petition of the
complainant or motu proprio, the proper disciplining
authority may issue an order of preventive suspension
upon service of the Formal Charge, or immediately
thereafter to any subordinate officer or employee under
his authority pending investigation, if the charge
involves:
a. dishonesty;
b. oppression;
c. grave misconduct;
d. neglect in the performance of duty; or
e. if there are reasons to believe that the respondent
is guilty of the charges which would warrant
his removal from the service.
An order of preventive suspension may be issued to temporarily
remove the respondent from the scene of his
misfeasance or malfeasance and to preclude the
possibility of exerting undue influence or pressure on
the witnesses against him or tampering of documentary
evidence on file with his Office.
In lieu of preventive suspension, for the same purpose,
the proper disciplining authority or head of office, may
reassign respondent to other unit of the agency during
the formal hearings.
The Supreme Court is given by the Constitution the exclusive power
over the discipline of lower court judges and court personnel. As the
charge embodied in the Complaint constitutes either dishonesty or
grave misconduct, the Supreme Court as the proper disciplining
authority may motu proprio or at the complainants behest as in the case
at bar, issue an order placing respondent under preventive suspension.
Under the circumstances, the Court believes that an order of
preventive suspension is warranted. It is worth reiterating that
preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for
misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure.

RULING: Maripi Apolonio is PREVENTIVELY SUSPENDED for 90

days. Administrative Case is held in abeyance pending resolution
of criminal case
4) G.R. No. L-22754, Dec 31, 1965 ZOSA
PETITIONER: Ruben A. Villaluz
RESPONDENT: Calixto Zaldivar, et al.
TOPIC: Preventive Suspension
FACTS:
May 20, 1958: Ruben Villaluz was nominated as Chief in the
Administrator of Motor Vehicles Office. 2 days after, his nomination
was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
May 26, 1958: Villaluz took oath of office after Acting Executive
Secretary Sofronio C. Quimson informed him of his nomination.
Jan. 28, 1960: Congressman Joaquin Roces (Chairman of Committee
on Good Government of the House of Representatives), through a
leter, informed the President of the Philippines of the findings made by
his committee:
(1) malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to the government;
(2) failure to correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the
same, facilitating thereby the commission of graft and corruption; and
(3) negligence to remedy unsatisfactory accounting; V
As a result of said findings, Cong. Roces recommended the
replacement Villaluz and the complete revamp of the offices coming
under Motor Vehicles Office.
Then Secretary of Public Works and Communications furnished
Villaluz with a copy of the letter, requiring him to explain within 72
hours why no administrative action should be taken against him
relative to the charges contained in the letter.
Villaluz replied and refuted in detail each and everyone of the charges
in the letter of Cong. Roces.
Feb 15, 1960: then Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo suspended
Villaluz as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office and created an
investigating committee, headed by Special Prosecutor Emilio A.
Gancayco, with the only purpose of investigating the charges against
Villaluz and his assistant, Aurelio de Leon.
Report from the investigating committee was submitted to the
President of the Philippines who thereafter issued Administrative
Order No. 332 decreeing the removal of Villaluz from office. As a
result, Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his place as acting
administrator.
Having been notified of his removal, Villaluz filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinstatement. One of his basis is that his
removal by the President of the Philippines is unwarranted, that only
the Civil Service Commissioner has such power. When this was
denied, he filed this petition before the Court.
Respondents denied the claim of Villaluz that
1. the charges were not directly against him but against the office;
2. that he was investigated without being accorded due process for in
fact he was given every reasonable opportunity to present his
defense.
Respondents also averred that
1. the Pres of Ph, contrary to what Villaluz claims, has jurisdiction to
investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who
belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of
RA 2260;
2. the letter of Cong. Roces is in effect a valid administrative
complaint because it contained specific charges which constitute just
causes for his suspension and removal; that said charges need not be
sworn to for the Chief Executive, as administrative head of Villaluz, is
empowered to commence administrative proceedings motu proprio
pursuant to EO 370, series of 1941, without need of any previous
verified complaint;
3. Villaluz is guilty of laches for having allowed almost 4 years before
instituting the present action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension was valid. Suspension was
valid.
Ruling:
The power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint.
Being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-
competitive or unclassified service of the government and as such, he
can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by
the President of the Philippines. Corollary, the Commissioner of the
Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the
administrative charges filed against Villaluz because the authority of
said Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension, separation
or removal can only be exercised with reference to permanent officials
and employees in the classified service to which Villaluz does not
belong.

With regard to the claim that the administrative proceedings

conducted against Villaluz which led to his separation are illegal
simply because the charges preferred against him by Cong. Roces
were not sworn to as required by Section 72 of Republic Act No. 2260
(Civil Service Act of 1959), this much we can say: said proceedings
having been commenced against Villaluz upon the authority of the
Chief Executive who was his immediate administrative head, the
same may be commenced by him motu proprio without previous
verified complaint pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of
1941.

Finally, on the theory that the instant petition partakes of the nature of
quo warranto which seeks petitioner's reinstatement to his former
position as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, we are of the
opinion that it has now no legal raison d'etre for having been filed
more than one year after its cause of action had accrued. As this
Court has aptly said: "a delay of slightly over one (1) year was
considered sufficient . . . to be an action for mandamus, by reason of
laches or abandonment of office. We see no reason to depart from
said view in the present case, petitioner herein having allowed about a
year and a half to elapse before seeking

WHEREFORE, petition is denied. No costs.

 Prudencio Quimbo vs. Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio 10. The Obudsman clarified that preventive suspension is not a
G.R. No. 155620. August 9, 2005 | CARPIO-MORALES, J. | ABALOS penalty but a preliminary step in an investigation; and that if after
such investigation, the charge is established and the person
investigated upon is found guilty . . . warranting the imposition of
1. Petitioner, PRUDENCIO C. QUIMBO, Provincial Engineer of
penalty, then he shall accordingly be penalized.
Samar, was on May 21, 1995 administratively charged for
11. CA dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari, it affirming the
harassment and oppression by ELMO V. PADAON (Padaon), a
Ombudsmans ruling that preventive suspension pending
general foreman who was detailed to the Motor Pool Division,
investigation is not a penalty.
Provincial Engineering, Barangay Payao, Samar by then
12. QUIMBO contends that the dismissal of his petition is in violation
Provincial GOVERNOR JOSE ROO.
of the doctrine enunciated in Gloria v. Court of Appeals and the
2. During the pendency of the administrative case before the Office
rule on equity that a person should not be punished twice nor be
of the Deputy Ombudsman, QUIMBO, on motion of the
made to suffer the suspension penalty after he had served the
complainant Padaon, was placed under preventive suspension
same (although in a preventive suspension).
without pay to commence upon receipt of the order and until such
time that it is lifted but in no case beyond 6 Months.
Issue: W/N preventive suspension pending investigation is considered
3. QUIMBO began serving his preventive suspension on March 18,
a penalty ---- NO.
1998.
4. After QUIMBO had presented on direct examination his last two
1. Jurisdprudence establishes a clear-cut distinction between
witnesses the Ombudsman lifted petitioners preventive
suspension as preventive measure and suspension as
suspension and ordered to resume performing his duties as
penalty.
Provincial Engineer.
Suspension as Preventive Suspension as Penalty
5. By Decision of April 5, 2000: the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of oppression and Measure
recommended that he be suspended from office for a period Merely a preventive measure, a If after such investigation, the
of eight (8) months without pay, this case being the second preliminary step in an charge is established and the
commission by him of the same offense. administrative investigation. person investigated is found
6. The Deputy Ombudsmans recommendation was approved by the guilty of acts warranting his
Ombudsman on April 28, 2000. QUIMBOs MR was denied. suspension or removal, then he
7. CA modified the decision of the Ombudsman, found petitioner is suspended, removed or
guilty of simple misconduct only and penalized him with dismissed.
suspension from office for 2 months without pay. Purpose of the suspension order
8. QUIMBO filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for is to prevent the accused from
Modification/Reconsideration the CAs decision, calling attention using his position and the powers
to the fact that he had been on preventive suspension from March and prerogatives of his office to
18, 1998 to June 1, 1998 [He had been in preventive suspension influence potential witnesses or
for 2 months and 17 days] tamper with records which may
9. PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR MILAGROSA TAN sent a letter to the be vital in the prosecution of the
Ombudsman seeking clarification on the merits of petitioners case against him
contention that he should no longer be required to serve the
penalty of 2 Months suspension without pay, he having
priorly served preventive suspension for more than 2
Months.
 2. Section 242 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing authority to conduct an respondent is exonerated
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987: Explicitly provides unhampered investigation and the administrative
that preventive suspension is not a penalty. decision finding him guilty is
3. Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under reversed
preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual Hence, he should be
penalty of suspension. reinstated with full pay for
4. Section 25 of the same Rule XIV: the period of the
SEC. 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged suspension
is placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part
of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee 3. Thus, 47(4) states that respondent shall be considered
found guilty. as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the
appeal in the event he wins. On the other hand, if his
5. Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period
credited as service of penalty. To rule otherwise is to of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of
disregard above-quoted Sections 24 and 25 of the suspension or dismissal
Administrative Code of 1987 and render nugatory the 4. In fine, as petitioners preventive suspension was carried out
substantial distinction between, and purposes of imposing pending his investigation, not while his appeal from his
preventive suspension and suspension as penalty. conviction was pending, the same cannot be credited to form
part of the final penalty of suspension.
Additional Notes:

1. Petitioners reliance on Gloria fails. In said case, this Court

recognized 2 kinds of preventive suspension of civil service
employees who are charged with offenses punishable by
removal or suspension:
(1) preventive suspension pending investigation (Section 51 of
the Civil Service Law, and
(2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty
imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal
and, after review, the respondent is exonerated
2. The foregoing classification has significant implications in
determining the entitlement of the employee to
compensation during the period of suspension, and to
credit the preventive suspension to the final penalty of
suspension.
Preventive suspension preventive suspension
pending investigation pending appeal
not a penalty but only a means is actually punitive although
of enabling the disciplining it is in effect subsequently
considered illegal if

2 SEC. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure.
Caniete v Secretary of Education
Petitioner: HERMAN CANIETE and WILFREDO ROSARIO
Respondent: THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS
Facts: Caniete and Rosario are public school teachers. Both were
absent on Sept 20 and 21 1990 and are charged by Sec. Isidro Cario,
Sec of Dep Ed, with alleged participation in the mass strikes then were
placed under preventive suspension. Eventually they were found guilty
and immediately dismissed from service.
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) set aside the case when it
was brought to on appeal. They ruled petitioners were only guilty of
Gross Violation of Existing Civil Service Law and Rules and were
suspended 3 months w/o pay.
the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they
are found innocent."
the employee who is placed under preventive suspension pending
investigation is not entitled to compensation because such suspension
"is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority
to conduct an unhampered investigation." Upon the other hand, there
is right to compensation for preventive suspension pending appeal if
the employee is eventually exonerated. This is because "preventive
suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect
subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the
administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should
be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension.

CSC modified the decision of MSPB and charged petitioners were

guilty of only being absent without necessary leave of absence.
Petitioners be reinstated without back salaries.

Petitioners elevated case to CA as it disallowed payment of backpay.

CA affirmed CSC

Issue: WON petitioners are entitled to their back salaries upon

reinstatement after they were found guilty only of violating reasonable
office rules and regulations and penalized only with reprimand.

Held: Yes.

The ruling in Gloria vs. Court of Appeals[4] is squarely applicable in this

case as the facts are substantially the same. In Gloria, the public school
teachers therein were either suspended or dismissed for allegedly
participating in the strikes sometime in September and October 1990.
They were eventually exonerated of said charge and found guilty only
of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations by failing to file
applications for leave of absence. Thus, the penalty of dismissal earlier
imposed on them was reduced to reprimand and their reinstatement
was ordered. Moreover, this Court affirmed the payment of back
salaries of said teachers explaining that although "employees who are
preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to the
payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, we do not agree
with the government that they are not entitled to compensation for
07) Horacio Apuyan and Alexander Eugenio vs. Alfredo St. Isabel
(Sheriff IV, RTC-Pasig City)
A.M. No. P-01-1497 | 2004-05-28 | AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
A complaint against Sheriff Sta. Isabel was filed before the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). Sta. Isabel denied
Apuyans allegations.
Apuyan and Eugenio are employees of plaintiff corporation in a
civil case pending before the RTC where a writ of attachment
was issued by the RTC against the monies and properties of
defendants
The complainants fetched Sheriff Sta. Isabel in his office to
assist them in the implementation of the writ of attachment. Sta.
Isabel started to dictate that the police officers should receive
no less than 1k each and another 1k for each mobile car used.
They proceeded to the office of defendant corporation Sta.
Isabel told them that he was able to gather information relative
to defendant's bank account that can be the subject of
garnishment. Sta. Isabel started hinting that ongoing sheriff's
rate.
Apuyan called their counsel, Atty. Perez, who requested Sta.
Isabel to immediately garnish the bank account, but Sta. Isabel
replied that he could not do so for he failed to bring with him the
necessary papers.
After levying some properties of defendant, Apuyan handed
Sta. Isabel an envelope containing 2k, and when respondent
saw the amount, he threw the envelope and cursed them,
saying that the amount of P2,000.00 is a big insult to his person.
Sta. Isabel blurted out that from then on, he would no longer
effect the garnishment.
The next day, while Apuyan was waiting for their case to be
called in court relative to a hearing of a Motion to Discharge
Attachment, Sta. Isabel grabbed his collar, uttering, "O, ano ang
gusto mong mangyari ngayon?" Later on, Sta. Isabel did not
report for work to avoid proceeding with the garnishment.
Apuyan and Atty. Perez went to court to file a Motion to Assign
a Special Sheriff. Sta. Isabel came out of the staff room and
started cursing them and vehemently denying the allegations in
their motion. He uttered to Atty. Perez, "Ikaw, abogado ka lang,
baka hindi mo ako kakilala, hindi ako basta bastang sheriff.
Ididimanda kita ng libel, gago. Puwede ako sa physical, puwede
ako sa mental. Hindi ko palalagpasin and ginawa ninyo sa aking
ito;"
Apuyan and Atty. Perez obtained a copy of the court's Order
granting the assignment of a special sheriff.
Sta. Isabel claims that complaint was brought about by a
personal grudge between him and Apuyan. He averred that he
never mentioned any monetary consideration, and that he never
touched any of the complainants or their counsel. According to
him, Apuyan was angered when he did not accept the 2k.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that
respondent really made the monetary demand and that the
verbal altercation transpired within the court premises. OCA
recommends suspension for one year without pay.
ISSUE: W/N Sheriff Sta. Isabel is guilty of misconduct.
SC Ruling:
We agree with the finding of the OCA that Sta. Isabels explanations
are inconsistent, and that the denial in grabbing the collar of Apuyan
and the occurrence of the verbal altercation between him and Atty.
Perez are implausible.
Sta. Isabels act of demanding money and receiving P1,500.00 from the
complainant for the lunch and merienda of the policemen who will
accompany him in executing the decision of the Court is a clear
violation of section 9, Rule 141. The Rules require the sheriff to
estimate his expenses in the execution of the decision. The
prevailing party will then deposit the said amount to the Clerk of Court
who will disburse the amount to the sheriff, subject to liquidation. Any
unspent amount will have to be returned to the prevailing party. In this
case, no estimate of sheriff's expenses was submitted to the court by
respondent. In fact, the money which respondent deputy sheriff had
demanded and received from complainant was not among those
prescribed and authorized by the Rules of Court. This Court has ruled
that any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees
allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders
him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty. Sta. Isabel
not only utterly failed to live up to the high ethical standards required of
a sheriff, but also, he totally ignored Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court. Respondent failed to demonstrate that he followed the
procedure laid down by Rule 141.
Sanction
Section 23 (a), (c), & (t), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292, provides:
Sec. 23. Administrative offenses with its corresponding
penalties are classified into grave, less grave, and light,
depending on the gravity of its nature and effects of said acts
on the government service.
The following are grave offenses with its corresponding
penalties:
(a) Dishonesty
1st offense - Dismissal
(c ) Grave Misconduct
1st offense - Dismissal
(t) Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service
1st offense - Suspension for six (6) months and one day to one
(1) year.
2nd offense - Dismissal

However, as correctly recommended by the OCA, we shall apply

Section 53 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service which provides that in the determination of the
penalties to be imposed, the extenuating, mitigating, aggravating
or alternative circumstances may be considered. Per report of the
OCA, this is the first time that respondent has ever been charged
administratively. Thus, instead of imposing the penalty of dismissal
which is the imposable penalty for commission of the first offense of
grave misconduct and dishonesty, respondent, as appropriately
recommended by the OCA, should be suspended for a period of one
year without pay with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
NILO A. MALANYAON, vs. HON. ESTEBAN M. LISING, as Judge of
the CFI of Camarines Sur, Br. VI, and CESARIO GOLETA, as
Municipal Treasurer of Bula, Camarines Sur
No. L-56028.
July 30, 1981
Facts:
The late Mayor S.B. Pontanal is one of the accused in Criminal
Case No. P-339 for Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Upon the filing of the case against him in court
and after hearing, he was suspended from office and during
his incumbency he died. Due to his death the charge against
him in Criminal Case No. P-339 was dismissed. Petitioner now
contends that any disbursement of funds by the respondent,
Cesario Goleta, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer in favor
of the heirs of the late Mayor for salaries corresponding to the
period he was under suspension and other benefits will be
illegal and contrary to the provisions of Section 13 because
said late Mayor S.B. Pontanal was not acquitted of the charge
against him.
Nilo A. Malanyaon, the petitioner, was formerly a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur. He filed an
action "to declare illegal the disbursement made by Cesario
Goleta as Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Bula,
Camarines Sur, to Venancia Pontanal, widow of the late Mayor
S.B. Pontanal, in the amount of P5,000.00 representing a
portion of the salary of the late Mayor as such mayor of said
municipality during the period of his suspension from August
16, 1977 up to November 28, 1979, and to restrain or prevent
respondent Cesario Goleta as such Municipal Treasurer of the
aforementioned municipality from further paying or disbursing
the balance of the claim. Respondent judge dismissed the
action on the ground that the criminal case against the late
Mayor S.B. Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal.
Issue:
Whether or not there is acquittal in the criminal case due to the death
of the late Mayor Pontanal?
Held:
It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer
being "acquitted" it means that after due hearing and consideration of
the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case
against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does
not amount to acquittal.
As aptly stated in People vs. Salico: Acquittal is always based on the
merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does
not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but
dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant
is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the
court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not
show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in
form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is
commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal,
is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the
defendant moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the case
on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in
reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. If the
prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the
dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant
could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent
jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case the defendant may
again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Respondents invoke Art. 81, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides that "Death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his
criminal and civil liability." There is no relevance of this provision to
the case at bar. For one thing the case against Mayor Pontanal was
not on appeal but on trial. For another thing the claim for back salaries
is neither a criminal nor a civil liability. It is in fact a right provided the
conditions of the law are present.
Paredes v. CSC
192 SCRA 84 | December 4, 1990 | Paras, J
Petitioner: Dolores A. Paredes
Respondents: CSC, Merit Systems Protection Board, and Remedios
A. Amor
TOPIC: The Civil Service: Appeals
DOCTRINE: [A]ppeal to the CSC in an administrative case is extended
to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the
respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Dolores Paredes as Head of the Administrative Services
Department of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) filed a complaint against respondent Remedios Amor, an
employee of HSRC, for falsification of official documents,
dishonesty, violation of Civil Service Law and reasonable office
Rules and Regulations, habitual tardiness, conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service and for being notoriously
undesirable. Accordingly, Paredes prayed for an investigation and
thereafter the dismissal from the service of Amor.
2. Amor denied the charges and countered that the same is only a
retaliatory measure intended to harass and intimidate her as she
protested the promotional appointment of Paredes.
3. The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) rendered its decision
absolving Amor of all charges except for habitual tardiness.
Considering that habitual tardiness is a light offense and that she
was not previously warned, Amor was only reprimanded and
warned that a repetition would be dealt with more severely.
4. Paredes interposed an appeal to the CSC which dismissed the
same on the ground that Paredes is not the party adversely affected
by the decision. Citing Section 39(a) of PD 807, it ruled that the
parties who can appeal in an administrative case are the
government and the respondent.
5. The CSC likewise denied Paredess MR stressing that the party
adversely affected had been consistently interpreted to refer to the
respondent against whom an adverse decision had been rendered
or the Department or Agency concerned and not the complainant
who after filing the complaint is relegated to the status of a
complaining witness as the offense is committed against the
government.
6. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Paredes as the complainant in this administrative case has
the legal personality to appeal the decision of the MSPB absolving
respondent Amor.
HELD: NO.
1. Appeal in judicial proceedings is a statutory right that must be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions
of law. This doctrine is also applicable in quasi-judicial proceedings
so that one must first ascertain the law applicable to determine
whether or not the party can appeal the order or decision.
2. Under Secs. 37 & 39 of PD 807, [read DOCTRINE]. The penalty
involved must be suspension for more than 30 days; or fine in an
amount exceeding 30 days salary demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office.
The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not
appealable to the CSC in cases where the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than 30 days or fine in an amount not
exceeding 30 days salary. Appeal in cases allowed by law must be
filed within 15 days from receipt of the decision.
In this case, the penalty was only a reprimand so that even Amor,
the party adversely affected by the decision, cannot even interpose
an appeal to the CSC.
3. As correctly ruled by MSPB, in an administrative case, Paredes as
the complainant is a mere witness, notwithstanding that she is the
Head of the Administrative Services Department of the HSRC. No
private interest is involved in an administrative case as the offense
is committed against the government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
10) ANGELITO HUERTAS, petitioner, vs. ANDREW GONZALEZ,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), and
CAROLINA DIZON, respondents. [Huertas vs Gonzales]
[G.R. No. 152443. February 14, 2005]
(The Civil Service: Appeal)
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed with the Office of the Regional
Director of the then Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS), NCR, by Dr. Carolina C. Dizon, the principal of the Bacood
Elementary School in Sta. Mesa, against Angelito M. Huertas, a school
teacher in the same school, for grave misconduct, disrespect of
authority and violation of the provision of the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers.
The school conducted a regular election of the officers of the faculty
club. Huertas was re-elected president, besting for the second time
around his co-teacher, Mrs. Catalina Lorenzo. This notwithstanding, a
group of teachers circulated a manifesto denouncing Huertas. As a
countermove, Huertas launched his own signature campaign to show
his clear mandate.
Huertas received information that Dizon was preventing the teachers
from signing in his favor. He rushed to the office of Dizon and angrily
confronted the latter. After the heated exchange of words, Huertas
decided to leave, but before doing so, warned Dizon that if she doesnt
stop, he will sue her. Dizon preempted Huertas and filed an
administrative complaint against him.
An Investigating Committee (Grievance Committee) was constituted for
the purpose. The Investigating Committee conducted a preliminary
hearing. The formal investigation was set on September 10, 1996,
during which Huertas appeared without the assistance of counsel. The
parties agreed to submit the case for resolution without any formal
investigation on the basis of the affidavits on record.
In time, the Grievance Committee submitted its investigation report,
finding Huertas guilty of gross discourtesy in the course of official
duties. In a Resolution dated October 16, 1996, Regional Director Nilo
Rosas modified the findings and recommendation of the Grievance
Committee. He found Huertas guilty of gross disrespect and imposed
on him the penalty of one (1) month suspension from service without
pay.
Huertas moved for a reconsideration of the resolution on the alleged
ground of lack of due process, both substantive and procedural. He
claimed that he was not represented by counsel during the investigation
and that the Grievance Committee failed to conduct a formal
investigation of the case. Director Rosas denied the motion, prompting
Huertas to appeal the resolution to the DECS Secretary via a petition
for review.
Then DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria issued a Resolution reversing
the resolutions of the Regional Director and dismissing the
administrative complaint for want of a formal hearing. The Secretary
ruled that Huertas was deprived of his right to due process when the
Grievance Committee dispensed with a formal investigation and based
its report-recommendation merely on the affidavits of the parties and
those of the witnesses of the complainant.
Dissatisfied, Dizon herself filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
resolution. Then Acting Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco reconsidered the
ruling of her predecessor and reinstated the resolution of the Regional
Director.
Huertas filed a petition for review which was treated as a motion for
reconsideration by then DECS Secretary Andrew Gonzalez, FSC.
Secretary Gonzalez reconsidered and set-aside Secretary Pefiancos
Resolution and reinstated Secretary Glorias Resolution. In reinstating
Secretary Glorias Resolution, Secretary Gonzalez tersely and
succinctly ratiocinated:
It is evident that then Secretary Pefianco acted on the motion for
Reconsideration of the complaint contrary to the rule that only the
respondent can file a motion for reconsideration (CSC Resolution No.
94-0512, Sec. 7).
The CA ruled that Dizon herself had the right to appeal or move for a
reconsideration of the Resolution of Secretary Gloria as held by the
Court in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy. It rejected the
argument of the OSG that a decision in administrative cases penalized
by one month suspension or less shall be final under Section 47(2),
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292. According to the
CA, the petitioners case does not fall within the ambit of E.O. No. 292
because the root of the penalty is an illegally constituted investigating The petitioner asserts that Section 9 of Republic Act No. 4670
committee. As the old saying tells, it is a fruit of a poisonous tree. enumerates those who should compose an investigating
committee, and that under DECS Order No. 34, Series of 1999,
Petitioner avers that respondent Dizon was barred from filing a motion noncompliance with the requirements of the said law would
for the reconsideration of the Resolution of Secretary Gloria. This amount to a denial of due process. The petitioner avers that Atty.
resolution reversed that of Regional Director Rosas and ordered the Manuel Ano was not a school superintendent of the division, and
dismissal of the said complaint, on the ground that the petitioner was that the teachers organization was not represented in the
deprived of his right to due process when the committee dispensed with committee.
a formal investigation and because its report was based merely on the The respondents argue that the petitioner is estopped from
affidavits on record. The petitioner cites Section 39(a) of Presidential assailing the composition of the committee because the
Decree No. 805, which provides that appeals where allowable, shall be administrative case against petitioner for Grave Misconduct and
made by the party adversely affected by the decision. He also cites Del Disrespect to Authority, filed by his own lady Principal, is one of
Castillo v. Civil Service Commission, where the Court ruled that only these cases belonging to the LACS.
the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed o A specialized section denominated as Legal Affairs and
is entitled to appeal from a decision adverse to him, and the ruling of Complaints Service (LACS), which is tasked to investigate
this Court in Mendez v. Civil Service Commission that the civil service complaints for disciplinary actions against the teachers of
law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or its division. One of those cases investigated by the LACS
employees from administrative charges. The petitioner insists that was the complaint of respondent Dizon against the
when Secretary Gloria ordered the dismissal of the complaint against petitioner. From the very start of the investigative
him for lack of due process, he was exonerated of the charge. proceedings up to its termination, and even after the DECS
Grievance Committee submitted its report of findings and
Issues: recommendation, petitioner never questioned the
competence of the hearing officers or the legality of the
1. Whether the CA committed a reversible error in the proceedings.
interpretation/application of the law and the appreciation of the We agree with the respondents that the petitioner is estopped from
facts and evidence presented. assailing the competence of the Grievance Committee. In the
2. Whether the CA committed a reversible error in failing to present action, the members of the Grievance Committee who were
consider the non-compliance of the mandatory requirements of tasked to conduct a formal investigation of the complaint of
RA 4670 as regards the composition of the grievance committee respondent Dizon belonged to the Legal Affairs and Complaints
which is violative of the due process of law. Service of the Manila Division of City Schools; hence, contrary to
3. Whether the CA committed a reversible error in failing to Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670.3
consider that respondent Carolina Dizon has no personality to
file the motion for reconsideration. 3rd issue:
The petitioner avers that respondent Dizon was barred from filing a
Held: motion for the reconsideration of the November 20, 1997 Resolution of
Secretary Gloria. The petitioner cites Section 39(a) of Presidential
1st and 2nd issue: Decree No. 805, which provides that appeals where allowable, shall be
made by the party adversely affected by the decision. He also cites Del
Castillo v. Civil Service Commission, where the Court ruled that only

3 teachers organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee shall
SECTION 9. Administrative Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee composed of the submit its findings and recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the hearings: Provided,
corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a duly-authorized representative who should, at least, have the rank of a division however, That where the school superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the members of the committee shall be
supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national appointed by the Secretary of Education.
the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed
is entitled to appeal from a decision adverse to him, and the ruling of
this Court in Mendez v. Civil Service Commission that the civil service
law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or
employees from administrative charges. The Court overturned its ruling
in Mendez v. Civil Service Commission in Civil Service Commission v.
Dacoycoy.

Neither can the old doctrine barring appeal be justified by the provision
limiting the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. According to
that provision, the CSC was limited to the review of decisions involving:
(1) suspension for more than thirty (30) days; (2) fine in an amount
exceeding thirty (30) days salary; (3) demotion in rank or salary; and
(4) transfer, removal or dismissal from office. Nothing in the provision,
however, indicates a legislative intent to bar appeals from decisions
exonerating a government official or an employee from an
administrative charge.

It must be stressed that the petitioner was not exonerated of the charge
against him in the November 20, 1997 Resolution of Secretary Gloria;
the DECS Secretary merely nullified the proceedings before the
committee as well as its report/recommendation. Hence, respondent
Dizon was moving for the reconsideration of the November 20, 1997
Resolution of the Secretary, and was not, in effect, appealing from any
resolution exonerating the petitioner.
11) Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) v. CA
Right to Self-Organization
Facts:
- In 1987, SSS filed a complaint for damages against SSSEA for
staging an illegal strike and barricading the entrances to the SSS
building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work
and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS
- The strikers refused to return to work despite being ordered to do
so by the Public Sector Labor Management Council.
- They went on strike after SSS failed to act on the unions demands,
including:
o Implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement on check-off of union dues
o Payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay, and
holiday pay
o Conversion of temporary/contractual employees and their
entitlement to the same benefits and salaries given to other
regular employees
- RTC issued a restraining order, ruling that the strike was illegal
- CA affirmed, ruling that SSS employees are government
employees thus are not allowed to strike. SSSEA argues that RTC
had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue
the restraining order, arguing that jurisdiction lies with the NLRC as
the case involves a labor dispute
- SSS argues that employees of the SSS are covered by civil service
laws and not the Labor code, therefore they do not have the right to
strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over
the dispute, RTC may enjoin the employees from striking
Issue: W/N employees of the SSS have the right to strike? NO.
Held: Sec. 3, Art. XIII of the Constitution [Article on Social Justice and
Human Rights], provides that the State shall guarantee the rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations,
and peaceful concerted activities including the right to strike in
accordance with law.
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers
and employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the
Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the
SubArticle on the Civil Service Commission, it provides that the right
to selforganization shall not be denied to government employees. The
Bill of Rights also provides that the right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the
right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether
such recognition also includes the right to strike.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution is that just because
government employees have the right to organize, they also have the
right to strike. We are only talking about organizing, uniting as a union.
Commissioner Lerum said.
The Industrial Peace Act (RA 875) repealed the Labor Code in 1974,
expressly banning strikes by employees in the government.
Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether government
employees may strike because such are excluded from its coverage
[LC doesnt cover government employees].
SSS is covered under the restriction against strikes by employees in
the Civil Service as it is a government controlled corporation with an
original charter such is included in the definition of civil service in
Sec. 2(1), Art. IX.
Distinction between private/public sector employees re: right to strike:
Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by
law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by
workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their
employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is
that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law.
Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an
essentially voluntary basis. In government employment, however, it is
the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions
of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative
circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining
agreements.
Corollarily, RTC was not precluded from assuming jurisdiction over the
SSSs complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for
therein as the case did not involve a labor dispute. PETITION DENIED.
Trade Unions v NHC
G.R. No. 49677 | May 4, 1989 | Regalado, J.
FACTS:
1. NHC is a corporation organized in 1959 in accordance with
Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the Uniform
Charter of Government Corporations. Its shares of stock are
and have been 100% owned by the Government from its
incorporation under Act 459. The government entities that own
its shares of stock are the Government Service Insurance
System, the Social Security System, the Development Bank of
the Philippines, the National Investment and Development
Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation. On the other hand, TUPAS is a legitimate labor
organization with a chapter in NHC.
2. TUPAS filed a petition for conduct of a certification election with
Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to
determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the
workers in NHC, claiming that its members comprised the
majority of the employees of the corporation.
3. Said petition was dismissed by med-arbiter Jimenez, holding
that NHC "being a government-owned and/or controlled
corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or
assist any labor organization for purposes of collective
bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code."
4. TUPAS appealed to Bureau of Labor Relations, where Director
Carmelo C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal and ordered
the holding of a certification election. This order was, however,
set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution
upon MR of NHC.
5. TUPAS prays that a certification election be held among the
rank and file employees of NHC.
ISSUE: Whether a certification election should be held among the rank
and file employees of NHC? YES
HELD:
1. In a former case of illegal dismissal involving the same respondent
corporation, the court ruled that the employees of NHC and of other
government owned or controlled corporations were governed by civil
service laws, rules and regulations pursuant to the 1973 Constitution
which provided that "the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision and instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations."
2. To allow subsidiary corporations to be excluded from the civil service
laws would be to permit the circumvention or emasculation of the
above-quoted constitutional provision. As perceptively analyzed
therein, "(i)t would be possible for a regular ministry of government to
create a host of subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code
funded by a willing legislature. A government-owned corporation could
create several subsidiary corporations. These subsidiary corporation
rations would enjoy the best of two worlds. Their officials and
employees would be privileged individuals, free from the strict
accountability required by the Civil Service Decree and the regulations
of the Commission on Audit. Their incomes would not be subject to the
competitive restraints of the open market nor to the terms and
conditions of civil service employment."
3. The rule was modified by the 1987 Constitution which declares that
the ivil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters."
4. The civil service now covers only government owned or controlled
corporations with original or legislative charters, that is those created
by an act of Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated
under and pursuant to a general legislation.
5. The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form
unions or employees' organizations. The right to unionize or to form
organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in
both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights
provides that "(t)he right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged"
6. This guarantee is reiterated in the second paragraph of Section 3,
Article XIII, on Social Justice and Human Rights, which mandates that
the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize
is recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX B which provides winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees
that "(t)he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government in said organizational unit."
employees." 11. The Constitution provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights
of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful
7. There is no impediment to the holding of a certification election concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law"
among the workers of NHC for it is clear that they are covered by the and that they shall also participate in policy and decision-making
Labor Code, the NHC being a government-owned and/or controlled processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
corporation without an original charter. Statutory implementation of the law."
last cited section of the Constitution is found in Article 244 of the Labor
Code --- Employees of the government corporations established under
the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain
collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the
civil service shall have the right to form associations for purposes not
contrary to law.

8. The records do not show that supervening factual events have

mooted the present action. Insofar as certification elections are
concerned, subsequent statutory developments have rendered
academic even the distinction between the two types of government-
owned or controlled corporations and the laws governing employment
relations therein, as hereinbefore discussed. For, whether the
employees of NHC are covered by the Labor Code or by the civil service
laws, a certification election may be conducted.

9. For employees in corporations and entities covered by the Labor

Code, the determination of the exclusive bargaining representative is
particularly governed by Articles 255 to 259 of said Code. Article 256
provides for the procedure when there is a representation issue in
organized establishments, while Article 257 covers unorganized
establishments.

10. With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees of all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
government including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters and who are, therefore, covered by the civil
service laws, the guidelines for the exercise of their right to organize is
provided for under Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV thereof,
consisting of Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination of the "sole
and exclusive employees representative"; Under Section 12, "where
there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the
appropriate organization unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon
petition order the conduct of certification election and shall certify the
G.R. No. L-12347 May 30, 1961
HERCULANO GRAPILON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF CARIGARA, LEYTE, ET AL.,
Doctrine: The "absence" that would authorize the vice-mayor to act as
acting mayor should be such absence as disables the mayor from
exercising the powers and prerogatives of his office.
Facts:
In the general elections held on November 8, 1955 in the municipality
of Carigara, Leyte, Jose Aguilar and Herculano Grapilon were elected
mayor and vice-mayor, respectively.
in compliance with a resolution duly approved by the municipal
council, Mayor Aguilar left Carigara for Manila on official business. On
that same date Grapilon inquired from the municipal secretary if it was
true that the mayor had left for Manila, to which the municipal
secretary replied in the affirmative, informing him besides that Mayor
Aguilar left for Manila on official business, without designating
anybody as acting municipal mayor.
Grapilon informed the secretary "that I assume office as acting
municipal mayor effective today and for the duration of his absence
pursuant to the provision of Section 2195 of the Revised
Administrative Code. He dressed a similar notice to the chief of police
of the municipality and to the provincial governor of Leyte.
In his notice (by telegram) to the latter, appellee also informed him
that the municipal secretary had refused to recognize him as acting
mayor and asked for advice. Answering petitioner's telegram, the
provincial governor, under date of March 7, 1957, wrote him an official
letter in which he said that, in view of the reasons therein stated, "in
the absence of the municipal mayor when such absence is for official
purpose he may not leave the office to the vice-mayor and there shall
not be an acting mayor"
Alleging that the municipal council, the municipal secretary Felipe
Lianza and the chief of police Ulpiano Arpon had refused to recognize
him as acting mayor and had excluded him from the use and
enjoyment of the office of municipal mayor, appellee filed with the
lower court a petition for mandamus praying that judgment be
rendered requiring the therein respondent to
(1) recognize, submit to, and respect his authority as acting
municipal mayor;
(2) open, unlock and allow his entry into the office of the municipal
mayor in the Municipal Hall of Carigara, Leyte;
(3) perform their duties according to law and cooperate with their
legitimate superior
RTC ruled in favor of Grapilon and declares that the Vice Mayor is
entitled to assume and discharge the office of Municipal Mayor in
accordance with Sec. 2195 of the Rev. Adm. Code in the absence of
the latter without having designated anyone to act as such.
Issue: Whether Grapilon is entitled to act as Municipal Mayor?
Held: (NO)
Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code considers "absence"
on the same level as "suspension" and other forms of temporary
disability. The "absence" that would authorize the vice-mayor to act as
acting mayor should, therefore, be such absence as disables the
mayor from exercising the powers and prerogatives of his office. Such
is not the case in the one before us because mayor Aguilar was in
Manila precisely in his capacity as mayor of Carigara transacting
official business. Although physically absent from Carigara, he was in
the exercise of the powers and prerogatives of his office and was
naturally entitled to continue drawing his salary.
An officer's absence is not such as to warrant the placing of another
person temporarily in his place unless said officer is absent on an
occasion demanding the immediate exercise of the powers of his
office. In the case before us there is no satisfactory evidence showing
that during the absence of mayor Aguilar on official business in Manila
particularly at the time appellee attempted to assume the office of
acting mayor of Carigara, an occasion had arisen demanding
immediate and peremptory exercise of the powers of that office either
for the preservation of public order or for the enforcement of the laws
and ordinances.
Under American jurisprudence, 'absence' is construed to mean not
merely physical absence, but absence which prevents the mayor from
the active performance of his duties. In the case of the mayor of a
municipality it is usually provided that the president of the municipal
council shall exercise all the powers of the mayor during his absence
from the municipality, and under such a provision it has been held that
'absence' must be construed reasonably, and so construed means
what may be called 'effective' absence.
LEGASPI v. MINISTER OF FINANCE -In the present case, PD 1804 was issued pursuant to his power to
Topic: Authority of the Public Officer legislate under Amendment No. 6

FACTS: -It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator
Honorable Valentino Legaspi, incumbent member of the interim as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the
Batasang Pambansa, filed a petition praying that the Court declares Batasan rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the
PD 1840 or granting tax amnesty and filing of the statement of assets Constitution
and liabilities and some other purposes unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
In his petition, he argues that:
1. The decree was issued by President Marcos under supposed
legislative powers granted him under Amendment No. 6
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595
2. That the decree was promulgated despite the fact that the
legislative power shall be vested in the Batasang Pambansa
(Sec. 1, Art VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only
with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 11, Art VII)
3. That Amendment No. 6 is not one of the powers granted the
President by the Constitution
4. PD 1840 was passed without the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa hence, null and void and is likewise of public
interest and of the nation that the question whether President
Marcos retained his legislative power after lifting Martial law
and after the Constitution was amended in 1981

ISSUE: WON the President can validly grant tax amnesties without
the concurrence of the Batasan Pambansa of his power to legislate
-YES

RULING:
-The current Batasan, being merely interim "in lieu of the interim
National Assembly" established under Section 1 of the Transitory
Provisions, it is subject to the provisions of Amendment No. 6 which
was approved and ratified together with the creation of the Batasan

-Art. 7, Sec. 11 provides that The President may, except in cases of

impeachment, grant, reprieves, commutations, and pardons, remit
fines and forfeitures and with concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa, grant amnesty.
this article only applies only when the President is exercising his
power of executive clemency
Digested by: Chad Dolina
Sevilla v Gocon
Facts: Sevilla and Limbo was charged of falsification of official
document, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. Gocon, Guidance Counselor III, was designated as
Chairman of the Values Education Department in 1989. Limbo was a
former Head Teacher III in the Practical Arts Department of the
Quezon National High School in Lucena City.
Respondent Sevilla requested for the reclassification of eight (8) items
of Secondary Head Teacher III to Secondary Head Teacher VI.
Apparently, said request contains super impositions/erasures,
specifically item 7 wherein the Practical Arts Department was
replaced to Values Department with Limbo as the ALLEGED
Secondary Head Teacher (Head Teacher III) when in truth he was
the Head Teacher of the Practical Arts Department which was later
merged with the Home Economics Department. Sevilla, in his
capacity as Principal IV, requested the Office of the Regional Director,
DECS Region IV, for the upgrading of Gocons position of Guidance
Counselor III to Head Teacher VI for Values Education. DECS denied
the request.
Gocon discovered that Limbo was appointed as Head Teacher VI for
Values Education when he asked about said appointment, Sevilla
explained to Gocon that Limbo was temporarily designated as Head
Teacher for Values Education so that all Head Teacher items would
be reclassified by DECS Regional Office IV. Gocon filed a complaint
and requested the intercession of the then DECS Secretary regarding
the matter. DECS claimed among others, as follows: I strongly deny
the allegation of Mr. Sevilla that I suggested to him to temporarily
designate Mr. Limbos appointment item as Values item I do not
know personally Mr. Sevilla, hence, I have no reason to make such
suggestion to him knowing that such act is a clear falsification of
public documents. And I do not remember having met him. Limbo
acknowledged that he was the one who made alterations in the
request for reclassification. He stressed, however, that he initialed all
the corrections he made to show that he was in good faith in doing so
and that he acted upon the suggestion of Monina Belen, as staff of
Leovigildo Arellano at the DECS Management Division.
In the CSC case, respondents Sevilla and Limbo were formally
charged by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV of
falsification of official documents, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
ISSUE: WON the acts or omissions of petitioner Sevilla
amounted to dishonesty
HELD: No, the omission of petitioner Sevilla was not equilvalent to
dishonesty BUT he is administratively liable for that omission. BASIS:
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and
Employees
RATIO: Dishonesty is intentionally making a false statement in any
material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or
fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or
promotion. Dishonesty was understood to imply a disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity.
It was Limbo who had made the alterations in the letter of petitioner,
who never represented him to anyone as the head teacher of the
Values Education Department.
The records show that the item of Limbo was reclassified from Head
Teacher III (Practical Arts) to Head Teacher VI (Values Education),
without petitioner misrepresenting the former as the one performing
the functions of head teacher of the Values Education Department.
Although Limbo was appointed as Head Teacher VI (Values
Education), after his previous item had been reclassified as such, he
continued performing the functions of head teacher of the Practical
Arts Department. Hence, there was no misrepresentation of him as
the head teacher of Practical Arts (Boys). The above circumstances,
however do not totally absolve petitioner from liability.
The meat of the anguished Complaint of respondent was the
concealment from her and the entire school of Limbos appointment
as Head Teacher VI for Values Education. Ordinarily, no one would
assume the heavy duties and responsibilities of a position without
receiving, or at least expecting to receive in the future, the
corresponding compensation therefor. Good faith demanded that
petitioner should have revealed Limbos appointment to respondent.
It was improper for him to expect her to continue performing the
functions of a values education head teacher, when someone else
had already been appointed to that position and was receiving the
corresponding salary. Thus, he is administratively liable for his
omission which, however, did not amount to dishonesty, as he had
made no false statement. On his part, no deliberate intent to mislead,
deceive or defraud can be read from the circumstances of this case.

As a public school principal, petitioner is bound by a high standard of

work ethic. The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees (RA 6713), enunciates inter alia, the State
policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility
in the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that (p)ublic
officials and employees at all times respect the rights of others, and
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.

By his omissions, petitioner failed to live up to such standard. His

failure to inform respondent of Limbos appointment and to promptly
remedy the resulting prejudice against her may be characterized as
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, since
such conduct affected not only her but also all the other faculty
members of QNHS.

AS TO THE SALARIES:
The conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service is
penalized under Section 22(t) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service
Laws by suspension. The suspension is for six (6) months and one (1)
day to one (1) year for the first offense. HOWEVER, petitioner has
already reached the compulsory age of retirement during the
pendency of this case. He is no longer in the government service.
Thus, it would be more appropriate to impose on him a fine equivalent
to his salary for six (6) months, instead of a suspension. This penalty
is allowed under Section 19 of the same Rules.
Petitioner: JUDGE ERNESTO A REYES (Branch 19, MTC Manila)
Respondent: NORBERTO R. ANOSA (Utility Worker in petitioners
court)
AM No. P-96-1203; FEB 6, 1997
EN BANC
FACTS:
Judge Reyes received a copy of an Information charging
respondent w/ the crime of falsification of public document
[respondent delivered falsified release order to a Gregorio
Sanchez who was under detention at the National Bilibid Prison
(NBP) for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition]
Prior to this, he also failed to deliver envelopes containing
notices and subpoenas to parties and counsels for hearings
scheduled way back 93-95. He admitted this but did not receive
any warning/admonition for failure to do his job.
Also, respondent would report late for work and leave before the
official time.
Judge Reyes issued a Memorandum requiring respondent to
explain in writing why he should not be dismissed from service.
Respondent explained that:
o He is always late cos he brings his child to school
o He doesnt go out of the office at official time; he helps
people asking favors to fix their papers w/o any
compensation.
o He is innocent of the charge against him, and that he
was just asked to deliver release order. He doesnt know
whether judges signature is forged
Judge Reyes recommended the dismissal of respondent Anosa
for grave misconduct, dereliction of duty, conduct unbecoming
a public officer.
After investigation, Judge Ponferrada (MTC Manila)
recommended dismissal of respondent. This was concurred by
Acting court administrator Reynaldo Suarez.
ISSUE: Whether respondent should be dismissed from office? YES.
HELD:
His failure to deliver the notices of hearing and subpoenas to
litigants and witnesses amounts to an utter disregard of the duty
as a court employee.
As a utility worker respondent performs vital work which has a
material bearing on the fast and efficient administration of
justice. The disposition of cases suffered undue delay because
there were no returns on the subpoenas or notices which should
have been mailed by the respondent. As well-observed by the
Investigating Judge, "x x x the life of a case is dependent upon
the effective service of notices, and respondent's failure to
deliver the mail matter as courier of the court somehow resulted
in the delay in the administration of justice." To be sure, the
wheels of justice will not run without the cooperation of the staff
of judges composed of clerks of court, staff assistants, legal
researchers, sheriffs, process servers, court stenographers,
interpreters, bailiffs and, as in this case, court aides or utility
workers.
Thus, for better delivery of judicial services to our people, we
stressed the need for synchronistic action of judges and their
staff in RTC Makati Movement Against Graft and Corruption v.
Dumlao viz:
"Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline.
A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of
honesty and integrity. The administration of justice is a sacred
task. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, all
those involved in it, must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and
invigorate the principle solemnly enshrined in the 1987
Constitution that a public office is a public trust; and all public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency. The conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with the office charged with the dispensation of
justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. x x x".
Equally disappointing is respondent's explanation that he
reports for work but stays downstairs and sometimes helps,
whether for a fee or not, people who need to follow-up papers
in court. Allegedly, he does so to augment his income from the
government which, according to him, is not adequate to support
his family. We have dismissed this excuse in Biyaheros Mart
Livelihood Association, Inc. v. Cabusao, Jr. where we held that
"(g)overnment service demands great sacrifice. One who
 cannot live with the modest salary of a public office has no
business staying in the service. He is free to seek greener
pastures. The public trust character of the office proscribes him
from employing its facilities or using official time for private
business or purposes." Our ruling is aligned with the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees which demands that every public servant shall at all
times uphold public interest over his personal interest.
Anent the charge of falsification, respondent's guilt is yet to be
determined pending the resolution of Criminal Case. Its
pendency, however, is not a hindrance to his dismissal
considering that the other charges are serious and sufficient in
themselves.
Respondent Utility Worker Roberto Anosa is dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits, if any, and with prejudice
to his subsequent employment in any other government
agency.
17 Mendiola v People TTL G
Petitioners: Lorenzo Mendoza
Respondents: People of the Philippines & Sandiganbayan
DOCTRINE: Kinds of Duties
(1) Ministerial: duty is ministerial when it is absolute, certain and
imperative involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from
fixed and designated facts. Where the officer or official body has no
judicial power or discretion as to the interpretation of the law, and
the course to be pursued is fixed by law, their acts are ministerial
only.
(2) Discretionary: Acts which necessarily require the exercise of
reason in the adaptation of means to an end, and discretion in
determining how or whether the act shall be done or the course
pursued. When the law commits to any officer the duty of looking
into facts and acting upon them, not in a way which it specifically
directs, but after a discretion in its nature, the function is
discretionary (e.g. quasi-judicial acts).
Every public officer acting in discharge of his official duties is entitled
to the presumption that such acts are done in good faith\.
So long as the requirements to receive documents (IN THIS CASE:
certificates of partial occupancy) under the law are fullfilled/adhered
to, the public officer has the ministerial duty to issue whatever the
document being requested
*there are other discussions and facts in the case, this is focused on
the topic under the syllabus: Liability of PubOff, Kinds of Duties.
FACTS:
1. 1984: Following the fire that destroyed the Angono Public Market,
the former stallholders including Zenaida Ortillada, Marlon
Rosales, and Ruben Blanco (Mendiolas relatives&friend) were
issued temporary business permits and allowed to construct
temporary market stalls on the grounds of the old market stood. The
area of the old market was known Angono Public Market Phase I
(APM I).
2. 1987: After a change of government, the Angono Municipal the
Angono Municipal Council, headed by Officer-in-Charge Nemesio
Miranda, Sr., (Miranda) enacted Reso No. 7-1987 (Reso 1).
Content:
a. authorized the construction of Angono Public Market Phase
II (APM II) on a vacant lot adjacent to APM I.
b. FINANCING: a contract was entered between
(1) a building contractor (b)
(2) a Construction Committee representing the stall awardees
of APM II
(3) Miranda signing on behalf of the Municipality of Angono,
c. Each awardee would pay the contractor P20k for APM IIs
construction
d. Sum paid was to be considered as advance stall rentals to the
Municipality for 20yrs.
e. The Municipality shall own the market building upon turnover
at completion by contractor.
f. Notably, no public bidding for the construction was
contemplated or provided for.
3. Lorenzo Mendiola was then Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator, Civil Registrar, and was concurrently Acting
Building Official of Angono. On 12 March 1987, he issued the
Municipality a Building Permit relating to the construction of APM II.
At the time of issuance of the permit, he noted on APM IIs
construction blue-print, He encircled the points to be corrected to
eliminate the encroachment. But of course, the market stalls
encroached upon were that of Mendiolas relatives&friend
4. Aside from this, other conflicts arose:
a. APM I stallholders demanded preference in the award or
occupancy of stalls in APM II.
b. APM I stallholders, acting under the name of, "Samahang
Nagkakaisa sa Pamilihang Bayan ng Angono" ("Samahan")
brought suit against Miranda, the contractor and, APM II
awardees, for a writ of preliminary injunction to stop the
construction of the new building (this was denied).
5. For some unstated reason, Mendiolas objection and change to the
blue print was never changed and so in June, 1987, Miranda
enacted Reso No. 42-1987 (Reso 2), cancelling Mendiolas
relatives&friends stallholders permits. Miranda then ordered the
contractor to demolish the their stalls.
6. The Feb 1988 local elections yielded another change in the Angono
government. The newly elected Municipal Council promptly
assailed the legality of Reso 1. The Rizal Provincial Board (Board)
enacted Reso No. 88-71 (Reso 3) directing the new Municipal
Council to hold Reso 1s implementation in abeyance, pending
review of that Resolution, and "until further notice by the Board."
7. Under the authority4 of Reso 2, and without prior hearing or a court
order and without a demolition permit, APM IIs contractor, with the
aid of the military, demolished Mendiolas relatives&friends market
stalls.
8. Mendiolas relatives&friends applied for authority to renovate their
demolished market stalls, to which Mendiola issued temporary
renovation building, subject to the condition that should the courts
or proper higher authority stop the them from renovating or
reconstructing, the permits would become ineffective.
9. After the demolition of the Phase I stalls the APM II contractor went
on with the contested construction. May 1988, the building
contractor requested the District Engineer of Rizal to inspect the
new building and to issue certificates of partial occupancy.
Mendiola was directed to issue the said certificates to APM II
stall awardees. The certificates were to be issued under the
National Building Codes IRR, which provides that the certificates
maybe withheld if there are valid grounds for witholding, provided
that In the event that there are still additional documents needed,
the parties concerned should be informed so they can submit them.
10. Mendiola did not immediately issue the certificates, and instead
wrote to the APM II awardees informing them of their incomplete
submission and that there were 5 requirements, still to be complied
with, for issuance of the certificates.
11. Mendiola also wrote to Regional Director Lagunilla that non-
issuance of the certificates of partial occupancy was grounded on:
a. AMP IIs contractor illegally demolishing market stalls, being
done without any demolition order from the courts or the
administrative authorities;
b. the pendency of suits and counter-suits before the courts
regarding the construction of APM II; and
c. refusal of the incumbent municipal officials to accept partial
turnover, which turnover was said to run counter to the terms
of Reso 1
12. RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the contractor
and APM II awardees from continuing with the construction of the
new building and directing to maintain the status quo until the
legality of Reso 1 was reviewed by the Provincial Board of Rizal.
4 The demolition was not expressly mentioned. Remember that Miranda in a separate written order, ordered the
demolition of the stalls.
5 Sec 3(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified
for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or a mere representative or dummy of one
who is not so qualified or entitled."
13. The Phase II awardees took two (2) courses of action: first, they
applied for a certificate of partial occupancy with the Municipal
Council, which was denied. The second recourse was to institute
an administrative charge against Mendiola and to appeal to the
Secretary of Public Works and Highways.
14. the Secretary, DPWH, upheld the contractor and Phase II
awardeess position and directed Mendiola to issue "the partial
occupancy certificate of the completed portion or Market Phase II,
after their application has been processed and the fees paid
therefor."
15. September 1988, the Angono Municipal Council adopted another
resolution warning the Phase II awardees from opening or doing
business at their stalls in the Phase II building,
16. Mendiola wrote the Secretary of DPWH stating his reasons for
refusing to issue the certificates:
a. No bldg. inspection sheet duly signed & accomplished by the
contractor;
b. Fire safety inspection certificate issued without electrical
permit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
c. CEI [Certificate of Electrical Inspection] not for the electrical
permit of the completed portion of the building;
d. Electrical permit & sanitary, permit not yet issued by our office
due to questionable layout or plan,"
17. The Sandiganbayan convicted Mendiola, on two separate charges,
of violating provisions5 of RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corruption
Practices Act. Charges:
a. issued building permits for market stalls in favor of his
relatives, who are allegedly not legally entitled to receive
permits
b. refused to issue certificates of partial occupancy to
awardees of market stalls in APM II
18. OSG: The first charge should be dismissed and Mendiolas
conviction thereof reversed and be acquitted. The renovation
permits where issued in good faith, only under a mistake of
judgment.
Sec 3(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions." (Emphasis
supplied)
ISSUE: Did Mendiola violate his ministerial duty to issue partial
occupancy certificates when he refused to do so? NO. He had
reasonable basis for refusing.
HELD:
First charge: Mendiola acted in good faith in refusing to issue
certificates.
Factors tending to show good faith:
a. The renovation permits issued to Mendiolas relatives&friends were
temporary and were qualified by see fact #1.
b. Mendiolas relatives&friends were long-time stallholders, having
been so before the destruction of the old Angono Public Market,
hence, not strangers to APM I.
c. Mendiolas relatives&friend had outstanding and paid-up municipal
business permits when Mendiola issued them the permits.
d. Mendiolas relatives&friends temporary stalls had been demolished
without prior hearing or a court order, or a demolition order from the
authorized building official which was petitioner Mendiola himself.
Thus, whether Mendiolas relatives&friends were legally entitled to
the temporary renovation permits presented a substantial question of
law and it is well to recall that mistake on a doubtful or difficult
question of law may be the basis of good faith.
There are other factors, environmental in nature, tending to show
good faith on Mendiolas part, which relate to Reso 1.
a. Reso 1s validity was being litigated before the courts. The records
shows that there were at least 3 cases involving Reso 1s validity or
enforceability.
b. Sec DPWHs decision was not really final since the applicable
statute itself provided for an appeal by way a petition for review
before the Office of the President. Mendiola filed not only a MR with
the Secretary but also a petition for review with the Office of the
President.
c. Among others not really relavant to topic.
Contrary to the OSGs submission: all the above factors support the
claim of good faith in respect of both the first and second charges
against Mendiola.
The question of validity and enforceability of Reso 1 was all pervasive
and inevitably affected both the entitlement of the three (3) Phase I
stallholders to the temporary renovation permits issued by petitioner
Mendiola and the entitlement of the contractor and Phase II awardees
to a certificate of partial occupancy of the admittedly incomplete new
building. The facts or events surrounding the first charge are so
intertwined.
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, requires proof of
"manifest partiality" or "evident bad faith or "gross inexcusable
negligence."
The information for violation of Section 3(e) alleged only "evident bad
faith." In the totality of the circumstances of this case, the prosecution
failed to show beyond reasonable doubt the presence of any of these
3 elements.
Indeed, it appears that the prosecution failed to overcome the
presumption of good faith to which every public official, acting in
discharge of his official duties, is entitled.
Mendiola, caught between 2 contending groups was constantly trying
to specify in writing the reasons for his acts. While one need not agree
with all his acts or stated reasons therefore or the wisdom thereof,
one cannot say that they were so obviously and palpably sham
justifications for merely arbitrary and capricious acts as to warrant a
finding of "evident bad faith."
No one has claimed that he received any money for issuing the
renovation permits or refraining from issuing the demanded
certificate(s) of partial occupancy.
There is also substantial doubt whether the element of "undue injury
to any party" required in Section 3(e) was adequately shown by the
prosecution. The Sandiganbayan apparently overlooked the
circumstance that the Phase II awardees had in fact entered and
occupied their respective stalls in the new building, without waiting for
the certificate(s) of partial occupancy which they demanded from
Mendiola and without paying heed to Reso 1 of the new Municipal
Council warning them not to open up their stalls in the still incomplete
new building.
The record strongly suggests that Mendiola had the misfortune of
getting caught in the middle of a heated controversy between two (2)
local interest groups and between the outgoing OIC municipal officials
and the incoming newly elected set of municipal officials. In the
course of requiring complete compliance with all formal and
documentary requirements for issuance of a certificate of occupancy
or partial occupancy, he was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019
as amended, doubtless at the behest of the Phase II awardees, the
contractor and the old or OIC set of municipal officials.

Had he in fact issued the demanded certificate(s) of partial

occupancy, he in all probability would have been charged criminally
by the Samahan of Phase I stallholders and the newly elected
municipal officials, probably under the same statutory provisions.

Under these circumstances, the filing of the two (2) criminal

informations appears quite unfortunate. MENDIOLA ACQUITTED.
 [LOPEZ] A.M. No. R-494-P September 17, 1987
HON. VICENTE P. SIBULO, complainant, vs. ERNESTO RAMIREZ,
respondent
Topic: Liabilities of Public Officers: Kinds of Duties
Facts:
1. Deputy Provincial Sheriff Ramirez was required by the court to
make a return within 10 days from receipt of the Order of the
writ of execution issued on Oct. 15, 1981. Such was received
by March 9, 1982. More than one year has elapsed and
Ramirez still failed to return.
2. Upon motion of Hon. Sibulo (judge of such court) on Mar. 18,
1983, the court issued an order directing said Ramirez to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt for
ignoring the Order of the court.
3. Inspite of these Orders, Ramirez still failed to comply with it,
prompting Hon. Sibulo to move for the court to require
Ramirez to comply.
4. On Aug. 4, 1983, Ramirez filed an Officers Return of Service
making it appear that the return was made as of Mar. 29,
1983.
5. Because of Ramirez acts, Hon. Sibulo referred the matter to
the RTC for appropriate action. Ramirez was then required to
submit his explanation, but instead, asked for an extension for
time, which was granted. However, upon lapse of the
extension, he still did not file his explanation.
6. In a final effort to make Ramirez defend himself, the Executive
Judge Reyes directed Ramirez to file his explanation on or
before Oct. 21, 1983, or else the case will be recommended to
the SC for disciplinary action. Ramirez still failed to comply.
7. Hence, Hon. Sibulo initiated a complaint against his sheriff
Ramirez for acts which directly or indirectly impede or obstruct
the administration of justice.
Issue: W/N Ramirez should be punished for his acts
Held: Yes. There is ample evidence of Ramirez unpardonable
conduct as an officer of the court.
1. Not only did Ramirez fail to make a return of the writ of
execution within the period specified, he did not make the
return for more than one year, despite court orders. As an
officer of the court, a sheriff has a duty to serve and make
a return of a writ of execution to the clerk or judge of the
court issuing it, at any time not less than 10 days, nor
more than 60 days after its receipt by the officer (Rules of
Court).
2. Ramirez also persistently left unheeded the several orders of
the Court directing him to comply with the order requiring him
tomake a return of the writ. Worse, Ramirez, when he decided
to comply with his duty, falsified the Return of Service, stating
that the return was made on Mar. 29, 1983.
3. Ramirez also defied at least two orders of the Executive Judge
for explanation of his acts and why he should not be
administratively liable.
4. [DOCTRINE]There is no reasonable doubt that the actuations
of Ramirez constitute disrespect and disregard of the courts
authority. He ignored the fact that as an officer of the court,
he is charged with certain official duties which must be
performed honestly and faithfully.
5. Ramirez, as an officer of the court, was subject to the Civil
Service Law. His acts could easily fall under the following
grounds for disciplinary action:
a. For Dishonesty
b. For Misconduct
c. For being notoriously undesirable
d. For inefficiency and incompetence in the performance
of official duties
e. For Falsification of official document
f. For conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service
6. Smith Bell & Co. vs. Saur: Sheriff who failed to return writ of
execution was guilty of malicious non-feasance in office; also
for causing unwarranted delat in proceedings and
consequently has contributed to the impairment of public
confidence in the judiciary.
7. Clearly, acts of Ramirez disturb the ethics of public life and
vititate the integrity of the court personnel and the court itself.
WHEREFORE, Ramirez is guilty of serious isconduct in the
performance of his officialduties, and orders his dismissal, with
prejudice to re-employment in any government position. Benefits are
also forfeited.
19) LUIS A. TABUENA, Petitioner, VS. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 103501-03, February 17, 1997
ADOLFO M. PERALTA, Petitioner, VS. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIRST DIVISION), AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
G.R. No. 103507. February 17, 1997
Francisco, J.
TOPIC: Liability of public officers - Kinds of duties
DOCTRINES:
(1) Where the payment of public funds has been made in good faith,
and there is reasonable ground to believe that the public officer to
whom the fund had been paid was entitled thereto, he is deemed to
have acted in good faith, there is no criminal intent, and the
payment, if it turns out that it is unauthorized, renders him only civilly
but not criminally liable.
(2) A recipient of directive coming from the highest official of the land,
complying in good faith, is entitled to the justifying circumstance of
Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior
for some lawful purpose.
FACTS:
Luis A. Tabuena and Adolfo M. Peralta, the General Manager and
the Acting Finance Services Manager, respectively, of MIAA, were
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of malversation under Article 217
of RPC, having malversed the total amount of 55M of MIAA funds
during their incumbency. Tabuena and Peralta filed petitions for
review separately.
Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay
directly to the presidents office and in cash what the MIAA owes
the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which
Tabuena replied, Yes, sir, I will do it.
About a week later, Tabuena received from Gimenez, then private
secretary of Marcos, a Presidential Memorandum (Marcos
Memorandum) directing Tabuena to pay the immediately the
PNCC, through the Office of the President, the sum of 55M in cash
as partial payment of MIAA.
In obedience to President Marcos verbal instruction and
memorandum, Tabuena caused the release of P55M of MIAA funds
by means of three (3) withdrawals. It was only upon delivery of the
P5 Million that Private Secretary Gimenez issued a receipt for all
the amounts she received from Tabuena.
The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as described by Tabuena
and Peralta themselves, out of the ordinary and not based on the
normal procedure. Not only were there no vouchers prepared to
support the disbursement, the P55 Million was paid in cold cash.
Also, no PNCC receipt for the P55 Million was presented.
Prosecution argued that there were no outstanding obligations in
favor of PNCC at the time of the disbursement of the P55M.
The defense of Tabuena and Peralta was that they acted in
good faith.
o Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying with the
MARCOS Memorandum which ordered him to forward
immediately to the Office of the President P55M in cash as
partial payment of MIAAs obligations to PNCC, and that he
(Tabuena) was of the belief that MIAA indeed had liabilities
to PNCC.
o Peralta for his part shared the same belief and so he heeded
the request of Tabuena, his superior, for him (Peralta) to help
in the release of P5M.
Sandiganbayan rejected their claim of good faith, which ultimately
led to their conviction. Hence, these petitions for review.
ISSUE: Whether Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a
public officer from the crime of malversation. -YES
HELD:
Yes, it is settled that good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for
malversation for it would negate criminal intent on the part of the
accused. This is in line with the maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing
the act complained of is innocent. Tabuena and Peralta meritoriously
showed that they acted in good faith and had no intention to convert.
With the due presentation in evidence of the MARCOS Memorandum,
the Court is swayed to give credit to his claim of having caused the
disbursement of the P55 Million solely by reason of such memorandum.
Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was
what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be
faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidential
directive. Marcos was undeniably Tabuenas superior the former
being then the President of the Republic who exercised control over
government agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC. Tabuena
therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of Any person
who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some
lawful purpose.
obligations. The manner the appellant effected the withdrawal was most
unusual, irregular, and anomalous.
Justice Panganiban - The defense of obedience to superiors order is
already obsolete. Nazi war criminals tried to justify their crimes against
humanity by alleging they were merely following the orders of Adolf
Hitler. Certainly, a moral choice was available to Tabuena & Peralta.
They could have opted to defy the illegal order, with no risk of court
martial or death, or they could have resigned.

However, Tabuena though acting in good faith, should still be
administratively or civilly liable (NOT CRIMINALLY). The
disbursements were made out of the ordinary and not based on
normal procedures. This deviation was inevitable under the
circumstances that Tabuena was in. He did not have the luxury of time
to observe all auditing procedures considering the fact that the
Memorandum called for his immediate compliance. Be that as it may,
Tabuena surely cannot escape responsibility for such omission.
Justice Puno - The order for immediate compliance, even if made by
the former President, cannot be interpreted as a green signal by a
subordinate official to disregard our laws. The country was no longer
under martial rule in 1986 and petitioners were under no compulsion to
violate our laws. Tabuena did not request for additional time to comply
with the rules if they felt in good faith that they needed more time. They
blindly obeyed the Marcos Memorandum despite its fatal and facial
flaws.

Moreover, the good faith of Tabuena in having delivered the money in

strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum was not at all
affected even if it later turned out that PNCC never received the money.
There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do with the execution
of the Memorandum. No conspiracy was established between Tabuena
and the real embezzler/s.

In the case at bench, the order emanated from the Office of the
President and bears the signature of the President himself. It carries
with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the
memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an
obligation illegal.

WHEREFORE, petitioners Tabuena and Peralta are ACQUITTED.

Sandiganbayan decision REVERSED.

DISSENTING OPINIONS:

Justice Davide - Not an iota of good faith was shown in the conduct of
the accused. Being responsible accountable officers of MIAA, they
were presumed to know actual unpaid balance (not P55M, only
P34.5M) and the procedure to be followed in the payment of contractual
CASE TITLE: JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO
DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES,
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE
PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS
FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR.,
respondent.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-
ARROYO, respondent.
G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001
FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the
Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit Singson, a
close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally
given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank
account known as Jose Velarde a grassroots-based
numbers game.
Singsons allegation also caused controversy across the nation,
which culminated in the House of Representatives filing of an
impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000.
House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment
complaint.
The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an
impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, Jr. as presiding officer.
Estrada, pleaded not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January
18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students
from private schools and left-wing organizations.
Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
associations joined in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada
and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time
since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not
resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to
continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from
office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a
snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added
that he will not run in this election.
On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of
presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively
resigned his post.
Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath
of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the
14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had strong and
serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as president, but saying he would give up his
office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation.
Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving the palace,
which he countered by filing a petition for prohibition with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
o It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from
conducting any further proceedings in cases filed
against him not until his term as president ends.
o He also prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be
the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of
the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have
taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1.) WON the case at bar a political or justiciable issue.
JUSTICIABLE.
2.) If justiciable, WON Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he
truly resign. TRULY RESIGNED.
3.) WON petitioner may invoke immunity from suits. NO.
4.) WON the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to
prejudicial publicity. NO.
HELD:
1. The Court defines a political issue as those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
 sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure.
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency
and the Arroyo presidency. Legal distinction between EDSA
People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I EDSA II
exercise of the people power of exercise of people power of
revolution which overthrew the freedom of speech and freedom
whole government. of assembly to petition the
government for redress of
grievances which only affected
the office of the President.
extra constitutional and the intra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new resignation of the sitting
government that resulted from it President that it caused and the
cannot be the subject of judicial succession of the Vice President
review as President are subject to
judicial review.
presented a political question; involves legal questions.
The Court said that while the Aquino government was a
government spawned by the direct demand of the people in
defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old
government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand
was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution,
wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the
former, it The question of whether the previous president
(president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review.
The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.
2. For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must
be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of
events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace.
Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara
diaries, detailed Estradas implied resignation on top of all
these, the press release he issued regarding is
acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president
despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on
leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court
held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of
the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the
issue.
3. As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he is immuned
from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to
absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a
public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting
President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged
criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the
deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity
of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the
term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not
his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another).
4. Regarding the last issue on whether the prosecution of Estrada
should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity, SC held in the
negative. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the
free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system does
not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally
enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere
publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present
enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has
influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to
perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada
were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity
of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge
and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice
and less with prosecution.
DISPOSITIVE:
Epilogue
A word of caution to the hooting throng. The cases against the petitioner
will now acquire a different dimension and then move to a new stage -
- - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority
for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of
the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the
respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute
the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial
which has been categorized as the most fundamental of all
freedoms.[135] To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice
and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He
has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls the impatient
vehemence of the majority. Rights in a democracy are not decided by
the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor
are rights necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a
democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be
the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best
form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the
minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of
multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to
mans progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not throw away that
key just to pander to some peoples prejudice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada

challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure
14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.