Macias v. Comelec (G.R.

L-18684, September 14, 1961)

FACTS

Macias and friends are members of the House of Representatives hailing respectively from Negros Oriental, Misamis
Oriental, and Bulacan. They bring this action in behalf of themselves and of other residents of their provinces alleging
that their provinces had been discriminated against RA 3040 because they were given less representative districts
than the number of their inhabitants required or justified. Also because when the said bill which became a law was
passed without printed final copies of the bill having been furnished at least 3 calendar days prior to the passage.

On the other hand Vicente Galla alleges that the petitioners have no personality to sue, that a duly certified copy of
the law creates the presumption of its having been passed in accordance with requirements of the Constitution, and
that RA 3040 complies with the principle of proportional representation as prescribed by the Constitution.

ISSUE

1. WON the apportionment law (RA 3040) is unconstitutional

HELD

1. Yes, RA 3040 is unconstitutional.

The Constitution directs that the 120 members of the House of Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants. RA 3040
violated this provision because: a) it gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of
inhabitants got only 4, b) it gave Manila 4 members while Cotabato with a bigger population got only 3, c)
Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato got more than both 5 members having
been assigned to it, d) Samar allotted with 4 members while Davao got three only.

Needless to say, equality of representation in the legislature being such an essential feature of republican
institutions and affecting so many lives, the judiciary may not with a clear conscience stand by to give free
hand to the discretion of the political departments of the Government. Cases are numerous wherein courts
intervened upon proof of violation of the constitutional principle of equality of representation.

Apportionment shall be made in accordance with the number of respective inhabitants on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio. But: (1)each city with not less than 250,000 inhabitants shall be entitled to at
 least one representative; and (2) each province, irrespective number of inhabitants, is entitles to at least one
representative.-[Article 6, Section 5 par. 1]

BANAT v. COMELEC

FACTS

May, 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15 million votes
cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. COMELEC sitting as National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
promulgated NBC resolution No. 07-60. Under the said resolution it proclaimed 13 parties as winners in the party-list
elections, namely: BUHAY, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela, AKBAYAN, BUTIL, Cooperative-Natco Network Party,
ANAKPAWIS, ARC, and Abono.

In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from
party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total
votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats
this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs
COMELEC.

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if it garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the
party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned
the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA
7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the
votes cast in the party-list election is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical
impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%
qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in
the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation.

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a
of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling
2. WON the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat is valid
3. WON the 3-seat limit rule is valid

HELD:

The petitions have partial merit. SC maintains that a PH style party-list election has at least 4 inviolable parameters
as clearly stated in Veterans case:

-20% allocation: combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the
House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list

-2% threshold: only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list
system are qualified to have a seat in House of Representatives

-3-seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of 3
seats; that is, one qualifying and 2 additional seats

-proportional representation: additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to
their total number of votes.

1. No, the 20% allocation for party list representatives is merely a ceiling- meaning, the number of party list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of members of lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
2. No, Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. SC rules that, in computing the allocation of additional
seats, the continued operation of the 2% threshold for the distribution of additional seats as found in the 2nd
clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. SC finds that the 2% threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of
available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the 2% threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

SC therefore strikes down the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found in
the 2nd clause of Section 11(b) of RA 7941. The 2% threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article 6 of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.

Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a
seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat. But how is
the seat determined?

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing
for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists
which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The
total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for
party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for
party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats.

The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, of the seats
allocated to a party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may
be provided by law, except the religious sector.-[Article 6, Section 5, par. 2]
Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC (G.R. 203766, April 2, 2013)

FACTS

54 Partylist groups and organizations filed petition to the Supreme Court to reverse various resolutions by Comelec
disqualifying them from participating in the May 2013 partylist race. Most, if not all, of these partylist groups or
organization were disqualified because they have not satisfied the requirement which is to represent the marginalized
or underrepresented sector. Also, nominees of some of the partylist groups do not come from marginalized and
underrepresented sector or some of the groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in
Congress.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in disqualifying petitioners from participating in May 2013 elections

HELD:

1. No, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for party-list system of representation. Party-list system is intended
to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a
chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly rejected the proposal
to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly intended the party-list
system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties as provided in Article 6, Section 5 of 1987
Constitution:
.those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

The provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons: First, the other of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the marginalized and underrepresented; Second, reservation
of of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first three consecutive terms after the
ratification of the Constitution, clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three
congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type
of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting party-list system.

As to the marginalized and underrepresented rule, it should only refer to the sectors in Section 5 that are
by their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented. These sectors are: labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and
other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented. The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector,
or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector does not mean one must wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity. It is sufficient
that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically marginalized
and underrepresented are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical
Coordination Board.

Going back to the issue at hand, COMELEC therefore cannot be faulted for following the prevailing
jurisprudence in disqualifying the petitioners. SC remanded the petitions to COMELEC with new parameters
which through these petitioners may now qualify to participate as set forth below:

Three different groups may participate in party-list system: 1) national parties or organizations,
2) regional parties or organizations, 3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sector.
 Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or
lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized
and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-
defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that represent marginalized
and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees
of sectoral parties or organizations that represent marginalized and underrepresented or that
represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies either must belong for their
respective sectors, or must have a track record for advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of
such parties or organizations.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.

SEMA v. COMELEC (G.R.177597, July 16, 2008)

FACTS

ARMMs legislature, ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create province under Section 19, Article 6 of
RA 9054 enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201 creating Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of 8
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. Later, 3 new municipalities were carved out of the the original 9
municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities
constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not
part of Province of Maguindanao.

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite and because of this Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution 3999 requesting COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in
view of the conversion of the first District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201. In answer,
COMELEC issued Resolution 7-0407 maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in
the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.

However, in preparation for the May 2007 elections, COMELEC promulgated Resolution 7845 stating that
Maguindanaos first legislative district composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.
Then COMELEC issued Resolution 7902 subject of these petitions, amending Resolution 07-0407 by renaming the
legislative district in question as Sharriff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.

Sema who was a candidate in May 2007 elections for Representative of Sharriff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City
prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of votes cast in
Cotabato City for that office alleging that Sharriff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under
Article 6, Section 5 par. 3 of the Constitution. Thus, Sema asserted that Comelec acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district
despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of
Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district. Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution 7902,
COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts.

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the
legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.

ISSUE:

1. WON Section 19, Article 6 of RA 9054 delegating to ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional

HELD:

1. RA 9054 is unconstitutional.
The creation of local government unit is governed by Article 10, Sec.10 of 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.

There is no express prohibition nor grant of authority in Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or
local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, Congress can delegate to local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided
no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards,
and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction subject to compliance
with the criteria established in Local Government Code and plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article 10
of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only an act of Congress can create
provinces, cities or municipalities.

Article 6, Section 5 par.3 provides, Each city with a population of at least 250,000 or each province shall
have at least one representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least 1 Member..

Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article
VI of theConstitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same
reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus,
the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to
create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the
power to create a legislative district because once the city's population reaches 250,000, the city
automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city
inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
Marcos v. Comelec

FACTS

Imelda Marcos filed her COC for the position of Representative of First District of Leyte, the point in issue of
which is the information she placed in the item providing for residence in the constituency she seeks to be
elected which then prompted Montejo, days after, to file a petition for cancellation and disqualification with
COMELEC alleging that Marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency further alleging that
Mrs. Marcos lacked Constitutions 1 year residency requirement for candidates to House of Representatives on
the evidence of declarations made by her.

After that, Marcos then filed an amended/corrected COC changing the entry 7 months to since childhood in the
residency item stating that it was only a result of an honest misinterpretation however was denied as it was
already filed out of time with the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte. Therefore, Marcos filed the
Amended/Corrected COC with the COMELECs Head Office with the same allegation and saying that she has
always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence however it was also denied declaring her not
qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Leyte.

Hence this petition.

 ISSUE: WON Marcos was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of 1 year at
the time of May 8, 1995 elections

HELD:

The majority of the Supreme Court (eight judges in favor, four against) held that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was a
resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence
qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court held that the term
residence in the context of qualifying for certain elected positions is synonymous with the term domicile. Domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which one intends to return after an absence. A person can only have a
single domicile, although they can abandon one domicile in favor of another. To successfully change domicile, one
must demonstrate three (3) requirements:

1. an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
3. and one must act in accordance with that intent.

Only with clear and positive evidence that all three requirements have been met will the residence of origin be
lost, otherwise residency will be deemed to continue.

The Court held that the meaning of residence in Article 110 of the Civil Code, which states that the husband
shall fix the residence of the family, is different therefore to the meaning of residence in the Constitution. The
term residence may have one meaning in civil law (as under the Civil Code) and Constitution. Residency is
satisfied under the Civil Code if a person establishes that they intend to leave a place when the purpose for
which they have taken up their abode ends. The purpose of residency might be for pleasure, business, or health
and a person may have different residences in various places. However, residency in the Constitution as
opposed to the Civil Code means domicile and therefore the key issue is to determine the domicile of the
petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos. The Court held that Article 110 does not create a presumption that a wife
automatically gains a husbands domicile upon marriage. When the petitioner was married to then Congressman
Marcos in 1954, she was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husbands actual place of
residence as fixed by him. The right of the husband to fix the residence was in harmony with the intention of the
law to strengthen and unify the family. It recognised the fact that the husband and wife bring into the marriage
different domiciles and if the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may live together. However, the term residence in Article 110 of the
Civil Code does not mean domicile and therefore it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile as
a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The Court also held that it would be
illogical for the Court to assume that a wife cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband, if
she has not positively selected a new one during the subsistence of the marriage itself.

The Court held that the new Family Code, which was introduced to replace the Civil Code, confirmed the
petitioners argument that marriage does not automatically change a wifes domicile to that of her husband. The
Family Code replaced the term residence (used in the Civil Code) with the term domicile. Article 69 of the
Family Code gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family domicile. The provision recognised
revolutionary changes in the concept of womens rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile
a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. The provision recognised the right of women to choose
their own domicile and removed the automatic transfer of a husbands domicile to his wife.
AQUINO v. COMELEC

FACTS
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his
certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor.
Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should
be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.

Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of
candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition
on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto
Syjuco with 35,910 votes.

Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an
order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the
Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional
qualification of residence.

Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

ISSUE:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant the
disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of
the COC)in the district he was running in.

HELD:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the
previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.
 Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the
place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.

What is the Committees concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual
residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word residence to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which
the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.

The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election
law requirements, this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters
those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period
of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelecs contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of
choice and not just residence.

The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the
district in which he seeks election to .
Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and
a registered voter of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth
certificate indicated that Conception as his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of
the same district. Thus his domicile of origin (obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in
Conception, Tarlac.

Aquinos connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium
unit in the area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a
condominium unit instead of buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the
fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole
purpose in transferring his physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as
a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City.

Aquinos assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in
the district.
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board

FACTS
A law was passed RA 9165 otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 requiring mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses among other
personalities.

Then in accordance to the said law, COMELEC issued Resolution 6486, prescribing rules and regulations on the
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with May 10, 2004 synchronized national and
local elections.

Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in
addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 6486.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate
for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via
RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test,
create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there
is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution 6486 are constitutional.

HELD: No. Pimentels contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law
or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In
the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience
to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

The provision [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test is not tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications
on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a
citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Liban v. Gordon

FACTS
Liban and friends field with the Court a petition to declare Richard Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the senate
being a chairman of PNRC. It was said that during Gordons incumbency as member of the Senate he was elected
as Chairman of PNRC and according to Liban that by accepting the chairmanship of PNRC, Gordon therefore ceases
to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution:

SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment
in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term
for which he was elected

Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate.

In Gordons reply, he asserts that Liban and friends have no standing to file the petition which appears to be a quo
warranto and according to the Rules of Civil Procedure, only a person claiming to be entitled to a public office
usurped or unlawfully held by another may bring an action for quo warranto in his own name. Gordon further alleges
that PNRC is not a GOCC and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article 6 of 1987 Constitution does not apply in
the case since volunteer service to PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.

ISSUE:
1. WON PNRC is a GOCC that which the chairmanship of Gordon constitutes a violation on the prohibition
under Section 13, Article 6 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
HELD:

Petition is without merit.

PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective,
and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race,
religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The PNRC provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster
Management, Safety Services, Community Health and Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.

Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary organization
for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929.

The PNRC is not organized for profit. It is an organization dedicated to assist victims of war and administer relief to
those who have been devastated by calamities, among others. It is entirely devoted to public service. It is not
covered by the prohibition since the Constitution aims to eliminate abuse by the Congress, which tend to favor
personal gain. Secondly, the PNRC was created in order to participate in the mitigation of the effects of war, as
embodied in the Geneva Convention. The creation of the PNRC is compliance with international treaty obligations.
Lastly, the PNRC is a National Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is not like government instrumentalities and
GOCC. The PNRC is regulated directly by international humanitarian law, as opposed to local law regulating the
other mentioned entities.
Arroyo v. De Venecia

FACTS
This is a case about a petition initiated to challenge the validity of RA 8240 amending certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. The
said law originated in the House of Representatives. The bill was approved on the 3rd reading and transmitted to the
Senate which approved with it certain amendments then a bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill which during the said conference
Representative Sarmiento was about to interpellate when Rep. Arroyo interrupted and moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. A roll call was done which declared the presence of a quorum then when Rep. Arroyo registered to
interpellate he announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum but he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by House of
Representatives and by the Senate. Enrolled bill was then signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos. Because of
the alleged irregularities upon passing the bill. Arroyo and friends filed a petition stating that RA 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of rules of the House that these rules embody the constitutional mandate in Article
6, Section 16 (3) that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings and that, consequently, violation of the
House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the
law was properly passed is false and spurious.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House?

HELD:

After considering the arguments of parties, Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed grave abuse
of discretion in enacting RA 8240. Case is dismissed.
First, it is clear from the facts that what is alleged to have been violated in enactment of RA 8240 are merely internal
rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law. Mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a deliberative body when the requisite numbers
of members have agreed to particular measure.

SC concludes the case by quoting Chief Justice Fernando commenting on the power of each of house of Congress
to determine its rules of proceedings:

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with the observance of said rules. House may waive it or disregard it.
In this case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress
in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown.

Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which others
may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the
working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an
inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our
power.
OSMENA v. PENDATUN

FACTS
Congressman Osmena, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of
bribery against the President Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution 59 was passed by the
lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmena during his speech and that if his allegations were
found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.

Osmena then questioned the validity of the Resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmena avers that the resolution
violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress.
ISSUE: WON Osmenas parliamentary immunity has been violated

HELD:
No, his parliamentary immunity has not been violated.
Section 15, Article 6 of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, Senators or members
of the House of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place. Our Constitution enshrines
parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic
world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his
words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For unparliamentary
conduct, members of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, suspended or even expelled
by the votes of their colleagues.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which
Osmea may be disciplined, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however, that the
House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred
jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows
best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. The theory
of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere.
Each department, it has been said, has exclusively cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within
its own sphere.

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS
The instant case arose when Santiago approved the applications for legalization of the stay of certain aliens who
arrived in Philippines knowing fully that said aliens are disqualified and because of these complaints are filed against
her by the employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation for allegedly violating RA 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Two other more cases were filed against her.

Pursuant to these information filed in Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of
Santiago. Santiago however posted cash bail without need for physical appearance as she was still sustaining
injuries from a vehicular accident which the Sandiganbayan approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the
Sandiganbayan for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the
Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan can order the suspension of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution

HELD:
Yes, Sandiganbayan has the authority to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with
violation of provisions in Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Section 13 of the said statute states:

Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or for
any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex
offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office.

In issuing the preventive suspension of Santiago, Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal
mandate of the law, as well as jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

he suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct
from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of
the Senate.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a
senator?

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the
office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that
the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and
not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before
trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence
of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court
could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that
he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a
specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that
the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal procedure.
Codilla v. De Venecia

FACTS
Codilla and Locsin were candidates for the position of Representative of 4th legislative district of Leyte
during the May 2001 elections. At that time, Codilla was the Mayor of Ormoc while Locsin was the sitting
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Later on however, one Josephine De la Cruz filed directly with
COMELEC a petition for disqualification case against Codilla alleging that Codilla is indirectly soliciting votes from the
registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte in violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and was
also alleged that Codilla used the equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul
and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob Leyte for the purpose of inducing,
influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

Hence, COMELEC 2nd Division issued an order delegating the hearing and reception of evidence on the
disqualification case which a telegram was sent to Codilla informing him about the disqualification case filed against.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codillas name remained
in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was
found guilty and ordered disqualified.

Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and
subsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also
sought the annulment of Locsins proclamation.

In defense, Locsin alleged that: 1)Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of her
proclamation and that any question on the election, returns, and qualification of Locsin can only be taken cognizance
of by the House or Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 2)the case should be filed and heard in the first instance by a
Division of the Commission and not directly by the Commission en banc, and 3) the proclamation of Locsin was valid
because she received the highest number of valid votes cast considering the votes of Codilla being stray.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the proclamation of Locsin by COMELEC 2nd Division is valid
2. Whether the proclamation divested COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity

HELD:
1. No, the proclamation is invalid under the following reasons:
The respondents proclamation was premature given that the case against petitioner had not yet been
disposed of with finality. In fact, it was subsequently found that the disqualification of the petitioner was null
and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Furthermore,
respondent, as second placer, could not take the seat in office since he did not represent the electorates
choice.

2. No, COMELEC has jurisdiction over the case.

The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the COMELEC en banc is of no
moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en banc could still rule on the nullity of respondent's
proclamation because it was properly raised in the Motion for Reconsideration.

Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for
reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division, viz:

"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc."
 Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division
suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its
jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second
Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of
the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant
case.

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration.
The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET
cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a petition for quo warranto
with the HRET.

A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines. In the case at bar, neitherr the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to
assume office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed
for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such
proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the
HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her
premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the
beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner,
to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.

People v. Jalosjos
FACTS

Statutory rape was committed by Romeo Jalsjos, a distinguished Congressman, on an 11 year old peddled for
commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father. He was convicted of rape and acts of
lasciviousness and is now confined at the national penitentiary. Romeo Jalosjos however filed a motion that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite being convicted of a non-bailable offense in order not to frustrate the expression of popular will and
in order not to deprive the electorate of their elected representative. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he
alleges that he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents
made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural
restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

ISSUE: WON Romeo Jalosjos be allowed to discharge the mandate as a member of House of Representatives

HELD:

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people
expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first
task is to ascertain the applicable law.

We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are
subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment
to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be
granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of
obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the
provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16
(2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and
under such penalties, as such House may provide.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section
11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a
call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to
the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking
to justify his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to
well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the States penal system.

Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation
not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of
the correction system.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts
that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending
on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed
the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise.
Pobre v. Santiago

FACTS
Senator Santiago delivered a privilege speech on the Senate floor:
.I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots
Which according to Pobre reflects a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and other members of the Court constituting direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks the
disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions taken against the lady senator.

Senator Santiago though, on her part, do not deny the aforestated comments. She however explained that the
statements are covered under the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she
delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of the Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech,
according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies n governance with a view to future remedial
legislation.

ISSUE: WON Senator Santiago may be disbarred because of the speech she delivered during the session of Senate

HELD:
No, Senator Santiago cannot be disbarred as the speech she delivered is protected under the privilege of
parliamentary immunity enshrined under the Constitution.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution,
which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be
questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof".

This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary
immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and
oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served.
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative
floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement
uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. 3The disciplinary authority of the assembly 4
and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or disciplinary
action is well taken.