Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his
capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination
for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said
examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said office. According to the circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take
the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice
before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring members of the
Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their
being allowed to practice before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications
for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not
involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so
much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by
the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring
further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the
preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of
provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as
the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States
Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is
similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or examinations the
passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first
time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally,
or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not
appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is
included in the practice of law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where
the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions . (5 Am.
Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and having
no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety
of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they
are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill , a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part
which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound
moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.),
194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc . (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis
ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the
enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves
the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in
accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office
in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other
laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public
order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it
was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed publication in
the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public
use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that
the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer
to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any
person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of
a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing
of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under Section
34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds,
such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the
patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not
being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on
reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the patented article or
working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is
prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these
things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and
experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director
involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section
61, provides that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to
obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court
from any final order or decision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and
decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically,
the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which
is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent
Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises
quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated
copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).

. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a
patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his
action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should
decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of
the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the
bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further
examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that
members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and
documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way
that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and
technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or to do
business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law,
Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases
prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the
following provisions of said Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in the Patent Office
on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office
in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of
these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or the
highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the
provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the
register of attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the
Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral
character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to
enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in
the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may
determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications
specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and
technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed.
The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in the
examining corps of the Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is
authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and
regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other
parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as
representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good
repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons
valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation
or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after
notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further
practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross
misconduct, or who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any
matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular,
letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the
Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the
district court of the United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as
the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced,
then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should
submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:
 SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as
regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the
necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases,
which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is
silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law, giving such
authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or
general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and
to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937,
known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the
approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section
338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance,
upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the
Bureau of Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business
in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to
require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent
Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the
business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods,
imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any
lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination
to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law,
and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said
office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable,
as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial
or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from
requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to
appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
In re: Albino Cunanan, 50 Off. Gaz. m, 1617, prom. March 18, 1954.
# 1: PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS. CELEDONIO AGRAVA,
in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office

FACTS: A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity
as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that
he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as
patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is
duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Directors holding an
examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice
of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice
so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the Patent office.
Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been
questioned formally.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent,
their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent
Office involves the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts
to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work
involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law
provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the
transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and
training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of
scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Case Digest: Philippine Lawyers Association vs Agrava,

105 Phil 173 (1959)

FACTS:

This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyers Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his
capacity s Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 23, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that
he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the said office. Petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations, and is in good standing, is
duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director's holding an examination for the
purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent, in reply, maintains that the rosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but include the application of scientific and technical
knowledge and training as a matter of actual purpose so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the
examination can practice before the Patent Office. Furthermore, respondent contends that he has previously conducted such
examinations and that this is the first time that he is questioned formally.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not members of the bar should first take and pass an examination conducted by the Patent Office before he
would be allowed to practice law in said office;

2. Whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation of applications or patents, etc. constitutes practice
of law or is included in the practice of law; and,

3. Whether or not the Director of the Patent Office is authorized to conduct examinations for patent attorneys.

RULING:

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines and any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity,
whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Moreover, "The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation m court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation sendees, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and conditions. As such, , the practice of law includes such appear ance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Thus, under the present law, members of the Philippine
Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,
for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and
application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved;
that part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and
decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court. In sum, the practice of law covers any activity in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedures, principles or practice and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience. And, only the Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice
of law.

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

FACTS:
Herein petitioner filed for prohibition and injunction against respondent Agrava, the Director of Philippines Patent Office due to
a circular the latter issued scheduling an examination for determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before
the Philippines Patent Office.

Petitioner contended that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in
the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that Agrava
is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law for requiring such examination as condition precedent before
members of the bar may be allowed to represent applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patents.
Undaunted, Agrava argued that that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law and
that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would
wish to handle cases before the Patent Office.

ISSUE:

Whether appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes
or is included in the practice of law

HELD:

Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and
other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights
in patent cases. Although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and
scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as
other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. All these things
involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and
experience for which a member of the bar has been prepared.

As stated in 5 Am. Jur, The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and
all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.

The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court to
practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, since much of the business in said
office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable,
as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial
or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, taken to the Supreme Court.
 DIVISION

[ GR NO. L-23815, Jun 28, 1974 ]

ADELINO H. LEDESMA v. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO +

DECISION

156 Phil. 481

FERNANDO, J.:

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge

denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de
oficio.[1] One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his
appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in
a position to devote full time to the defense of the two accused. The denial by
respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the
defendants, was due to "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." [2] It was
likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was
previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being
precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It
cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de
oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right
to counsel of the accused that must be taken seriously into consideration. In
appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is
easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the
responsibilities incumbent on counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the
assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be
very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk
an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good standing,
should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed
Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental.
Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de
parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he
filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such
motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants.
Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the
Commission on Elections to require full time service, as well as on the volume or
pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling
adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November
6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile,
he instituted this certiorari proceeding.[3]

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of

petitioner to withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a
reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the
proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then
respondent Judge spoke of his order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In
view of the objection of the prosecution to the motion for postponement of
October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue
appearing in this case without the express authority of the Commission on
Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who
are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion
for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as
Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the
trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil
service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de
oficio for the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963,
June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February 11,
1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964, July 26, 1964, and September 7,
1964."[4] Reference was then made to another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon
petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation of
the trial of this case is thereby transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the
morning. The defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has been
postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to
come all the way from Manapala"[5] After which, it was noted in such order that
there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to
the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar of the
Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by
allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the
prosecution has already rested its case."[6]

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly
mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that
for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed
counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For those holding such belief, it may come
as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an
opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession
dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then
why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent
statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban:[7] "There is need anew in
this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that
membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting
standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its
ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of
the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration
should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of
course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After
all, he has his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of
relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to neglect
his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de
oficio must be fulfilled."[8]

So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,[9] where respondent
was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This
Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous
performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the
performance of those duties necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of
criminal cases * * *."[10] Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia[11] reiterated such a
view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do
say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one
employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he
must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person
assigned to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant
expects of him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. * * * For,
indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a
bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." [12]

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to
the apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and
reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced.
His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was
rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words:
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail
if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent
or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the
rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this
reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of
procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have
an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney,
but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires
and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."[13] So it was under the previous Organic Acts.[14] The present Constitution is
even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel,"[15] there is this new provision: "Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence."[16]

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the bar in the
defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner
not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his
moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters
mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as an election registrar.
Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed of now. There is not
likely .at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his
time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above,
that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense
counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness
to remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever
timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times,
and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over
the promptings of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

Zaldivar, (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez, and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

[1]
Petition, Annex B.
[2]
Ibid, Annex C.
[3]
Petition, pars. 3-9.
[4]
Petition, Annex C.
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
L-31429, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 185.
[8]
Ibid, 186. Cf. People v. Apduhan, L-19491, Aug. 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 798;
People v. Solacito, L-29209, Aug. 25, 1969, 29 SCRA 61; People v. Serafica, L-
29092-93, Aug. 28, 1969, 29 SCRA 123; People v. Englatera, L-30820, July 31,
1970, 34 SCRA 245; People v. Aguilar, L-30932, Jan. 29, 1971, 37 SCRA 115;
People v. Estebia, L-26868, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 90; People v. Flores, L-
32692, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 230; People v. Alincastre, L-29891, Aug. 30, 1971,
40 SCRA 391; People v. Valera, L-30039, Feb. 8, 1972, 43 SCRA 207;
People v. Francisco, L-30763, June 29, 1972, 45 SCRA 451; People v. Espia, L-
33028, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 614; People v. Esteves, L-34811, Aug. 18, 1972, 46
SCRA 680; People v. Simeon, L-33730, Sept. 28, 1972, 47 SCRA 129;
People v. Daeng, L-34091, Jan. 30, 1973, 49 SCRA 221; People v. Ricalde, L-
34673, Jan. 30, 1973, 49 SCRA 228; People v. Martinez, L-35353, April 30, 1973,
50 SCRA 509; People v. Silvestre, L-33821, June 22, 1973, 51 SCRA 286;
People v. Busa, L-32047, June 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 317; People v. Alamada, L-
34594, July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA 103; People v. Andaya, L-29644, July 25, 1973, 52
SCRA 137; People v. Duque, L-33267, Sept. 27, 1973, 53 SCRA 132;
People v. Saligan, L-35792, Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 190; People v. Bacong, L-
36161, Dec. 19, 1973, 54 SCRA 288.
[9]
4 Phil. 298.
[10]
Ibid, 300.
[11]
L-26868, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 106.
[12]
Ibid, 109-110. Cf. Javellana v. Lutero, L-23956, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 717;
Blanza v. Arcangel, Adm. Case No. 492, Sept. 5, 1967, 21 SCRA 1.
[13]
85 Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950).
[14]
Cf. United States v. Gimeno, 1 Phil. 236 (1902); United States v. Palisoc, 4
Phil. 207 (1905); United States v. Go-Leng, 21 Phil. 426 (1912); United
States v. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500 (1912); United States v. Ramirez, 26 Phil. 616
(1914); United States v. Labial, 27 Phil. 82 (1914); United States v. Custan, 28
Phil. 19 (1914); United States v. Kilayco, 31 Phil. 371 (1915); United
States v. Escalante, 36 Phil, 743 (1917); People v. Abuyen, 52 Phil. 722 (1929).
[15]
Cf. Article IV, Section 19.
[16]
Section 20.

#2: Adelino H. Ledesma vs Hon. Rafael C. Climaco(GR No. L-23815, June 28, 1974)

Facts: Petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros
Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a
case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny
such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on
Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from
handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion.
A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding.

The SC found the petition without merit. As stated in the assailed order of the respondent judge, even before the petitioner
accepted the appointment to the Comelec, he knew that the case was going to resume on that day, that the case has been
delayed eight times at the instance of the petitioner, and that hiswork as an election registrar will not be in conflict with his
serving as counsel de oficio for the said accused. The high court described the petitioner as unmindful of his work as counsel
de oficio and reminded him that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions including that of being
appointed counsel de oficio which makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service
and not a mere trade.

In the end, the Court challenged the petitioner to exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with
competence, if not with zeal, if only toerase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing
and added that the admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in theranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this
is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

Adelino H. Ledesma v. Hon. Rafael C. Climaco

G.R. No. L- 23815 (June 28, 1974)

Legal Ethics : Definition

Facts:

Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of
the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the
Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a
motion to withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and
also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On November 6, Ledesma filed a
motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires full time
service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion.
So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not the order of the respondent judged in denying the motion of the petitioner is a
grave abuse of discretion?

Holding:

No, Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to the duty rqeuired of the
legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions.
The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be
required to act as counsel de oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The
fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.

Ratio:

The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are Judges, or other officials
or employees of the superior courts or the office of the solicitor General (Section 32 Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court [Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court]. The lawyer
involved not being among them, remained as counsel of record since he did not file a motion to
withdraw as defendant-appellants counsel after his appointment as Register of Deeds. Nor was
substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new counsel for the defendant-
appellant (People vs. Williams CA G.R. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963)
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer
may be required to act as counsel de officio (People v. Daban) Moreover, The right of an accused in
a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a constitutional right of the highest importance, and
there can be no fair hearing with due process of law unless he is fully informed of his rights in this
regard and given opportunity to enjoy them (People vs. Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950)
The trial court in a criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a counsel de
officio for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial Fiscal
of Rizal vs. Judge Muoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930)

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner

vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, respondent.
G.R. No. L23815
June 28, 1974

FACTS: The petitioner was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros
Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. He is also counsel de parte for one of the
accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw as such. Not only did
respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the
Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume or pressure of work of petitioner,
which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, denied the said motion.
According to the respondent judge, "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the motion
for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this
case without the express authority of the Commission on Elections) and since according to the prosecution
there are two witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for
postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13,
1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice
the civil service status of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The
defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November
27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964."

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio.

RULING: If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension
that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the
accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. The admonition is
ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them,
when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self interest.
Case Digest: People vs. Villanueva
Case Digest: People vs. Villanueva
14 SCRA 109 (1965)

FACTS:

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the crime of
Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by
counsel de oficio, but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented
by City AttorneyAriston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private-prosecutor, after
securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time
he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would
not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was
questioned by the counsel for the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the isolated appearance of Atty. Fule as private prosecutor constitutes practice of law.

RULING:

No. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as ah agent or friend of the offended
party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional
capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of Sail Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution
of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming
from Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attorney of San Pablo. As
such, there could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule us Assistant City Attorney of
San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. Furthermore, the isolated appearance of City
Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. Thus, the appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative
of engagement in the private practice of law. And, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been
given permission by his immediate supervisor, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complaint in the case at
bar who is a relative. Decision affirmed.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. L-19450
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.

Paredes, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before
the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de
parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance
as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every
time he would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused,
invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco, et al., L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been
appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in
private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation
of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.

Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this
Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear
and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided
by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be
represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in
the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that
his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the
prosecution of crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from
Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in
the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the
other hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an agent or a friend to
protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.

In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.

WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule
as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of
the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which
provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private
prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute
private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127,
p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of
law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of
Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs
against appellant hqXv.

*** The Supreme Court held that the isolate appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists of frequents or customary actions, a
succession of facts of the same kind or frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services. The
mere appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. It is also
worth noted that, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior to represent the
complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.
Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991
Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman
of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in
Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich
and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The
respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the
petition is DISMISSED.

Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,
contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years
is incorrect since Atty. Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of
the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

*** The Supreme Court held that the appointment of Monsod is in accordance with the requirement of law as having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer negotiator of contracts and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Again, in the case of Philippine
Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases and litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings and other similar work which involves the
determination by a legal mind the legal effects of facts and conditions.

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, 223 SCRA 378 (1993)

FACTS: The petitioner contends that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are champertous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity
of the members of the bar and that, to which as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended
by the following advertisements:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call:521-0767,
LEGAL 5217232,5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Force Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services"
through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided
by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977. ISSUE:Whether or not, the advertised services offered by
the Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes practice of law and whether the same are in violation of the Code of
Professional responsibility RULING: The advertisement of the respondent is covered in the term practice of law
as defined in the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod. There is a restricted concept and limited acceptance of paralegal
services in the Philippines. It is allowed that some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been
permitted with a limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable
services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefore. Canon 3 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. Canon 3.01 adds that he is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or give something of
value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business
(Canon 3.04). The Canons of Professional Ethics, before the adoption of the CPR, had also warned that lawyers
should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the
lawyer have been engaged of concerning the manner of the conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. There are existing exceptions under the law on
the rule prohibiting the advertisement of a lawyers services.However, taking into consideration the nature and
contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of
the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, the court found and held that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the exceptions. The respondents defense with the
case of Bates vs. State Bar applies only when there is an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by
lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a
written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is
provided for, expressly or impliedly whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stand therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in
that state. The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose
as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or
transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
EN BANC
 RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6705
Complainant,

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.

ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Promulgated:

Respondent. March 31, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private
practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
 The Facts

Ruthie Lim-Santiago (complainant) is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and

Special Administratrix of his estate. [1] Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and
the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. [2]

Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio (respondent) was the former Personnel

Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. [3] until his
appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan in 1992.[4]

Taggat Industries, Inc. (Taggat) is a domestic corporation engaged

in the operation of timber concessions from the government. The
Presidential Commission on Good Government sequestered it
sometime in 1986,[5] and its operations ceased in 1997.[6]

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat (Taggat

employees) filed a criminal complaint entitled Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v.
Ruthie Lim-Santiago, docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 (criminal complaint).
[7]
Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the
management and control of Taggat after the death of her father,
withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause
from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.[8]
 Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to
conduct the preliminary investigation. [9] He resolved the criminal
complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations [10] for
violation of Article 288[11] in relation to Article 116[12] of the Labor Code
of the Philippines.[13]

Complainant now charges respondent with the following

violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.

Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew
the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from
hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. [14] Furthermore,
complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed
and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the
complaint.[15]
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private
practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented
evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainers fee for the months of
January and February 1995,[16] another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995,
[17]
and P5,000 for the month of April 1996.[18]
 Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying
the prohibition against private practice of law while working as
government prosecutor.

Respondent refutes complainants allegations and counters that

complainant was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal
complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation. [19]

Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed,

respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five years.
[20]
Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to
Taggat.[21] Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct the
necessary preliminary investigation. [22] Respondent contends that
complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed
his duty.[23] Respondent points out that complainant did not file a
motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint [24] but
instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-
affidavit without mental reservation.[25]
 Respondent states that complainants reason in not filing a motion
to inhibit was her impression that respondent would exonerate her
from the charges filed as gleaned from complainants statement during
the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:

xxx

Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didnt think he would do it, Madam Witness?

A. Because he is supposed to be my fathers friend and he was working with my Dad and he was
supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna help me. x x
x.[26]

Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not
representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely
performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. [27] Respondent argues that
complainant failed to establish that respondents act was tainted with personal interest,
malice and bad faith.[28]

Respondent denies complainants allegations that he instigated the filing of the

cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this
accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the
employees or present them for cross-examination.[29]
 Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as
government prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant
but claims that it

was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. [30] Respondent

contends that the fees were paid for his consultancy services and not
for representation. Respondent submits that consultation is not the
same as representation and that rendering consultancy services is not
prohibited.[31] Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:

x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid
voluntarily by Taggat without the respondents asking, intended as token
consultancy fees on a case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees.
These payments do not at all show or translate as a specie of conflict of
interest. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or connection with,
the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat employees. [32]

Respondent insists that complainants evidence failed to prove

that when the criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent was still the retained
counsel or legal consultant.[33]
 While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and
Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations against
complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor
of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. [34] Hence, the
criminal complaint was dismissed. [35]

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M.
Alejandro-Abbas (IBP Commissioner Abbas) heard the case [36] and allowed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.[37] Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas resignation, the
case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa (IBP Commissioner Funa). [38]

After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP
Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 (IBP Resolution) dated 4
November 2004 adopting with modification [39] IBP Commissioner Funas Report and
Recommendation (Report) finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to
safeguard a former clients interest, and violating the prohibition against the private
practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of
law. The Report reads:

Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue will
require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former position of
Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for Violation of Labor Code (see Resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutors Office, Annex B of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being
accused as having the management and control of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros.
Office, supra).
 Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein Respondent
undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent,
undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent
undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore,
in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries
pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the mechanics and personalities in that case are very much
familiar with Respondent.

A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a

former client, the duty to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing
anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented
him (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4 th ed.)

Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any
client or any interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has
an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled for
that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor
relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No.
97-240 was for Violation of the Labor Code. Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been
different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel
Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and
Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.

xxxx

While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid
salaries being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees
and management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel
Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his
fiduciary relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and
part of its management.

xxxx

As to the propriety of receiving Retainer Fees or consultancy fees from herein

Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal consultancy
work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long been
settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law (see
Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA
109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To
engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are characteristic of the legal
 profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the
application of law, legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training
and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v.
Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).

Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.

As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and

instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.

Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to

safeguard a former clients interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of
law while being a government prosecutor.[40]

The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[41] of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). However, the Court finds respondent liable
for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against
unlawful conduct.[42] Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section
7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
or Republic Act No. 6713 (RA 6713).

Canon 6 provides that the Code shall apply to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official duties. [43] A government lawyer is thus bound by the
prohibition not [to] represent conflicting interests.[44] However, this rule is subject to
certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply
when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after
a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists.
[45]
Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
the administrative penalty.[46]

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in

unlawful x x x conduct. Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition
on a government employee to engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with [his] official functions.[47]

Complainants evidence failed to substantiate the claim

that respondent represented conflicting interests

In Quiambao v. Bamba,[48] the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict

of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to
use against his former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.[49] In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client
is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which
will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.[50]
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the
preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in
1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that
occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected
with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be

presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any
confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only
established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that
he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it
does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his
previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel
of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a
sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyers
immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyers employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer
the duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the
former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated.

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her

allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law

while working as a government prosecutor

The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as

 x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which
are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind
of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. [51]

Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.[52]

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat

intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged.
This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between
consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts
that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same
falls within the ambit of the term practice of law.

Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to

complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed
stated that the payments by Taggat were for Retainers fee. [53] Thus, as correctly pointed
out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.

However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the
Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of
specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no
jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees unless the acts involved also transgress
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Here, respondents violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of

Canon 1, which mandates that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondents admission that he received from Taggat fees
for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct,
which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct
when respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:

In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and
indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name
removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:

xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of
office and in his dealings with the public.[54]

On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.[55]

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in
unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to
one year.[56] We find this penalty appropriate for respondents violation in this case of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
 REYNATO S. PUNO LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

[1]
Rollo, p. 153.
[2]
Id. at 128-129.
[3]
Id. at 10.
[4]
Id. at 1, 240.
[5]
Id. at 240.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id. at 21.
[8]
Id. at 22.

[9]
Id. at 75.
[10]
21 Taggat employees filed their Affidavits alleging that complainant failed to pay them 31 quincenas of their salaries and
wages, thus 651 Informations were recommended for filing.
[11]
Article 288 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides: Penalties. Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or unless
the acts complained of hinges on a question of interpretation or implementation of ambiguous provisions of an
existing collective bargaining agreement, any violation of the provisions of this Code declared to be unlawful or
penal in nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than three months nor more than three years, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. x x x.
[12]
Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides: Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited. It shall be
unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, to withhold any amount from the wages of a worker or induce him to
give up any part of his wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever without the
workers consent.
[13]
Rollo, p. 82.
[14]
Id. at 2.
[15]
Id. at 3.
[16]
Id. at 110-111.
[17]
Id. at 112-113.
[18]
Id. at 114.
[19]
Id. at 243.
[20]
Id. at 242.
[21]
Id. at 244.
[22]
Id.
[23]
Id. at 243.
[24]
Id. at 245.
[25]
Id. at 244.

[26]
Id. at 246, 483.
[27]
Id. at 247.
[28]
Id.
[29]
Id. at 249.

[30]
Id. at 247-248.
[31]
Id. at 350.
[32]
Id.
[33]
Id. at 248.
[34]
Id. at 155-157.
[35]
Id.
[36]
Id. at 84-89, 99-103, 232, 237-239, 268, 273, 276-279, 282-284, 294-296, 299-300.
[37]
Id. at 330-331.
[38]
Id. at 362.
[39]
The IBP Commissioner imposed a penalty of three months suspension from the practice of law.
[40]
Rollo, pp. 549-554.
[41]
Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.
xxxx
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action.
[42]
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
[43]
Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6.
[44]
Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 15.03.
[45]
R. AGPALO, COMMENTS ON THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 165 (2001 ed.)
[46]
Berbano v. Barcelona, A.C. No. 6084, 3 September 2003, 410 SCRA 258.
[47]
RA 6713, Section 7(b)(2).
[48]
A.C. No. 6708, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 1.
[49]
Id. at 10-11.
[50]
Pormento, Sr. v. Pontevedra, A.C. No. 5128, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 167, 178.
[51]
Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210, 214.
[52]
Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., 447 Phil. 750, 759 (2003).
[53]
Exhs. B, B-2, B-3, rollo, pp. 110-114.
[54]
Id. at 241-242.
[55]
Endaya v. Oca, A.C. No. 3967, 3 September 2003, 410 SCRA 244, 255.
[56]
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws as mandated
by Section 12 of RA 6713.
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant, vs.ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:

DOCTRINE: the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as
respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same
falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."

NATURE: Disbarment complaint

FACTS:

1. Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc, a domestic
corporation engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the government. PCGG sequestered it
and its operations ceased.
2. Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of
Taggat Industries, Inc. until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
3. employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v.
Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint"). Taggat employees alleged that
complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld
payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause
4. Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation.
He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Article
288 in relation to Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
5. Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
a. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility- guilty of representing conflicting interests.
Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the
operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing,
investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees.
b. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor- Engaging in
the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. He received retainers fees
which respondent claims to only consultation fees.
6. Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for the violations committed.
7. Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for
more than five years and refutes complainants allegations and counters that complainant was merely
aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to her expectation.
8. Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the
criminal complaint and states that complainants reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her impression
that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed
9. While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651
Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor. Hence, the
criminal complaint was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was engaged in private practice of law while being a public official.
YES. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private practice of law. The act of being a
legal consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts that are
characteristic of the legal profession. It covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law,
legal principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience.

ISSUE: whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor

HELD: YES. A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a former client,
the duty to "maintain inviolate the clients confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect
him in any matter in which he previously represented him."

I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutors Office,
Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the
"management and control" of Taggat. Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat,
herein Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. Respondent, undoubtedly
dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related
with complainants in I.S. No. 97-240.

It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to
matters that he previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies,
and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-
240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S.
No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal
Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.

RULING. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (conflicting interest.) In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled
the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal
complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent
was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.

However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility against unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)
(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713
("RA 6713").

Respondent is mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct
includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his]
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with [his] official functions."
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of
law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO

RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,
Petitioner,, B.M. No. 1678,
2007 December 17, En Banc
RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.[1] On that day,
he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends
to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin
M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2,
Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant
for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and
must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.[2] It is so delicately

affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through
this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
[3]

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of

morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership
in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by
a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence
which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.[4]

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this
Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance
with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to
practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that
an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.[5] He must also
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.[6]

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory
proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;[7] passing the bar examinations;
[8] taking the lawyers oath[9] and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the
clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.[10]

The second requisite for the practice of law ? membership in good standing ? is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly,
payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;[11] payment of the annual professional
tax;[12] compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;[13]
faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually
subject to judicial disciplinary control.[14]

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice
law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.[15] Since Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.[16]
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
because all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
9225].[17] Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in
the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions (he) shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.[18] Stated
otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can
resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so,
conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education;
this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,

subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of
such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member
of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

WE C O N C U R:

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

(On Leave)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ

Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA M. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

* On Leave.

[1] As evidence thereof, he submitted a copy of his Identification Certificate No. 07-
16912 duly signed by Immigration Commissioner Marcelino C. Libanan.

[2] In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon, A.C.
No. 1928, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 612.

[3] Heck v. Santos, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 329.

[4] In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 03 August 1978, 84 SCRA 554.
[5] Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

[6] Id.

[7] Sections 2, 5 and 6, id.

[8] Sections 8 to 11 and 14, id.

[9] Section 17, id.

[10] Sections 18 and 19, id.

[11] In re Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 09 January 1973, 49 SCRA 22; In re
Atty. Marcial Edillon, supra note 3.

[12] Section 139, RA 7160.

[13] Resolution dated August 8, 2000 in Bar Matter No. 850 (Rules on Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education for Members of the IBP).

[14] Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., G.R.
No. L-23959, 29 November 1971, 42 SCRA 302.

[15] See last paragraph of Section 14, Article XII.

[16] In re Bosque, 1 Phil. 88 (1902).

[17] Section 2, RA 9225. mphasis supplied.

[18] Section 5(4), id.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, PETITIONER 540
SCRA 424

Facts:
1. Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960.
2. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his
ailments.
3. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's free medical aid program.
4. Became a Canadian citizen in May 2004
5. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to RA 9225, petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.
6. He took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine consulate general in
Toronto, Canada
7. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice

Issue:
Whether petitioner lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine
citizenship in May 2004

Ruling:
No. Practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public
interest that is both a power and duty of the state to control and regulate it in order to protect and
promote the public welfare.
Any breach by a lawyer of any of the conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence
which the courts and client repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The rules of court mandates that an applicant for
admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty one years of age, of good moral
Character and a resident of the Philippines.
The constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and consequently the
privilege to engage in the practice of law. The practice of law is a privileged denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently acquired pursuant to RA9225. This is because all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.

Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed
never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law
practice accrues. He must first secure from the court the authority to do so.

In re: Albino Cunanan, G.R. No. L-6784. March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO
CUNANAN
Resolution March 18, 1954

Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance
with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an
average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had
invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue:
WON RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid?

Held:
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a
judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the
admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so
generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an
attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly
uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no
matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

49 SCRA 22

FACTS:

Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine
Bar and Appropriating Funds Therefore was passed in September 1971, ordaining
Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules
of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. The Supreme Court formed a
Commission on Bar Integration and in December 1972, the Commission earnestly
recommended the integration of the bar. The Court accepted all comments on the
proposed integration.

ISSUES:
 1. Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?

2. Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?

3. Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?

RULING:

In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the
Commission to integration in this wise: Integration of the Philippine Bar means the
official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires
membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as
conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. The term Bar refers to the collectivity of all
persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified
Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to

do so; the State. Bar integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government
authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition
of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the
rule of law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their
own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its
power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Indeed, the power to integrate is
an inherent part of the Courts constitutional authority over the Bar.

The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of

association and of speech, as well as the nature of the dues exacted from the
lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a tax. The Court held:

1. Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not

compel a lawyer to become a member of any group of which he is not already
a member. All that it does is to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is
already a member. The lawyer too is not compelled to attend meetings,
 participate of activities, etc. The only compulsion is the payment of annual
dues. Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer to be a member of an
integrated bar, the court held that such compulsion is justified as an exercise
of the police power of the state

2. Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues
paid b the lawyer may be used for projects or programs, which the lawyer
opposes. To rule otherwise would make every government exaction a free
speech issue. Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out his objections to
positions taken by the integrated bar.

3. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for
purposes of regulation.

As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Survey
showed an overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.