Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
No. 15-1619
Appellee,
v.
Defendant, Appellant.
Before
But after the district court tallied all the points for what
back out of the deal. Finding only smoke but no fire to his
claims, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Gonzlez, 776 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 2015). Here's what happened.
--these are facts that Lasalle agrees the government could prove
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turned out to be Lasalle) was walking through the caller's
backyard. When Lasalle saw the officers, he ran and the officers
hospitalized.
some of the gunshots the second officer heard came from Lasalle's
told him to, but rather than surrender his gun, Lasalle shot the
that he broke into a house that night and stole some jewelry and
frozen chicken because he was hungry and had no money; and admitted
that he exchanged fire with the officers. (We note here that at
wounded officer would testify that it was Lasalle who shot him.)
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Although the only charge before the federal grand jury was
lawyer reports that sometime after the change of plea hearing but
(1) two more levels because the firearm was stolen, (2) four more
felony, and (3) six more levels because Lasalle injured a law
Lasalle's range was 108 to 135 months, though the PSR reduced the
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Lasalle objected to the PSR's Guidelines calculations on
violated his Sixth Amendment and due process rights. The judge
ANALYSIS
Sixth Amendment and due process rights because they are based on
advise him to back out of his plea agreement when it became clear
that his sentence would far exceed the recommended range.1 Finding
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we cannot give Lasalle safe harbor, we torpedo each of his
arguments in turn.
Mens Rea
even though the government never had to prove Lasalle knew his gun
16, 20 (1st Cir. 2013). We break down and knock down each argument
in turn.
1) Due Process
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out, "is [a principle] as universal and persistent in mature
246, 250 (1952). But in the end it boils down to this: Due
individual that his conduct does not conform to the law. See
due process rights. Staples, 511 U.S. at 605-06; Ford, 821 F.3d
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level increase neither creates a separate crime, nor functions as
See United States v. Thomas, 628 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2010); United
States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 1992) (defendant's
F.3d at 849; United States v. Schnell, 982 F.2d 216, 220 (7th Cir.
1992); United States v. Goodell, 990 F.2d 497, 499 (9th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Richardson, 8 F.3d 769, 770 (11th Cir. 1993); see
2
Although we have not previously addressed the question at
issue here, we have applied mens-rea-less offense-level increases
in the past over similar arguments that we should not. See United
States v. Evano, 553 F.3d 109, 112 (1st Cir. 2009) (rule of lenity
does not require addition of mens-rea requirement to identity theft
enhancement); United States v. Figuereo, 404 F.3d 537, 541 (1st
Cir. 2005) (no plain error in applying mens-rea-less Guidelines
offense-level increase for being found in the United States because
it was not an element of the offense, and other circuits had found
the increase constitutional).
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also United States v. Taylor, 659 F.3d 339, 343-44 (4th Cir. 2011)
federal law").
like the one Lasalle says he suffered here. The statute at issue
but did not require the government to prove the defendant knew his
mens rea when it makes clear that's what it intended to do, the
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impose criminal sanctions on a class of persons whose mental
element, the defendant would not have notice that his actions would
137 S. Ct. 886, 894 (2017); see Singleton, 946 F.2d at 26. This
946 F.2d at 26). The statute defining the crime limits the
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sentencing court's discretion and provides "[a]ll of the notice
(or like Lasalle, pled guilty to) a crime that itself includes an
Guidelines 'may compound the punishment for the offense, but [they]
United States v. Ray, 704 F.3d 1307, 1312 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting
United States v. Saavedra, 523 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2008));
constitutional rights.
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605 (considering plain language of the statute first). According
The history of the Guideline itself confirms that the omission was
reason to believe" the firearm was stolen, but the requirement was
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requiring an element of mens rea in gun-related crimes. Indeed,
inconsistent" with the intent behind the Gun Control Act because
423 U.S. 212, 220 (1976); Mobley, 956 F.2d at 453. The Act imposes
(j); Mobley, 956 F.2d at 454. Thus a defendant who has just been
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3) The Sentencing Reform Act
fair because it treats defendants who knew their guns were stolen
the same as defendants like Lasalle who did not. And, he claims
the enhancement does not meet any of the aims of the Act.
because a defendant who does not know his gun was stolen cannot be
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arbitrary and capricious. Once again, we think the government has
easily whether or not a gun has been stolen, and the failure to do
gun, regardless of whether they knew the gun was stolen, they will
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To sum up, the application of the mens-rea-less stolen-
Relevant Conduct
arguments de novo, United States v. Doe, 741 F.3d 217, 235 (1st
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1) The Sentencing Reform Act
punish only the substantive offense. For its part, the government
defendant "only for the fact that the present offense[, the offense
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Guidelines' history and purpose. United States v. Lombard, 72
F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1995). As we have explained, and reaffirm
States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154, 167 (1997) (Guidelines permit
Reform Act). The plain language of the Act likewise provides that
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Malouf, 466 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2006). Lasalle says we must
Ct. 2072 (2013). Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2088, holds that the
so do we.
fact, Peugh rejected the argument that its Ex Post Facto analysis
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question at issue in Malouf. 133 S. Ct. at 2088. And post-Peugh
(holding, one week after Peugh, that facts that do not increase
punishment for his crime and have become the "tail which wags the
of Alleyne and Apprendi, under which only facts that change the
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his sentence over what was recommended in the plea bargain,
Sixth Amendment and due process rights. The government, for its
share of the sentence that they become the "tail which wags the
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authority to impose anything less than a life sentence (remember,
Lombard was decided before United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
245 (2005), made clear that the Guidelines are advisory). We found
Lasalle's base offense level was set by the crime he pled guilty
increases only upped his base offense level; they did not displace
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2K2.1(b)(6), 3A1.2(c)(1). Most critically, his crime came with a
this argument. United States v. Cox, 851 F.3d 113, 120 (1st Cir.
reasonable doubt.
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To recap, the relevant conduct offense-level increases
Reform Act. And, neither Peugh nor Lasalle's take on Alleyne and
argument.
The government, for its part, takes the opposite position on each
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1) Procedural Reasonableness
because its author did not identify the specific sources (the who-
none here.4 See Cox, 851 F.3d at 124; United States v. Occhiuto,
4
Lasalle did object to the PSR below, but his challenges
largely echo the constitutional challenges he presents before us,
and indeed his counsel conceded at sentencing that his objections
were "legal arguments about the application" of the offense-level
increases, not the PSR's factual recitation. The parties now
dispute whether Lasalle's objections below encompassed the point
he raises on appeal. If they did not, we would review for plain
error. See United States v. Dunbar, 553 F.3d 48, 64 (1st Cir.
2009). But despite their dispute, both parties assume the less-
stringent clear error standard of review applies. So, we give
Lasalle the benefit of the doubt and review this claim for clear
error.
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information that has "sufficient indicia of reliability to support
Cyr, 337 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The
district court usually may accept the findings in the PSR without
further inquiry. Occhiuto, 784 F.3d at 868 (quoting Cyr, 337 F.3d
United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 872-73 (1st Cir. 1993) ("A
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Lasalle's PSR bears sufficient indicia of reliability that the
was the shooter, it is apparent from that section of the PSR that
the story was related by the injured officer, and when the
from the plea agreement, also summarized in the PSR, which explains
stop, he did not, one of the police officers was shot, and the
other shot Lasalle. The PSR also found that the same revolver
Lasalle used that day, described in the police reports and the
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not object to the factual basis of any of these findings. Under
error, meaning he must show "(1) that an error occurred (2) which
was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the
(1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60
sentencing court must "state in open court the reasons for its
F.3d 34, 40-41 (1st Cir. 2006)). It need not be "precise to the
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so long as "the record permits a reviewing court to identify both
the PSR, and it did not commit an error (let alone a "clear or
2) Substantive Reasonableness
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The government replies that the sentence is long enough, but not
Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 228 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
258 (2015).5
United States v. Daz-Arroyo, 797 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 272 (2015), and here we find both. As to
Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 410 (2016) (quoting United States
v. Clogston, 662 F.3d 588, 593 (1st Cir. 2011)). Lasalle has not.
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greater than necessary" to achieve the goals of sentencing. 18
range initially exceeded ten years but was reduced to the crime's
of that universe. The district court did not abuse its discretion.
See, e.g., United States v. Vega-Salgado, 769 F.3d 100, 105 (1st
nature of offense).6
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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
sentence. The argument goes like this: (1) Lasalle's plea bargain
but (2) he got the statutory maximum because the sentencing judge
have been acquitted, ergo (4) his attorney was ineffective for
failing to tell him to ditch the plea and roll the dice.
to, and acted upon by, the trial court." United States v. Ofray-
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Mala, 7 F.3d 1058, 1063 (1st Cir. 1993)). That is so because "a
States v. Costa, 890 F.2d 480, 483 (1st Cir. 1989). Here, for
instance, the government points out that the district court advised
Lasalle that the plea bargain range was not binding, so Lasalle
to nothing in the record to show what his attorney said about that
fact. He only says that, at the very least, his attorney should
Lasalle wanted to withdraw his plea, but his attorney did not.
CONCLUSION
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without prejudice to his right to raise his ineffective-
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