Also available from Continuum hough, Alain Badiou (anslated by Olver Feltham and Justin Clemens) ‘Theoretical Writings, Alain Badlon (edited and translated by Alero Toscano and Ray Bresier) BEING AND EVENT Alain Badiou ‘Translated by Oliver Feltham1 Belonging and inclusion 2 The theorem of the point of excess 3 The void and the excess 4 One, count-as-one, unity, and forming nto 8 The State, or Metatrucute, an the Typology of Being (normality singularity, exctescence) 9 The State of the Hisworco-social Situation 10 spinoza art I Being: Nature and Infinity. Heidegger! Galileo 1 Nature: Poem or matheme? 12. The Ontological Schema of Natural Multiples and the Non-exstence of Nature 1 The concept of normality: tansiive sets 2 Natural multiple: ordinals 3 The play of presentation in natural multiples or ordinals 44 Uimate natura element (unique atom) ‘An ondial i the number of that of which ts the name 6 Nature docs not exist, 15 Infinity: the other. the rule and the Osher 14. The Ontological Decision: “There i some infinity In natural maple 1 Point of being and operator of passage 2 Succession and imit 3 The second existential seal 4 Infinity finally defined 5 The finite. in second place 15 Hegel 1 The Matheme of infinity revised 2 How can an infinity be ba? 3 The retun and the nomination 4 The arcana of quantity 5 Disjunetion at a "9 ” m 133 130 0 be be 19 M40 waz 150 131 154 156 136 161 168 165 er 169 part IV The Event: History and Uliracone 16 Bvental sites and Historical Situations 17 The Matheme ofthe Event 18 Beings Profibition ofthe Event 1 The ontologial schema of historicity and instability 2 The axiom of foundation 5 the axiom of foundation is a metaontoogical thesis of ontology 4 Nature and history 5 The event Belongs to that-which-is-not-being- ua-being 19 Mallarmé art V The Event: Intervention and Fidelity ascal/ Choice; HOlderlin/Deduction 20 The Intervention: egal choice of name for the event, logic ofthe 1wo, temporal foundation 21 Pascal 22 The Form-mltipe of intervention: there a being of coe? 23 Fadeliy, Connection 24 Deduction as Operator of Ontological Fidelity 1 The formal concept of deduction 2 Reasoning via hypothesis 5 Reasoning va the absurd 4 Tipe determination of deductive fidelity 25 wolderlin Part VI Quantity and Knowledge. The Discernible (or Constructibl): Leibniz/Gdel 26 The Concept of Quantity and the Impasse of Ontology 1 The quanthative comparison of infinite sets 2 Natural quantitative corelate of a multiple: ‘cardinality and cardinals 3. The problem of infinite cardinals ry v8 ee as 187 187 199 191 201 aia 22 240 242 Daa 27 252 255 265 267 269 m‘ngalypibedin enh ate oman © to Sel 1988 “he gh nguge laton © Case 2008 “book supe yh en My Foren Al ap of sh ne hae i eh ty SBN 0-8264-5831-9, ' ay of Congo Cag ation a 2 log re for th bak tna om he ay of ones ‘pes by ete Sees Li, oueer acd anda he USA 4 Contents Authors Preface ‘Transator’s Preface Introduction art I Being: Multiple and Void. Plato/Cantor ‘The One and the Multiple: prior conditions of, any possible ontology Pato ‘Theory of the Pare Multiple: paradoxes and ital decision ‘Technical Noe: the conventions of writing ‘The Void Proper name of being ‘The Mark 2 1 The same and the other: the axiom of extensionaty 2 The operations under condition: axioms ofthe powetset, of union, of separation and of replacement 3. The void, subtractive suture to being Part Ik Being: Excess, State of the Situation, Onel ‘Multiple, Whole/Pars, or €/. This necessary to prohibit paradoxical multiples, which i o say the ‘non-being whose ontological inconsistency has as sgn the ruin of the language. The axiom-system has cherefore 1 be such that what iv authorizes tobe considered asa set, thas everyting hat it speaks fof-sinc, to distinguish sets from anything else within this ‘every- thing’, to distinguish the mulple (which s) rom the one (which not), and finally to distinguish belng from non-being, a concept of the multiple would be requited, a criterion of the set which is ‘exduded—Is nor corteate to formulas such a8 ~f © «), formulas ‘Which induce incoerency. Benveen 1908 and 1940 this double task was taken in hand by Zermelo and completed by Fraenkel, von Neumann and Godel I was accomplished In the shape ofthe formal axiom-system, the system in which, it fs ‘order logic. the pure doctrine ofthe miles presented, such that it ca sill be used today 1 se out every branch of mathematics would insist on the fac tha, it being st theory at stake, axlomatizaton {snot an arte of exposition, but an iminsic necessity. Being-mulipe if ‘musted to natural language and to intuition, produces an undivided ‘seudo-presentaton of consistency and inconsistency. thus of being and ‘non-being, because it does no dearly separate isl from the presumption ‘ofthe being ofthe one. Yer the one and the mulhiple do not frm “unity of conraries since the fst isnot whist te second isthe ver form of any resentation of being. Axlomatzation is required such thatthe mule left the implicness of ts counting rl, be delivered without consp, that 55, withou implying the Being hee. 2°‘ng AND evENT ‘the axlomatization consists in fixing the usage of the relation of belonging, €- to which the entire lexicon of mathematics can finally be reduced fone considers that equality rather a logical symbol “The fist msjor characteristic of the Zeemelo-Fraenkel formal system {he ZF system) Is that its lexicon contains solely one relation, ¢, and therefore no unary predict, no propery in the strict sense In particu, this sytem exces any construction ofa symbol whose sense would Be to beast. The multiple implicily designated herein the form of fogic ‘tbelonging. that is, in & mode in which the ‘something = ain general resented according toa multiplicity This wil be inscribed a5. ¢ 8, ais herent off. What is counted as one snot the concept ofthe muti: here sno insertable thought of what oe-muliple is. The one s assigned. {onthe signe alone: that it the operator of denotation for the relation ‘between the something’ in general and the multiple. The sign, wnbeing ff any one, determines, in a uniform manner, the presentation of ‘something’ as indexed t the multiple. "The second major characteristic ofthe ZF system imately evokes it being, ely speaking. something’ which is thereby disposed acording to ts mulple presentation, Zermelo's axiom system contains one type of ‘rasable lone, one list of variables. When I writ‘ belongs toa 8 the ‘Sgn wand fare variables from the same Ist, and can thus be substituted for by specially indstingushable terms. If one admis, with 2 grain of sale Quine’ famous formula, be sto be the valu of variable’ one can ‘Conclude that the ZF system postulates that there s only one type of (resentation of being: the mille. The theory does not distinguish between ‘objects’ and groups of objec (as Cantor di), nor even bewween, ‘Rlements and ‘et That there i only one type of variable means all is ulpe, everyting is a set indeed, ce inscription without concept of thatwhich-s amounts to fixing i as what can be bound, by belonging. (0 the muldple, and if what can be thus bound cannot be ditingushed, in tens of the status of ts inscription, rom what tis bound toi. na € 8 only has the possibility of being an element ofthe set inasmuch as itis Stee same srptural type a thats ase ise—then that-which ss ‘uniformly pure moliplicy “The thenry thus posits that what it presents—its terms—within the “axiomatic articulation, and whose concept it doesnot delivers always of the type er that what belongs 8 mulipe is alas a multiple: and that being an ‘element is nota satus of being, an inrinsie quality, but the Shmple relation, to-be-lement-of through which a multiplicity can be “ preset ystems the aio of vis, Iho na wits ont es pf on ad ht a iar present, n the nplins es me ‘ml aly mi of mie what toy depoye The it apr cae of Ferme work nce te trace topo del th he pier hc ann he fowing pepe on em me ue he spon thatthe We akeaty 9 presed eZee Stores by ngage hese lr {atin fa tal mle The 0 spartn compen oo ab) rome fr tion pstedin thc dhe dr tg of hi axom thai pops an any sso of ene te al Pes tea tthe aed on ances el ean Inpho geo whith aematgs esse prt oF incnsen uli te whe etn on in exe the eabeny ofthe Imgg, One sl Ft of cones tha nc ee esc sna som ene hen tothe ion teens tm te sen sly ho Shed resnion ofthe on of se 1 sh 3 Som ofan inte mathematica mating to ths maps smn ton towiathe as cesed-dacs nov coste ny eer ose yds spine the even ftom operon a at ot pohing pes woh ae lane Ce om Shere beng a exes ot overs cones he ico langage eens athe ml ht ewe aly by he tes esa) wih nantes he sane? Tt oe San ron the bs a prey) cone commsins mange een lip ‘demonstrable is an element of this set: Seton ferwnihae) eh we a bod L 1 existence all language multiple ttENG AND EVENT ‘The essence of this thestr—wich alms to secure the multiple, without rulnous excess. within the grasp of language—i that it dively exiten {al for every formula A) the existence ofa multiple is automaticaly and “uniformly guaranteed: the mitiple which gathers vogether all the terms which validate the formula. Tassels paradox cuts the coherency ofthe language with a conta icon: in doingso. it undoes the exstence-mulipi-langusge triplet such {bi & insenbedunder the primacy of existence (of the existential “guantfe)—in the statement above. “ermelo proposes the same tpt but ted into a diferent knot ‘The axiom of separation says tat, given a multiple, or rather, for any _ultple supposed given (supposed presented or existent), there exists the ‘Sb-rmllpe of terms which possess the property expressed by the formula I) In other words, what i induced by a formula of the language isnot flvcely an existence, a presentation of multiplicity, but rather—on the ‘condition that theres already a presentation—the ‘separation’, within that presentation, and supported by i, of a subset constituted from the tems {thus the mullite, since every multiple is multiple of mulspls) ‘which validate the formu ‘At formal level it follows that the axiom of separation i contrast ro the preceding statement, not existential since i only infers an existence from its already-being-there in the form of some multiplicity whose preseason has been supposed. The axiom of separation says that fr any upposed given multpicty there exist dhe part (he sub-multipicty) fwhone elements validate 2) It dhereby reverses she order of the quant fer: s a universal statement, in which all supposed existence induces, fo the basis of language, an implied existence plod existence v (0) 8) (Wy) IIe a1 6 AHI we AIL 1 1 supposed existence language multiple 1m conitast to Frege’ statement which draws the existence of directly foom is) the axiom of separation, on its own, does not allow any ‘conclusion eonceming enstenc, The delaration made by is iypliative Stracture amounts to the following if there is an/a then there is a [p-ohich i « part of «whose elements validate the formula i). But is there an a? The axiom says nothing ofthis it fs only a mediation by language from (supposed) existence to (implied existence ‘what Zermelo proposes asthe language-mltiple-exisence Knot no tonger stipulates that on the basis of language the existence of a multiple sintered bt rather that langage separates out, within a supposed glven ‘existence (within some already presented multiple) the existence of sub- multiple Language cannot induce existence, solely a split within existence ‘Zermelo's axiom is therefore materialist in that it breaks with the figure of ideainguistery—sohose price is the paradox of exces+—in which the ‘existential presentation of the muiple is dicey inferred trom a well: ‘constructed language. The axlom re-stablshes that is solely within the ‘presupposition of existence that language operates—separates—and that twat i thereby induces in terms of consistent muliplicy is supported in is being. in an anticipatory manner, by a presentation Which Is already there, The existence-muluple anucpates what language retreactively| ‘separates out om It as implied exstence-mltple The power of language doesnot go so far aso institute the ‘there of, the ‘there i, I confines tel to posing that theee are some distinctions within the “there i. The prindples dilerentiated by Lacan may be remarked therein: that ofthe real there is) and that ofthe symbolic (there are some distinction). ‘The formal stigmata ofthe already ofa coun, inthe axiom of separation, isfound nthe universality ofthe inital quantifier (the frst count-as-one), ‘which subordinates the existential quantifier the separating count-25-one of language) Therelore, it isnot essentially the dimension o ses which Is resected by Zexmelo, bot rather the presentative pretensions of language. I said th Russell’ paradox could be interpreted as an exces ofthe mule over the capacity of language to present it without fling apart. One coud just a5 ellsay tha Its language which i excessive in that it sabe to pronounce properties such as —f¢ a)—it would be alittle forced to pretend tat these Droperties can inti a multiple presentation, Being inasmuch 25 is the pure multiple, subtracted from such forcing: in other words, the ruprue of langue shows that nothing can acede to consistent presenta- fon in such a manner. The axiom of separation takes a stand within ontology—its positon ean ‘be summarized quite simply: the theory ofthe multiple s general form of ”BEING AND EVENT presentation, cannot presume that Its on the bass of ts pure formal rule Slone—well-consucted properies—that the existence of a multiple (3 presentation) i inferred. Being musth sleady-there: some pure mulpe {multiple of multpes, must be presented in order forthe rate to thea Separate some consistent muliplicty, self pesented subsequently by the sesture of the inital presentation However. crucial question remains unanswered: within the frame- work of axiomatic presentation isnot on the basis of language that the fxistence ofthe multiple is ensured—that son the basis ofthe present tion thatthe theory pesents—then where isthe absolutly iil poi of being? Which inital multiple has its exstence ensured such thatthe separating function of language can operate therein? ‘This isthe whole problem of he subtractive sutute af set theory to being ‘qua being, isa problem hat langoage emnot avo, an to which i ead {us by foundering upon ts paradoxical dissolution, the result of its own, excess, Language—svhich provides for separations and compostions— anno, alone, insttate the existence ofthe pure multiple; it cannot ensure that what the theory presents is indeed presentation, Technical Not | the conventions of writing ‘The abbreviated or formal writing used in this book is based on what called Brst-order logic. Iti a question of being able to inseibe statements ofthe genre: forall terms, we have che folowing property, or there does ‘ot exist any term which has the following property’ or tis statement is true, then tis other statement i also trae,’ The fundamental principle fs that the formulations “for al’ and ‘there exists’ only aflect terms {individuals} and never properties In short the stricture i that properties are not capable, in tur, of pssesing properties (this would cary us into ‘second-order log ‘The graphic realization of these requisites is accomplished by the Mxation of five types of sign: variables (which inscribe individuals, logical co recor (negation, conjunction, disjunction, Implication and equivalence, (quantifrs (universal: "or alt, and existential “there exis’), properties oF selations (here wil only be two ofthese for us equality and belonging) and punctuatons (parentheses, braces, and square brackets) = The variables for indivkduals (or us, muples or ses) are the Greek levers fy. 8 rand, sometins, 3, We will also use indices if need be, 0 Inuwoduce more variables, such a8 as, ys et, These signs designate tas which Is spoken of that of whieh one afi this oF that. = The quantifiers ae the signs ¥ (universal quantifier) and 3 (exisen tial quantifier), They are always followed by a variable: (Vs) reads: “fo ll a’ 3a) reads "there exists= the togeal connectors ate the following ~ (negation), > mpi tion) oF (dgjunction),& (conjunction), equivalence) The telations ere = (equality) and € (belonging). They always ink fhwo variables: a= B which reads als equal to and « © B which reads‘ belongs 0B The punetaton is comprised of parentheses (), braces (1, and square brackets [ -Aformula san assemblage of signs which obeys rues of conection, These ‘ules can be stely defined, but they are irutve: it a matter ofthe formula being eadabl. For example: (7a) 38) € f) > ~@ «)] reads without a problem: ‘For all «there exists at least one such that i « belongs tof then # does not belong 1 ‘An indeterminate formula will often be noted by the letter One very important point i the following: ina formula, a variable fs cither quantified or no, Inthe formula above, the to variables « and 8 Sre quantified (universally, existential). A variable which js not ‘quantified is a free variable. Ler's consider, for example, the following formu (Wale =a) Gale 6 ve all te reads intuitively: Forall , the equality of 8 anda is equivalent 1 the {act tha there exss ay such that y belongs to and also belongs 0 Ihe formulae andy are quantified but ee. The formula in question xpress 3 property of Be namely the fat that being equivalent (0 86 Cuulvalent to such and such (3 what & expressed by the piece of the formula: ito € B) & fre ail. We wil often write A) fora formula in tehlch w is a free variable, Inuitvely, this means that the formula A Expresses a property ofthe variable . If there are 1wo free variables, one ‘artes 9). Which expresses a relation between the fre variables aand fh, ‘or example. the formula (¥)[6 € a) ot = Bi which reads ‘ally belong ‘ether tow oF to 9,0 to both of ther’ (he logical os not exclusive} ixes ' particule elation between « and. ‘We willallow ourselves, as we go along. to dfn supplementary slns on tne bans of primitive signs. For that it wil be necessary to fx via an equivalence, the possibilty of retansating these signs into formulas ‘which contain primitive signs alone. For example, the formule: Tepe (lb a) + © Al defines the relation of inclusion between ‘Cand is equivalent tothe complete formula: or all, ify belongs to ‘a then ybelongs tog is evident thatthe new writing a 86 merely an {bbrevition fora formula Aj) writen uniquely with primitive signs and in which «and 8 are ree variables, inthe body ofthe text the reading of the lormulas should not pose any problems, moreover, they wil always be introduced. Definions willbe Explained. The reader cn trust te intl sense ofthe written form.st MEDITATION FOUR The Void: Proper name of being Take any situation in particular. 1 has een sald that is structure—the regime ofthe cour-as-one—spits the multiple which i presented ther: “litt nto consistency (te competion of ones) and inconsistency the inert ofthe domain) However, incons’stency i not actually presented 35 such since all presentation fs under the law of the count. Inconsistency 35 pure mule I solely the presupposition thr prior the count the one fs not. Yet what i explicit in any situation is rather thatthe one is. In neta. a situation Is not such thatthe thess ‘the one 8 nor” can be presented therein, On the contrary, because the la is the count-as-ne, rothing i presented in a situation which is pot counted: the situation fenvelops existence with the one. Nothing Is presentable in a station ftherwise than under the elec of structure, that, under the form of the one and its composition in consistent multiplicities. The one is thereby not only the regime of stuctured presentation but also the regime ofthe pomible of presentation ie In a non-ontological (thus non-mathema teal) situation, the miles possible only insofar asitis explicitly ordered by the law according othe one ofthe count. Inside she station there no gtaspable inconsistency which would be subtracted fom the count and thus astructured. Any situation, seized in it immanence, thus reverses ‘the inaugural axiom of our entre procedure. It states that the one fs and that the pure mutiple—inconslstency—is not. This is eniely natura because an indeterminate situation, not being the presentation of presen- tation. necessarily ieniiies being wih what i presentable thus withthe possibly ofthe one {HE Yoo: PROPER NAME OF BEING tis therefore vert I wil ound the essential distinction between the tnue andthe veriical mich further on in Meditation 31) that, inside what {situation establishes as a form of knowledge, being is being in the possibilty ofthe one, I is Lebni’s thesis (What nota being i not a Doing) which Merally governs the immanence of a situation and is horizon of vert. 115 a thesis of the law. “This thesi exposes vs to the following dificuly: inthe immanence of, a situation, Is inconsistency doesnot comet light, nevertheless count {sone being an operation ie indicates thatthe one a result. Insofar as the one is 2 ret, by necessy Something’ of the multiple does not absolutely coneide with the result. To be sure there is no antecedence of, the multiple which would give rise to presentation because the later i alivaysalready-stuctured such that there is only oneness or consistent ‘lips. But this “here leaves 2 remainder: the lw im which iti ‘deployed is discernible as operation. And although there ts never anything fother—in a suaton—hon the result (everything, In the situation, i ‘outed, what thereby reslls marks out, before the operation, a must be-counted. tf the latter which causes the structured presentation 10 waver towards the phantom of inconsistency ‘f course, remains certain that this phantom—which, on the basis of the fac that beingone ress, suily unhings the one fom being inthe ‘very midst of the situational thess that only the one is—cannot in any manner be presented itsel, Because the regime of presentation is con sistent mulpldr, the result ofthe count ‘By consequence, since everything is counted, yer given that the one of the count, obliged to be a res, leaves a phantom remainder—of the lip not originally being in the form ofthe one—onte has to allow that Inside the vation the pure o inconsistent mukple sboth excued fom ‘everything. and thus from the presentation island Included, in the name of what would be’ the presentation itsell the presentation ‘nisl if what the law does not authorize to think was tinkable: thatthe one is ‘not, thatthe being of consistency Is inconsistency To put it more clearly, once dhe entrty of a situation is subject the law of the one and consistency, its necessary, from the standpoint of limmanence tothe situation that the pure multiple, absolutely unpresent- able according to the count, be nok. But Deing-nothing is as distinct from non-being as the “there iss astinc from being Justa the stats ofthe one is decided erween the (tru) thesis “here {sonenes” and the [lle thes ofthe ontologies of presence, ‘the one is sso the staus ofthe pure muiiple decided, inthe immanence of a non “toloeal situation: betseen the (sue) thesis ‘incoasstency is nothing’ ind the (fase) structurlist or legals thesis “inconsistency not” Tt i guile true that prior to the count there Is nothing Because everything is counted. Yet this being-nothingwherein resides the illegal Inconsistency of being-is the base of there being the “whole” of the “compositions of ones in which presentation takes pace aust certainly be assumed thatthe elect of structures complete, that what subzacts ise from the later is nothing. an thatthe law doesnot “counter sngular islands in presentation which obstruct is passage. In an indeterminate situation there is no tebe or subtractive presentation ofthe pre multiple upon which dhe empite of the one i exercised. Moreover ‘isis why within a situation, the search for something that would feed an Jnuition of being qua being ia search in vain, The Tog of she acu, of ‘wba the count-as-one would have forgotten’ ofthe excluded which may be postive located assign or eal of pure mulipity, san impasse—an itusion—of thought. as i i of practice. A situation never proposes Enyting other than multiples wowen fom ones, and he law of laws i that nothing limits the eet of the count. “And yet the corelate thesis also imposes sell: that there fs a being of ‘thing, as form of she unpresentable. The ‘nothing’ is wat names the Lnpeccelvable gap, cancelled then renewed, between presentation as Sanicture and presentation a truetuted-presentaton, between the one as result and the one as operation, Between presented consistency and Inconsistency as what-wil-have-been-presented Naturally it would Be pointes tose off in search ofthe nothing. Yet it mast besa that this s exactly What poetry exhausts itself doing: this is that enders poetry, even at the most sovereign point of cary, even in Esperempory affirmation, compli with death. i one must—als!—con- cede that there Is some sense in Pat's project of crowning the poets in ‘rder to then send them into exile, ts because poetry propagates the idea ‘fa inition of the nothing in which being would reside when there is hot even the ste for such intuition—they call t Nature—because every thing i consistent. The only thing we can affirm is thls every station Smplies the nothing of ts all, Bur the nothing s ether place nor aterm ‘lhe situation, For dhe nothing were a term that could onty mean one thing: that it had been counted as one, Yet everything which has been. ‘outed is within the consistency of presentation. Its thus rled out that the nothing—which here names the pure will-have-been-counted. as {iscnguishabe from the effect ofthe count, and thus disunguishable from presentation-be taken as a term, There is mot arnothing. there is ‘noting, phantom of inconsistency ‘By isl the nothing is no more than the name of unpresentation in presentation, te status of being resus from the following: one has fo admit that ifthe one resuls, then “something’—which is not an {nstualon-tem, and which is thus nothing—has not been courted, this something’ being that it a necessary thatthe operation ofthe count scone operate. Ths it comes down to exactly the same thing say that, the nothing Is the operation of the count—which, as source ofthe one. I not itself counted-—and to say thatthe nosing isthe pure multiple upon Which the count operates—which ‘in-tsel’, as non-counted, is quite Aine trom how i turns out according tothe count, ‘The nothing names that undecidable of presentation which iss unpresenable, distributed between the pure inertia of the domain ofthe multiple, and the pure transparency of the operation thanks to which there Is oneness. The nothing is as much that of structure. thus of consistency, a5 that ofthe pure multiple. thus of inconsistency. Ii sald ‘with good reason that nothing i subteated trom presentation, because it feon the bass of he laters double unsdction, dhe aw and the mulpe that the nothing isthe nothing. Foran indeterminate situation, theres thos an equivalent to what Plato named, with respect 40 the great cosmological construcion of the Timacus—an almost catnvalesque metaphor of universal presenta Wion-—the ‘errant cause’, recognizing lis extreme difculty for thought ‘What iat tak I an unpresentable yet necessary igure which designates the gap between the rsult-one of presentation and that ‘on the bass of ‘which’ there is presentation: that ithe non-term of any tality, the nen fone of any countasone, the nothing particular to the situation, the ‘unlocaizable void poin in which its manifest both thatthe situation is sutured to being and that the sharwhio-presents-iself wanders in the presentation in the form ofa subtraction from the count. I would already be inexact to speak of this nothing a point because is nether local noe slobal, bat seatered all over. nowhere and everywhere: ts such that no encounter would authorize ic 10 be eld a presentable. term wid ofa situation tls suture to its being. Moreover, I state that every structured presentation unpresets “is” voi, in the mode ofthis non-one which is merely the subtractive face ofthe count.eING AND evENT 1 say ‘old rather than ‘nothing’, beeause dhe ‘nothing’ the name of the void correlative to the gloat fet of structure (eveything f counted); itis move accurate to indicate that not-having-been-counted is also quite Teal ints currence since i snot counted as one. “Vo” indicates the failure ofthe one, the notone, in a more primordial sense than the no ofthe-whole Wis a question of names here—nothing’ or ‘void'—because being Aesignated by these names, s either local nor global. The name 1 have chosen, the void Indicates precsely that nothing is presented, no tem. and also thatthe designation of that noting occurs empty, I oes not locate structurally ‘The void is the name of being—ol snconsstency—according to a situation, inasmuch a8 presentation ves us therein an unpresentable ‘ccess thus non acces tothe acces, inthe mode of what isot-one, nor ‘Composable of ones thus what fs quliable within the situation solely a5, the errancy of the nothing tis essential to remember that no term within asuation designates the ‘void, ond that in this sense Arist quite rightly declares inthe Ply that ‘he void not f one understands by “being what canbe located within a Situation. that i aterm, or what Aristotle called a substance. Under the ‘normal regime of presentation itis veridical that one cannot say ofthe ‘oid, non-one and wnsubstantal, that is ‘wil establish later on (Meditation 17) tat for the voi to become localizable a the level of presentation, and thus fra certain type of intra situational assumption of being qua being to occur, a dysfunction ofthe fount ls required, which results from an excess-f-one, The event wil be {his ulta-one of a hazatd, on the bass of which the vod of a station i retroactively discernible. ‘But for the moment we must hold that in a situation there i n conceivable encounter with the void. The normal repime of structured situations is that of the Imposition of an absolute ‘unconscious’ of the vd, Hence one can deduce a supplementary prerequisite for ontological Aisourse,ifitexiss, and ft as Imalotain—z situation (the mathemat fea situation). 1 have already established: that ontology is necessarily presentation of presentation, thus theory of the pure multiple without-one, theory ofthe multiple of mules: {THE VOI: PROPER NAME OF BEING > that its structure can only be that ofan implicit count. therefore that fof an axiomatic presentation, without a conceptone of is terms {orithout a concept ofthe multiple) ‘We can now add that the sole term fom whi omtlgy’s compositions swith con weave hemsees i meesary he vid Le’ establish this pont. If ontology i the particular situation which presets presentation, ft must also present the law of al resentation—the ferrancy of the void. the unpresentable as non-encounter. Ontology wll, fonly present presentation inasmuch as It provides a theory of the pre sentative suture to being, Which, speaking verdcally rom the standpoint fof any presentation, isthe void in which the orginary inconsistency i subsracted from the count. Ontology is therefore required to propose a theory ofthe vod But if 15 theory of the void, ontology, in a certain sense. can omy be theory ofthe void. Tha is, fone supposed that ontology axiomaticaly presented other terms than the void-—irespective of whatever obstacle there may be to ‘presenting’ the void—this would mean thet it atin fulshed Between the void and other terms, and that fs structure thus authorized the count-as-one ofthe vod as such, according co ts specie ‘iference to fll terms Is obvious that this would be impossible, since, {5 soon ast was counted as one ins diference to the one-tll, the void ‘would be filled with this alter. If ube void is thematized, it must be according to the presentation of ls ertancy, and not in regard to some Singularity, necessarily fal, which would distinguish it as one within 3 ifferentiatig count. The onl solution is for al of the terms tobe ‘void such that they are composed from the void alone. The void is thus distibuted everyshere, and everything that is distinguished by the Implicit count of pure mulpices i a modality-according-to-the-one of the void tell, This alone would account for the fact thatthe voi, in a situation, i the unpresentabe of presentation Lets rephrase this. Given that ontology is the theory of the pure ripe, what exactly could be composed by means ofits presentative {axiom sytem? What rxiset is seized upon by the Ideas ofthe multiple whose axioms institute the legislating action upon the muliple qua "multiple? Certainly nor the one, whichis not. Every multiple is composed ‘of maltples, This i the fst ontological law, But where to sae? What {the absolutely original existential position dhe first count if cannot bea fist one? There iso question about it: the ‘rs presented multiplicity 2eING ano EvENT without concept has to be a maliple of nothing, because if it was a ‘ultipl of something that something would then be inthe postion ofthe ‘One, And its necessary thereafter, thatthe axiomaticrue solely authorize Companions onthe basis ofthis multiple-ofnodhing. which Is to say on the basis ofthe vod “Shit approach. What ontology theorizes isthe inconsistent muliple of any situation; tha the multiple subtracted from any prticulat aw trom “ny count-asone—the a-structured multiple. The proper mode in which inconsistency wanders within the whole of situation f the nothing, and the mode in which it un-presents selfs that of subtraction from the ‘oun the non-one, the vol, The absolutely primary theme of ontology therefore the void-—the Greek atomists, Democritus and his successors, ‘eat understood this—but ii also its inal theme—this was not their ew-because in te lst resort, al inconsistency unpresentble thus oid If there are ‘atoms, they are not, as the materaliss of anviguty believed. a second principle of being. the one ater the voi. bur compos tions ofthe voi self, role by the ial laws ofthe maliple whose axiom. system is lald out by ontology ‘Ontology therefore, can only count the vod as existent, This statement announces that ontology deploys the ruled onder—the consitency—ol ‘what is nothing other than the sutureo-being of any situation, the that totch presents isl insoar as inconsistency assigns it wo solely being the lnpresenable of any peesentative conssency Tt appears that in this way a major problem is resolved. 1sad that being ‘spresented as pure multiple (Sometimes shorten this perlously by saying being is muliple), being gua beng, sticly speaking is neither one noF ‘utple. Ontology, the supposed science of being qua being. being Submited tothe low of skuations, mot present: at bes i must present presentation, which isto say the pre mutple. How can it avoid deciding In respect to being qua being, n favour of the multe? It avoids doing 50 “inasmuch as its own pong of beings the void that this"multipe’ whieh Isneither one not motile, being the mulipe of nothing. and therefore, tsfaras itis concemed, presenting nothing in the form ofthe malile. 80 more than in the form of the one. This way ontology states that presentation is certainly molile, but that che being of presentation. the that which is presented, being void, is subtracted from the one/muliple dialectic “The following question then arises: f that isso, what purpose does it serve to speak ofthe void as multiple” in terms such asthe ‘multe of "THE VOI: PROPER NAME OF BEING nothing? The reason for such usage s that ontology isa sivation, and thus everything that presents lls under las, which sto know nothing Spar from the multple-without-one, The results that the vod is named as ‘multiple even i composing nothing lt doesnot actualy ft ino the intra Stuational opposition of the one and the muliple. Naming the vod as rule the only sokation let by not Being able to name it as one, given that ontology sels out as is major prin the following: the one i no. ‘but any structure, even the axiomatic structure of ontology establishes, that there are uniquely ones and mulhples—even when, asin this ase, i isin order to annul the being ofthe one, ‘One of the acts of this annulment is precisely to posi thatthe wid i multiple, hat itis the frst multiple, the very being from which any ‘multiple presentation, when presented. is woven and numbered Naturally, because the voids indiscernible s aterm (because it snot fone), its inaugural appearance isa pire act of nomination. This name fannot be specific it cannot place the void under anything that would subsume it—this would be (0 reestablish the one, The name cannot Indicate that the void is this of that, The act of nomination, being a-secifi, consumes isl, indicating nothing other than the unpreset able as such, In ontology, however, the unpresenable occis within a resentative forcing which disposes i as the nthing ftom which every thing proceeds. The consequence is that the name ofthe void is @ pure proper name, vihich sncates set, which doesnot bestow any index of fitlerence within what it refers to, and which auto-dedares itself in the form of the multiple, despite there being thing which is numbered by es Ontology commences, inelucbly, once the legislative Kdeas of the ‘multiple are unfolded, by the pure utterance of the arbitrariness of a proper name. This name, this sign, indexed to the voi, fina sense tht ‘wil lays remain enigmatic the proper name of being.