To what extent was Israeli intelligence responsible for not warning Israel of the imminent 1973 Egyptian-Syrian attack? Word count: 1984 (excluding headings) Number of pages: 11 00874-0216 Jackson Fair 3-25-2014D. Analysis As early as 1967, the Egyptians had been preparing to resume fighting with Israel” however, fundamentally, it was almost impossible for Israel to accept that fighting was going to begin again due, in part, to the ‘Concept’. lan Black estimates the ‘Concept’ “took hold” in the late 1960s and early 70s and according to “Aman's overall assessment of Arab designs”, war was deemed unlikely, even on October 5" 1973,’ the day before Egypt and Syria launched their coordinated offensives. Even though numerous pieces of information supported that Egypt had met all the requirements of the ‘Concept’, military intelligence refused to believe an attack was possible. Israel knew that Egypt had been building up a SAM (surface to air missile) net in order to combat Israeli air superiority in the early 1970's, and this meets the first requirement of the ‘Concept’.’ The second requirement for the ‘Concept’ was met when Israel received intelligence that Syria had agreed to go to war with Egypt in mid-September 1973 but even with this information, Israel still refused to believe war was coming.’ The last requirement was met at the end of the Six Day War, when Egypt lost the Sinai. This event “provided a strong incent Sadat to regain the Egyptian territory by all available means”.” It is apparent that all criteria for the ‘Concept’ were met by at least the fall of 1973 (if not earlier) and Israel should have been aware that an attack was coming. The Israelis had, in effect, set up an early warning system by creating the (albeit misguided) ‘Concept’ but chose to ignore each red flag as it went up. eto The reason for this blunder was arrogance, best articulated by a former intelligence official: “You cannot suspect a stupid enemy of deceiving you who are smarter, because the mere fact that he can deceive you makes him smarter than you, an idea that was completely unacceptable in 1973.”° The war preparations of Egypt and Syria were clear enough and both Israeli leadership and the intelligence community did not give the warning signs enough credibility.” It seemed impossible at the time for Israel to be taken by surprise and no reports of Egyptian or Syrian build up were taken seriously.* A major general in the Israeli Defense Force even said: “We simply did not believe that they [the Arabs] were capable.”® P.R. Kumaraswamy went so far as to describe the Israeli intelligence’s approach to the situation as “dogmatic”."° They were stuck in the rut of the ‘Concept’ and refused to accept that an invasion was coming, even when all the signs suggested such an event would inevitably occur. It is important to note that not all individuals involved in the various intelligence services at the time were blind to the events unfolding just outside Israel's boarders. David Kimche, a deputy director of the Mossad (a branch of the intelligence service) was a lone voice in the intelligence community. Kimche realized that Egypt wanted its conquered land back and Sadat would be willing to launch an attack on Israel to reclaim the land."* His warnings went unheeded however, as Intelligence chiefs “downplayed” his advice and claimed there would be “at least a five day warning period” if an attack were going to occur.’? Others, like senior diplomat Gideon 00874-0216 Jackson Fair 3-25-2014Rafael, also commented on the fact that wi he worked in intelligence, some indi “ventured to differ” from the common held belief that a surprise attack could not happen. He also notes that “intelligence assessments had become increasingly and infectiously self-assured. They invariably predicted the undisturbed continuation of the cease-fire.”"* 10, 11. Dunstan, Simon. The Yom Kippur War: the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Oxford: Osprey Pub., 2007, Pg. 8 Black, Ian, and Benny Morris, Israe'’s secret wars: a history of Israel's intelligence services. New York: Grove Weldenfeld, 1991. Pg. 290 Dunstan, Simon, The Yom Kippur War: the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Oxford: Osprey Pub., 2007, Po. 27 Kumaraswamy, P. R., Revisiting the Yom Kippur war. London: Frank Cass, 2000. Pg. 13 &14 Ibid Pa. 3 Ibid Pg. 4 Lahav, Pnina. Judgment in Jerusalem: chief justice Simon Agranat and the Zionist century. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1997 Pg. 226 Kumaraswamy, P. R.. Revisiting the Yom Kippur war. London: Frank Cass, 2000. Pg. 4 Black, Ian, and Benny Morris. Israel's secret wars: a history of Israel's intelligence services. New York: Grove Weidenteld, 1991. Pg. 290 Kumaraswamy, P. R.. Revisiting the Yom Kippur war. London: Frank Cass, 2000. Pg. 14 Thomas, Gordon. Gideon's spies: the secret history of the Mossad. Sth ed., Updated ed. New York: Thomas Dunne/St. Martin's Griffin, 2009. Pg. 146 Ibid Pg. 146 Black, Ian, and Benny Morris, Israe!’s secret wars: a history of Israel's intelligence services. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991. Pg. 291 (00874-0216 Jackson Fair 3-25-201410 E. Conclusion The Israeli Intelligence community was wholly responsible for not warning Israel of the imminent Egyptian-Syrian attack. It comes as no surprise that there were many within the community who foresaw the attack and warned of it, but due to the inflexibility of the ‘Concept’ their words of caution went unnoticed. This blunder came about because few were 1g to challenge the commonly held belief that the Egyptians were unintelligent and therefore unable to outsmart the Israelis in any way. Israeli hubris caused the attack to come as a complete surprise and it can be said with confidence that the red flags were there, Israeli intelligence just refused to see them, wi 00874-0216 Jackson Fair 3-25-2014a F. Bibliography Works cited: * Lahav, Pnina. Judgment in Jerusalem: chief justice Simon Agranat and the Zionist century. Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1997 Dunstan, Simon. The Yom Kippur War: the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. Oxford: Osprey Pub., 2007. © Kumaraswamy, P. R. Revisiting the Yom Kippur war. London: Frank Cass, 2000. * Thomas, Gordon. Gideon's spies: The Secret History of the Mossad. Sth ed., Updated ed. New York: Thomas Dunne/St. Martin's Griffin, 2009, ‘* Black, lan, and Benny Morris. Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991. Works consulted: '* Raviv, Dan, and Yossi Melman. Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990. Websites consulted: ‘© “Declassified Yom Kippur War Papers Reveal Failures ~ Jerusalem Post” http://www. jpost.com/Defense/Declassified-Yom-Kippur-war-papers-reveal-failures (00874-0216 Jackson Fair 3-25-2014