University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test

Author(s): Michael F. Altfeld
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Dec., 1984), pp. 523-544
Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association
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 THE DECISION TO ALLY: A THEORY AND TEST
MICHAEL F. ALTFELD
MichiganStateUniversity

A GREAT dealofworkininternational relationshasbeendevotedto

thestudyof alliance formation.Mostof theearlyworkin thisarea
centered on theorizingor speculatingabout the formationof
particularalliances (Liska 1968; Russett1968; Rosen 1970). More recent
work,spurredbythediffusionof time-seriesanalysisintopoliticalscience
as well as the availabilityof data, has focused on alliance as a systemic
phenomenon(McGowan and Rood 1975; Job 1976; Siversonand Duncan
1976). Unfortunately,neitherof these approaches has been able to pro-
vide us witha theoryof alliance formation.
This stateof affairswould notbe so bad ifalliances were unimportant.
Yet, at least two studies have demonstratedthat alliances are of great
importanceforthe initiationand spread of internationalconflict(Altfeld
and Bueno de Mesquita 1979; Bueno de Mesquita 1981).
In this paper I will employ some notions of micro-economicsfirst
introducedbyBruce Berkowitz(1983) to the studyof alliance cohesion in
order to develop a simple theoryof the process by which national gov-
ernmentschoose to formmilitaryalliances. I will then proceed to testa
necessarybut notsufficient conditionforalliance formationderivedfrom
the theoryon the set of major power alliances in the 19th century.

THE THEORY

I. Major TheoreticalAssumptions
Four major assumptionslie at the heart of thiswork. First,I assume
that the decision-makerswho make up each nation's governmentare
rationalin the sense thattheyare expected utilitymaximizers.Second, I
assume that,eitherbecause there is a dictatorin foreignpolicy matters
(Bueno de Mesquita 1981) or because the preferencesof the decision-
makersobey value restriction(Sen 1970; Allisonand Halperin 1972), the
preferencesof each set of decision-makersmakingup a governmentare
collectivelytransitive.Third, I assume thatno possiblealliance partneris,
a priori,irrelevantto any government.That is, the decision not to allyis
made in exactlythe same way as the decision to ally,by calculatingcosts
and benefits.Finally,I assume that the decision-makerswho make up
governments,when theymake such decisionsas joining or initiatingwars
or formingalliances, do so according to a simple Cournot type rule
(Fellner 1949). That is, when theyare faced witha choice, theyassume
NOTE: I would like to thank Mr. ChristopherBrown and Ms. Harriet Dhanak of the MSU
PolitimetricsLaboratory,withoutwhose help I would never have been able to testthe
theorypresentedin thispaper. I would also liketo thankJohnAldrich,Bruce Bu1 noode
Mesquita, Gary Miller and Jim Morrow for theirmany helpful comments.

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524 PoliticalQuarterly
Western

thateverythingwill be the same aftertheirchoice as it was before their

choice except for theirchoice.1
II. Arguments oftheGovernment's UtilityFunction2
I assumed above that the set of decision-makerswho make up each
governmenthave collectivelytransitivepreferences.The resultof thisis
thatI can establishat leastan ordinal utilityfunctionforeach government
as a whole. Call thisfunctionU = U(X .. ,X) where X . . X may be
variousentitiesincludinggoods, services,voters,payrolls,patronage,etc.
For the purposes of thispaper I willassume thateach government'sutility
functionis definedover threecommodities:nationalsecurity(S), civilian
wealth(W), and freedomof action or "autonomy"(A), so thatU = U (S,
W, A). I will treatthese entitiesas being essentiallytheoreticalin nature
and willtherefore,forthe timebeing,leave themundefinedexcept to say
thatI assume thatwealth,securityand autonomyare differentgoods in
the sense thatone does not, for example, take one's amount of security
and/orautonomyintoaccount when computingone's wealth,thatwealth
is related to the totalamount of governmentalresources devoted to the
civilianeconomyand thatautonomyis related to the government'scapa-
cityto adopt whateverpositionsit wishesto withregard to international
issues salient to it and to change those positionsat will.3
Given that U = U (S, W, A), aU/dS is called the marginal utilityof
securityand representsthe change in U for a small change in security
holding wealth and autonomy constant. Further,aU/aW is called the
marginal utilityof wealth and representsthe change in U for a small
change in wealthholdingsecurityand autonomyconstant.Finally,aU/aA
is called the marginalutilityof autonomyand representsthe change in U
for a small change in autonomy holding securityand wealth constant.
Further,I assume that aU/aS, aU/RW,and aU/aA are always positive.
III. The NatureofSecurity
and itsRelationship and Wealth
toAutonomy
So far in the analysisI have treatedsecurityas a standard economic
good. This is not quite correct,however. The reason for this is that
securityis notpurchased bythegovernmentbut ratherproduced byitout
of inputs. The governmentis thus both the producer and consumer of
security.4

'This assumptionmay not sit well withsome, especiallythose who prefera more dynamic,
game theoreticapproach to alliance formation.The assumptionof simpleCournot type
rationalityhas, however, proven quite powerful in other contexts (see, especially,
McGuire 1974, 1982) and seems quite appropriate as a firstcut.
2The analysis in this section and sections III, IV and V is adapted in large part from
Henderson and Quandt (1980).
3Thus, by"domesticwealth"I mean all moniesspentbythegovernmentwhichare notspent
on procurementof armaments.Further,although at least one study(Hollenhorstand
Ault 1971) has shown that defense spending may have positiveimpacts on the non-
defense economy I will,for analyticalpurposes, ignore these effects.
4For a detailed analysisof such situationssee Becker (1971: chs. 10 and 10*).

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 The DecisiontoAlly:A Theoryand Test 525

Securityis, of course, the resultof manydifferent"factorsof produc-

tion" such as industrialcapacity,natural resourcesand a skilledpopula-
tion,whichare largelyunmanipulablebythegovernmentat leastover the
shortrun. I thereforeassume thatgovernmentstake as "given"whatever
securityis provided by such non-manipulablefactorsand then,if neces-
sary,produce additional securityfromfactorswhich are manipulable.5
I assume thatthereare two such manipulables foreach government;
procurementof armaments,designated R, and militaryalliances, desig-
nated L. (The assumptionthatincreasedsecurityis theexclusiveor at least
primarybenefitof alliances maybe found in much theorizingin interna-
tionalrelations.Examples would include Morgenthau 1973; Liska 1968;
Claude 1962.) I can thus establisha productionfunctionfor securityin
addition to that given by non-manipulable factors.Call this function
S = S(R,L)." Then aS/aR is the marginal product of armaments and
representsthe change in securityfora smallchange in armamentshold-
ing alliances constant.Further,dS/IL is the marginalproductof alliances
and represents the change in securityfor a small change in alliance
support holding armamentsconstant.I willassume that aS/aR is always
positive.That is, securitycan always be increased by increasing arma-
ments (holding other nations' armamentslevels constant)although the
rate of this increase may decline as higher levels of armaments are
reached (thatis, a2 S/aR2maybe negativeover some range of values of R.)
This is not the case, however, for alliances. While it is true that some
alliances can increasea nation'ssecurity,itis also true thatsome alliances
willadd nothingat all to a nation'ssecurityor even reduce itssecurityby
placingitin a morevulnerablepositionthanitwas in beforeitchose tojoin
the alliance. Thus, aS/dL will be positivefor some alliances but zero or
even negative for others.
Having previouslydefined the marginalproductsof armamentsand
alliance support,I can now definethe "rate of technicalsubstitution"or
RTS. The ratio
aS/aR
aS/aL
is called theRTS ofalliancesforarmamentsand givestherateat whichthe
governmentwould be willingto substitutealliances for armamentsper
unit of alliance in order to maintaina given level of security.

"Theoretically,thisrequires thatU be a separablefunctionof S, W and A. If thisis the case,

then I am merelymovingthe base-pointfromwhichutilityis calculated to the rightby
takingas "given" the security/utilityproduced by non-manipulables.
"An alternativeassumptionwhichmightbe made here is thatalliances and armamentsare
notsubstitutesbutcomplements.Murdoch and Sandler (1982), forexample, argue that
two of the goods produced by NATO (nuclear and conventionalforces)are comple-
ments. For an alliance itselfto be a complement to militaryexpenditures,however,
would seem to require a case in whicha powerfulnationmakes an alliance witha weak
but strategicallylocated small nation. Thus, in order to take advantage of its new
alliance,the large nationwould have to spend more on itsmilitary.For thelarge nation,
then,the alliance would be a complement.For the small nation,however,it would be a
substitute.Since, in thispaper, I focus only on alliancesamongmajor powers,it would
seem unlikelythatthe case of an alliance as a complementarygood would arise.

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526 Western
PoliticalQuarterly

Conversely,
aS/aL
aS/aR
is the RTS of armamentsfor alliances and gives the rate at which the
governmentwould be willingto substitutearmamentsfor alliances per
unit of armaments.
IV. The Problemof Tradeoffs
In deciding on the specificmix of armamentsand alliances whichwill
be used to produce its desired level of security,each governmentmust
take into account the "price" of each factor of production. As James
Buchanan (1969: 42-43) has pointed out, "Cost is that which the
decision-takersacrificesor gives up when he makes a choice." Thus, the
"price" of each factorreallyoccurs in termsof somethingelse whichthe
governmentcannotconsume because ithas decided to produce increased
security.In particular,assuming finiteresources at any given time,any
marginalpurchase of armamentsmustreduce the totalresourcesavaila-
ble to the civilian economy thus reducing domestic wealth as I have
definedit.Thus, ceterusparibus,the"cost"of increasingsecuritythrough
arms purchases is computed in termsof lost wealth(a similartradeoffis
postulated by McGuire 1965: ch. 3.
While the price of armaments seems fairlyclear, the price of an
alliance is somewhat less straightforwardto assess. Some alliances, of
course (e.g., NATO), involvea considerableexpenditureof resourcesby
all parties on militarycommissions,joint planning,etc. Many alliances,
however, perhaps most, do not. What all alliances have in common,
though,is a promise by each side to take specificactions in the event of
specificcontingencies.Such promisesare usuallyconsidered to be legally
bindingand have, in the past, usually been kept. Altfeldand Bueno de
Mesquita (1979), forexample, findthatnationshavingdefense pactswith
other nations almost invariablycome to the aid of their partnerswhen
thosepartnersare attacked.Thus, alliancescan be seen as deprivingeach
partyof some of its freedomof action. In addition, alliances tend to tie
nationsmore broadlyto each others'positionson relevantissues so thatit
becomes difficult foreitherpartyto adopt policystandstoo different from
thoseof itsally (some examples of those who have adopted thisor similar
assumptionsinclude Organski 1968; Singer and Small 1968; Berkowitz
1983; Bueno de Mesquita 1975, 1981; Altfeldand Bueno de Mesquita
1979). I assume, then, that the cost of an alliance to a governmentis
computed in termsof the autonomywhichmustbe given up in order to
form the alliance. Furthermore,I will assume that some autonomy is
alwayslost in forminga new alliance and thatsome wealthis alwayslost
when armamentsare increased.
Given thatthe costsof armamentsreallytake place in termsof wealth
and autonomyrespectively,I can establishtwofunctions,W = Gi(R) and
A = G2(L), whichrelatewealthto armamentsand autonomyto alliances.
Further,I assume thatthe derivativesof Gi and G2 are alwaysnegativeso
that the amount of civilian wealth available declines as the amount of
armamentsproduced increases,whiletheamountof autonomywhichthe

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 The DecisiontoAlly:A Theoryand Test 527

governmentpossesses on internationalissues declines as the amount of

alliance support which it possesses increases.
V. Governmental Equilibriumand ConditionsfortheFormation and Dissolution
ofAlliances
Given the above discussionI can now postulatethe conditionsunder
which the governmentwill be in equilibrium with respect to security,
wealthand autonomyand the conditionsunder whichalliance formation
and dissolution will be rational. Recall that I originallyassumed the
government'sutilityfunctionto be defined over security,wealth and
autonomy so that U = U (S, W, A). I then assumed that S was itselfa
functionof alliances and armamentsso thatI now have U = U (S (R, L),
W, A).7 I furtherassumed thatthereexisttradeoffsbetweenarmaments
and wealthon the one hand and alliances and autonomyon the other so
thatW = Gi(R) whileA = G2(L). Thus, each governmentcan be expected
to maximizeU subjectto the constraintsof Gi and G2. This is a lagrange
multiplierproblemthefullsolutionto whichcan be found in Appendix 1.
Equilibriumwill occur when the followingtwo conditionsare met:
AU , as
aS aL _ _ dA
dU/aA dL
And
(2) (2) U
au , as
aS dL = _ dW
aU/aw dR
That is, when the ratioof the marginalutilityof alliance to the marginal
utilityof autonomy is equal to the absolute value of the derivativeof
autonomy with respect to alliance and when the ratio of the marginal
utilityof armaments to the marginal utilityof wealth is equal to the
absolute value of the derivativeof welfarewithrespect to armaments.
These conditions,unfortunately, are a bitcomplex forpresentational
purposes but can be simplifiedwithout affectingany major results by
assuming that the rates of transformationbetween alliances and au-
tonomyon the one hand and armamentsand wealth on the other,are
linear.8In thiscase the above conditionsbecome
au as _ u u as _ au
d
aS aL dA aS aR aw

7Clearly, W is itselfalso theresultof a numberof inputs.However,since I am not interested

in the productionof welfareI treatit as a unitarygood.
8The assumption of a linear transformationrate between alliances and autonomy and
betweenarmamentsand welfareis identicalto the assumptionwhichmosteconomists
make of a linear budget constraint.

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528 Western
PoliticalQuarterly

From these conditions,and assuming only substitutioneffects,it can

be seen that it will be rational to forma new alliance in any one of five
circumstances:!'First,if thereis an increase in the marginalproductivity
of alliances. In thiscase the governmentcan be expected to "purchase"
more alliance support thus giving up some autonomy but gaining, in
return,morewealthbyloweringarmamentspurchases.Further,thisshift
fromarmamentsto alliances can be expected to take place at a rate equal
to the RTS of alliances forarmamentsforthatgovernment.This willalso
be thecase ifthegovernment'sutilityforcivilianwealthincreasesor ifthe
marginalproductivity of armamentsdeclines or if the marginalutilityof
autonomy declines. Finally,if the government'sutilityfor securityin-
creases we can expect the governmentto "purchase" both more alliance
supportand more armamentsat the expense of both civilianwealthand
autonomy.
As to the dissolutionof alliances,thiscan also be expected to occur in
any of fivecircumstances:an increase in the marginalproduct of arma-
ments;an increase in the marginal utilityof autonomy; a decline in the
marginalutilityof civilianwealth;a decline in themarginalproductivity of
alliances; or a decrease in the marginalutilityof security.In the firstfour
instancestheincreasedpurchase ofarmamentswillbe accompanied byan
increase in the amount of autonomypossessed by the governmentand a
decrease in civilianwealth.Further,theshiftfromalliances to armaments
willtakeplace at a rateequal to the RTS of armamentsforalliances. In the
fifthcase both armamentsand alliances would be reduced while wealth
and autonomywere increased.

RESEARCH DESIGN
I. The NatureoftheTest
In order fullyto testthetheoryof alliance formationpresentedabove,
I would need to develop measures forthe marginalutilityof security,the
marginalutilityof domesticwealth,the marginalutilityof autonomy,the
marginal product of alliance, and the marginal product of armament.

!' It is,of course, possible,forany of the goods in thisanalysisto be treatedas inferiorto the
point of showing"Giffen"typeeffectsby some governmentsat some times.However,
unlike potatoesor other"market"examples of such goods, it is not at all clear whichof
the goods included in thisanalysiswillbe treatedin thisway by whichgovernmentsat
what times. This will depend on the specificcharacter of each government'sutility
functionwhich,of course, would be difficult to specifyto thisextent.In addition,with
specificregard to alliances (the focusof thisstudy)such instances,to the extentto which
theyoccur at all, are likelyto be veryrare, especiallyamong the major powers. The
reason forthisis thatalliances are two partytrades.The kind of trade resultingfroma
Giffentype effectfor alliances would require one partyto give up autonomy to gain
securitywhiletheothergivesup securityto gain autonomy.This impliestheexistenceof
a veryasymmetrictypeof relationshipsuch as thatbetweena major and minorpower
ratherthanone betweentwomajor powers. For bothof thesereasons I choose to ignore
such possibleeffectsin thisanalysis.I should pointout,however,thatshould such effects
exist forany given trade, thattrade should show up as a mis-predictedcase. Further-
more, if such effectsare common, the theorypresented here will simplynot predict
alliances that formverywell.

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 The DecisiontoAlly:A Theoryand Test 529

Unfortunately, I cannot currentlymeasure mostof theseentities.I have,

however,made some plausible assumptionsabout them. As a result of
these assumptions,I can conduct a limitedtestof the theory.
Recall thatthe conditionsforgovernmentalequilibriuminvolvedfive
terms:dU/&S,aU/BW,aU/aA, aS/IL, and aS/aR. In addition,recall thatI
have assumed thatall of the marginalutilitytermsare alwayspositiveas is
the marginal product of armaments.I also assumed, however,that the
marginalproduct of alliance could be positiveor negative.That is, that
some alliancescould improvea nation'ssecuritywhileotherscould reduce
it. Further,because some autonomy is always lost when any alliance is
made (byassumption)and because the marginalproductof armamentsis
always positive,it can never be rational for a governmentto form an
alliance whichdoes not increase itssecuritysince some increase is always
necessaryto offsetthe loss in autonomywhich is assumed to occur.
As a resultof the above discussion,I can postulatea necessarybut not
sufficient conditionforalliance formationwhichmustbe metpriorto the
meeting any of the fiveconditionsfor formationnoted above. This is
of
the conditionthatthe marginalproduct of the alliance mustbe positive
foreach potentialpartyto the alliance. If thisconditionis not met,then
the alliance cannot form. If it is met, then the alliance may or may not
form,depending on the specificvalues of marginalutilitiesand marginal
productsforeach potentialparticipant.This is the conditionwhichI will
testin the succeeding sectionsof this paper.
I chose, as the spatio-temporaldomain forthistest,alliance formation
among annual European great power dyads during the period 1824-
1900. This domain was chosen forseveralreasons. First,thegreatpowers
werechosen in order to limitthetotalnumberof dyads thatwould have to
be analyzed to a tractablebut interestingset. Also, by limitingthe testto
the great powers the problem of nations being coerced into alliances as
well as that of possible "Giffen"effectswas minimized (see note 8).
Further,by limitingthe test to the European powers I minimized the
effectof any power decay over distance on governmentalcalculations.
Second, the 19th centurywas chosen because I feltthat its Europe-
centered internationalsystemcombined with the fact that the over-
whelmingpreponderanceofcapabilitiesin thatsystemwas in thehands of
the greatpowers would tend to mitigateany distortionscreated by focus-
ing only on alliances among this group of nations.
The startingyear of 1824 was chosen in order to eliminatefromthe
analysisthe dyadic alliances resultingfromFrance's entryintothe Quad-
ruple Alliance in 1818. The reason forthisis thatthe treatyto whichthe
French governmentwas invitedto adhere at Aix-La-Chapelle was not an
ordinarydefense pact but rathera collectivesecurityarrangementcom-
plete with provisions for the pacific settlementof disputes among its
members.One historianhas called thisagreement". . . an experimentin
internationalgovernment. .." (Phillips 1920: 11) whichhe compared to
the League of Nations. Another historianreferred to this alliance as
". .. somethingakin to theUnited Nationsofour own day .. ." (Schmeller
1968: Vol. 1, 11). As a result,therefore,of the unusual nature of this

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530 Western
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alliance going, as it did, so far beyond an ordinarydefense pact in its

provisions, I did not feel that the measure I could employ could
adequately capture the calculationsinvolved here.
Finally,the dyad was chosen as the unit of analysisfor purposes of
simplicity.Behind its choice lies the assumption that a governmentwill
consider taking its nation into a multi-lateralalliance only if all other
membersof thatalliance individuallymeetthenecessarycondition.Thus,
I would treat,say,theTriple AlliancebetweenGermany,Austriaand Italy
as three separate alliances between Germanyand Austria,Austria and
Italy,and Germanyand Italy. This assumptionis admittedlysomewhat
simplistic.However, the alternativeassumption,thatgovernmentscalcu-
late whetherthe conditionis met for the alliance as a whole, would have
requiredtheanalysisofall possiblesubsetsofgreatpowerswhichI feltwas
overlyburdensome fora firstcut. In any event,ifthesimplerassumption
provespowerful,theremaybe no need to employthemorecomplexone.
The European great powers and dates of theirstatusas great powers
in the 19thcenturyare given by Singer and Small (1972) as follows:

Country Dates
Austria-Hungary 1816-1900
Prussia/Germany 1816-1900
Russia 1816-1900
France 1816-1900
Italy 1860-1900
United Kingdom 1816-1900

The dependent variableforthisstudyis the formationof new formal

militaryalliances betweendyads of nations.This definitionincludes de-
fense pacts,whichrequire directaid should one partybe attacked; neu-
tralitypacts,whichrequire neutralityshould one partybe attacked; and
ententes,whichrequire onlyconsultationshould one partybe attacked.
This definitionexcludes the upgrading of already existingalliances
due to the larege amount of extra informationwhichsuch partnersare
likelyto have regardingone anothers'capabilities,intentionsand so on. I
feltthatsuch informationwould likelyproduce calculationstoo fineto be
captured by paper indicators.Thus, any dyad whichhas a statushigher
than "no-alliance" is dropped fromconsiderationas long as that status
lasts. For the same reason, I omit considerationof years during which
alliances are maintainedbut not upgraded as instanacesof "alliance."
To illustrateof how these coding rules work, we can examine the
Ententemade betweenAustria-Hungary,Prussia/Germany and Russia in
1833. In principle,thisalliance produces three dyadic alliances: (AUH,
GMY), (AUH,RUS) and (GMY,RUS). However, GMY and AUH already
have a defensepact,stemmingfromtheiralliance in 1815. As a result,this
entente cannot produce a new alliance between them. The only new
alliancesare thosebetweenAUH and RUS and GMY and RUS. Of course,
all of the aformentionedalliances are severed duringthe "yearof revolu-
tion"in 1848. When theyare reconstitutedin 1850, theyare all takento be

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 The DecisiontoAlly:A Theoryand Test 531

new alliances since the statusof each of the nationsinvolvedvis-a-visone

another was "no alliance" during the preceeding year (1849).
These coding rules produce a data-set of 705 annual dyads for the
period 1824-1900. Of these 705, 9 formdefense pacts,2 formneutrality
pactsand 15 formententeswhile679 formno alliance at all (see Appendix
2 fordyads thatformedand theiryearsof formation).Data on alliances
were obtained fromSmall and Singer (1969) updated by referenceto a
recent (1979) data tape obtained fromthe Correlates of War Project.10
II. MeasuringtheMarginalProductofan Alliance
In order to test the necessarycondition for alliance formationdis-
cussed above I mustprovidean indicatorof the marginalimpactof a new
alliance on a nation's security.This implies, however, that I must first
provide an indicatorof a nation'slevel of securityat any given time. To
accomplishtheserequirements,I draw on theworkof Bueno de Mesquita
(1981). In The War Trap he develops, using a set of assumptions very
similarto those which I have employed here, a theoryof the process by
whichgovernmentschoose to initiatewars.On the basis of thistheory,he
is able to compute a government'sexpected utilityfora war against any
othernation. Furthermore,alliances play a keyrole in thatcomputation.
In particular,Bueno de Mesquita employsa measure based on alliance
commitmentsto obtain indicatorsboth of the utilitywhich the potential
initiatorand opponent have forone another'spositionson relevantissues
as wellas the utilitywhicheach potentialthirdpartyto the war has forthe
issue positionsof the initiatorand opponent (Bueno de Mesquita 1981;
109-18). The theorydeveloped by Bueno de Mesquita proves to be quite
powerfulregardingthe predictionnot only of war initiatonbut also of
dispute escalation,the costsof warsand whichside willachieve victoryin
war.
Using Bueno de Mesquita's theoryof warinitiation,I can compute the
utilitywhicheach governmentof each major power possesses for a war
witheach other major power. I also assume thatthe securityfeltby any
governmentwithregard to any other nation correspondswithits utility
for a war withthat nation. The greatera government'sutilityfor a war
withsome other nation,the more secure thatgovernmentwill feel with
regard to that other nation. I thereforecompute each major power's
overallsecuritylevelto be itsaverage utilityfora warwithanyothermajor
power.
GiventhatI can computeeach major power'soverallsecuritylevel for
each year,I can also computethe marginaleffecton thatsecuritylevelof a
potentialnew alliance foreach potentialparticipantin thealliance. This is
accomplishedby determiningthe effectof the new alliance on the utility
termsof the war initiationchoice calculus of each potentialalliance par-

0As some readers are no doubt aware, there are certaindifferencesbetween the alliance
data as given in Small and Singer (1969) and as given in the up-dated 1979 data-tape
available fromthe Correlatesof War Project.Where these differenceswere relevant,I
used the alliances as given in the 1979 version of thisdata-set.

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532 Western
PoliticalQuarterly

ticipantvis-a-viseach other major power including the other potential

participant.A new securitylevel is then computed for each potential
alliance participantunder the assumption that the alliance is, in fact,
consummated.This new securitylevel foreach participantmay then be
compared to theirsecuritylevelsassumingthatno new alliance is formed
and the potentialchange in securitydue to the new alliance, whichI will
call AS, can be computed foreach potentialparticipant.In order forthe
necessaryconditiondiscussedearlierto be met,the minimumvalue of AS
for each potentialparticipantin a new dyadic alliance must be greater
than zero. That is, there must be some increase in securityto offsetthe
hypothesizedloss of autonomy due to the alliance. A more elaborate
discussionof how securitylevels and potentialchanges in securitylevels
due to potentialnew alliancesare computed maybe foundin Appendix 3.
III. SomePossibleObjections to theMeasure
Before proceedingon to a testof thetheory,itis necessaryto deal with
twoobjectionswhichmightbe raised againstthemeasurementprocedure
described above. First,this measure assumes implicitlythat each major
power perceivesitselfto be equally likelyto go to war againsteach other
major power. It could be argued thatthisis a false characterizationand
that the change in securitydue to an alliance for a given major power
should be computed on the basis of a weighted average withthe weights
corresponding to the with
probabilities which the major powerin question
assigns to wars witheach other power.
The problem here, of course, is how to determinethe weights.What
makes some dyads at some times more war prone than other dyads?
Bueno de Mesquita (1981) offersa partialanswer. In The WarTrap he
pointsout thatthe membersof some dyads ".. . withrespectto general
foreignpolicy ... are not particularlyattentiveto one another" (p. 95).
That is, the securityinterestsof such pairs of nations are just not very
likelyto clash. Further,of those nations whose securityinterestsmay
clash, Bueno de Mesquita showsthatwhethera disputebetweena pair of
nations escalates into a war or not depends heavily on those nations'
respectiveutilitiesforwar withone another (1981: 167-70). In addition,
he also shows thatthisis the case both forallies and enemies. Indeed, he
shows that allies in fact fightdisproportionatelymore often than one
would expect themto by chance (1981: 159-64). Thus, if we assume that
the 19thcenturymajor powersare attentiveto one another,and ifwe also
assume that,under most circumstances,it is verydifficultfor a govern-
mentto predictwell in advance whichothernationsit willand willnot be
engaging in disputes with(and alliances do tend to be long-termaffairs,
see Bueno de Mesquita and Singer 1973), then its only reasonable
strategy,when formingan alliance,is to choose the one whichmaximizes
itssecurityvis-a-visall otherrelevantnationswhethertheyare ostensibly
friendor foe. This is so because, prior to a considerationof utilities,the
nation cannot predictin advance whetherany given dispute whichdoes
arise will be ended favorablyand withoutwar, or not. (Certainlythis is
what Bueno de Mesquita's findingsdiscussed above would imply.)As a

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 The DecisiontoAlly:A Theoryand Test 533

result,the increase or decrease in a nation'saverage utilityforwar would

appear to be most appropriate here.
A second objection which mightbe raised against the measurement
procedure outlined above is thatalliances provide collectivegoods. As a
result,one partyto thealliance mightreduce itsmilitaryexpenditureand
personnel(2 variablesimportantto the marginalcontributionto security)
once the alliance is made and become a "free-rider"at the other ally's
expense (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). Thus, this objection goes, the
increasein securitydue to an alliance maywellrest,in part,on therelative
size of the allies and theirtastes.
The problem withthis objection is that the securityprovided by an
alliance only becomes a public good afterthe alliance is formed. Before
thisevent,thepotentialsecurityprovidedbyeach partnerbytheotherare
reallyprivategoods since each partnercan exclude the other fromcon-
sumptionbya simplyrefusingto ally.Once the alliance is concluded, the
public good character of at least some alliance benefitsmightbecome
apparent and individual productiondecisions mightchange as a result.
However, under the assumptionof Cournot typeindividualism,neither
partyshould calculate that anythingwill be differentafterthe alliance
thanitwas beforetheallianceexceptthealliance. Since myanalysisis not
concerned with what happens after the alliance is formed I need not
include such elementsas "size" or "taste"in my measure. I mightpoint
out, though, that should one partner'sarmamentsdrop so low that its
worthas an alliance partnerdrops below itscost in lost autonomyto the
other partner, it would be rational for that other partner simply to
abrogate the alliance therebyonce again excluding the delinquent part-
ner fromconsumptionof the alliance good. This line of reasoningwould
seem to implythat,even afterformation,alliance goods are not wholly
public in character.Indeed, some evidence existsforthisviewin NATO.
In his examinationof Olson and Zeckhauser'sempiricalfindings,Francis
Beer (1972: 23) notes that
... the evidencefromNATO does not firmly supportOlson and Zec-
khauser'shypothesis of thegreatbythesmall..."
of "theexploitation
Nordo thedatanecessarily implythatthe"largera nationisthehigherits
valuationof theoutputof an alliance."

TESTING THE THEORY

I. TestingtheNecessaryCondition
Having now developed an indicatorof the marginal product of an
alliance, I can proceed directlyto a test of the necessarycondition for
alliance formationdiscussed above. To testthisconditionI separated the

These notions are, of course, perfectlyconsistentwith each party to a new alliance

expectingto be able to loweritsownarmslevelonce thealliance is made. Whatis barred is
eitherpartythinkingthatthe otherone expects to reduce itsarms level. These notions
are admittedlyverysimple-minded.However, as I have noted previously,theyhave
proven powerfulin similarcontexts.

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534 Western
PoliticalQuarterly

705 dyads in my data-setinto two groups. In one group the minimum

value of AS forboth membersof the dyad was greaterthan zero. In the
other group, the minimumvalue of AS was less than or equal to zero. I
then examined the two groups to determine how many dyads in each
group formeda new alliance. Before presentingthe resultsof thattest,
however,some discussion of the nature of necessarybut not sufficient
conditionsis in order.
To state that X is a necessary but not sufficientcondition for the
occurenceof Y is to statethat,if X occurs,thenY can but need not occur.
However, if X does not occur, then Y cannot occur. This is the same as
statingthatY is a sufficientconditionforX. In the contextof the current
analysis, this means that, if each party to an alliance experiences an
increase in securitydue to the alliance (the "X" condition),then the two
partiescan but need not ally(the "Y" condition).On the otherhand, ifat
leastone of thepartiesto thepotentialalliance achievesno gain in security
(or suffersa loss), then an alliance cannot take place.
Figure 1 showsthenatureof thisconditionin a moregraphicmanner.

FIGURE 1

Minimum Minimum
AS>O AS<O

Form A
Alliance

Do Not C D
Form
Alliance

The columns of the contingencytable representthe values of the inde-

pendentvariable,whetheror notthe minimumvalue of ^S is greaterthan
zero. That is, whetheror not the necessaryconditionforalliance forma-
tion is met. The rows representthe values of the dependent variable,
whether or not an alliance was formed. The statementmade by the
necessarycondition derived earlier is simplythis; that the shaded cell
should be empty.Nothingat all is said regardingthe distributionof cases
in the other three cells. In particular, nothing is said regarding the
distributionof cases as between cells C and D. Of course, if cell D were
emptyand all of the cases whichfailed to formalliances resided in cell C
then,even iftherewere no cases at all in cell B, thisfindingwould not be

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 The DecisiontoAlly:A Theoryand Test 535

veryinterestingsince it would not help us rule out any dyads at all as

possibleallies. On theotherhand, giventhe natureof theconditionbeing
tested,it would also probablybe too much to expect thatcell C would be
empty.Finally,given the grossness of the measures involved, it would
probablyalso be too much to expect cell B to be totallyempty,though it
should be "almost" empty.
This discussion raises a number of questions regarding how the re-
lationshippostulatedhere can be adequately tested.The onlycases which
are trulymis-predictedbythisconditionare thosewhichshowup in cell B.
On the other hand, we would also like to be able to say something
regardingtheusefulnessof thecondition.Usefulness,in turn,restson the
abilityof the conditioneffectively to rule out some "reasonable" fraction
of thecases as potentialalliance partners.One wayto testthisrelationship
would be throughthe use of predictionanalysis(Hildebrand, Laing and
Rosenthal 1976). However, this technique has not been widelyused in
politicalscience and may be unfamiliarto manyreaders. Instead, I have
chosen to employtwowidelyused meaures of"goodness-of-fit." The first
of theseis Yule's Q. This is a measure of associationespeciallywell suited
for use witha necessarybut not sufficient condition. It is computed as
(A*D)- (B*C)
(A*D) + (B*C)
As the reader will note, this statisticcan achieve unityif only one cell is
empty rather than the usual two which would be required for other
statisticssuch as Tau-b.
The second measure of goodness-of-fit I willemployis a simpleT-test
forthe significanceof the differenceof twoproportions.This testwillbe
used to determinewhetherthe proportionof dyads whichformalliances
among those failing to meet the necessary condition (ideally zero) is
significantlysmaller than the proportionof dyads which formalliances
among those meetingthe necessarycondition(a numberabout whichthe
conditionitselfsays nothing).
The resultsof the data analysisare displayedin Figure 2. theseresults
generallyconfirmmyexpectationsforthenecessaryconditionforalliance
formationderived from the theory.Of the 566 dyads which meet the
conditionof positivegain in securityforbothpotentialpartners,24 or 4.2
percentformallianceswhile,of the 139 dyads whichfailto meetthismost
basic condition, only 2 or 1.4 percent form new alliances. Thus, the
formationrate among dyads whichmeet the conditionis threetimesthe
rateamong dyads whichfailto meetit.The testforthe significanceof the
differenceof proportionsindicatesthatthisresultcould occur bychance
fewerthansix out of one hundred times.In addition,Yule's Q computed
on this table yieldsa value of .504, indicatinga fairlystrongdegree of
association. As to the substantivevalue of the condition,it successfully
rulesout,as possiblecandidatesforalliance formation,over 20 percentof
those dyads whichactuallyfail to formwhile incorrectlyrulingout only
about 8 percent of those which do form.This is a far more successful
resultthan any obtained by those who have studied alliance as a systemic

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536 Western
PoliticalQuarterly

FIGURE 2

Minimum Minimum
AS>O AS<0

Form 24 2 26
Alliance

Do Not 542 137 679

Form
Alliance

566 139

Yule's Q = .504

Z = 1.57 Sig. at < .06

phenomenon. Finally,the twocases of dyads formingalliances in spiteof

theirmeasured violationof theconditionwereratherunusual. Both arose
fromItalyjoining the Triple Alliance. In each case, Italy gains dramat-
icallyfromthealliance,increasingitssecurityby88 percentwithGermany
and by 77 percentwithAustria. The Dual Allies, however,were by my
measure losers, withGerman securityreduced by 17 percentand Aust-
riansecurityreduced by 18 percent.Why,then,was Italybroughtintothe
alliance? The answerseems to be thatBismarkcalculated that,whileItaly
would be worthlessto the Dual Alliance if not an outrightburden, the
Italians could constitutea major threatto the Germanic coalition were
theyto fallintoan alliance withthe French.As Langer (1950; 244) put it:
... Bismark... wrotetoViennastressing
. .. that,inan alliancewithItaly
theformof theagreement wasofverylittleimportance. The mainthing
was to secure Italian neutrality. . . Germany and Austria did not need
Italianhelpand did notexpectit.Alltheywantedwastheassurancethat
Italywouldnotbe antagonisticand in thatwaytieup valuableAustrian
forceson theAustro-Italian
Frontier.
Indeed, by my measure, were Italy to have allied with France in 1882
instead of Germany and Austria, France's securitywould have been
increased by 15 percent while Italy's would have been increased by 47
percent.Thus, bymymeasure,Bismarkwas correctin thatItalydoes add
to Frenchsecurity.However,he mayhave been incorrectin assessingthe
magnitudeof thataddition. Thus, whatwe may have here is a mispredic-

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 The DecisiontoAlly:A Theoryand Test 537

tionas theresultofa game-theoreticassessmentof thevalue ofdenyingan

alliance to an enemy.
Another way to view these cases, however, is that they represent
instancesof Giffen-type effects.Bismark,under thisinterpretation,was
prepared to giveup some securityin order to gain some controlover what
the Italiansmightdo ifwar did breakout and thusincreasehis freedomof
actionvis-a-visotherpowers,especiallyFrance. This interpretationgains
some credibility fromthe factthatItalywas theweakestof thepowersand
did give up some of itsambitionsto secure the alliance (Langer 1950; ch.
7). Unfortunately,which of these interpretationsis the more correct
cannot be determined withouta thorough reading of documents and
diaries,whichwould be beyond the scope of thispaper. Whatcan be said,
however,is thatthese twocases appear to be the onlyones of theirtypein
the data.
II. SomeSpeculationon Sufficient Conditions
The theory,insofar as it as been tested here, appears to be well
supported by the available data. The next step, of course, is to begin to
develop measures which would allow for the testingof sufficient condi-
tionsforalliance formation.The utilityterms,of course, willprobablybe
verydifficult to assess. However,itmightbypossibleto assessthemarginal
productof armamentsas wellas, and especially,thecostof givenalliances
in termsof lost autonomy.To show how thiscould improve prediction,
note that,of the 542 cases in cell C, about 5 percent(or 27 dyads) involved
France and Germanyduring the period 1870-1899 inclusive.In each of
thosepotentialalliancesFrance would have been thegreatestgainer.Such
an alliance, however,would no doubt at least have required the French
governmentto accept the German regime in Alsace-Lorraine,a loss of
autonomywhich that governmentsimplycould not accept.
III. Extensions of theTheory
The reader will note that the theorypresented here does not just
purport to explain alliance formation.It is really a theoryabout the
trade-offs whichexistfora governmentbetweenarmamentsand alliances
as sources of security.As a result, the theoryshould not only tell us
somethingabout thedecision to ally,itshould also tellus somethingabout
the decision to procure armaments,as well,and, in addition, something
about the trade-offswhichexist between the two methods of increasing
securitydiscussed here and the othercommodities(domesticwealthand
autonomy)whichgovernmentsmayalso wantto consume. A futurepaper
willattemptto measure these trade-offs, as theyoccur, forspecificcoun-
triesover timesince,using thatapproach, marginalutilitiesas wellas the
"costs" of alliances in termsof lost autonomy may be measureable.
Even as it stands,however,the theorycan tell us a few thingsabout
thesetrade-offs.First,it would seem thatmajor powers,because theyare
so powerful,should have available to themonlya verylimitednumberof
alliance partnerswho can increasetheirsecurity.Once these partnersare
exhausted,such nations,iftheywishto furtherincreasetheirsecurity,will

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538 PoliticalQuarterly
Western

findthemselvesforcedto depend on armaments,thusgivingup domestic

wealth.Major powerswhose governmentshave highutilityforautonomy
will find themselvesin this position even sooner. Thus, if two major
powers each findsthe other to be its main securityconcern,and if both
have exhausted their securityenhancing alliances, we would have the
beginningsof an arms race. On the other hand, should such alliances be
unused at the time concern over securitydevelops, and if both powers
have low utilityfor autonomy,we mightsee an "alliance race" develop
until such time as the exhaustion of allies takes place or sufficientau-
tonomyis lost so as to make the loss of domestic wealth attendant to
increased armamentspreferableto furtherlosses in autonomy.
Even minor powers may findthemselvesdepending a great deal on
armamentsif theyhave high utilityfor autonomy.This is because their
major power friends,if theyhave any (nations like the Ayatollah'sIran
may value autonomyso highlythat no alliance looks attractive),may be
unwillingto aid them in circumstancesnot of interestto those friends.
One example of thisis the attitudeof the United States toward French
interestsin Africa.Historically,the United Statesdeclared itswillingness
to aid France up to and includingthe use of nuclear weapons on itsbehalf
in the event of an attackon France by the Soviet Union. On the other
hand, the US was quite unwillingto aid (and sometimesopposed) France
in Africa,especially when what the French governmentwas tryingto
accomplishtherewas different fromtheoutcome preferredbythe United
States.

CONCLUSION

This paper has presented a theoryof the process by which national

governmentschoose to formmilitaryalliances and has testeda necessary
but not sufficient conditionderived fromthattheory.Further,the results
of thattesthave been about as supportiveof thetheoryas theycould have
been given the nature of the condition being tested.
Clearly,much more workneeds to be done in thisarea. However, the
analysis presented here does offerreasonable support for the simple
micro-economicapproach adopted in this paper.
Finally,as I notedearlier,mostrecentstudiesof alliance behaviorhave
been carried out at the systemiclevel. Further,such studies have found
thedistributionof alliancesto be essentiallyrandom over time.This study,
however,indicatesthatwhen alliances are viewed cross-sectionally at the
nation-statelevel theydo not appear to be random but instead followa
definite pattern; i.e., potential alliances which fail to increase both
partners'securitylevels almost never form.

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 The DecisiontoAlly:A Theoryand Test 539

APPENDIX 1
Solution of the Constrained
MaximizationProblem

To summarize,I have stated the followingrelationships:

Maximize: U = U(S, W, A) subject to
1: S = S(L, R)
2: W= G1(R)
3: A = G2(L)

For convenience,I will temporarilyignore the interveningvariable S and write

U = U(L, A, R, W) then the Lagrangian becomes...
V = U(L, A, R, W) + Xi*(W - G, (R)) + X2*(A - G2(L))
AND
4: aV/0L = aU/aL + (X2- - dA/dL)
5: aV/aA = aU/aA + X2
6: 'V/aR = aU/aR + (Xi - dW/dR)
7: aV/aW= au/aW+ Xi
Settingthese four equations equal to zero and performingsome algebra I get
8: aU/aL = X2 * dA/dL
9: aU/aA = -A2
10: aU/aR = XA? dW/dR
11: aU/lW= --l
Dividing 8 by 9 and 10 by 11 I get the equilibriumconditions
12: aU/aL _ -dA
aU/aA dL

13: R
aU//R -dW
aU/ia dR

But recall that, by the chain rule,

au a
a_U
_ 0
as and au U aS
aL aS aL aR aS aR
so that 12 and 13 become

14: au aS
aS aL -dA and
aU/aA dL

15: au aS
as aR -dW
aU/aR dR

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540 PoliticalQuarterly
Western

APPENDIX 2
New Dyadic Alliances Among European
Major Powers, 1824-1900
Year Dyad Alliance
1827 UK, FRN Entente
1827 UK, USR Entente
1827 FRN, USR Entente
1833 GMY, USR Entente
1833 AUH, USR Entente
1834 UK, FRN Defense Pact
1840 UK, GMY Defense Pact
1840 UK, AUH Defense Pact
1840 UK, USR Defense Pact
1844 UK, USR Entente
1850 GMY, AUH Defense Pact
1850 GMY, USR Entente
1850 AUH, USR Entente
1861 UK, FRN Entente
1863 GMY, USR Defense Pact
1873 GMY, AUH Entente
1873 AUH, USR Defense Pact
1881 GMY, USR NeutralityPact
1881 AUH, USR NeutralityPact
1882 GMY, ITA Defense Pact
1882 AUH, ITA Defense Pact
1887 UK, AUH Entente
1887 UK, ITA Entente
1891 FRN, USR Entente
1897 AUH, USR Entente
1900 FRN, ITA Entente

APPENDIX 3

Bueno de Mesquita (1981) computes nationi's utilityfora waragainstnationj

as:

E(Ui) = E(Ui)b + 2E(Ui)ki

where E(Ui)b representsi's utilityfor a bi-lateralwar withj and EE(Ui)ki

k
representsthe totalamount of aid or opposition whichi expects to receive from
potentialthird-parties,k, to the war.
Furthermore:

E(Ui)b = Pi(Uii - Uij) + (1-Pi)(Uij - Uii)

where:
Pi is i's perceptionof the probabilitythat i wins the bilateralwar withj.
(I-Pi) is i's perceptionof the probabilitythat i loses the bilateralwar withj.

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 The DecisiontoAlly:A Theoryand Test 541

Uii is i's utilityfor its own policypositions.

and,
Uij is i's utilityforj's policypositions.12
Further,
Pi is measured as the ratioof i's capabilitiesto the sum of i's andj's capabilities
as measuredbytheCorrelatesof War project'scompositecapabilityscoreindex. 3
Uii is assumed to be 1.
Uij is measured as the rank order correlation (Tau-b) between i's and j's
alliance statuseswithone anotherand all othernationsin theregion.As discussed
in Bueno de Mesquita (1981: 94-97, 109-18), thisis computed by firstranking
alliancesfromthe mostrestrictive of a nation'sautonomy(a defense pact),to least
restrictive(a status that might be called "no alliance"). This ranking is then
employed to create a 4x4 table forthe pair of nations,i and j, and thencorrelate
theirstatuseswithone anotherand all third-parties in the region.'4 Of course, ifi
changesanyof itsalliance statuses,themeasured value of Uij willalso change. As a
result,the measured value of E(Ui)b will also change, either increasingor de-
creasing i's utilityfor the bi-lateralwar withj.
Having completed the explanation of how E(Ui)b is computed, we can move
on to a discussionof how SE(Ui)ki is computed.
k
Bueno de Mesquita (1981; 58) computesEE(Ui)ki at anygiventimeas follows:

[(Pik + Pjk - 1) * (Uiki - Uikj)]

where:
Pik is i's perceptionof the probabilitythati wins the war withj, given that k
joins i.
Pjk is i's perceptionof the probabilitytllati loses the war withj, given thatk
joins j.
Uiki is i's perception of k's utility for its policy positions.

Uikj is i's perception of k's utility for j's policy positions.

12 Inhis discussionof E(Ui) Bueno de Mesquita includes termsfori's perceptionof antici-

pated changes in the value of Uij as wellas changes in the values of Uiki and Uikj, to be
discussed below. Although these terms are importanttheoretically,they cannot, at
present,be measured in any systematicfashion.As a result,I disregard them here.
3In his measurementof the probabilitytermsused in the calculationof utility,Bueno ide
Mesquita employsa correctionfor distance when measuringcapabilities(and, there-
is notemployedherebecausethemajorpowersin
Thiscorrection
fore,probabilities).
the European regionare close enough to one anotherso thatthiscorrectionneed notbe
employed. I thereforedisregarddiscussionof thiscorrectionhere. Indeed, one of the
in
reasons for choosing the European major powers was to avoid the extra difficulty
fordistancewouldhaveadded to an alreadycomplex
whichcorrecting
computation
procedure. Also, it should be noted that,whiledyads are measured annuallyalthough
data on capabilitieswas available onlyquinquennially,I employeda linearextrapolation
toobtainapproximations
ofannualcapabilities.
Forexample,theUK'sscoreisgivenas
28.2 in 1820 and 27 in 1825. Thus, itsannual scoresfor 1821 to 1824 wereassumed to be
27.96, 27.72, 27.48 and 27.24 respectively.
4
"TheEuropean regionis definedhere as in Bueno de Mesquita (1981: 94-97) except thatI
assume China to be a memberof thatregionas of 1895 so thatitsalliance withRussia can
be takenintoaccountin computing
theutility
measures.

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542 WesternPolitical Quarterly

Anid,
Pikis measured as theratioof thesum of i's and k'scapabilitiesto thesum of i's,
k's and j's capabilities.
Pjk is measured as the ratioof the sum of k's and j's capabilitiesto the sum of
k's,j's and i's capabilities.
Uiki is measured as the rank order correlationbetween i's and k's alliance
statuseswithall nations in the region includingeach other.
Uikj is measured as the rank order correlationbetweenj's and k's alliance
statuseswithall nations in the region includingeach other.
Thus, again, any change in i's alliance statuseswillbe reflectedin a change in
the measured value of Uiki and will thus result in a change in the measured
amountofaid or oppositionwhichi can expectto receivefromeach kin a warwith
j; thatis, it will resultin a change in the measured value of .E(Ui)ki.
k
Having now explained how a nation'sutilityforwar withsome othernationis
computed, I can state the definitionof securityemployed in this paper.1'
The overall securitypositionof each major power is simplyitsaverage utility
for a war against all other major powers in the European region. This average,
designated S, is computed as:
n-I
E E(Ui)j/(N- 1)
j= 1
Where N is the numberof major powersin theEuropean region'; and eachj is
a major power which i mighthave to fight.
In order to compute AS, the change in a nation'ssecuritydue to a proposed
newalliance,I assume the newalliance to have been made and determinehow that
change in foreignpolicyaffectsS throughitsaffectson Uij, Uiki and Uikj.17The
I' In computingE (Ui) Bueno de Mesquitaincludescorrections foruncertainty and risk-
takingbehavior.MajorPowersare assumedto behaveas iftheywererisk-acceptant
Underconditions
underbothriskand uncertainty. of risk.all thirdparties'potential
tothewarareincludedinthecomputation
contributions oftE(Ui)ki.Underconditions
of uncertainty,only those third parties for whom Uiki>O and Uikj<O or for whom
Uiki<0 and Uikj>0 are includedin thiscomputation.These correctionsareemployedin
thisstudy.Discussionof themhas been omittedfromthetext,however,so as notto make
an already complex discussioneven more so. The reader who is interestedenough to
havecomethisfarshouldsee Buenode Mesquita( 1981:59-64)fora discussion
ofthis
rule.
I'iIn assessingeach greatpower'ssecurity,I calculate itssecurityonlyagainsttheothergreat
powers. Further,when computingeach greatpower's utilityforwar againsteach other
great power, I only consider the aid which each side may receive fromother great
powers.I do thisbecause(a) I assumethatminorpowerssimplycannotdo muchto
affectthe outcome of a major power war and, (b) I assume thatalliances made among
the great powers are directed primarilyagainst the other great powers.
7In computing due toa newalliance,I adoptthefollowing
thechangeinsecurity conven-
tions:
is alwaysa defensepact.Thisis
(a) I assumethatthenewalliancebeingcontemplated
because thedefensepactresultsin thegreatestincreasein themeasured utilitywhichthe
twopartieshave foreach other'spolicypositions.It should, therefore,offerthe greatest
marginal increase in securityto the parties.
(b) In computinga nation'ssecurityafterthe assumed formationof a new alliance, I
take intoaccount the nation'sutilityforwar againstall othergreat powers includingits
potentialally. I do thisbecause, as I have already noted, allies tend to fightfar more
often than one would expect by chance.

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 The Decision to Ally: A Theoryand Test 543

necessarybut not sufficientconditionforthe formationof such a new alliance is

that AS be positivefor both potentialallies.

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