#3 Antonio v.

Barroga
Facts:
Appellants' action was for the annulment of Free Patent No. 26383 and the
corresponding original certificate of title No. 2799 both issued in the names of Pelagio
and Marcelo Barroga. Their complaint substantially alleged that they were the children
of the deceased Jorge Antonio who, during his lifetime, was the absolute owner of a
parcel of land located in Barrio Nancamaliran, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, with an area of
approximately 27,646 square meters and described in said pleading; that the defendants
applied with the Bureau of Lands for a free patent in connection with said parcel of land,
alleging that it was public land although they knew that it was the private property of
Jorge Antonio; that subsequently, the free patent and certificate of title already
mentioned were issued in the names of said defendants, who on March 26, 1961
mortgaged and/or sold the property to the defendants Francisca Bautista and Inocencio
Salvador, for which reason the latter two were impleaded as defendants.
Appellants opposed the motion to dismiss alleging that the other defendants had
admitted in their answer that their predecessor in interest, Eusebio Rellera, was the
absolute owner of the land in question, his title thereto being evidenced by Titulo Real
No. 12479 and that they acquired the property from Rellera's legal heirs. From this they
concluded that the land was private property and that therefore the free patent and
original certificate of title issued in favor of the Barrogas were void because the Director
of Lands had no right to dispose of private property.
It is not disputed that appellee Pelagio Barroga applied for a free patent over the land
subject matter of the present case after he had purchased it from the heirs of Eusebio
Rellera, and that, as a result of the proceedings had in relation to his application, Free
Patent No. 26383 was issued in his name. Subsequently this was cancelled to be
substituted by original certificate of title No. 2799 likewise issued in his name, and now
partially cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 39487 issued in the name of
Francisca Bautista, duly approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
Issue:
1) WON application for free patent over the land in question by Barroga is valid, even
though there exist a Titulo Real No. 12479 issued in the name of his predecessor in
interest on July 22, 1894. YES
2)WON the free patent and certificate of title can still be assailed many years after had
become final and indefeasible. NO
Held:
1) It is true that by filing the application for a free patent Barroga impliedly admitted
either the invalidity or insufficiency of Titulo Real No. 12479 issued in the name of his
predecessor in interest on July 22, 1894, but neither the allegation made in his answer
that his aforesaid predecessor in interest was the absolute owner of the property
covered by said Titulo Real nor his implied admission of the latter's invalidity or
insufficiency are grounds for the annulment of the free patent and original certificate of
title in question. Evidently, it was Barroga's privilege to rely or not to rely upon his claim
of private ownership in favor of his predecessor in interest and of whatever the latter's
Titulo Real was worth. He decided not to rely upon them and to consider instead that the
property covered by the Titulo Real was still part of the public domain. Acting
accordingly he applied for a free patent and was successful. It must be borne in mind
that the Titulo Real was not an indefeasible title and that its holder still had to prove
that he had possessed the land covered by it without interruption during a period of ten
years by virtue of a good title and in good faith (Royal Decree of June 25, 1880). We may
well presume that Barroga felt that he had no sufficient evidence to prove this, for which
reason he decided to acquire the land as part of the public domain.
2) Having arrived at this conclusion, We are constrained to agree with the trial court
that because the record shows that the complaint was filed many years after the free
patent and certificate of title it sought to annul had become final and indefeasible, the
facts set forth in said pleading do not constitute a cause of action in favor of appellants.

Case #4:
Republic vs The Intermediate Appellate Court GR No. 73085

Facts:
The private respondents, all surnames Merchant, filed a complaint against the petitioner
for quieting of title over the property, which they claimed that they acquired by virtue of
a document which they alleged to be a Spanish title originally issued to Bernardo
Merchant, located in Sitio de Malapianbato alias Arras, Bo. De Ayuti, Lucban, Quezon
with an area of 1,660,000 sq m, more or less, 166 hectares.
Petitioner moved to dismissed the said complaint on the grounds that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the land is part of a forest
reserve.
The petition to dismiss was denied. On December 18, 1975, Judge Maddela declared the
private respondents as owner of land.
Petitioner filed a motion to set aside the decision and was granted.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor if the private respondents ad the rightful co-
owners and possessors of the land.
Issue: Is the petition with or without merit?
Ruling:
Petition is with merit. The contentions of the petitioner that being part of forest reserve
and a national park, the land cannot be the subject of appropriation.
The document alleged to be a Spanish title negates their claim and no statement that
Bernardo Merchan has acquired ownership and no specific area was indicated.
The land in question was already proclaimed a part of forest reserve by Proclamation
No. 42 and Proclamation No. 716. It is a rule that forest reserves are not capable of
private appropriation unless lands are reclassified.

#5
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MELECIO
MAGCAMIT, NENA COSICO and EMELITA MAGCAMIT,
FACTS:
On December 2,1971, the spouses Paulino Vivas and Engracia Lizards, owners of a
parcel of land situated in Bo. San Francisco, Victoria, Laguna, sold for P30,000.00 said
property in favor of spouses Melencio Magcamit and Nena Cosico, and Amelita Magcamit
(private respondents)
It is evidenced by "Kasulatan Ng Bilihang Mabiling Muli" with right to repurchase,
recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna on December 6,1971 under Act
No. 3344.
A balance of P40,000.00 was to be paid the moment that the certificate of title is issued.
From the execution of said Kasulatan, private respondent have remained in peaceful,
adverse and open possession of subject property.
On February 26, 1975, an Original Certificate of Title No. T-1728 covering the property in
question was issued to and in the name of the spouses Vivas and Lizardo without the
knowledge of the private respondents and on April 30, 1975, said Spouses executed a
Special Power of Attorney in favor of Irenea Ramirez authorizing the latter to mortgage
the property with the petitioner, National Grains Authority.
On May 2, 1974, the counsel for the petitioner wrote the Provincial Sheriff in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, requesting for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage executed by Irenea
Ramirez.
On May 31, 1974, the Provincial Sheriff caused the issuance of the notice of sale of the
property in question, scheduling the public auction sale and petitioner was the highest
and successful bidder. A Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor
The private respondents learned that a title in the name of the Vivas spouses had been
issued covering the property in question and that the same property had been
mortgaged in favor of the petitioner.
Private respondent Nena Magcamit offered to pay the petitioner NGA the amount of
P40,000.00 which is the balance of the amount due the Vivas spouses under the terms of
the absolute deed of sale.
Petitioner refused to accept the payment.
On July 31, 1974, counsel for private respondents made a formal demand on the spouses
Vivas and Lizardo the offer to pay the balance of P40,000.00 due under the absolute
deed of sale.
However, petitioner in its reply informed counsel of private respondents that petitioner is
now the owner of the property in question and has no intention of disposing of the same.
The private respondents, who as previously stated, are in possession of subject property
were asked by petitioner to vacate it but the former refused.
Petitioner filed a suit for ejectment against private respondents in the Municipal Court of
Victoria, Laguna, but the case was dismissed.
On June 4, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint before the then Court of First
Instance of Laguna but the declared petitioner the lawful owner of the property by virtue
of its indefeasible title to the same.
The private respondents interposed an appeal.
The appellate court reversed and set aside the lower courts decision.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but the same was
denied.
ISSUE:
whether or not violation of the terms of the agreement between the spouses Vivas and
Lizardo, constitutes a breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and right acquired by
petitioner NGA, an innocent purchaser for value.
HELD:
Private respondents claim a better right to the property in question by virtue of the
Conditional Sale, later changed to a deed of Absolute Sale which although unregistered
under the Torrens System allegedly transferred to them the ownership and the
possession of the property in question.
Thus, under Section 44 of P.D. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of
title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate and any of the
encumbrances which may be subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said
provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except those mentioned by law as
existing, against the land prior to the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such
certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so issued binds the whole world,
including the government (Aldecoa and Co. vs. Warner Barns & Co., 30 Phil. 209 [1915];
Snyder vs. Fiscal of Cebu and Avila, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]). Under said ruling, if the
purchaser is the only party who appears in the deeds and the registration of titles in the
property registry, no one except such purchaser may be deemed by law to be the owner
of the properties in question (Ibid). Moreover, no title to registered land in derogation to
that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession
(Umbay vs. Alecha, 135 SCRA 427 [1985]).
It does not appear that private respondents' claim falls under any of the exceptions
provided for under Section 44 of P.D. 1529 which can be enforced against petitioner
herein.
The real purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any
question as to its legality.
The only exception to this rule is where a person obtains a certificate of title to a land
belonging to another and he has full knowledge of the rights of the true owner. He is
then considered as guilty of fraud and he may be compelled to transfer the land to the
defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value.

#6
ANG LAM, vs. POTENCIANO ROSILLOSA and VICENTE SANTIAGO, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Quezon, respondents.
FACTS:
Potenciano Rosillosa, was the owner of a parcel of land, planted to coconuts, containing
an area of 145,957 square meters, and located in the municipality of Unisan, Province of
Quezon, which parcel of land he had acquired by homestead and for which he had
obtained homestead title No. 3201, patent No. 18102, issued January 30, 1932. On May
22, 1944, he sold said parcel of land to Maximo Alpay for P10,000. In the month of July,
1944, Maximo Alpay in turn sold said parcel of land to Eugenia Peregrina for the sum of
P25,000 and transfer certificate of title No. 19539 was duly issued in her name on July
29, 1944.
On or about October 22, 1947, Potenciano Rosillosa instituted civil case No. 4820 in the
Court of First Instance of Quezon against Maximo Alpay and Eugenia Peregrina to
redeem the said property under the provisions of the Public Land Act.
On December 4, 1948, upon petition of the plaintiff Potenciano Rosillosa, who alleged
that the defendant Eugenia Peregrina could not found and served with summons at her
known address, the respondent judge ordered that said defendant be served with
summons by publication in The Manila Chronicle. Thereafter said defendant, having
failed to appear within the period fixed in the summons, was declared in default; and the
court, after hearing the evidence for the plaintiff, rendered a decision on April 2, 1949,
ordering the defendant Eugenia Peregrina to execute a deed of resale of the land in
question in favor of the plaintiff Potenciano Rosillosa.
It turned out, however, that the defendant Eugenia Peregrina had died in the City of
Manila as early as April 1, 1945, that is to say, several years before said civil case No.
4820 was commenced. On September 22, 1949, the present petitioner Ang Lam, who
alleged under oath that on September 21, 1949, he was appointed by the Court of first
Instance of Manila administrator of the estate of the deceased Eugenia Peregrina, filed a
petition in said civil case No. 4820, praying that the judgment theretofore rendered
therein be set aside on the ground that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the deceased defendant Eugenia Peregrina.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment rendered in civil case No. 4820 should be set aside
on the ground that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
deceased defendant Eugenia Peregrina.
RULING: YES. We are of the opinion and so hold that the judgment in question is null and
void of jurisdiction over person of the defendant. At the time the action was commenced
said defendant had long passed to another world. Hence the publication of the summons
against her was absolutely vain and no validity whatsoever.
The attempt of the respondent judge to hold the said summons by publication binding
upon the petitioner Ang Lam on the theory that the action was one in rem and that said
petitioner is the surviving husband of the defendant and is the administrator of the
property in question, is, in our opinion, untenable. An action to redeem, or to recover title
to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole
world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an action in
personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly
impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard.
"Actions in personam and actions in rem differ in that the former are directed against
specific and seek personal judgments, while the latter are directed against the thing or
property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against the
whole world."
An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action, but it is an action in personam, for
it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing.
The order of the respondent judge of November 18, 1949, is set aside and the decision
rendered in civil case No. 4820 on April 2, 1949, is declared null and void, with costs
against the respondent Potenciano Rosillosa.

#7
Cacho vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 123361 March 3, 1997

FACTS: The late Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two (2) parcels of land situated in Lanao,
Moro Province. Both parcels were within the limits of the Military Reservation No. 43 known as Camp
Overton.
The application was tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge and he granted the petitioner (Cacho)
the entitlement to the two (2) parcels of land. On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, the sole heir of the
deceased Demetria Cacho filed for a petition for the reconstitution of the two (2) original certificates of
title under RA 26.
The petition was opposed to by the Republic of the Philippines, National Steel Corporation and
the City of Iligan on the basis of the Regalian Doctrine that states that all lands of whatever
classification belong to the State. The matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA denied
the petition for reconstitution of title and ordered that the decree of registration be reopened. Thus, the
instant petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the honorable Court of Appeals erred in its decision to reopen the decrees issued
by the trial court?

HELD: Yes. A land registration proceeding is in rem. The decree of registration is binding upon and
conclusive against all persons including the Government and its branches,
irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of the application, because all
persons are considered as notified by the publication required by law. A decree of registration that has
become final shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and determined but
also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land registration proceedings. It is no doubt
that the decrees of registration had been issued and such decrees attained finality upon the lapse of one
year from entry thereof. The decision of the CA to reopen the decrees previously issued runs counter
to the very purpose of the Torrens System.
It also constitutes a derogation of the Doctrine of Res Judicata. The decrees are res judicata
and these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of proceedings in rem.
Such a requirement is impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of the Torrens System of
registration because it also effectively renders the decree inconclusive.
The SC sets aside the decision of the CA and reinstated the decision of the lower court.