Alienation of Public Agricultural Lands

Facts:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title of a parcel of

land. The application sought a judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the
land.

The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles opposed the
petition. The court issued an order of general default against the whole world
except as to Angeles and the government.

The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of
Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Maming, wherein he renounced all his rights to
the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the
same.

Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The

administrator introduced improvements, planted trees in addition to existing
coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding
taxes due on the subject land.

Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land openly and in the
concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for registration.

The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared
alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or
disposable.

The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public domain which
were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant.

Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable
before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could
even start.

Held:

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration

proceedings, provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been

in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws.

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration
of title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually

inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.

The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for
alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in
good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of
the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of title under Section
14(1) had been met by Naguit. The parcel of land had been declared alienable;
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land evidenced by the 50 to 60-
year old trees at the time she purchased the property; as well as the tax
declarations executed by the original owner Urbano in 1954, which strengthened
one's bona fide claim of ownership.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 179987

April 29, 2009

en banc

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of
Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession
of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to
a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death,
his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife,
Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their
father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued
by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved
the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the
land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification
occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that
the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription
in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its
slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:
The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is
entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil
Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However,
public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and
other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title.
Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to
the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property
was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with
Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2)
of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.