Vitug vs.

CA GR 82027

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990

ROMARICO G. VITUG, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROWENA FAUSTINO-CORONA,
respondents.

Rufino B. Javier Law Office for petitioner.

Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This case is a chapter in an earlier suit decided by this Court 1

involving the probate of the two wills of the late Dolores
Luchangco Vitug, who died in New York, U. S.A., on November 10, 1980, naming private respondent
Rowena Faustino-Corona executrix. In our said decision, we upheld the appointment of Nenita Alonte as
co-special administrator of Mrs. Vitug's estate with her (Mrs. Vitug's) widower, petitioner Romarico G.
Vitug, pending probate.

On January 13, 1985, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for authority from the probate court to sell
certain shares of stock and real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly his advances to the
estate in the sum of P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were personal funds. As found by the
Court of Appeals, 2 the alleged advances consisted of P58,147.40 spent for the payment of estate tax,
P518,834.27 as deficiency estate tax, and P90,749.99 as "increment thereto." 3 According to Mr. Vitug, he
withdrew the sums of P518,834.27 and P90,749.99 from savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of
America, Makati, Metro Manila.

On April 12, 1985, Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell on the ground that the same funds
withdrawn from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties and part of the
estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for reimbursement. She also sought his ouster for
failure to include the sums in question for inventory and for "concealment of funds belonging to the
estate." 4

Vitug insists that the said funds are his exclusive property having acquired the same through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970. The agreement
provides:
 We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST
AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that all money now
or hereafter deposited by us or any or either of us with the BANK in our joint savings
current account shall be the property of all or both of us and shall be payable to and
collectible or withdrawable by either or any of us during our lifetime, and after the death of
either or any of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the survivor or survivors,
and shall be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.

We further agree with each other and the BANK that the receipt or check of either, any or
all of us during our lifetime, or the receipt or check of the survivor or survivors, for any
payment or withdrawal made for our above-mentioned account shall be valid and
sufficient release and discharge of the BANK for such payment or withdrawal. 5

The trial courts 6 upheld the validity of this agreement and granted "the motion to sell some of the estate
of Dolores L. Vitug, the proceeds of which shall be used to pay the personal funds of Romarico Vitug in
the total sum of P667,731.66 ... ." 7

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, in the petition for certiorari filed by the herein private
respondent, held that the above-quoted survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa
which "did not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of the Civil Code," 8
and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the
provisions of Article 133 of the Civil Code. 9

The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge dated November 26, 1985 (Annex II,
petition) is hereby set aside insofar as it granted private respondent's motion to sell
certain properties of the estate of Dolores L. Vitug for reimbursement of his alleged
advances to the estate, but the same order is sustained in all other respects. In addition,
respondent Judge is directed to include provisionally the deposits in Savings Account No.
35342-038 with the Bank of America, Makati, in the inventory of actual properties
possessed by the spouses at the time of the decedent's death. With costs against private
respondent. 10

In his petition, Vitug, the surviving spouse, assails the appellate court's ruling on the strength of our
decisions in Rivera v. People's Bank and Trust Co. 11 and Macam v. Gatmaitan 12 in which we sustained
the validity of "survivorship agreements" and considering them as aleatory contracts. 13

The petition is meritorious.

The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which should be embodied in a will. A
will has been defined as "a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person
disposes of his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death." 14
In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the testator. 15 In this case, the monies subject of
savings account No. 35342-038 were in the nature of conjugal funds In the case relied on, Rivera v.
People's Bank and Trust Co., 16 we rejected claims that a survivorship agreement purports to deliver one
party's separate properties in favor of the other, but simply, their joint holdings:

xxx xxx xxx

... Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption that Stephenson was the
exclusive owner of the funds-deposited in the bank, which assumption was in turn based
on the facts (1) that the account was originally opened in the name of Stephenson alone
and (2) that Ana Rivera "served only as housemaid of the deceased." But it not
 infrequently happens that a person deposits money in the bank in the name of another;
and in the instant case it also appears that Ana Rivera served her master for about
nineteen years without actually receiving her salary from him. The fact that subsequently
Stephenson transferred the account to the name of himself and/or Ana Rivera and
executed with the latter the survivorship agreement in question although there was no
relation of kinship between them but only that of master and servant, nullifies the
assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the bank account. In the
absence, then, of clear proof to the contrary, we must give full faith and credit to the
certificate of deposit which recites in effect that the funds in question belonged to Edgar
Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that they were joint (and several) owners thereof; and that
either of them could withdraw any part or the whole of said account during the lifetime of
both, and the balance, if any, upon the death of either, belonged to the survivor. 17

xxx xxx xxx

In Macam v. Gatmaitan, 18 it was held:

xxx xxx xxx

This Court is of the opinion that Exhibit C is an aleatory contract whereby, according to
article 1790 of the Civil Code, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind themselves to
give or do something as an equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in
case of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate
time. As already stated, Leonarda was the owner of the house and Juana of the Buick
automobile and most of the furniture. By virtue of Exhibit C, Juana would become the
owner of the house in case Leonarda died first, and Leonarda would become the owner
of the automobile and the furniture if Juana were to die first. In this manner Leonarda and
Juana reciprocally assigned their respective property to one another conditioned upon
who might die first, the time of death determining the event upon which the acquisition of
such right by the one or the other depended. This contract, as any other contract, is
binding upon the parties thereto. Inasmuch as Leonarda had died before Juana, the latter
thereupon acquired the ownership of the house, in the same manner as Leonarda would
have acquired the ownership of the automobile and of the furniture if Juana had died first.
19

xxx xxx xxx

There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and hence it must be presumed to
be conjugal, having been acquired during the existence of the marita. relations. 20

Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious reasons, because it was to take
effect after the death of one party. Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved
no conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other.

It is also our opinion that the agreement involves no modification petition of the conjugal partnership, as
held by the Court of Appeals, 21 by "mere stipulation" 22 and that it is no "cloak" 23 to circumvent the law on
conjugal property relations. Certainly, the spouses are not prohibited by law to invest conjugal property,
say, by way of a joint and several bank account, more commonly denominated in banking parlance as an
"and/or" account. In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No. 35342-038,
they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-making venture. They did not dispose of it in
favor of the other, which would have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the
funds were conjugal, it can not be said that one spouse could have pressured the other in placing his or
her deposits in the money pool.
The validity of the contract seems debatable by reason of its "survivor-take-all" feature, but in reality, that
contract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such agreements are permitted by
the Civil Code. 24

Under Article 2010 of the Code:

ART. 2010. By an aleatory contract, one of the parties or both reciprocally bind
themselves to give or to do something in consideration of what the other shall give or do
upon the happening of an event which is uncertain, or which is to occur at an
indeterminate time.

Under the aforequoted provision, the fulfillment of an aleatory contract depends on either the happening
of an event which is (1) "uncertain," (2) "which is to occur at an indeterminate time." A survivorship
agreement, the sale of a sweepstake ticket, a transaction stipulating on the value of currency, and
insurance have been held to fall under the first category, while a contract for life annuity or pension under
Article 2021, et sequentia, has been categorized under the second. 25 In either case, the element of risk is
present. In the case at bar, the risk was the death of one party and survivorship of the other.

However, as we have warned:

xxx xxx xxx

But although the survivorship agreement is per se not contrary to law its operation or
effect may be violative of the law. For instance, if it be shown in a given case that such
agreement is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation, to transfer property in fraud of
creditors, or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir, it may be assailed and annulled upon
such grounds. No such vice has been imputed and established against the agreement
involved in this case. 26

xxx xxx xxx

There is no demonstration here that the survivorship agreement had been executed for such unlawful
purposes, or, as held by the respondent court, in order to frustrate our laws on wills, donations, and
conjugal partnership.

The conclusion is accordingly unavoidable that Mrs. Vitug having predeceased her husband, the latter
has acquired upon her death a vested right over the amounts under savings account No. 35342-038 of
the Bank of America. Insofar as the respondent court ordered their inclusion in the inventory of assets left
by Mrs. Vitug, we hold that the court was in error. Being the separate property of petitioner, it forms no
more part of the estate of the deceased.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court, dated June 29, 1987, and its resolution,
dated February 9, 1988, are SET ASIDE.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999

LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO,
respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still be given
effect? This is the issue that arose from the following antecedents:

Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate being
settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he
died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandro's
will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The
trial court granted the motion and issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late
Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and
declaring the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late
spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed
according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government. 1

Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took
care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon
denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was
dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within the extended period
granted. 2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of
judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued
by the lower court to implement the final and executory Order. Consequently, private respondents filed
several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer Certificates of
Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the TCT's,
private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their
names. Petitioner opposed the motion.

An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final and
executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of
execution, on the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in character. The court
added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the
deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order
dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which
nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.

Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private respondents
before the Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be
said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise
assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which
declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.

Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late Alejandro and to
maintain the status quo or lease of the premises thereon to third parties. 3 Private respondents opposed
the motion on the ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the
late Alejandro.

The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or
reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has
attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals. It is
well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do
so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a
final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4

It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the trial
court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and
the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same
proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the
testator acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical
questions in connection therewith being for once and forever closed. 5 Such final order makes the will
conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution. 6

It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to
be probated, 7 particularly on three aspects:

n whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and
testament;

n compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;

n the testamentary capacity of the testator; 8

n and the due execution of the last will and testament. 9

Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and
disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under
duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he was of
the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. 11

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the
will has been authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and
testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for
dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to
the laws on succession, 13 the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is
specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court
which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final
and executory decision of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals
must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law
constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved
by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or
order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by law 14 become final
otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium the very object of which
the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so
speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. 16 The only
instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when
he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence, 17 which circumstances do not concur herein.

Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she
precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order of
January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those who are
not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res judicata
with respect to those who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those
matters anew for relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered
that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely by some
other court. 18 It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse should be
distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.

Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by
the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely declaring who are heirs and the
shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares from
one person to another particularly when no project of partition has been filed." 19 The trial court declared
in the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his
three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But it should be
noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed
according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order of intestate
distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the same will.

It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy
is preferred to intestacy. 20 But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the
scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer
available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is
usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give Nemo praesumitur donare. 21 No
intestate distribution of the estate can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic
and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic
validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is whether
the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had ruled
that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the
rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.

Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late
spouse, whom he described as his "only beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final and
executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or
properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns
the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and
determined in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse's estate.

Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was not
married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 45629 September 22, 1938

ANTILANO G. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
ALFONSO SANTOS, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondents.
ROSARIO BASA DE LEON, ET AL., intervenors.

Claro M. Recto and Benigno S. Aquino for petitioner.

Esperanza de la Cruz and Heracio Abistao for respondents.
Sotto and Sotto for intervenors.

LAUREL, J.:

On May 28, 1931, the petitioner herein filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition
for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa. Without any opposition, and upon the
testimony of Benigno F. Gabino, one of the attesting witnesses, the probate court, on June
27,1931, admitted the will to probate. Almost three years later, on April 11, 1934, the five
intervenors herein moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the
court to probate the will and to close the proceedings. Because filed ex parte, the motion was
denied. The same motion was filed a second time, but with notice to the adverse party. The
motion was nevertheless denied by the probate court on May 24, 1934. On appeal to this court,
the order of denial was affirmed on July 26, 1935. (Basa vs. Mercado, 33 Off. Gaz., 2521.)

It appears that on October 27, 1932, i. e., sixteen months after the probate of the will of Ines
Basa, intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the peace court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, a complaint against the petitioner herein, for falsification or forgery of the will
probated as above indicated. The petitioner was arrested. He put up a bond in the sum of P4,000
and engaged the services of an attorney to undertake his defense. Preliminary investigation of the
case was continued twice upon petition of the complainant. The complaint was finally dismissed,
at the instance of the complainant herself, in an order dated December 8, 1932. Three months
later, or on March 2, 1933, the same intervenor charged the petitioner for the second time with
the same offense, presenting the complaint this time in the justice of the peace court of Mexico,
Pampanga. The petitioner was again arrested, again put up a bond in the sum of P4,000, and
engaged the services of counsel to defend him. This second complaint, after investigation, was
also dismissed, again at the instance of the complainant herself who alleged that the petitioner
was in poor health. That was on April 27, 1933. Some nine months later, on February 2, 1934, to
be exact, the same intervenor accused the same petitioner for the third time of the same offense.
The information was filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga in the justice of the peace court
of Mexico. The petitioner was again arrested, again put up a bond of P4,000, and engaged the
services of defense counsel. The case was dismissed on April 24, 1934, after due investigation,
on the ground that the will alleged to have been falsified had already been probated and there
was no evidence that the petitioner had forged the signature of the testatrix appearing thereon,
but that, on the contrary, the evidence satisfactorily established the authenticity of the signature
aforesaid. Dissatisfied with the result, the provincial fiscal, on May 9, 1934, moved in the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga for reinvestigation of the case. The motion was granted on May
23, 1934, and, for the fourth time, the petitioner was arrested, filed a bond and engaged the
services of counsel to handle his defense. The reinvestigation dragged on for almost a year until
February 18, 1934, when the Court of First Instance ordered that the case be tried on the merits.
The petitioner interposed a demurrer on November 25, 1935, on the ground that the will alleged
to have been forged had already been probated. This demurrer was overruled on December 24,
1935, whereupon an exception was taken and a motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal
were filed. The motion for reconsideration and the proposed appeal were denied on January 14,
1936. The case proceeded to trial, and forthwith petitioner moved to dismiss the case claiming
again that the will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that the
order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due execution thereof. The
motion was overruled and the petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction to enjoin the trial court from further proceedings in the matter. The
injunction was issued and thereafter, on June 19, 1937, the Court of Appeals denied the petition
for certiorari, and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. Three justices dissented in a
separate opinion. The case is now before this court for review on certiorari.

Petitioner contends (1) that the probate of the will of his deceased wife is a bar to his criminal
prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will; and, (2) that he has been denied the
constitutional right to a speedy trial.

1. Section 306 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides as to the effect of judgments.

SEC. 306. Effect of judgment. The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or
special proceeding before a court or judge of the Philippine Islands or of the United
States, or of any State or Territory of the United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment or order, may be as follows.

1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a

will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal,
political, or legal condition or relation of a particular person, the judgment or order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or
relation of the person Provided, That the probate of a will or granting of letters of
administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis ours.)
Section 625 of the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a
probate will. It says.

SEC. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No will shall pass
either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First
Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of
real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution. (Emphasis ours.)

(In Manahan vs. Manahan 58 Phil., 448, 451), we held:

. . . The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it
cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any
separate or independent action or proceeding. Sec. 625, Code of Civil Procedure;
Castaeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil., 436; Sahagun vs. De
Gorostiza, 7 Phil., 347; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil., 393; Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil.,
676; in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil, 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil., 105; Austria vs.
Ventenilla, 21 Phil., 180; Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855; and Chiong Jocsoy vs. Vano,
8 Phil., 119.

In 28 R. C. L., p. 377, section 378, it is said.

The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is usually
considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that
the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and
was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is
genuine and not a forgery. (Emphasis ours.)

As our law on wills, particularly section 625 of our Code of Civil Procedure aforequoted, was
taken almost bodily from the Statutes of Vermont, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
State relative to the effect of the probate of a will are of persuasive authority in this jurisdiction.
The Vermont statute as to the conclusiveness of the due execution of a probated will reads as
follows.

SEC. 2356. No will shall pass either real or personal estate, unless it is proved and
allowed in the probate court, or by appeal in the county or supreme court; and the probate
of a will of real or personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution. (Vermont
Statutes, p. 451.)

Said the Supreme Court of Vermont in the case of Missionary Society vs. Eells (68 Vt., 497,
504): "The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof, upon the due
notice, is conclusive as to its due execution against the whole world. (Vt. St., sec. 2336; Fosters
Exrs. vs. Dickerson, 64 Vt., 233.)"

The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by
Publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world,
and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against
the State. This court held in the case of Manalo vs. Paredes and Philippine Food Co. (47 Phil.,
938):

The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265), and the court
acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested, through the publication of the notice
prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be
entered therein is binding against all of them.

Through the publication of the petition for the probate of the will, the court acquires
jurisdiction over all such persons as are interested in said will; and any judgment that
may be rendered after said proceeding is binding against the whole world.

In Everrett vs. Wing (103 Vt., 488, 492), the Supreme Court of Vermont held.

In this State the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem being in form and substance upon
the will itself to determine its validity. The judgment determines the status of the
instrument, whether it is or is not the will of the testator. When the proper steps required
by law have been taken the judgment is binding upon everybody, and makes the
instrument as to all the world just what the judgment declares it to be. (Woodruff vs.
Taylor, 20 Vt., 65, 73; Burbeck vs. Little, 50 Vt., 713, 715; Missionary Society vs. Eells,
68 Vt., 497, 504; 35 Atl., 463.) The proceedings before the probate court are statutory
and are not governed by common law rules as to parties or causes of action. (Holdrige vs.
Holdriges Estate, 53 Vt., 546, 550; Purdy vs. Estate of Purdy, 67 Vt. 50, 55; 30 Atl., 695.)
No process is issued against anyone in such proceedings, but all persons interested in
determining the state or conditions of the instrument are constructively notified by the
publication of notice as required by G. L. 3219. (Woodruff vs. Taylor, supra; In re
Warners Estate 98 Vt., 254; 271; 127 Atl., 362.)

Section 333, paragraph 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes an incontrovertible

presumption in favor of judgments declared by it to be conclusive.

SEC. 333. Conclusive Presumptions. The following presumptions or deductions,

which the law expressly directs to be made from particular facts, are deemed conclusive.

xxx xxx xxx

4. The judgment or order of a court, when declared by this code to be conclusive.

Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will not allow
them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong. (Brant vs. Morning Journal Assn.,
80 N.Y.S., 1002, 1004; 81 App. Div., 183; see, also, Joslyn vs. Puloer, 59 Hun., 129, 140, 13
N.Y.S., 311.) The will in question having been probated by a competent court, the law will not
admit any proof to overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not a forgery.

The majority decision of the Court of Appeals cites English decisions to bolster up its conclusion
that "the judgment admitting the will to probate is binding upon the whole world as to the due
execution and genuineness of the will insofar as civil rights and liabilities are concerned, but not
for the purpose of punishment of a crime." The cases of Dominus Rex vs. Vincent, 93 English
Reports, Full Reprint, 795, the first case being decided in 1721, were cited to illustrate the earlier
English decisions to the effect that upon indictment for forging a will, the probating of the same
is conclusive evidence in the defendants favor of its genuine character. Reference is made,
however, to the cases of Rex vs. Gibson, 168 English Reports, Full Reprint, 836, footnote (a),
decided in 1802, and Rex vs. Buttery and Macnamarra, 168 English Reports, Full Reprint, 836,
decided in 1818, which establish a contrary rule. Citing these later cases, we find the following
quotation from Black on Judgments, Vol. II, page 764.

A judgment admitting a will to probate cannot be attacked collaterally although the will
was forged; and a payment to the executor named therein of a debt due the decedent will
discharge the same, notwithstanding the spurious character of the instrument probated. It
has also been held that, upon an indictment for forging a will, the probate of the paper in
question is conclusive evidence in the defendants favor of its genuine character. But this
particular point has lately been ruled otherwise.

It was the case of Rex vs. Buttery, supra, which induced the Supreme Court of Massachussetts in
the case of Waters vs. Stickney (12 Allen 1; 90 Am. Dec., 122) also cited by the majority
opinion, to hold that "according to later and sounder decisions, the probate, though conclusive
until set aside of the disposition of the property, does not protect the forger from punishment."
This was reproduced in 28 R.C.L., p. 376, and quoted in Barry vs. Walker (103 Fla., 533; 137
So., 711, 715), and Thompson vs. Freeman (149 So., 740, 742), also cited in support of the
majority opinion of the Court of Appeals. The dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals in the
instant case under review makes a cursory study of the statutes obtaining in England,
Massachussetts and Florida, and comes to the conclusion that the decisions cited in the majority
opinion do not appear to "have been promulgated in the face of statutes similar to ours." The
dissenting opinion cites Whartons Criminal Evidence (11th ed., sec. 831), to show that the
probate of a will in England is only prima facie proof of the validity of the will (Op. Cit. quoting
Marriot vs. Marriot, 93 English Reprint, 770); and 21 L.R.A. (pp. 686689 and note), to show that
in Massachussetts there is no statute making the probate of a will conclusive, and that in Florida
the statute(sec. 1810, Revised Statutes) makes the probate conclusive evidence as to the validity
of the will with regard to personal, and prima facie as to real estate. The cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Florida cited by the majority opinion, supra, refer to wills of both personal and
real estate.

The petitioner cites the case of State vs. McGlynn (20 Cal., 233, decided in 1862), in which
Justice Norton of the Supreme Court of California, makes the following review of the nature of
probate proceedings in England with respect to wills personal and real property.

In England, the probate of wills of personal estate belongs to the Ecclesiastical Courts.
No probate of a will relating to real estate is there necessary. The real estate, upon the
death of the party seized, passes immediately to the devisee under the will if there be one;
or if there be no will, to the heir at law. The person who thus becomes entitled takes
possession. If one person claims to be the owner under a will, and another denies the
validity of the will and claims to be the owner as heir at law, an action of ejectment is
 brought against the party who may be in possession by the adverse claimant; and on the
trial of such an action, the validity of the will is contested, and evidence may be given by
the respective parties as to the capacity of the testator to make a will, or as to any fraud
practiced upon him, or as to the actual execution of it, or as to any other circumstance
affecting its character as a valid devise of the real estate in dispute. The decision upon the
validity of the will in such action becomes res adjudicata, and is binding and conclusive
upon the parties to that action and upon any person who may subsequently acquire the
title from either of those parties; but the decision has no effect upon other parties, and
does not settle what may be called the status or character of the will, leaving it subject to
be enforced as a valid will, or defeated as invalid, whenever other parties may have a
contest depending upon it. A probate of a will of personal property, on the contrary, is a
judicial determination of the character of the will itself. It does not necessarily or
ordinarily arise from any controversy between adverse claimants, but is necessary in
order to authorize a disposition of the personal estate in pursuance of its provisions. In
case of any controversy between adverse claimants of the personal estate, the probate is
given in evidence and is binding upon the parties, who are not at liberty to introduce any
other evidence as to the validity of the will.

The intervenors, on the other hand, attempt to show that the English law on wills is different
from that stated in the case of State vs. McGlynn, supra, citing the following statutes.

1. The Wills Act, 1837 (7 Will. 4 E 1 Vict. c. 26).

2. The Court of Probate Act, 1857 (20 and 21 Vict. c. 77).

3. The Judicature Act, 1873 (36 and 37 Vict. c. 66).

The Wills Act of 1837 provides that probate may be granted of "every instrumental purporting to
be testamentary and executed in accordance with the statutory requirements . . . if it disposes of
property, whether personal or real." The Ecclesiastical Courts which took charge of testamentary
causes (Ewells Blackstone [1910], p. 460), were determined by the Court of Probate Act of 1857,
and the Court of Probate in turn was, together with other courts, incorporated into the Supreme
Court of Judicature, and transformed into the Probate Division thereof, by the Judicature Act of
1873. (Lord Halsbury, The Laws of England[1910], pp. 151156.) The intervenors overlook the
fact, however, that the case of Rex vs. Buttery and Macnamarra, supra, upon which they rely in
support of their theory that the probate of a forged will does not protect the forger from
punishment, was decided long before the foregoing amendatory statutes to the English law on
wills were enacted. The case of State vs. McGlynn may be considered, therefore, as more or less
authoritative on the law of England at the time of the promulgation of the decision in the case of
Rex vs. Buttery and Macnamarra.

In the case of State vs. McGlynn, the Attorney General of California filed an information to set
aside the probate of the will of one Broderick, after the lapse of one year provided by the law of
California for the review of an order probating a will, in order that the estate may be escheated to
the State of California for the review of an probated will was forged and that Broderick therefore
died intestate, leaving no heirs, representatives or devisees capable of inheriting his estate. Upon
these facts, the Supreme Court of California held.

The fact that a will purporting to be genuine will of Broderick, devising his estate to a
devisee capable of inheriting and holding it, has been admitted to probate and established
as a genuine will by the decree of a Probate Court having jurisdiction of the case, renders
it necessary to decide whether that decree, and the will established by it, or either of
them, can be set aside and vacated by the judgment of any other court. If it shall be found
that the decree of the Probate Court, not reversed by the appellate court, is final and
conclusive, and not liable to be vacated or questioned by any other court, either
incidentally or by any direct proceeding, for the purpose of impeaching it, and that so
long as the probate stands the will must be recognized and admitted in all courts to be
valid, then it will be immaterial and useless to inquire whether the will in question was in
fact genuine or forged. (State vs. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118, 121.).

Although in the foregoing case the information filed by the State was to set aside the decree of
probate on the ground that the will was forged, we see no difference in principle between that
case and the case at bar. A subtle distinction could perhaps be drawn between setting aside a
decree of probate, and declaring a probated will to be a forgery. It is clear, however, that a duly
probated will cannot be declared to be a forgery without disturbing in a way the decree allowing
said will to probate. It is at least anomalous that a will should be regarded as genuine for one
purpose and spurious for another.

The American and English cases show a conflict of authorities on the question as to whether or
not the probate of a will bars criminal prosecution of the alleged forger of the probate will. We
have examined some important cases and have come to the conclusion that no fixed standard
maybe adopted or drawn therefrom, in view of the conflict no less than of diversity of statutory
provisions obtaining in different jurisdictions. It behooves us, therefore, as the court of last
resort, to choose that rule most consistent with our statutory law, having in view the needed
stability of property rights and the public interest in general. To be sure, we have seriously
reflected upon the dangers of evasion from punishment of culprits deserving of the severity of
the law in cases where, as here, forgery is discovered after the probate of the will and the
prosecution is had before the prescription of the offense. By and large, however, the balance
seems inclined in favor of the view that we have taken. Not only does the law surround the
execution of the will with the necessary formalities and require probate to be made after an
elaborate judicial proceeding, but section 113, not to speak of section 513, of our Code of Civil
Procedure provides for an adequate remedy to any party who might have been adversely affected
by the probate of a forged will, much in the same way as other parties against whom a judgment
is rendered under the same or similar circumstances. (Pecson vs. Coronel, 43 Phil., 358.)The
aggrieved party may file an application for relief with the proper court within a reasonable time,
but in no case exceeding six months after said court has rendered the judgment of probate, on the
ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. An appeal lies to review the
action of a court of first instance when that court refuses to grant relief. (Banco Espaol Filipino
vs. Palanca, 37 Phil., 921; Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, 47 Phil., 810; Samia vs.
Medina, 56 Phil., 613.) After a judgment allowing a will to be probated has become final and
unappealable, and after the period fixed by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure has
expired, the law as an expression of the legislative wisdom goes no further and the case ends
there.

. . . The court of chancery has no capacity, as the authorities have settled, to judge or
decide whether a will is or is not a forgery; and hence there would be an incongruity in its
assuming to set aside a probate decree establishing a will, on the ground that the decree
was procured by fraud, when it can only arrive at the fact of such fraud by first deciding
that the will was a forgery. There seems, therefore, to be a substantial reason, so long as a
court of chancery is not allowed to judge of the validity of a will, except as shown by the
probate, for the exception of probate decrees from the jurisdiction which courts of
chancery exercise in setting aside other judgments obtained by fraud. But whether the
exception be founded in good reason or otherwise, it has become too firmly established to
be disregarded. At the present day, it would not be a greater assumption to deny the
general rule that courts of chancery may set aside judgments procured by fraud, than to
deny the exception to that rule in the case of probate decrees. We must acquiesce in the
principle established by the authorities, if we are unable to approve of the reason. Judge
Story was a staunch advocate for the most enlarged jurisdiction of courts of chancery,
and was compelled to yield to the weight of authority. He says "No other excepted case is
known to exist; and it is not easy to discover the grounds upon which this exception
stands, in point of reason or principle, although it is clearly settled by authority. (1 Storys
Eq. Jur. sec. 440.)" (State vs. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118, 129. See, also,
Tracy vs. Muir, 121 American State Reports, 118, 125.)

We hold, therefore, that in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of our Code of
Civil Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction against the forger of a will which
had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction.

The resolution of the foregoing legal question is sufficient to dispose of the case. However, the
other legal question with reference to the denial to the accused of his right to a speedy trial
having been squarely raised and submitted, we shall proceed to consider the same in the light of
cases already adjudicated by this court.

2. The Constitution of the Philippines provides that "In all criminal prosecutions the accused . . .
shall enjoy the right . . . to have a speedy . . . trial. . . . (Art. III, sec. 1, par. 17. See, also, G.O.
No. 58, sec. 15, No. 7.) Similar provisions are to be found in the Presidents Instructions to the
Second Philippine Commission (par. 11), the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 (sec. 5, par. 2) and
the Jones Act of August 29, 1916 (sec. 3, par. 2). The provisions in the foregoing organic acts
appear to have been taken from similar provisions in the Constitution of the United States (6th
Amendment) and those of the various states of the American Union. A similar injunction is
contained in the Malolos Constitution (art. 8, Title IV), not to speak of other constitutions. More
than once this court had occasion to set aside the proceedings in criminal cases to give effect to
the constitutional injunction of speedy trial. (Conde vs. Judge of First Instance and Fiscal of
Tayabas [1923], 45 Phil., 173; Conde vs. Rivera and Unson[1924], 45 Phil., 650; People vs.
Castaeda and Fernandez[1936]), 35 Off. Gaz., 1269; Kalaw vs. Apostol, Oct. 15, 1937, G.R.
No. 45591; Esguerra vs. De la Costa, Aug. 30,1938, G.R. No. 46039.).
In Conde vs. Rivera and Unson, supra, decided before the adoption of our Constitution, we said.

Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other
accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and
she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble
position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts while investigations and trials are
arbitrarily postponed without her consent, is palpably and openly unjust to her and a
detriment to the public. By the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have
settled upon the appropriate information, could have attended to the formal preliminary
examination, and could have prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays.

In People vs. Castaeda and Fernandez, supra, this court found that the accused had not been
given a fair and impartial trial. The case was to have been remanded to the court a quo for a new
trial before an impartial judge. This step, however, was found unnecessary. A review of the
evidence convinced this court that a judgment of conviction for theft, as charged, could not be
sustained and, having in view the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Constitution to every
person accused of crime, entered a judgment acquitting the accused, with costs de oficio. We
said.

. . . The Constitution, Article III, section 1, paragraph 17, guarantees to every accused
person the right to a speedy trial. This criminal proceeding has been dragging on for
almost five years now. The accused have twice appealed to this court for redress from the
wrong that they have suffered at the hands of the trial court. At least one of them, namely
Pedro Fernandez alias Piro, had been con-fined in prison from July 20, 1932 to
November 27, 1934, for inability to post the required bond of P3,000 which was finally
reduced to P300. The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this
court to see that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that
they be immediately dis-charged from the custody of the law. (Conde vs. Rivera and
Unson, 45 Phil., 651.)

In Kalaw vs. Apostol, supra, the petitioner invoked and this court applied and gave effect to the
doctrines stated in the second Conde case, supra. In granting the writs prayed for, this court, after
referring to the constitutional and statutory provisions guaranteeing to persons accused of crime
the right to a speedy trial, said:

Se infiere de los preceptos legales transcritos que todo acusado en causa criminal tiene
derecho a ser juzgado pronta y publicamente. Juicio rapido significa un juicioque se
celebra de acuerdo con la ley de procedimiento criminal y los reglamentos, libre de
dilaciones vejatorias, caprichosas y opersivas (Burnett vs. State, 76 Ark., 295; 88S. W.,
956; 113 AMSR, 94; Stewart vs. State, 13 Ark., 720; Peo. vs. Shufelt, 61 Mich., 237; 28
N. W., 79; Nixon vs. State, 10 Miss., 497; 41 AMD., 601; State vs. Cole, 4 Okl. Cr., 25;
109 P., 736; State vs. Caruthers, 1 Okl. Cr., 428; 98 P., 474; State vs. Keefe, 17 Wyo.,
227, 98 p., 122;22 IRANS, 896; 17 Ann. Cas., 161). Segun los hechos admitidos resulta
 que al recurrente se le concedio vista parcial del asunto, en el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia de Samar, solo despues de haber transcurrido ya mas de un ao y medio desde
la presentacion de la primera querella y desde la recepcion de la causa en dicho Juzgado,
y despues de haberse transferido dos veces la vista delasunto sin su consentimiento. A
esto debe aadirse que laprimera transferencia de vista era claramente injustificadaporque
el motivo que se alego consistio unicamente en laconveniencia personal del ofendido y su
abogado, no habiendose probado suficientemente la alegacion del primero de quese
hallaba enfermo. Es cierto que el recurrente habia pedido que, en vez de sealarse a vista
el asunto para el mayo de 1936, lo fuera para el noviembre del mismo ao; pero,aparte de
que la razon que alego era bastante fuerte porquesu abogado se oponia a comparecer por
compromisos urgentes contraidos con anterioridad y en tal circunstancia hubiera quedado
indefenso si hubiese sido obligado a entraren juicio, aparece que la vista se pospuso por
el Juzgado amotu proprio, por haber cancelado todo el calendario judicial preparado por
el Escribano para el mes de junio. Declaramos, con visto de estos hechos, que al
recurrents se leprivo de su derecho fundamental de ser juzgado prontamente.

Esguerra vs. De la Costa, supra, was a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal to dismiss the complaint filed in a criminal case against the
petitioner, to cancel the bond put up by the said petitioner and to declare the costs de oficio. In
accepting the contention that the petitioner had been denied speedy trial, this court said:

Consta que en menos de un ao el recurrente fue procesado criminalmente por el alegado

delito de abusos deshonestos, en el Juzgado de Paz del Municipio de Cainta, Rizal. Como
consecuencia de las denuncias que contra el se presentaron fue arrestado tres veces y para
gozar de libertad provisional, en espera de los juicios, se vio obligado a prestartres
fianzas por la suma de P1,000 cada una. Si no se da fin al proceso que ultimamente se ha
incoado contra el recurrente la incertidumbre continuara cerniendose sobre el y las
consiguientes molestias y preocupaciones continuaran igualmente abrumandole. El Titulo
III, articulo 1, No. 17,de la Constitucion preceptua que en todo proceso criminalel
acusado tiene derecho de ser juzgado pronta y publicamente. El Articulo 15, No. 7, de la
Orden General No. 58 dispone asimismo que en las causas criminales el acusado tendra
derecho a ser juzgado pronta y publicamente. Si el recurrente era realmente culpable del
delito que se le imputo, tenia de todos modos derechos a que fuera juzgado pronta y
publicamente y sin dilaciones arbitrarias y vejatorias. Hemos declarado reiteradamente
que existe un remedio positivo para los casos en que se viola el derecho constitucional
del acusado de ser juzgado prontamente. El acusado que esprivado de su derecho
fundomental de ser enjuiciado rapidamente tiene derecho a pedir que se le ponga en
libertad, si estuviese detenido, o a que la causa que pende contra el sea sobreseida
definitivamente. (Conde contra Rivera y Unson, 45 Jur. Fil., 682; In the matter of Ford
[1911], 160 Cal., 334; U. S. vs. Fox [1880], 3 Mont., 512; Kalaw contra Apostol, R. G.
No. 45591, Oct. 15, 1937; Pueblo contra Castaeda y Fernandez, 35 Gac. Of., 1357.)

We are again called upon to vindicate the fundamental right to a speedy trial. The facts of the
present case may be at variance with those of the cases hereinabove referred to. Nevertheless, we
are of the opinion that, under the circumstances, we should consider the substance of the right
instead of indulging in more or less academic or undue factual differentiations. The petitioner
herein has been arrested four times, has put up a bond in the sum of P4,000 and has engaged the
services of counsel to undertake his defense an equal number of times. The first arrest was made
upon a complaint filed by one of the intervenors herein for alleged falsification of a will which,
sixteen months before, had been probated in court. This complaint, after investigation, was
dismissed at the complainant's own request. The second arrest was made upon a complaint
charging the same offense and this complaint, too, was dismissed at the behest of the
complainant herself who alleged the quite startling ground that the petitioner was in poor health.
The third arrest was made following the filing of an information by the provincial fiscal of
Pampanga, which information was dismissed, after due investigation, because of insufficiency of
the evidence. The fourth arrest was made when the provincial fiscal secured a reinvestigation of
the case against the petitioner on the pretext that he had additional evidence to present, although
such evidence does not appear to have ever been presented.

It is true that the provincial fiscal did not intervene in the case until February 2, 1934, when he
presented an information charging the petitioner, for the third time, of the offense of falsification.
This, however, does not matter. The prosecution of offenses is a matter of public interest and it is
the duty of the government or those acting in its behalf to prosecute all cases to their termination
without oppressive, capricious and vexatious delay. The Constitution does not say that the right
to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and
undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private
individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial,
irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced.
In any event, even the actuations of the fiscal himself in this case is not entirely free from
criticism. From October 27, 1932, when the first complaint was filed in the justice of the peace
court of San Fernando, to February 2, 1934, when the provincial fiscal filed his information with
the justice of the peace of Mexico, one year, three months and six days transpired; and from
April 27, 1933, when the second criminal complaint was dismissed by the justice of the peace of
Mexico, to February 2, 1934, nine months and six days elapsed. The investigation following the
fourth arrest, made after the fiscal had secured a reinvestigation of the case, appears also to have
dragged on for about a year. There obviously has been a delay, and considering the antecedent
facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the fiscal, the delay may not at all be regarded
as permissible. In Kalaw vs. Apostol, supra, we observed that the prosecuting officer all
prosecutions for public offenses (secs. 1681 and 2465 of the Rev. Adm. Code), and that it is his
duty to see that criminal cases are heard without vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays so
that the courts of justice may dispose of them on the merits and determine whether the accused is
guilty or not. This is as clear an admonition as could be made. An accused person is entitled to a
trial at the earliest opportunity. (Sutherland on the Constitution, p. 664; United States vs. Fox, 3
Mont., 512.) He cannot be oppressed by delaying he commencement of trial for an unreasonable
length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed.
It is not to be supposed, of course, that the Constitution intends to remove from the prosecution
every reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial. Impossibilities cannot be expected or
extraordinary efforts required on the part of the prosecutor or the court. As stated by the Supreme
Court of the United States, "The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with
delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the
rights of public justice." (Beavers vs. Haubert [1905], 198 U. S., 86; 25 S. Ct., 573; 49 Law. ed.,
950, 954.).
It may be true, as seems admitted by counsel for the intervenors, in paragraph 8, page 3 of his
brief, that the delay was due to "the efforts towards reaching an amicable extrajudicial
compromise," but this fact, we think, casts doubt instead upon the motive which led the
intervenors to bring criminal action against the petitioner. The petitioner claims that the intention
of the intervenors was to press upon settlement, with the continuous threat of criminal
prosecution, notwithstanding the probate of the will alleged to have been falsified. Argument of
counsel for the petitioner in this regard is not without justification. Thus after the filing of the
second complaint with the justice of the peace court of Mexico, complainant herself, as we have
seen, asked for dismissal of the complaint, on the ground that "el acusado tenia la salud bastante
delicada," and, apparently because of failure to arrive at any settlement, she decided to renew her
complaint.

Counsel for the intervenors contend and the contention is sustained by the Court of Appeals
that the petitioner did not complain heretofore of the denial of his constitutional right to a
speedy trial. This is a mistake. When the petitioner, for the fourth time, was ordered arrested by
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, he moved for reconsideration of the order of arrest,
alleging, among other things, "Que por estas continuas acusaciones e investigaciones, el
acusado compareciente no obstante su mal estado de salud desde el ao 1932 en que tuvo que
ser operado por padecer de tuberculosis ha tenido que sostener litigios y ha sufrido la mar de
humiliaciones y zozobras y ha incudo en enormes gastos y molestias y ha desatendido su
quebrantada salud." The foregoing allegation was inserted on page 6 of the amended petition for
certiorari presented to the Court of Appeals. The constitutional issue also appears to have been
actually raised and considered in the Court of Appeals. In the majority opinion of that court, it is
stated:

Upon the foregoing facts, counsel for the petitioner submits for the consideration of this
court the following questions of law: First, that the respondent court acted arbitrarily and
with abuse of its authority, with serious damage and prejudice to the rights and interests
of the petitioner, in allowing that the latter be prosecuted and arrested for the fourth time,
and that he be subjected, also for the fourth time, to a preliminary investigation for the
same offense, hereby converting the court into an instrument of oppression and
vengeance on the part of the alleged offended parties, Rosario Basa et al.; . . . .

And in the dissenting opinion, we find the following opening paragraph:

We cannot join in a decision declining to stop a prosecution that has dragged for about
five years and caused the arrest on four different occasions of a law abiding citizen for
the alleged offense of falsifying a will that years be competent jurisdiction.

From the view we take of the instant case, the petitioner is entitled to have the criminal
proceedings against him quashed. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed,
without pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.