PAGKATIPUNAN V CA
final and conclusive against the Republic.
PETITIONERS: Nestor Pagkatipunan
Rosalina Maagas-Pagkatipunan
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals
Republic of the Philippines
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 129682
PROMUL. DATE: March 21, 2002
PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
November 1960 petitioners predecessors-in-interest,
sps. Getulio Pagkatipunan and Lucrecia Esquires, filed
with CFI Gumaca, Quezon an application for judicial
confirmation and registration of their title to Lots 1 and 2
of Plan Psu-174406 and Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-112066,
all located in San Narciso, Quezon.
May 4, 1961 CFI entered an order of default against the
whole world
o Except sps. Felicisimo Almace and Teodulo
Medenilla, who were given 10 days to file their
written opposition as regards to Lot No. 2 of Plan
Psu-174406
o Getulio and Lucrecia filed a motion, and Lot. No. 2
of Plan Psu-174406 was removed from the
coverage of the application. The remaining
parcel of land covered by Lot No. 1 has an area of
3,804.261 square meters.
June 15, 1967 CFI promulgated a decision confirming
petitioners title to the property. On October 23, 1967, OCT
No. O-12665 was issued in the name of petitioners.
September 12, 1985 (18 years later) the Republic of the
PH filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC):
o an action to declare the proceedings in LRC Case
No. 91-G, LRC Record No. N-19930 before the
Court of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon null
and void, and to cancel Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-12665 and titles derived therefrom as null
and void
o to direct the register of deeds to annul said
certificates of title, and to confirm the subject
land as part of the public domain.
REPUBLICS CLAIMS:
o at the time of filing of the land registration case
and of rendition of the decision on June 15, 1967,
the subject land was classified as timberland
under LC Project No. 15-B of San Narciso,
Quezon, as shown in BF Map No. LC-1180;
hence inalienable and not subject to
registration
o petitioners title thereto cannot be confirmed for
lack of showing of possession and occupation
of the land in the manner and for the length of
time required by Section 48(b), Commonwealth
Act No. 141, as amended
o Neither did petitioners have any fee simple title
which may be registered under Act No. 496, as
amended.
o Consequently, the Court of First Instance did not
acquire jurisdiction over the res and any
proceedings had therein were null and void.
PETITIONERS DEFENSE:
o Raised the special defences of indefeasibility of
title and res judicata.
o Due to the lapse of a considerable length of time,
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon in the land registration case has become
o Moreover, the action for reversion of the land to
the public domain is barred by prior judgment.
June 27, 1986 IAC held that the land in question was
forestral land; hence not registrable.
o There was no evidence on record to show that the
land was actually and officially delimited and
classified as alienable or disposable land of
the public domain. Therefore, the Court of First
Instance did not acquire jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the application for registration and
to decide the same.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (by petitioners, July
16, 1986)
o Reiterated that the land in question was
agricultural because it was possessed and
cultivated as such long before its classification as
timberland by the Bureau of Forestry in 1955
o Petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious possession and occupation of said land
for agricultural and cattle raising purposes as far
back as the Spanish regime.
o CA DENIED (August 20, 1986). Their previous
decision on June 27 (see above) attained finality
and judgment was entered in the book of entries
of judgments. (Dec. 12, 1986)
URGENT MOTION TO SET ASIDE ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT (April 2, 1987)
o Filed by petitioners on the ground that Atty. Cirilo
E. Doronila, their counsel, was not furnished a
copy of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration.
o In the absence of such notice, the decision of the
appellate court did not become final and
executory.
October 22, 1987 - the Court of Appeals set aside and
lifted the entry of judgment in CA-G. R. SP No. 07115 and
directed the clerk of court to furnish petitioners counsel a
copy of the August 20, 1986 resolution.
o For petitioners inaction despite service of the
August 20, 1986 resolution, the June 27, 1986
decision became final and executory.
o On March 2, 1988, entry of judgment was again
made in the land registration case.
September 4, 1995 - Atty. Doronila withdrew his
appearance as counsel for petitioners
On April 1, 1996, petitioners, through their new counsel,
Atty. George I. Howard, filed with the Court of Appeals an
urgent motion to recall the entry of judgment, which
was denied by the appellate court on December 16,
1996.
o An MR was also DENIED on the ground that it
raised arguments already discussed and resolved
in the urgent motion to recall entry of judgment.
ISSUE: WON the Republics cause of action has been
barred by prescription and res judicata?
HELD:
o Petitioners claim that their title to the land became
incontrovertible and indefeasible one (1) year
after issuance of the decree of registration.
Hence, the Republics cause of action was barred
 by prescription and res judicata, proceedings
having been initiated only after about 18 years
from the time the decree of registration was
made. Contrary to the appellate courts findings,
the land is agricultural and the inclusion and
classification thereof by the Bureau of Forestry in
1955 as timberland cannot impair the vested
rights acquired by petitioners predecessors-in-
interest who have been in open, continuous,
adverse and public possession of the land in
question since time immemorial and for more than
thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application
for registration in 1960. Hence, the Court of
Appeals committed grave error when it denied
their motion to set aside entry of judgment in the
land registration case. - The petition lacks merit.
o Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified or alienated to a private person by
the State, it remains part of the inalienable
public domain. Occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title.
o Evidence extant on record showed that at the time
of filing of the application for land registration and
issuance of the certificate of title over the disputed
land in the name of petitioners, the same was
timberland and formed part of the public
domain, as per certification issued by the
Bureau of Forest Development on April 1, 1985,
thus:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated
in Vigo Cantidang, San Narciso, Quezon,
containing an area of 3,804.261 square
meters as described in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-117618 x x x registered in the
name of Spouses Nestor E. Pagkatipunan and
Rosalina Magas is verified to be within the
Timberland Block -B, Project No. 15-B of San
Narciso, Quezon, certified and declared as
such on August 25, 1955 per BFD Map LC-
1880. The land is, therefore, within the
administrative jurisdiction and control of the
Bureau of Forest Development, and not
subject to disposition under the Public Land
Law.
[Sgd.]ARMANDO CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer
o This fact was even admitted by petitioners during
the proceedings before the court a quo on March
10, 1986, when they confirmed that the land
has been classified as forming part of forest
land, albeit only on August 25, 1955. Since no
imperfect title can be confirmed over lands not
yet classified as disposable or alienable, the
title issued to herein petitioners is considered
void ab initio.
o Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State, and the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all
lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the
applicant that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.
o In the case at bar, there was no evidence
showing that the land has been reclassified as
disposable or alienable. Before any land may be
declassified from the forest group and converted
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes, there must be a positive act from
the government. Even rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the
land classified as forest land is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain. Declassification of forest
land is an express and positive act of
Government. It cannot be presumed. Neither
should it be ignored nor deemed waived. It
calls for proof.
o The court a quo found registrable title in favor of
petitioners based on the Republics failure to show
that the land is more valuable as forest land than
for agricultural purposes, a finding which is
based on a wrong concept of what is forest
land.
o There is a big difference between forest as
defined in the dictionary and forest or timber
land as a classification of land of the public
domain in the Constitution. One is descriptive
of what appears on the land while the other is a
legal status, a classification for legal purposes.
The forest land started out as a forest or vast
tracts of wooded land with dense growths of trees
and underbrush. However, the cutting down of
trees and the disappearance of virgin forest do
not automatically convert the land of the public
domain from forest or timber land to alienable
agricultural land.
o The classification of forest land, or any land for
that matter, is descriptive of its legal nature or
status, and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. A person cannot
enter into forest land and by the simple act of
cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits
towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect
title. The Government must first declare the forest
land to be alienable and disposable agricultural
land before the year of entry, cultivation, and
exclusive and adverse possession can be
counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
o Moreover, the original text of Section 48 (b),
Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act, which took
effect on December 1, 1936, expressly provided
that only agricultural land of the public domain are
subject to acquisitive prescription, to wit:
Section 48. x x x
(a) x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against
the Government, since July twenty-six, eighteen
 hundred and ninety-four, except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this Chapter. (Emphasis
supplied)
o Thus, it is clear that the applicant must prove not
only his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land
either since time immemorial or for the period
prescribed therein, but most importantly, he must
prove that the land is alienable public land. In the
case at bar, petitioners failed to do so.
o Petitioners contention that the Republic is
now barred from questioning the validity of
the certificate of title issued to them
considering that it took the government
almost eighteen (18) years to assail the same
is erroneous. It is a basic precept that
prescription does not run against the State. The
lengthy occupation of the disputed land by
petitioners cannot be counted in their favor, as it
remained part of the patrimonial property of the
State, which property, as stated earlier, is
inalienable and indisposable.
o In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals
did not err when it set aside the June 15, 1967
decision of the court a quo and ordered that
the subject lot be reverted back to the public
domain. Since the land in question is
unregistrable, the land registration court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the same. Any
proceedings had or judgment rendered therein is
void and is not entitled to the respect accorded to
a valid judgment.
REPUBLIC V RANESES
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Crisanto S. Raneses
DOCKET NO.: G.R. No. 189970
DATE: June 9, 2014
PONENTE: Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS:
March 26, 2007 respondent Crisanto S. Raneses filed
an Application for Original Registration of Land Title
docketed as LRC No. N-11573-TG over two parcels of land
identified as Lot No. 3085-A, Csd- 00-001621 and Lot No.
3085-B, Csd-00-001621 both located at Barangay
Napindan, Taguig City, Metro Manila with a total area of
twenty-two thousand six hundred (22,600) square meters
(subject properties)
Sept. 24, 2007 - respondent marked several documents to
establish compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.
o There being no opposition filed, the RTC issued
an Order of General Default against all
persons except herein petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner) and granted respondents
Motion to Present his Evidence Ex-Parte.
Oct. 1, 2007 - respondent testified that despite the fact that
the earliest tax declaration on record over the subject
properties was issued only in 1980, his parents had been
in continuous possession and occupation of the same
as early as June 1945.
o He narrated that his father, the late Pedro
Raneses (Pedro), was a farmer who cultivated the
subject properties by planting palay and other
crops thereon.
o He further narrated that since the subject
properties were near the lake, Pedro used a
portable irrigation system to suck water from
Laguna de Bay and a mechanized harvester to
harvest the palay.
o However, he claimed that when Pedro died on
November 15, 1982, the cultivation of the subject
properties was likewise stopped. Respondent
averred that Pedro declared the subject
properties for real estate tax purposes, as
evidenced by several tax declarations issued
in Pedros name.
o Respondent claimed that he acquired ownership
over the subject properties when his mother, Nina
Raneses, and his sisters, Annabelle R. San Juan
and Belinda R. Bayas, executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Deed of Waiver
(Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate) on April 24,
1997, whereby they agreed to partition and
adjudicate among themselves the subject
properties, and thereafter, waive all their
rights, interest and participation over the
same in favor of respondent.
o Respondent also testified that there were no other
persons or entities who occupied the subject
properties.
A Conversion Subdivision Plan, prepared by a private
Geodetic Engineer named Andrew DG. Montalla:
o Said Plan noted that the subject properties were
[s]urveyed in accordance with Survey Authority No.
LMS-SA-007607-310 dated August 29, 2006 issued by
the CENRO, South [S]ector and that the subject
properties were inside alienable and disposable land
area [P]roj. [N]o. 27-B as per LC Map No. 2623 certified
by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968.
Respondent also presented before the RTC an Inter-
Office Memorandum dated March 26, 2007 (Inter-Office
Memorandum) prepared and signed by the Engineering
and Construction Division (ECD) of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) composed of Engineer
Ramon D. Magalonga, Jr. (Engr. Magalonga),
Fredisvindo A. Latoza and Renato Q. Medenilla (ECD
Team) and addressed to the Division Chief-III of the
ECD. Said Memorandum provided that after an actual
field verification, the ECD Team found that the subject
properties are presently above (back filling) the
reglementary 12.5-meter elevation.
Catalina Raneses (mother of respondent) testified that
she and her husband Pedro had been in possession of the
subject properties since the Japanese occupation.
o Pedro cultivated the subject properties for palay
production. However, after Pedros death in 1982,
the subject properties were no longer used for
palay production, and were, instead, at times
leased out for the production of watermelons.
o sometime in 1997, she, her daughters and
respondent executed the aforementioned
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, wherein all of
them waived their rights and interests over the
subject properties in favor of respondent for a
consideration.
October 11, 2007 - the RTC issued its first assailed Order
granting respondents application for land registration.
 October 25, 2007 - the LLDA filed its Opposition to the
application alleging that the subject properties are below
the 12.50-meter elevation, hence, forming part of the bed
of Laguna Lake and are, therefore, inalienable,
indisposable and incapable of registration.
o To support its cause, the LLDA attached to its
Opposition a Memorandum23 dated September
24, 2007 (ECD Memorandum) prepared and
signed by no less than Engr. Magalonga of the
ECD and concurred by the ECDs Division Chief-
III, Engr. Donato C. Rivera, Jr. which stated that
upon the projection of the subject properties in the
LLDAs topographic map, the same were below
the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters.
o The LLDA posited that in the absence of any
declaration by the Director of Lands, the subject
properties remain inalienable and indisposable.
In the meantime, petitioner through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Notice of Appeal on
November 7, 2007.
In compliance with the RTCs Order, respondent filed his
Comment and Motion to the said Opposition:
o arguing that the RTC should give more credence
to the Inter-Office Memorandum as the findings
therein were based on an actual field inspection
rather than the ECD Memorandum, the findings of
which were based on a mere table survey
o respondent argued that the ECD Memorandum
should not be considered by the RTC as the same
was not formally offered in evidence.
On November 27, 2007, the RTC issued its second
assailed Order, finding merit in respondents arguments
and dismissing LLDAs Opposition. (For the LLDAs
failure to take any action, the RTC, approved the Notice of
Appeal filed by the OSG and directed the transmittal of the
records of this case to the CA.)
COURT OF APPEALS
o On June 18, 2009 the CA UPHELD the RTC
which gave more credence to the findings
contained in the Inter-Office Memorandum than
that of the ECD Memorandum and in granting
respondents application.
o respondent had adequately proven that the
subject properties form part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain. Petitioner
filed its MR which the CA, however, denied in its
Resolution dated October 5, 2009.
ISSUE: WON the subject properties in this case are
alienable or disposable land of the public domain
HELD:
o In this case, the records do not support the
findings made by the RTC and the CA that the
subject properties are part of the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain.
o Respondent bases his right to registration of title
on Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1529,otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, which provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
o The afore-quoted provision authorizes the
registration of title acquired in accordance with
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073, which reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
o Thus, under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529, a
petition may be granted upon compliance with the
following requisites: (a) that the property in
question is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; (b) that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation; and (c)
that such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
o It bears noting that in support of the respondents
claim that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable, respondent merely presented the
Conversion Subdivision Plan which was prepared
by Engr. Montallana with the annotation that the
subject properties were inside alienable and
disposable land area [P]roj. [N]o. 27-B as per LC
Map No. 2623 certified by the Bureau of Forestry
on January 3, 1968 and the Inter-Office
Memorandum from the LLDA. - Respondents
reliance on the said annotation and Inter-
Office Memorandum is clearly insufficient.
o Clearly, the pieces of evidence submitted by
respondent before the RTC in this case hardly
satisfy the aforementioned documentary
requirements. Given the lack of evidence that the
subject properties are alienable and disposable, it
becomes unnecessary for this Court to
resolve whether the Inter-Office Memorandum
should be given more credence over the ECD
Memorandum.
o WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 18,
2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90383, affirming the
Orders dated October 11, 2007 and November 27,
2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 153 in Land Registration Case No. N-
11573-TG, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
application for registration of title filed by
respondent Crisanto S. Raneses over two parcels
of land identified as Lot No. 3085-A, Csd-00-
001621 and Lot No. 3085-B, Csd-00-001621 both
located at Barangay Napindan, Taguig City, Metro
Manila, is DISMISSED.