5/27/2017 RepublicofthePhilippines

RepublicofthePhilippines

SupremeCourt
Manila

ENBANC

LOLITAS.CONCEPCION, G.R.No.153569

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA,C.J.,

CARPIO,

VELASCO,JR.,

LEONARDODECASTRO,

BRION,
versus
PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DELCASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA,JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA,

MINEXIMPORT SERENO,
CORPORATION/MINERAMA
CORPORATION,KENNETH REYES,and
MEYERS,SYLVIAP.MARIANO,
PERLASBERNABE,JJ.:
andVINAMARIANO,

Respondents.
Promulgated:

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January24,2012

xx

DECISION

BERSAMIN,J.:

The employer may validly dismiss for loss of trust and confidence an employee who
commits an act of fraud prejudicial to the interest of the employer. Neither a criminal
prosecution nor a conviction beyond reasonable doubt for the crime is a requisite for the
validityofthedismissal.Nonetheless,thedismissalforajustorlawfulcausemuststillbe
made upon compliance with the requirements of due process under the Labor Code
otherwise, the employer is liable to pay nominal damages as indemnity to the dismissed
employee.

Antecedents

Respondent Minex ImportExport Corporation (Minex) engaged in the retail of semi

preciousstones,sellingtheminkiosksorstallsinstalledinvariousshoppingcenterswithin
Metro Manila. It employed the petitioner initially as a salesgirl, rotating her assignment
1

amongnearlyallitsoutlets.ItmadeherasupervisorinJuly1997,butdidnotgrantherany
salary increase. On October 23, 1997, respondent Vina Mariano, an Assistant Manager of
Minex,assignedthepetitionertotheSMHarrisonPlazakioskwiththeinstructiontohold
thekeysofthekiosk.WorkingunderhersupervisionthereweresalesgirlsCristinaCalung
andLidaBaquilar.

OnNovember9,1997,aSunday,thepetitionerandhersalesgirlshadsalesofcrystal
itemstotalingP39,194.50.Atthecloseofbusinessthatday,theyconductedacashcountof
their sales proceeds, including those from the preceding Friday and Saturday, and
determined their total for the three days to be P50,912.00. The petitioner wrapped the
amountinaplasticbaganddepositeditinthedrawerofthelockedwoodencabinetofthe
kiosk.

Atabout9:30amofNovember10,1997,thepetitionerphonedVinaMarianotoreportthat

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Atabout9:30amofNovember10,1997,thepetitionerphonedVinaMarianotoreportthat
theP50,912.00wasmissing,explaininghowsheandhersalesgirlshadplacedthewrapped
amountatthebottomofthecabinetthenightbefore,andhowshehadfounduponreporting
toworkthatmorningthatthecontentsofthecabinetwereindisarrayandthemoneyalready
missing.

Later,whilethepetitionerwasgivingadetailedstatementonthethefttothesecurity
investigator of Harrison Plaza, Vina and Sylvia Mariano, her superiors, arrived with a
policemanwhoimmediatelyplacedthepetitionerunderarrestandbroughthertoPrecinct9
oftheMalatePoliceStation.There,thepoliceinvestigatedher.Shewasdetainedforaday,
from11:30amofNovember10,1997until11:30amofNovember11,1997,beingreleased
onlybecausetheinquestprosecutorinstructedso.

On November 12, 1997, the petitioner complained against the respondents for illegal
dismissalintheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment.

OnNovember14,1997,Minex,throughVina,filedacomplaintforqualifiedtheftagainst
thepetitionerintheOfficeoftheCityProsecutorinManila.

To the charge of qualified theft, the petitioner insisted on her innocence, reiterating
thatonNovember9,1997she,togetherwithCalungandBaquilar,hadfirstcountedthecash
beforeplacingitinaplasticbagthatshedepositedinsidethedrawerofthecabinetwiththe
knowledge of Calung and Baquilar. She explained that on that night Baquilar had left for
home ahead, leaving her and Calung to close the kiosk at around 8:00 pm that at exactly
8:01 pm she proceeded to SM Department Store in Harrison Plaza to wait for her friends
whomshehadpreviouslywalkedwithtotheLRTstationthatshenoticeduponarrivingat
thekioskthenextmorningthatthecabinetthattheyhadpositionedtoblocktheentranceof
thekioskhadbeenslightlymovedandthatshethendiscovereduponopeningthecabinet
thatitscontents,includingthecash,werealreadymissing.

Calung executed a sinumpaang salaysay, however, averring that she had left the
petitioneraloneinthekioskinthenightofNovember9,1997becausethelatterhadstillto
changeherclothesandthatthatwasthefirsttimethatthepetitionerhadeveraskedtobe
leftbehind,fortheyhadpreviouslyleftthekiosktogether.

VinadeclaredthatthepetitionerdidnotcalltheofficeofMinexforthepickupofthe

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VinadeclaredthatthepetitionerdidnotcalltheofficeofMinexforthepickupofthe
P39,194.50cashsalesonSunday,November9,1997,inviolationofthestandardoperating
procedure(SOP)requiringcashproceedsexceedingP10,000.00tobereportedforpickupif
theamountcouldnotbedepositedinthebank.

After the preliminary investigation, the Assistant Prosecutor rendered a resolution

dated February 4, 1998 finding probable cause for qualified theft and recommending the
filingofaninformationagainstthepetitioner. Thus,shewaschargedwithqualifiedtheftin
2

theRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)inManila,docketedasCriminalCaseNo.98165426.

ThepetitionerappealedbypetitionforreviewtotheDepartmentofJustice(DOJ),butthe
DOJSecretarydeniedherpetitionforreviewonJuly4,2001.
3

Astothepetitionerscomplaintforillegaldismissal,LaborArbiterJoseG.deVerarendered
hisdecisiondatedDecember15,1998,viz: 4

WHEREFORE,alltheforegoingconsidered,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavor
ofthecomplainantandagainsttherespondentsdeclaringthedismissalofthelatterfrom
work illegal and ordering her reinstatement to her former work position with full
backwagescountedfromNovember10,1997untilheractualreinstatementwithoutloss
ofseniorityorotheremployeesrightsandbenefits.

Respondentsarelikewiseorderedtopaycomplainanthermonetaryclaimsaboveas
wellasmoraldamagesofP50,000.00andexemplarydamagesofP20,000.00.

Lastly,respondentsareliabletopaytenpercent(10%)ofthetotalawardasandby
wayofpaymentofattorneysfees.

SOORDERED.

Onappealbytherespondents,theNationalLaborRelationsCommission(NLRC)reversed
the decision of the LaborArbiter on December 28, 2000, declaring that the petitioner had
notbeendismissed,buthadabandonedherjobafterbeingfoundtohavestolentheproceeds
of the sales and holding that even if she had been dismissed, her dismissal would be
justifiableforlossoftrustandconfidenceinthelightofthefindingofprobablecausebythe
DOJandtheCityProsecutorandthefilingoftheinformationforqualifiedtheftagainsther.
5

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TheNLRCdeletedtheawardsofbackwages,serviceincentiveleavepay,holidaypayand
13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees, opining that the
petitionerwouldbeentitledtoanawardofdamagesonlywhenthedismissalwasshownto
beeffectedinbadfaithorfraudorwasanactoppressivetolabor,orwasdoneinamanner
contrarytogoodmorals,goodcustoms,orpublicpolicy.
6

After the NLRC denied her motion for reconsideration on March 16, 2001, the
petitionerchallengedthereversalbytheNLRCintheCourtofAppeals(CA)oncertiorari,
claimingthattheNLRCtherebycommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtoexcess
ofjurisdictionforfindingthattherehadbeenlawfulcausetodismissherandinsistingthat
the NLRC relied on mere suspicions and surmises, disregarding not only her explanations
that,ifconsidered,wouldhavewarrantedajudgmentinherfavorbuteventhefindingsand
disquisitionsoftheLaborArbiter,whichwereinfullaccordwithpertinentcaselaw.

OnDecember20,2001, however, theCAsustainedtheNLRCmainlybecauseoftheDOJ

7

Secretarysfindingofprobablecauseforqualifiedtheft,holding:

WiththefindingofprobablecausenotonlybytheInvestigatingProsecutorbutby
theSecretaryofJusticenoless,itcannotbevalidlyclaimed,asthePetitionerdoes,inher
Petitionatbench,thatthereisnolawfulcauseforherdismissal.Thefelonyofqualified
theftinvolvesmoralturpitude.

Respondentcannotusesocialjusticetoshieldwrongdoing.Heoccupieda
position of trust and confidence. Petitioner relied on him to protect the
propertiesofthecompany.Respondentbetrayedthistrustwhenheorderedthe
subjectlamppoststobedeliveredtotheAdelfaHomeownersAssociation.The
offensehecommittedinvolvesmoralturpitude.Indeed,aCityProsecutorfound
probablecausetofileaninformationforqualifiedtheftagainsthim.(United
South Dockhandlers, Inc., versus NLRC, et al., 267 SCRA 401, at page 407,
supra)

Admittedly, there is no direct evidence that the Petitioner took the money from the
drawerinthecabinetintheKiosk.ButdirectevidencethatthePetitionertookthemoney
isnotrequiredforthePetitionertobelawfullydismissedforthelossofthemoneyofthe
Private Respondent corporation. If circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to
anchor a judgment of conviction in criminal cases under Section 4, Rule 133 of the
RevisedRulesofEvidence,thereisnocogentreasonwhycircumstantialevidenceisnot
sufficientonwhichtoanchorafactualbasisforthedismissalofthePetitionerforlossof
confidence.

INTHELIGHTOFALLTHEFOREGOING,thePetitionatbenchisdeniedduecourse
andisherebyDISMISSED.

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andisherebyDISMISSED.

SOORDERED.

OnMay13,2002,theCAdeniedthepetitionersmotionforreconsideration.
8

Issues

Inherappeal,thepetitionersubmitsthat:

THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINFINDINGTHATTHEREWASNOILLEGAL
DISMISSALINTHECASEATBAR,PARTICULARLYINFINDINGTHAT:

1.THEREWASJUSTCAUSEFORHERDISMISSAL,AND

2.RESPONDENT NEED NOT AFFORD THE PETITIONER DUE PROCESS

TOPETITIONER.

Ruling

Thepetitionlacksmerit.

Thedecisiveissueforresolutioniswhetherornotthepetitionerwasterminatedforajust
andvalidcause.

To dismiss an employee, the law requires the existence of a just and valid cause.
Article282oftheLaborCodeenumeratesthejustcausesforterminationbytheemployer:

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Article282oftheLaborCodeenumeratesthejustcausesforterminationbytheemployer:
(a)seriousmisconductorwillfuldisobediencebytheemployeeofthelawfulordersofhis
employer or the latters representative in connection with the employees work (b) gross
and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties (c) fraud or willful breach by the
employeeofthetrustreposedinhimbyhisemployerorhisdulyauthorizedrepresentative
(d)commissionofacrimeoroffensebytheemployeeagainstthepersonofhisemployeror
any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative and (e) other
causesanalogoustotheforegoing.

The NLRC held that the termination of the petitioner was due to loss of trust and
confidence.SustainingtheNLRC,theCAstated:

Withthefindingofprobablecausenotonlybytheinvestigatingprosecutorbutby
theSecretaryofJusticenoless,itcannotbevalidlyclaimed,asthePetitionerdoes,inher
Petitionatbench,thatthereisnolawfulcauseforherdismissalxxx.

xxx

Admittedly,thereisnodirectevidencethatthePetitionertookthemoneyfromthe
drawerinthecabinetintheKiosk.ButdirectevidencethatthePetitionertookthemoney
isnotrequiredforthePetitionertobelawfullydismissedforthelossofthemoneyofthe
Private Respondent corporation. If circumstantial evidence is sufficient on which to
anchor a judgment of conviction in criminal cases under Section 4, Rule 133 of the
RevisedRulesofEvidence,thereisnocogentreasonwhycircumstantialevidenceisnot
sufficientonwhichtoanchorafactualbasisforthedismissalofthePetitionerforlossof
9
confidence.

The petitioner still argues, however, that there was no evidence at all upon which
Minexcouldvalidlydismissherconsideringthatshehadnotyetbeenfoundguiltybeyond
reasonabledoubtofthecrimeofqualifiedtheft.

The petitioners argument is not novel. It has been raised and rejected many times
beforeonthebasisthatneitherconvictionbeyondreasonabledoubtforacrimeagainstthe
employer nor acquittal after criminal prosecution was indispensable. Nor was a formal
chargeincourtfortheactsprejudicialtotheinterestoftheemployeraprerequisitefora
validdismissal.

Inits1941rulinginNational Labor Union, Inc. v. Standard Vacuum Oil Company,

10

theCourtexpresslystatedthus:

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theCourtexpresslystatedthus:

xxx The conviction of an employee in a criminal case is not indispensable to

warrant his dismissal by his employer.If there is sufficient evidence to show that
the employeehasbeen guilty of a breach of trust, or that his employer hasample
reasontodistrusthim,itcannotjustlydenytotheemployertheauthoritytodismiss
such employee. All that is incumbent upon the Court of Industrial Relations (now
NationalLaborRelationsCommission)todetermineiswhethertheproposeddismissalis
forjustcausexxx.Itisnotnecessaryforsaidcourttofindthatanemployeehasbeen
guilty of a crime beyond reasonable doubt in order to authorize his dismissal.
(Emphasissupplied)

InPhilippineLongDistanceTelephoneCo.(BLTBCo.)vs.NLRC, theCourtheldthat 11

theacquittaloftheemployeefromthecriminalprosecutionforacrimecommittedagainst
theinterestoftheemployerdidnotautomaticallyeliminatelossofconfidenceasabasisfor
administrativeactionagainsttheemployeeandthatincaseswheretheactsofmisconduct
amounted to a crime, a dismissal might still be properly ordered notwithstanding that the
employeewasnotcriminallyprosecutedorwasacquittedafteracriminalprosecution.

In Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. NLRC, the Court explained further, as
12

follows:

Fraud or willful breach of trust reposed upon an employee by his employer is a

recognized cause for termination of employment and it is not necessary that the
employershouldawaittheemployeesfinalconvictioninthecriminalcaseinvolving
suchfraudorbreachoftrustbeforeitcanterminatetheemployeesservices.Infact,
eventhedroppingofthechargesoranacquittaloftheemployeetherefromdoesnot
preclude the dismissal of an employee for acts inimical to the interests of the
employer.

To our mind, the criminal charges initiated by the company against private
respondentsandthefindingafterpreliminaryinvestigationoftheirprimafacieguilt
oftheoffensechargedconstitutesubstantialevidencesufficienttowarrantafinding
bytheLaborTribunaloftheexistenceofajustcausefortheirterminationbasedon
loss of trust and confidence. The Labor Tribunal need not have gone further as to
require private respondents conviction of the crime charged, or inferred innocence on
their part from their release from detention, which was mainly due to their posting of
bail.(Emphasissupplied)

Indeed,theemployerisnotexpectedtobeasstrictandrigorousasajudgeinacriminaltrial
inweighingalltheprobabilitiesofguiltbeforeterminatingtheemployee.Unlikeacriminal
case,whichnecessitatesamoralcertaintyofguiltduetothelossofthepersonallibertyof
theaccusedbeingtheissue,acaseconcerninganemployeesuspectedofwrongdoingleads
onlytohisterminationasaconsequence.Thequantumofproofrequiredforconvictingan
accused is thus higher proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt than the quantum

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prescribed for dismissing an employee substantial evidence. In so stating, we are not

diminishingthevalueofemployment,butonlynotingthatthelossofemploymentoccasions
aconsequencelesserthanthelossofpersonalliberty,andmaythuscallforalowerdegree
ofproof.

Itisalsounfairtorequireanemployertofirstbemorallycertainoftheguiltofthe
employeebyawaitingaconvictionbeforeterminatinghimwhenthereisalreadysufficient
showingofthewrongdoing.Requiringthatcertaintymayprovetoolatefortheemployer,
whose loss may potentially be beyond repair. Here, no less than the DOJ Secretary found
probablecauseforqualifiedtheftagainstthepetitioner.Thatfindingwasenoughtojustify
herterminationforlossofconfidence.Torepeat,herresponsibilityasthesupervisortasked
to oversee the affairs of the kiosk, including seeing to the secure handling of the sales
proceeds,couldnotbeignoredordownplayed.Theemployerslossoftrustandconfidence
in her was directly rooted in the manner of how she, as the supervisor, had negligently
handledthelargeamountofsalesbysimplyleavingtheamountinsidethecabinetdrawerof
the kiosk despite being aware of the great risk of theft. At the very least, she could have
resorted to the SOP of first seeking guidance from the main office on how to secure the
amountifshecouldnotdepositinthebankduetothatdaybeingaSunday.

Yet,evenaswenowsaythattherespondentshadajustorvalidcauseforterminating
the petitioner, it becomes unavoidable to ask whether or not they complied with the
requirementsofdueprocesspriortotheterminationasembodiedinSection2(d)ofRuleI
oftheImplementingRulesofBookVIoftheLaborCode,viz:

Section2.Securityoftenure.xxx

xxx

(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due

processshallbesubstantiallyobserved:

ForterminationofemploymentbasedonjustcausesasdefinedinArticle282
oftheLaborCode:

(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or

grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity
withinwhichtoexplainhisside.

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(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with

theassistanceofcounselifhesodesiresisgivenopportunitytorespondtothe
charge,presenthisevidence,orrebuttheevidencepresentedagainsthim.

(iii)Awrittennoticeofterminationservedontheemployee,indicatingthat
upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
establishedtojustifyhistermination.(emphasissupplied)

xxx

We answer the query in the negative in the light of the circumstances of the petitioners
terminationsetforthinheraffidavit,towit:

xxx

14. While I was giving my statement to the security officer of the Mall,
respondentsVinaandSylviaMarianocamewithapolicemanandtheybroughtme
toPrecinct9,MalatePoliceStation.CristinaCalungalsoarrivedandtogetherwith
thesisterofVinaandSylvia,theyoperatedtheboothasifnothinghappened

15.I was detained at the police station from 11:15 a.m., November 10, up to
11:30a.m.,November11,1997

16.Aftermyreleasefromthepoliceprecinct,Icontactedbyphoneouroffice
and I was able to talk to respondent Sylvia Mariano. I told her that since I was
innocent of the charges they filed against me, I will report back to work. She
shouted at me on the phone and told me she no longer wanted to see my face. I
therefore decided to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents with the
NLRC,hencethispresentsuit(emphasissupplied)
13

xxx

The petitioner plainly demonstrated how quickly and summarily her dismissal was
carriedoutwithoutfirstrequiringhertoexplainanythinginherdefenseasdemandedunder
Section2(d)ofRuleIoftheImplementingRulesofBookVIoftheLaborCode.Instead,the
respondents forthwith had her arrested and investigated by the police authorities for
qualifiedtheft.This,wethink,wasadenialofherrighttodueprocessoflaw,consistingin
theopportunitytobeheardandtodefendherself. Infact,theirdecisiontodismissherwas
14

alreadyfinalevenbeforethepoliceauthoritycommencedaninvestigationofthetheft,the
finalitybeingconfirmedbynolessthanSylviaMarianoherselftellingthepetitionerduring
theirphoneconversationfollowingthelattersreleasefrompolicecustodyonNovember11,
1997thatshe(Sylvia)nolongerwantedtoseeher.

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1997thatshe(Sylvia)nolongerwantedtoseeher.

Thefactthatthepetitionerwastheonlypersonsuspectedofbeingresponsibleforthe
theft aggravated the denial of due process. When the respondents confronted her in the
morningofNovember10,1997forthefirsttimeafterthetheft,theybroughtalongapolice
officertoarrestandhalehertothepoliceprecincttomakeheranswerforthetheft.They
evidentlyalreadyconcludedthatshewastheculpritdespiteathoroughinvestigationofthe
theft still to be made. This, despite their obligation under Section 2 (d) of Rule I of the
Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code, firstly, to give her a reasonable
opportunity within which to explain (her) side secondly, to set a hearing or conference
duringwhichtheemployeeconcerned,withtheassistanceofcounselif(she)sodesiresis
given opportunity to respond to the charge, present (her) evidence, or rebut the evidence
presented against (her) and lastly, to serve her a written notice of termination xxx
indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify (her) termination. They wittingly shunted aside the tenets that mere
accusationdidnottaketheplaceofproofofwrongdoing,andthatasuspicionorbelief,no
matterhowsincere,didnotsubstituteforfactualfindingscarefullyestablishedthroughan
orderlyprocedure.
15

The fair and reasonable opportunity required to be given to the employee before
dismissalencompassednotonlythegivingtotheemployeeofnoticeofthecauseandthe
abilityoftheemployeetoexplain,butalsothechancetodefendagainsttheaccusation.This
wasourthrustinPhilippinePizza,Inc.v.Bungabong, whereweheldthattheemployeewas
16

notaffordeddueprocessdespitethedismissalbeinguponajustcause,consideringthathe
was not given a fair and reasonable opportunity to confront his accusers and to defend
himself against the charge of theft notwithstanding his having submitted his explanation
denying that he had stolen beer from the company dispenser. The termination letter was
issuedadaybeforetheemployeecouldgototheHRDOfficefortheinvestigation,which
madeitcleartohimthatthe decision to terminate was already final even before he could
submithissideandrefutethechargesagainsthim.Nothingthathecouldsayordoatthat
pointwouldhavechangedthedecisiontodismisshim.Suchomissiontogivetheemployee
thebenefitofahearingandinvestigationbeforehisterminationconstitutedaninfringement
ofhisconstitutionalrighttodueprocessbytheemployer.

The respondents would further excuse their failure to afford due process by averring that
even before the respondents could issue the petitioner any formal written memorandum
requiringhertoexplainthelossoftheP50,912.00salesproceedsxxxshewentposthasteto

theNLRCandfiledacaseforillegaldismissalinordertobeatthegunonrespondents.
17

However,wecannotexcusethenoncompliancewiththerequirementofdueprocessonthat
basis,consideringthatherresorttotheNLRCcameaftershehadbeentoldonNovember

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basis,consideringthatherresorttotheNLRCcameaftershehadbeentoldonNovember
11, 1997 by Sylvia that she (Sylvia) no longer wanted to see her. The definitive
termination closed the door to any explanation she would tender. Being afforded no
alternative,sheunderstandablyresortedtothecomplaintforillegaldismissal.

In view of the foregoing, we impose on the respondents the obligation to pay to the
petitioner an indemnity in the formofnominaldamagesofP30,000.00, conformably with
Agabonv.NLRC, wheretheCourtsaid:
18

Wherethedismissalisforajustcause,asintheinstantcase,thelackofstatutory
dueprocessshouldnotnullifythedismissal,orrenderitillegal,orineffectual.However,
theemployershouldindemnifytheemployeefortheviolationofhisstatutoryrights,as
ruled in Reta v. National Labor Relations Commission. The indemnity to be imposed
shouldbestiffertodiscouragetheabhorrentpracticeofdismissnow,paylater,which
we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the nature of
indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into
specialconsiderationthegravityofthedueprocessviolationoftheemployer.

UndertheCivilCode,nominaldamagesisadjudicatedinorderthatarightofthe
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized,andnotforthepurposeofindemnifyingtheplaintiffforanylosssufferedby
him.

AsenunciatedbythisCourtinViernesv.NationalLaborRelationsCommissions,
anemployerisliabletopayindemnityintheformofnominaldamagestoanemployee
whohasbeendismissedif,ineffectingsuchdismissal,theemployerfailstocomplywith
therequirementsofdueprocess.TheCourt,afterconsideringthecircumstancestherein,
fixed the indemnity at P2,590.50, which was equivalent to the employees one month
salary. This indemnity is intended not to penalize the employer but to vindicate or
recognize the employees right to statutory due process which was violated by the
employer.

The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private
respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The
amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into
accounttherelevantcircumstances.Consideringtheprevailingcircumstancesinthe
case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. We believe this form of
damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due
processrightsofemployees.Attheveryleast,itprovidesavindicationorrecognitionof
thisfundamentalrightgrantedtothelatterundertheLaborCodeanditsImplementing
Rules.(emphasisisintheoriginaltext)

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on December 20,

2001 by the Court ofAppeals, but ORDERS the respondents to pay to the petitioner an

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2001 by the Court ofAppeals, but ORDERS the respondents to pay to the petitioner an
indemnity in the form of nominal damages of P30,000.00 for noncompliance with the
requirementsofdueprocess.

Nopronouncementastocostsofsuit.

SOORDERED.

LUCASP.BERSAMIN

AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

RENATOC.CORONA

ChiefJustice

ANTONIOT.CARPIOPRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.

AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

(OnOfficialLeave)

TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROARTUROD.BRION

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TERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTROARTUROD.BRION

AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

DIOSDADOM.PERALTAMARIANOC.DELCASTILLO

AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

ROBERTOA.ABADMARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.

AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

JOSEPORTUGALPEREZJOSECATRALMENDOZA

AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENOBIENVENIDOL.REYES

AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

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ESTELAM.PERLASBERNABE

AssociateJustice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassigned
tothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourt.

RENATOC.CORONA

ChiefJustice

1ThepetitionerclaimedthatshestartedworkingforMinexonJuly27,1994butMinexstatedthatitemployedherin
1991.

2Rollo,pp.496497.

3Id.,pp.468472.

4Id.,pp.275286.

5Id.,pp.227246.

6Id.

7Id.,pp.113124pennedbyAssociateJusticeRomeoJ.Callejo,Sr.(lateraMemberoftheCourt,butalreadyretired),with
AssociateJusticeRemediosSalazarFernandoandAssociateJusticeJosefinaGuevarraSalongaconcurring.
8Id.,p.126.

9Id.,pp.123124.

1073Phil.279,282(1941).

11G.R.No.L63193,April30,1984,129SCRA163,172.

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11G.R.No.L63193,April30,1984,129SCRA163,172.

12G.R.No.L69875,October28,1988,166SCRA721,726727.

13Rollo,p.360.

14Agabonv.NLRC,G.R.No.158693,November17,2004,442SCRA573citingSantosv.SanMiguelCorporation,G.R.
No.149416,March14,2003,399SCRA172,182.

15Austriav.NLRC,G.R.No.123646,July14,1999,310SCRA293,303.

16G.R.No.154315,May9,2005,458SCRA288,299300.

17Rollo,p.531.

18Supra,note14atpp.616617.

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